CT  COURT  OF  APPE 


Appellate  Distr 


UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


SCHOOL  OF  LAW 
LIBRARY 


THE  LAW 


OF 


INSTRUCTIONS  TO  JURIES 


IN 


CIVIL  AND  CRIMINAL  ACTIONS 

AND 

APPROVED  FORMS 

WITH  REFERENCES   TO   ANALOGOUS   PRECEDENTS 

* 

BY 

CHARLES  HUGHES 

Of  the  Chicago  Bar 
EX-STATE'S   ATTORNEY 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE    BOBBS-MERRILL    COMPANY 
1905 


COPYRIGHT,   1905 

BY 
CHABLES  HUGHES. 


COPYRIGHT,   1905 

BY 
THE  BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 


T 


PREFACE 


The  author  of  this  volume  has  endeavored  to  present  to  the 
legal  profession  a  useful  and  handy  work  on  the  law  of  instruc- 
tions, with  its  subject  matter  and  the  forms  conveniently  arranged 
for  ready  reference. 

In  the  first  division  of  the  book  the  rules  and  principles  of 
the  common  law  and  under  statutory  enactment,  which  govern 
the  preparation  and  presentation,  and  the  giving  and  refusing 
of  instructions,  have  been  collected  and  classified. 

The  second  division  of  this  work,  it  will  be  observed,  presents 
a  body  of  forms  of  instructions  for  both  civil  and  criminal  cases, 
classified  and  arranged  in  chapters.  These  forms,  with  few  ex- 
ceptions, have  been  approved  by  the  courts  of  last  resort. 

No  attempt  has  been  made  to  encumber  the  pages  with  need- 
less duplications  of  "stock  instructions,"  inasmuch  as  such 
repetition  answers  no  useful  purpose  in  a  work  designed  for 
general  practice. 

The  law  is  presented  as  found  in  an  exhaustive  review  of  the 
law  reports.  The  subject  matter  has  been  arranged  in  that 
order  which  the  experience  of  an  active  practice  for  nearly 
a  quarter  of  a  century  has  suggested  as  rendering  the  material 
most  accessible. 

C.  H. 

Chicago,  Illinois, 

March  20,  1905. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  I. 
PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1.  Object    and    office    of    instruc-      26a. 

tions. 

2.  Propriety     of    giving     instruc-      26b. 

tions. 

3.  Court    instructing    of    its    own     27. 

motion.  28. 

4.  Written    instructions    required. 

5.  Oral    charge    taken    down    by      29. 

stenographer. 

6.  Party  must  request  written  in-      30. 

structions. 

7.  Specific    instructions    must    be      31. 

requested.  32. 

8.  Neither    party    requesting,    ef-      32a. 

feet.  33. 

9.  Must  request  in  criminal  cases.      34. 

10.  Presumed  in  writing — When. 

11.  Written  and  oral  charge.  35. 

12.  Waiving    written    instructions. 

13.  Exceptions  to  oral  charges.  36. 

14.  Time    of    requesting — Rule    of 

court.  37. 

15.  Time   of   requesting — Too   late. 

16.  Error   to    refuse    instruction —     38. 

When. 

17.  Court  may  give  time.  39. 

18.  Court's  power  to  make  rules.        40. 

19.  Too  many  instructions. 

20.  Repeating    generally     not     re-      41. 

quired. 

21.  Repeating   on   preponderance —      42. 

Reasonable  doubt. 

22.  Repeating     in     detail— Words,      43. 

phrases. 

23.  Repeating — As   to  defense.  44. 

24.  Repeating — As   to  witnesses. 

25.  Repeating — Request       substan-      45. 

tially  given  by  others. 

26.  Repeating — When,  general  and      46. 

special  charge. 

47. 


Repetition  when  evidence  is 
close. 

Court  may  refuse  all  instruc- 
tions. 

Defective   instructions   refused. 

Clauses  or  paragraphs  defect- 
ive. 

Incomplete  instruction  defect- 
ive. 

Modifying  defective  instruc- 
tions. 

Modifying    correct    instruction. 

In   language  of   request. 

Modifying    in    criminal    cases. 

Changing  to  conform  to  issues. 

Further  instructions  after  jury 
retires. 

Further  instructions  in  absence 
of  counsel. 

Further  instructions  in  absence 
of  defendant. 

Instructing  further,  on  other 
points. 

Recalling  jury  for  further  in- 
structions. 

Judge   calling  on   jury — Effect. 

Withdrawing  erroneous  instruc- 
tions— Amending. 

Rulings  and  remarks  not  in- 
structions. 

Directions  as  to  form  of  ver- 
dict. 

Signing  and  numbering  in- 
structions. 

Marking  "given,"  "refused" — 
Effect. 

Marking  for  plaintiff — Under- 
scoring. 

Court's  manner  of  charging 
jury. 

Trial  by  court — Jury  waived. 


VI 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  II. 


QUALITIES     AND     REQUISITES. 


Sec.  Sec. 

48.  Abstract    propositions    of    law.      64. 

49.  Cautionary    instructions — Gen- 

erally. 65. 

50.  Cautionary    instructions — 

Matters    not    raised    on    the      66. 
trial. 

51.  Cautionary    instructions —      67. 

Against    opinion     of     court. 

52.  Cautionary  instructions — Crim-      68. 

inal  cases. 

53.  Referring  jury  to  the  pleadings.      69. 

54.  Instructions    limited    to    some 

counts.  70. 

55.  In  criminal  cases — Referring  to 

indictment.  71. 

56.  Whole  law   in   one  instruction 

unnecessary.  72. 

57.  Instructions    as    to    damages — 

Measure   of.  73. 

58.  Instructions    as    to    damages — 

Personal  injury.  74. 

59.  Instructions    as    to    damages —      75. 

Exemplary  or  punitive.  76. 

60.  Misleading       instructions — Ob- 

scure,   though    correct.  77. 

61.  Misleading     instructions — Sus- 

ceptible   of    two    meanings.      78. 

62.  Misleading  instructions — If  ev- 

idence   is   conflicting.  79. 

63.  Misleading     instructions — Gen- 

erally erroneous. 


construed     as     a 


Misleading   instructions — Cured 
by   others. 

Misleading    instructions — Illus- 
trations. 

Argumentative      instructions — 
Generally. 

Argumentative      instructions — 
Not  necessarily  erroneous. 

Argumentative      instructions— 
Illustrations. 

Interrogative  instructions — Im- 
proper. 

Instructions 
whole. 

Instructions     of     both     parties 
construed   together. 

If  instructions  be  harmonious, 
defects  are  harmless. 

Grouping  instructions  into  on<e 
series. 

Words,   phrases  and  clauses. 

Definition   of   terms. 

Definition     of     terms — Contin- 
ued. 

Ungrammatical  and  awkwardly 
arranged. 

Misuse  of  names,  terms,  etc. — 
Effect. 

Words    omitted    from    instruc- 
tions. 


CHAPTER  III. 


BASED    ON    EVIDENCE    AND  PLEADINGS. 


Sec. 

80.  Supported  by   evidence. 

81.  Supported    by    evidence — Illus- 

trations. 

82.  Supported    by    evidence — Crim- 

inal cases. 

83.  Defense    unsupported    by    evi- 

dence. 

84.  Based  on  incompetent  evidence. 


Sec. 

85.  Speculative      evidence — Insuffi- 

cient. 

86.  Slight    evidence    will    support 

instructions. 

87.  Circumstantial    evidence    suffi- 

cient. 

88.  Evidence      sufficient — Criminal 

cases. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 


Vll 


CHAPTER  III— Continued. 


Sec.  Sec. 

89.  Evidence    sufficient  —  Larceny.      105. 

90.  Instructions  stating  issues  and 

contentions.  106. 

91.  Instructions   as    to    immaterial      107. 

issues. 

92.  Instructions   ignoring   issues.          108. 

93.  Issues     unsupported     by     evi- 

dence. 109. 

93a.  Issues  unsupported  by  evidence 

—Illustrations.  110. 

94.  Instructions    based    on    plead- 

ings. 111. 

95.  Based  on  evidence  rather  than      112. 

pleadings.  113. 

96.  Instructions     confined     to     de- 

fenses   alleged.  114. 

97.  Instructions    based    on    plead- 

ings— Illustrations.  115. 

98.  Instructions  limited  to  counts. 

99.  Issues  raised  outside  of  plead-      116. 

ings.  117. 

100.  Issues  abandoned. 

101.  Theory  of  party — Instructions.      117a. 

102.  Instructions  when  several  the- 

ories. 11.8. 

103.  Instructions  when  several  the-      119. 

ories — Illustrations. 

104.  Instructions    need    not    notice     . 

opposing  theory. 


Instructions  confining  jury  to 
evidence. 

Confining  jury  as  to  damages. 

Common  and  personal  knowl- 
edge. 

Confined  within  statute  of  lim- 
itations. 

Limiting  evidence  to  specific 
purpose. 

Limited  to  impeaching  wit- 
nesses. 

Limited   to   malice   or   intent. 

Limited  to  certain  defendants. 

Instructions  giving  promi- 
nence to  certain  facts. 

Singling  out  facts — When  not 
objectionable. 

Singling  out  facts — Criminal 
cases. 

Instructions     ignoring     facts. 

Instructions  with  dr  awing 
facts. 

Actions  for  personal  injury 
from  negligence. 

Instructions  ignoring  defense. 

Instructions  summing  up  the 
evidence. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


DIRECTING   VERDICT. 


Sec. 

120.  Peremptory     instructions     de- 

fined. 

121.  Nature   and    effect   of   motion 

for    peremptory. 

122.  Court  will  not  weigh  the  ev- 

idence on  the  motion. 

123.  Requesting     peremptory      in- 

structions— Waiving. 

124.  When  motion  for  peremptory 

presented. 

125.  Peremptory     instructions     in- 

stead of  nonsuit. 

126.  Peremptory     instructions     for 

defendant. 


Sec. 

127.  If    plaintiff's    evidence    varies 

from  his  pleadings. 

128.  If    evidence    shows     contract 

to  be  illegal. 

129.  Peremptory   improper  for  de- 

fendant. 

130.  If  the  evidence  tends  to  prove 

plaintiff's  case. 

131.  When     facts     are     doubtful — 

different  conclusions. 

.132.  Where  either  of  two  the- 
ories is  supported. 

133.  Evidence  strongly  against 
plaintiff. 


Vlll 


TABLE  OF   CONTEXTS. 


CHAPTER  IV— Continued. 


Sec. 

134.  The    foregoing    principles    il- 

lustrated. 

135.  Peremptory     instructions    for 

plaintiff. 

136.  Prima   facie   case   undisputed. 

137.  When    defendant    admits    all 

allegations. 

138.  When     defendant's     pleading 

is  insufficient. 

139.  When    verdict    cannot    stand. 

140.  Improper  for  plaintiff — If  any 

evidence  for  defendant. 

141.  If  the  evidence  is  conflicting. 

142.  If  part  only  of  plaintiff's  claim 

is  contested. 

143.  Where  amount  of  claim  is  dis- 

puted.. 


Sec. 

144.  Waiving  right  to  peremptory 

instruction. 

145.  Motion    by    both    parties — Ef- 

fect. 

146.  Waiving  right  to  submit  facts 

to   jury. 

147.  Motion  of  both  parties  denied 

—Effect. 

148.  Directing  jurors  to  agree. 

149.  Ruling  of  trial  court  review- 

able. 

150.  Criminal      Cases — Peremptory 

proper  for  defendant. 

151.  When  not  proper  for  defend- 

ant. 

152.  Peremptory  proper  for  prose- 

cution— When. 


CHAPTER  V. 


LAW     DETERMINED     BY     THE     COURT. 


Sec.  Sec. 

153.  Jury  bound  by  law  given  by      161. 

the  court. 

154.  Court  should  not  belittle  the      162. 

law. 

155.  Submitting     legal     questions      163. 

to  jury  improper. 

156.  Court    interprets    written    in-      164. 

struments. 

157.  Jury      interprets     oral     con-      165. 

tracts. 

158.  Wills    are    construed    by    the      166. 

courts. 

159.  Writing  as  a  fact  in  chain  of      167. 

evidence. 

160.  Some   phases    of   writing    ex-      168. 

plained   by   oral    evidence.          169. 


Validity  of  ordinances  and 
statutes  for  court. 

Foreign  law  a  fact  to  be 
proved. 

Illustrations  of  the  principles 
— Legal  questions. 

Illustrations  of  the  principles 
— Questions  of  fact. 

In  criminal  causes  court  de- 
termines law. 

Jury  made  judge  of  law  by 
statute. 

In  Massachusetts  and,  Con- 
necticut. 

In    Maryland    and    Georgia. 

In    Louisiana    and    Indiana. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


JURY   DETERMINE   THE   FACTS. 


Sec. 

170.     Court     prohibited     from 
pressing  opinion. 


ex- 


Sec. 
171. 


By    common    law    court    may 
express    opinion. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 
CHAPTER  VI— Continued. 


IX 


. 

172.  Submitting  facts  hypothetical- 

iy. 

173.  Instructing      that      "evidence 

tends  to  show." 

174.  Competency     of     evidence — Is 

there  any  evidence? 

175.  Intimating  opinion  is  improp- 

er. 

176.  Opinion   not  intimated — Illus- 

trations. 

177.  Opinion    intimated  —  Illustra- 

tions. 

178.  Opinion       not       intimated  — 

Criminal    cases. 

179.  Opinion    intimated — Criminal 

cases. 

180.  Instructions      as      to      dying 

declarations. 

181.  Inferences     and      conclusions 

are   for   the   jury. 


Sec. 

182.  Weight    of    evidence     is    for 

jury    to    determine. 

183.  Negligence — When   a  question 

of  fact,  when  of  law. 

184.  Instructions     improper — Illus- 

trations. 

185.  Remarks      and      conduct      of 

court    influencing    jury. 

186.  Instructions    urging    jury    to 

agree. 

187.  Instructions      attempting      to 

coerce   jury. 

188.  Instructions     not     attempting 

to    coerce    jury. 

189.  When  court  may  comment  on 

evidence    and    express    opin- 
ion. 
Illustrations   of   the   rule. 


190. 

191.     Instructions 
evidence. 


reviewing      the 


CHAPTER  VII. 


FACTS  ASSUMED. 


Sec. 

192.    Instructions     assuming    facts 
— Generally. 


Sec. 

196.     Instructions      may 
facts — When. 


assume 


193.     Instructions     assuming     facts      197.     Facts   admitted   by  both   par- 


— Illustrations. 

194.  Instructions      not      assuming 

facts — Illustrations. 

195.  Assuming  facts  when  evidence 

is   close  or   conflicting. 


ties. 

198.    Assuming    facts — In    criminal 
cases. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF. 


Sec.  Sec. 

199.  Instructions  that  burden  is  on  202.     Instructions     when     evidence 

affirmant.  is    equally   balanced. 

200.  Degree    of    proof    by    prepon-  203.     Preponderance  —  How  deter- 

derance.  mined — Witnesses. 

201.  Burden    and    degree   of   proof 

in  criminal  cases. 


X  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

AFFIRMATIVE   AND   NEGATIVE    EVIDENCE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

204.     Instructions  on  relative  weight      205.     Instructions  on-  relative  weight 
improper.  proper. 


CHAPTER  X. 


RELATING    TO    WITNESSES. 


Sec.  Sec. 

206.  Jury   judges   of  credibility   of      218. 
witnesses.  .219. 

207.  Instructions    violating    rule — 

Illustrations.  220. 

208.  Intimating     opinion     by     in- 
structions. 221. 

209.  Interested     witnesses     corrob- 
orated. 222. 

210.  Praising    or    denouncing    wit- 
nesses. 223. 

211.  Expert    and    non-expert    wit- 
nesses. 224. 

212.  Witnesses    contradicting   each 
other.  225. 

213.  Reconciling    conflicting    testi-      226. 
mony. 

214.  Interest  of  witness  to  be  con-      227. 

sidered. 

215.  Probability,  i  m  p  r  o  b  a  bility,      228. 
manner, 'conduct,   bias. 

216.  Instructing  that   jury   "must"      229. 
or    "should"    consider. 

217.  On   disregarding   evidence. 


On  swearing  wilfully  false. 
On  swearing  falsely — Improp- 
er. 

Impeachment    —    Instructions 
based    on    evidence. 
Believing  or  disbelieving  wit- 
ness. 

Failure   to   produce   witnesses 
or   evidence. 

Singling     out     witnesses-^Im- 
proper. 

On    detectives    and    informers 
as  witnesses. 
Relatives   as   witnesses. 
On     competency     and     testi- 
mony of  the  defendant. 
Defendant's       interest — Other 
considerations. 

On  defendant's  unsworn  state- 
ments. 

On  defendant's  failure  to  tes- 
tify. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


Sec. 


SPECIAL  FINDINGS. 


Sec. 


230.    Questions  for  special  findings      232.    General   instructions  unneces- 


are  proper . 

231.     Interrogatories    should    relate 
to  ultimate  facts. 


sary  and  improper. 

233.  Interrogatories        illustrating 

practice. 

234.  General   and   special   verdicts. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


XI 


CHAPTER  XII. 


ERRORS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

235.  Immaterial    error — Generally.       243. 

236.  Verdict   showing   error   disre- 

garded. 244. 

237.  The  principles  illustrated. 

238.  Imperfect  instruction  correct-      245. 

ed  by  others. 

239.  Error  cured  by  opponent's  in-      246. 

structions. 

240.  In  criminal  cases — Error  cur-      247. 

ed  by  others.  248. 

241.  Damages — Defective      instruc- 

tions cured.  249. 

242.  Instruction     assuming     fact — 

Harmless.  250. 


Verdict  clearly  right  and  jus- 
tice done. 

Erroneous  instructions  favor- 
able is  harmless. 

Principle  or  element  refused 
or  omitted. 

How  a  correct  instruction 
cures  a  defective  one. 

Instructions  contradictory. 

Instructions  differing  widely 
from  each  other. 

Instructions  self-contradicto- 
ry. 

Evidence  close,  conflicting  or 
doubtful. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


IN   CRIMINAL   CASES. 


Sec. 

HOMICIDE. 

251.  Degree  determined  by  jury. 

252.  Degree  —  Erroneous  instruc- 

tion— Harmless  error. 

253.  Instructions    when    degree    is 

doubtful. 

254.  "Cooling  time" — When  a  ques- 

tion of  law. 

255.  Self-defense     —     Instructions 

proper  and  improper. 

256.  Self    defense — Instructions    on 

belief  and  appearances. 

257.  Instructions  on  threats  of  de- 

ceased. 

258.  Provoking  difficulty— Freedom 

from  fault. 


Sec. 

259.  Defendant  first  in  the  wrong, 

but  abandons  the  conflict. 

260.  Duty  of  defendant  to  retreat. 

261.  Instructions   when   allegations 

and  proof  vary. 

262.  Instructions    when    arrest    is 

unlawful. 

263.  Killing    mere    trespasser — In- 

structions. 

264.  Motive — Instructions. 

265.  Mutual    combat — Instructions. 

BUKGLARY    AND    LARCENY. 

265a.    Possession  of  stolen  property 
— Instructions. 

266.  Presumption  as  to  possession 

is  one  of  fact. 


xii  TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
INCLUDED  CRIMINAL  OFFENSES. 

Sec.  Sec. 

267.  Included  offenses— I  n  s  t  r  u  c-      271.    No  evidence  of  manslaughter 

tions.  — Instructions. 

268.  If    no    evidence— Instructions      272.    Manslaughter   —    Instructions 

properly  refused.  proper. 

269.  Homicide — No  evidence  of  in-      273.     Involuntary       manslaughter — 

eluded   offenses.  Evidence  wanting. 

270.  Evidence   supporting  included      274.     Instructions  must  be  request- 

offense — Instructions.  ed. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

DEFINITION  OF  OFFENSES. 

Sec.  Sec. 

275.  Statutory     offenses  —  Instruc-      277.    Enumerating   elements   of  of- 

tions  defining.  fense. 

276.  Elements  omitted.  278.    Deadly  weapon  defined. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

CRIMINAL  INTENT. 

Sec.  '  Sep. 

279.  Intent  inferred  from  acts  and      282.    Malice     and      malice     afore- 

words.  thought. 

280.  On  evidence  disproving  intent.      283.    On   inferring  malice — Improp- 

281.  Drunkenness     disproving     in-  er. 

tent. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

STATUTORY   INSTRUCTIONS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

284.    Instructions  in  words  of  stat-     285.  Instructions  in  words  of  stat- 
ute, ute — Improper,  when. 

286.  Copying   extracts   from   cases. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 


xni 


ACCOMPLICE  AS  WITNESS. 


Sec. 

287.  Accomplice  defined. 

288.  Testimony      of     accomplice — 

How  considered. 

289.  Testimony      of     accomplice — 

When  corroboration  is  neces- 
sary. 

290.  Is  witness  an  accomplice — In- 

structions. 


Sec. 

291.  Instructions  assuming  witness 

is   an   accomplice. 

292.  Duty    to    instruct    on    accom- 

plices without  request. 

293.  Principal    and    accessory — In- 

structions. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


ON  REASONABLE  DOUBT. 


Sec. 

294.  Definition  and  elements. 

295.  Definition    and     elements — Il- 

lustrations. 

296.  Instructions     on      degree     of 

proof. 

297.  Instructions     on     probability, 

possibility. 

298.  Instruction     on     hunting     up 

doubt. 


Sec. 

299.  Doubt   arises  from   whole   ev- 

idence. 

300.  Modification  of  instruction  on 

reasonable  doubt. 

301.  Instruction   as   to   each   juror. 

302.  Instruction    that    jurors    "be- 

lieve as  men." 


CHAPTER     XX. 


ON  CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE. 


Sec. 

303.  When     evidence     is     circum- 

stantial. 

304.  When   evidence   is   direct  and 

circumstantial. 

305.  Instructing     on     comparative 

weight   improper. 

306.  Instructions    improper — Illus- 

trations. 

307.  Instructions    not    improper — 

Illustrations. 

308.  Drawing     inferences — Instruc- 

tions. 

309.  Instructing     to      convict     on 

proof    of    certain    facts — Ef- 
fect. 


Sec. 

310.  Circumstances    must    be    con- 

sistent with   guilt. 

311.  Essential   facts   need   only   be 

consistent. 

312.  Essential      facts— Degree      of 

proof. 

313.  Omission    of   words   from    in- 

struction— Effect. 

314.  Omission  of  words  not  fatal — 

Illustrations. 

315.  Illustrations  of  the  rules. 


XIV 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 


ON  CONFESSIONS— ADMISSIONS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

316.  Weight   of   confession    is   for  319.    Voluntary    concessions— C  a  u- 
the   jury.  tionary    instructions. 

317.  Weight     o  f     confession — Im-  320.     Confessions — Corroboration. 

proper  comment.  321.    Instructions     when     no     evi- 

318.  Voluntary     confessions — Com-  dence — When  evidence. 

petency. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


RELATING  TO  ALIBI. 


Sec. 
322. 

323. 
324. 

325. 


Alibi  as  a  defense — Burden  on 

defendant. 

Burden — Degree  of  proof. 
Burden  —  By    preponderance, 

when. 
Instructions  discrediting  alibi. 


Sec. 
326. 

327. 
328. 


Instructions  on   issue — Proper 

and  improper. 
Instructions  proper. 
Instructions  improper. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


INSANITY  AS  A  DEFENSE. 


Sec. 

329.  Insanity  defined. 

330.  Sanity     presumed  —  Insanity 

presumed    to   continue. 

331.  Insanity — Burden    on    defend- 

ant. 

332.  Insanity — Instructions      may 

define. 


Sec, 

333.  Insanity     feigned — Cautionary 

instructions. 

334.  Insanity  —  Instructions  prop- 

er— Illustrations. 

335.  Insanity  —  Instructions     im- 

proper— Illustrations. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 
PRESUMPTIONS  OF  INNOCENCE. 


Sec.  Sec. 

336.  Defendant  presumed  to  be  in-  338.    Presumption    of    innocence    is 

nocent.  evidence. 

337.  Instructions     refused — W  hen  339.    Presumption    is    evidence — 11- 

error   and   when   not.  lustrations. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXV. 


XV 


CHARACTER    OF    DEFENDANT. 


Sec. 

340.  Proof  of  good  character  prop- 

er. 

341.  Good    character    considered — 

Instructions. 

342.  Instructions     o  n     character — 

Refusal — When  proper. 

343.  Good   character   creating   rea- 

sonable     doubt — Instruction. 

344.  Good    character    unavailing — 

When. 


Sec. 

345.    Good     character — Instructions 

improper. 
(1.)     Considered    as    generating 

doubt. 

(2.)    Persons  not  likely  to  com- 
mit crime. 

(3.)  Sufficient  to  raise  doubt. 
(4.)  Invading  province  of  jury. 
(5.)  Ignoring  evidence  of. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 


OBJECTIONS    AND  EXCEPTIONS. 


Sec. 

346.  Method    and    manner    of   tak- 

ing exceptions. 

347.  Time  of  taking  exceptions. 

348.  Specific    exceptions    generally 

necessary. 

349.  General    exceptions    sufficient. 

350.  Exceptions   when    instructions 

are  numbered. 

351.  Exceptions — General,     specific 

and  joint. 

352.  Failure  to  except — Effect. 

353.  Assignment    of    error    on    in- 

structions  in  group. 

354.  Exceptions  limited  to  grounds 

stated. 

355.  Objections  and  exceptions  not 

waived. 


Sec. 

356.  Error  presented  on  motion  for 

new  trial. 

357.  Making    instructions    part    of 

record. 

358.  By   bill   of   exceptions. 

369.    All    instructions    must   be    in 
record. 

360.  Presumption  in  absence  of  all 

instructions. 

361.  When    considered    in    absence 

of  evidence. 

362.  Presumptions    in    absence    of 

evidence. 

363.  Errors    caused    at    one's    own 

request. 

364.  After  cause  is  remanded. 


XVI 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


FORMS. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 


WITNESSES   IN   CIVIL  OR  CRIMINAL  CASES. 


Sec. 

365.  Jury  judges  of  credibility  of 

witnesses. 

366.  Jury   weigh   the    testimony. 

367.  Impeachment   of   witnesses. 

368.  Witness     testifying     wilfully 

falsely. 


Sec. 

369.  Party  witness  in  his  own  be- 

half. 

370.  Husband   a   witness  for  wife. 

371.  Positive    and    negative    testi- 

mony. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 


WITNESSES,    IN   CRIMINAL   CASES  ONLY. 


and     conduct     of 


Sec. 

375.  Demeanor 

witness. 

376.  Accomplice  as  witness. 

374.    Defendant's  failure  to  testify.      377.    Opinions  of  expert  witnesses. 

378.    Detectives   as   witnesses. 


Sec. 

372.  Instructions  for  the   prosecu- 

tion. 

373.  Instructions    for    defense. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

CAUTIONARY    INSTRUCTIONS  IN  CIVIL  OR  CRIMINAL  CASES. 


Sec. 

379.  Jury  determine  the  facts. 

380.  Court  determines  the  law. 


Sec. 

381.    Court  construes  writings. 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXX. 


xvii 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF  IN  CIVIL  CASES  ONLY. 


Sec. 

382.  Instructions     for     plaintiff — 

General. 

383.  Instructions    for    defendant — 

General. 

384.  Burden  in  specific  cases. 


Sec. 

385.  Preponderance    of     evidence; 

number  of  witnesses. 

386.  Evidence   equally    balanced. 

387.  Preponderance    in    a    case    of 

negligence. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 


AGENCY. 


Sec. 

INSTRUCTIONS    FOR    PLAINTIFF. 

388.  Principal  bound  acts  of  agent. 

389.  Agent    borrowing    money    for 

employer. 

390.  Company    bound    by    acts    of 

paying  teller. 

391.  Agent     exceeding     authority; 

principal   bound. 


Sec. 

392.  Railroad    company    bound    by 

agents'    negligence. 

INSTRUCTIONS    FOR    DEFENDANT. 

393.  Agent  acting  without  scope  of 

authority. 

394.  Agent    selling   land    at    price 

agreed   upon. 

395.  Contract  on   sale  of  machine 

by  agent. 


CHAPTER   XXXII. 


Sec. 

INSTRUCTIONS    FOR    THE    PLAINTIFF. 

396.  Party  completing  contract  can 

recover. 

397.  Preventing  completion  of  con- 

tract. 

398.  Damages   for   failure   to    per- 

form contract. 

INSTRUCTIONS    FOR   THE    DEFENDANT. 

399.  Party  failing  to  complete  con- 

tract. 

400.  Damages  for  failure  to  deliv- 

er property  sold. 

401.  Joint   or   several    liability   on 

contract. 


CONTRACTS   IN  GENERAL. 
Sec. 


RESCINDING    CONTRACT. 

402.  Contract,    rescinding    without 

express   words. 

403.  Contract  void,  if  made  by  In- 

sane person. 


SETTLEMENT     OF     DISPUTED     CLAIMS. 

404.     Consideration    of     settlement, 
when  sufficient. 


CLAIMS    WITHOUT    CONSIDERATION. 

405.     Claim  based  upon  void  patent. 


XV111 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXXIII. 


CONTRACTS— SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


Sec. 
406. 
407. 
408. 
409. 
410. 
411. 


Sale    complete   on    delivery. 
Sale  of  goods  by  sample. 
Sale  on  warranty — Breach. 
Implied   warranty. 
Burden   of   proving  warranty. 
Damages   for   breach   of   war- 
ranty. 


Sec. 
412. 

413. 
414. 


Conditions  of  sale  complied 
with. 

Rescinding  sale    for    defects. 

Purchasing  with  intent  to  de- 
fraud. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 
CONTRACTS— PROMISSORY   NOTES. 


Sec. 

415.  Holder  of  note   may   recover, 

when. 

416.  Holder  of  note,  when  cannot 

recover. 


Sec. 

417.  Transferring  note  by  endorse- 

ment. 

418.  Interest  on  note — Usury. 

419.  Suit  to  recover  value  of  lost 

note. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 


CONTRACTS    RELATING   TO    INSURANCE. 


Sec. 


420. 
421. 
422. 
423. 
424. 


Sec. 


LIFE    INSURANCE. 


False   statements    in    applica-      425. 

tion  avoids  policy. 
The  right  to  avoid  policy  may      426. 

be  waived. 
Manner     or    mode     of   giving      427. 

notice  of  death. 
Formal  proof  of  death  unnec-      428. 

essary,  when. 
Assignment  of  policy  without      429. 

authority  of  beneficiary. 


FIRE    INSURANCE. 

Property  not  destroyed,  by  fire 
— No  recovery. 

Holder  of  policy  not  responsi- 
ble for  agent's  acts. 

Fraud  in  proof  of  loss  defeats 
recovery. 

Abandonment  of  insured  boat, 
when  justifiable. 

Boat  not  in  safe  and  sea- 
worthy condition  defeats  re- 
covery. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXXVI. 


xix 


CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS. 


Sec. 

ATTORNEY    AND    CLIENT. 

430.  Value    of   services    of   an    at- 

torney. 

431.  Party  not  liable  for  services  of 

attorney — When. 


ARBITRATION. 

432.  Submitting   disputes    to   arbi- 

tration. 

BAILMENTS. 

433.  Party  hiring  horso  liable  for 

injury. 

434.  Party   liable   for     money     in- 

trusted to  him. 

435.  Hotel  losing  property  of  guest 

entrusted  to  it. 

BANKING     TRANSACTIONS. 

436.  Company  holding  one  out  as 

agent. 

437.  Attempt  to  defraud  company. 

BROKERS. 

438.  Brokers    entitled    to    commis- 

sions— When. 

439.  What    is    essential    to    entitle 

one  to  commissions. 

440.  Failure   to  comply   with   con- 

tract prevents  recovery. 

441.  Notice  to  be  given  under  the 

contract. 

442.  Burden  of  proof  on  plaintiff — 

When. 

443.  Payment  of  interest  on  month- 

ly balances. 

BUILDING    CONTRACTS. 

444.  Contractor     complying      with 

contract  can   recover. 

445.  Parties     abandoning     original 

contract. 

DOMESTIC    RELATIONS. 

446.  Husband     entitled    to  income 

of  wife's  estate. 


•Sec. 

447.  Liability     of     wife    for     hus- 

band's debts. 

448.  Duty  of  both  parents  to  sup- 

port their  children. 

449.  Father      entitled      to     minor 

child's  services  and  earnings. 

450.  Minor  remaining  with  family 

after  full  age. 

451.  Minor  liable  on  his  contracts 

—When. 

452.  Head     of     family     or   house- 

holder. 

LANDLORD    AND    TENANT. 

453.  Liability   of   tenant  for  dam- 

ages to  premises. 

454.  New  leasing  of  premises  dis- 

charges guaranty. 

MARRIAGE    CONTRACTS. 

455.  What     essential      to     entitle 

plaintiff      to      recover      for 
breach. 

456.  Unchastity     of     woman     not 

breach  of  contract. 

457.  Assessing  damages  for  breach 

of  contract. 

PARTNERSHIP    CONTRACTS. 

458.  WThat    constitutes    a    partner- 

ship. 

459.  Each    partner    has    power  to 

bind  all  others. 

460.  Partners' — Not    general     part- 

ners. 

CHATTEL    MORTGAGES. 

461.  Mortgagee    may   take   posses- 

sion of  the  property. 

SUBSCRIPTION     CONTRACT. 

462.  Alteration       of      subscription 

contract. 

463.  Stock  illegally  issued,  invalid. 

SERVICES    RENDERED    TO    PUBLIC. 

464.  Liability  of  county  for  physi- 

cian's services. 


XX 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 
CHAPTER   XXXVI— Continued. 


Sec. 


465. 


Sec. 


STATUTE    OF    LIMITATIONS. 


Reviving   a   claim    barred    by 
statute  of  limitations. 

466.  The     promise     reviving     dis- 

charged claim  must  be  clear. 

467.  Payment  on  running  account 

— How   applied. 

468.  Deeds  executed  and  placed  in 

escrow. 


OTHER     MATTERS. 


469.  Rights     iri     contract    may  be 

waived. 

470.  Correspondence      constituting 

contract. 

471.  Written    contract    cannot    be 

varied  by  parol  proof. 

472.  Unsigned  contract  binding. 

473.  Execution     and     delivery     of 

deed. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 


DAMAGES. 


Sec. 

INJURY    TO    THE    PERSON. 

474.  Assaulting    another    in    self- 

defense. 

475.  Assaulting     another     not     in 

self-defense. 

476.  Assessing  damages  for   phys- 

ical  injury. 

477.  Damages   for  assault   to  rav- 

ish. 

478.  Injury  to  the  person  by  ani- 

mal. 

479.  Attack  by  vicious  dog. 

480.  Dangerous       obstruction       in 

highway. 

481.  Turnpike    unsafe  —  Liability. 

482.  Injury     to     bicycle-rider     on 

bridge. 

483.  Accidental   injury  to   traveler 

on   highway. 

MALPRACTICE     BY     PHYSICIAN. 

484.  Negligence  of  doctor — Liabil- 

ity. 

485.  Physician    required    to    exer- 

cise ordinary  care. 

486.  Patient     must     observe     doc- 

tor's directions. 

UNLAWFUL    SALE    OF    LIQUOR. 

487.  Liability     for     selling    liquor 

unlawfully. 


Sec. 

488.  Wife— Selling  to  her  husband 

—Liability. 

489.  Transfer    of    liquor    license — 

Effect. 

490.  Sales    made    since    commenc- 

ing  suit — Evidence. 

LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 

491.  Libel  and  slander  denned. 

492.  Malice  an  essential  element. 

493.  Slanderous     words     must     be 

proved. 

494.  Proof  of  part  of  words  suffi- 

cient. 

495.  Words  libelous  in  themselves. 

496.  Charging  another  with  crime. 

497.  Publication — Letter    so    held. 

498.  Measure  of  damages — Consid- 

erations. 

499.  Punitive       damages  —  When 

proper. 

500.  Matters  in  mitigation. 

501.  Good    faith — Probable    cause. 

502.  Degree    of   proof   in    justifica- 

tion. 

MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 

503.  Arrest  without  warrant. 

504.  Probable    cause    for    prosecu- 

tion. 

505.  Unlawful  arrest — Liability. 

506.  Advice   of    counsel    as    a    de- 

fense. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 
CHAPTER  XXX Vil— Continued. 


XXI 


Sec. 

507.  Essential  elements  of  a  cause. 

508.  Estimating  damages. 

DAMAGE    TO    PERSONAL    PROPERTY. 

509.  Unlawful   seizure  of  property 

—Liability. 


Sec. 

510.  Landlord       seizing       tenant's 

property. 

511.  Damages  for  seizure — How  es- 

timated. 

512.  Killing  stock— Liability. 

513.  Damages   from   diseased    cat- 

tle. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 


FRAUDULENT  TRANSACTIONS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

514.  The    law    presumes    men    act      522. 

fairly. 

515.  Fraudulent       representations      523. 

resulting  in  damages. 

516.  Fraudulent  representations  in      524. 

sale  of  stocks. 

517.  Contracts      made     to     defeat      525. 

creditors,  void. 

518.  Innocent    purchaser    for    fair      526. 

consideration,    protected. 

519.  Purchaser     knowing     fraudu-      527. 

lent  intent  of  seller. 

520.  Opinion  as  to  value  not  basis      528. 

of  fraud. 

521.  Sureties  induced  to  sign  bond 

by  fraud. 


Fraud  practiced  in  sale  of 
land  resulting  in  damages. 

Contracts  between  husband 
and  wife  scrutinized. 

Fraudulent  assignment  to 
compel  compromise. 

Fraud  in  reference  to  indebt- 
edness. 

Contract  made  under  compul- 
sion may  be  avoided. 

What  constitutes  duress  to 
avoid  contract. 

Gambling  contracts — On  mar- 
kets. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 


NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY. 


Sec. 

529.  Negligence,  carelessness,  care, 

defined. 

530.  Ordinary  care  defined. 

531.  Burden  of  proof  generally. 

532.  Degree  of  care  required  of  de- 

fendant. 

533.  Care  in  driving  vehicle. 

534.  Care  and  safety  of  machin-ery. 

535.  Care  of  injured  party  may  be 

inferred. 


Sec. 

536.  Infant — Degree     of     care     re- 

quired of. 

537.  Children — Care    of    defendant 

for  them. 

538.  Negligence    may    be    inferred, 

when. 

539.  Negligence    will    not   be   pre- 

sumed. 

540.  What  does  not  amount  to  neg- 

ligence. 


xxn 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 
CHAPTER   XXXiX— Continued. 


Sec.  Sec. 

541.  Negligence     the     proximate      544. 

cause  of  injury. 

542.  Instructions   submitting  ques-      545. 

tion  of  negligence. 

543.  Plaintiff's   contributory   negli-      546. 

gence. 

547. 


Plaintiff  and  defendant  both 
negligent. 

Injury  resulting  from  acci- 
dent or  natural  cause. 

Negligence  in  the  use  of  elec- 
tricity. 

Electric  wires  out  of  repair. 


CHAPTER  XL. 


NEGLIGENCE   OF   CAKK1EKS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

548.  Negligence     of     carrier     pre-      567. 

sumed — Burden. 

549.  High  degree  of  care  required       568. 

of  carriers. 

550.  Carrier    liable,     though     neg-      569. 

ligence   only   slight. 

551.  Care    of    passenger — Ordinary      570. 

care. 

552.  Carrier    bound   to   carry   sick      571. 

person. 

553.  Drunkenness  of  passenger  not      572. 

negligence. 

554.  Injury  to  postal  clerk  in  mail      573. 

train. 

555.  Injury  to  passenger  on  freight       574. 

train. 

556.  Ordering    or    putting    passen-      575. 

ger  off  moving  train. 

557.  Willful   ejection  of  passenger      576. 

from  train.  577. 

558.  Plaintiff   a    trespasser,    not   a 

passenger.  578. 

559.  Children    trespassers,    getting 

on  train.  579. 

560.  Passenger   assisting  in   push- 

ing car.  580. 

561.  Passenger  getting  off  moving 

train.  581. 

562.  Plaintiff  negligent   in  getting 

off  train.  582. 

563.  Passenger   injured   in   leaving 

train.  583. 

564.  Duty  of  carrier  to  stop  train.      584. 

565.  Passenger  entitled  to  reason- 

able time  to  get  off.  585. 

566.  Platform    unsafe  —  Passenger 

getting  off.  586. 


Injury  to  passenger  approach- 
ing or  getting  on  train. 

Passenger  negligent  in  get- 
ting on  train. 

Passenger  falling  off  plat- 
form— No  liability. 

Passenger  riding  upon  plat- 
form of  car. 

Assisting  passenger  —  By 
agent  of  carrier. 

Ticket  not  essential  to  be- 
come passenger. 

Mistake  of  conductor  in  tak- 
ing ticket. 

Putting  off  passenger  for 
want  of  ticket  or  fare. 

Putting  off  disorderly  passen- 
ger. 

Passenger    on    wrong   train. 

Passenger  may  rely  on  direc- 
tions of  carrier's  agents. 

Passenger  injured  while 
changing  cars. 

Liability  when  car  owned  by 
another. 

Liability  for  injury  from  boil- 
er explosion. 

Injury  from  accident — No  li- 
ability. 

Passenger  guilty  of  contribu- 
tory negligence. 

Burden  of  proof  generally. 

Carrier  not  insurer  of  passen- 
ger's safety. 

Carrier  liable  for  loss  or  in- 
jury of  baggage. 

Carrier's  liability  for  baggage 
limited. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 
CHAPTER   XL-— Continued. 


XX111 


Sec.  Sec. 

587.  Goods  lost  or  delayed  by  car-  589.     Liability  in  shipment  of  live 

rier — Liability.  stock. 

588.  Carrier    not    liable    for    dam-  590.    Freight  rates  of  carrier  under 

age  to  goods.  federal  statute. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 


NEGLIGENCE  OF  CITIES  AND  TOWNS. 


Sec. 

591.  Sidewalks — Duty     of    city     to 

keep  them  in  repair. 

592.  Sidewalk  presumed  reasonably 

safe. 

593.  Plaintiff  knowing  unsafe  con- 

dition. 

594.  Care     of    plaintiff    when    he 

knows   danger. 

595.  Notice    to    city    of    defect    or 

danger   necessary. 

596.  Notice  of  unsafe  condition  may 

be   inferred. 

597.  City  must  take  notice  of  un- 

safe condition. 

598.  Injury  from  accident;   no  lia- 

bility. 

599.  Elements    necessary    to   a    re- 

covery. 

600.  Drains,  left  in  dangerous  con- 

dition. 


Sec. 

601.  Bridges,   shall   be   kept  in   re- 

pair. 

602.  Grades  and  embankments  ob- 

structing natural  flow  of  wa- 
ter. 

603.  Ice,   sleet,   snow,   on   sidewalk 

— Liability. 

604.  Signs    overhanging    sidewalks 

— Damages. 

605.  Building   permits    to    obstruct 

streets. 

606.  Streets  and  highways,  shall  be 

safe  for  travel. 

607.  Considerations     in     assessing 

damages. 

608.  Matters  of  evidence — Incompe- 

tent evidence. 

609.  Claims  against  city,  mode  of 

allowing. 


CHAPTER  XLII. 


MASTER    AND    SERVANT. 


Sec. 


Sec. 


610.    Care  of  master  for  safety  of      614.     Injury    caused    by   fellow  ser- 


servant. 


vant. 


611.    Rules  for  conduct  of  servants.      615.     Injury  from  wilful  act  of  ser- 


612.  Master  must  advise  servant  of 

danger. 

613.  Not  a  fellow   servant — Liabil- 

ity. 


vant. 

616.  Burden    on   plaintiff   to    show 

negligence. 

617.  Servant  assumes  risks  incident 

to  employment. 


XXIV 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 
CHAPTER  XLI1— Continued. 


Sec. 
618. 

619. 
620. 
621. 
622. 


Servant  knowing  of  danger  is 
negligent. 

Servant  continuing  in  service 
after  knowledge  of  danger. 

Servant  continuing  after  mas- 
ter's promise  of  repair. 

Servant  does  not  assume  risks 
of  negligence. 

Servant  may  assume  appli- 
ances to  be  safe. 


Sec. 
623. 

624. 
625. 
626. 


Servant  injured  when  not  at 
his  place. 

Brakeman  injured  coupling 
cars — Liability. 

Question  of  negligence  sub- 
mitted to  jury. 

Servant  discharged  for  cause 
— No  liability. 


CHAPTER  XLIIL 


NEGLIGENCE  OF  RAILROADS. 


Sec. 

627.  Care  required  of  plaintiff. 

628.  Care   of   plaintiff — Exceptions. 

629.  The  same — Instructions  for  de- 

fendant. 

630.  Care  of  defendant  in  running 

trains. 

631.  Great  care  of  defendant,  when. 

632.  Contributory    negligence,    de- 

fined. 

633.  Burden  of  proof  as  to  contrib- 

utory   negligence. 

634.  Plaintiff's   contributory   negli- 

gence. 

635.  Contributory  negligence  of  de- 

ceased. 

636.  Both   parties   guilty   of   negli- 

gence. 

637.  The  plaintiff  not  a  trespasser. 

638.  Question    of    negligence    sub- 

mitted   to    jury. 

639.  Question  of  contributory  neg- 

ligence for  the  jury. 

640.  Speed    of    train,    running    at 

high   rate. 

641.  Failure    to   sound    whistle   or 

ring  bell. 

642.  Wrongfully  blowing  whistle. 

643.  Flagman    at    crossing — Neces- 

sity. 

644.  Railroad     company     violating 

ordinances. 


Sec. 

645.  Fire  escaping  from  engine  and 

burning   property. 

646.  Killing  stock  from  failure  to 

fence  track. 

647.  Essential    facts    necessary    to 

cover. 

648.  Accident — No  liability. 

CASES  OF  DEATH. 

649.  Measure   of   damages   to   next 

of  kin. 

650.  Damages    restricted    to   pecu- 

niary loss. 

651.  Damages — Instructions  for  de- 

fendant. 

MEASURE       OF       DAMAGES — GENERALLY. 

652.  Consider  permanency  of  inju- 

ry, health,  business,  expense, 
time. 

653.  Consider  age,  pain,  mental  an- 

guish. 

654.  Considerations    in    mitigation 

of  damages. 

CUSTOMS    AND    USAGES. 

655.  Customs,  usages,  rules  relating 

to    railroad. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XLIV. 


XXV 


Sec. 


REAL  ESTATE. 

Sec. 


ADVERSE    POSSESSION    OF    LAND. 


DAMAGE    BY    ANIMALS. 


656.  Possession  must  be  open  and      676.     Horses   and   cattle   destroying 

notorious.  crops,  liability. 

657.  Actual   possession   essential.          677.     Measure   of   damages   for    in- 

658.  Possession   shown   by   acts   of  jury  to  crops. 

ownership.  678.     Submitting  facts  to  jury,   on 

659.  Possession — Acts  of  ownership  injury   to  crops. 

not  sufficient. 

660.  Intention      must     accompany 

possession. 

661.  Notice  to  legal   owner  essen- 

tial. 

662.  Claiming    land     by    color    of 


DAMAGES  BT  NUISANCE.. 

679.    Residence,     health,     business, 


title. 

663.    Occupying  land  without  color 
of  title. 


BOUNDARY    LINES. 


injury   to. 

680.  Plaintiff  must  prove  nuisance, 

injury    insufficient. 

681.  Purchasing    property    in    fac- 

tory  locality,   no   liability. 

682.  Using    premises    as     a    pest- 

house. 


EMINENT   DOMAIN — CONDEMNATION. 


664.  Boundary  line  fixed  by  agree- 

ment. 

665.  Locating  the  boundary  line. 

666.  Meander    line    as    the    boun-  683.    Highest   and    best   use   in   es- 

dary.  timating   damages. 

667.  By  high-water  mark.                .  684.    Damages   based    upon    market 

668.  Accretions     along     rivers   —  value. 

Ownership.  685.     Considerations  in  determining 

value. 

DAMAGES  TO  REALTY.  686.    Value  of  lots  fronting  on  nav- 
igable streams. 

669.  Owner  permitting  property  to  687.    Benefits     shall     be     deducted 

be   damaged.  from   damages. 

670.  Excavations  on  adjacent  prem-  688.    Witnesses    magnifying   values 

ises— Liability.  Credibility. 
67?.    Damages     from      change     of 

grade.  TAXES  ON  REALTY. 

672.  Damages     from     piling     dirt, 

filth.  689.    Land  unlawfully  sold  for  taxes 

673.  Damages  in  destroying  fences.  —Certificates  void. 

674.  From    diverting    flow    of    sur-  690.    Listing  land  on  books  for  as- 

face  water.  sessment. 

675.  Dam  injured  by  bridge  wash-  691.    Forfeitures    are    odious    and 

ing  out  through  negligence.  must  be  strictly  proved. 


XXVI 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XLV. 


WILLS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

692.  Person  making  will  may  dis-      700. 

inherit  relatives. 

693.  Statutory  requirements  in  at-      701. 

testing  wills. 

694.  Mental  capacity  to  make  will,      T02. 

essential. 

695.  Sound  mind  and  memory  de-      703. 

fined. 

696.  Maker    of    will    presumed    of      704. 

sound  mind. 

697.  Insane  delusions,  lucid  inter-      705. 

vals. 

698.  Insanity    is    disease    of   brain      706. 

affecting   the   mind. 

699.  Mental  weakness  will  not  dis- 

qualify. 


Unsoundness  of  mind  of  per- 
manent nature. 

Considerations  in  determin- 
ing mental  state. 

Testimony  of  medical  experts 
on  mental  state. 

Considerations  in  determin- 
ing validity  of  will. 

"Undue  influence"  used  in 
procuring  will. 

Advising  person  to  make  will 
is  not  improper. 

Will  presumed  genuine — Not 
forgery. 


CHAPTER  XLVI. 


CAUTIONARY  INSTRUCTIONS  IN  CRIMINAL    CASES. 

Sec.  Sec. 

707.  Caution   as   to  duty  in   grave      710.  In   Indiana   the   jury   are   the 

cases.  judges. 

708.  Deliberations  of  jurymen  as  to      711.  In     Ohio     the     court      is    the 

verdict.  judge. 

712.  In     Iowa    the     court    is     the 

JUDGES   OF    CRIMINAL   LAW.  judge. 

709.  In    Illinois    the    jury    are    the 

judges. 


CHAPTER  XL VII. 

PRESUMPTION    OF    INNOCENCE. 

Sec.  sec. 

713.  Defendant   is   presumed   inno-      715.    Presumption  continues  through 

cent.  trial. 

714.  Presumption    of    innocence   a 

protection. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XLVIII. 


XXVll 


REASONABLE  DOUBT. 


Sec.  Sec. 

FOR  THE  PROSECUTION.  724.    Doubt,    though    a   probability 

of  guilt. 

716.  A     substantial,     well-founded      725.    Doubt    confined    to    essential 

doubt.  facts. 

717.  A   doubt  for   which  a  reason      726.    Doubt    arising   from    part    of 

can   be  given.  the   evidence.  , 

718.  Doubt  from  undue  influence. 

719.  Hunting  up  doubts  outside  of 

evidence.  PROBABILITIES. 

720.  Reasonable  certainty  only  re- 

721.  DoubTas   to    "each    link"    in     727'    A  .metre  Probability  not  sum- 

chain.  cient 

722.  Jurors  are  to  believe  as  men. 


FOR   THE   DEFENSE. 


ONE  OF   TWO   OR   MORE. 


723.     Every  reasonable  theory  must      728.     Uncertain    which    of    two    is 
be  excluded.  guilty. 


CHAPTER  XLIX. 


CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE. 


Sec. 

729.  Circumstantial      evidence      is 

competent. 

730.  Every    reasonable    hypothesis, 

must  be  excluded. 

731.  Circumstances  consistent  with 

each  other. 


Sec. 

733.  Each  link  in  chain  of  circum- 

stances. 

734.  Degree   of   proof   as   to   each 

essential  fact. 

735.  Subsidiary    facts    not    within 

the   rule. 


732.     Inconsistent    with    any    oth'er      736.     Circumstances     of     suspicion 


rational    theory. 


not    evidence. 


CHAPTER  L. 


CONFESSIONS,    ADMISSIONS,  FLIGHT. 


Sec. 


Sec. 


737.    Confessions   to   be   considered      739.    Admissions   of   deceased. 


like  other  evidence. 


740.    Flight   tends    to   prove   guilt. 


738.     Admissions   subject  to  imper-      741.    Flight  is  a  circumstance  only. 


fection. 


742.    Defendant  surrendering. 


XXV111 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  LI. 

ALIBI   AS   DEFENSE. 


Sec.  Sec. 

743.  Burden  of  proof.  745.     High    degree   of   proof   in    II- 

744.  Alibi     raising     a     reasonable  linois. 

doubt. 


CHAPTER  LII. 


INSANITY    AS    DEFENSE. 


Sec.  Sec. 

746.    Every    man    presumed   to   be     750.    Will  overcome  by  irresistible 


sane. 

747.  Insanity     presumed     to     con- 

tinue, when. 

748.  Ability    to    distinguish    right 

from  wrong. 

749.  No  will  power  to  refrain  from 

act. 


impulse. 

751.  Reasonable  doubt  of  sanity. 

752.  Higher    degree    of    proof   re- 

quired in  some  states. 

753.  Mere  weakness  of  mind. 

754.  Defense  of  insanity,  examined 

with   care. 

755.  Drunkenness   is   not   insanity. 


CHAPTER  LIII. 

GOOD   CHARACTER   OF   ACCUSED. 

Sec.  Sec. 

756.  Good   character  of   defendant      758.    Character   of   defendant   pre- 

a  circumstance.  sumed  good. 

757.  Good     character     may    create 

reasonable   doubt. 


CHAPTER  LIV. 


CRIMINAL    OFFENSES— CONSPIRACY. 


Sec. 

759.  Conspiracy  denned. 

760.  Formal     agreement     unneces- 

sary. 

761.  All    responsible   for   result   of 

design. 

762.  Conspiracy     to     commit    rob- 

bery. 


Sec.  • 

763.  Declarations    of   one   evidence 

against  all. 

764.  Principal    and    accessory,    dis- 

tinction   abrogated. 

765.  Aiding  and  abetting. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  LV. 


XXIX 


ASSAULTS. 


Sec. 

766.  Simple  assault  defined. 

767.  Assault   with   deadly   weapon. 

768.  Assault  with  intent  to  kill. 

769.  Assault  to  commit  rape. 


Sec. 

770.  Consent  to  sexual  intercourse. 

771.  Consent  a  question  of  fact. 

772.  Assault  to  rob. 


CHAPTER  LVI. 


HOMICIDE,   MURDER   AND    MANSLAUGHTER. 


Sec.  Sec. 

773.  Definition       and       illustrative      784. 

cases. 

774.  Murder  in  first  degree — Illus-      785. 

trations. 

775.  Murder  in  the  second  degree.      786. 

776.  Malice   defined— Essential   ele-      787. 

ment.  788. 

777.  Intent  presumed   from   means      789. 

used.  790. 

778.  Intent  in   administering  drug. 

779.  Drunkenness    reducing     grade      791. 

of   crime. 

780.  Time    of    deliberation,    length     792. 

immaterial. 

781.  Motive  proper,  but  not  indis-      793. 

pensable. 

782.  Killing  being  proved  presumed      794. 

murder. 

783.  Doubt  as  to  degree  of  homi- 

cide. 


Killing  while  lying  in  wait, 
murder. 

Killing  by  one  of  several 
burglars. 

Killing  person  not  intended. 

Officer  killing-  while  arresting. 

Killing  officer  while  arresting. 

Arresting  without  a  warrant. 

Degree  of  proof  to  warrant 
conviction. 

Wound  neglected  causing 
blood  poisoning. 

Mere  presence  of  accused  is 
not  aiding. 

Inquest  proceedings  not  evi- 
dence. 

Manslaughter  defined  and  il- 
lustrations. 


CHAPTER  LV1I. 


HOMICIDE— SELF-DEFENSE. 


Sec.  Sec. 

795.  Justifiable  homicide  defined —  801. 

Illustrations.  802. 

796.  Cases  illustrating  self-defense.  803. 

797.  Defendant  at  fault  in  provok- 

ing difficulty.  804. 

798.  Declining  further  struggle. 

799.  Bare  fear  no  justification.  805. 

800.  Mere  belief  of  danger  no  de-  806. 

fense.  807. 


Mere  previous  threats. 

Danger  need  not  be  real. 

Reasonable  doubt  of  appre- 
hension. 

Resisting  attack  of  several 
persons. 

Resisting  unlawful   arrest. 

Accidental  killing  no  offense. 

Character  of  deceased  proper 
matter. 


XXX 


TABLE    OF     CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  LVII1. 


BURGLARY  AND  LARCENY. 


Sec. 
808. 
809. 
810. 

811. 
812. 
813. 


Breaking-  defined. 

Intend,  how  shown. 

Burglary  and  larceny  at  same 

time. 
Aiding    and    abetting,    acting, 

together. 
Possession   of   property    taken 

by   burglary. 
Submitting  facts  to  the  jury. 


Sec. 

814.  Definition    and    essential    ele- 

ments. 

815.  Intent    an    essential   element. 

816.  Possession    of    stolen  proper- 

ty ,u  evidence. 

817.  Property  found  and  appropri- 

ated. 

818.  Taking  under  claim  of  right 

819.  Prosecution  confined  to  prop- 

erty  alleged. 


CHAPTER  LIX. 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    FALSE    PRETENSE. 


Sec.  Sec. 

820.  Embezzlement      defined— Ele-      827. 

ments. 

821.  Agent    collecting    on    commis-      828. 

sion. 

822.  Attorney  receiving  and  appro-      829. 

priating. 

823.  Debtor  and  creditor,  their  re-      830. 

lation.  831. 

824.  Intent   an    essential    element. 

825.  Intent,    knowledge    of    bank's      832. 

condition. 

826     Bank     receiving    deposits    by 
officers  or  others. 


President  borrowing  from  his 
bank,  evidence. 

Condition  of  bank,  value  of 
assets,  liabilities. 

Failure  of  bank  as  prima  fa- 
cie evidence. 

Definition  and  elements. 

Offense  committed  by  acts, 
symbols,  words. 

Defrauding  tax  collector — 
Essential  elements. 


Sec. 


CHAPTER  LX. 

OTHER  SPECIFIC  OFFENSES. 
Sec. 


ADULTERY. 


BASTARDY. 


833.  Occasional      acts      of      inter-      835.     Facts    to    be    determined    by 

course.  jury. 

834.  Common  law  marriage.  836.     Public  rumor  is  not  evidence. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 
CHAPTER    LX— Continued. 


XXXI 


Sec. 


Sec. 


CRUELTY    TO    ANIMALS. 


PERJURY. 


837.  Killing     stock     to     preserve 

crops. 

838.  Intentionally   overdriving 

horse. 

DISORDERLY    HOUSE. 

839.  What     constitutes     disorderly 

house. 


840.  Forgery  defined. 

841.  Alteration    of    instrument    is 

forgery. 

842.  Aiding   and    abetting   another. 

843.  Uttering  or  publishing  forged 

document. 

844.  Intent  to  defraud  essential. 

845.  Forging  a  deed — Venue. 


846.  Gaming  defined. 

847.  Betting  on  game  of  cards. 

848.  Betting  on  game  of  billiards. 

849.  Doing  forbidden  act  in  public 

place. 

CRIMINAL    LIBEL. 

850.  Motives   prompting   communi- 

cation. 


851.  Evidence   of   one  witness   not 

sufficient. 

PUBLIC    NUISANCE. 

852.  Offensive  smells  from  slaugh- 

terhouse. 

853.  Nuisance    must    affect    whole 

community. 

854.  Mill-dam  and  pond  producing 

offense. 

855.  Pond  producing  malaria. 

856.  Offense  caused  by  other  means. 

857.  Caused  by  others,  not  the  de- 

fendant. 

HIGHWAY    VIOLATIONS. 

858.  Public   roads — How    establish- 

ed. 

859.  Vacating    public    road — How. 

860.  Malicious        destruction        of 

bridge. 

SUNDAY    VIOLATIONS. 

861.  Operating  machinery  on  Sun- 

day. 


Sec. 


CHAPTER  LXI. 

MISCELLANEOUS    INSTRUCTIONS. 
Sec. 


CONTRACTS. 


CORPORATIONS. 


862.     Extending    time    of    payment,      864.    Proving  existence  of  corpora- 
evidence,  tion  by  user. 


CONVERTING    PROPERTY.  CUSTOMS. 

863.    Damages   for   property   appro-      865.    Customs    and    rules    of   board 
priated.  of   trade. 


XXXii  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  LXI— Continued. 
Sec.  Sec. 

EJECTMENT.  GUARDIAN. 

866.  Plaintiff     must     recover     on      871.    Estimating     value     of     guar- 

strength  of  his  own  title.  dian's  services. 

HANDWRITING,    PROVING. 
EVIDENCE. 

_          .  872.    Knowledge    from    seeing    per- 

867.  Copy,  instead  of  original,  used  son  wri°e. 

as  evidence.  873     comparison  of  signatures  im- 

proper. 

VERDICT. 

HOMESTEAD. 

868.  Separate  verdict  where  several     874-    Abandonment    of    homestead. 

defendants. 

SEDUCTION. 

ESTOPPEL.  875.    Exemplary     damages    proper. 

876.  Damages     for     alienation     of 

869.  Disclaiming  interest   in  prop-  wife's  affections. 

erty. 

SELLING    LIQUORS, 

877.  Residence       district,       selling 

liquor  in. 

870.  Notice    of    fence    viewers    to 

parties   interested. 

878.  Damages  for  trespass. 


TABLE  OF  OASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Abbitt  v.  Lake  Erie,  &c.  R.  Co. 

150  Ind.  498    119 

Abbott   v.   City   of   Mobile,    119 

Ala.  595  358 

Abend  v.   Terre  Haute  &   I.   R. 

Co.   Ill   111.   202 126 

Abernathy  v.  Southern  R.  I.  P. 
Co.    (Tex.    Cv.    App.)     62 

S.   W.    786    94 

Abilene  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Bris- 

coe,  27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  157  7 
Abram  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  44.  297 
Acers  v.  U.  S.  164  U.  S.  388 

75,   278 

Achey  v.  S.  64  Ind.  59 279 

Acker  v.  S.  52  N.  J.  L.  259.  ...    299 

Ackerson  v.  P.  124  111.  571 322 

Acme  Brewing  Co.  v.  Central  R. 

&  B.  Co.   115  Ga.  494...    175 

Adams  v.  P.  47  111.  379 258 

v.  P.  109  111.  451 52 

v.  P.  179  111.  637 250 

v.  Smith,  58  111.  419. ..19,  192 

v.  S.  115  Ala.  90  297 

v.  S.  133  Ala.  166.63,  178,  7"3 

v.  S.  135  Ind.  571 302 

V.  S.  25  Ohio  St.  584 351 

v.  S.  29  Ohio  St.  412 

61,  153,  165,  250 

v.  S.  38  Ohio  St.  369 269 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  470.  303 
v.  Stringer,  78  Ind.  181 

525,  526 
Addington  v.  U.  S.  165  U.  S. 

184 256 

Aden  v.  Road  Dist.  &c.   197  HI. 

220 347 

Adkins  v.   S.   41    Tex.   Cr.   App. 

577 275 

Adler  v.  Robert  Portner  Brewing 

Co.  65  Md.  28..  .    408 


Advance   Thresher   Co.   v.   Esteb 

41  Ore.  469    361 

Aerheart   v.   St.   Louis   &   S.   R. 

Co.   90   Fed.   907 35,    189 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reed,  33  Ohio 

St.  283 1,  61,  63,   80 

v.  Sanford,  200  111.   126...      91 

v.  Ward,   140  U.  S.  76 211 

Agee  v.  S.  113  Ala.  52 276 

Agne  v.  Seitsinger,  96  Iowa,  181 

129 
Agnew    v.   Farmers'   M.   P.   Fire 

Ins.  Co.  95  Wis.  445 23 

Aguilan  v.  Ter.   8  N.  Mex.  496 

269,   270 
Aiken    v.    Com.    24    Ky.    L.    R. 

523 11,  269,  270,   273 

Aikin  v.  Weckerly,  19  Mich.  482         1 
Aitkens    v.    Rawlings,    52    Neb. 

539  350 

Akridge  v.  Noble,  114  Ga.  949.    168 
Alabama,   &c.   R.    Co.   v.   Davis, 

119  Ala.  572   81 

v.  Guilford,  -114  Ga.   621..    360 

v.  Hill,  93  Ala.  514 211 

v.  Hoyne,  24  So.  907, 93 

v.Marcus,  115  Ala.  389...      81 
v.  Slaton,   120   Ala.   259...      27 
v.  Thompson    (Ala.)    32   So. 
672 


Alberger  v.  White,  117  Mo.  347 


113 

176 

Albert  v.  Besel,  88  Mo.  150 153 

Albertz  v.  U.  S.  162  U.  S.  499.  115 

Albin  v.  S.  63  Ind.  598... 325,  745 
Albion  Milling  Co.  v.  First  Nat. 

Bank,  64  Neb.  116 353 

Albrecht  v.  Walker,  73-111.  73..  80 

Albright  v.  Brown,  23  Neb.  141 

365,   406 
Albritton  v.  S.  94  Ala.  76 

323,  325,   327 


XX  XIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Albritton  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

26   S.   W.    398 304 

Alcorn  v.  Bass,  17  Ind.  App.  500.   493 
Aldous    v.    Olverson     (S.    Dak.) 

95   N.  W.   917 80 

Alexander   v.   Bank   of   Lebenon 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   47  S.  W. 

840 191 

v.  Cunningham,  111  111.  511 

120,    126 
v.  Northwestern    C.   U.     57 

Ind.  466 394 

v.  Pennsylvania  Co.  48  Ohio 

St.  623 162 

v.  P.  96  111.   102 201 

v.  Staley,  110  Iowa,  607..  94 
v.  S.  114  Ga.  266.... 227,  228 
v.  S.  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  395 

304 
v.  Town  of  Mt.  Sterling,  7 1 

111.    369    597 

Alexandria  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hern- 
don,  87  Va.   197.... -563,   566 

Aliunde  Consul  Min.  Co.  v.  Ar- 
nold (Colo.  App.)   67  Pac. 

28 195 

Allen  v.  Frost    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

71   S.  W.   767 119 

v.  Fuller,  182  Mass.  202..  80 
v.  Hamilton,  109  Ala.  634.  48 

v.  Kirk,   81    Iowa,   658 321 

v.  P.    77    HI.    484 25 

v.  S.   60  Ala.    19 299 

v.  S.  87  Ala.  107 227 

v.  S.  70  Ark.  337 

.     180,  744,  782 

v.  S.    Ill    Mich.    80 294 

v.  S.   10  Ohio  St.  288 288 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   66  S. 

W.  671   93 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   70  S. 

W.  85 274 

v.  U.  S.  157  U.  S.  675....  255 
v.  U.  S.  164  U.  S.  492 

178,  188,  277,  337 
Allend  v.  Spokane  Falls,  &c.  R. 

Co.   21    Wash.    334 351 

Allender  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

43  Iowa,  280  ..549,  567,  571 
Allis  v.  U.  S.  155  U.  S.  117 

38,  48,   189,   191 
Allison  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  42 

Iowa,   282 545 

v.  U.  S.   160  U.  S.   203 

257,  261 


Almond  v.  Gairdner,  76  Ga.  701 


523 


Alsing  Co.  v.  New  Eng.  I.  &  S. 

Co.  73  N.  Y.  S.  347 239 

Alton  Pav.  B.  &  Fire  B.  Co.  v. 

Hudson,  176  111.  270... 20,  48 
Altschuler  v.  Coburn,  38  Neb. 

881  200 

Amble  v.  Whipple,  139  111.  322.  126 
American  Bible  Soc.  v.  Price, 

115  111.  623 

27,  66,  692,  694,  697,  699 
American  C.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heiser- 

man,  67  Fed.  947 144 

American  C.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Noble, 

98  Mich.  67  118 

American  Cotton  Co.  y.  Beasley, 

116  Fed.  256    .  .  ." 358 

v.  Smith     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

69    S.   W.   443 75 

v.  Smith,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

425 8 

American  D.  T.  C.  Co.  v.  Walker, 

72  Md.   457    433 

American  Ex.  Co.  v.  Hawk,   51 

Ohio  St.  572    587 

v.  Parsons,   44   111.   314 419 

American  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Land- 
fare,  56  Neb.  482...  348,  363 

American  Harrow  Co.  v.  Dolvin 

(Ga.)   45  S.  E.  983 84 

American   Ins.   Co.  v.  Crawford, 

89  111.  62   192,  250 

American  M.  U.  Ex.  Co.  v.  Milk, 

73  111.   224    102,  587 

American  Oak  Ex.  Co.  v.  Ryan, 

104  Ala.  267    117 

American  Strawboard  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, &c.  R.  Co.   177  111. 

513 80,'  133,  247 

American  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Kersh, 

27  Tex.  Cv.  App.   127 

6,  80,  191,  220 
Ames  v.  Cannon  River  Mfg.  Co. 

27    Minn.    245    171 

Ames   &   F.   Co.   v.   Strachurski, 

145  111.  192 120,  133 

Amis  v.  Cameron.  55  Ga.  449..  203 
Ammerman  v.  Teeter,  49  111. 

402 214 

Amos  v.  Buck,  75  Iowa,  654.  .  .  432 
Amsden  v.  Atwcod,  69  Vt.  527.  27 
Anacostia  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Klein, 

8  App.  Cas.  (D.  C.)  75...  26 
Anders  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.  62  Neb. 

585 126 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


XXXV 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Anderson  v.  Avis,  62  Fed.  227 

65, 

v.  Baird,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  444 
94, 

v.  City  of  Bath,  42  Me.  346 
45, 

v.  Daley  Mining  Co.  16  Utah 
28 

v.  McCormick,  129  111.  308. 

v.  McDonald,  31  Wash.  274 

v.  Nonvill,  10  111.  App.  240 

v.  Oskamp    (Ind.   App.)    35 

N.  E.  207  

v.  S.  104  Ind.  472 

169,  372,  710,  741, 

v.  S.  147   Ind.  451 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  546 

v.  S.    117   Ga.   255 

v.  Timberlake,  114  Ala.  377 

65 

v.  U.  S.   18  U.  S.  689.....' 
Andreas  v.  Ketcham,  77  111.  377 

80, 

Andrews  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  Co.  86  Iowa,  681 

549, 

v.  P.  60  111.  354 170, 

v.  Postal    Tel.    Co.    119    N. 

Car.   403    

v.  S.   21   Fla.   595 

v.  S.   134  Ala.  47 

v.  Toledo,    A.    A.    &   N.    M. 

R.  Co.  8  Ohio  C.  D.  584. 

Andrysick    v.     Stakowski,     159 

Ind.  428 

Aneals  v.  P.   134  111.  415 

45,  340,  343, 
Angier  v.  Western  Ass.  Co.  10  S. 

Dak.   82 

Anglo-American  Provision  Co.  v. 

Prestiss,    157    111.   506... 

Anniston  L.  •&  C.  Co.  v.  Lewis, 

107    Ala.    538    

Anson  v  P.   148  111.  494,   842. 

Anthony    v.    Wheeler,    130    111. 

128 

Anthony  Ittner  Brick  Co.  v. 

Ashby,  198  111.  562 

Antietam.  &c.  Co.  v.  Chronicle 

Pub.  Co.  15  N.  Car.  147.. 
Appeal  of  Sturdevant,  71  Conn. 

392 


171 

199 
245 

242 
136 

191 
102 
102 

771 

777 

326 
220 

117 
251 

185 

641 
175 

351 
321 
301 

81 
358 
757 
146 
163 

116 
25 

135 

48 

351 

191 


Appeal  of  Turner,  72  Conn.  305 


351 


Apple    v.    Board,    &c.    127    Ind. 

555 601 

Arabak  v.  Village  of  Dodge,  62 

Neb.  591 136 

Arbuckle  v.  S.  80  Miss.  15 238 

Archer  v.  U.  S.  9  Okla.  569 80 

Archibald  v.  S.   122  Ind.   122..    357 
Argabright  v.  S.  49  Neb.  760 

113,  219,  223 
Arismendis  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

54  S.  W.  599    80 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   60  S. 

W.  47 326 

v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  374 

303,  312 
Armour  v.  Brazeau,  191  111.  124 

1,  387 
Armstrong  v.  Penn,  105  Ga.  229 

199, 305 

v.  P.  38  111.  513    279 

v.  S.   30  Fla.   170    331 

v.  S.  83  Ala.  49 203 

Arnett   v.   Huggins    (Colo.)     70 

Pac.    765    247 

Arnold  v.  Lane,  7 1  Conn.  6 1 ...     14 
v.  Pucher,  83  111.  App.  182.    223 

v.  S.  5  Wyo.  439 288,  290 

v.  S.   (Ark.)    74  S.  W.  513.        4 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   40  S. 

W.  591 7 

Arthur  v.  City  of  Charleston,  5 1 
Arzman  v.  S.   123   Ind.   361 

281,  336,  715,  754,  779 

W.  Va.   132    25 

Ash  v.  Beck  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  68 

S.  W.   53    236 

Ashborne    v.    Town    of    W.    69 

Conn.  217 200 

Ashcraft  v.  Com.  24  Ky.  L.  R. 

488 110 

Asher  v.  Beckner,  19  Ky.  521..    118 
Ashley  Wire  Co.  v.  Mercier,  163 

111.  487 25 

Ashlock  v.  Linder,  50  111.  169..    308 
Ashworth  v.  East  Tenn.  V.  &  G. 

R.  Co.  94  Ga.  715 80 

Aspy  v.  Botkins,  160  Ind.  170 

215,  238 

Astley  v.  Capron,  89  Ind.  175..   452 
Atchison,   &c.  R.   Co.  v.   Ayers, 

56  Kas.   181    645 

v.  Calvert,  52  Kas.  547 73 

v.  Cuniffe    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

57  S.  W.  692    236 


XXXVI 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Atchison,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Feehan, 

149    111.    202 25,    206 

v.     Franklin,  23   Kas.   74..      14 

v.  Wells,  56  Kas.   222 81 

Atkins  v.  Field,  89  Me.  281 ....    348 
Atkinson    v.    Dailey,    107    Ind. 

117 '70 

v.  Catcher,  23  Ark.  101 84 

v.  Lester,  2  111.    (1    Scam.) 

409 48 

v.  Reed  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)    49 

S.  W.  260 200 

Atlanta,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hardage, 

93  Ga.  457    101 

v.  Jones,  116  Ga.  369 113 

Atlantic,    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Iron- 
monger, 95  Va.  638 636 

Atlas   Nat.   Bank   v.   Hohn,    71 

Fed.  489 94 

Augusta  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Vertrees,  4 

Lea  (Tenn.)    75    308 

Austill    v.     Heironmymus,     117 

Ala.   620  116 

Austin  v.  French,  36  Mich.  199.    163 
Austin,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 

79  Tex.  428    674 

v.  Flannagan    (Tex.   Cv. 
App.)    40   S.  W.   1043...      94 

v.  Grothe,  88  Tex.  262 244 

S.  W.   1043    94 

Avery  v.  S.  124  Ala.  20 295 

Avery  &  Son  v.  Meek,   16  Ky. 

L.  R.   384    192 

Ayer   v.   City    of   Chicago,    111 

111.  406 120,  126 

Ayers  v.  Metcalf,  39  111.  307...    117 

v.  S.  88  Ind.  275   376 

Ayres  v.  Blevins,   28   Ind.  App. 

101 346 

v.  Pittsburgh,    C.    C.    &    St. 
L.    R.    Co.    201    Pa.    St. 

124 117 

Axthelm  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

R.  Co.   (Neb.)    353 

B 

Bachmeyer  v.  Mutual  Life  Asso. 

87    Wis.    325 113 

Bachtelheimer  v.  S.  54  Ind.  134 

778 
Bacon  v.   Bacon,   76  Miss.  458 

20,  44 
Badger    v.   Batavia   Paper   Mfg. 

Co.   70   111.    302    31 

Bailey    v.    Campbell,    2    111.    (1 

Scam.)   110 284,  363 


Bailey    v.    Carnduff,     14    Colo. 

App.    169    6 

v.  McCance   (Va.)    32  S.  E. 

43 194 

v.  Mill    Creek   Coal   Co.    20 

Pa.  Super.  Ct.   186..  119,   348 

v.  S.   116  Ala.  437    150 

v.  S.   133  Ala.   155    295 

v.  S.  52  Ind.  466   817 

v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cv.  App.  289.    318 
v.  Trustees,  200  Pa.  St.  406 

239 
Bailus  v.  S.  16  Ohio  C.  C.  227.   280 

Baker  v.  Ashe,  80  Tex.  356 247 

v.  Baker,  202  111.  595 70 

v.  Borrelli,   136  Cal.    160..    107 

v.  Com.  90  Va.   820 336 

v.  Irish,   172  Pa.  St.  528..    133 
v.  Johnson,   2   Marv.    (Del.) 

219 126,  127 

v.  Kansas  City,  &c.  R.  Co. 

147  Mo.  140   176 

v.  S.  17  Fla.  410   43 

v.  S.  17  Ga.  452 71 

v.  S.  Ill  Ga.  141   273 

v.  S.  31  Ohio  St.  314 150 

v.  Summers,   201    111.   52...      53 
v.  Youngs,  44  111.  44.. 494,  499 
Baldez  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  35 

S.   W.    664    312 

Baldwin  v.   Bank  of   Massillon, 

1  Ohio  St.  141    243 

v.  Cornelius,  104  Wis.  68..     94 

v.  Killain,  63  111.  550    246 

v.  Lincoln  Countv,  29  Wash. 

509 51 

v.  S.   (Fla.)   35  So.  221.25,301 

v.  S.  75  Ga.  489  48 

v.  S.   Ill   Ala.   11    67 

v.  Wentworth,     67     N:     H. 

408 123,  124 

Ball  v.  Marquis   (Iowa)    98  N. 

W.   497     385 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)    36 

S.  W.  448 -.  .  ..113,  115 

v.  S.  (Iowa)  92  N.  W.  691.    362 

Bnllance  v.  Leonard,  37  111.  43.  347 

•  Ballard  v.  S.  19  Neb.  609 331 

v.  S.  43  Ohio  St.  340 789 

Ballou  v.  Young,  42  S.  Car.  170 

71 
Ballow  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   69 

S.  W.  513    : 244 

Balph  v.  Liberty  Nat.  Bank  179 

Pa.   St.    430 191 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


XXXV11 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Baltimore,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Alsop, 

176   111.  471    144. 

v.  Brydon,   65  Md.  200 413 

v.  Cain,  81  Md.  87    575 

v.  Campbell,     36    Ohio    St. 

647    585,   586 

v.  Cassell,  66  Md.  421  ....  652 
v.  Conoyer,  149  Ind.  524..  7 
v.  Countryman,  16  Ind.  App. 

139 244 

v.  Faith,   175  111.  58 74,   86 

v.  Feev's  Ex'r,  94  Va.  82..      80 

v.  Few,  94  Va.  85   650 

v.  Friel,  77  Fed.  126   44 

v.  Hollenthal,   88   Fed.   116 

26 

v.  Kean,  65  Md.  396   630 

v.  Kirby,  88  Md.  489   118 

v.  Lafferty,  2  W.  Va.  104.  .  247 
v.  Laffertys,  14  Gratt.  (Va.) 

478 32 

v.  Leapley,  65  Md.  573...  562 
v.  McKenzie,  81  Va.  78  ...  582 
v.  Mackey,  157  U.  S.  72 

350    351 

v.  Maryland,  75  Md.  153..'  619 
v.  Nugent,  86  Md.  351.547,  548 
v.  Owings,  65  Md.  505 

530,  633,  634,  639,  643,  655 

v.  Pierce,  89  Md.  497 615 

v.  Rowan,  104  Ind.  88   361 

v.  S.  30  Md.  48   536 

v.  S.  &c.  60  Md.  452.. 535,  553 
v.  Spaulding,  21  Ind.  App. 

323 238 

v.  Stanley,     158     111.     396 

25,-  126 

v.  S.  91  Md.  506   195 

v.  Theu,  159  111.  535 

118,  363,  650 
v.  Worthington,  21  Md.  275 

538 
v.  Young,  153  Ind.  163 

29,   632,   647 
Bandalow  v.  P.  90  111.  218 ......      48 

Bank  v.  Barry,  20  Md.  287 162 

Bank    of   Asheville    v.    Summer, 

119  N.  Car.  591    191 

Bank  of  C,  v.   Eureka  B.  &   L. 

Co.  108  Ala.  89 48 

Bank  of  Galloway  v.  Henry,  92 

N.  W.  63 1' 102 

Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Bright,  77 

Fed.  946 190 

Bank  of  H.  v.  Napier,  41  W.  Va. 

481 243 


Bank  of  M.  v.  Page,  98  111.  125 

80 
Bankhead  v.  S.  124  Ala.  14 

282,  343 

Banks  v.  S.  72  Ala.  522 306 

Bannen  v.  S.  115  Wis.  317..^.      25 
Banner  v.  Schlessinger,  109  Mich. 

262 101,  113 

Barbee  v.  S.  23  Tex.  App.  199.         3 
Bard  well  v.  Ziegler,  3  Wash.  34 

182 

Barfield  v.  S.    105  Ga.  491 6 

Bargna  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   68 

S.  W.  997    83,  88 

Barker  v.  Com.  90  Va.  820.337,  339 
v.  Cunard  S.   S.  Co.   36  N. 

Y.   S.   256    351 

v.  Lawrence    Mfg.    Co.    176 

Mass.  203 346,  358 

v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.  57  W. 

Va.  430 572 

v.  S.  126  Ala.  69 101,  299 

v.  S.  40  Fla.   178    192 

v.  S.  48  Ind.   163 

113,  119,  192,  195 
v.  Todd,  37  Minn.  370  ....   347 
Barkley    v.    Barkley    Cemetery 

Asso.   153  Mo.  300 196 

Barkman  v.  S.  1 3  Ark.  706 45 

Barmby  v.  Wolfe,  44  Neb.  77 

214,  226 

Barnard  v.  S.  88  Wis.  656..  225,  240 

Barnes  v.  Barnes,  66  Me.  300..   696 

v.  S.  103  Ala.  44.... 27,  29,  103 

v.  S.   Ill   Ala.   56 52,  297 

v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cv.  App.  184 

26,  268 
Barnesville    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Love, 

(Del.)    52  Atl.  267..  238,  244 

Barnett  v.  Com.  84  Ky.  449 170 

v.   Farmers',  &c.  Ins.  Co.  115 

Mich.  247 303 

v.  Fearig,  101  Ind.  96 80 

v.  Salomon,  118  Mich.  460.      35 

v.  Talbot,  90  Me.  229 126 

Barnett   &    R.   Co.   v.   Schlapka, 

208  111.  436 30 

Barnewall   v.  Murrell,   108   Ala. 

366 44 

Barney  v.  S.  49  Neb.  515 302 

Barnhart   v.   Chicago,   M.   &   St. 

P.  R.  Co.  97  Iowa,  654..    126 
v.  Ehrhart,  33  Ore.  279   ...   666 
Barow  v.  Reading  Iron  Co.  202 

Pa.  St.  280   531,  539 


XXXV111 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Barr  v.  City  of  Omaha,  42  Neb. 

341  . 347 

v.  Irey,  3  Kas.  App.  240.  ..    126 

v.  P.  30  Colo.  522 322 

v.  P.  113  111.  471..  19,  195,  198 
v.  S.  (Miss.)  21  So.  131...      71 

v.  S.  45  Neb.  458 247,  274 

Barrett  v.  Boddie,  158  ill.  479.    136 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   69  S. 

W.  144 351 

Barren  v.  Barren,  122  Ala.  194.      93 

Barrow  v.  S.  80  Ga.  191 310 

Bartay  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  67 

S.  W.  416 

Bartelott  v.  International  Bank, 

119  111.  269   ...121,  124, 

Earth  v.  Kansas  City  E.  R.  Co. 

142  Mo.  535   

Earthing   v.   Behrends,   20   Neb. 

211 

Bartlett  v.  Board  of  Education, 

59  111.  364   

v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.   122 

Mass.  213 

v.  Cunningham,  85  111.  22.. 
v.  Hawley.  38  Minn.  308.. 
v.  Secor/56  Wis.  520 

656,  658, 
Bartley   v.   Metropolitan   St.   R. 

Co.  148  Mo.  124 

v.  S.   Ill   Ind.  358 

v.  S.  53  Neb.  310 

70,  302,  336, 
v.  Williams,  66  Pa.  St.  329 


Barton  v.  Gray,  57  Mich.  623 
3,  156, 

v.  S.  154  Ind.  670 

v.  Strond-Gibson  Grocery  Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   40  S.'  W. 

1050 113, 

Bass  v.  Cantor,  123  Ind.  446... 

v.   S.    103   Ga.   227    

Bassett  v.  S.  (Fla.)   33  So.  262. 

Bates  v.  Ball,  72  111.  108 

v.  Bates,  27  Iowa,  115.695, 
v.  Benninger,   2   Cin.   Super. 

Ct.   (Ohio)   568   

Bates-Smith   Ins.   Co.   v.   Scott, 

56  Neb.  475    

v.  Harte,  124  Ala.  427.... 
Batten  v.  S.  80  Ind.  401 


255 
126 

27 
172 
198 

544 
94 
30 

663 

242 
15 

338 

172 

157 

359 


177 
433 
6 

20 
12 
696 

66 

20 
195 
742 
Battershall  v.  Stephens,  34  Mich. 

68 156 

Battle  v.  S.  103  Ga,  53.  .  .    296 


Bauer  v.  Bell,  74  111.  226 

v.  S.  105  Ga.  703 

Baxter  v.  Campbell  (S.  Dak.)  97 

N.  W.   368    

v.  Lusher,  159  Ind.  381... 
v.  P.  3  Gilm.  (111.)  381..  .. 
v.  P.  8  111.  (3  Gil.)  368.. 
v.  Roberts,  44  Cal.  191... 

Baxton  v.  S.  157  Ind.  213 

Bay  City  Iron  Co.  v.  Emery,  128 

Mich.  506 70, 

Beabont  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

515 

Beach  v.  Netherland,  93  Ga.  233 

Beall  v.  Pearre,  12  Md.  550 

Bean  V.  Green,  33  Ohio  St.  444 

359,  360, 

v.  Miller,  69  Mo.  393.. 396, 

v.  P.   124  111.  580 

Beard  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    53 

S.  W.  348    

v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cv.  App.  173 

v.  S.  71  Md.  275 169, 

v.  Trustees   of   School,    106 

111.  659 

Bearer  v.  S.  103  Ala.  36..  322, 
Beason  v.  S.  43   Tex.  Cr.  App. 

442    

Beaty  v.  S.  82  Ind.  232 

Beavers  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.  47 

Neb.  761 

Beck  v.  Cole,  16  Wis.  95 

v.  S  51  Xeb.  106 

Becker  v.  Becker.  45  Iowa,  239. 
v.  Woarms,  76  N.  Y.  S.  438 

Beckham  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

69  S.  W.  534 : 

Becknell   v.   Becknell,    110    Ind. 

42 

Beckner    v.    Riverside,    &c.    65 

Ind.  468 

Bedford  v.  Penny,  58  Mich.  424. 
v.  S.   (Tex. 'Cr.  App.)    38  S. 

W.  210  

v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  477.. 
Bedford   I.    Co.    v.    Thomas,    29 

Ind.  App.  85    

Bedford,   S.  O.   &  B.   R.   Co.  v. 

Rainbolt,  99  Ind.  556 

Beecher    v.    Ferris,    112    Mich. 

584 

Beene  v.  Miller,  149  Mo.  233 
656. 


509 
25 

80 

243 

1 

60 
612 
252 

465 
276 

94 
101 

490 

397 
206 

75 

269 
839 

25 
324 

303 

824 

243 

84 
248 

84 

214 

272 
360 

136 

28 

88 
255 

234 
545 
663 
668 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


XXXIX 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Behm  v.  Parker   (Md.)    32  Atl. 

199 239 

Behrends  v.  Beyschlag,  50  Neb. 

304 353 

Behymer  v.  S.  95  Ind.  140 346 

Beidler  v.  King,  202  111.  302.. 48,  70 
Belair  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

43  Iowa,  671   620 

Belden  v.  Woodmanse,  81  111.  25 

105 
Belding  v.  Archer,   131   N.  Car. 

287 20 

Belk  v.  P.  125  111.  584 48,  80 

Belknap    v.    Grover     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    56   S.  W.   249....    360 
Bell    v.    Beazley,    18    Tex.    Cv. 

App.   639 199 

v.  City  of  Spokane,  30  Wash. 

508 191,  346 

v.  Hutchins  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

41  S.  W.  200    113 

.  v.  Incorporated      Town      of 

Clarion,   120  Iowa,  332..      25 
v.  Martin    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

28  S.  W.   108   71 

v.  Ober  &  Sons  Co.   96  Ga. 

214 208 

v.  Sherideh,  21  D.  C.  370..  144 
v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  677.  290 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  56  S. 

W.  913 94 

v.  S.  115  Ala.  25 

256,   258,   260,   297 
v.  Washington    Cedar -Shin 

gle  Co.  8  Wash.  27 192 

Bell  City  Mfg.  Co..  v.  Kemp,  27 

Wvash.   Ill 395 

Bellamy  v.  S.  35  Fla.  242 266 

Bellefontaine  R.   Co.  v.   Snyder, 

24   Ohio  St.   670 197 

Bellow  v.  Ahrburg,  23  Kas.  287 

119 

Belt  v.  Goode,  31  Mo.  128 157 

v.  P.  97  111.  469..  105,  172,  252 
Benavides    v.    S.    31    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  173 34,  36 

Bender  v.  Dugan,  99  Mo.  126. .      94 

Benham  v.  Taylor,  66  Mo.  App. 

308 71 

Benjamin  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 

Co.  133  Mo.  274 48,  50 

Bennett  v.  Connelly,  103  111.  50 

245,  430 

v.  Ellison,  23  Minn.  245...  524 
v.  McDonald,  52  Neb.  278.  351 
v.  McDonald,  60  Neb.  47  ..  80 


Bennett  v.  P.  96  111.  606 

v.  S.  70  Ark.  43 

v.  S.  30  Tex.  Cr.  App.  341. 

v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  639 

261,  270,  276,  282, 

Benson  v.  Lundy,  52  Iowa,  265 

v.  S.  119  Ind.  488 

Bentley  v.  Standard  F.  Ins.  Co. 
40  W.  Va.  729  

Benton  Co.  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bod- 
dicker,  117  Iowa,  407  .. 

Berez  v.  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R. 
Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  67 
S.  W.  137 

Berkett  v.  Bond,  12  111.  86 

Berliner  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co. 
121  Cal.  451  116, 

Bernhard  v.  S.  76  Ga.  613 

Bernstein  v.  Downs,  112  Cal.  191 

Berrenberg    v.    City    of    Boston, 

137  Mass.  231  

Berry  v.  Rood,  168  Mo.  316... 

v.  S.  31  Ohio  St.  225 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  38  S. 

W.  812  

Bertha  Zinc  Co.  v.  Martin,  93 

Va.  794 611, 

Bertram  v.  Peoples  R.  Co.  154 

Mo.  639 113,  196, 

Berzevizv  v.  Delaware  L.  &  W. 

Co.  46  N.  Y.  S.  27 

Beseler  v.  Stephani,  71  111.  404. 
Best  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dunlevy, 

157  111.  141  

Bett  v.  P.  97  111.  461  


112 
815 
322 

314 


192 
94 


191 
358 

208 
289 

351 

359 
361 
243 

191 
622 
198 

207 
243 

241 
797 
Betting  v.  Hobbett,  142  111.  76 

48,  488 
Beutell  v.  Magone,  157  U.  S. 

154 145 

Bevelot    v.    Lestrade,    153    111. 

625 218 

Bever  v.  Spangler,  93  Iowa,  576 

211,  223 

Beverly  v.  Burke,  9  Ga.  447...    170 
Bewley  v.  Massie  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

31  S.  W.  1086  25 

Bibb  County  v.  Ham,   110   Ga. 

340 244 

Bibbins  v.  City  of  Chicago,  193 

111.  363' 113 

Bibby  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    65 

S.  W.  193 248 

Bierbach  v.  Goodyear  R.  Co.  54 

Wis.  213  .  ,  .. 203 


xl 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Billings  v.  McCoy,  5  Neb.  187.  .      14 

Bims  v.  S.  66  Ind.  433 770 

Bingham    v.    Hartley,    44    Neb. 

682 72 

v.  Lipman,  40  Ore.   363...    32a 
Binkley  v.  Dewell    (Kas.   App.) 

58  Pac.   1028    245 

Binns  v.  S.  66  Ind.  428 247 

Bird  v.  Forceman,  62  111.  212..    198 
v.  S.  107  Ind.  154....  166,  216 

v.  S.  43  Fla.  541 313 

Birmingham,  &c.  Co.  v.  Cuzzart, 

133  Ala.  262    113,  118 

v.  Mullen  (Ala.)  35  So.  204, 

701,  702 192,  475 

v.  Pulver,  126  111.  339   .  .26b,  49 
v.  Williams,  119  Ala.  547 

62,  117a 
Birney  v.  New  York  &  W.  P.  T. 

Co.  18  Md.  341 95 

Birr  v.  P.  113  111.  648 80 

Bisewski    v.    Booth,     100    Wis. 

383 203 

Bishop  v.  Journal  Newspaper  Co. 

168  Mass.  327    46 

v.  P.  200  111.  37    363 

v.  P.  194  111.  365 725 

v.  S.  43  Tex.  390    3 

P.issot  v.  S.  53  Ind.  408 710 

Bitter  v.  Saathoff,  98  111.  266.  .   200 
Black  v.  Rocky  Mountain  B.  T. 

Co.  (Utah)  73  Pac.  514..  196 
v.  S.  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  58.103 
v.  S.  18  Tex.  App.  124..  279 

v.  S.    1    Tex.   App.    369 199 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)    41 

S    W.    606 118 

v.  S.    59    Wis.    471 288 

Blackburn  v.  S.   71   Ala.   319..   228 
v.  S.    23    Ohio    St.    165 

4,  334,  748 
Blackman      v.      Edsall       (Colo. 

App.)     68'    Pac.    790 70 

v.  Housels    (Tex.   Cv.  App.) 
31    S.    W.    511.. 


v.  Kessler,    110    Iowa,    140 


243 

94 
Blackwell    v.    S.    33    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    287    252 

Blackwood   v.   Brown,   29   Mich. 

483    222 

Blair    v.     Blanton      (Tex.     Cv. 

App.)    55   S.   W.   321....    116 
v.  City    of    Groton,    13    S. 

Dak.    211     244 

v.  S.    69    Ark.    558.. 372,    795 


Blake's  Estate,  In  re,  136  Cal. 

306   66, 

Blake     v.      Austin       (Tex.      Cv. 

App.)     75    S.    W.    571.. 

v.  Rourke,    74   Iowa,   523.. 

Blaker  v.  S.  130  Ind.  203.166, 

Blalock  v.  S.  79  Miss.   517 

Blanchard    v.    Jones,    101    Ind. 

542 

v.  Pratt,    37    111.    243.101, 
Blanchard-Hamilton     Furniture 

Co.   v.    Calvin    (Ind.)    69 

N.  E.   1035 

Blanco   v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

57    S.    W.    828 

Blass    v.    Ferry,    34    N.    Y.    S. 

475   

Blaul   v.   Tharp,    83    Iowa,   665 

Bleiler  v.  Moore,   94   Wis.    385 

Blesch   v.    Chicago,    &c.    R.    Co. 
48    Wis.    172 

541,   684,   685, 

Blige   v.   S.    20    Fla.    742 

Blizzard  v.    Bross,    56    Ind.    74 

Bloch    v.     Edwards,     116     Ala. 

90   101, 

v.  S.    161    Ind.    276 

Bloomer     v.     Shernll,     11     111. 

483    

Blotcky    v.    Caplan,     91     Iowa, 

352   

Blough  v.  Parry,    144   Ind.  463 

81.    223, 

Bloyd    v.    Pollock,    27    W.    Va. 

75   

Blue    V.    L.    Co.    v.    Smith,    48 

Neb.   293 

v.  Newman,    58    Neb.    80.. 
Bluedom    v.    Missouri    Pae.    R. 

Co.    108   Mo.   439.... 25, 
v.  Missouri     Pac.     R.     Co. 

(Mo.)    24   S.   W.   57 

Bluff      City      Lumber      Co.      v. 

Floyd,    70    Ark.    418 

Blum    v.    Whitworth,     66    Tex. 

350  

Blume  v.   S.    154   Ind.   343 

25,   247, 
Blumeno  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  I. 

B.  R.  Co.   101   Mich.   325 
Blumer    v.     Bennett,     44     Neb. 

873   

Board,  &c.  v.  Allman,  142  Ind. 

573 


211 

194 
702 
169 
255 

123 
163 


534 
109 
146 
197 
247 

687 
361 

362 

116 
809 

41 
199 
702 

85 

195 
102 

247 
181 
347 
99 
249 
191 
357 
480 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
(References  are  to  Sections.) 


xli 


Blair  v.  Boyd,  31  Kas.  765....    301 
v.  Brewington,    74   Ind.    10 

464 
v.  Galloway,    17    Ind.   App. 

689    464 

v.  Gibson,    158    Ind.   471.. 

359 
v.  Legg,    110    Ind.    474 

43,    196,    346 
v.  Nichols,    139   Ind.   611..      71 

v.  Vicker,    62    Kas.    25 364 

Bobo  v.  S.    (Miss.)    16  So.   755 

319 
Bodie    v.    Charleston    N.    C.    R. 

Co.    ol    S.    Car.    468 200 

Bodine  v.   S.    129  Ala.    106.66,   297 
Boecker   v.    City    of    Nuperville 

166    111.    151 363 

Boeltger    v.    Scherpe    &    Koken 

A.  &  I.  Co.   136  Mo.  531      76 
v.    Boggess,    127    Mo. 


305 


109,    112 


v.  Metropolitan    St.    R.    Co. 

118    Mo.    328 14 

v.   Clifton,    17    Ind.   217 

15 
Bohl  v.  City  of  Dell  Rapids   (S. 

Dak.)    91    N.   W.    315...    121 
Bohlman    v.    S.     135    Ala,    45 

195 
Boice  v.  Palmer,   55   Neb.    389 

101 
Boldenwick   v.   Cahill,    187    111. 

218    94,    238 

Boldt  v.   Budwig,    14  Neb.    743 

500 
v.  Budwig,     19     Neb.     743 

494,    495,    498 
Bolen   v.    S.    26    Ohio    St.    371 

360 

Boiling  v.  S.   54  Kas.   602.66,   331 
Bolton  v.  Vellines,  94  Va.  399 

505 
Boltz   v.   Miller,    23    Ky.   L.  'R. 

991   156 

v.  Town    of    Sullivan,    101 

Wis.    608    58 

Bon   v.   S.   23    Ohio   St.    349...       20 
v.  S.     34    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

481    259 

Bonaparte    v.    Thayer,    95    Md. 

548    198 

v.  Wiseman,  89  Md.  12...  670 
Bonardo  v.  P.  189.  111.  411..  71.  73 
Bond  v.  P.  39  111.  26 172,  194 


Bond  v.  S.  23  Ohio  St.  349..  20,  32 
Bondurant   v.    S.    125    Ala.    31 

48,    109 
Bone  v.  S.  102  Ga.  387 

109,   300,    323 
Bones  v.  S.  117  Ala.  138 

296,    297 

Bonic  v.  Maught,   76  Md.   4 4 2.. 46 5 

Bonner  v.   Com.    18   Ky.    728..    115 

v.  Com.     (Ky.)     38    S.    W. 

488 240 

v.  Herrick,  99  Pa.  St.  225 

171 

v.  S.  67  Ga.  510 36 

v.  S.    107    Ala.    97 

40,   351,    182 

v.  Monnell,    52   Me.   255...    158 
Booher  v.   S.    156   Ind.    435 

281,  755,  779 

Booker  v.   S.   76  Ala.   25 757 

Boon   v.   Murphy,    108   N.   Car. 

187   347 

Boone   v.   Miller,    73    Tex.    557 

14 

v.  P.    148    111.    440 80 

v.  Ritchie    (Ky.)    53   S.  W. 

518    80,    81 

Borham  v.   Davis,    146   Pa.   St. 

72    191 

Borrego  v.  Ter.   8  N.  Mex.  446 

322 
Bosqui    v.    Sutro    R.    Co.     131 

Cal.    390    48 

Boss  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  2 

N.   Dak.    128! 347 

Bossit  v.  S.  53   Ind.   417 805 

Boston  v.  S.   94  Ga.  590 274 

Boston      Marine      Ins.      Co.      v. 

Scales,    101    Tenn.    628..      84 
Boswell    v.    Dist.    of    Columbia, 

21   D.   C.   526 247 

Bosworth    v.    Barker,     65     Ind. 

596 4 

Botkin    v.    Cassady,    106    Iowa, 

334 101 

Botsch  v.   S.   43  Neb.   501 98 

Boulder   v.   Niles,    9    Colo.    421 

247 
Bourland    v.    Gibson,     124     111. 

602 94 

Bourquin  v.  Bourquin.   110  Ga. 

440 113 

Boutwell  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

35    S.    W.    376 110 

Bowden  v.  Archer,  95  Ga.  243 

34,   92,    117 


xlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Bowen  v.  Carolina,  C.  G.  &  C. 

R.  Co.   34  S.  Car.   217.. 

v.   Southern    R.    Co.    58    S. 

Car.    222 6,    244, 

v.  Sweeney,    35     N.    Y.    S. 

400  

Bower  v.  Bower,  146  Ind.   393 

Bowers  v.  P.  74  111.  419.. 206, 
Bowie  v.  Maddox,   29   Ga.   285 

v.  Spaids,    26   Neb.    635... 
Bowling    v.    Floyd     (Kas.)     48 

Pac.    875    

Bowling     Green     Stone     Co.     v. 
Capshaw,    23    Ky.    L.    R. 

945   

Bowman  v.   Bowman,    153   Ind. 

503    71, 

v.  Roberts,   58  Miss.    126.. 

v.  Witlig,    39    111.    416 

Boyard    v.    Johnson     (Ky.)     53 

S.   W.    651 

Boyce  v.  Martin,  46  Mich.  239 

v.  Palmer,    55    Neb.    389.. 
v.  Schroeder,    21    Ind.   App. 

28    

v.  Wabash  R.  Co.   63  Iowa, 

70 

Boyd  v.  Blue  Ridge   R.   Co.   65 

S.    Car.    326 

v.  Portland    Elec.     Co.     40 

Ore.    126   20, 

v.  S    24    Tex    App.    570... 
Boyden  v.  Fitehburg  R.  Co.   72 

Vt.    89    

Boyer  v.  Soules.   105  Mich.  31. 

Boyett   v.    S.    130    Ala.    77 

Boygero  v.   Southern  R.  Co.   64 

S.   Car.    104 

Boykin   v.   P.    22    Colo.    496 

71,    105, 
Boyle   v.    Illinois    Cent.    R.   Co. 

88    111.    App.    255 

Boynton  v.  S.   115  Ga.  587.. 6, 
Brace   v.    S.    43    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

48 

Bracken   v.   Union    Pac.   R.   Co. 

75    Fed.    347 

Braden  v.   Cook,    18   Pa.   Super. 

Ct.   156 

Bradford  v.  Pearson,  1 2  Mo.  7 1 

v.  P.  (Cal.)  43  Pac.  1013 


363 

358 

20 

349 
367 

177 
192 

347 

113 

456 

192 

14 

6 

157 
209 

232 
351 

48 

238 
303 

28 

363 

66 

243 

201 

126 
220 

292 

363 

195 

86 

4 


Bradford  Glycerine  Co.  v.  Kis- 

jer,    113    Fed.    894 347 

Bradley    v.    Coobaugh,    91     111. 

148   195 

v.  Ohio  River   &  C.   R.   Co. 

126    N.    Car.    735 195 

v.  S.    31    Ind.    492 211 

Bradshaw  v.   S.    17   Neb.    147..   299 
Bradway    v.    Waddell,    95    Ind. 

170   4,  41 

Brady    v.    Cassidy,    104    N.   Y. 

147   156,    160 

v.  Com.      11     Bush      (Ky.) 

285   734 

Braggen  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  R.  Co. 

24   Utah,    391 358 

Brainard  v.  Burton,   5   Vt.   97.    245 
Brakken    v.    Minneapolis    &    St. 

L.  R.  Co.  29  Minn.  43.  .  107 
Braley  v.  Powers,  9 2  Me.  203.  80 
Bramble  v.  Ward,  40  Ohio  St. 

267    415 

Branch  v.  Faust,   115  Ind.  464 

47 
v.   Illinois    (Tex.  Cv.   App.) 

48   S.  W.   40 665 

Brande  v.  S  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   45 

S.  W.    17 272 

Braniel   v.    Braniel,    19   Ky.   L. 

R.    72    " 696 

Brann    v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

39    S.    W.    526 290 

Brannum  v.  O'Conner,  77  Iowa. 

632    86 

Branson  v.   Com.   92   Ky.   330.    265 

Branstrator  v.  Crow    (Ind.)    60 

N.    E.    668 330 

Brant  v.   Gallup,    111    111.   487 

19,   94 
Brantley  v.  Lee.   106   Ga.   313.    133 

v.  S.    115    Ga.    229 113 

v.  S.    9   Wyo.    102 6,    268 

Brashinjjton  v.  South  B.  R.  Co. 

62    S.   Car.    325 7.    101 

Bratt  v.   Swift.   99   Wis.   579..    210 
Braun    v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

39    S.    W.    940 191 

Braunschweiger   v.    Waits,    179 

Pa.    St.    47 96 

Braxton  v.  S.  157  Ind.  213..   80 

Bray  v.  S.  41  Tex.  560 205 

Braymer     v.     Commercial.     &c. 

Co.    199   Pa.   St.   259 422 

Bredlau  v.  Town  of  York,    115 

Wis.  554.  .  .177 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


xliii 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Breedlove    v.    Sunday,    96    Ind. 

319   34 

v.  Dennie,     2     Indian     Ter. 

606    25 

Breen  v.  Field,   159  Mass.   582 

25 
Breese    v.    United    States,    106 

Fed.    680 191 

Brehmer  v.  Lyman,  71  Vt.  98.  126 
Brems  v.  Sherman,  158  Ind. 

300   234 

Breneman  v.  Kilgore    (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)    35   S.   W.   202 94 

Bressemer  Sav.  Bank  v.  Ander- 
son,   134   Ala.    343 44 

Bressler   v.    P.    117    111.    422 

48,   226,   299,   312,  366, 

372,   373,    375,    721 
Brewer     v.     Wright,     25     Neb. 

805   404 

Briceland   v.    Coin,    74    Pa.    St. 

469 324 

Brick    v.    Bosworth,    162    Mass. 

334 14 

Brickill    v.    City    of    Baltimore, 

60   Fed.    98 113 

Bridenthal  v.  Davidson,   61    111. 

461 202 

Bridges  v.   S.    110   Ala.    15 88 

Bridgeton     v.     Jones,     34     Mo. 

472 465 

Bridgewater     v.     S.     153     Ind. 

560 169 

Bridyers    v.    Dill.    97    N.    Car. 

222   84 

Briggs  v.   Com.    82   Va.   554...    343 
v.  Union    St.    R.    Co.     148 

Mass.    72    183 

Brin    v.     McGregor      (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    45    S.   W.    923...    .  80 
Brink  v.   Black,   77   N.  Car.   59 

31 
Brinser     v.     Longenecker,     169 

Pa.    St.    51 6,    8 

Britton    v.    City    of    St.    Louis, 

120  Mo.    437 53,    194 

v.  S.    61    Ark.    15 27 

Broil  v.  S.  45  Md.  359..  166.  168 
Bromley's  Estate,  In  re,  113 

Mich.  53 119 

Bromley  v.  Goodwin,  95  111. 

122  26a 

Bronnenburg  v.  Charman,  80 

Ind.  475  286 

Brookin  v.  S.  26  Tex.  App. 

121  ...  ..307 


Brookins  v.   S.    100   Ga.   331 

267, 

Brooks  v.  Allen,   62   Ind.   405.. 
v.  Barrett,   7  Pick.    (Mass.) 

94    

v.  Com.    16    Ky.    356 

v.  Dutcher,    22   Neb.    644.. 
v.  Rochester,  31  N.  Y.   179 

v.   S.   96   Ga.   353.14,  265, 

v.  S.    35    Ohio   St.    48 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     31 

S.    W.    410 

Brotherton  v.  P.   75  N.  Y.   159 

Brower  v.   Edson,   4  7   Mich.   9 1 

Brown  v.  Baird,  5  Okla.   133.. 
v.  Chicago,   R.    I.   &    P.    R. 

Co.    51    la.    235 

v.  Com.    86   Va.    466..  153, 
v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R.   1552 

v.  Emerson,    66    Mo.    App. 

63  

v.  Everett  Ridley  Ragan 

Co.  Ill  Ga.  404 

v.  Foster,  41  S.  Car.  118 

v.  Hannibal    &    St.    J.     R. 

Co.    66    Mo.    599 

v.  McAllister,   39   Cal.   573 

v.  Master,    104    Ala.    451.. 
v.  Mayo,   .80    Mo.    App.    81 

v.  P.   9  111.    (4  Gilm.)    439 
v.  Pierce  Co.  28  Wash.  345 

v.  Porter,    7    Wash.    327... 
v.  Potter,     13     Colo.     App. 

512  

v.  Stacy,  5  Ark.  403 

v.  S.  108  Ala.  18 

v.  S.  109  Ala.  70 

v.  S.  124  Ala.  76 

v.  S.  128  Ala.  12 

v.  S.  105  Ind.  390 

70,  294,  716, 

v.  S.  32  Miss.  584 

v.  S.  72  Miss.  997 

30,  195,  288, 

v.  S.  75  Miss.  842 

v.  S.  9  Neb.  157 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  150 


268 
416 

696 
240 
350 

238 
816 

817 

86 
331 

192 
143 

574 
165 

255 
196 

86 


219 

247 
260 

356 
3 

682 
25 

126 

215 
310 
251 

318 

297 

719 

317 

296 
366 
255 

103 


xliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Brown  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   65 

S.    W.    906 243 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     29 

S.  VV.  772 86 

v.  S.    23    Tex.    195 306 

v.      Town    of    Swanton,    69 

Vt.   53 222 

v.  U.    S.    164    U.    S.    221 

25,   348 
Brownell    v.     Fuller,     60    Neb. 

558 181 

Browning  v.  Wabash,  &c.  R.  Co. 

124  Mo.   65.12,616,625,649 
Biroyhill    v.    Norton,    175    Mo. 

190   80 

Brozek  v.  Steinway  R.  Co.   161 

N.   Y.    63 353 

Bruce   v.    Beall,    99    Tenn.    303.248 
Bruch   v.    Carter,    32    N.   J.    L. 

565   191 

v.  Smith,  111  Iowa,  217...  236 
Bruen  v.  P.  206  111.  425...  12,  346 
Bruker  v.  Town  of  Covington, 

69   Ind.   35 593 

Brunette    v.    Gagen,     106    Wis. 

618    244 

Bruni  v.  Garza   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

26  S.  W.   108 94 

Brunswick       Grocery       Co.      v. 
Brunswick    &    W.    R.    Co. 

106    Ga.    270 124 

Brush  v.  Smith,  111  Iowa,  217 

211,   223 
Brusie  v.  Peck  Bros.  &  Co.  135 

N.    Y.    622 99 

Bryant  v.  Hagerty,   87   Pa.  St. 

256   156 

v.  S.    116   Ala.    445 

68,   343,   338 

v.  S.    (Ala.)    23  So.  40 757 

v.  S.    34    Fla.    291 20,    299 

v.  S.    114   Ga    861 268 

v.  S.    106    Ind.    509 256 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     47 

S.  W.   373 257 

Bryce  v.  Cayce,  62  S.  Car.  546 

90,   174 
Buchart    v.    Ell,    9    Ind.    App. 

353   43 

Buchman  v.   S.    109  Ala.   7....    306 
Buck   v.    Hogeboom     (Neb.)     90 

N.   W.    635 203 

v.  Maddock,    167    111.    219.    238 
v.  People's  St.   R.   &   E.   L. 

&  P.  Co.   108  Mo.   129...       17 
Buckingham  v.  Harris,  10  Colo. 

458   439 


Buckley  v.  S.  62  Miss.  705 215 

v.  Silverberg,    113   111.   673 

101 

Buckman   v.   Missouri   K.   &   T. 
R.  Co.    100  Mo.  App.   30 

239 
Buckmaster  v.  Cook,  12  111.  74 

346,   358 
Buel  v.  New  York  Steamer,    17 

La.   Ann.    541 347 

v.  S.    104    Wis.    132 25,    65 

Bugbee      v.      Kendricken,      132 

Mass.   349   100 

Bugg    v.    Com.     18    Ky.    L.    R. 

844    252 

Bullard    v.    Brewer     (Ga.)     45 

S.    E.    711 80 

v.  Smith    (Mont.)    72    Pac. 

761   80 

Bullock   v.   Narrott,   49    111.    62 

155,   163 
Bumgardner  v.  Southern  R.  Co. 

132  N.  Car.  438 192,   195 

Bunce  v.  McMahon,  6  Wyo.  24.   218 
Bundy    v.    McKnight,    48     Ind. 

505   693 

Bunn  v.   Crowl,    10  Johns.    (N. 

Y.)    239 39 

Bunnell  v.   Com.    17   Ky.  L.  R. 

106   276 

v.  Greathead,  49  Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    106   3 

Bunting  v.  Saltz,   84   Cal.   168.    182 
Bunyan    v.    Loftus,     90     Iowa, 

122   75 

Burbridge   v.    Kansas    City  Cable 
R.  Co.  36  Mo.  App.  678 

568 
Burdick    v.    P.    58    Barb.     (N. 

Y.)    51 170 

Burgess   v.   Davis   Sulphur    Ore 

Co.    165   Mass.    71 25 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     42 

S.   W.    562 6,   9 

v.  Singer    Mfg.     Co.      (Tex. 
Cv.     App.)      30     S.     W. 

1110   188 

Burgett  v.  Burgett,  43  Ind.  78.         7 
Burke     v.     Holmes      (Tex.     Cv. 

App.)    68    S.  W.   52 118 

v.  Lee,   76   Va.  386 

156,    158,    160 
v.  Maxwell,  81  Pa.  St.  139 

170 
v.  Sanitary    Dist.    152    111. 

134   25,    80 

v.  S.   34  Ohio  St.   79 864 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


xlv 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Burkham    v.    Martin,    54    Ala. 

122   181,    182 

Burleson   v.    Lindsey    (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    23   S.  W.   729 96 

Burlingrin    v.    Bader,    45    Neb. 

673   246 

Burn  v.  P.  126  111.  285.. 66,  347 
Burnett  v.  Cavanaugh,  56  Neb. 

190   93,   358 

v.  P.    204   111.    225 738 

v.  S.    60   N.  J.   L   255 247 

v.  Wilmington   N.   &  N.   R. 

Co.    120    N.   Car.    517...    351 
Burnette    v.    Town    of    Guyers, 

106    Wis.    618 346.    358 

Burney    v.    S.     (Ga.)     25    S.    E. 

911    105 

Burnham     v     Allen,      1      Gray 

(Mass.)    497    416 

v.  Logan,   88  Tex.   1 28,  351 

Burns    v.    Woolery,     15    Wash. 

134   71 

Burr    v.     McCullum,     59    Neb. 

326   6 

Burrows   v.   Delta  Tr.   Co.    106 

Mich.   582   107 

Burt  v.  Long,   106  Mich.  210..    19G 

v.  Meyer,    71    Md.    467 440 

v.  S.    72    Miss.    408 305 

Burton    v.    Rosemary    Mfg.    Co. 

132   N.  Car.    17 80 

v.  S.    118    Ala.    109 25 

v.  S.    107   Ala.    108 

113,    296,    326 

Busch  v.  Fisher,  89  Mich.  192.  84 
Buse  v.  Russell,  86  Mo.  212..  668 
Bush  v.  Glover,  47  Ala.  167..  32 

v.  S.    37    Ark.    215 113 

v.  S.    47    Neb.    642 347 

Bushnell     v.     Chamberlain,     44 

Neb.   751   25 

Bussanicy   v.   Myers,    22   Wash. 

369   244 

Bussey   v.    Charleston   &   W.    C. 

R.   Co.   52   S.  Car.   438..    197 
Butler  v.  Greene.  49  Neb.  280.      71 
v.  Holmes    (Tex.   Cv.  App.) 

68   S.   W.   52 351 

v.  Machen,    65    Fed.    901..      71 
Butterfield      v.      Kirtley,      114 

Iowa,    520   80 

Buzzell   v.   Emerton,    161   Mass. 

176   8 

Byers  v.   Maxwell,   22   Tex.   Cv.. 

App.   269   48 

v.  Thompson,    66   111.   421..   153 
v.  Wallace,   88  Texas,  503.    196 


Byford  v.  Girton,  90  Iowa,  661 

349 
Bynum   v.   Bynum,    33   N.   Car. 

632   355 

v.  S.    (Fla.)    35   So.   85 9 

v.  Southern    Pump    Co.    63 

Ala.   462    347 

Byrd  v.  Ellis    (Tex.   Cr.  App.) 

35    S.   W.    1070... 363 


C 


Cady  v.  Owen,  34  Vt.  598 14 

Cage  v.  Tucker's  Heirs,  29  Tex. 

Cv.   App.    586 94 

Cahill   v.   Chicago   M.    &   St.    P. 

R.    Co.    74    Fed.    285....    148 
Cahn  v.  Ladd,   94  Wis.    134...    219 

Cain  v.  Hunt,  41   Ind.   466 181 

Caldwell    v.    Stephens,    57    Mo. 

589   84 

Caledonian    Ins.    Co.    v.    Traul, 

80   Md.    214 80 

Calef    v.    Thomas,    81    111.    486 

44,   113,  504 
Calkins,    Estate    of,     112    Cal. 

296   81 

Callaghan     v.     Myers,     89     111. 

566,    569    113.    192 

Callahan    v.    Port    Huron,     128 

Mich.    673 86,    245 

Callan    v.     McDaniel,    72    Ala. 

96    27 

Callanan  v.   S.   24   Iowa,   441..    218 
Calloway  v.  S.    Ill   Ga.   832 

265,   816 
Calquhour  v.  Wells  &  Fargo  Co. 

21    Nev.    459 60 

Calumet,  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Christ- 

enson,    170   111.    383 124 

v.Moore,    124   111.   337 106 

v.  Morawetsy,   195  111.  406 

241 
v.  Van   Pett,    173    111.    72 

71,    70,    53,    650,    124 
Camarillo  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

68    S.    W.    795 109 

Camden  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams, 

61    N.  J.   L.    646 192 

Cameron  v.   Union  Trunk   Line, 

10    Wash.    507 239 

v.  Vandergriff,  53  Ark.  151 

170 
Camp    P.    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Ballou 

71    111.    421 94,    534 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Campbell    v.    Beckett,    8    Ohio. 

St.   211    35 

v.  Campbell,  138  111.  612.   74 
v.  Me  Coy,  3  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

298  176 

v.  P.  16  111.  17.. 19,  256,  728 

v,  P.  92  111.  602 115 

v.  P.  109  111.  565 48,  101 

v.  Prague,  39  N.  Y.  S.  558 

145 
v.  Preferred     M.     A.     Asso. 

172   Pa.   St.   561 86 

v.   S.    133   Ala.    81 

55,   68,   80,   317 
v.  S.   150  Ind.   74 

75,   265,   266,    816 
v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.   160 

304 
.      v.  Warner    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

24    S.    W.    703 6 

Canado  v.  Curry,  73  Ind.  246.  182 
Cancerni  v.  P.  16  N.  Y.  501..  340 
Canfielcl  v.  City  of  Jackson,  112 

Mich.   120 26 

Cannon      v.      Farmers'      Bank 
(Neb.)    91   N.  W.  585 

48,   238 
v.  P.    141    111.    270 

80,    195,    198 
v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)    56 

S.   W.    351 255,    269 

Canthem  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

65   S.  W.  96 23 

Capital  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  62 

Mo.    62 84,    416 

Caraway    v.    Citizens'    N.    B'k 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.)     29    S. 

W.   506   101 

Cardon  v.  S.  84  Ala.  417...  52 
Carle  v.  P.  200  111.  494.. 251,  773 
Carleton  v.  S.  43  Neb.  373 

21,    27,    67,    238.    258,    297 
Carleton    Min.    &    Mill     Co.    v. 

Ryan,    29    Colo.    401 79 

Carlisle  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

56    S.    W    365 156,    331 

Carlton  v  P.    150    111.    181 

25,   294,   295,   299,   303 

308,   315.   322,   721 
Carlyle    Canning    Co.    v.    Balti- 
more &  O.   S.  W.  R.  Co. 

77   111.  App.  396 42 

Carmona  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

65    S.   W   928 304 

Carpenter    v    American    A.    Co. 

46  S.  Car.   541..  ..  351 


Carpenter  v.  City  of  Red  Cloud, 

64  Neb.  126 57 

v.  Dowe  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

26  S.  W.  1002 355 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co.  67  Minn. 

188  351 

v.  P.  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  603 

153,  165 

v.  S.  62  Ark.  286 294 

v.  S.  43  Ind.  371 6 

Carr  v.  Frick  Coke  Co.  170 

Pa.  St.  62 6 

v.  S."  104  Ala.  4 163 

v.  S.  84  Ga.  250 299 

v.  S.  96  Ga.  284 329,  332 

Carrell      v.      Kalanuazoo      Cold 
Storage    Co.     112     Mich. 

34  26 

Carretson    v.    Appleton,    58    N. 

J.    L.    386 120 

Carroll    v.    Chicago,    St.    P.    M. 
&   O.    R.   Co.    (Iowa)     84 

N.  W.   1035 170 

v.  S.    45    Ark.    539 290 

v.  S.    53    Neb.    431 275 

v.  Tucker,  26  N.  Y.  S.   86.      32 
Carruth     v.     Harris,     41     Neb. 

789   92 

Carson  v.   S.    34   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

342    6 

Carstens    v.    Earles,    26    Wash. 

676 71.     191.     200 

v.  Stetson  &   P.   M.   Co.    14 

Wash.   643   25 

Carter  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co. 

19    S.    Car.    26 355 

v.  Fischer,    127    Ala.    52..    142 
v.  Fulgham,    134   Ala.    238 

249 
v.  Kaufman     (S.    Car.)     45 

S.    E.    1017 86 

v.  Missouri  M.   &   L.   Co.    6 

Okla.  11    347 

v.  S.    106   Ga.    372 25 

v.  S.    22    Fla.    553 43 

Carter  White  Lead  Co.  v.  Ki'n- 

lin,   47   Neb.   409 7 

Cartier    v.    Troy,    &c.    Co.    138 

111.    538   250 

Cartiledge  v.  S.   132  Ala.    17..      80 
Carver  v.   S.   36   Tex.  Cr.  App. 

552   102' 

Carwile    v.    Carwile,    131    Ala. 

603    118 

Case  v.    Central   R.   Co.    59    N. 

J.   L.   471 .127 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


xlvii 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Case  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  38 

Iowa,  581  80 

Casey  v.  Ballou  Banking  Co. 

98  Iowa,  107 358 

v.  S.  49  Neb.  403 744 

Casner  v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

118  112 

Castle  v.  Boys,  19  Ky.  L.  R. 

345  358 

v.  S.  75  Ind.  146 301,  336 

Castlin  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

57  S.  W.  827 25,  48 

Castro  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

40  S.  W.  985 272 

Cathey  v.  Bowen,  70  Ark.  348.  347 
Catholic  Order  of  Foresters  v. 

Fitz'  181  111.  206 56 

Catlett  v.  Young,  143  111.  74..  649 
Cauble  v.  Worsham  (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)  69  S.  W.  194...  25 
Caughlin  v.  P.  18  111.  266....  48 
Cavallora  v.  Texas.  &c.  R.  Co. 

110  Cal.    348 351 

Cavender  v.  S.   126  Ind.  48 310 

Caveny    v.    Neely,    43    S.    Car. 

'70   7.    12 

v.  Weiller.    90    111.    159 135 

Caw  v.   P.   3   Neb.    357 48 

Cawfield   v.   Ashville   St.    R.  Co. 

111  N.  Car.   597 85 

Cawley  v.  S.    133   Ala.   128 295 

Cederson  v.  Oregon  R.  &  N.  Co. 

38    Ore.    343 174 

Central,  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Barmis- 
ter,   195   111.  48 

53,    106,    199,   239 

v.  Bond 356 

v.  Bush,    12   Tex.  Cv.  App. 

291    78 

v.  Chatterson,     17     Ky.    L. 

R.   5   134 

v.  Coleman,  80  Md.  328...  346 
v.  Dumas,  131  Ala.  172..  116 
v.  Hardin,  114  Ga.  548..  7 

v.  Haslett,    74    Ga.    59 63 

v.  Hubbarcl,  86  Ga,  623...  84 
v.  Johnson,  106  Ga.  130 

196,   247 

v.  Knowles,  191  111.  241..  124 
v.  Serpass,  153  111.  379 

58.    238 

v.  Thompson,  76 'Ga.  775.  653 
v.  Trammell,  114  Ga.  312.  20 
v.  Windham,  126  Ala,  552 

80 


Central    City    v.    Engle    (Neb.) 

91    N.   W.    849 80 

Central   Tobacco   Co.   v.   Knoop, 

24    Ky.    L.    R.    1268....    170 
Centralia   &   C.    R.    Co.   v.   Rix- 

man,    121    111.    2-14 286 

Cerrillos   Coal   R.   Co.   v.   Deser- 

an,   9   N.  Mex.   49 94,   101 

Cesure  v.   S.    1   Tex.  App.    19..      67 
Challis   v.   Lake,    71    N.  H.   90 

80,   358 
Chamberlain  v.   S.   2  Tex.  App. 

451    37 

Chamberlain     Banking     H.     v. 

Woolsey,    60    Neb.    516..      94 
Chambers  v.  P.   105  111.  409 

48,    115,    172,    195,    227 

v.  Short.    79    Mo.    206 393 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     44 

S.    W.    495 25 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     68 

S.    W.    286 103 

Chandler    v.    Com.     19    Ky.    L. 

R.    631    238 

v.  Keeler,   46   Iowa,   598...    689 
Chancy  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.   62 

Mo.    App.    45 113 

Chapell    v.    Schmidt,    104    Cal. 

511    65 

Chapman    v.    Cawrey,     50     111. 

518    25,   504 

v.  McCormick,     86     N.     Y. 

479   14 

v.  S.    109   Ga.    157 170 

v.   S.    61    Neb.    888 66 

v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cr.  App.   135 

x  255 
v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.   12 

Utah,   30   48 

v.  Yellow  P.  L.  Co.  89  Fed. 

903   126 

Chappell  v.  Allen,   38  Mo.  213.         1 
v.  S.  7  Caldw.    (Tenn.)    92 

322 
Charter  v.  Lane,   62  Conn.    121 

27,   116 
Chase   v.    Blodgett   Milling   Co. 

Ill    Wis.    655 74 

v.  Horton,    143  Mass.    118.    192 

v.  P.  40   111.   353 331 

v.  Washburn,     1     Ohio     St. 

244   243 

Chattanooga  R.  &  C.   R.   Co.  v. 

Owen,    90    Ga.    265 63 

Chavarria  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

62    S.    W.    312 206 

Cheaney  v.  S.   36  Ark.   74 359 


xlviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections./ 


Cheatham  v.  S.  67  Miss.  335..    288 
Cherokee  Packet  Co.  v.  Hilson, 

95   Tenn.    1 238 

Cherry    v.    Cox,    1    Indian    Ter. 

578   360 

Chesapeake,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.  An- 
derson,   93    Va.    651 558 

v.  Barlow,  86  Tenn.  537..  187 
v.  Board  (Ky.)  77  S.  W. 

189 529 

v.  Clowes,    93    Va.    195 

570,   584 
v.  Dupee's    Adm'r,    26    Ky. 

L.    R.    2349 90 

v.  Gunter,  108  Ky.  365..  183 
v.  Ogles  (Ky.)  73  S.  W. 

751    .   . 129 

v.  Rogers'   Adm'x,    100   Va. 

324   80 

Cheshire    v.     Tappan,    94     Ga. 

704 25 

Chesney    v.     Meadows,     90     111. 

431 113 

Chestnut  v.  Southern  I.  R.  Co. 

157  Ind.  509 362 

Chezem  v.  S.   56  Neb.  496      • 

6,    117,   214 
Chicago,    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Adler, 

129    111.    335 121 

v.  Allen,  169  111.  287.196,  363 
v.  Anderson,  162  111.  572.  183 
v.  Anderson,  166  111.  572 

54,  235 

v.  Anderson,  182  111.  298.  58' 
v.  Anderson,  193  111.  9...  48 
v.  Anderson.  38  Neb.  112.  192 
v.  Austin,  69  111.  429.106,  635 
v.  Avery,  109  111.  322....  31 
v.  Bailey,  66  Kas.  115.  ..  94 
v.  Bingenheimer,  116  111. 

226 31,    86 

v.  Bragonier,  119  111.  51..  80 
v.  Browdy,  206  111.  617 

101,   648 
v.  Brown,    157    Ind.    547..   645 

v.  Bryan,    90    111.    126 80 

v.  Buekstaff    (Neb.)    91    N. 

W.    426    101 

v.  Bundy,    210    111.    47 

30,    80,    549 
v.  By  rum,    153    111.    131 

183,    549 

v.  Camper,  199  111.  569...  244 
v.  CarroH,  206  111.  318 

127,    196 

v.  Catholic  Bishop,  119  111. 
528 ..  683 


Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Chancel- 
lor,  165  111.   445 

v.  Chisholm,  79  111.  584.. 
v.  Clapp,  201  111.  434.... 

v.  Clark,    70    111.    276 

v.  Delaney,  169  111.  581.. 
v.  Dickson,  143  111.  374.. 

v.  Dimick,    96    111.    47 

v.  Dinsmore,    162  Ala.   658 

117, 

v.  Dougherty,   110  111.   525 

v.   Dowd,    115    111.    659 

v.  Dumser,    161    111.    190.. 

v.  Dunleavy,    129    111.    132 

25,.  121, 

v.  Dunn,    61    111.    385 

v.  Erwin     (Tex.    Cv.    App. ) 

65    S.    W.    496 

v.  Eselin,   86   111.  App.  94. 
v.  Eston,   178  111.   192.. 75, 
v.  Fennimore,    199    111.    18 
25, 
v.  Fietsam,    123    111.    518.. 

v.  Filler,    195    111.    17 

v.  Fisher,    141    111.    624 

53,    74, 

v.  Flynn,    154   111.   453 

v.  Fuller,    195    111.    18 

v.  Garver,  83  111.  App.   118 

v.  Goebel,  1 1 9  111.  5 1 5 ... 
v.  Goldsmith,  173  111.  326 

v.  Gore,.  202  111.  188.194, 
v.  Gregory,  58  111.  272... 
v.  Griffin,  68  111.  499 

66.   113,    119, 
v.  Groves,    56    Kas.    601 

20,   25,    26,    56, 
v.   Harrington,    192    111.    9 

53,   56,   99,    119, 
v.  Harwood,    80    111.    91 

245, 

v.  Harwood,    90    111.    429.. 

v.  Hastings,    136    111.    251 

95, 

v.  Healey,  86  Fed.  245... 
v.  Hedges,  105  Ind.  398.. 
v.  Heinrich,  157  111.  388.. 

v.  Hines,    132   111.    161 

v.  Holland,    122    111.    469 

19,   25,   625, 
v.  Hutchinson,       120      '111. 

587    

v.  Ingraham,  131  111.  659. 


12(5 
106 
238 

92 
124 

48 
250 

247 

250 
650 
117 


106 

54 

133 

238 

31 

382 

638 
116 
113 

250 
198 

238 

638 

94 

195 
101 
363 

651 

192 

242 
6 

43 
133 

56 

652 

195 
48 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


xlix 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Chicago,   &c.   R.    Co.   v.   Jacobs, 

110   111.   414 65,   94 

v.  Johnson,    103    111.   512..  65 

v.  Johnson,  116  111.  210..  238 
v.  Johnson  (Neb.)  95  N. 

W.    614    123 

v.  Keegan,    185   111.    80 

244,    246,  247 
v.  Kelly,    182   111.   267 

183,  363 

v.  Kelly,  25  111.  App.   19..  19 

v.  Kmnare,    90    111.    9 31 

v.  Kneirim,    152    111.    458 

76.   94,  243 
v.  Krapp,    173    111.    219 

235,  238 
v.  Krayenbuhl      (Neb.)     91 

N.   W.    880 182 

v.  Krueger,   124  111.   457 

25,  66 

v.  Kuckkuck,  197  111.  304.  118 
v.  Lagerkrans  (Neb.)  91 

N.   W.   358 230 

v.  Lane,    130    111.    116 643 

v.  Leach,    152    111.   249....  363 

v.  Lee,  29  Ind.  App.  480..  247 

v.  Levy,    160   111.    385 106 

v.  Lewis,   109  111.   134 

80,    86,    87 
v.  Libey,    68   111.   App.   144 

94 

v.  Linn.  30  Ind.  App.  88..  468 
v.  Lonergan,  118  111.  41 

65,  115 
v.  McCarthy,    66    111.    App. 

•667   54 

v.  McDonnell,  194  111.  82..  196 
v.  Maroney,  170  111.  526 

56,  183 

v.  Matthews,   153  111.  268.  235 

v.  Mayer,  185  111.  336...  24 
v.  Mead,  206  111.  178.. 58,  71 
v.  Meech,  163  111.  305 

78,  206 

v.  Mills,    91    111.    39.. 192,  195 

v.  Mills,    105    111.    70 86 

v.  Mitchell,    159    111.   406..  19 

v.  Mochell,  193  111.  208..  105 
v.  Moran,  210  111.  9 

25,   31,    116,  117 

v.  Moranda,  108  111.  582.  170 
v.  Murowski,  179  111.  77 

123,   124,  363 
v.  Murphy,    198    111.    470 

199,  243,  247 

v.  Murray,    62   111.   331..1,  250 

.    v.  Naperville,    166   111.    87.  247 


Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Conner, 

119    111.    598 181 

v.  O'Donnell,    208    111.     273 

19,  629,  530 
v.  O'Sullivan,    143    111.   60.      68 

v.  Otto,   52   111.   417 652 

v.  Oyster,    58    Neb.    1 7,    70 

v.  Parks,  59   Kas.    790 26 

v.  Payne,    49    111.    499 247 

v.  Payne,  59  111.  534.. 53,  650 
v.  Pelligreen,  65  111.  App. 

333    204 

v.  Pennell,    94   111.    448 245 

v.  Pollock,   195  111.   162 

183,   200,   366 
v.  Pontiac,    169   111.   155 

48,   238 

v.  Prouty,  55  Kas.  503...  80 
v.  Rains,  203  111.  422.186,  212 
v.  Rayburn,  153  111.  290 

94,    195 

v.  Renter.  210  111.  279...  25 
v.  Roach.  180  111.  174 

542,    551 

v.  Robbins,  159  111.  602..  35 
v.  Robinson,  106  111.  142 

97.    170,   204 

v.Ryan,    165    111.    88 25 

v.  Sanders.    154  111.    531 

195,  363 
v.   Sandusky,    99    111.    App.  • 

164   19 

v.   Schmelling,    99    111.    Ap. 

577   155 

v.  Smith,    162    111.    185 133 

v.  Snyder,    128    111.    655 

51,   117.   119,  129 
v.  Spilker.   134  Ind.  401 

196,  633 

v.  Stahley,    62    Fed.    363..    190 
v.  Stephenson      (Ind.)      69 

N.    E.    273 199 

v.  Sullivan.     76     111.     App. 

505   14 

v.  Sykes,   96   111.    162 

66,    106,    117 

v.  Tilton,    87    111.    553 865 

v.  Utley.   38   111.    411 1 

v.  Van'Darn.  149  111.  338.  133 
v.  Van  Patten,  64  111.  514 

250 

v.  Van  Vleck.  143  111.  480.  20 
v.  Warner,  108  111.  545 

113,  624.  652,  653 
v.  Warner,   123   111.   49.68,    181 

•      v.  Wedel,    144    111.    9 124 

v.  Weiss,   203    111.   539....    196 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Chicago.    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Welsh, 

118  111.  572 198 

v.  White,  2Q9  111.  124...  76 
v.  Winters,  175  111.  299..  223 
v.  Woolridge,  174  111.  330 

123,  124 

v.  Yando,  127  111.  214...  360 
v.  Yorty,  158  111.  323.74,  642 

v.  Zapp,  209  111.  341 40 

v.  Zerneeke,    59    Neb.    689.      71 
Chicago    Packing    &     Provision 

Co.  v.  Tilton,  87  111.  547.      86 
Chicago  T.   &   T.   Co.  v.  Brady, 

165  Mo.   201.. 388,   415,   416 
Chicago    T.     T.     Co.    v.    Gruss 

(111.)    65    N.   E.    693 25 

v.  Katoski,    199    111.    383..      25 
Chichester   v.    Whiteleather,    51 

111.    259 157,    192 

Child  v.  Boyd  &  Carey  Boot  & 
Shoe  Mfg.  Co.  175  Mass. 

493   6 

Childers  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

35    303 

Childress  v.  Callender,  108  Ind. 

394   349 

Childs   v.    Muckler,    105    Iowa, 

279    25 

v.  S.    76    Ala.    93.... 203,    219 
v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  573.      22 
Chilesler  v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

635   311 

Chins  v.  U.  S.   118   Fed.   538..    189 
Chisholm    v.     Preferred    Bank- 
er's     Life      Ass'n,      112 

Mich.    50    207 

Chisum    v.    Chestnut    (Tex.   Cv. 

App.)    36   S.  W.   758....      25 
Chittenden    v.    Evans.     41     111. 

251 209,    113,    219 

Chittim    v.    Martinez,    94    Tex. 

141    199 

Choctaw,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Deper- 
ade  (Okla.)  71  Pac.  629 

192,    196 
v.  Tennessee,    116    Fed.    23 

238,  239 
Choutean       v.       Jupiter       Iron 

Works,   94    Mo.    388 37 

Chrisholm    v.    Keyfauver,     110 

Cal.    102    80 

Chrisman   v.   S.    54   Ark.   288..   281 
Christensen  v.   Lambert,    67  N. 

J.    L.    341 25 

Christian  v.  Connecticut  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  143  Mo. 
460  84,  363 


Christian  v.  S.  7  Ind.  App.  417 

27 
Christie  v.   P.   206   111.   342 

53.    113 
Christman  v.  Ray,  42   111.  App. 

Ill    203 

Christy    v.     Stafford,     123    111. 

466   47 

Churchwell  v.  S.   117   Ala.   124 

218 
Cicely  v.  S.  13  S.  &  M.  (Miss.) 

202   306 

Cicero,    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Brown, 
193    111.    274 

117,   218,   380,   652 
v.  Meixner,    160    111.    320 

30,    363 
v.  Rollins,    195    111.    220 

242,   366 
Cincinnati     v.     Whetstone,     47 

Ohio    St.    199 671 

Cincinnati,   &c.   R.   Co.  v.   Clif- 
ford,   113    Ind.    460 361 

v.  Cregor,    150    Ind.    625 

215,    350 
v.  Howard,    124    Ind.    287 

629,    633 

v.  Lutes,    112   Ind.   281 398 

v.  Smock,    133    Ind.    411..        7 
Cincinnati  &  H.  T.  Co.  v.  Hes- 
ter,  12  Ohio  C.  C.  350..      12 
Citizens'    Gas    &    0.    M.    Co.    v. 
Whipple     (Ind.)      69     N. 

E.    559 365,    532 

Citizens'   Gas   Light  Co.   v.   O'- 
Brien,   118    111.    182.. 65,   242 
Citizens'   Ins.   Co.   v.    Short,    62 

Ind.   316 10 

v.  Stoddard,    197    111.    330.    196 
Citizens'    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Burke, 
98    Tenn.    650 

58,    105,    175,    182 
v.  Hamer,     29     Ind.     App. 

426   238,   243 

v.   Shepherd,       107       Tenn. 

444 247 

v.  Willoeby,  134  Ind.   567.    557 
City  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Findley,  76 

Ga.    311    119 

City       Bank's       Appeal       from 

Com'rs,    54    Com..    273..    202 
City     Council     v.     Wright,     72 

Ala.   41  i    591 

City    of     Aledo     v.    Honeyman, 

208    111.    415 48 

City  of  Atchison  v.  Jansen.   21 

Kas.  560   4 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


li 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


City   of   Atlanta   v.    Young,    93 

Ga,   265   72 

Ciify  of  Aurora  v.  Hillman,   90 

111.   68   591 

City  of  Austin  v.  Ritz,  72  Tex. 

401    543,   594 

City    of    Beardstown    v.    Clark, 

204  111.  526 243 

v.  Smith,   150  111.   169, 

175 363,  592 

City    of    Birmingham    v.    Starr, 

112    Ala.    98 66 

City  of  Bonham  v.  Crider  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)    27  S.  W.  419 

68,    171 
City  of  Chadron  v.  Glover,   43 

Neb.    732   44 

City    of    Chicago   v.    Bixby,    84 

111.   83 192 

.v.  Hastings,  136  111.  251.  25 
v.  Keefe,  114  111.  230. ..3,  12 
v.  Langlass,  66  111.  363...  595 
v.  Le  Moyne,  119  Fed.  662 

14 
v.  McDonough,    112   111.   85 

238 
v.  McLean,    133    111.    148..      58 

v.  Moore,    139    111.    201 195 

v.  Schmidt,    107    111.    186 

104,    119 

v.  Sheehan,  113  111.  658..  95 
v.  Shelton,  75  111.  468..  80,  86 
v.  Stearns,  105  111.  554 

25,    591,    606,    607 
City   of   Columbus  v.   Strassner, 

138   Ind.   301 181,   308 

City     of     Crete     v.     Hendricks 

(Neb.)    90   N.   W.    215..    230 
City  of  Dallas  v.  Breeman,    23 

Tex.   Cv.  App.   3 15... 94,    182 
v.  Jones    (Tex.)    53    S.   W. 

377   106 

City  of  Decatur  v.  Besten,   169 

111.    340    235 

City  of  Dixon  v.  Scott,  181  111. 

116   223 

City  of  East  St.  L.  v.  O'Flynn, 

119    111.    207 126 

City  of  Elgin  v.  Beckwith,   119 

111.    367    198 

v.  Joslyn.    136   111.   529 242 

City  of  Elizabeth  v.  Fitzgerald, 

114    Fed.    547 230 

City   of   Evansville   v.   Tenhenn. 

151    Ind.    42 595 

City  of   Ft.   Madison   v.   Moore, 

109   Iowa,  476 90 


City  of   Freeport  v.   Isbell,    83 

111.   440    1,    106 

City    of    Galveston    v.    Posnain- 

sky,    62    Tex.    120.. 599,    600 
City  of  Harvard  v.  Crouch,   47 

Neb.    133    216 

City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Doherty, 

71  Ind.  6 605 

v.  Gaston,    58    Ind.    224 

591,    607 
v.  Scott,   72    Ind.    200 

591,   596,   597,   598,    607 
City  of  Joliet  v.  Johnson,    177 

111.    178 25,    48,    238 

v.  Looney,   159  111.  471 

34,    35,    597 

v.  Seward,    86   111.    402 113 

City    of    Lanark    v.    Dougherty, 

153    III.    163 238 

City    of    Logansport    v.    Dyke- 
man,   116  Ind.   26 27 

v.  Kihm,    159   Ind.   68 482 

City    of    Louisville     v.     McGill 

(Ky.)    52  S.  W.   1053...      71 
City   of   Lynchburg  v.    Wallace, 

95   Va.    640 48 

City  of  Ma  con  v.  Holcomb,  205 

111.    645    238 

City  of  Madison  v.  Moore,   109 

Iowa,   476   25 

City  of  Marshall   v.  McAlister, 

22    Tex.    Cv.   App.    214..      48 
City    of    Mishawaka    v.    Kirby 

(Ind.)    69  N.  E.  482 234 

City  of  Morris  v.  S.  25  Ala.  57 

34 
City  of  Omaha  v.  Bowman,   63 

Neb.    333    120 

v.  Hager    (Neb.)    92  N.  W. 

1017   355 

v.  Meyers  (Neb.)   92  N.  W. 

743   70 

v.  Richards,    49    Neb.    249.    350 
City  of  Peoria  v.   Calhoun,    29 

111.    317    161 

v.  Gerber,    168    111.    323 

25,  90,   183 
City  of  Roodhouse  v.  Christian, 

158    111.    137 235,    238 

City  of  Salem  v.  Webster,    192 

111.   369   20 

City  of  San  Antonio  v.  Kreusel, 

17   Tex.  Cv.  App.   594...   242 
City    of    Sherman    v.    Greening 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.)    73     S. 
W.   424   355 


Hi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


City  of  So.  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98 

Ind.    585    

City   of    South   Omaha   v.    Fen- 

nell     (Neb.)     94    N.    W. 

632 

v.  Meyers     (Neb.)      92     N. 

W.    743    

v.  Powell,  50  Neb.  798... 
v.  Wizensinski  (Neb.)  92 

N.    W.    1045 

City  of  Spring  Valley  v.  Gavin, 

182    111.    232 219, 

City  of  Sterling  v.  Merrill,   124 

111.    522   20 

City   of    Streeter   v.   Leibendorf- 

er,    71    111.   App.    625 

City   of   Toledo   v.    Higgins,    12 

Ohio   C.    C.    646 

City  Trans.  Co.  v.  Draper,   115 

Ga.    954    

Clafin  v.  Cottman.    77   Ind.   58 

damn  v.  Fagan,   124  Ind.  304 

Clapp    v.    Royer,    28    Tex.    Cv. 

App.  29  

Clapper  v.  Mendill,  96  Mo. 

App.  106 

Clare  v.  P.  9  Colo.  122.. 311, 
Clark  v.  Bennett,  123  Cal.  275 

v.  Clark,     16     Ohio    C.     C. 

103    

v.  Clark,  36  N.  Y.  S.  294. 
v.  Com.  18  Ky.  L.  R.  758. 
v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1029 
v.  Com.  123  Pa.  St.  555.. 

v.  Goddard.    39   Ala.    164.  . 

v.  S.    159    Ind.    66 201, 

v.  S.    12    Ohio,    494... 334, 

v.  S.    31    Tex.    574 

v.  S.    8    Tex.   App.    350 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.   120 

v.  Stitt,  12  Ohio  C.  C.  759 

Clarke  v.  S.  117  Ala.  1 

Clarkson  v.  Whitaker  (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)  68  S.  W.  53 

Clausen  v.  Jones,  18  Tex.  Cv. 

App.  376  

Clear  Creek  Stone  Co.  v.  Dear- 

min,  160  Ind.  162 

Cleason  v.  Baldwin,  152  N.  Y. 

204  145, 


592 

45 

348 
351 

595 
223 

65 
202 

12 
244 
357 
357 
244 

118 
312 

20 

6 

146 
274 

269 
253 
170 
238 
720 
12 
752 

103 

126 

269 

236 
223 

238 
146 


Cleavenger     v.     S.      (Tex.     Cr. 
App.)   65  S.  W.  89..  179, 

Clem   v.    S.    31    Ind.    480 

v.  S.    42    Ind.    420 186, 

Clemmons  v.   S.   43   Fla.   200.. 
Cleveland    v.    Anderson     (Neb.) 

92   N.   W.    306 

v.  Empire  Mills  Co.  6  Tex. 

Cv.    App.    479 

Cleveland,   &c.    R.    Co.   v.    Bad- 
deley,    150    111.    328.238, 

v.  Bates,    91    Ind.    290 

v.  Best,    169    111.    301 

v.  Crawford,    24    Ohio    St. 

640 183,  245, 

v.  Drumm     (Ind.)      70     N. 

E.    286 

v.  Heath,   22   Ind.  App.   47 

v.  Jenkins,    174  111.   398 

106, 

v.  Miles,    162   Ind.   646 

v.  Monaghan,   140  111.  474 

v.  Patton,    203    111.    379... 
v.  Richardson,   19  Ohio  Cir. 

385    

v.  Sargent,     19     Ohio     St. 

452    

v.  Terry,   8   Ohio  St.   570.. 
v.   Walters,    147    111.    60.20. 
Cleveland  Axle  Co.  v.  Zilch,   12 

Ohio   C.    C.    578 

Clewis    v.     Malone,     131     Ala. 

465   

Clifford  v.  Lee   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

23    S.   W.    843 181. 

v.  Minneapolis   St.   P.   &   S. 
S.  R.  Co.   105  Wis.  618. 

v.   S.    56    Ind.    245 

Cline  v.  S.  43   Ohio  St.   33° 

192, 
v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     28 

S.    W.    684 

Clore  v.  Mclntire,  120  Ind.  266 

Clough  v.   S.   7   Neb.   344 

Clouser   v.   Ruckman,    104    Ind. 

588    

Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.   Clay,   51 

Ohio    St.    550 

Coal     Co.     v.    Estievenard,     53 

Ohio  St.    57 

v.Jones,  127  111.  382.. 66. 
Coates  v.  S.  50  Ark.  330.... 
v.  Town  of  Stanton.  90 

Wis.  130  . 


297 

80 

222 


112 
355 

650 
646 
195 

246 

85 

126 

• 

133 
631 

71 
363 


27 
70 
94 

130 
191 
191 

25 

154 

281 
259 

360 
781 

41 
351 

544 

81 

331 

232 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


liii 


( References  are  to  Sections.} 


Cobb  v.   Covenant  M.   B.   Asso. 

153    Mass.    176 75 

v.  Griffin  &  A.  Co.   87   Mo. 

90    162 

v.  Malone,    87    Ala.    514...    360 

v.  S.    115    Ala.    18 219,    299 

v.  Simon    (Wis.)    97   N.  W. 

279   48 

Cobb    Chocolate    Co.    v.    Kund- 

son,    207    111.    461 19,    98 

Coburn  v.  S.   36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

257    290,    292 

Cochran   v.   United   States,    157 

U.    S.    286 337 

Coekrill  v.  Hall,   76  Cal.   193..      37 
Cocoran     v.     Lehigh     Coal     Co. 

138    111.    399 197 

Codding  v.   Wood,    112   Pa.   St. 

371    157 

Coddington     v.     Canaday,      157 

Ind.   243 112 

Coffee  v.  McCord,  83  Ind.  593.    352 

v.  S.    5   Tex.   App.    545 336 

Coffey  v.  S.  (Miss.)   24  So.  315 

282 

Coffeyville    Brick    Co.    v.    Zim- 
merman,   61    Kas.    750..   234 
Coffin  v.   Brown.   94  Md.    190..    191 
v.  United    States,     156    U. 

S.    432 200,    337 

v.  U.   S.    162   U.   S.    664 

48.    71,    113 
Coffman     v.     Com.     10     Bush. 

(Ky.)    495    115 

v.   Reeves,    62    Ind.    334...      25 

In   re.    12    Iowa,   491 696 

Cogan  v.  Cass.  Ave.  &  F.  G.  R. 
Co.     (Mo.    App.)     73    S. 

W.    738    126 

Coghill    v.    Kennedy,    119    Ala. 

641 20,    67,    704 

Cogwell  v.   Southern  P.   R.  Co. 

129   N.  Car.   398 223 

Cohen   v.   Pemberton,    53    Conn, 

235   191 

Cohn   v.   David   Mayer   Brewing 
Co.    56    N.    Y.    S.    293 

126,    141 

v.  Stewart.    41    Wis.    527..    156 
Coker  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    31 

S.    W.    655 110 

Colby  v.  McDermont   (N.  Dak.) 

71    N.   W.    772 358 

v.  Portman,    115    Mich.    95 

84 
Cole    v.    City    of    Boston.    181 

Mass.    374    ....  57 


Cole  v.  Curtis,   16  Minn.   182..   354 

v.  S.    75    Ind.    511..; 56 

Colee   v.   S.    75    Ind.    515 281 

Coleman     v.     Adair,     75     Miss. 

660 195,    211,    223 

v.  Drane,    1-16  Mo.   387 664 

v.  Lord  .(Me.)    52  Atl.  645 

126 

v.  S.    Ill    Ind.    563 52 

Coley  v.  North  Carolina   R.  Co. 

129    N.    Car.    407 121 

Collar    v.    Patterson,     137     111. 

406    124.    126 

Collier  v.  Gavin    (Neb.)    95   N. 

W.   842   363 

v.  Jenks,    19   R.   I.   493 243 

Collins  v.   Breen,  75   Wis.   606.    359 
v.  Chicago,       &c.      R.      Co. 

(Iowa)    97  N.  W.   1103.       25 
v.  City    of    Janesville,    107 

Wis.    436    48 

v.  City    of    Janesville,    111 

Wis.    348    25 

v.  Collins,  46  Iowa,   60 84 

v.  Cooper,  65  Tex.  462 389 

v.  George    (Va.)    46    S.   E. 

684   347 

v.  Green,   28   N.   Car.    139.    158 

v.  P.    39    111.    233 276 

v.  P.   08   111.   589 288 

v.  S.  20  Tex.  App.  400 319 

v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  441 

191 

v.   Waters.    54    111.    486 102 

Collins      Ice      Cream      Co.      v. 

Stephens,    189    111.    200..    347 
Colquhonn    v.    Wells,    Fargo    & 

Co.   21   Nev.   459 65 

Colter    v.    S.    37    Tex.    Cr. 

App.   284 304 

Columbus,      C.      &      I.      C.      v. 

Troesch,    68    111.    545 94 

Columbus   C.   Co.   v.   Crane   Co. 

101    Fed.    946 351 

Columbus  R.   Co.  v.   Ritter,   67 

Ohio   St.    53 7 

Columbus  S.  Bank  v.  Crane  Co. 

56   Neb.    317 100 

Columbia  Veneer  &   Box  Co.   v. 
Cottonwood    Lumber    Co. 

99    Tenn.    122 4..    34 

Comer  v.  Hines.   49   Ind.   482..    156 
Comey   v.   Philadelphia   Tr.   Co. 

175   Pa.   St.    133 198 

Comfort  v.   Balh'ngal,    134   Mo. 

289   155,   156 

v.  P.    54    111.    404...  .   265 


liv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Comfort    v.    Young,    100    Iowa, 

629 492,  501 

Commercial    Bank    v.    Chatfield, 

121   Mich.   641 118 

Comjmercial     Club     v.     Hilliker, 

20   Ind.   App.  .239 G50 

Commercial  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
ris,   105   Ala.   49'8 195 

Commercial  Nat.  Bank  v.  Proc- 
tor,  98   111.   562 198 

Commercial     Travelers'     M.     A. 
Asso.  v.  Fulton,    79   Fed. 

423    347 

Commissioners  v.  Ryckman,   9 1 

Md.    36 235,    358 

v.  Wise,    71   Ind.   43 675 

Commonwealth    v.    Anthes,     71 
Mass.    (5   Gray)    185 

153,    165,    166,    167 
v.  Barry,   91   Mass.    (9   Al- 
len)    276 119,    208 

v.  Berchine,     168     Pa.     St. 
603,   32   Atl.    109 

189,    252,    740 

v.  Bishop,  165  Mass,  148.  288 
v.  Boschim,  176  Pa.  St. 

103    326 

v.  Bosworth,      22       Pick. 

(Mass.)     398    288 

v.  Boutwell,   162  Mass.  230 

85 

v.  Briant,  142  Mass.  463.  170 
v.  Brooks,  164  Mass.  397.  151 
v.  Brown,  167  Mass.  144.  229 
v.  Brubaker,  13  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.    14    68 

v.  Carter     (Mass.)     66     N. 

E.   716   26 

v.  Castley,    118  Mass.    1 

222     295 
v.  Clark,   3   Pa.   Super.   Ct.' 

141    -44 

v.  Cleary,  135  Pa.  St.  64.  340 
v.  Clume,  162.  Mass.  206..  288 
v.  Delaney,  16  Ky.  L.  R. 

509    113 

v.  Devaney,  182  Mass.  33.  227 
v.  Devine,  18  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  431  297 

v.  Eckerd,  174  Pa.  St.  137 

344 

v.  Flynn,  165  Mass.  153..  171 
v.  Foster  (Ky.)  61  S.  W. 

271    151 

v.  George,     13     Pa.     Super. 
Ct.    542 .151 


Commonwealth  v.  Gerade,  145 
Pa.  St.  289.  ..329,  330, 

v.  Gray,    17    Ky.    354 

v.  Grether,    204    Pa.    203.. 

v.  Hagenlock,  140  Mass. 
125  

v.  Hall,    18  Ky.  L.  R.  783 

v.  Hardiman,       9        Gray 

(Mass.)  136  

v.  Harlow,   110  Mass.  411. 

v.  Harris,   168  Pa.  St.   619 

52, 

v.  Hillman,     189     Pa.     St. 

548 

v.  Hollinger,  190  Pa.  St. 

155  

v.  Holmes,  127  Mass.  124. 
v.  Hoskins,  18  Ky.  L.  R. 

59  

v.  Howe  (Pa.  Super.  Ct.) 

4  W.  N.  Cas.  246 

v.  Hyde,  94  Ky.  517 

v.  Kelly,  165  Mass.  175.. 
v.  Kilpatrick,  204  Pa.  St. 

218  

v.  Leonard,  140  Mass.  473 
299, 

v.  Light,  195  Pa.  St.  220. 
v.  McGorty,  114  Mass.  299 

v.  McGowen,     189    Pa.    St. 

641 178,    256, 

v.  McMahon,     145    Pa.    St. 

413   

v.  McManus,     143    Pa.    St. 

64 119.    153, 

v.  Miller,   139  Pa.  St.   77 

294, 
v.  Mudgett,     174     Pa.     St. 

'211    

v.  Mulrey,  170  Mass.  103. 
v.  O'Brien,  172  Mass.  248 

v.  Pease,  110  Mass.  412.. 
v.  Pomeroy,  117  Mass.  143 

v.  Preece,  140  Mass.  276.. 
v.  Reid,  175  Mass.  325..  . 
v.  Rogers,  181  Mass.  184. 
v.  Ruddle,  142  Pa.  St.  144 

v.  Tarr,  4  Allen  (Mass.) 
315  

v.  Van  Horn,  188  Pa.  St. 
143  . 


331 
113 
272 

281 
150 

222 
222 

284 

85 

334 

288 

258 

35 
841 
188 

201 

340 
192 

265 

281 
195 

165 
295 

261 

174 

284 
222 

331 
317 

80 
86 

197 
320 

281 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


Iv 


( References  are  to  Sections.) 


Commonwealth    v.    Walsh,    1(52 

Mass.   242 191, 

v.  Warner,     13    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.    461    

v.  Washington,  202  Pa.  St. 

148    

v.  Webster,        5        Gush. 
(Mass.)    320 

295,   312,   734, 
v.  Williams,       171       Mass. 

461    

v.  Wilson,    152    Mass.    12 

340, 

v.  Wilson,    186  Pa.   St.    1.. 
v.  Wood,    111    Mass.    409.. 
v.  Yost,   197  Pa.  St.   171.. 
Compton  v.   S.    110   Ala.   24 

272.    296, 
Conard  v.  Kinzie,  105  Ind.  281 

Concord-Williams    Lumber    Co. 

v.  Warren  Grain  Co.   114 

Ga.  966  

Conde  v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

10  

Condon  v.  Brockway,  157  111. 

91  

Cone  v.  Citizens'  Bank,  4  Kas. 

App.  470  

Coney  v.  S.  108  Ga.  773 

Congran  v.  Bigelow,  164  U.  S. 

301  

Conkey  v.  Carpenter,  106  Mich. 

'l  

Conkey  Co.  v.  Bueherer.  84  111. 

App.  633 '. 

Conkwright  v.  P.  35  111.  204.. 
Conley  v.  Redwine,  109  Ga. 

640  

Conn  v.  P.  116  111.  464 

Connaghan  v.  P.  88  111.  462.. 
Connaughton  v.  Sun  Printing 

and  Pub.  Co.  Asso.  76  N. 

Y.  S.  755 

Connecticut  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

MoWherter,   73   Fed.   444 

Connelly  v.  Shamrock  Ben.  Soc. 

43    Mo.   App.    283 

Conner   v.    Citizens'    St.    R.    Co. 

146    Ind.    430 

v.  Giles,    76   Me.    132 

v.  Metropolitan      Life      Ins. 

Co.   78  Mo.  App.   131.... 

v.  Wilkie,  1  Kas.  App.  492 


308 

191 

6,    9 

776 
151 

342 

109 
838 
150 

783 

7 

135 

290 

10 

154 

82 

126 
227 

30 
195 

90 
279 
294 

25 

93 
352 

164 
126 

80 
18 


Conners  v.  Chingren,  111  Iowa, 

437    195 

v.  Indiana,    I.   &   Q.   R.   Co. 

193    111.    464 363 

v.   S.    95    Wis.    77 198 

Connor  v.  Electric  Tr.  Co.   173 

Pa.    St.    605 649 

Conrad  v.   S.    132    Ind.    259 

326.    367 
Convey     Mill,     Matter     of,     52 

Iowa,    198   693 

Consolidated,    &c.    Co.    v.    Haw- 
ley,   7    S.  Dak.   229 129 

Consolidated    Coal    Co.    v.    Bo- 

kamp,    181    111.    16..  183,   235 
v.  Haenni,    146   111.   614 

241,   363 

v.  Scheiber,    167   111.   539..       54 
Consolidated  Stone  Co.  v.  Mor- 
gan,   160   Ind.    241 233 

Consolidated  Tr.   Co.   v.   Cheno- 
with,  61   N.  J.  L.   554 

28,    349 
v.  Haight,   59  N.  J.  L.  577 

80 
Consolidation    C.    &    M.    Co.    v. 

Clay,    51    Ohio   St.    542..    351 
Continental,     &c.     Ins.     Co.     v. 

Yung,    113    Ind.    159....    308 
Continental    Nat.   Bank   v.    Fol- 

son,    67    Ga.    624 12 

v.  Tradesmen's    National 

Bank,    173   N.  Y.   272...       25 
Continental   Tob.   Co.   v.  Knoop, 

24  Ky.  L.  R.   1268 119 

Converse    v.    Converse,    21    Vt. 

168   694 

Conway  v.  Jefferson,  46   N.  H. 

521    199 

v.  .Jordan,    110   Iowa,    462.         6 

v.  S.    118    Ind.    482 329 

v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  327 

326 

v.  Vizzard,   112   Ind.   268..    701 
v.  Vizzard.   122   Ind.   271..      70 
Cook    v.     Bartlett,     179     Mass. 

576   191 

v.  Brown,  39  Me.  443 308 

v.  Brown,  62  Mich.  478 

31,  415,  471 
v.  Los  Angeles  &  P.  E.  R. 

Co.  134  Cal.  279 25,  30 

v.Morris,  66  Conn.  196..  141 

v.  P.  177  111.  146 21,  48 

v.  S.  (Fla.)  35  So.  669 

25,  269,  301,  779.  782 


Ivi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Cook  v.  Steinert  &  Sons  Co.  69 

Conn.   91    189 

Cook    County    v.    Harms,     108 

111.    151 104,     196 

Cooke  v.  Cook,  100  Ala.  175..  48 
Coombs  v.  Mason,  97  Me.  270 

20,   119 
Coon  v.  P.   99    111.   368 

115,    116,    175 
Cooper  v.  Central  R.  Co.  44  la. 

136,  610,  611,  633,  634,  739 

v.   Delk,    108    Ga.    555 243 

v.  Denver   &   R.    G.    R.    Co. 

11    Utah.    46 197 

v.  Ford      (Tex.     Cv.     App.) 

69    S.    W.    487 191 

v.  Morris,  48  N.  J.  L.  607 

35 
v.  Mulder.    74  Mich.   374..    245 

v.  S.    80    Miss.    175 258 

Coos    Bay,    R.    &   E.    R.    Co.    v. 

Siglin,    26    Ore.    387.. 84,    94 
Copas  v.   Anglo-American   Prov. 

Co.   73   Mich.   541 6 

Copeland   v.   Ferris,    118    Iowa, 

554    351 

v.  Hall,  29  Me.   93 157 

v.  Hewitt.   96   Me.   525.25,   235 
v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  575 

224 
Corfcin    v.    Shearer,    8    111.     (3 

Gilm.)    482    48 

Corbus  v.  Leonhardt,    114  Fed. 

10   25 

Cordill   v.   Moore,    17    Tex.   Cv. 

App.    217    68 

Cormody  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co. 

162    Mass.    539 181 

Cornelius  v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R. 

771    258 

Cornish  v.   Graff.    36   Hun    (N. 

Y.)     160    . 35 

Coryell  v.  Stone,  62  Ind.  312..  43 
Cossitt  v.  Hobbs,  56  111.  238..  94 
Costella  v.  Kottas,  52  Neb.  15 

26,   358 
Costly    v.    McGowen,     174    111. 

76   116 

Cotton  v.  Ulmer,  45  Ala.  378.  696 
Cottrell  v.  Piatt,  101  Iowa, 

231    212 

Covington     v.      Simpson      (Del. 

Super.)    52   Atl.    349 84 

Cowan    v.    Umbagog    Pulp    Co. 

91    Me.    26 188 

Cowie    v.    City    of    Seattle,    22 

Wash.    659   .  66 


Cowles   v.   Chicago,   R.   I.   &   P. 
Co.     (Iowa)     88    N.    W. 

1072 120 

Cox  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

95    Iowa,    54 25 

v.  Com.  125  Pa.  St.  94..  288 
v.  Highley,  100  Pa.  St. 

252   34 

v.  Matthews,  17  Ind.  367.  868 
v.  Norfolk  &  C.  R.  Co.  123 

N.    Car.    604 126 

v.  Peltier,    159    Ind.    355..    187 

v.  P.    109    111.    459 359 

v.  S.    68   Ark.   462 192 

Coyle  v.  Com.   100  Pa.  St.  573 .    331 
v.  Pittsburg  B.  &  L.  E.  R. 

Co.    18  Pa.  Super.   235..       81 
Crabtree  v.  Hagenbaugh,  25  111. 

219   367 

Craggs    v.    Bohart    (Ind.    Ter.) 

69    S.   W.    931 359 

Craig     v.      Borough,      1 1      Pa. 

Super.   Ct.    490 351 

v.  Frazier,  127  Ind.  286..  43 
v.  Hamilton,  118  Ind.  568 

515 

v.  Hobbs,    44    Ind.    363 415 

v.  Miller,    133    111.    307 

113,    250 

v.  Rohrer,    63    111.    325 367 

v.  Southard.   162  111.  213..    696 
Grain   v.    First   National    Bank, 

114    111.    527 85,    113 

Cramer  v.   City  of   Burlington, 

39    Iowa,    512 594 

v.  City    of    Burlington,    42 

Iowa,    322    608 

v.  City    of    Burlington,    49 

Iowa,   215    222 

v.  S.  21   Ind.  App.  502 9 

Crane  v.  Crane,  5  Pet.    (U.  S.) 

356   359 

v.  S.   Ill   Ala.  45.82.   213,  296 
Crane  Co.  v.  Columbus  S.  Bank 

(Neb.)    91    N.   W.    532..    238 
v.  Tierney,    175   111.   79 

1.    20.    25,    48 
Cranston  v.  New  York  C.  &  H. 

R.  Co.    103  N.  Y.   614..    186 
Crawford  v.  Athletic  Asso.  Ill 

Iowa,    736    351 

v.  Brown.  21  Colo.  272..  5 
v.  Com.  18  Ky.  L.  R.  16..  151 
v.  S.  112  Ala.  1 

61,  115,  258,  299,  306, 

313,  341,  345 
v.  S.  117  Ga.  247 191 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ivii 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Crawford  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

34    S.   W.    927 

v.  Wittish,     4     Pa.     Super. 

585    

Crawshaw   v.    Summer,    56    Mo. 

517   

Creed  v.  P.   81   111.   565 

31,    226,    344, 
Crenshaw    v.    Johnson,    120    N. 

Car.    270    

Crescent  Horse  Shoe  &  Iron  Co. 

v.      Eynon,    95    Va.    153 

Cresler  v.  Ashville  (N.  Car.) 
46  S.  E.  739 

Crete  M.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Patz, 
64  Neb.  676 

Crews  v.  Lackland,  67  Mo.  621 

v.  P.    120   111.   317 

25,    115,    299, 
v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  533 

Criner  v.   S.   41   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

290    

Crip  pen  v.  Hope,  38  Mich.  344 

Crisman  v.  McDonald,   28  Ark. 


Crittenden  v.  City  of  Mt.  Clem- 
ens,   86   Mich.    227 

v.   S.    134    Ala.    145 

116,    192,    288, 
Crockett    v.    Miller,     112    Fed. 

729    

v.  S.  40  Tex.  Cr.  App,  173 

Croft  v.  Northwestern  S.   S.  Co. 

20    Wash.    175 

v.  S.    95    Ala.    3 

Crooks  &  Co.  v.  Eldridge  &  H. 

Co.   64  Ohio  St.    195.... 

Cropper    v.    Pittman,     13    Md. 

190   

Crosby  v.  P.   137   111.   336.112. 

v.  P.    165    111.    619 

v.   Ritchey,    56    Neb.    336.. 

Cross     v.     Kennedy     (Tex.     Cv. 

App.)    66   S.   W.   318.... 

v.  P.    47    111.    58 

v.  S.    132   Ind.    65 

Crossen  v.  Grandy,  42  Ore.  282 

v.  Oliver,    41    Ore.    505 

Crossette  v.  Jordan    (Mich.)    92 
N.   W.    782 7,    80, 


.289 
141 

19 
745 

71 

626 

247 

80 

84 

802 

303 

247 

14 

32 

609 

327 

198 

221 

27 
297 

94 

192 

279 
281 
247 

25 
287 
302 

25 
113 

351 


Grouse  v.   Holman,    19    Ind.   30 

330 
Crow   v.    S.    33    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

264   312 

v.  S.  37   Tex.  Cr.  App.   295 

314,    731 

Crowder   v.    Reed,    80    Ind.    1..      80 
Crowe  v.  House  of  Good  Shep- 
herd,  56   N.  Y.   S.    223..    141 
Crowell  v.   P.    190   111.   514 

34,  73,  277,  773 
Crown   C.   &   C.   Co.   v.    Taylor, 

184    111.    250 25,    30 

Crum    v.    Yunott     (Ind.    App.) 

40   N.   E.    79 100 

Crump    v.    Com.     (Va.)     23    S. 

E.    760    341,    347 

Crutcher    v.    Sechick,     10    Tex. 

Cv.   App.    676 72 

Crutchfield    v.    Richmond    &    R. 

Co.   76  N.  Car.   320 208 

v.   S.   7  Tex.  Cv.  App.  65..    314 

v.  S.  7  Tex.  App.  65 730 

Cullen    v.    Hanisch,     114    Wis. 

24    231 

Culter  v.   Skeels,   69   Vt.    154..    351 
Gumming  v.  S.  99   Ga.  662....    257 
Cummings    v.    Halena    &    L.    S. 
R.   Co.    26   Mont.    434 

121,    126 

v.  Tilton,  44  111.  172....  117 
Cummins  v.  S.  50  Neb.  274...  78 
Cunningham  v.  Davis, '  175 

Mass.    213    94 

v.  P.    195    111.    550 82 

v.  P.    210    111.    410 60 

v.  S.    117    Ala.    59 301 

v.  S.   65   Ind.   380 210 

v.  S.   56  Miss.   269 331 

v.  S.    56   Neb.    691 303,    729 

v.  Stein,    109    111.    375 106 

v.  Underwood,       116      Fed. 

803 351 

v.  Washburn,      119      Mass. 

224   160,   445 

Cupps  v.   S.    (Wis.)    97   N.   W. 

218 9,    25,    192,    196,   269 

Currier  v.  S.   157  Ind.   114....    275 
Curry  v.  Cathin,  12  Wash.  322 

25 

Curtis   v.   Detroit  &   M.   R.   Co. 
27    Wis.    161 
531,  532,  540,  543,  550 

551.   567 
v.  S.    36    Ark.    284..  .267 


Iviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  an   to  Sections.) 


Cushman    v.     Carbondale     Fuel 
Co.     (Iowa)     88     N.    W. 

817   126,   144 

v.  Cogswell,    86    111.   414 

110,   250 
Cusick     v.     Campbell,     68     111. 

508   195,   243 

Cutler  v.  Callison,  72  111.  116 

175,  664 
v.  Parsons,    43     N.    Y.     S. 

187    145 

v.  P.    184    111.    395 12 


I) 


Dacey  v.   P.    116    111.   555 

42,   243,   329.   330,   331, 

727,   746,   747,  751 
Dady  v.  Condit,    188   111.   234 

192,    193 
Dahlstrom  v.   St.   Louis.   &c.   R. 

Co.    108    Mo.    533 644 

Dalby  v.   Snuffer,   57   Mo.   294.    656 
Dallas.    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Broad- 
hurst      (Tex.     Cv.     App.) 

68    S.    W.    315 93a 

v.   Campbell        (Tex.        Cv. 

App.)    26   S.  W.   884....      97 
v.  Harvey    (Tex.   Cv.  App.) 

27    S.   W.   423... 92,   97,   198 
v.  Payne    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

78  S.  W.    1085 196 

Dallas    Cotton    Mills    v.    Ashley 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.)     63     S. 

W.    160    203 

Dalton  v.   Bank,  54   Mo.    106..    656 

Daly   v.   Kimball   Co.    67    Iowa, 

132    156 

Dalzell  v.   S.   7   Wyo.   450 339 

Dammann    v.     St.    Louis,     152 

Mo.    186 198 

Damour     v.     Lyons     City,      44 

Iowa,   281    602 

Dancy    v.    S.     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

46    S.    W.    247 269 

Danforth  v.   S.   75   Ga.   614 168 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     69 
S.   W.    159 25 

Danghrill  v.   S.    113  Ala.   7 253 

Daniels   v.   Florida   C.   &   P.   R. 

Co.    62    S.   Car.    1 96 

v.  Leibig  Mfg.  Co.  2  Marv. 
(Del.)     207    126 

Danville    St.    Car    Co.    v.    Wat- 
kins,    97   Va.    717 547 


Darity  v.  S.   38   Tex.  Cr.  App. 

546   280 

Darling    v.    Williams,    35    Ohio 

St.   61 474,   475,   649 

Darlington    v.    Allegheny,     189 

Pa.    St.    202 188 

Dart  v.  Horn,    20   111.    213 198 

Dashiel      v.      Harshmanj       113 

Iowa,    824   668 

Daugherty  v.  Herndon,   27   Tex. 

Cv.    App.    175 25 

Davenport     v.     Hannibal,     108 

Mo.   479   599 

v.  Johnson,   182  Mass.   260 

32 
v.  Sebring,    52     Iowa,     364 

656,  660 

Davidoff     v.     Wheeling     &     W. 
Mfg.    Co.     37     N.    Y.    S. 

661    130 

Davidson  v.  Jefferson    (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)    68   S.   W.   822 244 

v.  P.    90    111.    231 709 

v.  Pittsburg,  &c.  R.  Co.   41 
W.  Va.   415 

641,    648,    529,   536 
v.  Wallingford,       88      Tex. 

619    94,    223 

Davis    v.    Alas    Assur.    Co.     16 

Wash.    232    191 

v.  Atlanta,  &c.  C.  A.  L.  R. 

Co.   63   S,  Car.   577.. 99.    191 
v.  Bailey,     21     Ky.     L.     R. 

839    347 

v.  Bingham    (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    33   S.  W.   1035...      80 
v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.   Co. 

18    Wis.    188 582 

v.  Concord  &  M.  R.  Co.   68 

N.    H.    247 113 

v.  Davis,   20  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

310   199 

v.  Dregne     (Wis.)      97     N.  . 

W.    512    175 

v.  El  more,  40  S.  Car.  533.  172 
v.  Foster,  68  Ind.  238.  .4,  367 
v.  Oilliam,  14  Wash.  206.  243 
v.  Ghiarnieri,  45  Ohio  St. 

478    543.    050 

v.  Hall    (Neb.)    97    N.    W. 

1023   25.    ?-5r, 

v.  Hays,    89    Ala.    563 182 

v.  Holbrook.  25  Colo.  493.  135 
v.  Hoxey,  2  111.  (1  Scam.) 

406    .' 120 

v.  Kenava.    51    III.    170...    155 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


lix 


(References  are  to  Medians.) 


Davis  v.  Kent,  97  Ga.  275....  130 
v.  Kroyden,      1     Mo.     App. 

102   122 

v.  Living,   50  W.  Va.   432.  866 
v.  Northern  E.   R.   Co.    170 

111.    602    217 

v.  P.    114    111.    86 

115,  198,  273,  299 
v.  Paducah  R.  &  L.  Co.  24 

Ky.  135  184 

v.  S.  131  Ala.  10,  31  So. 

569  724 

v.  S.  74  Ga.  869 312 

v.  S.  105  Ga.  808 320 

v.  S.  114  Ga.  104 

265,  297,  321 

v.  S.  152  Ind.  34 48,  118 

v.  S.  51  Neb.  301.21,  305,  307 

v.  S.  25  Ohio  St.  369. .48,  360 

v.  S.  63  Ohio  St.  173 301 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  54 

S.  W.  583 303 

v.  Searey,  79  Miss.  292...  80 
v.  U.  S.  160  U.  S.  469 

330  331 

v.  U.  S.   165  U.  S.  373...!  269 

v.  Wilson,    65    111.    525....  20 

v.  Wilson,    11    Kas.    74 4 

Davis  Coal  Co.  v.  Polland,   158 

Ind.    687    544 

Davison   v.   P.    90    111.    231 

153,    166,  260 
Dawson    v.    Coffman.     28     Ind. 

220 356 

v.  Coston,    18    Colo.   493...  347 

v.  S.    62   Miss.    241... 325,  328 
Daxaribeklav  v.  P.  93   111.  App. 

553   44 

Day  v.   Boston   &  M.   R.    (Me.) 

55    Atl.    420 126 

v.  Porter,    161    111.    235...  238 
Dayton  v.  Lincoln,   39  Neb.  74 

93 

v.  Monroe,    47   Mich.    193..  760 
Deal    v.   S.    140    Ind.    354 

216,    260,    372,  366 

Dean  v.  Erskine,   18  N.  H.   81.  158 

v.Ross,    105    Cal.    22-7 195 

v.  S.    130    Ind.    237 221 

v.  S.    147    Ind.    215.. 169,  822 
Deasey    v.    Thurman,    1    Idaho, 

'779  102 

Deatley   v.    Com.    (Ky.)    29    S. 

W.    741    83 

Debney  v.   S.    45   Neb.    856 71 

Decatur     Cereal     Mill     Co.     v. 

Gogerty,    180  111.   197...  21 


Decatur  Cereal  Mill  Co.  v.  John- 
son   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)    35  S. 

W.  951   70 

Decker  v.  Sexton,   43   N.  Y.  S. 

167 '....: 139 

DeClerg  v.  Mungin,  46  111.   112 

243 
Deerfield   v.   Northwood,    10    N. 

H.    269    84 

Deering   &    Co.    v.    Hannah,    93 

Mo.    App.    618 362 

Deets     v.     National     Bank,     57 

Kas.   288 13 

Defoe  v.  St.  Paul  C.  R.  Co.   65 

Minn.  319  101 

Deggs  v.  S.   7   Tex.  App.   359..    326 
DeGoey  v.  Van  Wyk,  97   Iowa, 

491   70 

De  Graff  enried  v.  Menard,    103 

Ga.    651    100 

v.  Wallace    (Ind.   Ter.)    53 

S.    W.    452 126 

De    Hart    v.    Board,     143    Ind. 

363   199 

Deig    v.     Morehead,     110     Ind. 

461    70 

Deilks  v.  S.    141    Ind.    26 

21,  260,  777,  802 
Deitz  v.  Regnier,  27  Kas.  94..  20 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 

Devore,    114    Fed.    155...    204 
Delhaney  v.   S.    115    Ind.   502 

357,    358 
De  Los  Santos  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr. 

App.)    31    S.   W.   395....    284 

Delvin  v.   P.    104   111.   504 170 

Dempster  M.  Mfg.   Co.  v.   First 

Nat.   Bank,   49   Neb.   321 

353 
Denise    v.    City    of    Omaha,    49 

Neb.   750 25 

Denison   &   P.    S.   R.   Co.   v.   O'- 

Maley     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

45    S.   W.    225 80 

Denman  v.  Bloomer,  11  111.  193 

1 

Denmark  v.  S.  43  Fla.   182 43 

Dennis  v.   S.    112   Ala.    64 306 

v.  S.    118   Ala.    72 

25,   68,   258,   279,  295,  304 

v.  S.    91    Ind.    292 852,    856 

Dennison    v.    Musgrave,    46    N. 

Y.    S.    530 '131 

Denny  v.  Stout,   59  Neb.   731..    101 
Densmore    v.    S.    67    Ind.    306, 

154,    195,    294,    297,    715 
Dent  v.   S.    17    So.   94 201 


Ix 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Denton     v.     Jackson,     106   "111. 

433   48 

Denver  v.   Fatherington    (Colo.) 

68    Pac.    978 247 

v.  Myers,    63   Neb.    107 247 

Denver,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Buffehr, 

30    Colo.    27 97 

v.  Crumbaugh,       23      Colo. 

363    7 

v.  lies,   25   Colo.    19 101 

v.  Lassasso,    22    Colo.    444 

92,    118 
v.  Lorentzen,    79    Fed.    291 

205 
v.   Peterson,    30    Colo.    77..      94 

v.  Spencer,  25   Colo.  9 80 

v.  Young,    30    Colo.    349 

80,    350 
Denver  Tramway  Co.  v.  Owens, 

20   Colo.    112,    582 48 

v.  Reid,  4  Colo.  App.  53..  553 
Derby  v.  S.  60  N.  J.  L.  258..  178 
Deserant  v.  Cerrillos  Coal  Co. 

178    U.    S.    409 247 

Dessaunier   v.   Murphy,    33   Mo. 

191 657 

Detroit    Elec.    &    L.    P.    Co.    v. 
Applebaum      (Mich.)      94 

N.    W.     12 !. 514 

Detwiler  v.  City  of  Lansing,  95 

Mich.    486     601 

Dever  v.   Clarke,    44   Kas.   752 

491,    495 
•Devine  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

R.    Co.    100    Iowa,    692..117a 
v.  Murphy,    168  Mass.   249 

136 
DeWeese  v.  Merimee,  I.  M.  Co. 

128    Mo.    423    238 

Dick  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 

23   Ky.   L.   R.    1068    126 

Dicken  v.  Liverpool  S.  &  C.  Co. 

41   W.  Va.   511    53 

Dickens   v.    S.    30    Ga.    383 168 

Dickensen  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

63    S.   W.    328 182 

Dickerhoff   v.   Alder,    32    N.   Y. 

S.    698    94 

Dickerson   v.   Johnson,    24   Ark. 

251    84 

v.  Quincy  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  67 

Vt.   609 351 

Dickie   v.    Carter,    42    111.    376 

696,  705 
Diefenback    v.    Stark,    56    Wis. 

463   156,   157 


Dietz  v.  Metropolitan   L.  I.  Co. 

168    Pa.    St.    504 129 

Diggers  v.   S.   38   Fla.   7 25 

Dillingham     v.      Bryant      (Tex. 

App.)    14  S.  W.   1017...      43 

v.   Crank,   87   Tex.    104 117a 

v.   Fields,   9   Tex.   Cv.   App. 

1     31,   32 

Dimmick   v.   Babcock,   92   Iowa, 

692    8 

Dina  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    78 

S.    W.    230 192 

Dingee    v.    Unrue's    Adm'x,    98 

Va.   247 84 

Dinsmore  v.  S.  61  Neb.  418.    49,  78 
v.  Tidball,  34  Ohio  St.  416.    521 
Dirimple  v.  State  Bank,  9 1  Wis. 

601   129 

District   of   Columbia    v.   Robin- 
son,   180    U.   S.    92 119 

Diver  v.  Hall,  46  N.  Y.  S.  553.   203 

Dix  v.   Akers,   30   Ind.   433 357 

Dixon  v.   Labry,    16   Ky.   L.   R. 

522 65 

v.    S.    113    Ga.    1039 192 

v.   S.    46   Neb.    298 206 

Doan   v.    S.    26    Ind.    498 222 

Doane    v.    Lockwood,     115    111. 

490 121 

Dobbs    v.    Gate,    60    Mo.    App. 

658    113 

Dobney    v.     Conley      (Tex.     Cv. 

App.)    65   S.  W.    1124...    116 

Dobson  v.  S.  46  Neb.  250 265 

v.  S.  61  Neb.  584 115,  119 

v.   Southern  R.  Co.    132  N. 

Car.    900 119,    192 

Dockerty   v.    Hutson,    125    Ind. 

102    479 

Dodd  v.  Gui'seffi,   100  Mo.  App. 

311    119,    192 

v.  Gaines,      82      Tex.      433 

518,   519 

v.Moore,    91     Ind.    522.. 1,    41 
Dodds  v.  McCormick  Harvesting 

M.   Co.    62   Neb.    759 243 

Dodge  v.  Brown,  22  Mich.  446.    172 
v.  Reynolds    (Mich.)    98  N. 

W.    738 366 

Doe  v.  United  States   (Neb.)    91 

N.  W.   519 237 

Doering   v.    S.    49    Ind.    56 278 

Doggett  v.  S.   39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

5   215 

Dohmen  Co.  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins. 
Co.    96    Wis.    38 

177,    200,    207,    219 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


Ixi 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Dolan  v.  S.   44  Neb.   643 267 

Doll    v.    S.    45    Ohio    St.    452.. 7,    8 
Dollman    v.    Haefner,    12    Ohio 

C.   C.   721    8 

Dolphin  v.  Plumley,    175   Mass. 

304 80,    101 

Dombrook      -v.      Rumeley      Co. 

(Wis.)    97  N.  W.   493...    358 
Dominick  v.  Randolph,  124    'la. 

557    6,   330 

Donaho   v.    S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.) 

47    S.    W.    469 25 

Donahue  v.  Egan,    85   111.   App. 

20   223 

v.  Windsor   Co.   M.    F.    Ins. 

Co.    56   Vt.    374 3 

Donald    v.    S.    21    Ohio    C.    C. 

124   80 

Donaldson  v.   S.    10   Ohio  C.   C. 

613    340 

Donavan  v.  Bromley,   113  Mich. 

53    199 

Donaway   v.   P.    110    T.i.    333..    279 
Donk    Bros.    Coal    &    C.    Co.    v. 

Stroff,    20    111.    483 238 

Donley    v.    Dougherty,    174    111. 

582 382 

Donley    v.    Dougherty,   .75    111. 

App.   379   200 

Donnilly  v.  S.  26  N.  J.  L.  480 

119 
Dooley  v.  Gorman,  104  Ga.  767 

140 
Doolittle  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  62 

S.    Car.     130 48 

Doon  v.   Ravey,   49   Vt.    293...    191 
Dooner    v.    Delaware    &    H.    C. 

Co.    164   Pa.  St.    17 93 

Doran  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &  M.  C. 

R.    Co.     117    Iowa,    442 

200,  244 
Dorrance    v.    McAlister,    1    Ind. 

Ter.    473 26 

Dorsey     v.     S.      110    Ga.     351 
175,  201,  265,  272,  279, 

345,  782 
Dougherty  v.  King,  48  N.  Y.  S. 

110    192 

v.  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.    97  Mo.  658 

548.     549,     567,    572.    574 
Douglas  v.  Blankenship,     0  Ind. 

16C    356 

Douglass  v.  Geiler,  32  Kas.  499 

3,   196 

v.  Trask,    77    Me.    35      107 

v.  Wolf,    6    Kas.    88 27 

Douthill  v.  Ter.  7   Okla.  55 9 


Dove    v.    S.    3    Heisk     (Tenn.) 

371    331 

Dowdy  v.  Watson,  115  Ga.  42.      206 
Downey  v.  Germini  Min.  Co.   24 

Utah,    431... 25,    80 

Downing   v.   Murray,    113    Cal. 

455 126 

*    S.     114    Ga.    30 220 

v.   S.    (Wyo.)    69   Pac.   264 

361 
Dowzelot   v.    Rowlings,    58    Mo. 

75    34 

Doyle   v.   Donnelly,   56   Me.   28.    404 
v.  Mo.  K.  &  T.  T.  Co.   140 
Mo.     1..383,     610,    614, 

617,    618,    621,    622 
v.  P.  147  111.  394.  .80,  223,  226 

v.   S.   39   Fla.   155 48,    195 

Doysher  v.  Adams,  1 6  Ky.  L.  ,R. 

582 100 

Drainage  Corns,  v.  Illinois  Cent. 

R.  Co.    158   111.   353 113 

Drake    v.    S.    60    Ala.    62 153 

Drennen  v.  Smith,  115  Ala.  396 

196 
Drenning  v.  Wesley,  189  Pa.  St. 

160   351 

Dresback  v.  S.  33  Ohio  St.  369.    269 

Driggers    v.    S.     38    Fla.    7 284 

Driver   v.   Atchison,  T.   &  S.   F. 

R.   Co.  59  Kas.   773 6 

v.   Board,      70      Ark.      358 

197,  244 

v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  160.        3 
Drumheller  v.   American  Surety 

Co.    30   Wash.    530 191 

Drummond  v.  Nichols   (S.  Car.) 

21    S.   E.    322 130 

Drury  v.  Connell,   117  111.  43.6,693 
Druse  v.  Wheeler,  26  Mich.  189 

197 
Drye  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    55 

S.  W.   65 25 

Dryman    v.     S.     102    Ala.   130 

226,    758 
Dubois  v.  Decker    114  Fed. 

267 359 

Dueber    Watch    C.    Mfg.    Co.   v. 

Young,  155  111.  226....  238 
Duff  v.  Com.  24  Ky.  L.  R.  201 .  195 
Duffield  v.  Delaney.  36  111.  258.  195 

Duffin  v.  P.   107   111.   113 44 

Duffy  v.  P.  26  N.  Y.  588 165 

v.  St.    Louis    Tr.    Co.    (Mo. 

App.)  78  S.  W.  831....  121 
Dugan  v.  Com.  19  Ky.  L.  R. 

1273 .    318 


Ixii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Duggins    v.    Watson,     15     Ark. 

118    361 

Duke   v.    S.    35    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

283 Ill 

Dunbar  v.  S.   34  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

596 358 

Duncan    v.    Borden,     13     Colo. 

App.  481 25 

v.  P.    134   111.    110. ...275,   791 

v.  S.    95    Ga.    477 328 

Duncombe  v.  Powers,    75    Iowa; 

185 199 

Dunham   v.    Holloway,    3    Okla. 

244    349 

Dunham  Towing  &  Wrecking  Co. 

v.  Danclelin,  143  111.  414.       24 
Dunlap    v.    United    Statas,    165 

U.    S.    486 49 

Dunlop    v.    Patterson,     5     Cow. 

(N.   Y.)     243 218 

Dunn  v.  Bushnell    (Neb.)    83  N. 

W.   693 20 

v.  P.   109  111.  635..  19,  42, 

243,  284,  294,  295,  337, 

644,    718,    748 

v.  P.  172  111.  582   117 

Dunnington     v.     Frick     Co.     60 

Ark.  250 351,  363 

v.  Syfeers,    157    Ind.    458..    126 
Dunseath  v.  Pittsburg,  A.  &  M. 

Tr.  Co.  161   Pa.  St.   124.    192 
Dupuis  v.  Chicago  &  N.  R.  Co. 

115    111.    101 116 

Duren  v.  Kee,  41  S.  Car.  171..    157 
Durhami    v.     Goodwin,     54     111. 

469 71 

v.  Smith,     120    Ind.    468..   211 

v.  S.   120  Ind.   467 206 

Durkee    v.    Marshall,    7    Wend. 

(N.   Y.)    312 171 

Durrah  v.  Stillwell,  59  Ind.  142 

493 
Du    Souchet    v.    Dutcher,     113 

Ind.   249 7 

Duthie    v.    Town   of   Washburn, 

87    Wis.    231     163 

Duval  v.  Kenton,  127  Ind.  178.    216 
v.    S.      Tex.    Cr.    App.)    70 

S.    W.    543 268 

Dwelling     House     Ins.     Co.     v. 

Dowdall,  55  111.  App.  622 

243 
Dwight  v.  Germania  L.  Ins.  Co. 

103    N.    Y.    341 156 

Dyal   v.    S.    103   Ga.   425 80 

Dye  v.  Scott,  35  Ohio  St.   194.    367 


Dyer  v.  Dyer,  87   Ind.   18 694 

v.  S.    74    Ind!    595 773 


E 


Eames  v.  Blackhart,  12  111.   195 

172,    308 

v.   Rend,    105    111.    506 104 

Earle  v.   Poat,   63   S.   Car.   439 

27,    191 
Earll  v.  P.  73  111.  329 

294,    2'95,    297,    376,    716 
Earp  v.  Edginton,  107  Tenn.  23 

170 
Easley  v.  Valley  M.  L.  Asso.  91 

Va.    161    243 

East  v.  Crow,  70  111.  92..    382,   384 
East,    &c.    R.    Co.   v.    Scott,    71 

Tex.  705.. 614,  619,  621,  623 
v.  Waldrop,   114  Ga.   289..    192 
Eastman  v.  Curtis,  67    Vt.   432 

76,  118,  363 
East  St.  L.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen, 

54    111.    App.    32 363 

v.  Eggman,    170   111.    539..      53 
v.  Enright,     152     111.     246 

71,  242 

v.  Hightower,  92  111.  139..      94 
v.  O'Harra,    150    111.    585 

183.   236 

v.  Stout,   150  111.  9 150,  347 

East  Tenn.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayless. 

77   Ala.   430 32 

v.  Gurley,    12    Lea    (Tenn.) 

46 26b 

v.  Lee,  90  Tenn.  570 53 

v.  Toppins,  10  Lea    (Tenn.) 

64 48 

Eaverson  v.  S.   73   Miss.    810..    255 
Eaves  v.   Cherokee   Iron  Co.   73 

Ga.    459 397,    469 

Echols    v.    S.     (Ga.)    46    S.    E. 

409 80 

Eckels   v.    S.    20   Ohio   St.    515 

27.  814 

Eckert  v.  S.   114  Wis.    160....    329 
Economy  L.  Co.  v.  Stephen,  187 

111.    137    649 

Edd   v.   Union   P.    Coal   Co.    25 

Utah,    293 94 

Eddy  v.  Chase,  140  Mass.  471.    158 
v.  Lafayette,  163  U.  S.  456 

358 
Edelhoff  v.  S.  5  Wyo.  19 243 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixiii 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Edens  v.   Hannibal  &   St.   J.   R. 

Co.    72    Mo.    212 186 

v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  522 

21 
Edgerton   v.    New   York    R.    Co. 

39    N.    Y.    227 538 

Edgington   v.   U.   S.    164   U.    S. 

361 340,   348 

Edmunds    v.    Black,    15    Wash. 

73 354 

Edwards  v.  Atlantic,  &c.  R.  Co. 

132    N.    Car.    99 247 

v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.   Co.   94 

Mo.   App.    36 70 

v.  Dellenmair,    85   111.  App. 

366 86 

v.  Gold-Smith,    16    Pa.    St. 

48    157 

v.  P.    26    Colo.     539 71 

v.  S.   47    Miss.   589 6 

v.   S.      (Neb.)     95      N.     W. 

1038 715 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     38 

s.  w.  779....:...: so 

v.  Wessinger,     65     S.     Car. 

161   32 

Effinger  v.  S.  9  Ohio.C.  C.  376.  200 
Egbers  v.  Egbers,  177  111.  82, 

89 74,  363 

Eggers  v.  Eggers,  57  Ind.  461.  211 
Eggett  v.  Allen,  106  Wis.  633.  80 
Eggleston  v.  S.  102  Ala.  80..  345 
Ehrlick  v.  S.  44  Neb.  810....  4 
Eickhof  v.  Chicago  N.  S.  St.  R. 

Co.   77   111.   App.    196 361 

Eilard    v.    S.    52    Ala.    330 30 

Einseidler    v.    Whitman   Co.    22 

Wash.    388 80 

Eklund  v.  Toner,  121  Mich.  687 

94 

El  am  v.   Badger.    23   111.    445..    243 
Elgin,   J.   &  E.   R.   Co.   v.   Ray- 
mond,   148     111.    2'48 116 

Elk    Tanning    Co.    v.    Brennan, 

203    Pa.   St.   232.. 249 

Elkhorn   Valley   Lodge   v.    Hud- 
son, 58  Neb.  672 347 

Elledge    v.   National    City   &   O. 

R.   Co.    100   Cal.    282 194 

Eller  v.  P.    153   111.   344 

84.    195.    227,    250 
Ellerman   v.    St.   Louis    Tr.    Co. 
(Mo.    App.)     76    S.    W. 

661    126 

Elliott  v.  Elliott,   15  Ky.   L.  R. 

274    '.  ...  65 


Ellis   v.    Iowa    City,    29    Iowa, 

230 602 

v.  Leonard,  107   Iowa,  487.    349 

v.  P.    159    111.    337 4,   42 

v.  S.   120  Ala.  333 258,   295 

v.  Simonds,  168  Mass.  316..   282 
v.  Stewart  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

24    S.    W.    585 196 

v.  Stone     (Teoc.    Cv.    App.) 

55    S.    W.    758 244 

v.  Whitehead,  95  Mich.  115 

496 

El  Paso  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Comas     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

72    S.  W.    629 94 

Elster    v.    Springfield,    49    Ohio 

St.    82 243 

Elston   &   Wheeling   Gravel    Co. 

v.  Pierce,  96  111.  584 65 

Elsworth   v.   Newby    (Neb.)    91 

N.   W.   517 84,    126 

Ely  v.  James,  123  Mass.  36..  162 
Emery  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  67 

N.    H.    434 348 

v.  Hoyt,    46    111.    258 65 

v.  Smith,    54    Ga.    273 222 

v.  S.    92    Wis.    146 294 

v.  S.   101   Wis.   627 

214,  295  297,  328,  336 
Emory  v.  Addis,  71  111.  275.  363 
Empson  Packing  Co.  v.  Vaughn, 

27    Colo.    66 94 

Endleman    v.     U.     S.     86    Fed. 

456 190 

Endowment     Rank     K.      P.     v. 

Steele,  108  Tenn.  624..  199 
Endsley  v.  Johns,  120  111.  477.  155 
Engel  v.  Dado  (Neb.)  92  N.  W. 

629 358 

Engeman  v.  S.  54  N.  J.  L.  247.  17 
England  v.  Fawbush,  204  111. 

384 25,    71,    704 

English  v.  Yore,  123  Mich.  701.  364 
Enlow  v.  S.  154  ind.  664.. 255,  256 
Ennis  v.  Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  165 

111.    161    117 

Enright  v.   P.    155   111.    32 

86,    88,    255,    256,    285 
Enterprise   Ins.    Co.    v.    Parisat, 

35    Ohio    St.    35 429 

Entwistle  v.   Meikle,    180  111.   9 

80,  701 

Eppendorff  v.   Brooklyn   City   & 
N.    R.    Co.    69    N.    Y.    S. 

195 183 

Epperson    v.    S.    22    Tex.    App. 

697    820,    824 


Ixiv 


TABLE    OF    CA.SES. 


(References  are  to  Medians.) 


Epps  v.  S.  102  Ind.  553 . . .  .21 1,  377 
Eppstein  v.  Thomas  (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)    44    S.   W.   893 101 

Equitable  E.  Asso.  v.  Fisher,  7  1 

Md.  436   .  .    397,  626 

Eslinger  v.  East,  100  Ind.  434.  357 
Estate  of  Spencer,  96  Cal.  448.  286 
Estes  v.  Boothe,  20  Ark.  590.  156 
Etchepare  v.  Aguirre,  91  Cal. 

288    286 

Etherington  v.   Prospect,  &c.  R. 

Co.    88    N.    Y.    642 631 

Eubanks  v.  S.   3  Heisk.   (Tenn.) 

488    846 

Eureka.   &c.   Ins.   Co.  v.  Percell, 

10  Ohio  C.  C.    135 247 

Eureka  Block  Coal  Co.  v.  Wells 

(Ind.)     61     N.    W.    236.    652 
Eureka   Fertilizer   Co.  v.   Balti- 
more, &c.  Co.  78  Md.  183 

118,  408 
Evans  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  122 

Ind.  365 543 

v.  Clark,  1  Indian  Ter.  216 

349 
v.  Clark     (Miss.)      24     So. 

532 358 

v.  George,   80   111.   51 

84.    113,    115,    116 

v.  Givens,  22   Fla.   476 30 

v.  Lipscomb,  31  Ga.  7 1 ...  214 
v.  Merritt,  62  Ark.  228...  243 
v.  Mills  (Ga.)  46  S.  E. 

675 126,  130 

v.  Montgomery,     95     Mich. 

497 30 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     31 

S.  W.    648 207,    304 

Evans  Lumber  Co.  v.  Crawford 

(Neb.)    93  N.  W.   177...    244 
Evansville    &    T.    H.    R.    Co.    v. 

Crist,  116  Ind.  457 15 

v.  Talbot,     131      Ind.     223 

504,  507 
Evening    Post    Co.    v.    Canfield, 

23  Ky.  L.  R.   2028 356 

Everett  v.  Spencer,   122  N.  Car. 

1010 242 

Everson  v.  Sellers,  105  Ind.  270 

863 

Ewatt  v.   S.   100   Ga.   80,   273 

Ewen  v.  Wilbor,  208  111.  500..  203 
Ewing  v.  Sanford.  19  Ala.  605.  6 
Exchange  Bank  v.  Trumble,  108 

Ky.  234 126.   183 

Ezell  v.  S.    103  Ala.   8 175 


F 


Fairbanks   v.    Jacobs,   69    Iowa, 

265   156 

Faircloth    v.    Fulghum,    9"    Ga. 

357 136 

Faivre     v.     Manderschild,      117 

Iowa,  724 348 

Falconio     v.     Larsen,     3 1     Ore 

149 4.04 

Falk  v.   P.   42   111.    335 360 

Fanton  v.    S.   50    Neb.    351 302 

Faqua  v.  Com.    (Ky.)    73   S.  W. 

782 337 

Fargo  &   Co.  v.  Dixon,    63   111. 

App.   22    113 

Farley  v.   S.    127   Ind.  421 336 

v.  S.    57    Ind.    335 34 

Farlow   v.    Town,    &c.    186    111. 

256    80 

Farmer    v.     Farmer,     12u    Mo. 

530    3 

v.  Thrift,  94  Iowa,  374 41 

Farmers'  &  M.   Bank  v.  Upton, 

37   Neb.    417 96 

Farmers'  &  Mer.  Bank  v.  Riddle, 

115   Ga.   400 70 

Farmers'   Bank    v.    Garrow,    63 

Neb.  64 25 

v.  Woodell    (Ore.)    61    Pac. 

831    247 

Farmers'    Banking   Co.   v.    Key, 

112   Ga.   301 48 

Farmers'     Loan     &    T.     Co.     v. 

Siefke.    144   N.  Y.    354..    358 
Farmers'  S.  B.  v.  Wilka.  (Iowa) 

17    N.   W.    210 348 

Farrall  v.  Broadway,  95  N.  Car. 

551    288 

Farrar  v.  Heinrich,  86  Mo.  527 

657 

Farrel  v.  P.   133   111.   247 229 

Farrer  v.  McNair,  65  Kas.  147.      43 
Fassinow    v.     S.     89    Ind.    237 

708,    301 
Faulkner  v.  King,   130  N.  Car. 

494   191 

v.  Mammoth.  23  Utah.  437.      25 
v.   Paterson  R.  Co.  65  N.  J. 

L.    181    206 

v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  311.    109 
Faust    v.    Hosford,     119    Iowa. 

97 70,   118 

Feary  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 

162    Mo.     75 30 

Featherstone  v.  P.  194  111.  325.      45 
v.  Wilson,  123  N.  Car.  623.    122 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixv 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Fee  v.   Columbus   Borough,   168 

Pa.    St.    384 594,    597 

Feibelman  v.   Manchester  F.   A. 

Co.  108  Ala.  180 35 

Feinstein  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

73   S.  W.   1052. 6 

Feist  v.  Soothe  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

27    S.    W.    33 200 

Felhauer   v.   City    of   St.   Louis 

(Mo.)    77   S.   W.  848....   598 

Felix  v.  S.  18  Ala.  725 340,  757 

Felker    v.    Douglass     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    57   S.  W.  323....      35 
Fells  Point  S.  Inst.  v.  Weedon, 

18  Md.  320 : 31 

Felmat  v.  Southern  Ex.  Co.  123 

N.    Car.    499 361 

Felton   v.    Clarkson,    103    Tenn. 

457 7 

v.  S.   139  Ind.  540..  6,  229,  770 
Fendriek  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

147   272 

Ferguson   v.    Davis    County,    57 

Iowa,    611 601 

v.  Hosier,   58    Ind.    438 411 

v.Moore,  98  Tenn.  342..  163 
v.  S.  (Neb.)  77  N.  W.  590.  813 
v.  S.  52  Neb.  432 

4,  55.  229,  295 
v.  Smethers,  70  Ind.  521..  875 
v.  Venice  Tr.  Co.  79  Mo. 

App.    352    131 

Ferguson's  Adm'r   v.   Wills,    88 

Va.    139    444 

Fernbach   v.    City    of    Waterloo, 

76    Iowa,    598 -. . .    360 

Ferris   v.    Marshall    (Neb.)     96 

N.   W.   602 90 

Fessenden    v.    Doane.     188    111. 

232 71,   101 

Fetcher   v.    Louisville   &    N.    R. 

Co.    102   Tenn.    1 94 

Ficken  v.   City  of   Atlanta,   114 

Ga.   970    80 

Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  v.  Court- 
ney,   186    U.    S.    342 25 

Fidelity  M.  L.  Asso.  v.  Jeffords, 

107    Fed.    402 224 

Fidelity    Trust    Co.    v.    Palmer, 

22    Wash.    473 120 

Field  v.  Crawford.  146  111.  136.      20 

v.   Long,   89   Me.   281 348 

Fields  v.   S.    134   Ind.  55.. 796,  802 
Fifer    v.    Ritter,     159    Ind.    11 

216.    366,    367 
Files    v.    S.    36    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

206   .  .    191 


Finance  Co.  v.  Old  Pittsburg  C. 

Co.  65  Minn.  442 351 

Finch  v.   Bergins,   89    Ind.   360 

195,  206 
Fineburg  v.  Second  &  Third  St. 

P.  R.  Co.  182  Pa.  St.  97.    191 
Fink  v.   Evans,   95    Tenn.   413.    155 
v.  Gulf   C.  &   S.   F.   R.   Co. 

4  Tex.  Cv.   App.    269 8 

Finks  v.   Cox    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

30    S.   W.    512 200,   250 

Finley   v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

47    S.    W.    1015 109 

Finney   v.    Smith,    31    Ohio   St. 

529    499 

Fiore  v.  Ladd,  25  Ore.  423 116 

First  Baptist  Church  v.  Rouse, 

21    Conn.    167 119 

First  C.  M.  H.  Soc.  v.  Town  of 

Rochester,   66  Vt.   501...      49 
First  M.  E.  Church   v.  Fadden, 

8   N.  Dak.    162 145 

First     Nat.     Bank     v.     Bower 

(Neb.)  98  N.  W.  836..  196 
v.  Hayes,  64  Ohio  St.  101.  145 
v.  Holan,  63  Minn.  525 

171,   189 
v.  Minneapolis  &  N.  E.  Co. 

UN.    Dak.    280 218 

v.  Ragsdale,    171    Mo.    168.         7 
v.  Sargent  (Neb.)   91  N.  W. 

595   196 

v.  Tolerton     (Neb.)     97    N. 

W.   248   346,   356 

First    National    Bank    of    Mon- 
mouth  v.  Dunbar,  118  111. 

630    54 

Fisher  v.  Central  Lead  Co.   156 

Mo.    479 48 

v.  Hamilton,  49   Ind.  349..    508 

v.  P.  23  111.   218 35 

v.  P.  20  Mich.   135 219 

v.  Porter,   11    S.   Dak.   311.    126 

v.  S.   23  Mont.  540 270 

Fisk  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 

Co.  74  Iowa,  424 94 

Fitch  v.  Belding,  49  Conn.  469.       14 

v.  Bill    71    Conn.    24 128 

Fitzcock  v.   S.   52   Miss.   923...    288 
Fitzgerald  v.    Clark,    17    Mont. 

100    198 

v.  Goff,  99   Ind.  39 473 

v.    S.    112    Ala.    34 261 

v.  S.  20  Tex.  Or.  App.  294 

772 
Fitzpatrick  v.  P.  98  Til.  269...    279 


Ixvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Fitzpatrick  v.  Union  Tr.  Co.  206 

Pa.  St.  335 348,  582 

Fitzwater  v.    Roberts,    116    Pa. 

St.    454 130 

Flam  v.  Lee,  1 1 6  Iowa,  289 78 

Flanigan  v.   S.   25   Ark.   92 

225,    288 

Fleetwood  v.   Com.   80   Ky.    1..    788 
Fleming  v.   Dixon,    194   Pa.   St. 

67 25 

v.  Fleming,  33  S.  Car.  505.  352 

v.  S.  136  Ind.  149 322,  326 

v.  S.  107  Ala.  11 267 

v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co. 

115  N.  Car.  676 195 

Fletcher   v.  Louisville   &   N.   R. 

Co.    102   Tenn.    1 20 

v.  Post,   104  Mich.  424 80 

v.  S.    85    Ga.    666 326 

v.  S.    132    Ala.    10 301 

Flick   v.   P.    204   111.    225 738 

Flint  v.  Nelson,  10  Utah,  261..      15 
v.    Van    Hall,    4    Tex.    Cv. 

App.  404 96 

Flora  v.  Russell,   138  Ind.  153.    506 
Florence  Sewing  M.  Co.  v.   Gro- 
ver   &    B.    Sewing  M.   Co. 

110  Mass.  70 38 

Flores    v.    Maverick     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)   26  S.  W.  316.. 199,  200 
Florida.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Foxworth, 

41  Fla.  8 631 

v.  Lucas,  110  Ga.  121.  .170,  175 
v.  Williams,  37   Fla.   406..    129 
Flower    v.    Beveridge,    161    111. 

53    44 

Flowers  v.  Flowers,  92  Ga.  688.    113 
Flynn   v.   New   York   E.   R.   Co. 

50   N.   Y.   S.   375 222 

Fogarty   v.  Hook,   32  N.   Y.   S. 

555    145 

v.  S.     80    Ga.    450 301 

Foley  v.  Longhran,  60  N.  J.  L. 

468 189 

Folks  v.    Folks,    107   Ky.    561.      81 
v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     58 

S.  W.  98 255,  272 

Follmer   v.    McGinley,    146    Pa. 

St.    517    171 

Folsom    v.    Plumer,    43    N.    H. 

469    157 

Ford  v.    Chicago   &  R.   I.   &   P. 

Go.     106    Iowa 355 

v.  Ford,    110   Ind.  89 360 

v.  S.    92    Ga.    459 220 

v.  S.   73   Miss.   734 331 

Ford  v.  S.   75  Miss.  727 119 

v.  S.    101    Tenn.    454.. 26,    328 


Ford  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    56 

S.  W.  338 21,  268 

Fore    v.    Hitson,    70    Tex.    520 

388,  459 

v.  S.  75  Miss.  727 80 

Forst  v.  Leonard.    116   Ala.  82.    140 
Fortson  v.  Mikell,  97  Ga.  336.        7 

Forwood  v.   S.  49   Md.   537 168 

Fosdahl  v.  S.   87   Wis.    482 110 

Fossum   v.   Chicago,  &c.   R.  Co. 

80   Minn.    12 647 

Foster     v.     Berg,    104    Pa.    St. 

328 160 

v.  Chicago  &  A.   R.   Co.    84 

111.    164 243 

v.  Franklin      L.      Ins.      Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)  72  S.  W. 

91 196 

v.  Pacific   C.    S.    30    Wash. 

515    20 

v.  Pitts,  63  Ark.  387 363 

v.  S.    89    Wis.    482 336 

v.   Turner,    31    Kas.    65..  14,    37 
Fowler  v.   Harrison,   64   S.  Car. 

311    199,    348 

v.   Hoffman,    31    Mich.   215.  26b 

v.  S.  85  Ind.  538 166,  710 

Fox  v.  Boyd,   104  Tenn.  357...    244 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.   73  N. 

Y.    S.     896 223 

v.  P.    95    111.    75 84 

v.  P.    84   111.   App.   270 113 

v.   Utter,   6   Wash.    299 100 

Foxwell   v.   S.    63    Ind.    539 229 

Foxworth    v.    Brown,    120    Ala. 

59    84 

Frame   v.    Badger,    79    111.    441 

80/113 
Francis  v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.) 

55    S.    W.    488 113 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     70 

S.  W.  75 802 

Frank  v.  S.  94  Wis.  2 11.. 294.  295 
v.   Tatum    (Tex.   Cv.    App.) 

26  S.  W.  900 198 

v.  Williams,   36   Fla.    136..    243 
Frank  &  Sons  v.  Welch,  89  111. 

38 25 

Frank  Bird  Tr.  Co.  v.  Krug,  30 

Ind.    App.    602 25 

Frankfurter    v.    Bryan.    12    111. 

App.  549 282 

Franklin  v.  Claflin.  49  Md.  24.    347 
v.  Krum.   171   111.  37 8.. 25,   124 

v.  S.    12  Md.  236 168 

Franklin  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

625 21,    271 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixvii 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Franklin  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

48  S.  W.  178 272 

Franklin    Bank    v.    Stevens,    39 

Me.    532 415 

Franks   v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.   App.) 

45   S.  W.   1013 304 

Frantz  v.  Rose,  89  111.  594 80 

Frazer   v.    Howe,    106    111.    573 

121,   126 
v.  South,  &c.  R.  Co.  81  Ala. 

190 635,    648 

Frazure    v.    Zimmerly,     25    111. 

184 117 

Frederick    v.    Allgaier,    88    Mo. 

598 249 

Freelcorn   v.   Norcross,    49    Cal. 

313   359 

Freeman  v.   Gates,    22   Tex.  Cv. 

App.   623 198 

v.  Metropolitan    St.    R.    Co. 

95  Mo.  App.  314 195 

v.   S.   112  Ga.  48 220 

v.  Weeks,    48    Mich.    255..   286 
Freemont  Brewing  Co.   v.    Han- 
sen  (Neb.)  91  N.  W.  279 

126 
Freemont  E.  &  M.  V.   R.   Co.  v. 

Harlin,    50   Neb.    698 199 

Freese    v.   Kemplay,     118    Fed. 

428    144,    189 

Freidberg   v.    P.    102    111.     160 

20,   25 
Freidman  v.  Wersz,  8  Okla.  392 

27,    66 

Freidrick  v.  Ter.    2  Wash.    358      69 
French   v.    Millard,    2    Ohio    St. 

44 28 

v.    S.    12    Ind.    670 323 

v.  Sale.  63  Miss.   386 192 

v.  Seattle  Tr.  Co.  26  Wash. 

264 25,  191 

v.  Town  of  Wa£terbury,   72 

Conn.  435 6 

v.  Ware,    65   Vt.    338 22,   94 

Frenkmann  v.  Schneider,    64  N. 

Y.    S.    Ill 347 

Frenzer  .v.     Richards,    60    Neb. 

131 353 

Frick    v.    Kabaker,     116    Iowa, 

494 96,    200,    244 

Fritz  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 

25  Utah,  263 80 

Frixell  v.  Cole,  42   111.   363 371 

Frorer  v.  P.   141  111.   171 94 

Frost  v.   Foote   (Tex.   Cv.  App.) 

44  S.  W.   1071 80 


Frost   v.    S.    124    Ala.    85..  68,    113, 

223 
Fruchey    v.    Eagleson.    15    Ind. 

App.    88 347 

Frudie  v.   S.    (Neb.)    92  N.   W. 

320 378 

Fruit  D.  Co.  v.  Russo,  125  Mich. 

306 63 

Fry  v.  Leshi,  87  Va.  269 100 

Frye  v.  Ferguson,  6  S.  Dak.  392 

12,   13 

Ft.   Worth   &  R.    G.   R.   Co.    v. 
Greer  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   69 

S.  W.  421 81 

Fugate  v.  City  of  Somerset,   97 

Ky.  48   126 

Fullam    v.    Rose,     181    Pa.    St. 

138    192 

Fuller  v.  Gray,   124  Ala.   388..      66 

v.    New    York    L.    Ins.    Co. 

(Mass.)    67    N.   E.    879 

119,  170 

v.  S.  12  Ohio  St.  435 727 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cv.    App.)     48 

S.    W.    183 271 

Fullerton   v.    Fordyce,    121    Mo. 

1    195 

Fulton  v.   S.  13  Ark.    168 815 

Fulton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Goodman,  32 

Ala.    113   428 

Fulwider  v.   Ingels,  87   Ind.  414 

170 
Funk  v.  Babbitt,   156   111.   408 

30,    363 
Fuqua  v.  Com.   24  Ky.  L.  R. 

2204   110 

Furhman  v.   City  of  Huntsville, 

54    Ala.    263..  .    185 


Gable  v.  Ranch,  50  S.   Car.   95 

172,    205,    351 
Gables   v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

68    S.    W.    288 255 

Gablick  v.    P.   40   Mich.    292 

265,    816 
Gachet  v.  Warren,  72  Ala.   291 

410 
Gafford  v.  S.   122   Ala.   54 

260,    297 
v.  S.    125    Ala.    1 

251,    269,    273 
v.  S.    (Miss.)    24    So.   314..    257 

Gage  v.  Eddy,   179  111.  503 385 

v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  R. 
Co.   88    Tenn.   724 200 


Ixviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Gaines    v.    McAllister,    122    N. 

Car.   340    195 

v.  S.  99  Ga.  703 192 

Gainey  v.  P.  97   111.  277 

70,   74,    285 
Gale    v.    Priddy,     66    Ohio    St. 

400   230,   231 

Galena,   C.   &  N.   R.   Co.   v.   Ja- 
cobs,   20   111.   478 3 

Galesburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Milroy, 

181   111.    243 70,    683 

Gall   v.  Beckstein,  173    111.187..    149 
Gallagher   v.    McMullen,    40    N. 

Y.    S.    222 14 

v.  S.   28   Tex.  App.    247 

323,   339 
v.  Williamson,  23  Cal.  334 

119 
Gallatin  Turnpike  Co.  v.  S.    16 

Lea    (Tenn.)     26 161 

Galh'more  v.  Brewer,   22  Ky.  L. 

R.    296   236 

Gallman  v.   Union  H.   Mfg.   Co. 

65    S.   Car.    192 348 

Galloway   v.   Corbitt,    52    Mich. 

461    35 

v.  S.   29    Ind.   442 851 

v.  S.    (Tex.   Cv.   App.)     70 

S.   W.    212 734 

Gallup  v.  Fox,  64   Conn.   491..    158 
Galveston     v.     Posnainsky,     62 

Tex.    122 .* 605 

Galveston,    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Ben- 
nett   (Tex.  Cr.   App.)    38 

S.   W.   813 632 

v.  Bowman    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

25    S.    W.    140 238 

v.  Buch,   27    Tex.  Cv.  App. 

283 7,   65,   198 

v.  Courtney,     30     Tex.     Cv. 

App.    544 ,    94 

v.  Croskell    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

25   S.  W.   486 100 

.  v.  Dyer     (Tex.     Cv.    App.) 

38   S.   W.   218 172 

v.  Edmunds    (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)    26   S.  W.   633....         7 
v.  Hitzfelder        (Tex.       Cv. 

App.)    66  S.  W.  707 90 

v.  Jenkins.      29      Tex.      Cv. 

App.    440    196 

v.  Johnson   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

29    S.   W.    428 97 

v.  Karver    (Tex.   Cv.  App.) 

70  S.  W.   328 170 

v.  Kinnebrew,     7    Tex.     Cv. 
App.    549    101 


Galveston,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Knip- 
pa     (Tex.    Cv.    App.>     27 

S.  W.  730 177 

27    S.    W.    730 177 

v.  Levy,    10   Tex.   Cv.  App. 
104   245 

v.  Lynes     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

65    S.    W.    1119 197 

v.  McMonigal       (Tex.      Cv. 
App.)    25   S.  W.   341....        6 

v.  Michalke,     14     Tex.     Cv. 
App.   495 183 

v.  Neel   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)    26 
S.   W.    788 43 

v.  Newport,     26     Tex.     Cv. 
App.    583 191,    238 

v.  Parvin    (Tex.   Cv.   App.) 

64  S.   W.    1008 65 

v.  Sanchez    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

65  S.    W.    893 195 

v.  Siligman     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)  23  S.  W.  298 94 

v.  Thompson  (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)  44  S.  W.  8 172 

v.  Waldo  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

26  S.    W.    1004 8,    80 

v.  Waldo    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

32    S.    W.    783 198 

v.  Worthy    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

27  S.    W.    426 57 

Gambrill    v.    Schooley,    93    Md. 

49    497 

v.  Schooley,    95    Md.    260 

65,  80,   85 
Gandy    v.  Bissell's  Estate  (Neb.) 

"  69   N.  W.   633.. 25,   384,   416 
v.  Orient    Ins.     Co.     52     S. 

Car.   224   80 

Gann  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    59 

S.    W.    1069 103.    304 

Gantling  v.  S.  40  Fla.  237....    305 
Garbaczewski   v.   Third   Ave.   R. 

Co.    39   N.   Y.   S.   33 26 

Garcia  v.   Candelaria,    9   N.   M. 

374   144 

v.  S.    34    Fla.    311., 326 

Gard  v.  Neff,  39  Ohio  St.  607.    862 
Gardner  v.  Gooch,   48  Me.   489 

656,   658,   659 

v.  S.  55  N.  J.  L.   17 336 

v.  S.  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  272.    275 

Garfield  v.  S.   74  Ind.   60 295 

Garner  v.   S.   28   Fla.    113 281 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     77 

.S.    W.    708 261 

Garoutte     v.     Williamson,     108 

Cal.    135    .  .    347 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixix 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Garrett  v.   S.    109    Ind.    527...    360 
Garrison  v.  S.   147  Mo.   548...    272 

v.  S.   6  Neb.   285 336 

Garrity  v.   P.    107   111.    162....    322 
Garrott  v.  Ratliff,   83   Ky.   386 

359 
Garton     v.     Union     City     Nat. 

Bank,    34    Mich.    279 347 

Gartside  Coal  Co.  v.  Turk,   147 

111.    120   58 

Gary    v.    Woodham,     103     Ala. 

421    123,    124 

Gasch  v.  Niehoff,    162   111.   395 

53,   360 
Gatlin    v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

49    S.    W.    87 109 

Gavigan     v.     Evans,     45     Mich. 

597  196 

Gawn  v.  S.   13   Ohio  C.  C.   116 

322,    324 

Gaynor    v.    Louisville    &    N.    R. 
Co.    (Ala.)    33    So.   808 

119,    124 
Gearing  v.  Lacher,   146   Pa.  St. 

397    247 

Geary  v.   Kansas   City,  O.   &  S. 

R.   Co.    138   Mo.    257 198 

v.   Parker,    65   Ark.   521...    349 

Gee  .v-   S.    80   Miss.    285 198 

Gehl  v.  Milwaukee  Pro.  Co.  116 

Wis.   263 219,   347 

Gehr  v.   Hegeman,    26    111.   438 

153,    155 
Geiser    Mfg.     Co.    v.     Krogman 

(Iowa)    82   N.   W.   938..    361 
Geist    v.    Missouri    Pac.    R.    Co. 

62   Neb.    322 641 

Gemmill     v.     Brown,     25     Ind. 

App.    6 25,    56 

General  Fire  E.  Co.  v.  Schwartz, 

165    Mo.    121 25 

Gentry  v.  S.   24  Tex.  App.   80.    321 
Genz    v.    S.    58    N.  -J.    L.    482 

198,  271,  329 
George    v.    Los    Angeles    R.    Co. 

126    Cal.    357 639 

v.  Stubbs,    26   Me.    242 191 

Georgia,   &c.    Ins.    Co.   v.   Allen, 

128    Ala.    451 192 

v.  Campbell,  102  Ga.  106..    215 
Georgia,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hutchin.s 

(Ga.)    46    S.   E.    662.,..    203 
v.  Pittman,   73  Ga.   325 

649,   651 

v.  West,    66    Miss.    314 
383,   556.  562.   565,   569. 

•      581,    583,    652.    653 


Georgia,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Young 
Ins.  Co.  (Ga.)  46  S.  E. 

644 6 

v.  Zarks,    108    Ga.    800...      94 
Gerdes   v.   Christopher   &   S.   A. 
I.  &  F.  Co.    (Mo.)    27   S. 

W.    615    217 

Gerke  v.  Fancher,   158   111.   385 

127,    133,    196 
Germaine  v.   City  of  Muskegon, 

105    Mich.    213 234 

German  v.  U.  C.   120  Fed.   666 

201 

German  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Colum- 
bia E.  T.  Co.  15  Ind. 

App.    623    15 

German   Fire    Ins.    Co.   v.   Gru- 

nert,    112    111.    68 33 

German  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bates' 
Add.  S.  Co.  (Iowa)  82 

N.    W.    1005 145 

v.  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank,  101 

Iowa,   530   188 

Germania      Fire      Ins.      Co.      v. 

Hicks,    125    111.    364 47 

v.  Klewer,    129    111.    611 

117,    195 

v.  McKee,   94   111.   494 48 

Germantown     Pass.     R.     Co.     v. 

Walling,   97    Pa.   St.   55..   183 
Gerrard   v.    La   Crosse    City    R. 

Co.    113   Wis.   258 232 

Gerwe     Consolidated     Fire     W. 

Co.    12   Ohio  C.  C.   420..    134 
Gibbons  v.  Van  Alstyne,   29   N. 

Y.    S.    461 39 

Gibbs     v.     Johnson,     63     Mich. 

674    46 

v.  Wall,    10   Colo.    153 94 

Gibson  v.  Correker,  91  Ga.  617 

107 

v.  S.    26    Fla.    109 347 

v.  S.    114    Ga.    34 7 

v.  S.    76   Miss.    136... 258.    305 
Gichrist  v.  Brown,   165   Pa.  St. 

275    135 

Gifford  v.  Ammer,   7  *Kas.  App. 

365   137 

Gilbert  v.  Bone,   79   111.   341 

153,155.    163' 
v.  Watts-De  Golyer  Co.  169 

111.    129    124 

Gilbertson  v.  Forty-Second  St. 
M.  &  St.  N.  Ave.  R.  Co. 
43  N.  Y.  S.  782.... 80,  106 


Ixx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Gilchrist    v.    Gilchrist,    76    111. 

218   238 

v'.  Hartley,      198     Pa.     St. 

132   90 

Giles    v.    S.    43    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

561 258 

Gill  v.  Donovan.,   96  Md.   518..      25 
v.  Skelton,    54    111.    158 

359,  360 
v.  S.    59    Ark.    422 

296,    307,    310 

Gillen  v.  Riley,  27  Neb.  158..  44 
Gills  v.  Com.  18  Ky.  L.  R. 

560   110 

Gilmore    v.    Courtney,    158    111. 

437   116,    127 

v.  McNeil,   45   Me.   599 250 

v.  P.    124   111.   383 19 

v.  Seattle,    &c.    R.    Co.     29 

Wash.   150 203 

v.  S.    126    Ala.    20 66 

Gilroy  v.   Loftus,    48   N.  Y.   S. 

532   351 

Gilyard  v.   S.   98  Ala.   59 221 

Ginnard     v.     Knapp,     95     Wis. 

482   245 

Givens  v.   S.   34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

563    221,   304 

Gizler  v.  Witzel.  82  111.  322..  105 
Glaser  v.  Glaser  (Okla.)  74 

Pac.    945    351 

Glass  v.  Cook.  30  Ga.  133....  116 
Glenn  v.  Hunt,  120  Mo.  330..  35 
Globe  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sherlock,  25 

Ohio   St.    67 243 

Globe    Oil    Co.    v.    Powell,     56 

Neb.    463 118,    351 

Glover    v.    Blakeslee,     115    Ga. 

696   243 

v.  Charleston    &    S.    R.    Co. 

57  S.  Car.  228 244 

v.  Gasque  (S.  Car.)  45  S. 

E.  113  156 

v.  S.  105  Ga.  597 265 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  46 

S.  W.  824 326 

Glucose   Sugar  R.   Co.  v.  Flinn, 

184    111.   J28 80 

Goddard    v.     Foster,     17     Wall 

(U.   S.)    142 156,    160 

Godfrey    v.    Phillips,    209    111. 

584   236 

Godwin  v.   S.   96  Ind.   550 281 

v.  S.   73  Miss.  873 

105,    113.    279.    296 
Goesel  v.  Davis,    100  Wis.   678 

232 


Goff  v.  Greer,   88   Ind.    122 37 

Goffney    v.    St.    Paul    City    R. 

Co.    81    Minn.    459 1 

Gohn   v.    Doerle,    85    111.    514..    183 
Goins    v.    S.    46    Ohio    St.    467 

792,    804 

Golden  v.  S.  25  Ga.   527 168 

Goldsberry  v.   S.    (Neb.)    92   N. 

W.    906    276 

Goldsby  v.  U.  S.  160  U.  S.  70 

326 
Goldsmith  v.  City  of  New  York, 

43    N.    Y.    S.    447 25 

v.  S.    105    Ala.    8 301,    345 

Goldthorp     Estate,     115     Iowa. 

430 45 

Goldthorp     v.      Clark-Nickerson 

L.  Co.   31   Wash.  467....    119 
v.  Goldthorp,  115  Iowa,  430 

114,  200 

Goldsworthy    v.    Town    of    Lin- 
den,   75    WTis.    24 171 

Goley  v.   S.    85   Ala.    333 115 

Golibart    v.    Sullivan,    30    Ind. 

App.  428 25,  476 

Gohn  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

90  110 

Gonzales  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

339  274,  347 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  57  ' 

S.  W.  667 255,  310 

Goodale    v.    Worcester    Agr.    S. 

102    Mass.    405 532 

Goodbar    v.    Lidikey,    136    Ind. 

7    704 

Goode    v.    Campbell,     14     Bush 

(Ky.)     75    39 

Goodhue  v.  Farmers'  W.  Co.  v. 

Davis,   81    Minn.    210 212 

Goodman  v.  Sampliner,   23   Ind. 

App.    72   351 

Goodsell    v.    Seeley,     46     Mich. 

623    186 

Goodwin    v.    S.     (Ala.)     18    So. 

694 44 

v.  S.  96  Ind.  550 

211.    329.    377 
v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     46 

S.    W.    226 274 

v.  S.    114    Wis.    318 321 

Gordon  v.  Alexander,  122  Mich. 

107    25,    80 

v.  Burris.    153   Mo.    223 

25,    113,    238 
v.  City     of     Richmond,     83 
Va.'  438 

59,   61,   63,   591,    597 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxi 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Gordon  v.  Com.   100  Va.  825.. 

v.  P.   33  N.  Y.   501 

v.  S.    129    Ala.    113 

Gorgo  v.  P.   100  111.  App.   130. 

Gorham  v.  Kansas  City,  &c.  R. 

Co.    113    Mo.   410 

616,    617,    618,    652, 
Gorman    v.    Campbell,     14    Ga. 

142   

Gorrell  v.  Payson,  170  111.  217 

Goss  v.  Colkins,  162  Mass.  492 

144, 

Goss    Printing    Pr.    v.    Lempke, 

191    111.    201 

Gott   v.   P.    187    111.    249 

151.   206,   299, 

Gottfried   Brewing   Co.   v.   Szar- 
kowski,  79   111.  App.  583 

Gottlieb    v.    Hartman,    3    Colo. 

53  

Gottstein  v.  Seattle  L.  &  C. 

Co.  7  Wash.  424 

Gould  v.  Gilligan,  181  Mass. 

600  

v.  Magnolia  Metal  Co.  207 

111.  178  . 

Grove  v.  P.  162  111.  265 

Gover  v.  Dill,  3  Iowa,  337 

Gowdey  v.  Robbins,  38  N.  Y. 

S.  280  

Gowen  v.  Kehoe,  71  111.  66... 
Grace  v.  Dempsey,  75  Wis.  313 

v.   St.     Louis,     &c.     R.     Co. 

156   Mo.    295 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     69 

S.    W.    529 

Grade    v.    Stevens,    171    N.    Y. 

658   

Graferman     Dairy     Co.     v.     St. 
Louis   Dairy   Co.    96    Mo. 

App.    495    

Graff  v.   P.    134   111.   3 83..  105, 

v.  P.    208    111.    326 

Graham     v.     Frazier,     49     Neb. 

90    

v.   Nowlin.    54   Ind.    389.  .. 
v.  St.  Louis.  I.  M.  &  S.  R. 

Co.   69   Ark.    562 

Granado  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

426    

Granberry  v.   Frierson,   2   Baxt. 
(Tenn.)    326    


338 
222 
299 
218 


653 

48 

250 

195 
217 
421 

404 

219 

6 

15 

363 
320 

94 

355 
172 

32 
244 

85 
346 

116 
246 
223 

191 
173 

136 

304 

37 


Granby  Mining  &  Smelting  Co. 
v.   Davis,    156   Mo.   422 

170,    182 
Grand   Lodge   v.   Orrell,   99    111. 

App.    246    250 

Grand    Rapids    &    I.    R.    Co.    v. 

Judson,    34    Mich.    507..    223 
Grand  Tower  Mfg.   Co.   v.    Ull- 

man,    89    111.    244 54 

Grand    Trunk    R.    Co.    v.    Cob- 

leigh,    78    Fed.    786 636 

Grande   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.) 

38  S.  W.   613 82 

Granger  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.) 

31    S.   W.    807 293 

Grant    v.     Roberts     (Tex.     Cv. 

App.)    38   S.  W.   650 71 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     70 

S.    W.    954 229 

v.  S.   97    Ala.   35 115 

v.  Westfall,    57    Ind.    121..    356 
Grau  v.  Houston,   45   Neb.   813 

115,    196 
Graves  v.  Cadwell,  90  111.  612 

200 
v.  Colwell,    90    111.    612 

113.    308 

v.  Dill.    159   Mass.    74 116 

v.  Hillyer    (Tex.   Cv.   App.) 

48    S.    W.    889 238 

v.  P.    18   Colo.    181 312 

v.  S.   45    N.   J.   L.   203 331 

Gravett  v.   S.   74   Ga.    196 37 

Gray  v.  Callender,   181  111.   173 

48 
v.  City      of     Emporia,      43 

Kas.   706       604 

v.  Merriam,    148   111.    188..    243 
v.  Sharpe    (Colo.  App.)    67 

Pac.    375   48 

v.  S.    42    Fla.    174 71 

v.  Washington      Water      P. 

Co.   30   Wash.    665..  346,   630 
Graybeal    v.    Gardner,    146    111. 

337   696 

Graybill  v.   Chicago.  &c.  R.  Co. 

112   Iowa,   743 53.   630 

Grayson  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

57    S.    W.    808 258 

Greaney      v.      Holyoke      Water 
Power     Co.      174      Mass. 

437   25 

Great   N.    R.    Co.   v.   McLaugh- 

lin,   70   Fed.   669 20 

Greathouse  v.   Moore    (Tex.   Cv. 

App.)    23   S.   W.   226....    200 


Lxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Green    v.    Com.    17    Ky.    L.    R. 

943   

v.  Eden,   24   Ind.  App.  583 

v.  Hansen,   89   Wis.   597... 
v.  Southern     Pac.     R.     Co. 

122    Cal.    563 

v.  S.    97   Ala.   59 

v.  S.    40    Fla.    474 

v.  S.   43   Fla.   556 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     34 

S.    W.    283 

v.  Tierney,    62    Neb.    561.. 
v.  Willingham,       100      Ga. 

224   

Greenbaum  v.  Millsaps,   77   Mo. 

474   '. 

Greene  v.  Greene,    145   111.   264 

48, 
Greenup    v.    Stoker,    8    111.     (3 

Gilm.)     202    

Greenwood  v.  Davis,   106  Mich. 

230   . 

v.  Houston   I.   &   B.   Co.   27 

Tex.    Cv.   App.    590 

Greer    v.    Com.    23    Ky.    L.    R. 

489    

v.  Lafayette  Co.  Bank,   128 

Mo.    559    

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cv.    App.)     45 

S.   W.    12 

Gregg  v.  Jones   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

26    S.   E.    132 

v.  P.    98   111.   App.    170 

v.  Willis,    71    Vt.    313 

Grentzinger  v.  S.   31   Neb.   460 

Greschia  v.   P.    53   111.    299.... 

Grier  v.  Cable,    159   111.   29.... 

v.  Puterbaugh,   108  111.602 

v.  S.   53   Ind.   420 

Griffin    v.    Henderson,    117    Ga. 

382   

v.  Lewiston       (Idaho)       55 

,.  Pae.    545    

v.  Manice,    62    N.  Y.  S.  364 

v.  Mulley,  167  Pa.  St.  339 

v.  Southern   R.    66    S.   Car. 

77  

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  53 

S.  W.  848 

v.  White,  52  N.  Y.  S.  807 


11 

71 
351 

247 

304 

42 

80 

303 
353 

80 

359 

363 

98 

71 

7 

107 
243 
269 

200 
119 
351 

816 

795 

25 

48 
209 

93 
247 

25 

22 
119 

80 
195 


Griffith   v.    Bergeson,    115    Iowa, 

279   195 

v.  Hanks,    91    Mo.    109 84 

v.  Potter,   65  N.  Y.  S.   689 

361 

v.  S.    90    Ala.    583 297 

Grim   v.   Murphy,    110   111.    271 

65,    94,    249 

Grimes  v.  S.   105  Ala.  86 301 

Grimes   Dry  Goods   Co.   v.   Mal- 
colm,   164    U.    S.    483...    148 
Grmsinger     v.      S.      (Tex.      Cr. 

App.)    69   S.  W.   583.86,   290 
Griswold   v.    Town   of   Guilford. 

75   Conn.    192 .'      80 

Grogan  v.  U.  S.  Industrial  Ins. 

Co.   36  N.  Y.  S.   687 145 

Gross  v.  Shaffer,   29  Kas.   442.    113 
Gross  Luimfoer  v.  Coody,  99  Ga. 

775   360 

Grover    v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

46    S.    W.    824 304 

Groves  v.   Acker,    33    N.   Y.    S. 

406    145 

Grows   v.   Maine   C.    R.    Co.    69 

Me.   412   191 

Grubb  v.   S.    117    Ind.    277 

229     330 

Grube  v.   Nichols,    36    111.    92.!    113 
Gruber  v.  Decker,   115  Ga.  779 

243 
Gruesendorf  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

56  S.  W.  624 6 

Grugan  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 

158   Pa.   St.   337 352 

Guardian  Mutual   Life   Ins.   Co. 

v.  Hogan,   80   111.   35 200 

Guenther  v.  Amsden,   44   N.  Y. 

S.  982 145 

Guerin   v.   New   Eng.   H.   I.   Co. 

70  N.  H.   133    360 

Guerold    v.    Holtz,     103    Mich. 

118 237 

Guerrero  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

662 265 

v.  S.  41   Tex.  Cr.  App.  161.    270 
Guetig  v.  S.   63  Ind.  278..  247,   332 
v.  S.  66  Ind.   106 

331,  335,  377,  751,  755 
Guimard  v.  Knapp,  Stout  &  Co. 

95  Wis.  482    199 

Guimo  v.   S.    39    Tex.   Cr.   App. 

257    229 

Guinard   v.   Knapp,   &c.   Co.    90 

Wis.   123 246 

Guinn  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    65 

S.  W.  376 110 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxiii 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Gull    C.    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Brown 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   24  S.  VV. 

918 195 

v.  Carter  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  71 

S.  W.  73  238 

v.  Cash  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  28 

S.  W.  387  97 

V.  Condor,  23  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

488 236 

v.  Courtney  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

23  S.  W.  226  94 

v.  Dansbank,  6  Tex.  Cv. 

App.  385 65 

v.  Dunlap  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

26  S.  W.  655   73 

v.  Duvall,  12  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

348 26 

y.  Greenlee,  70  Tex.  557...  648 

v.  Harriett,  80  Tex.  81 25 

v.  Higby  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  26 

S.  W.  737  94 

v.  Hill,  95  Tex.  629  199 

v.  Holt  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  70 

S.  VV.  591  26 

v.  McCarty,  82  Tex.  608..  199 
v.  Manghan,  29  Tex.  Cv. 

App.  486 7,  355 

v.  Moore  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  68 

S.  W.  559  80 

v.  Pendery  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

27  S.  W.  213    8 

v.  Perry  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  30 

S.  W.  709    8 

v.  Pierce,    7    Tex.   Cv.   App. 

597 196 

v.  Rowland,  90  Tex.  365 

562,  564,  565 
T.  Shieder    (Tex.   Cv.  App.) 

26  S.  W.  509   100 

v.  Thompson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

35  S.  W.  319   65 

v.  Warner,      22      Tex.     Cv. 

App.    167    245 

v.  White  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  32 

S.   W.    322    193,   247 

v.  Wilbanks,  7  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

489 196 

v.  Wilson,  79  Tex.  371 

549,  554 

Gulliher  v.  P.  82  111.   146 227 

Gulliver   v.    Adams   Ex.   Co.    38 

111.    509   358 

Gumby   v.    Metropolitan   St.   R. 

Co.   171  N.  Y.  635 347 

Gunther  v.  P.  139  III.  526 

113,  265,  816 
Gusdorff    v.     Duncan,     94     Md. 

160   .  163 


Gustafon  v.  Seattle  Tr.  Co.   28 

Wash.  227 211 

Gutirrez  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

59  S.  W.  274 322 

Gutta  P.  &  R.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wood, 

84  Mich.  459  407,  413 

Gutzman  v.  Clancy,  114  Wis. 

589 45,  231,  351 

Guy  v.  S.  Ill  Ga.  648..  34,  168,  267 
Gwaltney  v.  Scottish  C.  F.  & 

L.  Co.  115  N.  Car.  579..  7 
Gwatkin  v.  Com.  9  Leigh  (Va.) 

678 3 

Gwin  v.  Gwin,  5  Idaho,  271 48 


Haacke  v.  Knights,  &c.  76  Md. 

431 434 

Haas  v.  Brown,  47  N.  Y.  S.  606.   351 
Haase  v.  S.  24  Vroom  (N.  J.  L.) 

40  .  .  .   .    850 

Hackelrath   v.    Stookey,    63    111. 

486 308 

Hacker  v.  Heiney,  111  Wis.  313 

4,    111 
v.  Munroe  &  Sons,   176  111. 

384,  394 363,  238 

Hafner  v.  Heron,    165   111.   242, 

251 363 

Hagan    v.    Chicago,    &c.    R.    Co. 

86  Mich.  624    630 

Hagenow  v.  P.  188  111.  553 45 

Haggarty  v.  Strong,  10  S.  Dak. 

585 80 

Hahn  v.  Miller,  60  Iowa,  96 363 

Haight  v.  Vallet,  89  Cal.  249 

211,  246 
Haines  v.  Hayden,  95  Mich.  350 

704 
v.  Illinois   Cent.   R.   Co.   41 

Iowa,  231 639 

v.  McLaughlin,    135    U.    S. 

584 171 

Hale  Elevator  Co.  v.  Hall,  201 

111.   131 215 

Halff  v.  Wangemann    (Tex,  Cv. 

App.)    54  S.  W.  967 6 

Halfman  v.  Pennsylvania  Boiler 
Ins.  Co.   160  Pa.  St.   202 

191,   196 

Hall  v.  Durham,  109  Ind.  434..   126 
v.  Incorporated    Town,    &c. 

90  Iowa,  585..  196,  347,  358 
v.  Needles,  1  Ind.  Ter.  146.  350 
v.  O'Malley,  49  Tex.  71 

503,   508 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Hall  v.  Rankin,  87 'Iowa,  261..   211 
v.  S.  130  Ala.  45..  66,  192,  198 

v.  S.   134  Ala.  90    192,  217 

v.  S.   132  Ind.  317 340 

v.  Stroufe,  52  111.  421 243 

v.  Vanderpool,    156   Pa.   St. 

152 118 

v.  Woodin,  35  Mich.   67...      90 

v.  Wolff,  61  Iowa,  559 200 

Hall-Moody  Institute  v.  Copass, 

108  Tenn.  582    6 

Hallenbeck   v.    Garst,    96    Iowa, 

509 351 

Halley   v.   Tichenor,    120    Iowa, 

164 43 

Hamilton  v.  Great  F.  St.  R.  Co. 

17  Mont.  334   71,  351 

v.  Hartinger,  96  Iowa.,  7 ...      30 

v.  Love,    152    Ind.    641 238 

v.  P.  29  Mich.   173 

165,  294,  308 
v.  Pittsburg  B.  &  T.  E.  Co. 

194  Pa.  St.   1    7 

v.  S.  62  Ark.  543. .214,  253,  372 

v.  S.  96  Ga.  301    310 

v.  S.   75  Ind.  593    848 

v.  S.  97  Tenn.  452 201 

v.  Singer  S.  M.  Co.   54  111. 

370 93 

Hamilton  Keeling  Co.  v.  Wheeler, 

175  111.   514    144 

Hamlin  v.  S.   39   Tex.  Cr.  App. 

579     315 

v.  Treat,  87  Me.  310..  119,  172 
Hamman  v.  Central  Coal  &  Coke 

Co.  156  Mo.  232 244 

'     Hammel  v.  Lewis,  23  Ky.  L.  R. 

2298 7 

Hammond  v.  P.  199  HI.   173 

118,  259,  260 

v.  S.  74  Miss.  214   ....340,  345 
Hampton   v.   Norfolk    &   W.   R. 

Co.  120  N.  Car.  534 348 

v.  Ray,  52  S.  Car.  74. ..350,  351 
Hanchette  v.  Kimbark,   118  111. 

132 3 

Hancock   v.   Colrybark,    66   Mo. 

672 • 158 

v.  Shockman  (Ind.  Ter.)  69 

S.  W.  826    360 

Hand  v.  Agen,  96  Wis.  493 186 

Hanes  v.  S.  155  Ind.  120... 86,  769 
Haney  v.  Breeden,  100  Va.  781.  113 
v.  Caldwell,  43  Ark.  184..  19 
Hanger  v.  Evins,  38  Ark.  338.  .  19 
Hank  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  56 

S.  W.  922    303 


Hankins  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

261 293 

Hanley  v.  Balch,  106  Mich.  46..  120 
Hanna  v.  Hanna,  3  Tex.  Cv. 

App.   51 66 

Hannah  v.  S.  1  Tex.  App.  579..  170 
Hannahan  v.  S.  7  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

610 37 

Hannibal,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin, 

111   111.   227 

53,  58,  172,  549,  579.  653 

Hannigan  v.  S.  131  Ala.  29 304 

Hannon  v.  S.  70  Wis.  448..  38,   119 
v.  St.    Louis    Tr.    Co.    (Mo. 

App.)    77   S.  W.    158 58 

Hannton  Keeling  Co.  v.  Wheeler, 

175   111.   514    144 

Hannum  v.  S.  90  Tenn.  647...  165 
Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stod- 

dard,   52   Neb.   745    94 

Hanrahan  v.  P.  91  111.  142 115 

Hanrohan  v.  P.  91  111.  142. .198,  279 

Hans  v.  S.  50  Neb.   150 198 

Hansberg  v.  P.  120  111.  21....  80 
Hansen  v.  Boyd,  161  U.  S.  397.  144 
Hanson  v.  Garr,  Scott  &  Co.  68 

Minn.  68 48 

v.  S.  43  Ohio  St.   378 772 

v.  St.   Paul    Gas    Light   Co. 

(Minn.)   92  N.  W.  510...      99 

Hanye  v.  T.  99  Ga.  212 274 

Hardeman  v.   S.    (Miss.)    16   So. 

876 358 

Hardin   v.   S.   40   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

208 262 

v.  S.  4  Tex.  App.  365..  759,  761 
Harding  v.  Wright,  119  Mo.  1.  .      84 

Hardy  v.  Brier,  9 1  Ind.  91 415 

v.  Milwaukee  St.  R.  Co.  89 

Wis.  183 203 

v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  400 

275,  278 

v.  Turney,  9  Ohio  St.  400.  .        4 
v.  Wise, '5  App.  Cas.  (D.  C.) 

108 121 

Hargadine    v.    Davis     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    26  S.  W.  424 8 

Hargis  v.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co. 

75  Tex.  20 641,  642 

Hargraves  v.  Home  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

43  Neb.  271 141 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  (Tex. 

Cv.  App.)  60  S.  W.  689..    393 
Harlen  v.  Baden   (Kas.)   49  Pac. 

615 129 

Harless    v.    U.    S.    1    Ind.    Ter. 

447 351 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Uxv 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Harnianson  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

42   S.  W.   995 255,  265 

Harmon  v.  S.  158  Ind.  37 86 

Harness  v.  Steele,  159  Ind.  293 

7,    238,  503 
Harp.  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   57 

S.  W.   835    269 

Harper  v.  S.  109  Ala.  66 37 

v.  S.   101   Ind.    113    7,  202 

v.  S.  71  Miss.  202  ....265,  816 

v.  S.  (Miss.)  35  So.  575...  246 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  40  S. 

W.  272 26 

Harpham  v.  Whitney,  77  111.  38 

282 
Harrell   v.   S.   39   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

204 282 

v.  S.  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  204.  70 

v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  612..  215 
Harrington  v.  Claplin  (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)    66   S.  W.   898 80 

v.  Priest,   104  Wis.   362...  247 

v.  S.   19  Ohio  St.   268 340 

Harris    v.    Carrington,     115    N. 

N.  Car.  187    118 

v.  First  N.  Bank    (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)   45  S:  W.  311 27 

v.  Flowers,  21  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

669    7 

v.  Higden    (Tex.    Cv.   App.) 

41  S.  W.  412   93 

v.  Murphy,  119  N.  Car.  34.  212 

v.  S.  96  Ala.  27   220 

v.  S.  36  Ark.   127    258 

v.  S.   97    Ga.   350 191 

v.  S.  155  Ind.  271   265,  776 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  47  S. 

W.   643 268 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    57   S. 

W.  833  .  .  .  .: 103 

V.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    65  S. 

W.  921 191 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  494.  310 
v.  Shebeck,   151   111.  287 

144,  197 

v.  Smith,   71   N.  H.   330...  351 
v.  U.  S.  8  App.  Cas.  (D.  C.) 

20 25 

v.  Woodford,  98  Mich.  147.  81 
Harrison  v.  Adamson,  86  Iowa, 

695 677 

v.  Baker,  15  Neb.  43    80 

v.  Chappell,  84  N.  Car.  258 

347 

v.  Com.  123  Pa.  St.  508...  165 

v.  S.   83   Ga.    129    228,  322 

v.  S.  6  Tex.  App.  42 312 


Hart  v.  Bowen,  86  Fed.  877 351 

v.  Chicago,    &c.    R.    Co.    56 

Iowa,    166 247 

v.  Cedar  K.  &  M.  C.  R.  Co. 

109  Iowa,  631 530,  632 

v.  Niagara   Fire   Ins.   Co.    9 

Wash.  620 200 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  44  S. 

VV.  247 269 

v.  S.  93  Ga.  160  80,  220 

v.  S.  (Ga.)  23  S.  E.  831...  303 

v.  U.  S.  84  Fed.  799  189 

Harter    v.    Marshall     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)   36  S.  W.  294.. 65,  247 
Hartford  v.  City  of  Attala,  119 

Ala.  59 129 

Hartford  Deposit  Co.  v.  Calkins, 

186    111.    104    246,    669 

v.  Pederson,  168  111.  224...    124 
v.  Sollitt,  172  111.  222. .124,  542 
Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Josey, 

6  Tex.  Cv.  App.  290 94 

Hartlep  v.  Cole,  120  Ind.  247  ...  47 
Hartley  v.  Mullane,  45  N.  Y.  S. 

1023 149 

Hartman  &  F.  B.  Co.  v.  Clark, 

94  Md.  520 200 

Hartpence   v.    Rogers,    143    Mo. 

623 53 

Hartrich  v.  Hawes   (111.)    67  N. 

E.  13 , 129 

Hartsel  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   68 

S.  W.  285    25 

Hartshorn  v.  Burlington,  &c.  R. 

Co.  52  Iowa,  616   685 

v.  Byrne,   147   III.   426 

113,   171,   182 
Harvey  v.  Keegan,  78   111.  App. 

682 4 

v.  S.   125  Ala.  47    150,  245 

v.  Tama  Co.  53  Iowa,  228.      44 
v.  Vandegrift,     89     Pa.     St. 

346 156 

Hasbrouck   v.   City  of   Milwau- 
kee, 21  Wis.  219   41 

Haskell  v.  Starbird,   152  Mass. 

118  .  .  .  - 388 

Hassett  v.  Johnson,  48  111.  68.  .  48 
Hasson  v.  Klee,  168  Pa.  St. 

510 80 

Hatch  v.  Marsh,  71  111.  370 113 

Hatcher  v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

237 271.  201 

v.  S.  116  Ga.  617 220,  272 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  65  S. 

W.  97  .  75 


Ixxvi 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Hatchett   v.   Hatchett,   28    Tex. 

Cv.  App.  33   233 

Hatfield  v.  Chenoworth,  24  Ind. 

App.  343 41 

Hathaway  v.  Detroit,  &c.  R.  Co. 

124  Mich.  610    646 

Kaufman  v.  S.  49  Ind.  248 324 

Hauk  v.  S.   148  Ind.  238 

317,  714,  721,  725,  733 
Haun  v.  Rio  Grande  W.  R.  Co. 

22  Utah,  346    351 

Haupt   v.    Haupt,    157    Pa.    St. 

469 192 

Hauss  v.  Niblack,  80  Ind.  414.  .  401 
Havana  v.  Biggs,  58  111.  485..  858 
Haven  v.  Markstrum,  67  Wis. 

493 321 

Hawes  v.  S.  88  Atl.  37 90 

Hawk  v.  Brownell,  120  111.  161.  172 
Hawk  v.  Ridgway,  33  111.  473. .  193 
Hawkins  v.  Collier,  106  Ga.  18.  360 
v.  S.  136  Ind.  634  ....198,  771 
Hawley  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co. 

71    Iowa,   717    90,    173 

v.  Corey,  9  Utah,   175    ....    177 

v.  S.  69  Ind.  98   347 

Hay  v.   Carolina  M.   R.   Co.    41 

S.  Car.  542   26,  49 

Hayden   v.   Com.   20   Ky.   L.  R. 

274 261 

v.  Frederickson,  59  Neb.  141 

117,  223 

v.  McCloskey,  161  111.  351.    363 
Haydensville  M.   &   Mfg.   Co.   v. 
Steffler,  17  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

609 70 

Hayes  v.  Kelley,  116  Mass.  300 

84 

v.  S.   114  Ga.  25 56,  228 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    39  S. 

W.   106  .  .   86 

v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  146.    193 

v.  S.  112  Wis.  304    351 

v.  Williams,  17  Colo.  465..      34 
Hays  v.  Border,  6  111.  (1  Gilm.) 

46 ' 33 

v.  Johnson,  92  111.  App.  80.   203 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.   195 

Pa.  St.'  184 101,  113,  198 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    57  S. 

W.  835 255 

Hay  ward  v.  Merrill.  94  111.  349  25 
Hazard  v.  City  of  Council  Bluffs, 

87   Iowa,   54    596 

Hazel]    v.    Bank    of    Tipton,    95 

Mo.  60 363 


Hazewell  v.  Coursen,  81   N.  Y. 

630 116 

Hazy  v.  Woitke,  23  Colo.  556..  130 
Hazzard  v.  Citizens'  Bank,  72 

Ind.   130 136 

Head  v.  Bridges,  67  Ga.  227...    154 
v.  Langworthy,      15     Iowa, 

235 4 

Healy  v.  P.    163   111.   383.... 48,   80 

Hearn  v.  Shaw,  72  Me.'  187 360 

Heaston  v.  Cincinnati  &  Ft.  W. 

R.  Co.   16  Ind.  275 12,   13 

Hebbe  v.  Town  of  Maple  Creek, 

111  Wis.  480   65 

Hector  v.  Knox,  63  Tex.  615..  873 
Heddle  v.  City  Elec.  R.  Co.  112 

Mich.   547 113,  223 

Hedrick  v.  Smith,  77  Tex.  608.    361 

v.  Straus,  42  Neb.  485 348 

Heed  v.  S.  25  Wis.  421 816 

Helling   v.    Vanzandt,    162    111. 

166 13 

Heilman  v.  Com.  84  Ky.  461...  3 
Heinman  v.  Kinnare,  73  111. 

App.  .184 48 

Heinsen  v.  Lamb,  117  111.  549 

135,  136 
Heintz  v.  Cramer,  84  Iowa,  497 

656 
Helbing   v.   Allegheny   Cemetery 

Co.  201  Pa.  St.   172 545 

Heldmaier  v.  Cobbs,   195  111.  72 

542 
Heller  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Co. 

109  Mich.  53    93 

v.  Pulitzer  Pub.  Co.  153  Mo. 

203 153 

Hellyer  v.  P.  186  111.  550 

193,    195,   214,   227 

Helm  v.  P.   186  111.   153 4,  42 

Helmholz     v.     Everingham,     24 

Wis.  266 160 

Helms    v.   Wayne    Agr.    Co.    73 

Ind.  327   347,  415 

Kelt  v.  Smith,  74  Iowa,  667...  53 
Helton ville  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fields, 

138   Ind.   58    20,   610 

Heminway   v.    Miller,    87    Minn. 

123 244 

Hemphill  v.  S.  71  Miss.  877...  296 
Hempton  v.  S.  1 1 1  Wis.  127...  170 
Henderson  v.  Bartlett,  53  N.  Y. 

S.     149     348 

v.  Com.   98  Va.   736,  797..         6 
v.  Henderson,  88   111.   248..    153 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxvii 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Henewacker  v.  Ferman,  152  111. 

325  49 

Henkle  v.  McClure,  32  Ohio  St. 

202 84 

Henry  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.  113 

Mo.  534 529 

v.  Henry,  122  Mich.  6 347 

v.  Klopfer,  147  Pa.  St.  178 

286 
v.  McNamara,  114  Ala.  107 

120,    129 

v.  P.   198  111.   162 798 

v.  S.   51   Neb.    149 247,   328 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   30  S. 

W.  802 269 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)    49  S. 

W.  96 276 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   43  S.  ' 

W.  340 289 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   54  S. 

W.  592 247 

v.  Stewart,  185  111.  448 

116,   133,  438 
Hensel  v.  Haas,  101  Mich.  443..  191 

Hensen  v.  S.  114  Ala.  25 258 

Henson  v.  S.  112  Ala.  41 322 

Hepler  v.  S.  58  Wis.  49 6 

Herbert  v.  Drew,  32  Ind.   366 

25,   199 
v.  Ford,  33  Me.  90   157 

Herbich  v.  North  Jersey  St.  R. 

Co.  67  N.  J.  L.  574 48 

Herman  v.  S.  75  Miss.  340 9 

Herrick  v.  Gary,  83  111.  86 

1,   80,   200 

v.  Quigley,  101  Fed.  187...    189 
Herring  v.  Herring,  94  Iowa,  56 

84 
Herrington  v.  Guernsey,  177  Pa. 

St.  175 191 

Hersey   v.   Hutchins,    70   N.   H. 

130 80 

Herzog    v.    Campbell,    47    Neb. 

370 45 

Hess  v.  Preferred  M.  M.  A.  Asso. 

112  Mich.   196    363 

v.  Williamsport  &  N.  B.  R. 

Co.  181  Pa.  St.  492 205 

Hessing    v.    McCloskey,    37    HI. 

351 56 

Hewey  v.  Nourse,  54  Me.  256..  360 
Hewitt  v.  Johnson,  72  111.  513..  113 
Heydrick  v.  Hutchinson,  165  Pa. 

St.  208 133,  170 

Heyl  v.  S.  109  Ind.  589 247 


Hickman  v.  Griffin,  6  Mo.  37...   247 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.   Co.   91 

Mo.  435 565 

Hickory   v.   United   States,    151 

U.  S.  303 307 

v.  United  States,  160  U.  S. 

408 191,  210 

Hicks  v.  Nassau  Electric  R.  Co. 

62  N.  Y.  S.  597 25 

v.  Southern    R.    Co.    63    S. 

Car.  559 80 

v.  United  States,  150  U.  S. 

442     210 

Hide  &   Leather  National  Bank 
v.  Alexander,  184  111.  416 

48 

Hidy  v.  Murray,  101  Iowa,  65.  .    282 
Higbee    v.    McMillan,    18    Kas. 

133 218 

Higginbotham    v.    Campbell,    85 

Ga.  638 183 

Higginbotham  v.  Higginbotham, 

106  Ala.  314    183 

Higgins  v.  Grace,  59  Md.  365..    116 
v.  Hannibal,   &c.  R.  Co.   36 

Mo.  418 538 

v.  Wren,  79  Minn.  462....    221 
Highland   v.   Houston   E.    &   W. 
T.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

65  S.  W.  649 25 

Highland   Ave.   &   B.   R.   Co.   v. 

Donovan,  94  Ala.   300    ..    570 
v.  Sampson,  112  Ala.  425..    110 
Highway     Comrs.     v.     Highway 

Comr.   60   111.   58 175 

Hildman  v.  City  of  Phillips,  106 

Wis.  61  i 205 

Hildreth    v.    Hancock,    156    111. 

618 65 

Hill    v.    Bahrns,    158    111.    304, 

320 363 

v.  Inhabitants    of    Seekonk, 

119    Mass.    88    600 

v.  Newman,  47  Ind.  187...      63 
v.  Parson,    110   111.    Ill    ...    26a 

v.  S.   43  Ala.   335 361 

v.  S.  42  Neb.  503 196 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   35  S. 

W.   660 314 

v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cv.  App.  371 

262,   360 
v.  Spear,  50  N.  H.  253 192 

Hillebrant  v.  Green,  93  Iowa, 

661 248 

Hillis  v.  First  Nat.  Bank.  54 

Kas.  421 136 


Ixxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  /Sections.) 


Hills    v.    Ludaig,    46    Ohio    St. 


Hirarod  Coal  Co.  v.  Clark,   197 

111.  514  ............... 

Hindman  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

112  Fed.  931  ......  347, 

v.  Timme,  8  Ind.  App.  416. 
Hine  v.  Commercial  Bank,  119 

Mich.  448  ............. 

Hiner  v.  Jeanpert,  65  111.  429.  . 
Mines  v.  Com.  (Ky.)  62  S.  W. 

732  .................. 

Kingston  v.  ^Etna  Ins.  Co.  42 

Iowa,    47     .............. 

Hinkle  v.  Davenport,  38  Iowa, 

364  .................. 

Hinshaw  v.  Gilpin,  64  Ind.  116 

v.  S.  147  Ind.  334 

6,  22,  25,  30,  49,  725, 
735, 

Hinton    v.    Cream    City    R.    Co. 
65  Wis.  335    ........... 

Hintz  v.  Graupner,  138  111.  158 

Hirsch  v.  Feeney,  83  111.  548.. 
Hirschman  v.  P.  101  111.  568 

7,   226,   372, 

Hix  v.  P.  157  111.  383.  .238,  265, 
Hobbs  v.  Ferguson,  100  111.  232 

Hoben  v.  Burlington,  &c.  R.  Co. 

20    Iowa,    562  .......... 

Hoberg  v.  S.  3  Minn.  262  ...... 

Hockaday  v.  Wartham,  22  Tex. 

Cv.  App.   419    .......... 

Hochworth      v.      Des      Grandes 

Champs,  71  Mich.  520 

656, 
Hodge  v.   Chicago  &   A.   R.   Co. 

121    Fed.    52  ............ 

v.  Ter.   12   Okla.    108 

108,   301,   304, 
Hodge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala. 

372  .........  409,  411, 

Hodgen  v.  Latham,  33  111.  344.  . 
Hodges  v.  O'Brien,  113  Wis.  97. 
Hodgman  v.  Thomas,  37  Neb. 

568  .................. 

Hodo  v.  Mexican  N.  R.  Co.  (Tex. 

Cv.  App.)   31  S.  W.  708.. 
Hoehn  v.  Chicago,  P.  St.   L.  R. 

Co.  152  111.  223  ......  25, 

Hoffine  v.  Swings,  60  Neb.  731 

656. 

Hoffman  v.  Oates,  77  Ga.  703.  . 
v.  Cockrell,  112  Iowa,  141. 


6 
25 

351 

12 

175 
243 

80 
426 
500 
676 

790 

209 

356 

282 

756 
276 

47 

247 
39 

71 

661 
351 
733 

413 

80 

187 
25 
80 

183 

658 

409 

63 


Hogan  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.  150 
Mo.  44 365, 

v.  Shuart,  11  Mont.  498.. 

v.  Peterson,  8  Wyo.  549.. 
Hoge  v.  P.  112  111.  46 

v.  P.  117  111.  46..  78,  113, 

195,  201,  246,  299,  322, 

Hoges  v.  Nalty,  113  Wis.  567.. 

Hogsett  v.  S.  40  Miss.  522 

Holcomb  v.  P.  79  111.  409 

Holder  v.  S.  5  Ga.  444 

Holland  v.  S.  131  Ind.  572 

v.  S.  39  Fla.  178 316, 

Hollenbeck  v.  Cook,  180  111.  65. 

Holley  v.  S.  104  Ala.  100 

Holliday  v.  Burgess,  34  111.  193 

v.  Gardner,  27  Ind.  App.  231 

v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.   133 

196, 

Rollings  v.  Bankers'  Union,   63 

S.  Car.    192 176, 

Hollingsworth  v.  S.  156  Mo.  178 
256,  272, 
Hollins  v.  Gorham,  23  Ky.  L.  R. 

2185 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    69  S. 

W.  594. 

Hollowav  v.  Dunham,  170  U.  S. 

615 

v.  Johnson,  129  111.  367 

195, 

v.  S.   156   Mo.  222 

Holmes  v.  Ashtabula  R.  T.  Co. 

10  Ohio  C.  C.  638 

v.  Hale,  71   111.   552    

Hoist    v.    Stewart,     161     Mass. 

516 

Holston  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  116 

Ga.   656 

Holt  v.  Pearson,  12  Utah.  63.  .. 
v   Roberts,    175   Mass.    558 

v.  S.  62  Ga.  214 

v.   Spokane   &  P.  R.  Co.    3 

Idaho    703    97, 

Holtzman  v.  Douglas,  168  U.  S. 

285 

Home  v.  Walton,   117   111.   130. 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


Ixxix 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Homes  v.  Hale,  71  111.  552....  113 

Homish  v.  P.  142  111.  024 748 

Hon  v.  Hon,  70  Ind.  135 523 

Honesty  v.  Com.   81   Va.   283..  80 
Honeywell    v.    S.    40    Tex.    Cv. 

App.   199 208 

Honick    v.    Metropolitan    St.    R. 

Co.  GO  Kas.  124 80 

Hood  v.  Olin,  68  Mich.   165....  192 
Hooper  v.  Moore,  50  N.  Car.   (5 

Jones)    130 162 

v.  S.   106  Ala.  41    29 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)    69  S. 

W.  149 272 

Hoover    v.    Haynes     (Neb.)     91 

N.  W.  392    106 

v.  Mercantile,    &c.    Ins.    Co. 

93   Mo.  App.    Ill    249 

v.  S.   110  Ind.  349    47 

Hopkins    v.    Bishop,    9 1     Mich. 

328 39 

v.  Dipert,  11  Okla.  630   ...  4 
v.  Norfolk  &  S.  R.  Co.  131 

N.  Car.  463 121 

Hopkinson  v.  P.  18  111.  264....  172 
Hoppe   v.  Chicago,  M.   &   St.  P. 

R.  Co.  61  Wis.  357 234 

Hopps  v.  P.  31  111.  392 

329,  748,  751 

Hopt  v.  Utah,  104  U.  S.  631 ...  4 

Horgan  v.  Brady,   155  Mo.  659 

94,  244 

Hormon  v.  S.   158  Ind.  43 797 

Horn  v.  Hutchinson,  163  Pa.  St. 

435 126 

Home  v.  McRea,  53  S.  Car.  51.  6 

Hornish  v.  P.  142  111.  626 115 

Horton   v.   Chevington   &   B.    C. 

Co.  2  Penny  (Pa.)   1 46 

v.  Com.  99  Va.  848 63,  299 

v.  Cooley,   135  Ma^s.  589..  361 

v.  S.  110  Ga.  739   272 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    19   S. 

W.  899 305 

v.  Smith,  115  Ga.  66 87 

v.  Williams,  21  Minn.   187.  154 
Hosley  v.  Brooks,  20  111.   117..  499 
Hot  Springs  R.  Co.  v.  William- 
son, 136  U.  S.  121   80 

Hotema   v.   United    States,    186 

U.  S.  413   264 

Hough    v.    Grant's    Pass    Power 

Co.  41  Ore.  531    48 

House  v.  Marshall,  18  Mo.  370.  515 
v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    69  S. 

W.  417 86 


House  v.  Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co. 

131  N.  Car.   103 121 

v.  Wilder,  47  111.  510..  122,  123 
Householder  v.  Grandy,  40  Ohio 

St.  430 4 

Housh  v.  S.  43  Neb.   163 

7,  71,  227 

Houston  v.  Com.  87  Va.  257...    192 
v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   47  S. 

W.   468 293,   304 

Houston,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Dotson, 
15  Tex.  Cv.  App.  73 

5,  200,  549,  563,  584 
v.  Gorbett,  49  Tex.  576 

530,  544,  563,  564,  571,  581 
v.  Cranberry,    16    Tex.    Cv. 

App.  391 191 

v.  Hampton,  64  Tex.  429..   543 
v.  Harion    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

54  S.  W.  629   172 

v.  Hubbard   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

37   S.  W.  25    183 

v.  Jones,    16   Tex.  Cv.  App. 

179 184 

v.  Kelly,    13   Tex.   Cv.  App. 

1   28 

v.  Miller,  49  Tex.  323 449 

v.  Patterson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

57  S.  W.  675    199 

v.  Patterson,    20    Tex.    Cv. 

App.  255 94 

v.  Richards   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

49  S.  W.  687 213 

v.  Richards,     20     Tex.     Cr. 

App.  203 106 

v.  Ritter  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  41 

S.  W.   753    94 

v.  Runnels  (Tex.)   47  S.  W. 

971 215 

v.  White,  23  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

280 244 

Houston   City    St.   R.   Co.   v.   Ar- 

tusey  '(Tex.  Cv.  App.)    31 

S.  W.  319    195 

Hovey  v.  Chase,   52   Me.   304..    211 
Howard  v.  Carpenter,  22  Md.  10 

181 
v.  Inhabitants,     117     Mass. 

588 480 

v.  P.  185  111.  552 71 

v.  S.  115  Ga.  244 271 

v.  S.  50  Ind.   190    322,  329 

v.  S.   (Miss.)   35  So.  653...    376 
v.  Schwartz  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

55  S.  W.  348    80 

v.  Supervisors,  54  Neb.  443 

20 


Ixxx 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Howard  v.  Turner,   125  N.  Car. 

126   

Howe   v.   Miller,    23   Ky.   L.   R. 

1610   

v.  West    S.    Land   &    I.   Co. 

21  Wash.  594 

Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  Riber,  66 

Ind.  504 

Howe  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Layman,  88 

111.  39 

Howell    v.    Hanrick     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)  24  S.  W.  823   

v.  Mellon,  169  Pa.  St.  138. 
v.  New  York,  C.  H.  &  R.  R. 

Co.  73  N.  Y.  S.  994 

v.  Norfolk  &  C.  R.  Co.  124 

N.  Car.  24    

v.  S.  61  Neb.  391    206, 

v.  Wilcox  &  Gibbs  S.  M.  Co. 

12  Neb.  177    

Howes  v.   District  of  Columbia, 

2  App.  Cas.  (D.  C.)   188.. 

Howey  v.  Fisher,  111  Mich.  422 

121, 

Howland  v.  Day,  56  Vt.  324.  .. 
Hewlett  v.  Dilts,  4  Ind.  App.  23 

Howser  v.  S.  (Ala.)  23  So.  681. 

Hoxie  v.  S.   114  Ga.  19 176, 

Hoye  v.  Turner,  96  Va.  624 

Hoyt  v.  Dengler,  54  Kas.  309.  . 

*  v.  P.   140  111.  596    

Hronek  v.  P.  134  111.  135 

Hubbard  v.  Hubbard    (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)   38  S.  W.  388 

v.  S.   37   Fla.    156    

Hubuer  v.  Friege,  90  111.  212.  . . 

Hudelson  v.   S.   94  Ind.   426 

166, 
Hudson  v.  Best,  104  Ga.  131 

208, 
v.  Hughan,  56  Kas.   159 

695, 

v.  S.  101  Ga.  520   

v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  420 

Huelsenkamp  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co. 

37  Mo.  537,  568 

Huff  v.  Aultman,  69  Iowa,  71 .. 

v.  Cole,  45  Ind.  300   

Huffman  v.  Cauble,  86  Tnd.  591 . 


20 

27 
94 
80 

163 
101 

130 

121 

247 

90 
126 

131 

7 

203 

293 
228 
14 
6,  7 
288 
117a 

93 
347 
80 

710 
305 

701 

272 

191 

558 
360 
129 

I!).") 


Hufford  v.  Lewis,  29  Ind.  App. 

202 70 

Huggins  v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

364 337 

Hughes  v.  Antietam  Mfg.  Co.  34 

Md.  319 462 


Hughes   v.  Chicago  &   A.  R.  Co. 

127  Mo.  447 238 

v.  P.  116  111.  330   258 

v.  S.  117  Ala.  25 258 

v.  Tanner,  96  Mich.   113    ..    157 
Hughie  v.  Hammett,  105  Ga.  368 

80 
Hull  v.  City  of  St.   Louis,    138 

Mo.  018 182 

Hull's  Will,  117  Iowa,  738 7 

Hulse  v.  S.  35  Ohio  St.  429 ...  34,  36 
Hulton  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   33 

S.  W.  969    ..  ...    110 

Humes    v.    Bernstein,     72    Ala. 

546 160 

v.  Decatur  Land,  &c.  Co.  98 

Ala.  465 431 

v.  Gephart,      175     Pa.     St. 

417 6 

Hummel  v.  Stern,  48  N.  Y.  S.. 

528 25 

Humphries  v.  Huffman,  33  Ohio 

St.  97 663 

v.  S.   100  Ga.  260   205 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  434.    284 
Hunt    v.    McMullen     (Tex.     Cv. 

App.)   46  S.  W.  666   ....      66 

v.  S.  3  Ind.  App.  383. .  ....    837 

v.  S.  7  Tex.  Cv.  App.  212 

314,  726,  730 

v.  S.   135  Ala.   1    269,  783 

v.  Searcy,  167  Mo.  158   ...      80 

Hunter  v.  S."  29  Fla.  486 217 

v.  S.  74  Miss.  515 282,  318 

v.  Third  Ave  R.  Co.   45  N. 

Y.  S.  1044 174 

Hunter,  E.  &  Co.  v.  Lanius,  82 

Tex.  677 404 

Huntingdon,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Decker, 

84   Pa.   St.   422 650 

Kurd  v.  Xeilson,  100  Iowa,  555 

126.  129 
Hurlbut  v.  Bagley,  99  Iowa,  127 

199 
v.  Boaz,    4    Tex.    Cv.    App. 

371 113 

v.  Hall,  39  Neb.   889    48 

v.  Hurlburt,  128  N.  Y.  420.    171 

Hurley  v.  S.  29  Ark.  17 67 

Hurst    v.    McMullen     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)   48  S.  W.  744 48 

Hurt   v.   Ford    (Mo.)    36   S.   W. 

673 415 

Huschle  v.  Morris,  131  111.  575.      66 
Huston  v.  City  of  Council  Bluffs. 

101  Iowa.  33  603 

v.  P.  121  111.  497  1$ 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxxi 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Hutchins  v.  S.  151  Ind.  667 ....   238 
Hutchinson  v.  Bowker,  5   M.  & 

W.  535 160 

v.  Lemcke,   107   Ind.    121 

43,   346 

v.  Wenzel,   155  Ind.  49 119 

Huth  v.  Carondelet,  56  Mo.  207 .    158 
Hutton  v.  Doxsee,  116  Iowa,  1 3 

195 

Hutts  v.  S.  7  Tex.  App.  44 336 

Hyde  v.  Shank,  77  Mich.  517..        1 
v.  Town  of  Swanton,  72  Vt. 

242 153 

Hyde    Park    v.    Washington    Ice 

Co.  117  111.  233   683 


I.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hassell,  62 

Tex.   258 576 

Ickenroth   v.   St.    Louis   Tr.   Co. 

102  Mo.  App.  597    ..474,575 
Idaho  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Kalan- 
quin  (Idaho)   66  Pac.  933 

65,   113 

Ide  v.  Fratcher,  194  111.  552...   238 
v.  Lake  Tp.   (Pa.  Com.  PL) 

9  Kulp,  192   191 

Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 

184  111.   294    195 

v.  Ashline,   171   111.   320 

133,  235 

v.  Beebe,  174  111.  13,  27...  363 
v.  Byrne,  205  111.  21  ..104,119 
v.  Cosby,  174  111.  109 

70,   109,   126 

v.  Davenport,  177  111.  110.  53 
v.  Davidson,  76  Fed.  517..  190 

v.  Eioher,  202   111.   556 53 

v.  Freeman,  210  111.  270  ..  50 
v.  Gilbert,  157  111.  365 

116,  250 
v.  Goddard,  72  111.  569-627,635 

v.  Griffin,    184   III.    10 115 

v.  Hammer,    72   111.    347...        1 

v.  Hammer,  85  111.  526 42 

v.  Harris,   162   111.   200 363 

v.  Haskins,  115  111.  308 

8,  14,  18,  366.  367 
v.  Hopkins,  200  111.  .122..  238 
v.  Jernigan,  198  111.  297..  53 
v.  King,  179  111.  96...1,  120.  196 
v.  Latimer,  128  111.  171..  363 
v.  Linstroth  Wagon  Co.  112 

Fed.   737 353 

v.  McClelland,  42  111.  359.  .  30 
v.  McKee,  43  111.  119 84 


Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Modglin, 

85   111.   481 347 

v.  Moffitt,  67  111.  431 250 

v.  Noble,   142  111.  584 74 

v.  Nowicki,   148  111.  29 149 

v.  O'Keefe,   154  111.  508 

183,  356,  361 

v.  Sanders,   166  111.  270...  94 

v.  Slater,  139  111.  199 183 

v.  Smith,  208  111.  618......  118 

v.  Swearingen,  47  111.  210..  242 
v.  Thompson,  210  111.  226 

53,  106 

v.  Turner,  194  111.  575 198 

v.  Weiland,   179  111.  609    ..  130 

v.  Weldon,  52  111.  294 649 

v.  Whalen,  42  111.  396   163 

v.  Wheeler,  149  111.  525...  42 

v.  Whittemore,  43  111.  420..  163 

v.  Zang,  10    111.  App.  594..  203 
Illinois  Iron  &  M.  Co.  v.  Weber, 

196  111.  526    56 

Illinois    Life   Ins.   Co.   v.   Wells, 

200    111.    453     363 

Illinois  Linen  Co.  v.  Hough,  9 1 

111.  67 247 

Illinois   Steel   Co.   v.   McFadden, 

196    111.    344    80 

v.  Mann,  197  111.  186  231 

v.  Novak,  184  111.  501 99 

v.  Schymanowski,  162  111. 

447 195 

Imhoff  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  20 

Wis.  344 247 

Indianapolis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ber- 

ney.  71  111.  390   94 

.  v.  Boettcher,    131    Ind.    82, 

615,  642 
v.  Brown  (Ind.)  69  N.  E. 

408 549 

v.  Bundy,  152  Ind.  590 

20  357 

v.  Bush,  101  Ind.  587..  84',  232 
v.  Haines  (Ind.)  69  N.  E. 

188 7,  199 

v.  Hale,   106  111.  371    640 

v.  Hendrain,   190  111.  504..  360 
v.  Hockett,   159   Ind.    682 

25,  236,  238 

v.  Houlihan,  157  Ind.  494..  614 

v.  Push,  85  Ind.  279    358 

v.  Robinson,  157  Ind.  414 

25,  105 
v.  Robinson.    157   Ind.   232 

478,  482,  531 

v.  Sawyer,  109  Ind.  344...  646 

v.  Stout,  53  Ind.  143    635 


Ixxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Indianapolis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Tay- 
lor (Ind.)  Jan.  1905 

457,    631 
v.  Taylor,   158  Ind.  279 

384,  627 
Ingalls  v.  S.  48  Wis.  647 

220,  266,  288 
Inglebright     v.     Hammond      19 

Ohio,  337 28 

Ingols  v.  Plimpton,  10  Colo.  535 

105 
Ingram  v.  S.  62  Miss.   142 19 

Insurance  Co.  of  N.  A.  v.  Bird, 

175   111.   42    133 

International,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  An- 
chond  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  68 

S.  W.  743 » 247 

v.  Beasley,  9  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

569 8 

v.  Bonatz    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

48  S.  W.  767    65 

v.  Clark  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   71 

S.  W.  585  '    6 

v.  Clark,  81  Tex.  48   430 

v.  Eason     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

35   S.   W.   208 80 

v.  Eckford,   71    Tex.   274 

549,  582,  583 
v.  Harris  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  65 

S.  W.   885    7 

v.  Kuehn,  11  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

21    355 

v.  Lehman   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

66  S.  W.  214   249 

v.  Locke  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  67 

S.  W.   1082    ..  ..94,   194,   1,96 
v.  Martineg    ( Tex.  Cv.  App. ) 

57  S.  W.  689   198 

v.  Newman  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

40    S.   W.    854 115,   363 

v.  Niff   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)    26 

S.   W.    784 28 

v.  Sun,    11    Tex.    Cv.    App. 

386   363 

v.  Welch,  86  Tex.  203   ....    355 
International     Bank    v.     Ferris, 

118    111.    470 114 

International  Farmers'  Live 
Stock  Ins.  Co.  v.  Byrkett 
(Ind.  App)  36  N.  E.  779 

174 
International    Soc.    v.    Hildreth, 

11  N.  Dak.  262   236 

Iowa  State  Sav.  Bank  v.  Black, 

91   Iowa,  490    75 

Irby  v.  S.  95  Ga.  467 80,  255 


Iron  M.  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  92 

Mo.  265  . 363 

Iron  R.  Co.  v.'  Mowery,  36  Ohio 

St.  418 544 

Iroquois  Furnace  Co.  v.  Bignall 

H.  Co.   201    111.   299    402 

Irvine  v.  S.  104  Tenn.  132 2o9 

v.  S.  20  Tex.  App.  12 25 

Irwin  v.  Smith,  72  Ind  488 35« 

Isaac  v.  McLean,  106  Mich.  79.    106 
Isely  v.  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co.   88 

Wis.  453 223 

Isham  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    41 

S.  W.  622 215 

Ison  v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1805 

296 

Ittner  v.  Hughes,   154  Mo.   55.      25 
Izlar  v.  Manchester  &  A.  R.  Co. 

57  S.  Car.  332 308,  356 


Jackson   v.   Burnham,    20    Colo. 

532 198 

v.  Com.  17  Ky.  L.  R.  1350 

217 
v.  Com.  17  Ky.  L.  R.  1197      32 

v.  Com.  96  Va.   107 101 

v.  Com.  98  Va.   845...  255,  258 
v.  Consolidated   Tr.    Co.    59 

N.  J.  L.  25    ,...149 

v.  Ferris   (Pa.)    8  Atl.  435.    126 
v.  Grand   Ave.    R.    Co.    118 

Mo.  216  ...551,561,562,643 
v.  International  &  G.  N.  R. 

Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  57  S. 

W.  869 6 

v.  Kas.  City.  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R. 

Co.  157  Mo.  621  115 

v.  Jackson,  82  Md.  17  26 

v.  P.  18  111.  269,  271 

201,  279,  316,  737,  773, 

776,  782 

v.  P.  126  111.  139 830 

v.  S.  106  Ala.  12 

240,  258,  267 

v.  S.  91  Ga.  271 80 

v.  S.  71  Ind.  149 195 

v.  S.  20  Tex.  Cr.  App.  192.  765 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  62  S. 

W.  914 304 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  67  S. 

W.  497  326 

v.  S.  91  Wis.  253 

188.  252,  708 
v.  Van  Dusen,  5  Johns.  (N. 

Y.)  144  330 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Ixxxiii 


(References  are  to  Sections. J 


Jackson  Scjiool  Tp.  v.  Shera,   8 

Ind.  App.  330   119 

Jacksonville   &   S.   E.   R.   Co.   v. 

Walsh,  106  111.  257  ....    113 
Jacksonville    St.    R.   v.   Walton, 

42  Fla.  54   361 

v.  Wilhite,  209   111.   84 

25,  68,  348,  363 
Jacob   Tome   Inst.   of   Port  De- 
posit v.  Crothers,  87  Md. 

569 116 

Jacob!  v.  S.    133  Ala.   1 

27,  80,   113 
Jacobson   v.   Gunzburg,    150   111. 

135 19,  25 

Jacoby  v.  Stark,  205  111.  34...   238 
Jahnke   v.   S.    (Neb.)    94   N.  W. 

158 269 

James  v.  Gilbert,   168  111.  627.      25 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  107 

Mo.  480 63 

v.  S.   104  Ala.  20    52 

v.  S.  115  Ala.  83 328 

Jameson  v.  Weld,  93  Me.  345..   347 
Jamison  v.  P.   145  111.   357 

735,   751 

v.  Weld,  93   Me.  345 223 

Jam  son  v.  Quivey,  5  Cal.  490..      31 
Jane  v.  Com.  2  Mete.  (Ky.)   30 

295,  306 
Janny  v.   Howard,    150   Pa.   St. 

342 352 

Jansen    v.    Grimshaw,    125    111. 

468 30 

Jaqua   v.   Cordesman,    106    Ind. 

141   4,   12,  347 

Jarman  v.  Rea,  137  Cal.  339 

191,   194 
Jarmusch   v.   Otis   Iron   &   Steel 

Co.  23  Ohio  Cir.   122 99 

Jarnigan   v.    Fleming,    43    Miss. 

710 221,  222 

Jarnis  v.  S.  70  Ark.  613 271 

Jarrell  v.  Lillie,  40  Ala.  271.  ..   202 

v.  S.  58  Ind.  296 295,  716 

Jarvis  v.  Hitch,  161  Ind.  271..   614 
Jefferson  v.  S.   110  Ala.  89....    113 

Jeffries  v.  S.  61   Ark.  308 196 

v.  S.  77  Miss.  757.... 219,  297 

•Jenkins   v.    Louisville   &   N.   R. 

Co.  (Ky.)  47  S.  W.  761..  133 
v.  Mammoth    Min.     Co.    24 

Utah,  513 347 

v.  S.   82  Ala.  27 282,  777 

v.  S.   35   Fla.   737 315 

v.  S.  62  Wis.  49 313 

v.  Tobin,  31  Ark.  307 182 


Jenks    v.    Lansing    Lumber    Co. 

97   Iowa,  342    53,  70 

Jennings   v.   Kosmak,   45   N.   Y. 

S.   802 219 

Jenny    Elec.    Co.    v.    Branham, 

145  Ind.  322 365 

Jensen  v.  Steiber   (Neb.)    93  N. 

W.  697 20,  90 

Jesse  v.   State    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

57   S.  W.   826 48 

Jesse  French  Piano  &  Organ  Co. 

v.  Forbes,  134  Ala.  302..    199 

Jinks  v.  S.   114  Ga.  430 238 

Johnson  v.  Brown,  1 3  W.  Va.  91.  501 
v.  Com.  (Va.)  46  S.  E.  790  80 
v.  Culver,  116  Ind.  278...  232 
v.  Galveston  H.  &  N.  R.  Co. 

27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  616...  26 
v.  Gebhauer,  159  Ind.  284.  238 
v.  Glidden,  11  S.  Dak.  237.  238 
v.  Gulledge,  115  Ga.  981..  12 
v.  Hirschberg,  185  111.  445.  244 
v.  Hirschburg,  85  111.  App. 

47 48 

v.  International  &  G.  Co.  24 

Tex.  Cv.  App.  148 172 

v.  Johnson    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

67  S.  W.  123    355 

v.  Johnson,  114  111.  611...      94 

v.Johnson,   187   111.   97 238 

v.  Kahn,  97  Mo.  App.  628.  119 
v.  McKee,  27  Mich.  471...  48 

v.  Miller,  63  Iowa,  529 163 

v.  P.   113  111.  99 814 

v.  P.  140  III.  352 203,  209 

v.  P.  202  111.  53 294 

v.  S.   59   Ala.   37 318 

v.  S.    100  Ala.   55 36,   39 

v.  S.   102  Ala.   1 202,  345 

v.  S.  36  Ark.   242 80 

v.  S.  60  Ark.  45 187 

v.  S.    105   Ga.   665 257 

v.  S.   65  Ind.   269 376 

v.  S.   148  Ind.  522 266 

v.  S.  (Miss.)  16  So.  494...  206 
v.  S.  (Miss.)  27  So.  880...  182 

v.  S.   75  Miss.   635 255 

v.  S.  53  Neb.   103 6,  313 

v.  S.  100  Tenn.  254..  255,  335 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  4  S. 

W.   901   274 

v.  S.  18  Tex.  App.  385....  312 
v.  S.  18  Tex.  Cr.  App.  398.  734 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  45  S. 

W.   901    26 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   57   S. 
W.  805 .   326 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Johnson  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

58   S.   W.    105 269 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    67  S. 

W.   412 .  .      25 

v.  Stone,   69  Miss.   826 191 

v.  St.    Louis    &    S.    R.    Co. 

173  Mo.   307 50,  239 

v.  Superior  R.  Tr.  R.  Co.  9 1 

Wis.  233 208 

v.  Thompson,  72  Ind.  167..    211 

v.  U.  S.   157  U.  S.  320 227 

v.  Worthy,   17  Ga.  420 94 

Joiner  v.  S.  105  Ga.  646 71,  305 

Joines  v.  Johnson,   133  N.  Car. 

487 80 

Jokers  v.  Borgman,  29  Kas.  109 

487 
Joliet,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McPherson, 

193    111.   629 33,    129 

v.  Velie,    140   111.   59..  121,    124 

Jolly  v.  S.  43  Neb.   857    44 

Jones  v.  Achey,   105  Ga.  493..    135 

v.  Adler,  34  Md.  440 438 

v.  Angell,  95  Ind.  376 

202.  485,  4f' 

v.  Bangs,  40  Ohio  St.  139.  243 
v.  Casler,  139  Ind.  382 

206,  702 
v.  Charleston    &    W.    C.    R. 

Co.  61   S.  Car.  556    .....    195 
v.  Chicago    &    Iowa    R.    Co. 

68  111.   380    243 

v.  Cleveland,    6    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.   640 174 

v.  Collins,  94  Md.   403 80 

v.  Durham,  94  Mo.  App.  51.  199 
v.  East  Tenn.  V.  and  G.  R. 

Co.   175  U.   S.   682 351 

v:  Ellis,  68  Vt.  544... 350,  351 

v.  Foley,   121   Ind.   180 361 

v.  Fort,   36  Ala.   449 86 

v.  Hathaway,  77  Ind.  24..  515 
v.  Heirs,  57  S.  Car.  427.  ..  6 
v.  Hess  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  48 

S.  W.   46    303 

v.  Johnson,  61  Ind.  257...  39 
v.  Johnson  (N.  Car.)  45^8. 

E    828  25 

v.  Jones,  19  Ky.   1516 113 

v.  Layman,  123  Ind.  573..  356 
v.  McMillon,  129  Mich.  86.  192 
v.  Matheis,  1 7  Pa.  Super. 

220 7 

v.  Morris,  97  Va.   44 506 

v.  Murray,   167  Mo.   25 

153,   500 

v.  P.   23   Colo.   276 335 

v.  P.   12  111.  259 265 


Jones  v.  Parker  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

42  S.  W.  123  118 

v.  Rex  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  31 

S.  W.  1077  :  101 

v.  S.  107  Ala.  93 290 

v.  S.  59  Ark.  417 193 

v.  S.  61  Ark.  88.. 227,  310,  372 

v.  S.  105  Ga.  649 303 

v.  S.  53  Ind.  237 816 

v.  S.  160  Ind.  539 351 

v.  S.  26  Miss.  247 266 

v.  S.  80  Miss.  181 118 

v.  S.  20  Ohio  St.  34 7,  8 

v.  S.  26  Ohio  St.  208 36 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  490.  310 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  45  S. 

W.  596  21 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  72  S. 

W.  845 291 

v.  Spartanburg  Herald  Co. 

44  S.  Car.  526  6 

v.  Swearingen,  42  S.  Car. 

58 38,  156 

v.  Warren  (N.  Car.)  46  S. 

E.  740  .  ..'. 144 

v.  Wattles  (Neb.)  92  N.  W. 

765 80 

v.  Williams,  108  Ala.  282.  48 
Joplin  Water  Works  v.  Joplin 

(Mo.)  76  S.  W.  960 94 

Jordan  v.  City  of  Benwood,  42 

W.  Va.  312  32 

v.  Duke  (Ariz.)  36  Pac. 

896 163 

v.  Indianapolis  Water  Co. 

155  Ind.  337  96 

v.  James,  5  Ohio,  88 243 

v.  Philadelphia,  125  Fed. 

825 363 

v.  S.  81  Ala.  20 206 

v.  S.  117  Ga.  405 265 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  30  S. 

W.  445  187 

Joy  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  46.  .  326 
Judy  v.  Sterrett,  153  111.  94 

101  30,  56,  231,  363 

Justice  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R. 

386 255 

v.  Gallert,  131  N.  Car.  393.  6 

Jupitz  v.  P.  34  111.  516 340 

v.  P.  34  111.  521 340 


K 


Radish  v.  Young,   108  111.   170.    101 
Kafka  v.   Levensohn,   41    N.  Y. 

S.   368   ,  •    149 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxxv 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Kahn  v.  Triest-R.  &c.  Co.   139 
Cal.  340 

Kahrs  v.  Kahrs,   115  Ga.  288.. 

Kairn  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    45 
S.  W.  203 

Kalley  v.  Baker,  132  N.  Y.  5.. 

Kane  v.  Footh,  70  111.  590.. 78, 

Kankakee  Stone  Co.  v.  Kanka- 
kee,  128  111.   177    

Kansas  City  v.  Birmingham,  45 

Kas.    214    .  .  .  .- 

v.  Bradbury,  45   Kas.  483 
368;  385,  596, 

Kansas  City,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Beck- 
er, 63  Ark.  477 

v.  Chamberlin,  61  Kas.  859 

v.  Henson,  132  Ala.  528.  .  . 

v.  Ryan,   49   Kas.    1 

v.  Simpson,   30   Kas.   647.. 
Kansas  Farmers'.  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Hawley,  46  Kas.  746 

Kansas  Inv.  Co.  v.  Carter,   160 

Mass.   421    

Karl  v.  Juniata  Co.  206  Pa.  633 

Karnes  v.  Dovey,  5  3  Neb.  725. 

Karr  v.  S.   106  Ala.   1 67, 

Kassman  v.   Citv   of   St.   Louis, 

153  Mo.  293    

Kaufman  v.  Maier.  94  Cal.  269 

Kavanaugh  v.   City   of  Wausau 

(Wis.)   98  N.  W.  553..  .. 

Keady  v.  P.  (Colo.)  74  Pac.  895 

v.  P.  (Colo.)   77  Pac.  895.. 
Keanders  v.  Montague,   180  111. 

306   ,. 

Kearney  v.  Fitzgerald,  43  Iowa, 

582 
v.  P.  (Cal.)    17  Pac.  782.  .. 

v.  S.    68    Miss.    233 

Kearns  v.  Burling,  14  Ind.  App. 

143 

Keastner  v.  First  National  Bank, 

170  111.   322    

Keating  v.  P.  160  111.  483 

235,  238,  265. 

v.  S.   (Neb.)    93  N.  W.  980 

25, 

Koatley  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 

94  Iowa,  685  

Keaton  v.  S.  99  Ga.  197 

Keegan  v.  Kinnare,  123  111.  290 


192 
136 

255 
438 
230 

250 

599 

608 

76 

25 

68 

211 

569 

352 

94 

192 
353 
297 

48 
319 
214 

238 
505 

250 

487 
170 
170 

129 

25 

816 

226 


53 

256 

84 


Keeler  v.  Herr,  54  111.  App.  468 

363 
v.  Herr,  157  111.  57 

156,  235,  399 

v.  Stuppe,  86  111.  309 66 

Keeling  v.  Kuhn,  19  Kas.  441.  359 

Keely  v.  S.  14  Ind.  36..., 815 

Keener  v.  S.  18  Ga.  194  .' 168 

V.  S.  97  Ga.  3881 331 

Keens    v.    Robertson,    46    Neb. 

837 347 

Keesier  v.  S.  154  Ind.  242..  71,  216 
Keesley   v.   Doyle,    8    Ind.   App. 

43   .   .    .". 25 

Kehl  v.  Abram,   210  111.   218..  76 
Kehoe  v.  Allentown  &  L.  V.  Tr. 

Co.  187  Pa.  St.  474 86 

Kehrley  v.  Shafer,   36  N.  Y.  S. 

510 35 

Keiser  v.  S.  83   Ind.  234 

166,  169,  710 

Keith  v.  Hobbs,  69  Mo.  87 405 

.v.  Spencer,    19   Fla.    748...  245 
v.  S.   157   Ind.   376 

316,  319,  738 

v.  S.  49  Kas.  439 204 

'    v.  Wells,    14   Colo.   321 12 

Keithley    v.    Stafford,    126    111. 

507 27,  29,  74 

Kelch  v.  S.  55  Ohio  St.   152...  331 

Kelderhouse    v.    Hall,    116    111. 

150   47 

Kelleher  v.  City  of  Keokuk,  60 

Iowa,  473 359,  361 

Keller  v.  Lewis,  116  Iowa,  369.  7 

v.     Stuppe,  86  111.  309 25 

Kelley  v.  Highfield,  15  Ore.  277.  457 
v.  Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co. 

49   Til.  App.   304    203 

v.  Schupp,  60  Wis.  86 205 

Kellog  v.  Lewis,  28  Kas.  535..  14 
v.  McCabe    (Tex.   Cv.   App.) 

38  S.  W.  542    213 

Kellogg  v.  Boyden,  126  111.  378 

83 
Kelly  v.  Cable  Co.  7  Mont.  70.6,247 

v.  Eby,   141   Pa.    176 192 

v.  Fleming,  113  N.  Car.  133 


v.  Palmer  (Minn.)  97  N. 

W.  578  

v.  P.  55  N.  Y.  S.  565.. 


94 


29 

760 

v.  S.  (Fla.)  33  So.  235 792 

v.  S.  51  Neb.  572 80 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  412.  290 

v.  Strouse,  116  Ga.  872...  121 

Kemp  v.  S.  13  Tex.  565 802 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Kendall  v.  Brown,  74  111.  232..      86 

v.  Brown,  86  111.  388 484 

v.  Young,   141   111.   188 25 

Kendrick      v.      Cisco,     1 3     Lea 

(Tenn.)    248 160 

v.  Dillinger,     117     JSJ.     Car. 

491 7,  348 

Kennard  v.  Grossman  (Neb.)  89 

N.  W.   1025 25 

Kennedy    v.    Behout,     62     Ind. 

363 154 

v.  Forest    Oil    Co.    199    Pa. 

St.   644 • 102 

v.  Hannibal,  &c.   R.  Co.  105 

Mo.  273 636,  639 

v.  P.  44  111.  285 21,   115 

v.  S.   107  Ind.   144 71 

Kent  v.  Cole,  84  Mich.  581 

471,  574 

v.  P.  8  Colo.  563 282 

v.  S.  64  Ark.  247 1174,  289 

Kenwood  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dunder- 

date,  50  111.  App.  581 397 

Kenyon  v.  City  of  Mondovi,  98 

Wis.   50 26,  238 

Keokuk   Stove  Works  v.   Ham- 
mond, 94  Iowa,  694   358 

Kepler  v.  Jessup,  11  Ind.  241..    199 
Kepperly    v.   Ramsden,    83     111. 

354   44 

Kerr  v.  Modern  Woodman,   117 

Fed.   593 189 

v.  .S.   63   Neb.    115 8 

v.  Topping,  109  Iowa,  150.   247 
Kerr-Murphy  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hess, 

98  Fed.  56  71 

Ketchum  v.  Ebert,  33  Wis.  611.    171 
v.  Wilcox     (Kas.)     48    Pac. 

446   136 

Kettry   v.   Thuma,   9   Ind.   App. 

498   93 

Key  v.  Dent,  6  Md.  142 26a 

v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App 276 

Keyes  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids, 

107  Iowa,  509   6,  20 

Kibler  v.  Com.  94  Va.  804 191 

Kicld  v.  S.  83  Ala.  58 192 

Kidman  v.  Garrison   (Iowa)    97 

N.  W.  1078   25 

Kidwell  v.  S.   35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

264 255,  304 

Kiekhoef er    v.    Hidershide,    113 

Wis.   280    ,  •      70 

Kielbeck  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

Co.  (Neb.)  97  N.  W.  750.    126 
Kieldsen  v.  Wilson,  77  Mich.  45 

116 


Kiernan  v.  Chicago,  &c.    R.  Co. 

123  111.   188    685,  688 

Kildow  v.  Irick  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

33  S.  W.  315   192 

Kilgore  v.  S.  74  Ala.  5 328 

v.  S.   124  Ala.  24 258 

Killiau   v.   Eigenmann,    57    Ind. 

488 210 

Kilpatrick  v.  Grand  T.  R.  Co.  74 

Vt.  288 25 

Kilpatrick  Koch  Dry  Goods  Co. 

v.  Kahn,  "53  Kas.   274    ..  234 
Kimball  v.  Borden,  97  Va.  478 

71,  645 
v.  Friend,  95  Va.  126 

628,  629,  630,  631,  633,  636 
641 

v.  Paye,  96  Me.  487 54 

Kimbrough  v.  S.  101  Ga.  583..  328 

Kimmel  v.  P.  92  111.  457 30,  32a 

King  v.  Franklin,  132  Ala.  559.  66 

v.  King,   155  Mo.  406.174,  243 

v.  Rea,   1 3   Colo.   69 84 

v.  S.   120  Ala.  329 223 

v.  S.   43   Fla.   211 353 

v.  S.   86   Ga.    355 34 

v.  S.  (Miss.)   23  So.  166...  192 

v.  S.  74  Miss.  576 331 

Kingsbury    v.    Missouri,    &c.    R. 

Co.  156  Mo.  384 646 

v.  Thorp,  61  Mich.  216 156 

Kinkle  v.  P.  27  Colo.  450 245 

Kinnemer  v.  S.  66  Ark.  206...  36 
Kinney  v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co. 

122  N.  Car.  961 182 

v.  P.   108  111.  524 258,  285 

Kinyon  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.   118  Iowa,  349..  17 7,  355 
Kipperly    v.    Ramsden,     83     111. 

354 361 

Kirby  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  63  S. 

Car.   494 7,  183 

v.  Wilson,  98  111.  240.117,  286 
Kirchner  v.  Collins,  152  Mo.  394 

200 

Kirk  v.  Garrett,   84   Md.   383..  ]21 

v.  S.   14  Ohio  St.  511 3!) 

v.  Ter.   10  Okla.  46 

48,  80,  170,  255 

Kirkham  v.  P.   170  111.   16 227 

Kirland  v.  S.  43  Ind.   146 250 

Kirsher    v.    Kirsher,    120    Iowa, 

337 7 

Kischman    v.     Scott,     166     Mo. 

214 25.  75 

Kitchell  v.  Bratton,  2  111.  300..  244 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


Ixxxvii 


( References  are  to  Sections.) 


Kitchen  v.  Loudenback,  48  Ohio 

St.   177    415,  4 It) 

Klatt   v.   N.   C.   Foster   Lumber 

Co.  97   Wis.   641    232 

Kleiner  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  162 

N.   Y.    193    71 

Kleinschmidt  v.  McDermott,   12 

Mont.   309    359 

Klepsch     v.     Donald,     8     Wash. 

162 50 

Kletzing     v.     Armstrong,      119 

Iowa,   505    231 

Kline  v.  Baker,  99  Mass.  253..    162 

Klink  v.  P.  16  Colo.  467 360 

Klipstein  v.  Raschein,  117  Wis. 

248 200 

Kloke   v.   Martin,   55   Neb.   554 

350,  353 

Klugen  v.  S.  45  Ind.  521 247 

Kluse   v.   Sparks,    10   Ind.   App. 

444 27 

Knapp    v.   Griffin,    140    Pa.   St. 

004 171 

v.     Jones,  50  Neb.  490 126 

Knight     v.     Denman,     64     Neb. 

814   247 

v.  Overman  Wheel  Co.    174 

Mass.   455    80 

v.  Pacific      C.      Stage      Co. 

(Cal.)    34  Pac.  868 94 

v.  S.  (Fla.)   32  So.  110....      70 

v.  S.   114  Ga.  48 228,  321 

Knopf  v.  Richmond,  F.  &  P.  R. 

Co.   85   Va.  773 574 

Knowles    v.    Murphy,    107    Cal. 

107    65 

v.  Nixon,   17  Mont.  473 

182,  319,  321 

Koerner  v.  S.  98  Ind.  8....  196,  774 
Kohl  v.  S.  57  N.  J.  L.  445....  84 
Kohler  v.  West  Side  R.  Co.  99 

\Vis.   33   232 

v.  Wilson,  40  Iowa,  185...  526 
Kohn  v.  Johnson,  97  Iowa,  99.  70 
Koller  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

496 265 

Kollock  v.  S.  88  Wis.  663 

111,  310,  311,  312 
Konold   v.   Rio   Grande,   &c.    R. 

Co.  21   Utah,   379 247 

Koster  v.  Seney,  100  Iowa,  562 

461 
Kostuch  v.  St.  P.  City  R.  Co.  78 

Minn.  459 6 

Kowalski   v.   Chicago   0.   W.  JR. 

Co.  (Iowa)  87N.W.  409.      20 


Krack  v.  Wolf,  39  Ind.  88 

3,   188,  358 

Krall  v.  Lull,  49  Wis.  405 474 

Kranz  v.   Thieben,    15   111.  App. 

482   107 

Kraus  v.  Haas,  6  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

665 25 

Krause   v.   Plumb,    195    Pa.   St. 

65 71 

Krauss  v.  Haas  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

25   S.   W.    1025 247 

Krehnavy  v.  S.  43  Neb.  337...  279 
Krepps  v.  Carlise,  157  Pa.  St. 

358 191 

Krish    v.    Ford,    19    Ky.    L.    R. 

1167 80 

Kroeger  v.  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co.  30 

Tex.  Cv.  App.  87 25 

Kroetch    v.     Empire     Mill     Co. 

(Idaho)    74   Pac.   868 130 

Kuehn  v.  Wilson,  13  Wis.  117.  203 
Kuenster  v.  Woodhouse,  101 

Wis.   216    19!) 

Kugler    v.    Wiseman,    20    Ohio 

361   .   .• 244 

Kuhl  v.  Long,  102  Ala.  569...  35 
Kuhn  v.  Nelson,  61  Neb.  224..  12 
Kunst  v.  Ringold,  116  Mich.  88.  238 
Kurstelska  v.  Jackson,  89  Minn. 

95 119,  246 

Kutner   v.    Fargo,   45    N.    Y.   S. 

753 5!) 

Kyd  v.  Cook,  56  Neb.  71 3 

Kyner    v.    Sambuer    (Neb.)    91 

N.  W.  491    94 


LaBean  v.  Telephone  &  T.  C.  Co. 

109   Mich.    302 .• 347 

Lacewell  v.  S.  95  Ga.  346..  30,  228 

Lackey  v.  S.  67  Ark.  416 6 

Lacy  v.  Porter,  103  Cal.  597..    126 

Ladd  v.  Pigott,  114  111.  647...    172 
v.  Witte,  116  Wis.  35 119 

Lafayette   &    I.   R.   Co.   v.   Ad- 
ams, 26  Ind.  76   243 

Laflan  v.  Mississippi  Pulp  Co.  74 

Vt.    125    25 

Laflin   v.   Chicago  W.   &  N.  R. 

Co.   33   Fed.   422 211 

Laflin    R.    P.    Co.    v.    Tearney, 

131   111.   322    155 

La  Grande     Ins.     Co.    v.     Shaw 

(Ore.)    74   Pac.   919 94 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


La  Grande   Nat.   Bank   v.   Blum, 

27   Ore.   215    26 

Lagrone   v.   Timmerman,   46    S. 

Car.   372 172 

Lahr  v.  Kraemer  (Minn.)   97  N. 

W.   4 1 8 7 

Laidlaw  v.  Sage,  80  Hun   (N. 

Y.    550    286 

Laird  v.  Warren,  92  111.  208..  384 
Lake  E.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brafford, 

15   Ind.  App.   655 15 

v.  Holland,   162   Ind.   406..   357 
v.  McKewen,    80   Md.    593.      25 

v.  Parker,  94  Ind.  95 365 

v.  Wills,    140  111.   614 235 

Lake     Shore,     &c.     R.     Co.     v. 
Brown,    123    111.    182 

129,  195,  198,  649,  650 
v.  Conway,  169  111.  505..  363 
v.  Hessions,  150  111.  559 

98,  126 

v.  Hundt,   140  111.   525....      58 
v.  Johnson,  135  111.  641 

74,  129,  183,  198 
v.  Knital,  33  Ohio  St.  471.  617 
v.  Mclntosh,  140  Ind.  271 

53,  541,  630,  635 
v.  Miller,  25  Mich.  274....  247 
v.  O'Conner,  115  111.  254 

92,   129,   183 
v.    Parker,  131  111.  557 

66,  74,  195 
v.     Richards,   152  111.  72 

100,   124,   126 
v.  Shultz,     19     Ohio    C.    C. 

639 32 

v.  Whiden,  23  Ohio  Cir.  85 

7,  65,  113 
La  Manna  v.  Munroe,  62  N.  Y. 

S.  984 35] 

Lama  v.  S;  46  Neb.  236 199 

Lamb  v.  Lamb,  105  Ind.  460..    692 

v.  P.  96  111.  73 2,  101,  785 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  147 

Mo.   171 238 

Lambeth     R.     Co.     v.    Brigham, 

170   Mass.    518    238 

Lambright  v.  S.  34  Fla.  564..  188 
Lampe  v.  Kennedy,  60  Wis.  100.  214 
Lamphere  v.  S.  114  Wis.  193.  .  191 

Lampley   v.    Atlantic   C.    L.    R. 

Co.  63  S.  Car.  462 7 

Lampman  v.  Bruning,  120  Iowa, 

167  380 

v.  Van  Alstyne,  94  Wis. 

417 6 


Lancashire   Ins.  Co.  v.   Stanley. 

70  Ark.  1  ".  .  214 

Lancaster  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

31  S.  W.  515 215,  270 

Lancaster  G.  &  (.'.  Co.  v.  Murry 

G.  S.  Co.  19  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

110 135 

Lander  v.  P.  104  111.  248 :  1 

Landers  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

63  S.  W.  557  201 

Landis  v.  S.  70  Ga.  651 322 

Landman  v.  Glover  (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)  25  S.  W.  994 198 

Landrum  v.  Guerra  (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)  28  S.  W.  358 65 

Lane  v.  City  of  Madison,  86 

Wis.  453  115 

v.  Miller,  17  Ind.  58 361 

v.  Minnesota  S.  Agr.  Soc. 

67  Minn.  65  351 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  132 

Mo.  4 6 

v.  P.  10  111.  307 817 

Laner  v.  Yetzer,  3  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  461  191 

Langdon  v.  P.  133  111.  404 

181,  192,  193,  238,  304,  331 
v.  Winterstein,  58  Neb. 

278 77 

Lange  v.  Weigan,  125  Mich. 

647  174 

Langford  v.  Jones,  18  Ore.  307.  211 

v.  P.  134  111.  444 265 

Langshort  v.  Copn,  53  Neb. 

765  .  .  353 

Langtry  Sons  v.  Lowrie  (Tex. 

Cv.  App.)  58  S.  W.  835.  .  200 
Lankster  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

72  S.  W.  388 41 

Lansing  v.  Wessell  (Neb.)  97  N. 

W.  815  101 

Lantmann  v.  Miller,  158  Ind. 

382 233 

Lanyon  v.  Edwards  (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)  26  S.  W.  524 28 

Lapeer  Co.  F.  &  M.  F.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Doyle,  30  Mich.  159..  156 
La  Plant  v.' S.  152  Ind.  80..  .  238 
Lapworth  v.  Leach,  79  Mich. 

20 448 

Large  v.  Moore,  17  Iowa,  258.  30 
Largey  v.  Mantle,  26  Mont. 

'264  25 

Larkin  v.  Burlington,  &c.  R.  Co. 

91  Iowa.  654  ...65,  141,  249 
Lary  v.  Youngs  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

27  S.  W.  908  347 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxxix 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


La  Salle  County  C.  Coal  Co.  v. 

Eastman,     99     ill.     App. 

495   198 

Laselle  v.  Wells,  17  Ind.  33... 4,  18 

Lassiter  v.  Norfolk  &  C.  R.  Co. 

126  N.  Car.  509 244 

Last  Chance  Min.  &c.  Co.  v. 

Ames,  23  Colo.  167 245 

Latham  v.  Roache,  72  111.  182. .   238 

Latimer  v.  S.  55  Neb.  609.. 335,  341 

Lau  v.  Fletcher,  104  Mich.  295.    140 

v.  Merrills,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

268  . 


361 
101 


Laughlin    v.    Gerardi,    67     Mo. 

App.   372   

Lawder   v.   Henderson,   36   Kas. 

754 70 

Lawhead  v.  S.  46  Neb.  607 

294,   295,   302 

Lawler  v.  P.  74  111.  230 803 

Lawless    v.    S.    4    Lea    (Tenn.) 

179 1 

Lawnsdale  v.  Grays  Harbor  Boom 

Co.  21  Wash.  542 6 

Lawrence  v.  Bucklen,  45  Minn. 

195 347 

v.  Hagerman,  56  111.  68..  71 
v.  Jarvis,  32  111.  304.. 80,  243 
v.  Westlake  (Mont.)  73  Pac. 

119 192 

Lawrenceville     Cement     Co.     v. 

Park,    60    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

586 44 

Layton  v.  S.   56  Miss.  791 80 

Lazarus    v.    Pheps,    156    U.    S. 

202 25 

Lea  v.  Henry,  56  Iowa,  662...  156 
Leach  v.  Hill,  97  Iowa,  81..351,  358 

v.  Nichols,  55  111.  273 94 

v.  P.  53  111.  311  243 

v.  S.  99  Tenn.  584  255 

Lear  v.  McMillen,  17  Ohio  St. 

464 48 

Leary  v.  Electric  Tr.  Co.  180 

Pa.  St.  136 7 

v.  Meier,  78  Ind.  387  383 

Leasure  v.  Colburn,  57  Ind. 

274 183 

Leavenworth,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Forks, 

37  Kas.  448  646 

Leavitte  v.  Randolph  County, 

85  111.  509  2,  361 

Lebanon  Coal  &  M.  A.  v.  Zer- 

wick,  77  111.  App.  486...  94 
Le  Cointe  v.  U.  S.  7  App.  Gas. 

(D.  C.)    16 297 


Ledbetter   v.    S.    21    Tex.    App. 

344 

Lee  v.  Gorham,  165  Mass.  130. 

v.  Hammond,  114  Wis.  550 

25,  198, 

v.  O'Quinn,    103   Ga.   355.. 
v.  Publishers,  &c.    137    Mo. 

385 

v.  Quick,  20  111.  392    

v.  S.  74  Wis.  45 

Leeds  v.  Reed   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

36  S.  W.  347    

Leeper  v.  S.  12  Ind.  App.  637.  . 

Lefler  v.  S.  122  Ind.  206 

Leftwich   v.   City  of   Richmond, 

4  Va.  Super  Ct.  128 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  489. 
303, 

Lehman  v.  Hawks,  121  Ind.  546 
1,  41, 

v.  Press,  106  Iowa,  389... 

Leifheit  v.  Jos.  Schiltz  Brewing 

Co.   106  Iowa,  451    ..20, 

Leigh  v.  P.   113  111.  372..  115, 

Leise  v.  Meyer,   143  Mo.  547 

113, 

Leisenberg  v.  S.  60  Neb.   628.. 
Leiser  v.  Kieckhefer,  95  Wis.  4 

Leiter  v.  Lyons  (R.  I.)   52  Atl. 

78 

Lemasters   v.   Southern  Pac.  R. 

Co.   131  Cal.   105   85, 

Le  May  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 

105  Mo.   370    635, 

Lensing   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.) 

45   S.  W.   572    206, 

Leob.  v.   Huddleston,    105    Ala. 

Leonard   v.   Ter.   2   Wash.  Ter. 

397 182, 

Leslie  v.  Smith,  32  Mich.  64.  .. 

v.  S.    42   Tex.   Cr.   App.    65 

269    282 

v.  Wabash,  St.   L.  &  P.  R.' 

Co.  88  Mo.  53 

Lesser  Cotton  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 
I.    M.    &    S.    R.    Co.    114 

Fed.  133 107,  189, 

Lester  v.  Hays   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 
38  S.  W.  52 

Letts   v.    Letts,   91    Mich.    596 

Levan  v.  S.  114  Ga.  258 

Lever   v.    Foote,    31    N.    Y.    S. 


317 
129 

351 
196 

121 

34 

209 

355 

7 
206 

243 
304 

360 

80 

358 
299 

208 
302 

141 
92 
249 
637 
296 
141 

311 
192 

363 
563 

361 
39 

208 
220 


356 141 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Leverich  v.  S.  105  Ind.  277 

357, 

Levi  v.  Gardner,  53  S.  Car.  24. . 
Levy  v.  Cunningham,  56  Neb. 

348 

v.  S.  79  Ala.  259    

Lewellen  v.  Patton,  73  Mo.  App. 

472 

Lewin  v.  Pauli,    19    Pa.   Super. 

447 

Lewis  v.  Christie,  99  Ind.  377 
321 
v.  Com.  19  Ky.  L.  R.  1139 

v.  McDaniels,    82   Mo.    583 

492, 

v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  132 

N.  Car.  382 

v.  Rice,  61  Mich.  97  .... 

v.  S.   120  Ala.  339    

v.  S.  42  Fla.  253    

v.  S.  4  Ohio,  397    48, 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    59   S. 

W.   886 21, 

v.  Topman,  90  Md.  274  . 
Lewton   v.   Hower,   35    Fla.    58 

Lexington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Paver,  16 

Ohio,  324 

Libby  v.  Deake,  97  Me.  377-. 
Liberty  Ins.  Co.  v.  Erlich,  42 

•  Neb.   553 

Lichty  v.  Tarmatt,  11  Wash.  37 

Lieber  v.  Weiden,   17  Neb.  584. 

Lifschitz   v.   Dry   Dock,   &c.   R. 

Co 

Liggett  &  M.  T.  Co.  v.  Collier, 

89  Iowa,  144 

Light  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 

Co.  93  Iowa,  83  

Lilly  v.  P.  148  111.  47  3....  56, 
Linch  v.  Paris,  &c.  Co.  80  Tex. 

23 

Lincoln  v.  City  of  Detroit,  101 

Mich.  245 

v.  Felt  (Mich.)  92  N.  W. 

780 

Lindberg  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co. 

83  111.  App.  433  

Lindell  v.  Deere  Wells  Co.  (Neb.) 

92  N.  W.  164  

Lindeman  v.  Fry,   178   111.   174 

104, 

Lindheim  v.  Duys,  31  N.  Y.  S. 

870 


358 
25 

119 

815 

141 
7 

325 
261 
494 

173 
192 
258 
353 
245 

337 
347 

164 

48 
156 

235 

348 
527 

245 

41 

363 
329 

444 

191 
20 

247 

244 
116 
351 


Lindle  v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R. 

1307 

Lindsay  v.  Turner,  156  U.  S. 

208 

Line  v.  S.  51  Ind.  172 

296,  325,  336, 
Linehan   R.   Tr.   Co.   v.   Morris, 

87  Fed.  127  .  .   

Linehan  v.  S.  113  Ala.  70 

Liner  v.  S.  124  Ala.  1.. 25,  101, 
Links  v.  S.  13  Lea  (Tenn.)   701 

Linn   v.    Massilion,   &c.   Co.    78 

Mo.    App.    Ill 

Linton  v.  Allen,  154  Mass.  432. 
v.  Butler,  40  Ohio  St.   158 

Linville  v.  Welch,  29  Mo.  203. 
Lion  v.  Baltimore  City  P.  R.  Co. 

90  Md.  266 

Lipscomb  v.  S.  75  Miss.  559... 

Litt  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  64  N.  Y. 

S/108 

Little  v.  McGuire,  38  Iowa,  562 

v.  P.  157  111.   158   294, 

v.  S.  58  Ala.  265    

v.  S.   89  Ala.  99    

v.  S.  157  111.  157   

v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cv.  App.  654 

v.  Superior  Rapid  Tr.  Co.  88 

Wis.  462 

v.  Town,  &c.   102  Wis.  250 
196, 

Little  Dorritt  Gold  Min.  Co.  v. 
Arapahoe    Gold    Min.    Co. 

30  Colo.  431    7, 

Little  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Wetmore,  19 

Ohio  St.   134    1,   13 

Little  Rock,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  At- 
kins, 46  Ark.   430 

529,   561,   565, 

Littleton  v.  S.  128  Ala.  31 

Litton  v.  Young,  2  Mete.   (Ky.) 
565 

Liverpool.  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ende, 

65  Tex.  124  365, 

v.  Farnsworth  Lumber  Co. 

72  Miss.  555  

v.  Joy,  26  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

613 

Livingston  v.  Moore  (Neb.)  89 

N.  W.  289  

v.  Stevens  (Iowa)  94  N.  W. 

925  . 


101 
358 
339 

353 
258 
299 

84 

247 
360 

534 
172 

101 
313 

145 

676 
301 
44 
297 
301 

271 
210 
360 

363 
,  60 

571 
63 

218 

425 
200 
102 
358 
90 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XC1 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Lloyd  v.  Moore,  38  Ohio  St.  100 

37 
v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R. 

Co.   128  Mo.  595    176 

Lobdell  v.  Keene,  85  Minn.  90 

20 
Locke  v.  S.  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  40 

Iowa,  113 633 

Lockwood  v.  Crawford,  18  Conn. 

361 162 

Loeb  v.  Weis,  64  Ind.  285 1 

Loewenstein  v.  Bennett,  19  Ohio 

C.  C.  616 347 

Lofland  v.  Goben,  16  Ind.  App. 

67 70 

Lofton  v.  S.  79   Miss.   723 255 

Logansport,    &c.    Co.    v.    Coate 

(Ind.)   64  N.  E.  638 244 

Logg  v.  S.  92  111.  598 

104,  113,  170 
Logwood  v.  Hussey,  60  Ala.  421 

446,  447 
Lomax  v.    Holbine,    (Neb.)    90 

N.  W.  1122 237 

Long  v.  Hunter,  58  S.  Car.  152 

48 

v.  Martin,   152  Mo.   668    ..    200 
v.     S.  42  Fla.   509 

315,   323    326 

v.  S.  23  Neb.  33 275,  336 

v.  Shull,    7    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

476 359 

v.  Southern  R.  Co.  50  S.  Car. 

49' 7,   44 

v.  Travellers'   Ins.   Co.    113 

Iowa,  259 -211 

Longacre  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

41  S.  W.  621    258 

Longenecker  v.  S.  22  Ind.  247  .  •    101 
Longley  v.  Com.   99   Va.   807 

307,  310 
Longyear  v.  Gregory,  110  Mich. 

277 358 

Lonkster  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

603 25,   255 

Lopez  v.  Jackson,  80  Miss.  684 

193 

v.  S.  Tex.  Cr.  App.  649 303 

Lorie  v.  Adams,  51  Kas.  692..    170 
Lorimer  v.  S.  776  Ind.  497 849 

Los  Angeles  Farming  &  Milling 

Co.  v.  Thompson,  117  Cal. 

594 136 

Lou  v.  Grimes  Drygoods  Co.  38 

Neb.  215  . 32 

Louisville,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Baker, 

106  Ala.  624 80 


Louisville,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Banks 

(Ky.)    23   S.  W.   627.. 4,   113 

v.  Buck,  116  Ind.  566   232 

v.  Cowherd,    120   Ala.    51 

25,  26 
v.  Dick  (Ky.)   78  S.  W.  914 

122 
v.  Falvey,   104  Ind.  429 

181,  552,  (i52,  654 
v.  Ferry's   Adm'rx.    20    Ky. 

L.  R.   803 126 

v.  Finley,  86  Ky.  L.  R.  294 

359 

v.  Foley,  88  Fed.  240    25 

v.  Fox,  11  Bush   (Ky.)   506 

545,  582 
v.  Frawley,   110  Ind.  28...   232 

v.  Gidley,  119  Ala.  525 588 

v.  Grantham,   104  Ind.  357 

7,   646 

v.  Hall,   91   Ala.   113    13 

v.  Harrod,    25    Ky.    L.    R. 

250 196 

v.  Hart,   119  Ind.  273    247 

v.  Hubbard,  116  Ind.  193..  27 
v.  Jones,  130  Ala.  456  ...  113 

'v.  Kelly,  92  Ind.  374   577 

v.  Lynch,  147  Ind.  165 232 

v.  McCune   (Ky.)    72  S.  W. 

756 81 

v.  Mattingly,  22  Ky.  L.  R. 

489 94 

v.  Morgan,  114  Ala.  449  ..  223 
v.  Patchen,  167  111.  204...  48 
v.  Pittman,  23  Ky.  L.  R. 

877 25 

v.  Pointer's  Adm'r  (Ky.)  69 

S.  W.   1108    74 

v.  Ray,   101   Tenn.   1    26 

v.  Rice.  101  Ala.  676  ....  177 
v.  Sandlin,  125  Ala.  585..  63 
v.  Shires,  108  111.  617,  631 

94,  97,  204,  363 

v.  Spencer,  149  111.  103 75 

v.  Suddoth,  70  Miss.  265..  30 
v.  Sullivan  T.  Co.  (Ala.)  35 

So.  330 120,  645 

v.  Utz,   133  Ind.  265 196 

v.  Ward.  67  Fed.  927..  198,  203 
v.  Whitehead,  71  Miss.  451 

211 
v.  Wills'  Adm'rx.  23  Ky.  L. 

R.  1961 97 

v.  Wood,    113   Ind.   561 

542.  549,  556,  577,  584, .638 
v.  Wright,  115  Ind.  378...  357 
v.  York,  128  Ala.  305 

66,  191,  195,  204 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Lourance  v.   Goodwin,    170   111. 

390 71 

Love  v.  Anchor  Raisin  Vin.  Co. 

(Cal.)   45  Pac.  1044   351 

v.  Gregg,  117  N.  Car.  467..    114 
v.  Moynehan,   16  111.   277..   361 

v.  Wyatt,   19  Tex.  312 94 

Lovejoy  v.  S.  62  Ark.  478 296 

Lovick  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co. 

129  N.  Car.   427 25,  30 

Low  v.  Freeman,  117  Ind.  345  35 
Lowe  v.  Lehman,  15  Ohio  St. 

179 243 

v.  Salt  Lake  City,  13  Utah, 

91    351 

v.  S.   88   Ala.   8    218 

Lowenberg  v.  P.  5  Park.  Cr.  (N. 

Y.)    414 343 

Lower  v.  Franks,  115  Ind.  340 

40,  247 
Lowery   v.   Rowland,    104    Ala. 

420 200 

Lubsenz  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 

Co.  76  N.  Y.  S.  411 183 

Lucas  v.  Milwaukee,  &c.  R.  Co. 

33  Wis.  50    555,  558 

v.  S.  110  Ga.  758  324 

Lucia  v.  Meech,  68  Vt.  175....  80 
Lucio  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

320 6 

Luckhart  v.  Ogden,  30  Cal.  548 

156 
Luckie   v.    Schneider    (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)   57   S.  W.  690 195 

Ludwig  v.  Blackshere,  102  Iowa, 

266 349,   351 

v.  Metropolitan    St.    R.    Co. 

75  N.  Y.  S.  667 25 

v.  Sager,  84  111.  100 66 

Lueck  v.  Heisler,  87  Wis.  644.  .  6 
Luedtke  v.  Jeffrey,  89  Wis.  136 

351 
Luhrs  v.  Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co.  42 

N.  Y.  S.   606    122,   133 

Lundon  v.  City  of  Chicago,   83 

111.  App.  208   200 

Lung  v.  Deal.  16  Ind.  349 4 

Lurssen  v.  Lloyd,  76  Md.  360.  80 
Lusk  v.  Throop,  189  111.  127..  80 
Lydiek  v.  Gill  (Neb.)  94  N.  W. 

109 109,  112,  119,  192 

Lyle   v.    McCormick   H.   M.   Co. 

108  Wis.  81    49 

v.  Mclnnis    (Miss.)     17    So. 

510 195 

Lyman  v.  P.  198  111.  544 80 

Lynch  v.  Bates,  139  Ind.  206.  .  .214 
v.  Johnson,  109  Mich.  640.    144 


Lynch  v.   S.   41    Tex.   Cr.  App. 

510 ..255,    262,    272 

Lyne  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  123 

N.  Car.  129 20 

Lynn  v.  P.  170  111.  534 

251,  260,  773 
Lyon  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    34 

S.    W.    947 326 

v.  Watson,    109   Mich.   390 

71,  198- 

Lyons  v.  P.  68  111.  272 728 

v.  P.  137  111.  619 20 

v.  Wayercross  A.  L.  R.  Co. 

114  Ga.  727    126 

Lytle  v.  Boyer,  33  Ohio  St.  506 

245,  393 
Lyts  v.  Keevey,  5  Wash.  606..   218 


M 


McAfee  v.  Montgomery,  21  Ind. 

App.   196 7 

McAleer  v.  S.  46  Neb.   116 119 

McAlister  v.  Long,  33  Ore.  368 

351 

McAlpine  v.  S.  117  Ala.  93 25 

McArthur  v.  S.  60  Neb.  390 

294,  297 
McAvoy  v.  Cassioy,  60  N.  Y.  S. 

837 656 

McAyeal  v.  Gullett,  202  111.  214 

196 
McBaine    v.    Johnson,    153    Mo. 

191 94 

McBeth  v.  Trabue,  69  Mo.  650.   673 
McBride    v.    Banguss,    65    Tex. 

174   .  .   . 200 

McCabe  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 

12  Pa.   Super  Ct.   383...    113 
McCaleb  v.  Smith,  22  Iowa,  244 

19 
McCallister   v.   Mount,    73    Ind. 

566 1,  41 

McCallon    v.    Cohen     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    39   S.  W.   973....    195 
McCandless   v.    S.    42    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  58 258 

McCann    v.    Ullman,    109    Wis. 

574 94 

McCarthy    v.    Kitchen,    59    Ind. 

506 506 

v.  S.   56  Ind.  203    166 

McCartney  v.  McMullen,  38  111. 

237    H3 

McCary  v.  Stull,  44  Neb.  175.  .   243 
McCasland  v.  Kimberlin,  100  Ind. 

121 220 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


XC111 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


McClary  v.  Stull,  44  Neb.  191 . . 
McClellan  v.  Hein,  56  Neb.  600 

44, 

v.  S.   117  Ala.   140   

McClelland  v.  S.   117  Ala.  140. 
McClernan   v.   Com.    1 J    Ky.    L. 

R.  301   

MeCloskey  v.  Pulitszer  Pub.  Co. 

152   Mo.   346    

McClung  v.  Com.   17  Ky.  L.  R. 

1339 

McClure   v.   Phila.  W.   &   B.   R. 

Co.  34  Md.  534   

McClure  v.  Williams,  65  111.  390 

53, 

McCoggle  v.  S.  41  Fla.  525 

McCole  v.  Loeher,  79  Ind.  430.. 
McConkey  v.  Com.   101   Pa.  St. 

420 

McCord   v.   McSpaden,    34   Wis. 

549 

v.  S.  83  Ga.  521    

McCord-Brady  Co.  v.  Moneyhan, 

59    Neb.    593    

McCorkle   v.    Simpson,    42    Ind. 

453 113, 

McCormick   v.   McCormick,    194 

Pa.    St.    107    

v.  Kreinkle,   179  111.  301.. 
v.  McGaffray,   55   N.  Y.   S. 

574 

v.  S.  92  N.  W.  606 

v.  S.   133  Ala.  202 

v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  60  N.  J. 

L.   243 79, 

McCormick  H.   M.  Co.  v.   Send- 
zikowski,  72  111.  App.  402 

McCosker  v.  Banks,  84  Md.  292 

McCoy  v.  Kokomo  R.  &  L.  Co. 

158  Ind.   658    

v.  P.   175   111.   224 

70,  251,  285. 

v.  S.  40  Fla.   494    

McCracken   v.   Webb,    36   Iowa, 

551 

McCray  v.  Humes,  116  Ind.  Ill 

McCready  v.  Phillips   (Neb.)    67 
N.'  W.  7 

McCreery's      Adm'rs      v.      Ohio 
River  Co.  43  W  Va.  110 

McCrory  v.  Anderson,  103  Ind. 
16    .... 


38 

349 
218 
313 

369 
493 


574 

218 

65 

247 

220 

432 

154 

200 

119 

189 
104 

192 

79 

324 

124 

45 
349 
234 

776 
252 

61 

47 

94 

118 

247 


McCrum  v.  Hildebrand,  85  Ind. 

205  455 

McCrystal  v.  O'Neill,  86  N.  Y. 

S.  84  129 

McCulley  v.  S.  62  Ind.  428..  21 

McCulloch  v.  S.  48  Ind.  109  ..  320 
McCullough  v.  Armstrong  (Ga.), 

45  S.  E.  379 196 

v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S. 

S.  Co.   101   Mich.   234..  192 

V.  S.  23  Tex.  App.  626   .  .  299 

McCully  v.  S.  62  Ind.  433. ...  766 

McCutcheon    v.    Loggins,    109 

Ala.  457    48 

McDaniel   v.   Crosby,    19    Ark. 

533    38 

v.  S.  30  Ga.  853   168 

v.  S.   100  Ga.  67    255 

McDaniels    v.    Monroe,    63    S. 

Car.  307    176 

McDerott  v.  S.  89  Ind.  193...  777 
McDommell  v.  De  Los  Fuentes, 

7   Tex.  Civ.  App.   136..  191 

McDonald  v.  Beall,  55  Ga.  288  192 
v.  Fairbanks,  Morse  &  Co. 

161   111.   124    44 

v.  McDonald,   94   Ga.   675  80 

v.  McDonald,   142  Ind.   89  706 
v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 

61    N.    Y.   S.    817 126 

v.    Minneapolis,    St.    P.    R. 

Co.   105  Mich.   659 123 

v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R. 

Co.   (R.  I.)    54  Atl.  795  32 
V*  Norfolk,  &c.  R.   Co.   95 

Va.    104 610,    614,  650 

v.  S.   63  Ind.  544    166,  169 

v.  S.  (Miss.)   28  So.  750..  219 

v.  U.  S.  63  Fed.  426   347 

McDonall   v.  P.   168   111.   93.. 6,  802 

McDonnell     v.    Nicholson,     67 

Mo.    App.    408    363 

McDonough  v.  Great  N.  R.  Co. 

15  Wash.  244    348 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.  137 

Mass.    210    183 

v.  Miller,   114  Mass.   94..  116 

McDoiigal  v.  S.  88  Ind.  24.. 247,  331 
McEldon  v.  Patton  (Neb.),  93 

N.  W.  938    80 

McElroy  v.  P.  202  111.  478.. 

373,  821 

McElya  v.  Hill,  105  Tenn.  319  90 

McEwen  v.  Morey,  60  HI.  38. .  26b 

v.  S.    (Miss.)    16   So.   242  226 


XC1V 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


McFadyen      v.       Masters,       1 1 

Okla.   16    360 

McFarland   v.   Carver,   34   Mo. 

196     522 

McFaul  v.  Madero  F.  &  F.  C. 

134   Cal.   313    71 

McGar  v.  National  &  P.  W.  M. 

Co.  22  R.  I.  347    94 

McGee  v.  Smitherman,  69  Ark. 

632    7,  25,   196 

v.  Wells,  52  S.  Car.  472..        27 
v.  Wineholt,  23  Wash.  748      245 
McGehee  v.  Lane,  34  Tex.  390      118 
McGinnis  v.  Fernandes,  126  111, 

232     84 

v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich.  364 

694,  695,  696,  697,  698 
McGowen    v.    Larsen,    66    Fed. 

910    102 

McGrath  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

413     269 

McGraw  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

R.   Co.    (Neb.)    81    ...   W. 

306   360 

McGrew  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 

109  Mo.  582   48 

McGuire  v.  Hartford  Fire  Ins. 

Co.   158  N.  Y.  680   ....       145 
McHale  v.  McDonnell,   175  Pa. 

St.   632    65 

McHenry  v.  Bulifant   (Pa.)   56 

Atl.   226    119,    192 

v.  Man,  39  Md.  510 156 

McHugh    v.    S.     42     Ohio    St. 

154  31,  32 

Mclntosh    v.    Moore,    22    Tex.^ 

Civ.  App.  22  81 

v.  S.    151    Ind.    251 

226,  227,  238,  243   300,  754 

Mclntyre  v.  P.  38  111.  520 281 

v.  Sholtey,   121   111.   665..         47 
McKay  v.  Evans,  48  Mich.  597      116 

McKee  v.  P.  36  N.  Y.  118 333 

v.  S.  Ill  Ind.  378   760 

McKenzie   v.   Sykes,   47    Mich. 

294    156,   157 

McKinney  v.  Guhman,  38  Mo. 

App.  344  199 

v.  Hopwood,  46  Neb.  871   129 
v.  Snyder,  78  Pa.  St.  497    63 

v.  S.  134  Ala.  134 318 

McKinnon   v.   Atkins,    60   Mich. 

418     352 

McKinsey   v.  McKee,    109   Ind 

209   346 


McKinzie  v.  Remington,  79  111. 

388  44,  78 

McKissack  v.  Witz,  120  Ala. 

412  142 

McKlervy  v.  S.  77  Ala.  95 295 

McKnight  v.  Detroit  M.  R.  Co. 

(Mich.)  97  N.  W.  772..        25 

v.  U.  S.  115  Fed.  972 201 

McKown  v.  Powers,  86  Me. 

291  347 

McLain  v.  Commonwealth,  99 

Pa.  St.  86  69 

v.  S.   18  Neb.   154 

160,    322,    744 
McLane    v.    Maurer,    28    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  75    25,  196 

McLean  v.  Clark.  47  Ga.  24..      212 
v.  Erie  R.  Co.   (N.  J.)    54  . 

Atl.   238    204 

McLellon  v.  Wheeler,   70   Me. 

285   196 

McLeod  v.  Sharp,  53  111.  App. 

406    200 

McLeroy  v.  S.  120  Ala.  274..  11  j 
McMahan  v.  Sankey,  133  111. 

636    238 

McMahon    v.    Eau    Claire    W. 

Works,  95  Wis.   640    .'.         35 
•     v.  Flanders,  64  Ind.  334.  .         80 
v.  O'Connor,      137      Mass. 

216    14 

v.  P.   120  HI.   584 

217,   366,   367 

v.  Sankey,  133  111.  637.  56,  249 
McManus    v.    Finan,    4    Iowa, 

285     678 

McMarshall  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R. 

Co.    80   Iowa,    759    ....      630 
McMeen   v.  Com.    114  Pa.  St. 

300    302 

McMillan    v.    S.    35    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  370  360 

McMillen  v.  Lee,  78  111.  433..  238 
McMinn  v.  Whalen,  27  Cal. 

319    185,   208 

McMullen  v.  Clark.  49  Ind.  81  73S 
McNair  v.  Platt.  46  111.  211..  48 
McNamnra  v.  King,  7  111.  (2 

Gil.)  432   59 

v.  Pengilly,  64  Minn.  543      351 

v.  P.  24  Colo.  61   324 

McNeel  v.  Smith,  106  Ga.  215  135 
McNeil  v.  Durham,  130  N.  ' 

Car.   256    244 

McNeile    v.     Cridland,     6     Pa. 

Super.  Ct.   428 215 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCV 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


McNight  v.  Bell,    168   Pa.  St. 

50     141 

McNulta  v.  Lockridge,  137  111. 

288    74,  627,  641 

McNutt,    &c.    R.    v.    Kaufman; 

26  Ohio  St.    130    199 

McPeak  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 

128  Mo.  617   187 

McPeck   v.   Central  Vt.  R.  Co. 

79   Fed.   590    126 

McPhee  v.  McDermott,  77  Wis. 

33     360 

McPherson  v.   St.   Louis   I.  M. 

&  S.  R.  Co.  97  Mo.  253      105 
McQuay  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R. 

Co.    109   N.   Car.   585..      181 
McQueen  v.  S.  82  Ind.  74.. 340,  756 

v.  S.   103  Ala.   12    252,  282 

McQuinn  v.  Com.   17   Ky.  500      293 
McQuown      v.      Thompson,      5 

Colo.  App.  466   141 

McVay   v.    S.    (Miss.)    26    So. 

947 226 

McVeigh     v.    S.     43     Tex.     Cv. 

App.    17    182 

McVey  v.  St.  Clair  Co.  49  W.   , 

Va.    412 

92,    102,   118,   610,   619 

v.  S.  55  Neb.  777   33S 

v.  S.  57  Neb.  471    238 

McWaters   v.   Equitable   Mort. 

Co.  115  Ga.  723 135 

Maas  v.  Ter.    10  Okla.   714..      331 

Mabry  v.  S.  7  1   Miss.  716 19 

Machen  v.  Hooper,  73  Md.  354      453 

Mackin  v.  P.  115  111.  312 21 

v.  S.  59  N.  J.  L.  495 329 

Macon    v.    Holcomb,    205    111. 

640    247 

Madden  v.  State,  148  Ind.  183        41 

Maddox  v.  Newport  New  &  M. 

V.  Co.  18  Ky.  L.  R.  635      195 
Madison  v.  Com.  13  Ky.  L.  R. 

313     267 

Maes  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co. 

(Tex.    Civ.   App.)    23    S. 

W.    725     25,  87 

Magee  v.  McNeil,  41  Miss.   17      158 

v.  P.    139    111.    140    265 

Magone  v.  Origet,  70  Fed.  778      145 
Magoon  v.  Before,  73  Vt.  231 

6,  351 
Maliaffey  v.  Ferguson,  156  Pa. 

St.    156    195 

v.  Ter.     (Okla.)      69     Pac. 

342  255 


Mahan   v.    Com.    21    Ky.    L.    R. 

1807    80,    94 

Mahaska    County     S.     Bank    v. 

Crist,  87   Iowa,  418 415 

Maher  v.  James  Hanley  Brew- 
ing Co.  23  R.  I.  343 91 

Mahnken   v.   Board   of   Chosen 

Freeholders,  62  N.  J.  L. 

404     134 

Mahoney   v.    San   Francisco   & 

S.   M.   R.    Co.    110    Cal. 

471     187 

Maines  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

109     265 

Mallen  v.  Waldowiski,  203  111. 

87    194,  245,  543 

Malone    v.    Robinson,    77    Ga. 

719     433 

v.  S.   66  Ga.   540 166,    168 

v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  42  N. 

Y.  S.  694   16 

Malott    v.   Hawkins,    159    Ind. 

137     346 

v.  Hood,  201   111.  202 

6,   53,   624 
Manch    v.    City    of    Hartford, 

112  Wis.  40   232 

Manger  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

69  S.  W.   145   272 

Mangham  v.  S.  87  Ga.  549   . .      265 
Mangum    v.    Com.    19    Ky.    L. 

R.    94 329 

Manier   v.   S.   6   Baxt.    (Tenn.) 

595     11 

Manley  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co. 

'159   Mass.   493    113 

Mann  v.  Cowan,   8   Pa.   Super. 

Ct.   30    191 

v.  S.    134   Ala,    1 

102,    116.    258.    260,.  299 
Manning   v.    Gasharie,    27    Ind. 

399   14 

Mansfield  v.  Neese.  2 1   Tex.  Cv. 

App.    584    .'  48 

Mantz  v.  Maguire  52  Mo.  App. 

137 156,    159,    160 

Marcus  v.  Leake    (Neb.)    94  N. 

W.    100    25 

Marden  v.  Dorthy,  42  N.  Y.  S. 

827   130 

Mariner    v.    Dennison,    78    Cal. 

202   27 

Marion  v.   S.    16   Neb.    349 312 

Mark  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.   136...    110 
Market  &  Fulton  Nat.   Bank  v. 

Sargent,    85   Me.    349 126 

Marks  v.  Jacobs,  76  Ind.   216.    3,   6 


XCV1 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Marr  v.  Marr,  5  Sneed   (Term.) 

385   

Marsh    v.    Eichardson,    106    N. 

Car.    539    

v.  Smith,    49    111.    396 

Marshall  v.  John  Grosse  Cloth- 
ing Co.    184   111.   421 

v.  Lewark,    117    Ind.    377 

351,    359. 

v.Morris,    16    Ga.    368.... 
v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  450 

Marshalltown    L.    Ins.     Co.     v. 

Doll,   80  Ind.    113 

Martens   v.    Pittock    (Neb.)     92 

N.  W.    1038 

Martensen    v.    Arnold,     78     111. 

App.    336    

Martin  v.   Chicago  &  N.  W.   R. 

Co.   194   111.   138 121, 

v.  Davis,    76    Iowa,    762.  .. 
v.  Home   Bank,    160    N.   Y. 

190   .   .    

v.  Hughes,   98   Fed.   556.  .. 
v.  Johnson,    89    111.    537 

106, 
v.  McCray,     171     Pa.     St. 

575   

v.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)  56  S. 

W.    1011    .     

v.  S.    104    Ala.    71 

v.  S.   (Neb.)   93  N.  W.  161 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  38 
S.  W.  194 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  43 
S.  W.  352 175, 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  53 
S.  W.  849 

v.  S.  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  441 

v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  632. 
v.   Union  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.   13 

Wash.    L75    

Martineau  v.  S.   14  Wis.   373.. 
Martinez  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

56    S.    W.    580 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     57 

S.   W.    670 

'Marts  v.  S.   20  Ohio  St.   162.. 
Marx  v.   Hess,    19    Ky.   L.    42 

129, 

Mar/en  v.  P.   173  111.  60.. 319. 
Mascott    v.    Insurance    Co.    69 

Vt.    116   

Mason  v.  Jones,  36  111.  212.. 


182 

14 
155 

136 

360 

196 

326 
358 

113 
155 

129 
199 

145 
189 

116 
84 

115 

4 

8 

288 
290 
109 

303 
289 

80 
155 

268 

48 
802 

141 
731 

145 
25 


Mason    v.    McCampbell,    2    Ark. 

506 361 

v.  Seiglitz,   22    Colo.    320 

43,  236,  346 
v.  Silver,    1    Aik.     (N.    S.) 

(Vt.)     367    48 

v.  Southern    R.    Co.    58    S. 

Car.    70    94 

Masonic,    &c.    Asso.    v.    Collins, 

210    111.    482 71 

Matheson     v.    Kuhn,     15     Colo. 

App.   477    94 

Mathews    v.     Granger,     96     111. 

App.    536    223 

Mathews     Adm'rs     v.     Traders' 
Bank      (Va.)      27     S     E. 

609 135 

Mathis   v.    S.    80    Miss.    491...    294 
v.  S.   33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  605 

192 
Matson    v.     Port    Townsend    S. 

R.   Co.    9    Wash.    449 144 

Matthews   v.   Granger,    196    111. 

164    363 

v.  Hamilton,  23  111.  416...    105 
v.   P.    6    Colo.   App.    456...    229 

v.  S.    55   Ala.    65 153 

v.  Story,  54  Ind.  417 195 

Mattingly  v.  Lewishon,   13  Mont. 

508 196 

Mattoon  v.  Freemont,  E.  &  M.  V. 

R.  Co.  6  S.  Dak.   196 133 

Matula    v.    Lane,    22    Tex.    Cv. 

App.  391 48 

Maurer  v.  P.   43  N.  Y.   1 36 

Mawich  v.  Elsey,  47  Mich.   10..    208 

Maxfield  v.   S.    54   Neb.    44 716 

Maxon.     v.     Farris      (Tex.     Cv. 

App.)    48   S.   W.    741....    200 
Maxwell  v.  Chapman,   26  N.  Y. 

S.   361 245 

v.   Cunningham,   50  W.  Va. 

298.. 25,  661,   662.   690,   691 
v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co. 

85   Mo.   1C6 84 

v.  Williamson,  35  111.  529..    219 

May  v.  P.  8  Colo.  226 766,  770 

v.  P.    6   111.    119 294,   299 

v.  S.  94  Ga.  76 271 

v.  Tallman,  20  111.  443 25 

Mayer  v.  Thompson  B.  Co.  104 

Ala.   611    141 

v.  Wilkins,  37  Fla.   244 

48,    181,    308 

Mayers  v.  Smith,  121  111.  451..    385 
Mayes  v.  Kenton,  2b  Kv.  L.  R. 

1052 163 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCV11 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Mayfield   v:    Williams,    73    Tex. 

508   

Maynard  v.   Fellows,   43   N.   H. 

255 
v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    39  S. 

W.  667 

v.   Sigman  (Neb.)   91  N.  W. 

576 

v.  Tyler,    168    Mass.    107.. 
v.  Vinton,  59  Mich.   139... 

Mazzia  v.  S.  51  Ark.   177 

Mead  v.  Brotherton,  30  Mo.  201 

v.  McGraw,  19  Ohio  St.  61 

Meadows  v.   Pacific  M.   L.   Ins. 

Co.    129   Mo.   76 

v.  Truesdell  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

56  8.  W.  932 170, 

v.  West.  U.  Tel.  Co.   13 IX. 

Car.  73 

Means   v.   Gridley,    164    Pa.   St. 

387 195, 

Mechanics'   Bank  v.   Barnes,    86 

Mich.    632 

Medearis  v.  Anchor  Mutual  Fire 

Ins.   Co.    104    Iowa,    88.. 
Meehan  v.  S.    (Wis.)    97  N.  W. 

174   9, 

Mefford    v.    Sell    (Neb.)     92    N. 

W.   148  

Mehurin   v.   Stone,    37    Ohio   St. 

49    .   .   .   .   .    

Meier  v.  Shrunk,  79  Iowa,  21.. 
Meigs  v.  Dexter,   172  Mass.  217 

Meiners  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  130 
Mo.  274 

Mellor  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
105  Mo.  455 

Mells  v.  U.  S.    164   U.   S.   644. 

Melvin  v.  Easly,  46  N.  Car.  386 

Memphis  &  C.  P.  Co.  v.  Abell, 
17  Ky.  L.  R.  191 

Memphis  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Newman, 
108  Tenn.  666 

Mendenhall  v.  North;  Carolina 
R.  Co.  123  N.  Car.  275.. 

Mendes  v.  Kyle.  16  Nev.  369 

25, 

Mercer  v.  Wright.  3  Wis.  645.. 

Merchants    &    Planters'   Oil    Co. 

v.      Burrow       (Tex.      Cv. 

App.)   69  S.  W.  435 

Merrietta  &  C.   R.  Co.  v.  Pick- 

sley,  24  Ohio  St.  668 


665 
199 
281 

238 

191 

211 

4 

113 
218 

71 
191 
119 
363 
234 
119 
301 

84 

243 

478 

30 

48 

652 
276 

211 
134 
101 
245 

113 
219 

230 

286 


Merrill  v.  Equitable  F.  I.  &   S. 

I.  Co.  49   Neb.   198 358 

v.  Hale,   85   Iowa,   66 113 

v.  Packer,     80     Iowa,     543 

155,    156 

v.  Palmer,  68  Vt.  475  .  .  .  351 
v.  Reaver,  5  0  Iowa,  417 

381,  396,  463 
v.  Suing    (Neb.)    92  N.  W. 

618 94 

Merrimac  Paper  Co.   v.   Illinois 
Trust  &  S.  Bank,  129  111. 

296 47 

Merritt  v.  Merritt,  20  111.  80.  ..       66 

v.  S.    107    Ga.    675 170 

Mertens    v.     Keilman,     79    Mo. 

416 659 

Merwin  v.  Magone,  70  Fed.  776 

145 
v.  Morris,    71    Conn.    564 

658,    659,    662 
Messmann  v.  Ihlenfeldt,  89  Wis. 

585 26 

Metropolitan,  &c.  Co.  v.  Hudson, 

113  Fed.  449 347 

v.  McClure,   58   Kas.    109..    195 

v.  Skola,    183    111.    454 21 

Metropolitan  Bank  of  Minneapo- 
lis v.   Northern   Fuel   Co. 

173   111.   345 124 

Metropolitan     L.      Ins.     Co.     v. 

Howie,  62  Ohio  St.  206..   420 

Metz  v.  S.  46  Neb.  547 195,  229 

Meul  v.  P.  198  111.  258 31 

Mewes  v.  Crescent  P.  L.  Co.  170 

Pa.   St.   369   211 

Mexican,  &c.  R.   Co.  v.  Murray, 

102  Fed.  264 131 

v.  Wilder,    114    Fed.    708..    361 

Mever   v.    Blackmore,    54    Miss. 

575 199 

v.  Hafmeister  (Wis.)  97 

N.  W.  166 200,  247 

v.  Mead.  83  111.  App.  19..  203 

v.  P.  156  111.  129 329 

v.  Pacific  R.  Co.  40  Mo. 

151  113 

v.  Reimer.  65  Kas.  822 48 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.)  49  S.  W. 

600 243 

v.  Shamp,  51  Neb.  424  .  ...  160 
v.  Southiern  R.  Co.  (Mo.) 

3-6  S.  W.  367 71 

v.  Temme,  72  111.  571 360 

Meyers  v.  Birch,  59  N.  J.  L. 

238 126,   129 


xcvm 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Meyers  v.  S.  39  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

500    

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    49  S. 

W.   600  

Michie  v.  Cochran,  93  Va.  614. 
Michigan   S.   &  N.   I.   R.   Co.   v. 

Shelton,    66    111.    425 

Mickle  v.   S.    27    Ala.    20 '. 

Middlebrooks  v.  Mayne,   96   Ga. 

449 

Miers   v.    S.    34    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

161 

Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  Kennedy, 

75   Tex.   214 

Miles   v.   Plant,    18    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  80 

v.  Stanke,   114  Wis.  94 

v.  Strong,  68  Conn.  273 

v.   Walker   (Neb.)   92  N.  W. 

1014 

Miller  v.  Barber,  66  N.  Y.  558. 
v.  Bathasser,    78    111.    305 

105,   477, 

v.  Cinnamon,  168  111.  451. 
v.  Com.  (Va.)  21  S.  E.  499 

v.  Coulter,  156  Ind.  298 


269 

238 
173 

192 
306 

100 
3 

873 

191 

8 

199 

197 
200 

877 
118 

284 

706 
222 
63 
155 
209 


25, 

v.  Dayton,  57  Iowa,  423... 
v.  Dumon,  24  Wash.  648.. 
v.  Dunlap,  22  Mo.  App.  97. 

v.  Eglin,  64  Ind.  197 

v.  Haas   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   27 

S.  W.  263 

v.  Howard,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  22 


v.  John,   108   111.    180   .   ...    203 
v.  Madison  Car  Co.  130  Mo. 

517 219 

v.  Miller,  17  Ind.  App.  605 

26 
v.  Miller.  187  Pa.  St.  572.    185 

v.  P.  23  Colo.  95 274,  351 

v.  P.    39   111.   466 

19,   221,  298,   299,   324, 

325,   328,   367,    719,    760 
v.  Preston,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y. ) 

314 43 

v.  Root,  77  Iowa,  545 244 

v.  S.  107  Ala.  40.. 56,  115,  345 

v.  S.  74  Ind.  1 260 

v.  S.  (Miss.)  35  So.  690...  365 
v.  S.  (Wis.)  81  N.  W.  1020 

9 

v.  R.  106  Wis.  156.  .21,  25,  219 
v.  Stevens,  23  Ind.  App. 

365.  .  71 


Milhgan  v.  Texas  &  N.  0.  R.  Co. 

27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  600 f> 

Milliken  v.  Marlin,  (56  111.  22..    20U 
v.  Maund,   110  Ala.  332...    351 
Milling  v.  Hillenbrand,  156  111. 

310 238 

Millman  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.  39 

N.    Y.    S.    279 222 

Mills   v.   S.    104   Ga.   502 271 

Milmo    Nat.    Bank    v.    Convery 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   49  S.  W. 

926 27,    199 

Milroy  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  98 

Iowa,  193 655 

Milwaukee     Harvester      Co.     v. 

Tymich,   68  Ark.  225 360 

Mimms  v.  S.    16  Ohio  St.   234 

84,   119,  173 

Mims  v.  S.  42  Fla.  199 101 

Mineral  R.   &  M.  Co.  v.   Auten, 

188   Pa.   St.    568 6 

Minnesota  Thresher  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

Wolfram,    71    Wis.    809..    140 
Minor   v.   Parker,    72    N.   Y.    S. 

549 


Mirrielees  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  163 


358 


530 


Mo.  470 

Mississippi  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller, 

40  Miss.  45 247 

Missouri,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   A  very 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   64  S.  W. 

935 25 

v.  Bowles,  1  Ind.  Ter.  250..  590 
v.  Brown  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 


39  S.  W.  o26  . 


195 


v.  Byars,    58    Ark.    108 174 

v.  Cardena,      22     Tex.     Cv. 

App.   300 101 

v.   Carter    (Tex.)    68   S.  W. 

159 b8 

v.  Christman,  65  Tex.  369.    173 
v.  Coffey     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

68   S.  W.   721 115 

v.  Collins,  15  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

21 109,  113 

v.  Cook,    12   Tex.   Cv.  App. 

203 244 

v.  Crowder   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

53   S.   W.   380 6 

v.   Dil worth  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

65  S.  W.  502 7 

v.  Edwards,     90     Tex.     69 

537 
v.  Evans    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

41  S.  W.  80 33 

v.  Fox.  56  Neb.  746 247 

v.  Fuller,   72  Fed.   468   ...      25 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


XC1X 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Missouri,    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Hen- 

nessy     (Tex.)     49    S.    W. 

641    20 

v.  Hildebrand,  62  Kas.  284.      26 
v.  Johnson   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

67  S.  W.  769 191 

v.  King,    2    Tex.    Cv.    App. 

122 28 

v.  Kirschoffer       (Tex.      Cv. 

App.)   24  S.  W.  577   ....   355 
v.  Lyons     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

58   S:  W.  96 71 

v.  Magee     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

49  S.  W.  928 191 

v.  Miller,   15  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

428 6 

v.  Mitchell,  75  Tex.  1 94 

v.  Peay,    7    Tex.    Cv.    App. 

400 6 

v.  Rogers    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

40  S.  W.  849 184 

v.  Steinberger,  60  Kas.  856 

6 
v.  Walden    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

66  S.  W.  584 26 

v.  Warren,  1 9  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

463 196 

v.  White,  22  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

424 549 

v.  Wickham    (Tex.   Cv. 

App.)    28   S.  W.   917....      94 

v.  Williams,    75   Tex.   4 347 

Missouri  Furnace  Co.  v.  Abend, 

107  111.  49 620 

v.  Abend,  107  111.  50 86 

Missouri  M.  Iron  Co.  v.  Hoover, 

179   111.    107 133 

Mitchell   v.   Charleston   L.   &  P. 

Co.    45    S.   Car.    146 

28,  543,   546,   547 
v.  Electric  Co.   129  N.  Car. 

173 546 

v.  Fond  du  Lac,  61  111.  174 

153,  155 
v.  Harmony,    13    How.    (U. 

S.)    130 119 

v.  Hindman,  150  111.  528 

21,  199,  2CO,  239 
v.  Potomac  Ins.  Co.  183  U. 

S.  42  80 

v.  S.  133  Ala.  65 

68,  88.  225 
v.  S.  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  325 

289 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  41 

S.  W.  816 258 

v.  S.  43  Fla,  188 206 


Mitchell-Tranter  Co.  v.   Ehmett, 

23  Ky.  L.  R.   1788 116 

Mittwer  v.  Stremel,  69  Minn.  19 

80 

Mixon  v.  Mills,  92  Tex.  318 354 

v.  Warren,   94  Ga.   688 140 

Mize  v.  S.  36  Ark.  662 801 

Mobile,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Godfrey, 

155    111.    82 94,    101 

v.  Healy,  100  111.  App.  586 

198 

v.  Wilson,   76  Fed.   122 189 

Mobile  Fruit  &  T.  Co.  v.  Potter, 

78  Minn.  437    4 

Mobley  v.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R. 

Co.  42  S.  Car.  306  ....    237 

v.  S.   83   Ind.   94 825 

Mode  v.  Beasley,   143   Ind.   306 

243 
Model   Mill   Co.   v.   McEver,    95 

Ga.  701 113,  117 

Moellering   v.    Evans,    121    Ind. 

197 670 

Moffitt  v.  Colkin,  35  Mo.  453..    192 

Mohr  v.   Kinnane,   85   111.  App. 

447 193,   195 

Mohrenstecher  v.  Westervelt,  87 

Fed.    157 80 

Momence    Stone    Co.    v.    Groves, 

197   111.  93 222 

v.  Turrell,  205  111.  524 192 

Monaghan  v.  Agriculture  F.  Ins. 

Co.  53  Mich.  238 200 

Montag  v.  P.    141    111.   81 

1,  20,  48,  80,  330,  331 
Montgomery  v.   Black,    124   111. 

62 47 

v.  Com.     (Ky.)     63    S.    W. 

747 80 

v.  Del.    Ins.    Co.    (S.   Car.) 

45   S.  E.  934 119 

v.  Harker,  81  Mo.  63 359 

v.  Hickman,   62   Ind.   598..    446 

Moody  v.  S.  114  Ga.  449   182 

Mooney  v.    S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.) 

65    S.   W.   926 272 

Moor  v.  Heineke,  119  Ala.  627.    200 
Moore   v.    Barker   Asphalt   Pav- 
ing Co.  118  Ala.  563 80 

v.  Brewer,  94  Ga.  260 199 

v.  Brown,  27  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

208 7,  346 

v.  Dickinson,  39  S.  Car.  441 

191 

v.  Graham,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
235 7,  248,  363 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Moore    v.    Gwynn,    27    N.    Car. 

(5   Ired.  L.)    187 

v.  Hinkle,    151    Ind.    343.. 

v.  People,   190   111.   331 

v.  Platterville,  78  Wis.  644 

v.  Prussing,   165   111.   319.. 

v.  Richmond,    85    Va.    542 

59, 

v.  Ross,    11   N.  H.   547 

v.  S.    97    Ga.    759 

v.  S.   114  Ga.  256 80, 

v.  S.   65   Ind.   382 63, 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Or.    App.)     28 

S.    W.    874 358 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    33  S. 

W.   990 3,   266 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   68  S. 

W.  279 191 

v.  Shields,  121  Ind.  267....         6 
v.  Sweeney,  28  111.  App.  547 

44 

v.  Wright,    90    111.    471....    113 
Moore  Furniture  Co.  v.  Sloane, 

166  111.  460 101 

Moran  v.  Higgins,   1 9  Ky.  L.  R. 

456 113 

v.  P.    163   111.    372 219 

v.  S.    11    Ohio  C.   C.    464..    34 T 
Moran   Bros.   Co.  v.   Snoqualmie 
Falls  Power  Co.  29  Wash. 

292 25 

Moratsky    v.    Wirth,    74    Minn. 

146 20 

Morearty  v.  S.  46  Neb.  652 94 

Morehead    v.    Adajns,    18    Neb. 

569    63 

Morey  v.  Laird,  108  Iowa.  670.    134 
Morgan  v.  Hudnell,  52  Ohio  St. 

552    512 

v.  Peet,   32   111.   ?87   ....      30 

v.  S.    133    Ala.    18 295 

v.  S.   51  Neb.  672 

196,    2,69,    299 
v.  S.  48  Ohio  371 

115,    119,   720 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   67  S. 

W.   420   196 

v.  S.    (Neb.)    93  N.  W.  743 

20 
v.  Stone    (Neb.)    93   N.  W. 

743  . 117 

v.  Wabash  R.  Co.    159  Mo. 

271    641 

v.  Wattles,    69    Ind.    260..    172 

Moriarty  v.  S.  62  Miss.  661 19 

Morris  v.  Com.  20  Ky.   402...    255 


Morris  v.  Lachman,  68  Cal.  112.  68 
v.  Platt,  32  Com.  75.. 48,  245 
v.  S.  124  Ala.  44 

65,  297,  326 

v.  S.    101    Ind.   562 319 

v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  371 

191,   318 

Morrison  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co. 
(Wash.)     74    Pac.    1066 

25,   230 

v.  S.  42   Fla.   149 4 

v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  519.    258 

v.   S.  41  Tex.  520    317 

Morrisson  v.   S.    76   Ind.    339..    715 
Morrow     v.     Pullman     P.     Car 
Co.     (Mo.    App.)     73    S. 

W.    281    129 

v.  St.    Paul    C.   R.    Co.    65 

Minn.    382   94 

Morse  v.  Ryland,  58  Kas.  250.        1 
v.  Weymouth,    28   Vt.    824.    155 
Morton    v.    Gately,     2    111.     (1 

Scam.)    210   80 

v.  Harvey,   57   Neb.   304...    195 
Mose  v.  S.   36  Ala,   211 

297,   315,   730 
Moseley  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

578   Ill,  290 

v.  Washburn,      165      Mass. 

417    35 

Mosely  v.   S.    107  Ala.    74 258 

v.  Washburn,      167      Mass. 

345   113 

Mosher  v.  Rogers,   117   111.  446 

65 
Moshier   y.    Kitchell    &    Arnold, 

87   111.   18 284 

Mosier  v.  Stall,    119   Ind.   244.      27 
Mount   v.    Brooklyn   Union    Gas 

Co.   76  N.  Y.   S.   533....    358 
Movar    v.    Harvey,    125    Mass. 

574       249 

Mowry  v.   Stogner,   3   Rich.    (S. 

Car.)    251    160 

Mt.    Olive    v.    S.    Ooal    Co.    v. 
Rademancher,      190      111. 

538 104,    284,    382,    649 

Mt.  Vernor  Bank  v.  Porter,  148 

Mo.   176   126 

Mueller  v.  Pels,   192   111.   76...    238 
v.   Rosen,    179    111.    131....    104 
Muetze     v.     Tuteur,     77     Wis. 

236   191 

Muir  v.  Miller,   82   Iowa.    700.    196 

Mullen  v.  Bower    22  Ind.  App. 

294 440 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


Cl 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Muller    v.    Powers,    174    Mass. 

555   347 

Mullin  v.  Spangenberg,   112  111. 

140   505 

Mullinix  v.  P.  76  111.  211.166,  709 
Mullins  v.   Com.    23   Ky.   L.   R. 

2433   253 

v.  P.    110   111.   42 

115,    299,    322,    744,    745 
Mulvihill     v.      Thompson,      114 

Iowa,   734   71 

Muncie     Natural     Gas     Co.     v. 
Allison    (Ind.)    67    N.   E. 

Ill    20 

Muncy    v.    Mattfield     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    40   S.   W.   345 7 

Mundine  v.  Pauls,   28   Tex.  Cv. 

App.   46   195 

Hunger   v.    Waterloo,    83    Iowa, 

562   594 

Murchison     v.     Mansur-Tibbetts 
Implement   Co.    (Tex.   Cv. 

App.)    37   S.  W.   605 96 

Murphy  v.   Chicago,  R.   I.  &  P. 

R.  Co.   38   Iowa,   539 19 

v.  Farlow,  124  Ala.  279..  80 
v.  Johnson,  4  5  Iowa,  5  7 ...  361 
v.  Murphy,  95  Iowa,  271.  164 

v.  P.  37  111.  447 70 

v.  S.   31    Fla.    166 328 

v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  24.  262 
v.  S.  108  Wis.  111... 336,  337 
v.  St.  Louis  Tr.  Co.  96 

Mo.   App.    272 236 

Murray  v.  Board  of  Comrs.  58 

Kas.    1    353 

v.  Boston      Ice      Co.      180 

Mass.    165   25 

v.  Burd    (Neb.)    91    N.   W. 

278    53,    70 

v.  Hudson.  65  Mich.  673..  658 
v.  New  York,  L.  &  W.  R. 

Co.    103    Pa.   St.    37 25 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     44 

S.  W.   830 4 

Musfelt  v.   S.    64   Neb.   445 7 

Musgrave  v.  S.   133  Ind.  297..      30 
Musser  v.  S.  157  Ind.  431.729  760 
Muth   v.    St.    Louis    T.    Co.    94 
Mo.  App.  94 

390.    393.    436,    437 
Mutual.   &c.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Baker, 

10  Tex.  Cv.  App.   515...        6 
v.  French,    2     Gin.     (Ohio) 

321    19 

v.  Miller,    39   Ind.   475 

4,    8,    12,    420 


Myer  v.   Mead,   83   111.    19.. 31,   385 
v.  Milwaukee     E.     R.     Co. 

(Wis.)    93   N.   W.   6 6 

v.  Myer,   86   111.  App.   417.    195 
v.  Richards,    111    Fed.    296 

20 
v.  Suburban    Home    Co.    55 

N.  Y.  S.   566 360 

Myers  v.  P.   156   111.   129 331 

v.   S.    43    Fla.    500 25,    708 

v.  S.   97   Ga.   76.. 94,    11-7,   224 
v.  S.    (Tex.    Cv.    App.)     39 

S.    W.    938 93 

v.  Taylor,    107   Tenn.    364.      14 

v.  Walker,    31    111.    353 117 

My  rick  v.  Wells,  52  Miss.   149 

170 


N 


Nabours   v.    McCord    (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    75   S.   W.   827....    192 
Nappanee  Canning   Co.   v.  Reid, 

&c.  Co.   159  Ind.  614 517 

Nash   v.    Mam'stee    Lumber    Co. 

75    Mich.    357 404 

Nashville,    &c.    R.    Co.   v.   Ham- 
mond,   104    Ala.    191 195 

v.  Norman,   108  Tenn.  324 

00 

v.  O'Bryan,    104   Tenn.   28.      25 
v.  Witherspoon    (Tenn.)    78 

S.   W.    1052 106 

Nason  v.  Letz,   73   111.   371 361 

National  Bank  v.  Suimmer,   1 1 9 .... 

N.   Car.    591 352 

National     Bank     of    Merrill     v. 

Illinois    and    W.    Lumber 

Co.    107    Wis.    247 7,    20 

National    Horse    Importing    Co. 

v.  Novak,   95   Iowa,   596...    236 
National    L.    M.     Ins.     Co.     v. 

Whitacre    (Ind.  App.)    43 

N.    E.    905 236 

National  Linseed  Oil   Co.  v.  Mc- 

Blaine.    164    111.    597....      25 
National    Lumber   Co.    v.    Snell, 

47    Ark.    407 34 

National   Syrup  Co.  v.   Carlson, 

155    111.    210 133 

Naugher  v.   S.    116   Ala.    463 

68.    227 
Navarro  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

43    S.   W.    105 255,   269 

Nebraska    M.    M.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Sasek.   64  Neb.    17 20 


Cll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Nebraska  N.  Bank  v.  Burke, 
44  Neb.  234 

Needham  v.  King,  95  Mich. 

303  

v.  P.  98  111.  279.. 48,  284, 

Negley  v.  Cowell,  91  Iowa,  256 

Nehms  v.   S.   58   Miss.   362 

Neiders  v.  Bell,  174  111.  325.. 
Neill  v:  Jordan,  15  Mont.  47.. 
Neiman  v.  Schmitker,  181  111. 

406   

Neininger   v.    Cowen,    101    Fed. 

787  

Nelson  v.  Cottingham,  152  Ind. 

135   

v.  Lake    Shore,    &c.    R.    Co. 

104   Mich.   587. 

v.  McLennan,       31       Wash. 

208   

v.  S.    (N.  J.)    35  Atl.   785. 
v.  S.     43     Tex.     Cr.     App. 

553    

v.  Spears,    16   Mont.    351.. 
v.  Terry     (Ky.)     56    S.    VV. 

672   

v.  Voree,    55    Ind.    455.... 
Neufeld  v.  Roderninski,   144  111. 

83    

Neville  v.  Mitchell  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.)  66  S.  W.  579.... 

v.  S.    133    Ala.    29 

Newbold    v.    Hayward,    96    Md. 

247    

Newbury  v.  Getchell  &  M.  L. 
Mfg.  Co.  100  Iowa,  441 

New    Dxmderberg   Minn.    Co.    v. 

Old,   97    Fed.    150 

Newell   v.   S.    115   Ala.   54 

New  England  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Wetmore.   32   111.  221. 

New     England     M.     S.     Co.     v. 

Great  W.  &  E.  Co.   6  N. 

Dak.    407    

New  Ene.  T.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Cath- 

olican,    79    Fed.    294 

Newman  v.  Day,  108  Ga.  813. 
v.  Hazelrigg,  96  Ind.  377. 
v.  McComas,  43  Ind.  70.. 

v.  S.   49    Ala.    9 

v.  Schmilker,    181    111.    406 

v.  Virginia,     &o.      Co.      80 
Fed.   228   . 


56 

363 

772 

94 
328 
284 
244 

193 
121 

47 
650 

211 

295 

191 
65 

244 
209 

242 

355 
301 

121 

86 

353 
297 

80 

146 

353 
356 
321 
308 
318 

192 
351 


New  Omaha  Thompson-Houston 
Elec.  Light  Co.  v.  John- 
son (Neb.)  93  N.  W. 

778 20 

v.  Rombold    (Neb.)     97    N. 

W.    1030   192 

New  Orleans   R.  Co.  v.   Allbrit- 

ton,    38    Miss.    242 538 

v.  Clements,    100   Fed.    415 

351 
Newport  v.   S.    140   Ind.    299 

70,   191,   206,   227,  253 
Newport  News  &  M.   V.   Co.  v. 

Pace,    158    U.    S.    36....    348 
Newton  v.  Newton,  12  Ind.  527 

15 
v.   S.    (Miss.)     12    So.    560.    195 

v.  S.    37    Ark.    333 113 

New   York,    &c.   R.    Co.   v.    Blu- 

menthal,    160   111.   40 183 

v.Jones,    94   Md.    24 195 

v.  Luebeck,   157  HI.  595 

129,    643 
v.  Thomas,    92    Va.    606 

113,    245 

New  York  &  T.  Land  Co.  v. 
Gardner  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

25    S.   W.    737 116 

New  York  Dry  Goods  Store  v. 
Pabst  Brewing  Co.  112 

Fed.   381   121 

New  York  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Walden,  12  Johns  (N. 

Y.)    519    171 

New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Browns'  Adm.r.  23  Ky. 

L.    R.    2070 6 

v.  Fraser,    130   U.   S.    611.       84 
Nichol   v.   Laumeister,    102   Cal. 

658    6,    199 


Nichols  v.  Bradley,  78  111.  44. 

v.  Mercer,    44    111.    250 

v.  Munsel,    115    Mass.    567 

v.  S.    46    Miss.    284 

v.  Winfrey,  90  Mo.  407... 
Nicholson    v.    Merritt,    23    Ky. 

L.   R.    2281 

Nicklaus  v.  Burns,   75  Ind.   98 

63, 
Nickless   v.    Pearson,    126    Ind. 

477   

Nickum  v.  Gaston,  24  Ore.  380 

Nicol    v.     Crittendon,     55     Ga. 
Ga.  497 


80 

78 

34 
245 

475 

106 
518, 
10 
351 
222 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cm 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Nighbert  v.  Hornsby,   100  Term. 

82    360 

Nilan  v.   P.  27    Colo.   206.255,   279 
Niles  v.  Sprague,  13  Iowa,  198 

187 
Nite  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  App.)    54 

S.    W.    763 80 

v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  340 

304.    462 
MX    v.     Reiss     Coal     Co.      114 

Wis.    493    231 

v.  S.   97   Ga.    211 299,    318 

Nixon    v.    Jacobs,    22    Tex.    Cv. 

App.    97    7 

Noble  v.   Worthy,    1    Indian  Ter. 

458   26 

Nobles  v.  S.  98  Ga.  73....  11 2,  319 
Nofsinger  v.  Goldman,   122  Cal. 

609    80 

Nome    Beach    L.    &    T.    Co.    v. 
Munich    Assur.    Co.     123 

Fed.    820    189 

Norfleet    v.     Sigman,    41    Miss. 

631    250 

Norfolk      Beet     Sugar     Co.     v. 

Hight.   56   Neb.    162.. 94,    119 
Norfolk,   &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ampsey, 

93    Va.    112 617,    624 

v.  Corletto.  100  Va.  355.  80 
v.  De  Board,  91  Va.  702.  637 
v.  Poole's  Adm'r,  100  Va. 

148    198 

v.  Reeves,    97    Va.    29 589 

v.  Stevens,  97  Va.  631 84 

Norris  v.   Clinkscales    (S.  Car.) 

22    S.    E.    1 130,    172 

North  v.  Mallory,   94  Md.   305 

116 
Northam    v.    International    Ins. 

Co.    61    N.    Y.    S.    45....    145 
Nortli    Chicago    St.    R.    Co.    v. 

Boyd.  156  111.  416.. 71,  238 
v.  Cossar,  203  111.  608.74,  126 
v.  Dudgeon,  83  111.  App. 

528  223 

v.  Eldridge,   151  111.  550 

183,   562 

v.  Fitzgibbons,       180       111. 
466    . 


v.  Gastka,  27  111.  App.  523 
v.  Honsinger,    175   111.    318 


653 
385 

196 

80 


v.  Husson.    101    Pa.   St.   7. 
v.  Hutchinson,       191       111. 
104    63,    382 


North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Ir- 

win,   202   111.   345 80.   530 

v.  Kaspers,    18G    111.    246 

379,    380 

v.  Louis,    138   111.   12 26a 

v.  Penser,   190  111.   67 

238,  363,  551,  629 
v.  Polkey,  203  111.  232 

1,    19,    90 

v.  Rodert,    203    111.    415...    379 
v.  Shreve,    171    111.   441 

86,    652 
v.  Wellner,  206  111.   274 

215,  365,  370,  379 
v.  Williams,  140  111.  281.  183 
v.  Wiswel,  168  111.  613...  133 
v.  Wrixon,  150  111.  532..  356 

v.  Zeigler,    182    111.    13 78 

Northern  Ohio  R.  Co.  v.  Rigby, 

69   Ohio,    184 119,    192 

Northern    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Bab- 
cock,    154   U.   S.    190.. 25,   92 

v.  Lynch,    79   Fed.   268 71 

v.  Poirier,  67   Fed.   881 71 

Northwestern  Fuel   Co.  v.  Dan- 

ielson,    57    Fed.    915 196 

Norton    v.    Blinn,    39    Ohio    St. 

145    528 

v.   North    Carolina    R.     Co. 

122  N.  Car.   910 26 

Norwood    v.    S.     (Ala.)     24    So. 

53    209 

Noyes  v.  Tootle,  48  S.W.I 031 

218 
Nudd  v.  Burrows,  91  U.  S.  441 

189 
Nugent    v.    Brenchard,    157    N. 

Y.   687   198 

v.  Brenchard,   36   N.    Y.    S. 

102    198 

Nuzum  v.   S.   88   Ind.   599.168,   169 

Nye  v.   Chase,    139   Mass.   380.    416 

v.Kelly,    19    Wash.    73 84 


Oberdorfer     v.     Newberger,     23 

Ky.  L.  R.   2323 8 

O'Brien 'v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.    92    Wis.    340 133 

v.  Com.    89    Ky.    354 269 

v.  Northwestern     I.     &     B. 

Co.   82  Minn.   136 63 

v.   P.     48     Barb.      (N.     Y.) 

280    331 

O'Callaehan    v.    Bode.     84    Cal. 

489 ...      78 


CIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Och  v.  Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 

130    Mo.    27 93a 

Oehs  v.   P.    124   111.   399..  299,   363 
O'Connell  v.  P.   87   N.  Y.   384.    331 
v.  St.    Louis,    C.    &    W.    R. 
Co.    106    Mo.    483 

172,   368,   385,   531,   549 
v.  Samuel,     31     N.     Y.     S. 

889    - 126 

O'Connor  v.   Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
P.  R.  Co.   27   Minn.    166 

347 

v.  S.   28   Tex.  App.   288...    290 
O'Dea  v.  S.   16  Neb.  243 

858,    859,    860 
Odette  v.    S.    90   Wis.    258 

187,    188,   274 

O'Donnell   v.    Chicago,    R.    I.    & 
P.   R.   Co.    (Neb.)    91    N. 

W.   566   93 

v.  Rodiger,   76  Ala.   222...      60 
O'Driscoll  v.  Lynn  &  B.   St.  R. 

Co.   180  Mass.    187 8 

Offterdinger    v.    Ford,    92    Va. 

644 510 

Offutt  v.  Columbian  Exposition, 
175    111.    472 

120,   121,  122,  126 
O'Flaherty    v.    Mann,    196    111. 

304    192 

Oftelie   v.    Town    of    Hammond, 

78    Minn.    275 48 

Ogbom  v.  Hoffman,  52   Ind.  439 

404,    451 
Oglsby    v.    Missouri    P.    R.    Co. 

(Mo.)    37   S.  W.   829 106 

O'Hara  v.  Miller,  64  Iowa,  462 

479 
Ohio,  &c.  R.   Co.  v.   Buck,   130 

Ind.    300   204 

v.Cosby,    107    Ind.    35 652 

v.  Cramker,    132    Ind.    277 

220,    367 

v.Dunn,    138   Ind.    18 126 

v.  McCartney,  121    Ind.  385 

348 
v.  Pearcy,    128    Ind.    197 

119,    170 

v.  Stein,     140    Ind.    61 235 

v.  Voight,    122   Ind.   288...    554 
v.  Wacker,    113    Ind.    201..    640 
v.  Wangslin,    152   111.    141.    183 
Ohio  &  I.  Torpedo  Co.  v.  Fish- 
burn,   61   Ohio  St.  608..      71 
Ohlweiler   v.   Lohlman,    88   Wis. 

75    198 

Olds  v.  S.    (Fla.)    33  So.  296... 341 


Olds  Wagon  Works  v.   Coombs, 

124  Ind.   62 156,   160 

O'Leary  v.  German  A.  Ins.  Co. 

100    Iowa,    390 20 

Olferman    v.    Union    D.    R.    Co. 

125  Mo.   408 363 

Oliver  v.  Columbia,  N.  &  L.  R. 

Co.    65    S.   Car.    1 213 

v.  Moore     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

43    S.   W.    812 101 

v.  Ohio    River    R.    Co.    42 

W.  Va.    703 80 

v.   S.    34    Fla.    203 228 

v.  S.    38    Fla.    46 28 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cv.    App.)     42 

S.    W.    554 110,    215 

v.  Sterling,      20     Ohio     St. 

400   48,    238 

Olsen  v.  Oregon,  S.  L.  &  U.  N. 

R.    Co.    9    Utah,    129 205 

Olson  v.   Oregon,   S.   L.   R.   Co. 

24   Utah,   460 238 

Omaha    B.    R.    Co.    v.    McDer- 

mott,    25   Neb.    714 209 

Omaha,    &c.    Asso.   v.    Missouri, 
&c.  R.  Co.  42  Neb.   105 

181,    238,    308,    363 
Omaha  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Deirks, 

63    Neb.    473 351 

Omaha  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Douglas 

Co.   62   Neb.    1 94 

Omaha    Nat.    Bank    v.    Thomp- 
son,   39    Neb.    269 48 

Omaha,  &c.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Lev- 

ingston,    49    Neb.    17....      70 
Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Chol- 
lette,    33   Neb.    148 

561,   562.   570,   582 
Omaha    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Boeson 
(Neb.)    94  N.  W.   619 

19,    101,    561 
O'Neal  v.  Curry,   134  Ala.  216 

113 
O'Neil    v.    Blase.    94    Mo.    App. 

648   192.   200 

v.  Dry   Dock,    &c.    Co.    129 

N.  Y.    130 17 

v.  Hanscom,  175    Mass.  313 

25 
v.  Orr,  5  111.    (4  Scam.)    3 

363 

v.  S.   48  Ga.   66 294 

Ordway   v.    Sanders,    58    N.    H. 

132   116 

Oregon  R.  &  N.  Co.  v.  Galliber, 

2    Wash.    Ter.    70 359 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


CV 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


O'Reily    v.    Fitzgerald,    40    111. 

310    

Orendorff   v.   Finfronch,    65    111. 

App.    174    

Orne  v.  Cook,   31   111.   238 

O'Rourke     v.     Vennekohl,     104 

Cal.   254   

Orr  v.   Cedar   R.   &  M.   R.   Co. 

94    Iowa,    423 

v.  S.    (Miss.)    18   So.    118. 
Orth    v.    Clutz*s    Adm'r,    18    B. 

Mon.    (Ky.)    223 

Ortwein    v.    Com.    76    Pa.    St. 

414    331, 

Osborne     v.     Ringland      (Iowa) 

98   N.   W.    116 

v.  Simmerson,       73      Iowa, 

513    

v.  S.    125   Ala.    106... 218. 
Ostrander     v.     Scott,     161     111. 

345    

Otmer  v.   P.    76   111.    149 

78,   308. 
O'Toole    v.    Post    P.    Pub.    Co. 

179   Pa.   St.   271 

Ottawa  Gas  Light  &   Coke  Co. 

v.  Graham,  28  111.  73.. 
Ously  v.  Hardin,  23  111.  353.. 
Over  v.  Schiffling,  102  Ind.  194 

Overall  v.  Armstrong    (Tex.  Cv. 
App.)     25    S.    W.    440... 
Owen  v.   Brown,    70   Vt.    521 
348, 

v.  Long,   97   Wis.    78 7, 

v.  Palmour,   111   Ga.   885.. 
v.  Phillips,    73   Ind.   287.  .. 

v.  S.    78    Ala.    425 

Owens  v.  Callaway,  42  Ala. 

301  

v.  S.  80  Miss.  499... 288, 
v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  345 

v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  391 


223 
117 

22 

238 
296 

197 

334 

6 

472 
221 

404 

729 

6 

182 
476 

27 
192 

841 
195 
208 
679 
318 

361 

368 

110 
193 


P.  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Probst, 

30   Ohio  St.    106 351 

Pace  v.  Harris,   97   Ga.   357...  126 

v.  Payne,  73  Ga.  675 360 

v.  S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.)    31 

S.  W.  173  103,  289 

Pacific  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fisher, 

109  Cal.  566   141 

v.  Walker,  67  Ark.  147..  195 


Packer    v.    Thompson-Houston 

E.  Co.   175  Mass.  496..       113 

Padbury  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 

Co.  75  N.  Y.  S.  952 133 

Padfield  v.  P.  146  111.  663..  105,  226 

Padgett   v.   Jacobs,    128    Mich. 

632    78 

v.  Sweeting,    65    Md.    405      498 

Padron  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 


548 


Page  v.  Shainwald,  65  N.  Y.  S. 


174 


326 
146 


v.  S.   141   Ind.  236 260,  802 

Pahlman  v.  King,  49   111.   269      243 
Paine    v.    Incorporated    Town, 

&c.    103    Iowa,   481 6 

Painter  v.  P.  147  111.  444.. 20,  719 
Palm  v.  Chernowsky,   28   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  405 200 

Palmer  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Ulysses     (Neb.),    81    N. 

W.   303    356 

v.  Marshall,  60   111.   292..      417 
v.  S.  (Neb.)  97  N.  W.  235      227 

v.  S.  9  Wyo.  40 247 

v.  Smith  "(Conn.),   56   Atl. 

516     7 

Palmore  v.   S.   29   Ark.   248.. 11,  60 
Palnode  v.   Westenhaver,    114 

Wis.    460    231 

Pannell  v.  Com.  86  Pa.  St.  260      211 
Panton  v.  P.  114  111.  509.. 251,  773 

Paragon    Paper    Co.   v.    S.    19 

Ind.  App.  328   853 

Paris  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   31 

S.    W.    855    110 

Parish   v.   Williams    (Tex.   Cv. 

App.),   53   S.  W.  79....  6 

Park  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  43 

Iowa,    636    679 

Parker  v.  Chancellor,   78   Tex. 

524    43,   101 

v.  Fisher,  39  111.  164   105 

v.  Hastings,    123    N.    Car. 

671     93 

v.  National     M.     B.     &     L. 
Asso.    (W.  Va.)    46  S.  E. 

811  80 

v.  P.  97  111.  32  55 

v.  S.  136  Ind.  284 

361,  328,  743 
v.  S.  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

119  2,  68 

v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  526   191 
v.  Taylor  (Neb.),  91  N. 
W.  537  85 


CV1 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections. J 


Parker  v.   Wells    (Neb.)    94  N. 

W.  717  

Parkins  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 

(Neb.)    93    N.   W.    197 

7,  90, 
Parkinson    v.    Concord    St.    R. 

Co.  71  N.  H.  28  

Parks  v.   Gulf,  C.   S.   &   F.   R. 

Co.    (Tex.   Cv.   App.)    30 

S.  W.  708    

v.  S.    105    Ga.    242 265, 

v.  St.    Louis   &   S.   R.   Co. 

(Mo.)  77  S.  W.  70  .... 
Parman  v.  Kansas  City  (Mo.) 

78  S.  W.  1046  

Parmlee  v.  Adolph,  20  Ohio  St. 

10     1 

Parmley    v.    Farrar,     169    111. 

607     

Parr   v.    S.    36    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

493     

Parrish  v.   S.    14  Neb.   61 1, 

Parsons  v.  S.  81  Ala.  577.. 329, 
Partin  v.   Com.    17   Ky.   L.   R. 

499     

Partridge    v.    Cutter,    168    111. 

504    56,    118,    119, 

Pate  v.  P.  8   111.    (   Gilm.)    661 

v.  S.  94  Ala.   14,  18 

322,    328, 

v.  Wight   30   Ind.   476    

Patee  v.  Adams,  37  Kas.  135  .. 
Patterson   v.   Inclined   P.   R.   Co., 

12  Ohio  Cir.   280    

v.  Mills,  48  N.   Y.  S.   781 

v.  S.  75  Miss.  670   

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   29  S. 

W.    272     

Patzwald  v.  U.  S.  7  Okla.  232 

Paul  v.  S.  100  Ala.  136 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  45  S. 

W.    725     

Paulin   v.   Howser,    63    111.    312 

Payne  v.  Com.    1   Mete.    (Ky.) 

370  

v.  Crawford,  102  Ala. 

387 

v.  McCormick,  &c.  Co.,  11 

Okla.  318  

Payne  Clothing  Co.  v.  Payne 

(Ky.)  54  R.  W.  709.... 
Paynter  v.  Com.  21  Ky.  L.  R. 

1562 


80 

206 
35 

65 
273 

196 

6 

,  48 
250 

290 
165 
331 

358 

247 
48 

340 

41 

513 

563 
0 

80 

358 

297 
221 

304 

80 

253 

48 

247 

126 

268 


Peak  v.  P.  76  111.  289 219 

Pearce  v.  Boggs,  99  Cal.   340..    163 
v.  Strickler,   9   N.  Mex.   467 

20 
Pearson  v.  Spartenberg  Co.  51 

S.  Car.   480 6,   350,   351 

Peart   v.   Chicago,   M.   &   St.    P. 

R.  Co.    8  S.  Dak.  431..         32 
Pease  Piano  Co.  v.  Cameron,  56 

Neb.    561 84,    351 

Pecha   v.   Kastl,64   Neb.    380..       25 

Peck  v.  Boggess,  2  111.  285    ..      347 

v.  St.    Louis   Tr.   Co.    (Mo.) 

77   S.  W.   736    199,562 

Peirce  v.  Walters,  164  111.  561 

124,  149 

Pelfrey    v.    Texas     C.     R.     Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   73  S.  W. 

411     25 

Pellum  v.  S.  89  Ala.  28 324 

Peltier  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  & 

O.   R.   Co.,   88   Wis.   521.. 200 
Pena  v.   S.    38    Tex.   Cr.   App. 

333     280 

Pence    v.    Makepeace,     65     Ind. 

357   424 

v.  Wabash     R.     Co.      116 

Iowa   279    85,    238 

Pendleton  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Stell- 

.man,  22  Ohio  St.   1.    243,247 
Pennsylvania    Co.     v.     Backes. 

133   111.   264    53,  101,  126 

v.  Bray,   125  Ind.  932 573 

v.  Conlan,  101  111.  106.133,183 
v.  Connell,  127  111.  419....  81 
v.  Files,  65  Ohio  St.  403 

57 
v.     Frana,   13   111.  App.   91 

161 

v.  Frana,   112  111.   404 117a 

v.  France,  112  111.  398..  155 
v.  Gallagher,  40  Ohio  St. 

637     637 

v.    Harris,    101    Pa.    St.    93 

116 
v.  Horton,    132    Ind.    194 

627,    644 
v.  Hunsley,    23    Ind.    App. 

37     215,    216 

v.     Langendorf,     48     Ohio 

St.    321     647 

v.    McCaffrey,     173    111. 

175  .' 183 

v.  McCormack,   131   Ind. 
250  617,  618.  622 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CV11 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Marshall, 
119  111.   404 

33,  48,  56,  382,  650 
v.  Martin,  114  Fed.  586  126 
v.  Miller,  35  Ohio  St.  543, 

535 

v.  Platt,  47  Ohio  St.  382  868 
v.  Rossman,  13  Ohio  C.  U. 

Ill     7 

v.  Roy,  102  U.  S.  155.. 84,  579 
v.  Rudel,  100  111.  609..  26a 
v.  Sloetke,  104  111.  201..  116 
v.  Versten,  140  111.  637 

26a,  223 
Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Kelly, 

150   111.   9    236 

Penobscot  R.  Co.  v.  White,  41 

Me.   512    80 

Penso   v.    McCormick,    125    Ind. 

116     537 

People     v.    Abbott,     116     Mich. 

263     773 

v.  Ahern,  93  Cal.  518  ....  294 
v.  Ah  Fong,  12  Cal.  345.  .  4 

v.  Ah  Fung,  17  Cal.  377..  19 
v.  Ah  Sing,  51  Cal.  372..  394 
v.  Ah  Sing,  95  Cal.  654  219 
v.  Aiken,  66  Mich.  460 

312,  734 
v.   Allender,    117    Cal.    81 

333,   754 

v.  Alton,  193  111.  309....  153 
v.  Amaya,  134  Cal.  531.180,  214 
v.  A™merman  118  Cal.  23 

152,    299 

v.  Anderson,  105  Cal.  32.70,71 
v.  Anthony,  56  Cal.  397 

312,  315,  733,  734 
v.  Appleton,  120  Cal.  250.  7 
v.  Arlington,  131  Cal.  231 

219,  336 

v.  Armstrong,  114  Cal.  570  71 
v.  Arnold,  116  Cal.  682...  274 
v.Arnold,  40  Mich.  715..  228 
v.  Arnold,  46  Mich.  268..  760 
v.  Ashmead,  118  Cal.  508..  31 
v.  Baker,  153  N.  Y.  111..  294 
v.  Barberi,  149  N.  Y.  256.  360 
v.  Barker,  60  Mich.  277..  318 
v.  Barney,  114  Cal.  554..  274 

v.  Barrie,   49   Cal.    342 318 

v.  Bartheman,    120    Cal.    7 

25,   63,   335 

v.  Beeler,  6  Cal  246 4 

v.   Bell,   49    Cal.    489 343 

v.  Bellamy,   109  Cal.  610..    315 


People    v.    Bemmerly,     87    Cal. 

121    295 

v.  Benham,    160  N.  Y.   402 

40,  297 

v.  Bennett,  121  Mich.  241.  247 
v.  Bennett,  49  N.  Y.  137.  150 

v.   Berlin,    10  'Utah   39 353 

v.  Bernal,  10  Cal.  66....  225 
v.  Beverly,  108  Mich.  509.  269 
v.  Board,  &c.  of  Madison 

County,    125   111.   340 126 

v.   Bodley,    131    Cal.    240..   301 

v.  Bonney,  98   Cal.   278 288 

v.  Bowers,     (Cal.)     18    Pac. 

660 336 

v.    Bowkus,    109    Mich.    360 

194,   195 

v.  Brannon,  47  Cal.  96 925 

v.    Britton,     118     Cal.     409 

240,    409 

v.  Brooks,  61  Hun  (N.  Y.)  344 
v.  Brow,  35  N.  Y.  S.  1009 

171,    210,    212 

v.   Brown,   59   Cal.   345 11 

v.  Buddensieck,     103    N.    Y. 

487     352 

v.  Burgle,  123  Cal.  303.71,  334 

v.  Burns,  63  Cal.  614   284 

v.  Burns,  121  Cal.  529.300,304 
v.  Byrnes,  30  Cal.  206..  3,  7 
v.  Caasata,  39  N.  Y.  S.  641 

201 
v.  Caldwell,    107    Mich.    374 

115,    347 
v.  Calvin,   60      Mich.      114 

214,    227 

v.  Carey,  125  Mich.  535..  208 
v.  Carpenter,  102  N.  Y.  238 

329 
v.  Carroll,    92    Cal.    568...      65 

v.   Casey,    53    Cal.    392 34 T 

v.    Casey,    65    Cal.    260 170 

v.  Chadwick,     7     Utah     134 

265,    290,    816 

v.  Charles,  26  Cal.  78 34 

v.  Chartoff,  75  N.  Y.  S.  1088 

296,    309 
v.  Chaves,      122      Cal.      134 

25,  42,  275 

v.  Chavez,  103  Cal.  407..  268 
v.  Cheong  Toon  Ark,  61 

Cal.     527     294 

v.      Chew    Sing    Wing,    88 

Cal.  288    208 

v.  Chun      Heong,      86      Cal. 
329    203,   237,   253 


CY111 


TABLE     OF     CAS1-.S. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


People  v.  Church,  116  Cal.  300.  267 
v.  Clark  105  Mich.  169.115,223 
v.  Clarke,  130  Cal.  642...  315 
v.  Comgus,  114  Cal.  107  ..  89 
v.  Compton  (Cal.)  56  Pac. 

44     |   217 

v.   Connelly    (Cal.)    38   Pac. 

42 .....    Ill 

v.  Considine,  105  Mich.  149.  48 
v.  Corey,  157  N.  Y.  332..  191 
v.  Costello,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.) 

87    288 

v.  Cotta,  49  Cal.  116 192 

v.  Coughlin,  65  Mich.  704..  336 
v.  Crawford,  48  Mich.  498.  60 
v.  Cronin,  34  Cal.  191.215,307 
v.  Crotty,  47  N.  Y.  S.  845.  191 
v.  Curry,  103  Cal.  548....  227 

v.  Davis,  47  Cal.  93    31 

v.  Davis,  64  Cal.  440 315 

v.Davis,  135  Cal.  162 297 

v.  Daniels,  105  Cal.  362...  150 
v.  Daniels  (Cal.)  34  Pac. 

233 303,  306 

v.  De  Garmo,   76   N.  Y.   S. 

477   273 

v.  De  La  Cour  Soto,  63  Cal. 

165 340 

v.  Devine,  95  Cal.  227   80 

v.  Dick,  32  Cal.  216 

198,  310,  326 
v.  Dippold,  51  N.  Y.  S.  859 

340- 
v.  Dole,  122  Cal.  486.. 301,  310 

v.  Dom  Pedro,  43  N.  Y.  S. 

44 198 

v.  Donlan,  135  Cal.  489...  754 
v.  Don  Pedro,  43  N.  Y.  S. 

44 340 

v.  Doyell,  48  Cal.  85  191 

v.  Elliott,  163  N.  Y.  11 

343,  757 

v.  Elmer,  109  Mich.  493..  152 
v.  Enwright,  134  Cal.  527.  264 
v.  Eubanks,  117  Cal.  652..  52 
v.  Ezzo,  104  Mich.  341.. 6,  295 

v.  Fasan,  66  Cal.  534 266 

v.  Fairchild,  48  Mich.  37  ..  312 
v.  Fanning,  131  N.  Y.  663.  119 

v.  Feliz,  136  Cal.  19   326 

v.  Ferraro,  161  N.  Y.  365..    170 

v.  Ferry,  84  Cal.  31    227 

v.  Fice,  97  Cal.  460    6 

v.  Fish,  125  N.  Y.   136....   281 


People   v.    Fitzgerald,    46    N.   J. 

L.   1020 229 

v.  Fitzgerald,  156  N.  Y.  253 

229 
v.  Flaherty,   162   N.  Y.   532 

82 
v.  Flannelly,    128   Cal.   83 

173     238 
v.  Flynn,   73   Cal.   511....'.    229 

v.  Foley,   64   Mich.    148 211 

v.  Fong   Ah    Sing,    64    Cal. 

253     743 

v.  Forsythe,  65  Cal.  102  ..  741 
v.  Friedland,  37  N.  Y.  S. 

974 295 

v.  Fuhrmann,      103      Mich. 

593 269 

v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  25.14,  331 
v.  Gilmore  (Cal.)  53  Pac. 

806 21 

v.  Gleason,  122  Cal.  370...  342 
v.  Glover  (Cal.)  74  Pac.  749 

70 
v.  Goodrode    (Mich.)    94   N. 

W.  14 244 

v.  Gorman,  83  Hun,  605...    208 
Graney,  91   Mich.  646   ..   336 

Guidici  100  N.  Y.  503 295 

Hall,  94  Cal.  595    .  .      30 

Hancock,   7   Utah,    170..   340 

Harlan,    133   Cal.    16 27 

Harper,  83  Mich.  273...  337 
Harris,  103  Mich.  473..  268 
Harrison,  93  Mich.  597.  343 
Hartman,  130  Cal.  487.  48 

Hawes,  98  Cal.  648 115 

Hecker,  109  Cal.  451...  297 
Henderson,  28  Cal.  465.  284 
Hendrickson,  46  N.  Y. 

S.  402 276 

v.  Herrick,  52  Cal.  446...  295 
v.  Hertz,  105  Cal.  660 

172,   195,  214,  226 

V.  H«ttick,    126   Cal.    425..      25 

v.  Hill,  116  Cal.  562 301 

v.  Hill,  123  Cal.  47.......  281 

v.  Hillick,  126  Cal.  425....    331 

v.  Hinshaw    (Mich.)    97    N. 

W.  758 !> 

v.  Hitchcock,  104  Cal.  482 

172,  214,  226- 

v.  Hoagland,  137  Cal.  218.  341 
v.  Hoch,  150  N.  Y.  291...  22<V 
v.  Hoin,  62  Cal.  120  32» 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


C1X 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


People  v.  Holmes,  126  Cal.  462 


Holmes,    111    Mich.    364 
251,  331, 

Hong  Fong,  85  Cal.  171. 
Howard,  112  Cal.  135.. 
Howard,  135  Cal.  266.. 
Hubert,  119  Cal.  216 

78, 

Hughson,  154  N.  Y.  153 
275,   277,   284, 

Ivey,   49    Cal.    56    

Johnson,  61  Cal.  142  .. 
Johnson,  104  Cal.  418 

191, 
Johnson,  140  N.  Y.  350. 

Jones,  24  Mich.  216   

Kaiser,  119  Cal.  456 

Keefer,  18  Cal.  636   

Kelley,   35   Hun    (N.   Y.) 
295 
Kelly,    132   Cal.   430.... 

Kelly,    133    Cal.    1 

Kessler,  13  Utah.  69  ... 
Kindleberger,  100  Cal. 

367 

Klee  (Cal.)   69  Pac.  696. 

Kloss,  115  Cal.  567 

Landman,  103  Cal.  577. 
Langton,  67  Cal.  427 

279, 
Lapique    (Cal.)    67    Pac. 

14 

Larrabee,   115  Cal.   159 

333, 

Lattimore,  86  Cal.  403. 
Lee  Sare  Bo,  72  Cal.  623 


v.  Lehr,    196    111.    361 

v.  Lem  Deo,   132  Cal.   199. 

v.  Levison,   1 6  Cal.  98   

v.  Long,   104  Cal.  363 

v.  Lopez,    135   Cal.   23 

v.  Lyons,   49    Mich.    78 

v.  McArron.    121    Mich.    1.. 

v.  McCann.  16  N.  Y.  58 

v.  McCarthy,   115  Cal.   255 

330,  331, 

v.  McFarlane,  134  Cal.  618 

v.  McGraw,  72  N.  Y.  S.  679 

People  v.   McKane,    143    N".   Y. 

455    

v.  M'Kay,   122   Cal.   628... 


227 

332 

80 

255 

191 

332 

343 
153 
342 

227 
302 
214 
299 
17 

325 
63 
80 

324 

208 
238 
333 
172 

777 
198 

754 
325 

196 

94 

304 

195 
268 
208 
312 
331 

333 
100 
106 

65 
37 


v.  McLaughlin,  37  N.  Y.  S. 

1005 

v.  McNamara,  94  Cal.  515 
336, 

v.  McNut,  93  Cal.  658 

v.  Macard,  73  Mich.  26 

v.  Machado    (Cal.)    63    Pac. 

66 

v.  Malaskina,  57  Cal.  628. 
v.  Mallon,  103  Cal.  513... 

v.  March,   6  Cal.   543 

v.  Martin,  53  N.  Y.  S.  745. 
v.  Matthai,  135  Cal.  442 

7, 

v.  Matthews,  126  Cal.  17.. 
v.  Mayes,  113  Cal.  618 

34,  36, 
v.  Mayor,  &c.  193  111.  309. 

v.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228 

v.  Mendenhall,   135  Cal.  344 

v.  Miller,    114   Cal.    10 

v.  Mills,   143  N.  Y.  383 

275, 
v.  Minnaugh,  131  N.  Y.  563 

v.  Mitchell,  129  Cal.  584.. 
v.  Moore  37  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

84 

v.  Murray,  72  Mich.  10.... 
v.  Neary,  104  Cal.  373 

115, 

v.  Neufeld,  165  N.  Y.  43.. 
v.  Newcomb,  118  Cal.  263. 
v.  Newcomer,  118  Cal.  263 

215, 
v.  Niles,  44  Mich.  606.286. 

v.  Nino.  149  N.  Y.  317 

v.  O'Brien,  106  Cal.  104 

336, 

v.  O'Brien,  130  Cal.  1..170 
v.  Oldham,  111  Cal.  648... 
v.  Oliveria,  127  Cal.  376.. 

v.  O'Neil,  67  Cal.  378 

v.  O'Neil,  109  N.  Y.  251.. 
v.  Ostrander,  110  Mich.  60 

336, 

v.  Owens,  123  Cal.  482 

v.  Pallister,  138  N.  Y.  605 

v.  Palmer,  105  Mich.  568.. 
v."  Parsons,  105  Mich.  177. 

v.  Paulsill,   115  Cal.   6 

v.  Payne,  8  Cal.  341  

v.  Pearne,  118  Cal.  154... 


6 

715 
269 
336 

52 

328 

198 

48 

179 

192 
80 

163 
155 
340 

80 
281 

284 

286 
344 

815 
3 

238 
307 
259 

283 
360 
331 

715 

305 

218 

6 

214 
218 

337 
335 

336 

258 
337 
296 
4 
249 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


People    v.    Pearsall,    50    Mich. 

233    323 

v.  People's     Ins.     Exchange, 

126    111.    466    129 

v.  Petmecy,  99  N.  Y.  421 

218,  227 
v.  Phidillia,    42    Cal.    536..   295 

v.  Phipps,   39    Cal.    326 295 

v.  Pichette,    111   Mich.   461 

322,  323 

v.  Plyer,  121  Cal.  160   219 

v.  Plyer,    126   Cal.    379....    170 

v.  Pomeroy,  30  Ore.   16 225 

v.  Potter,  89  Mich.  354 336 

v.  Prather,  120  Cal.  660..  25 
v.  Pullman,  129  Cal.  258..  198 
v.  Reed  (Cal.)  52  Pac.  835.  113 
v.  Reilly,  53  N.  Y.  S.  1005 

291 

v.  Repke,  103  Mich.  459..  269 
v.  Resh,  107  Mich.  251 

322,  327,  336,  339 
v.  Rice,  103  Mich.  350...  101 
v.  Ricketts,  108  Mich.  584 

70 

v.  Riordan,  117  N.  Y.  71..  329 
v.  Robertson,  67  Cal.  649.  798 
v.  Rose,  52  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

33 229 

v.  Ross,   115   Cal.   233.. 71,  294 

v.  Ross,   134   Cal.   256 80 

v.  Rush,   65   Cal.    129 259 

v.  Samsels,  66  Cal.  99 

44,  344,  756 
v.  Sanders,    114   Cal.   216..    115 

v.  Sanford,  43  Cal.  29    4 

v.Scott,    123    Cal.    434 240 

v.  Scott,   10   Utah,   217 303 

v.  Seaman,   107   Mich.   348 

211.  261 

v.  Sears,    18   Cal.    635    14 

v.  Shattuck,  100  Cal.  673..  225 
v.  Shoemaker,  131  Mich. 

107    378 

v.  Silva,  121  Cal.  668 14 

v.  Simons,  60  Cal.  72   259 

v.  Slater,   119   Cal.   620....    191 

v.  Smith,  57   Cal.   130 330 

v.  Smith,   59   Cal.   601 344 

v.  Smith,   105   Cal.   676 

293,  297 

v.  Smith,  92  Mich.   10    336 

v.  Spiegel,  143  N.  Y.  107..    191 
v.  Spriggs,  58  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
603    342 


People  v.  Stanton,  106  Cal.  139 
v.  Stegenberg,  127  Cal.  510 


268 


32a 
v.  Stephenson,   32  N.  Y.  S. 

1112   297 

v.  Sternberg,     111     Cal.     3 

174,    198,    288,    289,    319 
288,   289,   319 
v.  Steubenvoll,  62  Mich.  329 

295 
v.  Stewart,   75   Mich.   21 

31,  32,  307,  312 
v.  Streuber,  121  Cal.  431..  150 
v.  Swartz,  118  Mich.  292.  297 

v.  Tarbox,   115   Cal.   57 320 

v.  Taylor,  138  N.  Y.  406 

329,  331 
v.  Thiede,   11  Utah,  241 

20,  28,  270,  347,  351 
v.  Tice,    115    Mich.    219...    745 

v.  Topia,   131   Cal.   647 94 

v.  Totman,  135  Cal.  133..  191 
v.  Travers,  88  Cal.  233  ..170 
v.  Underbill,  26  N.  Y.  S. 

1030 841 

v.  Uquidas,  96  Cal.  239  ..  307 
v.  Vanderhoof,  71  Mich.  158 

211 
v.  Van  Ewan,  111  Cal.  144 

227 
v.  Van  Horn,    119   Cal.   323 

319 
v.  Van  Houter,  38  Hun  (N. 

Y.)    173 337 

v.  Vanzile,  143  N.  Y.  368.  98 
v.  Walden,  51  Cal.  588...  308 
v.  Waller,  70  Mich.  237...  295 
v.  Wappner,  14  Cal.  437..  34 
v.  Ward,  134  Cal.  301.. 80,  289 
v.  Warner,  104  Mich.  337.  6 
v.  Wayman,  128  N.  Y.  585 

286.  302 

v.  Webster,  111  Cal.  381..  196 
v.  Webster,  50  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

398 170,  211 

v.  Weissenberger,  77  N.  Y. 

S.  71   223 

v.  Welch,  49  Cal.  174.170,  174 
v.  Wells,  112  Mich.  648..  299 
v.  Westlake,  124  Cal.  452.  250 

v.  Wheeler.   65   Cal.   77 215 

v.  White,  24  Wend.   (N.  Y.) 
520 758 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CXI 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


People  v.  Wilder,  134  Cal.  182.    218 
v.  Willett,   105  Mich.    110 

7,  102,  311,  336 
v.  Willett,  36  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

500   279 

v.  Williams,  17  Cal.  142 

31,  192 

v.  Wilson,  49  Cal.   13   331 

v.  Wilson,   135   Cal.   331...   816 
v.  Winthrop,   118  Cal.   85..        6 
v.  Wong   Ah    Foo,    69    Cal. 
180  .  .   ..173,  325,  327,  328 

v.  \Vood,  99   Mich.   620 265 

v.  Worden,  113  Cal.  569 

90,  153,  165,  269,  302,  '323 
v.  Zigouras,  163  N.  Y.  250 

255 

Peoples  v.  McKee,  92  111.  397..   206 
v.  S.   (Miss.)    33    So.   289..    118 
People's    &    Drovers'    Bank    v. 

Craig,  63  Ohio  St.   382..    126 
Peoples  C.  &  A.  Co.  v.  Darrow, 

172    111.    62    238 

Peoria,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Clayberg, 

107  111.  644 641 

v.  Tamplin,  156  111.  285...    195 
Peoria  M.  &  I.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ana- 

pow,  45  111.  86    87 

Pepperall  v.  City  P.  Tr.  Co.   15 

Wash.  176 174 

Percival   V.    Chase,     182    Mass. 

371 32,  116 

Perez   v.   San   Antonio   &   A.   P. 
R.   Co.   28   Tex.   Cv.   App. 

255   94 

Perham  v.  Coney,  117  Mass.  103 

433 

Peri  v.  P.   65  111.  26 1,  21 

Perigo  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  52 

Iowa,  277 619 

Perin  v.  Parker,   126  111.  201..      25 

Perkins  v.  Attaway,  14  Ga.  27.    192 

v.  Perkins,  39' N.  H.   163..   690 

v.  S.  50  Ala.  154 187 

Perrin  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   78 

S.  W.  932 767.  777 

Perry  v.  Dubuque  S.  W.  R.  Co. 

36    Iowa,    102    63 

v.  Makenson,   103   Ind.   302 

243 

v.  P.    14  111.   496    279 

v.  S.    110   Ga.    234    304 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    42  S. 

W.   297   215 

Persons  v.  S.  90  Tenn.  291..    .   211 


Peshine  v.  Shepperson,  17  Gratt. 

(Va.)   472 28 

Petefish  v.  Becker,  176  111.  455 

284 
Peters  v.  McCay  &  Co.  136  Cal. 

73 94 

Peterson  v.  S.  74  Ala.  34 63 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    88  S. 

W.  549 7 

v.  Wistman   (Mo.  App.)    77 

S.  W.    1016    530 

Petty  v.  S.   (Miss.)    35   So.  213 

725,  727,  730 
Pettyjohn  v.   Liebscher,   92   Ga. 

149 107 

Peyton  v.  S.  54  Neb.   188..  743,  744 
Pfaffenback   v.   Lake   S.   &c.   R. 
Co.   142  Ind.  251 

84,  203,  365,  558 
Pfeuffer  v.  Maltby,  54  Tex.  454 

361 
Pfund  v.  Zimmerman,  29  111.  269 

80 
Phelps  D.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Sampson, 

113   Iowa,   150    414 

Philadelphia,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 72  Md.  520 

544,  551,  583,  639,  652 
v.  Hogeland,   66   Md.    150 

531,  582,  638 

Philbrick  v.  Town  of  University 
Place,   106  Iowa,  352 

361,  362 
Philibert  v.  Burch,   4   Mo.  App. 

470 160 

Phillips'  Case,  132  Mass.  233..      17 
Phillips    v.    Cornell,    133    Mass. 

546 94 

v.  Phillips,  93  Iowa,  615   ..    129 

v.  Rentz,    106   Ga.    249 126 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   30  S. 

W.    1063   358 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   31   S. 

W.  644 20,  103 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   45  S. 

W.  709 55 

v.  Thome,  103  Ind.  2 7 5..  14,  17 
v.  Williams,  39  Ga.  602  ..  182 
v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co. 

130  N.  Car.  582   11,  13 

Philpot    v.    Lucas,     101     Iowa, 

478 45 

Phinney    v.    Bronson,    43    Kas. 

451 7 

Phipps    v.    Pierce,    94    N.    Car. 

514 354 


CXJ1 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Phoenix    A.    Co.   v.    Tucker,    77 

Fed.  243 126,  351 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gray 321 

v.  Raddin,   120  U.  S.   183 

359,  361 
v.  Wilcox   &   G.   G.   Co.    65 

Fed.  724 84 

Pickens  v.  S.   115  Ala.  42 

267,  297,  301 
Pickett  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 

Co.  46  N.  Y.  S.  693 145 

Pickham  v.  Wheeter  B.  Mfg.  Co. 

77  Fed.  663    351 

Pierce    v.   Arnold   Print   Works, 

182  Mass.   260    12 

v.  Engelkemier,      10      Okla. 

308 361 

v.  Pierce,  17  Ind.  App.  107 

489 

v.  S.    53    Ga.    365    219 

v.  S.   13  N.  H.  536 165 

v.  S.   17  Tex.  App.  239....   765 
v.  Walters,  164  111.  561 

123,  363 

Pierpont   Mfg.    Co.    v.   Goodman 
Produce     Co.      (Tex.     Cv. 
App.)    60   S.   W.    347....   200 
Pierson  v.  Duncan,   162  Pa.  St. 

239 355 

v.  S.    12  Ala.   149    359 

Pike  v.  Stutton,  21  Colo.  84 358 

Pinkerton  v.  Verberg,   78  Mich. 

580   503 

Pioneer    Fire    Proof    C.    Co.    v. 

Hansen,   176  111.    100 144 

Pipkin  v.  Home  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

68   S.  W.   100    243 

Pitcairn   v.   Philip   Hiss   Co.    (C. 

C.   A.)    125   Fed.    110....    156 
Pitman    v.    Manran,    69    N.    H. 

230   347 

Pitstick  v.  Osterman,  107  Iowa, 

189   94 

Pittman    v.    Gaty,    10    111.    186, 

190 362 

v.  Weeks,   132  N.  Car.  81.      78 

Pitts  v.  Pitts,  21  Ind.  314 450 

v.  S.   114  Ga.   35    228 

Pittsbnrg,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Banfill, 

206  111.  556   66 

v.  Callaghan,  157  111.  406 

115,   133,   308 

v.  Hewitt,  202  111.   28    25 

v.  Kinnare,  203  111.  388.. 53,  90 
v.  Krouse,  30  Ohio  St.  240 

60 


Pittsburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin, 

82   Ind.   482 641 

v.  Montgomery,  152  Ind.  1.    614 

v.  Noel,  77  Ind.  116   631 

v.  Noftsger,   148  Ind.   101 

247,    248 
v.  Parish,  28  Ind.  App.  189 

109 
v.  Slusser,  19  Ohio  St.  161 

48,    81 
v.  Spencer,  85  Ind.  169 

392,    652 

v.  Swinney,  52  Ind.  117  ..  683 
v.  Thompson,  82  Fed.  720.  351 
v.  Thompson,  56  111.  138..  538 
v.Williams,  74  Ind.  464..  538 
Pittsburg  Bridge  Co.  v.  Walker, 

170  111.  550   76 

Pittsburg   Coal   Co.    v.   Estieve- 

nard,  53  Ohio  St.  43   48 

Pittsburg   Spring   Co.   v.   Smith, 

115  Ga.   764    96 

Plake  v.  S.   121  Ind.  433.. 329,  331 
Piano  Mfg.  Co.  v.  McCord  (Iowa) 

80  N.  W.  659    .'. 358 

Platt  &  S.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 

R.  Co.   74   Iowa,   127....    161 
Platz   v.   McKean   Tp.    178   Pa. 

St.  601    122,   133,  209 

Plumb  v.  Campbell,  129  111.  109 

80 

v.  Curtis,  66  Conn.  154 116 

v.  Rigdon,  78  111.   222    80 

Plummer  v.  S.  Ill  Ga.  839.218,221 
v.  S.   135  Ind.   308 

260,  262,  305 
Poertner   v.    Poertner,    66    Wis. 

644 200 

Polanka  v.  S.   33  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

634 303 

Pollard  v.  S.  53  Miss.  421   324 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   73  S. 

W.  953    258,  272 

Polly  v.  Com.  16  Ky.  L.  R.  203 

101,  113 
Polvkrans  v.  Kransy,  77  N.  Y.  S. 

46 90,  347 

Pomerene   Co.   v.   White    (Neb.) 

69  N.  W.  234   652 

Ponder  v.  S.   115  Ga.  831 303 

Pool  v.  White,  175  Pa.  St.  459 

171,  189 
Poole  v.  Consolidated  St.  R.  Co. 

100  Mich.  379    101 

Pope    v.    Branch     County     Sav. 

Bank,  23  Ind.  App.  210..       7 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CX111 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Pope  v.  Pope,  95  Ga.  87 235 

v.  Riggs  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   43 

S.  W.  306   101 

Poppell  v.  S.   71   Ga.  276 228 

Poppitz  v.  German  Ins.  Co.   88 

Minn.  118 146 

Porath  v.  S.  90  Wis.  537 6 

Portance  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co. 

101   Wis.   574    124 

Porter  v.  Knight,  63  Iowa,  365.      53 

v.  P.   158   111.  370    235 

v.  White,   128  N.  Car.  42..      94 
Porterfield  v.  Com.  91   Va.  801 

265,  266 

Portis  v.  S.  27  Ark.  360   846 

Post  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

14    Neb.    112     574 

v.  Supervisors,     105    U.    S. 

667 161 

Postal  T.  C.  Co.  v.  Hulsey,   115 

Ala.   193 350,  351 

v.  Jones,  133  Ala.  217   ....    113 
Poston  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   35 

S.  W.  656   304 

Poteet  v..S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   43 

S.   W.   399    239 

Potter  v.  S.   117  Ala.  693 170 

v.  S.    162    Ind.   213... 806 

v.  S.   85   Tenn.   88    3 

Potterfield  v.  Com.  91  Va.  801 

812,  816 
Pound  v.  Pound,  60  Minn.  214.    129 

Powell  v.  S.   19   Ala.   581.. 257 

v.  S.  95  Ga.  502    295,  297 

v.  S.  101  Ga.  9   220,  367 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   44  S. 

W.  504 292 

Power  v.  Harlow,  57  Mich.   107 

286 

Powers  v.  Gary,  64  Me.  9 160 

v.  Com.  22  Ky.  L.  R.   1807 

40,    105 
v.  Hazelton,  &c.  Co.  33  Ohio 

St.  438 4,  351 

v.  S.  87  Ind.  154   794 

v.  S.  74  Miss.  777 

317,  340,  341,  343 
Prairie    State    L.    &    T.    Co.    v. 

Doig,  70  111.  52   192 

Prall  v.  Underwood,  79  III.  App. 

452 384 

Prater  v.  S.  107  Ala.  26   219 

v.  Snead,  12  Kas.  447   13 

Prather  v.  Wilkins,  68  Tex.  187 

200 


Pratt  v.  S.  56  Ind.  179 209 

Preisker  v.  P.  47  111.  382 95 

Preistly  v.  Provident  !Sav.  Co. 

117  Fed.  271 126 

Prendergast  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  358  290 

Prentice  Co.  v.  Page,  164  Mass. 

276 80 

Prentit  v.  P.  5  Neb.  377 378 

President,  &c.  of  B.  &c.  Tpk.  Co. 
v.  S.  71  Md.  576 

481,  483,  650 

Presser  v.  S.  77  Ind.  274.. 256,  260 
Preston  v.  Bowers,   13  Ohio  St. 

14 35 

v.  Dunham,  52  Ala.  217...      27 
v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  252.    115 
Prewett  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

262 93,  229,  269 

Price  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N. 

R.  Co.  42  Iowa,  16 354 

v.  Grautz,   118  Pa.  St.  406 

679,   680 

v.  Hallett,   138   Mo.   561...    347 
v.  Hamscher,    174    Pa.    St. 

73  .  .      189 

v.  S.   107  Ala.   161    28 

v.  S.    114  Ga.   855 213,   311 

v.  Vanstone.    40    Mo.    App. 

207   352 

v.  Wood,  9  N.  MQX.  397...      84 
Priel  v.  S.  (Neb.)   91  N.  W.  536 

7 
Prim  v.  Haren,  27  Mo.  205.  .  .  .    159 

v.  S.  73  Miss.  838 115 

Prince  v.  S.  100  Ala.   \44 328 

Prindeville  v.  P.   42  111    217.'..       18 

Prior  v.  White,   12  111.  260....      84 

Pritchard  v.  Budd,  76  Fed.  710.    358 

v.  Hopkins,   52   Iowa,    122.    384 

Pritchett  v.  Johnson   (Xeb.'*    97 

N.  W.  224 245 

v.  Munroe,  22  Ala.  501 117 

v.  S.   92  Ga.   65    90 

Probst  Consolidation   Co.   v.   Fo- 

ley,  166  111.  31 127 

Proctor   v.    S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.) 

35  S.  W.  172  108 

v.  Spratley.  78  Va.  257 

407,  413 

Producers'  Marble  Co.  v.  Bergen 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   31  S.  W. 

89 26,  351 

Prosser  v.  Pretzel,   8  Kas.  App. 

856 20 


CX1V 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Protection   Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dill, 

91  111.  174   113,  117 

Prothero  v.  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co. 

134  Ind.  435   ..116,  577,  629 
Providence,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ad- 

ler,  65  Md.   163 425 

Providence  G.  M.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son  (Ariz.)    60  Pac.  874.    117 
Provident  S.  L.  A.  Soc.  v.  Ber- 

ger,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  2460..      84 
Provines  v.  Heaston,  67  Ind.  482 

4 

Provo  v.  S.  55  Ala.  222 325 

Pryor  v.  Coggin,    17  Ga.  444..        3 

Puett  v.  Beard,  86  Ind.  108 360 

Puff  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  24  N. 

Y.  S.   1068 25 

Pugh  v.  S.  114  Ga.  16 273 

Punk  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    48 

S.  W.   171    115,  323 

Purcell  v.  Tibbies,  101  Iowa,  24 

111 
Purdom  v.  Brussells,  22  Ky.  L. 

R.  1796  .  .  '.   100 

Purdy  v.  P.   140  111.  46 

215,  372,  793 
Purnell    v.   Raleigh,   &c.   R.    Co. 

122  N.  Car.  839   635 

Purvis  v.  S.  71  Miss.  706 304 

Puth    v.    Zinbleman,    99    Iowa, 

641 Ill 

Putnam  v.  Bond,  100  Mass.  58 

160 

v.  Wadley,  40  111.  346. .871,  872 
Pyle  v.  Pyle,   158  111.   300.. 25,   113 


Q 


Quaife   v.   Chicago   &   N.   W.   R. 

Co.  48  Wis.  516   566 

Qualey    v.    Johnson,    80    Minn. 

"408 84,  99 

Queen    City    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Bla- 

lack   (Miss.)    18  So.   800.    363 
Queen  Ins.  Co.  v.  Leonard,  9  Ohio 

C.  C.  46 94,  351 

Oueenan  v.  Ter.  11  Okla.  261..    748 
Quinn     v.    Eagleston.     108     Til. 

248 87,  136 

v.  P.  123  111.  342 

84,  95,  119,  196 

v.  S.  130  Ind.  340   39 

Quirk  v.   St.   L.  N.  E.  Co.    126 

Mo.  279  .  .   ..7,  12,  242,  363 


Rabe  v.  Summerbeck,  94  Iowa, 

659     

Race  v.  American  F.  S.  &  M.  Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   43  S.  W. 

36 

Rack  v.  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.   173 

111.  289 

Rafferty  v.  P.  72  111.  46 36, 

Ragan  v.  Kansas  City   S.  &  E. 

R.  Co.   144  Mo.   623 

Ragland  v.  S.  Ill  Ga.  211 

v.  S.  125  Ala.  534 

20,  68,  254, 
Ragsdale  v.  Ezell,  18  Ky.  L.  R. 

146 

v.  S.   134  Ala.   24 273, 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Depew,  40  Ohio 

St.   124 

v.  Schneider,    45     Ohio    St. 

688 

v.  Shultz,   43   Ohio  St.   273 

v.  Walrath,     38     Ohio     St. 

462    ,  .... 

Rainger     v.      Boston     M.     Life 

Asso.    167   Mass.    109 

Rains   v.   S.    Io2   Ind.   69 

v.  S.   88   Ala.   91 

Raker  v.   S.    50   Neb.    202 

Ramirez  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

65    S.   W.    1101 

v.  S.   43  Tex.  Cr.  App.   455 

Ramsey     v.     Burns,     27     Mont. 

154 57.    60, 

Randall    v.    Baltimore    &    O.    R. 

Co.   109   U.  S.   478.. 124, 
Randalp    v.    Lampkin,    90    Ky. 

551    

Rankin    v.     Sharpies,    206     111. 

309    

Ranney   v.    Barlow,    112    U.    S. 

207    

Ransbottom  v.   S.    144   Ind.  250 

Ransom  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 
7  S.  W.  960 

Ranson  v.  Weston,  110  Mich. 
240  

Rapid  Tr.  R.  Co.  v.  Lusk  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.)  66  S.  W.  799 

Rapp  v.  Kester,  125  Ind.  79 

94, 


541 


122 
223 

196 
251 

269 

203 
351 

627 
627 

27 
539 

124 
252 
304 
248 

21 
314 
379 
126 
187 

48 
116 

15 
269 
358 

198 
361 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXV 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Rastetter  v.  Reynolds,   160  Ind. 

141, 351 

v.   S.    160   Ind.    133 351 

Ratchford    v.    Com.    16    Ky.    L. 

R.    411    270 

Ratcliff  v.  Bellfonte  Iron 

Works  Co.   87   Ky.   564..    868 
Rath  v.  Rath   (Neb.)    89  N.  W. 

612   57 

Rathbun  v.  Geer,  64  Conn.  421 

163 
Ratliff  v.  Ratliff    (N.  Car.)    42 

S.    E.    887 144 

Rattlemiller  v.  Stone,  28  Wash. 

104    172 

Ranch  v.   State,   110   Ind.   384.        3 
Rawlins   v.   S.    40    Fla.    155...         6 

Rawls  v.  S.  97   Ga.    186 171 

Ray  v.  Goings,   112  111.   662...    504 
v.  Loner,    132    N.   Car.    891 

119 

v.  S.    108   Tenn,   282 25 

v.   Wooters,    19    111.    82 4 

Rayburn  v.   S.    (Ark.)    63   S.  W. 

356 311,   312 

Rea  v.  S.   8  Lea    (Tenn.)    363.    306 
Reading   Braid   Co.   v.    Stewart, 

43  N.  Y.  S.   1129 139 

Reagan  v.  U.  S.  157  U.  S.  310 

227 
Reardon  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 

114    Mo.    384 248 

Reber  v.   Herring,    115   Pa.   St. 

599    113 

Receivers    of    M.    K.    &    T.    R. 

Co.   v.    Pfluger    (Tex.   Cv. 

App.)    25   S.  W.   792....        6 
Record  v.   Chickasaw  Cooperage 

Co.    103    Tenn.    657...!.      25 
Red   v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.)    53 

S.    W.     108 304 

v.  S.  3P  Tex.  Cr.  App.  414 

265 
Reddick  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  App.) 

47    S.    W.    993 272 

Redding  v.   Redding  Estate,   69 

Vt.   500 80 

Redelsheimer     v.     Miller,      107 

Ind.    485    234 

Redford  v.   Spokane  St.   R.   Co. 

9    Wash.    55 234 

Redhing   v.    Central    R.   Co.    68 

N.   J.   L.    641 238 

Redman   v.   Voss.    46   Neb.    512.353 
Reed  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  124 

Mass.    567    39 


Reed  v.  Commonwealth,  98  Va. 

817 48    94,    269,    281 

v.Gould,    93    Mich.    359..      90 
v.  Inhabitants,   8   Allen 

(Mass.)    524 124,    12fi 

v.  Madison,   85   Wis.   667..    232 

v.  S.    76    Miss.    211    276 

v.  S.   (Neb.)    92  N.  W.  321 

40 
Reeder     v.     Dupuy,     96     Iowa, 

729    126 

Reed's  Estate,  In  re,   86  Minn. 

163    244 

Reese  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    68 

S.   W.   283. ...103,    191,    818 

Reeves  v.   S.    29   Fla.   527 336 

v.   S.   34   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

483    49 

Reg.  v.  Farler,   8  C.  &  P.    106.    288 
v.  Layton,    4    Cox   Cr.   Cas. 

155V   331 

Reiber    v.     Butler,    &c.    R.    Co 

201    Pa.    St.    49 685 

Reichenbach    v.    Ruddach,     127 

Pa.    564   211 

Reichsletter     v.     Bostick      (Tex. 
Cv.  App.)    33   S.  W.   158 

7 

Reid  v.  S.  ifQ  Ga.   556 336 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cv.    App.)     57 

S.  W.   662 20 

Reighard   v.    S.    22    Ohio   C.    C. 

340    271 

Reilly  v.  Atlas  I.  C.  Co.  38  N. 

Y.   S.    485 141 

v.  Conway,    121    Mich.   682 

25 
v.  Third   Ave  R.  Co.   35  N. 

Y.   S.    1030 48 

Reinback    v.    Crabtree,    77    111. 

182 418 

Reins  v.   P.    30  HI.  257 

198,    201,   796 
Reiser  v.   Southern  P.  M.  &  L. 

Co.  24  Ky.  796 534 

Reliance    T.    &    D.    Works     v. 
Martin,     23     Ky.     L.     R. 

1625   196 

Remey    v.    Olds    (Cal.)    34    Pac. 

216   116,    118 

Remner  v.   S.  43   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

347 '. 191 

Remsen  v.  P.  57   Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

324    340 

Renand    v.    City   of    Bay    City, 

124    Mich.    29 '.  .    170 


CXV1 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Renard  v.  Grande,  29  Ind.  App. 

579   107,   386 

Reno  v.  Wilson,   49   111.   95 155 

Rensens  v.  Lawson,  91  Va.  230 

866 
Republican    &   R.    Co.    v.    Fink, 

18    Neb.   89 101 

Resmer  v.  Thornbury,  111   Iowa, 

515    40 

Rettig  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Tr.  Co.   26 

N.  Y.    S.    896 192 

Reusens  v.  Lawson,  91  Va.  237 

665 

v.  Lawson,   96  Va.  285 86 

Rex  v.  Wilkes,  7   C.  &  P.  272.    288 
Reynolds  v.  Com.  24  Ky.  L.  R. 

1742    113 

v.  Davison,   34   Md.    666...    391 
v.  Greenbaum,    80    111.   416 

218 
v.  Pierson,     29     Ind.     App. 

273  25 

v.  Richards,      14      Pa.      St. 

205    159 

v.  Richmond   &    M.    R.    Co. 

92    Va.    41     550 

v.  S.    68    Ala.    507 347 

v.  S.   147  Ind.  3 

169,    191,   274,   295,  307,   310 
v.  Weiman    ( Tex.   Cv.  App. ) 

40   S.  W.  560 7 

Rhea  v.  S.   63  Neb.  461 80 

v.  U.  S.   6  Okla.  249.. 226,   349 
Rheimfeldt  v.   Dahlman,    43   N. 

Y.   S.   28 351 

Rhoades  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R. 
Co.    (W.    Va.)    55    L.    R. 

A.    175    101 

Rhodes   v.    Chesapeake  &  0.  R. 

Co.  49  W.  Va.  494 404 

v.  U.   S.    79  Fed.    704 205 

Rhyner  v.  City  of  Menasha,  107 

Wis.   201    232 

Rice  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  40 

la.  639 591,  596 

Rice  &    Sullen    Matting   Co.   v. 
International    Bank,    185 

111.   422   182 

v.  Manford,    110   Ind.   596.    234 

v.  P.    38    111.    436 80 

v.  Williams       (Colo     App.) 

71    Pac.    433    350 

Rich   v.   City    of    Chicago,    152 

111.   30    235 

v.  Lappin,   43   Kas.    666...        5 


Rich  &   B.  Malting   Co.    v.   In- 
ternational   Bank,  185  111. 

422   133 

Richards   v.  Louisville   &   N.   R. 

Co.  20   Ky.  L.  R.   1478..    133 
v.  S.    (Ga.)   27  S.  E.  726..   303 

v.  S.  55   Ind.   383 870 

Richardson     v.     Coleman,      131 

Ind.    210 186,    187 

v.  Dybedall     (S.    Dak.)     98 

N.    W.     164 195 

v.  Eureka,    96    Cal.    443...    360 
v.  Halstead,   44    Neb.    606.    247 
Richelieu    Hotel    Co.    v.     Inter- 
national   M.    E.    Co.    140 

111.    267   202 

Richison    v.   Mead,    11    S.   Dak. 

639    94 

Richlands    Iron    Co.    v.    Elkins, 

90    Va.    249 34 

Richmond    v.    Roberts,    98     111. 

472   25,    182 

Richmond,   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Bur- 
nett,  88  Va.   540 616 

v.  Greenwood,   99    Ala.   501 

198 

Richmond  P.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Allen 
(Va.)    43  S.  E.  356 

86,    544,   562 

Richmond  Tr.  Co.  v.  Wilkinson 
(Va.)    43  S.   E.   623 

26,   194,  198,   536,  559 
Rickards   v.    Bennis     (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    78   S.   W.   240....    126 
Rickert  v.  Southern  R.  Co.   123 

N.    Car.    255 134 

Ricketts    v.    Harvey,     106    Ind. 

564    27 

Riddle    v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

46  S.  W.  1058 269 

v.  Webb,   110  Ala.   599 

66,    68 
Rider  v.    P.    110    111.    11 

218,  226,  372 
Riedle    v.    Mulhausen,    20    111. 

App.    72    517 

Riepe  v.   Elting,   89  Iowa,  82..      21 
Riley  v.   Allen,   L54   Ind.    176 

357,    360 
v.  Salt  Lake  R.  T.   Co.    10 

Utah,    428    65 

v.   Watson,    18   Ind.    291...    153 
Rindskopf    v.    Myers,    87    Wis. 

80    50 

Rinear    v.    Skinner,     20    Wash. 

541    .  .    131 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXV11 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Rios  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    48 

S.  W.   505 304 

Ilipley    v.    Second    Ave.    R.    Co. 

8   Misc.    (N.  Y.)    449 222 

Riptoe   v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.   App.) 

42    S.    W.   381 272 

Riser    v.     Southern    R.     Co.     (S. 

Car.)    46   S.   E.  51..  192,    197 
Rishell    v.   Weil,    63    N.    Y.    S. 

178 94 

Rising  v.  Nash,   48  Neb.   597..    113 

Ritchey  v.  P.  23   Colo.   314 349 

Ritter    v.   Ewing,    174    Pa.    St. 

341    282 

Y.  P.    130    111.   255 793 

v.  S.    70    Ark.   472 240 

Ritz    v.    City    of    Wheeling,    45 

W.   Va.    262 126 

Ritzenger  v.  Hart,  43  Mo.  App. 

183  352 

Ritzman   v.   P.    110    111.    362 

71,    243 
Rivard    v.    Rivard,     109    Mich. 

98    211 

River    Boom    Co.    v.    Smitih 

(Wash.)    45    Pac.    750...   243 
Riviere    v.    McCormick,    14    La. 

Ann.    139    170 

v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.)     40    S. 

W.   1074   28 

Roach  v.  P.  77  111.  29 80,  256 

Roanok     Grocery,     &c.     Co.     v. 
Watkins,   41   W.  Va.   793 

416 
Roark  v.   S.   105  Ga.   736 

6,   109,    198,  265 
Robbins  v.   Brockton   St.  R.   Co. 

180    Mass.   51 358 

v.  P.    95    111.    178 308 

v.  S.    8   Ohio   St.    167 

165,    167,    711 
v.  Spencer,   121   Ind.   594 

156,    159,    164 
Robelson     v.     Brown,     56    Neb. 

390    106 

Roberts    v.    Johnson,    58    N.   Y. 

613    211 

v.  Mansfield,    32  Ga.   228..    196 

v.  Neal,    62   Ga.    163 154 

v.  Port  Blakely,  &c.  Co.  30 

Wash.   25    304 

v.  S.    83    Ga.    369 305 

v.  S.    110    Ga.    253 314 

v.  S.    114  Ga.    450 75.   250 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     70 
S.  W.   423 304 


Robertson  v.   Burton,   88  Minn. 

151    101 

v.   Illinois      Cent.,     R.      Co. 

(Miss.)     17    So.    235 134 

v.  Parks,   76   Md.    125 

514,  516,  520 

v.  S.  40   Fla.   509 109 

Robey  v.  S.  94  Md.  61 120 

Robinson    v.   Brewster,    140   111. 

649   25 

v.  Hyer,  35  Fla.  544 -.    243 

v.  Love,  50  W.  Va.   75 113 

v.  Mcllver   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

23    S.   W.    915 6 

v.  P.    159    111.    119 317,   318 

v.  S.    82    Ga.   535 32 

v.  S.    84   Ga.   674 269 

v.  S.     114    Ga.    56 305 

v.  S.    (Miss.)    16  So.  201..    198 
v.  S.  35   Tex.  Cr.  App.  54.    290 

v.  Uhl,   6  Neb.   332 406 

v.  Walton,    58    Mo.    380...    332 
Roche     v.     Baldwin,     135     Cal. 

522    192 

Rockford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 

v.  Coultas,  67  111.  403...    367 
Rockford  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nelson,   65 

111.    415 20,    94 

Rock  I.    &c.    R.    Co.  v.  Gordon, 

184    111.   456... f 80 

v.  Leisy  Brew.  Co.   174  111. 

549.. 70,   105,   238,   683,   686 
v.  Pohlman,  210   111.    139 

116,   192 
Rockwood  v.  Poundstone,  38  111. 

200 204 

Roddy    v.    Harrell      (Tex.     Cv. 

App.)    40   S.  W.   1064...      94 
Roden    v.    Chicago   &    G.   T.    R. 

Co.    133    111.    72 126 

Rodgers  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

563    304 

Roe     v.     Batchelder,     41     Wis. 

360    200 

v.  Taylor,  45  111.  485.. 19,  158 
v.  Winston,  86  Minn.  77..  234 
Rogers  v.  Black.  99  Ga.  139..  26 
v.  Brightman,  10  Wis.  55.  32 
v.  Brooks,  105  Ala.  549...  129 
v.  Com.  16  Ky.  L.  R.  199.  279 
v.  Kansas  C.  &  O.  R.  Co. 

52   Neb.    86 141 

v.  Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co. 

17  Ky.  L.  R.   1421 129 

v.  Manhattan.   &c.    Ins.    Co. 
138  Cal.  285. .119,   192,   195 


CXV111 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Rogers  v.  S.  1 1 7  Ala.  0 

25,   68,  296,    336,   723 
v.  S.    (Miss.)    21   So.    130 

240,    284 
Rolfe  v.  Rich,    149   111.   436 

27,    200 

Rolling    Mill    Co.    v.    Corrigan, 
46   Ohio   St.  294 

6,    7,  534,   536 
v.  Morrissey,    111    111.    650 

106 
Romberg    v.    Hedi'ger,    47    Neb. 

201    347 

Rome  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  101 

Ga.    26    90 

Romine  v.   San  Antonio  Tr.   Co. 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.)     77    S. 

W.    35    

Rommeny  v.  City  of  New  York, 

63   N.  Y.   S.   186 

Ronlo    v.    Valcour,    58    N.    H. 

346   

Ronnsaville  v.   Walters,    94   Ga. 

707    

Rooks  v.  S.   (Ga.)  46  S.  E.  631 


80 
102 
161 

25 

80 
Roos  v.  Lewyn,  5  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

593   109 

Roose  v.  Roose,  145  Ind.   162..    346 

Root  v.   Boston  E.   R.  Co.    183 

Mass.    418    14 

v.  Village    of    M.    16    Ohio 

C.    C.    457 14 

Rose  v.   Bradley.  91    Wis.    619.    243 

v.  Otis,   18'Colo.  59 220 

Rosenbaum  Bros.  v.  Levitt,   109 

Iowa,   292   6 

Rosenblatt  v.    Haymam,    56   N. 

Y.    S.    378 94 

Rosenfield    v.    Rosenthal     (Tex. 

Cv.  App.)    39  S.  W.   193 

351 
Rosenheimer  v.    Standard    Gas— 

light    Co.    53    N.    Y.    S. 

192 238 

Rosenkrans  v.   Barker,   115  111. 

336 80 

Rosevear  v.    Borough,    &e.    169 

Pa.    St.    555 189 

Rosin  v.  U.  S.  161  U.  S.  29....  279 

Ross  v.  S.   59  Ga.   249 208 

v.  S.    29   Tex.   499 170 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     43 

S.    W.    1004 112 

v.  Thompson,    78    Ind.    97..  858 


Rotan    Grocery    Co.    v.    Martin 

(Tex.    Cv.    App.)    57    S. 

W.    706    94 

Roth  v.  Eppy,   80   111.  283 74 

Rountree  v.  Gurr,  68   Ga.  292.      46 
v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     55 

S.   W.    827 326 

v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     58 

S.  W.   106 303,   304 

Rouse  v.  Harry,   55  Kas.   589..  236 
,      v.  Printers'  E.  Co.  33  N.  Y. 

S.    55   124 

Roush   v.   Roush,    154,   Ind.   562 

25 

Rowe  v.  U.  S.   97   Fed.  779 340 

Rowell  v.   Fuller,  59  Vt.   688..    171 
Rowen   v.   Sommers    (Iowa)    66 

N.    W.    897 353 

Rowland    v.    Apothecaries'    Hall 

Co.   47   Conn.    387 388 

Roy  v.  Goings,   112  111.  667 

3,'  367,    506 

Ruby  C.  M.  &  M.   Co.  v.  Pren- 
tice,   25   Colo.    4 350,    351 

Ruck  v.  Chicago  C.  R.   Co.   173 

111.    291    126 

Rucker  v.  S.   1 14  Ga.   1 3 49 

v.  S.    (Miss.)    18   So.    121 

217,    296 
v.  S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     40 

S.    W.    991 88 

Rudy  v.  Com.  128  Pa.  St.  500.    299 

Ruff  v.  Jarrett,  94  111.  480 250 

Rule  v.  Bolles,  27  Ore.  368....      77 
Rumbold  v.   Royal  League,   206 

111.    517 65,    250 

v.  Supreme       Council,       &c. 

(111.)    69  N.  E.   590 68 

Runnells  v.  Village   of   P.    109 

Mich.   512   358 

Runnill  v.  Art,    169  Mass.  341 

319 
Runquist  v.   Anderson,    64   Neb. 

755  ' 353 

Ruschenberg  v.  Southern  El.  R. 

Co.    161    Mo.    86 629 

Russell    v.    Huntsville.    &c.    Co. 

137  Ala.  fi??.." 94 

v.  Nail,  79   Tex.    664 84 

Rutherford   v.    Southern    R.   Co. 

56  S.  Car.  446 

Rutledsre  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

33    S.    W.    347 

Ryall  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.  76 

Cal.  474 

Ryan  v.    Conroy,    33    N.   Y.    S. 

330   


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CX1X 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Ryan  v.  Donnelly,   71   111.   104.    243 
v.  Los   Angeles,    I.    &    C.    S. 

Co.    112   Cal.    244 172 

v.  Washington,    &c.    R.    Co. 

8  App.   Gas.    (D.   C.   542.    351 
Ryder    v.    Jacobs,    196    Pa.    St. 

386 198,  358 

v.  S.    100  Ga.   528 170,   211 

Rylee  v.  S.   75  Miss.  352 217 


S 


S.  v.   Abbott,    65    Kas.    139 

v.  Achey,   64  Ind.   59 

v.  Adair,    160    Mo.    394 

206.   215, 

v.  Addy,   28  S.  Car.   4 

v.  Adrion,      49      La.     Ann. 

1145    248, 

v.  Afray,    124    Mo.    393 

236, 

v.  Akin,   94  la.   50 

v.  Albright,  144  Mo.  638. 
v.  Alcom,  137  Mo.  121... 
v.  Alexander,  66  Mo.  148. 

v.  Allen,   45  W.  Va.  65 

v.  Anderson.  6  Idaho,  706. 
v.  Anderson,  30  La.  Ann. 

557    

v.  Anderson,  86  Mo.  309.. 
v.  Anderson,  126  Mo.  542. 
v.  Anderson,  10  Ore.  448 

277, 
v.  Andrews,    62    Kas.    207 

310,    314, 

v.  Angel,   29  1ST.  Car.   27... 

v.  Anslinger,   171   Mo.    600 

3, 

v.  Apple,   121    N.  Car.   584 

v.  Armstrong,  167  Mo.  257 

v.  Asbell,   57  Kas.   398 

v.  Asberry,     37     La.     Ann. 

125   

v.  Ashcraft.    170  Mo.  409 

25, 

v.  Atkins,  49  S.  Car.  481. 
v.  Aughtry,  49  S.  Car.  285 
198,  303,  305, 
v.  Austin,  109  Iowa,  118. 
v.  Austin,  129  N.  Car.  534 

v.    Avery   113  Mo.  475 

v.  Bailey,' 3  2   Kas.  83 


118 

777 

744 
69 

322 

274 

268 
269 
268 

39 
175 

65 

158 
253 
255 

284 

732 

197 

340* 
225 

304 
310 

170 

774 
191 

327 
170 

303 

303 

20 


S.  v.  Baker,    136  Mo.   74 

v.  Baker,    146  Mo.  379 

269, 
v.  Ballerio,  11  La.  Ann.  81 

v.  Banks,  48  Ind.  197..  .'. 
v.  Banks,  40  La.  Ann.  736 

v.  Banks,    73    Mo.    592 

v.  Bar  bee,  92  N.  Car.  820. 
v.  Barber,  1 1 3  N.  Car.  7  1 1 

v.  Barnes    (Utah)    69    Pac. 

70 

v.  Barrett,     132J    N.     Car. 

1005   

v.  Barry,   UN.  Dak.  428 

14,   170, 
v.  Bartlett   (Mo.)    71  S.  W. 

149    

v.  Bartlett,  43  N.  H.  224. 
v.  Bartley,  56  Neb.  810 

80, 
v.  Barton.    142   Mo.    450 

75, 

v.  Bauerle,  145  Mo.  1..25, 
v.  Bazile,  50  La.  Ann.  21.. 
v.  Beasley,  8 1  Iowa,  8  3  ... 
v.  Beatty,  51  W.  Va.  232. 

v.  Beck,   46   La.   1419 

v.  Benner,   64    Me.   267 

v.  Bennett,      8      Ind.      App. 

679    

v.  Betsall,   11    W.   Va.   704 

v.  Birchard,  35  Ore.  484.. 
v.  Birmingham,  74  Iowa, 

407    

v.  Black,    143   Mo.   166 

v.  Bland.  97  N.  Car.  441. 
v.  Bliss.  27  Wash.  463... 

v.  Blue,    136   Mo.   41 

v.  Blunt,    59    Iowa,   468 

325, 
v.  Bohan.    19  Kas.    35 

203,    214, 
v.  Bone.    114   Iowa,  537 

75, 
v.  Bonner    (Mo.)    77  S.  W. 

463  •. 
v.  Booker,  123  N.  Car.  713 

v.  Booth  (Iowa)  88  N.  W. 

344 

v.  Bowker,  26  Ore.  309 

112. 
v.  Bowser,  21  Mont.  133... 


294 
270 

169 
174 

218 
267 
279 

288 

25 

269 

335 

150 
331 

357 

268 

277 

212 

322 

12 

75 

170 

8 

288 
367 

11 
2"55 

787 
266 
294 

327 

215 

196 

192 

25 

43 

198 
25 


cxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


S.  v.  Brady,  100  Iowa.  191 

101,  265,  729,   730, 

v.  Brady,  44  Kas.  436 

v.  Brady,    107  N.  Car.  822 

v.  Branton,    33   Ore.   533.. 
v.  Brennan,    164  Mo.   487 
25, 

v.  Bridges,  29  Kas.  139 

v.  Broadwell,   73   Iowa,  765 

v.  Bronstine,    147   Mo.   520 

v.  Brown,    64   Mo.    367 

v.   Brown,    145   Mo.    680 

244, 

v.  Brown,   168  Mo.   449 

v.  Brown,  76  N.  Car.  225. 
v.  Brown  119  N.  Car.  789 

v.  Brown,  28  Ore.  147.... 
v.  Bruce,  48  Iowa,  534 

330, 

v.  Bryan,    134  Mo.  246 

v.  Bryant,  55  Mo.  75.... 
v.  Bryant,  134  Mo.  246 

216,    265, 
v.  Buckley,   40  Conn.   246 

166, 
v.  Bungardner,        7        Baxt. 

(Tenn.)    163    

v.  Buralli    (Nev.)    71    Pac. 

532 113, 

v.  Burke,  30  Iowa,  333.. 
v.  Burlingame,  146  Mo. 

207 

v.  Burns     (Nev.)      74    Pac. 

984 27, 

v.  Burns,    19    Wash.    52... 

v.    Burpee,    65    Vt.    1 

'  v.  Burton,     (Ala.)     22    So. 

585 

v.  Burton,    27   Wash.    528 

49,  215. 
v.  Butler,    47  S.  Car.    25.  . 

v.   Butterfield,    75   Mo.   301 

808. 

v.  Byers,    80    N.    Car.    426 

v.  Byers,    100    N.    Car.    512 

v.  Byrd,  52  S.  Car.  480.. 
v.  Cain,  20  W.  Va,  710.. 
v.  Calder,  23  Mont.  504 

269. 
v.   Callaway,   154  Mo.  91.. 


S.  v. 

816 

495 

v. 

170 

V. 

25 

V. 

316 

362 

V. 

361 

V. 

269 

V. 

219 

V. 

270 

V. 

264 

222 

V. 

V. 

150 

V. 

173 

V. 

752 

322 

V. 

270 

V. 

326 

V. 

167 

V. 

V. 

13 

V. 

796 

V. 

25 

V. 

V. 

290 

V. 

176 

.   v. 

165 

V. 

V. 

218 

V. 

744 

70 

V. 

V. 

813 

V. 

328 

V. 

1 

V, 

225 

V. 

255 

V. 

799 

V. 

304 

V. 

80 

Campbell,   7   N.   Dak.   58 

Cancienne,    50    La.    Ann. 

847 6, 

Cannon,  49   S.  Car.   550 

Cannon,  52  S.  Car.  452 
Canty,  41  La.  Ann.  587 

Carey,    15    Wash.    549 

214, 
Canagy,  106  Iowa,  483 

Carr,  25  La.  Ann.  408.  . 
Carson,  115  N.  Car.  743 

Carter,  100  Iowa,  501.. 
Carter,  1 1  2  Iowa,  1 5  ... 
Carter  (Wash.)  45  Pac. 

745 

Case,  96  Iowa,  264 

227, 

Case,    99    Iowa,    743 

Castle,   133  N.  Car.  769 

Caymo,     108      La.    Ann. 

218 

Chandler,  31  Kas.  201.  . 

Chee  Gong,    16  Ore,  538 

322,  325, 

Chevallier,    36    La.   Ann. 

85 

Chick    (Mo.)     48    S.    W. 

829 

Chiles,  58  S.  Car.  47.. 
Clancy,  20  Mont.  498.. 
Clark,  102  Iowa,  685.. 

Clark,    147    Mo.     20 

Clark,  37  Vt.   371 

Clark,    51    W.    Va.    457 

25 

Clevenger,    156   Mo.    190 

Coates,  22  Wash.  601.. 
Cobhs,  4  W.  Va.  7 1 8 ... 
Cochran,  147  Mo.  504 

240, 

Cocoran.  7  Idaho,  220.. 
Cohen,  108  Iowa.  208.  . 
Cole.  2  Pen.  (Del.)  344.. 
Collins,  20  Iowa,  85 

261, 
Collins,  47  La.  Ann.  578 


354 

258 

171 

26 

48 

261 

229 

229 

306 

45 

170 

256 

294 
25 

256 


Collins.  118  N.  Car.  1203 


.26 

38 

328 

12 

223 

6 

723 
240 

8 
347 

91 

331 

288 
274 

256 

71 

312 

331 

328 
191 
225 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXX1 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


S.  v.  Collins,   121   N.  Car.  GG7. 


112 


v.  Collins    (R.   I.)    52   Atl. 

990 131 

v.  Colter,    15  Kas.   302 4 

v.  Conley,  130  N.  Car.  683 

776 
v.  Conway,    55     Kas.     333 

324,   326 
v.  Conway,    56  Kas.   682..    322 

v.  Cooper,  45   Mo.   66 13 

v.  Costner    (N.  Car.)    37   S. 

E.    326    151 

v.  Cottrill,   52  W.  Va.  36^3 

45,   238 

v.  Cough,  111  Iowa,  714..  153 
v.  Couper,  32  Ore.  212..  150 
v.  Cou'rtemarsh,  1 1  Wash. 

446 268 

v.  Courtright,    66    Ohio    St. 

37 201 

v.  Covington,    117    N.    Car. 

834 269 

v.  Coy,  119  N.  Car.  901..  276 
v.  Crabtree,  170  Mo.  642 

264,  312,  734 
v.  Craine,  120  N.  Car.  601 

255 

v.Crawford,  11  Kas.  32..  331 
v.  Crawford,  31  Wash.  260 

244 

v.  Crockett,  39  Ore.  76 294 

v.  Cross,    42    W.    Va.    253 

281 
v.  Crossley,    C9    Ind.   203..    199 

v.  Crotean,    23    Vt.    14 165 

v.  Crowell,  149  Mo.  391..  325 
v.  Crowner,  56  Mo.  149..  833 
v.  Culver  (Neb.)  97  N".  W. 

1017    .... 


v.  Cummings,  33  Conn.  260 


823 

815 
v.  Cunningham,    111    Iowa, 

233 267,    274 

v.  Currie,   8  N.  Dak.   545..      21 
v.  Curtis,      0    Mo.    594 316 

v.  Cushenberry,      157      Mo. 

168 ". 294,    297 

v.  Gushing,    17   Wash.    544 

25,  343 
iv.  Daley,    53    Vt.    442.,..   340 

v.Daly,    16    Ore.    240 170 

v.  Dana,    59   Vt.   614 288 

v.  Darrah,     152     Mo.     522 
834,   522,   716,   730,   737 
756,  825,  826,  827,  828,  829 


S.   v.    Darrough,    152    Mo.    522 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 


Davenport,    33    La.   Ann. 

231    

David,   131  Mo.  380 

55,    294,    297,    314, 
Davis,   109  N.   Car.   780 
31,    90, 

Davis,    27    S.    Car.    609 
105, 

Davis,  104  Tenn.  501.. 
Davis,  52  W.  Va.  224.  . 
Dawson,  124  Mo.  418.. 

Day,    79    Me.    120 

Day,    55    Vt.    570 

Dean.  49  Iowa,  74.  ... 
Debott,  104  Iowa,  105 


71 
35 

732 
331 

191 
255 

258 
288 
198 
317 
817 

65 

282 
13 

225 
20 

316 
169 

269 
273 

347 

764 

208 

297 
786 
191 
271 

269 

758 
Dolan,   17  Wash.  499 

268,  279,  282 
Donette  (Wash.)  71  Pac. 

556 6 

Donnelly,    130    Mo.    642 

288,   303,  304 
Donovan,    61    Iowa,    369 

173 
Dorland.    103   Iowa,    168 

170 
Dotson,    26     Mont.     305 

25.  216,  305,  307 


v.  Decklotts,   19  Iowa,   447 

v.  DeMosse,  98  Mo.  340... 
v.  Dennis,   1 9  La.  Ann.  119 

v.  Dent,    170   Mo.   1 

v.  Derrick,  44  S.  Car.    344 

191, 

v.  Desforges,    47    La.    Ann. 

1167 

v.  Desmond,    109    Iowa,    72 
268, 

v.  Dettmer,  124  Mo.  426.. 
v.  Dewitt,      152      Mo.      76 
4, 
v   De Wolfe  (Mont.)   77  Pac. 

1087 30,  219, 

v.   Dick,   60   N.  Car.    440.  . 

v.  Dickey,   48   W.    Va.   325 

165,    206, 

v.  Dickson,    6    Kas.    2 1 3  ... 

v.  Dill,   48   S.  Car.  249 

v.  Diller,    170   Mo.    1 

v.  Dixon,   131   N.  Car.    808 

v.  Dockstader,  42   Iowa,  436 


cxxn 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


S.  v.  Drumm,  156  Mo.  216 

196, 
v.  Duck,   35    La.  Ann.    764 

v.    Dudoussat,    47    La.    Ann. 

977 26,   35, 

v.  Duestrow,     137    Mo.    44 

v.  Duncan,    142   Mo.   456.. 
v.  Dunn,    116    Iowa,    219.. 

v.  Dunn,   1 8  Mo.  419 

v.   Earnest,    5  6    Kas.     31.. 
v.  Eastman,   60  Kas.  557.. 

v.  Easton,  138  Mo.  103 

v.  Edie,    147    Mo.    535 

v.  Edwards,     126     N.     Car. 

1051 173, 

v.  Elliott.    98   Mo.    150 

v.  Ellsworth,    30    Ore.    145 


v.  Elshain,    70    Iowa,    534 
298,  302,  303, 

v.  Estep,    44   Kas.    572 

v.  Evans,  9  Kas.  App.  889 

v.  Evans,  138  Mo.   116 

v.  Evans,    12    S.    Dak.    473 

v.  Ezzard,    40   S.   Car.   312 

v.  Fahey  (Del.)  54  Atl.  693 
713, 

v.  Faile,   43   S.  Car.   52 

v.  Fairlamb,    121    Mo.    137 

v.  Fannon.     158     Mo.     149 
31, 

v.  Feisher,   32  Ore.  254 

v.   Felter,   32    Iowa,    49.... 
v.  Fergeson,    162    Mo.    668 


v.  Fetterer,    65    Conn.    287 
v. 


Fin  ley,      118      N.      Car. 

1161      88, 

v.  Fisher,    23    Mont.    540.. 
v.  Fiske,        3     Conn.     392 
214. 
v.  Fitzgerald,     72     Vt.    142 

v.  Flanagan    (W.    Va.)     35 

S.  E.   862      

v.  Floyd,  15  Mo.  355 

v.  Flye,  26  Me.  3 12.. 329, 
v.  Fogerty,  105  Iowa.  32.. 
v.  Foley,  144  Mo.  600 


268 
339 
187 

269 

295 

65 

299 

282 

824 

25 

297 

272 
267 

272 

729 

267 

229 

85 

247 

86 

727 
251 

304 

296 
150 
329 

342 

172 

269 

4 

215 

247 

150 
19 

840 
25 

264 


S.  v.  Fontenot,  50  La.  Ann.  537 
v.  Forbes  (La.)  35  So.  710 

v.   Ford,    37    La.   Ann.    443 

166, 

v.  Foster,  130  N.  Car.  666 


Fox,    80    Iowa,    312 

Frahm,   73   Iowa,   355 

265, 
Fredericks,    136  Mo.   51. 

Fruge,    106   La.    694 

Fry,  67  Iowa,  475 

301,    322, 
Fulford,      124     N.     Car. 

798 

Furney,    4 1    Kas.    115.. 
Gadberry,     117    N.    Car. 

811 

Gallivan,    75    Conn.    326 
116, 

Gannon,   75   Conn.   206.. 

Garth,      164      Mo.      553 

56, 

Gartrell,    171    Mo..   489 

304, 

Garvin    (S.   Car.)    26    S. 

E.  570  

Gaston,    96    Iowa,    505.. 

Gates,  130  Mo.  351 

Gates  (Wash.)  69  Pac. 

385 

Gatlin,  170  Mo.  354 

Gay,  1 8  Mont.  51 

Geddis,  42  Iowa,  271 

111,  293, 
Gee,  85  Mo.  647 

740,  775, 
Geier,  111  Iowa,  70C.. 

Gibbons,    1 0    Iowa,    1 1  / 


v.  Glass,  5  Ore.  81.  .313. 
v.  Gleim,  17  Mont.  17 
294.  295,  299,  311.  312, 
v.  Glover,  27  S.  Car.  602.. 
v.  Godfrey,  60  S.  Car.  498 

v.  Goff.    62    Kas.    104.. 48, 

v.  Goforth,     136    Mo.     Ill 

178, 

v.  Gonce,   79   Mo.    602 

v.  Good,  132  Mo.  114.. 41, 
v.  Gorham,  67  Vt.  365 

187,  188.  196.  198, 
v.  Grant.  144  Mo.  56 


26 

15 
169 

75 

809 

812 

88 

268 

743 

3 

312 

251 

311 

49 

301 
342 

201 
111 
252 

84 
326 
180 

750 

776 
332 

174 
315 

317 
210 

48 
229 

240 
336 
297 

316 
268 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXX111 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


S    v    Grant    152  Mo    57  20 

S.  v. 

v.  Grebe,    17    Kas.   458  222 

v. 

v.  Green,  7   La.  Ann.  518..    170 

v. 

v.  Green,   117  N.  Car.   695 

151 

V. 

v.  Green,    48    S.    Car.    136 

178,    179 

V. 

v.    Greenburg,    59    Kas.    404 

376 

V. 

v.  Greer,   22   W.  Va.   801..    170 

v.  Gregory,   170  Mo.  598..      75 

V. 

v.  Grinstead,    62    Kas.    593 

V. 

199 

v.  Grugin,      147      Mo.      39 

*          V. 

°.        65,    769 

iv. 

v.   Gunter,  30  La.  Ann.  537 

V. 

316 

V. 

v.  Gurley,    170   Mo.   429...    271 

v.  Haerston,     121     N.    Car. 

V. 

579   14 

V. 

v.  Halm,   38   La.   Ann.    169 

170 

V. 

v.  Haines,    160    Mo.    555..      90 

v.  Hale,    156    Mo.    112 

V. 

218,  220,  323 

v.  Halford,     104    N.    Car. 

V. 

874   347 

v.  Hall,    168    Mo.    475  271 

V. 

v.  Hal  lock.    70    Vt.    159...    151 

V. 

v.  Ham,     98    Iowa,    60  265 

V. 

v.  Hamilton,    57   Iowa,   596 

V. 

322,  324 

V. 

v.  Haney,    19    N.   Car.    390 

288 

V. 

v.  Hannibal,    37    La.    Ann. 

V. 

620  709 

V. 

v.  Hardee,   83   N.   Car.   619 

319 

V. 

v.  Hardin,      6   Iowa,    623..    322 

v.  Hardin,    19   N.  Car.  407 

V. 

288 

v.  Harding,       1    Iowa,    599 

V. 

4,  34 

v.  Harkin.    7    Nev.    377  185 

\ 

v.  Harlan,    130    Mo.    381..    269 

V. 

V.Harris,    97    Iowa    407..    294 

V. 

v.  Harris,  107  La.  Ann.  325 

V. 

347 

V. 

v.  Harrison,   66  Vt.   5  2  3..  7.   25 

V. 

v.  Harrison,  36  W.  Va.  729 

329 

V. 

v.  Hart,  116  N.  Car.  976..    347 

v.  Hartley,    22    Nev.    342..    335 

V. 

v.  Harvey,    131    Mo.    339..    322 

V. 

v.  Hathaway,      100      Iowa, 

225      ...           .             6    347 

v. 

v.  Hawkins,    18   Ore.   476..    188 

Hay  den,  45  Iowa,   11,.... 

Hayes,    78    Mo.    310 

Haynes,   7    N.   Dak.   352 

Heacock,  106  Iowa,  191 
Heinze,  2  Mo.  App.  13L4 

Hellekson,     13     S.     Dak. 

242 

Helvin,  65   Iowa,   289.. 
Hendricks,   172  Mo.   654 

Henry,  48  Iowa,  403.. 
Henry,  24  Ka.s.  460.. 
Henry,  50  N.  Car.  65.. 
Hertzog  (W.  Va.)  46  S. 

E.  796 

Hickman,  95  Mo.  322.. 
Hicks  (Mo.)  77  S.  W. 
541  ....  80,  244,  784, 
Hicks,  125  N.  Car.  636 

Hicks,    130  N.  Car.   705 

25,  31 
Higgerson,   157   Mo.   395 

259, 
Higgins,    124   Mo.    640.  . 

Hill,   65   Mo.    88 

Hill,    91    Mo.    423 

Hill,    47   Neb.   456 

Hilsabeck,    132   Mo.    348 

216, 

Hockett,  70  Iowa,  442.. 
Hodge,  50  N.  H.  51.0.. 
Hogan,  115  Iowa,  455 

229, 
Holloway,    156   Mo.    222 

198, 
Holloway,     117    N.     Car. 

730 

Holman,  104  N.  Car. 
865.. 853,  854.  855,  856, 
Holmes.  65  Minn.  230.. 
Honing,  4  9  Iowa,  158.. 
Hood,  120  Iowa,  238... 

Hope.    102    Mo.   410 

Hopkins,  94  Iowa,  86.. 
Hopkins,  33  La.  Ann.  34 

Hopkins,  50  La.  Ann. 
1171 

Home,  9  Kas.   119 

Horton  L.  &  L.  Co.  161 
Mo.  664 

Horton,   100  N.  Car.  443 


299 
740 

290 
238 
337 

44 
6 

25 
324 
265- 
340 

80 
218 

797 
269 

,  48 

268 
276 
732 
187 
243 

358 
329 
266 


13 

175 
198 

174 
30 


CXX1V 


TABLE    OF    OASES. 


(References  arc  to  Sections.) 


S.  v.  Hoshor,  26  Wash.  643 

v.  Hossack,    116   Iowa,    194 

v.  Howard,  41  Ore.  49... 
v.  Howell,  26  Mont.  3 

25,   301, 
v.  Howell,    28   S.  Car.    250 

v.  Hudspeth,    159  Mo.    178 

v.  Hunt,  141  Mo.  626..  240, 

v.  Hunter,    118    Iowa,    686 

282,  372, 

v.  Hunter.  50  Kas.  302... 
v.  Hyde,  20  Wash.  234 

175, 

v.  Hyde,    22    Wash.    551.. 

v.  Hyland,    144   Mo.    302.  . 

v.  Jackson,    103    Iowa,   702 

223.  269.  289, 

v.  Jackson,    95    Mo.    623... 

v.  Jackson.    126  Mo.   521.. 

v.  Jaynes,    78    S.   Car.    504 

325, 

v.  Jelinek,  95  Iowa,  420.. 
v.  Jenkins,  21  S.  Car.  595 

v.  Jennett,  88  N.  Car.   665 

v.  Johnson,  102  Ind.  247.. 
v.  Johnson,  40  Kas.  266.. 
v.  Johnson,  6  Kas.  App. 

119     .    .    

v.  Johnson,  48  La.  Ann.  87 

v.  Johnson,     50      La.    Ann. 

154 

v.  Johnson,  129  Mo.  26.. 
v.  Johnson,  19  Wash.  410 

v.  Jones,  46  La.  Ann.  1395 

v.  Jones,    64    Mo.    391 

v.  Jones,   78  Mo.    283 

344.   372, 
v.  Jones,    153   Mo.   4  5  7  .... 

v.  Jones,    19    Nev.    365 

v.  Jones,  87  N.  Car.  542.. 
v.  Jones,  126  N.  Car.  1099 

v.  Jones,  29  S.  Car.    201.. 

v.  Kabrick,   39  Iowa,  277.. 

v.  Kaplan,    167    Mo.    298.  . 

v.  Kattlemann,   35  Mo.  105 

v.  Kearley.  26  Kas.  77.. 20, 
v.  Keefe,*54  Kas.  197 


215 

373 
244 

336 

46 

338 

282 

776 
303 

191 
151 
255 

319 
326 
103 

328 

7 

69 

266 
794 
'326 

195 
212 

229 
268 

294 

269 

288 

757 

323 

731 

48 

332 

107 
758 
326 

841 
295 
341 


S.  v.  Kellerman,   14   Kas.    135 

218, 

v.  Kelley,  57  Iowa,  644 

265, 

v.  Kelly,    73  Mo.    608 

208, 

v.  Kelly   (Vt.)    51  Atl.  434 

v.  Kendall,   54  S.  Car.  192 

v.  Kennedy,    20    Iowa,    571 
795, 
v.  Kennedy     (Iowa)    62    N. 

W.  673  

v.  Kennedy,  154  Mo.  268.. 
v.  Kerns,  47  W.  Va.  26ti 

170, 

v.  Kindred,     148    Mo.    270 
244, 

v.  Kmley,  43  Iowa,  296.. 
v.  Kirkpatrick,  63  Iowa, 

k        554    

v.  Kirkpatrick,      72      Iowa, 

500 

v.  Kline,    54    Iowa,     185.. 

v.  Knight,  95  Me.    467 

v.  Knittson,  9]  Iowa,  549.. 
v.  Knotts,  24  Ind.  App.  477 

v.  Koonstett,    62   Kas.    221 
63, 

v.  Kortgaard,  62  Minn.  7-. 
v.  Krug,  12  Wash.  288 

229.    297,    336, 
v.  Kruger,  7  Idaho,   178 

312, 

v.  Kunhi,  119  Iowa,  461.. 
v.  Kyle,  14  Wash.  550.  . 
v.  Labuzan,  37  La.  Ann. 

489 

v.  La  Grange,   94   Iowa,  60 

20, 

v.  Landano,    74    Conn.    638 

v.  Landry,  85  Me.  95.... 
v.  Larkins.  5  Idaho,  200.. 
v.  Laurie,  1  Mo.  App.  371 

v.  Lawrence,  57  Me.  577.. 
v.  Lee,  121  N.  Car.  544... 

v.  Lee.   58   S.  Car.   335 

v.  Lett.   85  Mo.    52 

v.  Lewis,    56   Kas.    374 

v.  Lewis,  69  Mo.  92 

v.  Lewis,  136  Mo.  84.  .'.  . 
v.  Lewis,  20  Nev.  333 


288 
816 
265 
279 
6 
802 

70 
288 

261 

271 
340 

220 

816 
324 
749 
358 

488 

268 
279 

339 

734 
108 
219 

80 
265 

25 
229 
331 

285 
329 
225 
71 
219 
195 
325 
334 
201 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXT 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


S.  v.  Lightsey,  43   S.  Car.    114 


38 

v.  Lindley,   51   Iowa,   344.. 

340 

v.  Lmhoff,    121    Iowa,    632 

20,  200, 

713 

v.  Leppere,    66    Wis.    355.. 

344 

v.  Lockland,    136   Mo.    26.. 

276 

v.  Locklear,     118     N.    Car. 

1154  

251 

v.  Loveless,   17   Nev.   424.. 

361 

v.  Lowry,   42    W.    Va.   205 

322, 

323 

v.  Lucas   (Iowa)    97  N.  W. 

1007  

733 

v.  Lucas,    124  N.  Car.  825 

267, 

268 

v.  Lucey,  24  Mont.  295  .... 

272 

v.  Lynn   (Del.)   51  Atl.  882 

830,   831, 

832 

v.  Lynott,   5   R.   I.    295  

171 

v.  McBee,    52    Va.    260  

861 

v.  McCann,    16    Wash.    249 

32,   214,   259, 

260 

v.  McClellan,  23  Mont.  532 

223,  226,  247, 

322 

v.  McClune,    16   Utah,    170 

297 

v.  McCoy,   34   Mo.   535  

746 

v.  McCoy,     15    Utah,     136 

70 

,  71 

v.  McCracken,  66  Iowa,  569 

324 

v.  McCullough,     114    Iowa, 

532  

211 

v.  McDevitt,    69   Iowa,    549 

220 

v.  McDonald,   57    Kas.    537 

25, 

289 

v.  McDonnell,  32  Vt.  491.. 

282 

v.  McDowell,    129    N.    Car. 

523    65,    191, 

225 

v.  McGarry,  111  Iowa,  709 

322 

v.  McGinnis,   76  Mo.      26.. 

214 

v.  McKea,  120  N.  Car.  608 

201 

v.  McMurphy,  52  Mo.  251. 

340 

v.  McNamara,  100  Mo.   100 

342, 

345 

v.  McPherson,     114     Iowa, 

492  

780 

v.  Mackey,    12  Ore.   154 

195,    198, 

326 

v.  Magers,    3  6    Ore.    38  

229 

v.  Magoon,   68  Vt.    289.... 

178 

v.  Mahley,  68  Mo.    315  

252 

v.  Mahn,    25   Kas.    186  

751 

S.  v.  Mahoney,  24  Mont.  281 

25,  86,  170,   181 

v.  Main,  69  Conn.  123 161 

v.  Main,  75  Conn.  55..  103,  199 
v.  Manning  (Vt.)  52  Atl. 

1033 327 

v.  Marks,    16    Utah,    204..    345 

v.  Marsh,   171   Mo.  523 198 

v.  Marshall,  105  Iowa,  38.  297 
v.  Martin  (Mont.)  74  Pac. 

728 238,  338 

v.  Martin,    124   Mo.   514 

218,  296 

v.  Martin,  166  Mo.  565 363 

v.  Martin,  47  S.  Car.  67..  70 
v.  Mason  54  S.  Car.  240.. 253 
v.  Matthews,  38  La.  Ann. 

795 153,  169 

v.  Maxwell,  42  Iowa,  210..  809 
v.  May,  172  Mo.  630 

253,  271,  773,  776 
v.  Meadows,     156    Mo.     110 

269 
v.  Means,  95  Me.  364 

172,  178,  189,  191 
v.  Mecum,  95  Iowa,  433 

227    372 

v.  Medley,  54  Kas.  627....'  714 
v.  Medlin,  126  N.  Car. 

1127 198,   259 

v.  Meller,   13  R.  I.  669 84 

v.  Melton,  120  N.  Car.  591 


351 
816 

227 
80 


v.  Merrick,  19  Me.  398.. 
v.  Metcalf,  17  Mont.  417 
v.  Meyer,  69  Iowa,  148.. 
v.  Meyer,  58  Vt.  457 

252,  267,  295 

v.  Meyers,   99   Mo.    107 347 

v.  Meyesenburg,    171  Mo.   1 

288 

v.  Miles,    15   Wash.    534..          4 
v.  Milholland,  89  Iowa,  5..    279 

v.  Miller,  53  Iowa,  157 712 

v.  Miller,    53    Iowa,    210..    221 
v.  Miller,   107    Iowa,   656..    816 

v.  Miller,    100  Mo.  606 36 

v.  Miller,    156    Mo.    76 323 

v.  Miller,  12  Ohio  C.  C.  66 

834 
v.  Miller     (Ore.)      74    Pac. 

660 256,  802 

v.  Mills,    116    N.   Car.    992 

32 

v.  Missio,   105  Tenn.  218..       13 
v.  Mitchell,     41     La.     Ann. 

1073    .  .    172 


CXXV1 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


S.  v.  Mitchell,  56   S.  Car.  524 

v.  Mix,    15    Mo.    159 

v.  Mize,    36    Kas.     187 

v.  Montgomers     (S.     Dak.) 

97  N.  W.  717 

v.  Moody,  18  Wash.  165.. 
v.  Moore,  160  Mass.  443.. 
v.  Moore,  168  Mo.  432.... 
v.  Moore,  120  N.  Car.  570. . 
v.  Moore,  49  S.  Car.  438. 
v.  Morgan  (Utah)  75  Pac. 

528 

v.  Morledge,  164  Mo.  522.. 
v.  Mortimer,  20  Kas.  93... 

v.  Morwy,   37  Kas.  369 

v.  Moxley,  102  Mo.  374 

303, 
v.  Murphy,    109    Iowa,   116 

v.  Murphy,    118    Mo.    7 

v.  Murray,  91  Mo.  95..  1, 
v.  Musgrave,  43  W.  Va 

672 218,  219, 

v.  Musick,  101  Mo.  260.. 
v.  Myers,  12  Wash.  77 

299, 
v.  Napper,   141   Mo.  401 

225, 
v.  Nash,   30   N.   Car.   35.  .. 

v.  Nat.  5 1  N.  Car.   114 

v.  Neal,  120  N.  Car.  613.. 
v.  Nelson  (Minn.)  97  N.  W. 

655 

v.  Nelson,  132  Mo.  184.. 
v.  Nelson,  11  Nev.  340 

295, 

v.  Newman,  57  Kas.   705.. 

v.  Nichols,  50  La.  Ann.  699 

27, 

v.  Nickels  65  S.  Car.  169.. 
v.  Nixon,  32  Kas.  213 

329,  331, 

v.  Norris,  10  N.  Car.  391. 
v.  Northway,  164  Mo.  513 

v.  Norton,  28  S.  Car.  572.  . 
v.  Norwood,  74  N.  Car.  248 

v.  Oakes,  95  Me.  369.... 
v.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa.  95... 
v.  O'Donald  (Idaho)  39  Pac 

556 
v.   Oilkili,    7    Ired.    L.    (N. 

Car.)    251 

v.  Olds.  106  Iowa,  110 

v.  O'Neal,  58  Minn.  478.. 


170 
19 

267 

819' 
282 
321 
249 
351 
55 

365 
83 
11 

329 

312 

268 
281 
326 

305 
269 

721 

226 
225 
215 

27 

251 
358 

731 

88 

298 
196 

751 
170 

80 
69 

306 
251 
808 

347 

758 
345 
255 


S.  v.  O'Reilly,  126  Mo.  597.... 
v.  Ostrander,    18  Iowa,  437 


v.   Ott,    49    Mo.    326 

v.  Owen,   72  N.  Car.   605.. 

v.  Owens,    79   Mo.    619 

v.  Owens,    44    S.    Car.    324 
251, 
v.  Oxendine,    107    N.   Car. 

783 

v.  Pagels,  92  Mo.  300 

329,  330,  331,  746, 

v.  Painter,    67    Mo.    84 

v.  Palmer,  88  Mo.   568 

3,  220, 
v.    Pancoast    (N.   Dak.)    67 

N.  W.    1052  

v.  Parker,    13   Lea    (Tenn.) 

221 

v.  Parker,  172  Mo.  1 9 1 ... 
v.  Pasman,  118  Iowa,  501. 
v.  Patterson,  52  Kas.  335. 
v.  Patterson,  68  Me.  473 

158,    159, 

v.  Patterson,  116  Mo.  505. 
v.  Patterson,  45  Vt.  301.. 
v.  Patton,  66  Kas.  486.. 
v.  Paxton,  126  Mo.  500.. 

v.  Peck.    85    Mo.    190 

v.  Peebles    (Mo.)    7-7   S.  W. 
520. .713,   729,   810, 
v.  Peel,   23  Mont.  358 

247, 

v.  Pennell,  56  Iowa,  29.. 
v.  Penney,  113  Iowa.  65)1. 
v.  Pennington,  164  Mo.  27 

v.  Pepo,   23  Mont.    473 

v.  Perry,    41    W.    Va.    641 

v.  Peterson,   110  Iowa,  649 

v.  Peterson,   38  Kas.  205.. 
v.  Petsch,    43    S.    Car.    132 
32,    49 

v    Pfefferle,  36  Kas.  90 

v.  Phillips,    118   Iowa,    660 

180, 

v.  Phillips,    119   Iowa,    642 

v.  Phipps,    95    Iowa,    487. 
v.  Pierce,   65   Iowa,   90 

294,   302, 

v.  Pierce,    136    Mo.    34 

v.  Pierce.    8    Nev.    291 

v.  Pirlot,  19  R.  I.  695.... 
v.  Pitts,  11  Iowa,  343.... 


297 

19 

211 

84 

358 

112 

748 
279 

267 
20 

80 
20 

281 
289 

160 

279 
35 
294 
358 
316 

878 

750 

355 

75 

258 
170 

218 

25 
326 

,  80 
6,  7 

262 

244 

3,  7 

719 

188 

3 

347 
38 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXV11 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


S.  v.  Pitts,   156  Mo.  247  ...... 

v.  Poe     (Iowa)     98    N.    W. 
588  ................. 

v.  Porter,  64  Iowa,  237.. 
v.  Porter,  74  Iowa,  623.. 
v.  Porter,  35  La.  Ann.  535 

v.  Porter,  32  Ore.  135 

340,  344, 

v.   Potter,   42   Vt.   495  ...... 

v.Powell,    109     La.    727.. 

v.  Prater,    52    W.    Va.    132 
20,    48,    113, 

v.  Pratt,   20   Iowa,  269  ____ 

v.  Pratt,    98    Mo.    482  ..... 

v.  Preston,    4    Idaho,    215.. 

v.  Price,    55    Kas.    610  ____ 

v.  Prine,     25    Iowa,     231.. 

v.   Pritchard,  16  Nev.  101.. 

v.  Probasco,    46    Kas.    310' 
347, 

v.  Prudhomme,  25  La.  Ann. 
525    ................. 

v.  Pugsley,   75   Iowa,   744.. 

v.  Punshon,    124    Mo.    448 
252,  -69. 

Pyscher    (Mo.)    77    S.  W 
341  ................  21, 

Rath  bone      (Idaho)       67 
Pac.   186   ............. 

Rathbun,    74    Conn.    524 
70,  211, 
Ray,    146    Ind.    500  ____ 

Reasly,   100  Iowa,   231.. 
Reavis,  71  Mo.  419  ..... 

Reed,    20   Iowa,   421  _____ 

Reed,  50  La.  Ann.  990.. 
Reed,   62   Me.    129..  170, 
Reed,    137    Mo.    125  ____ 

Reed,    154    Mo.    122  ____ 

Reidell,   9   Houst.    (Del.) 
479    ................ 

Rheams,    34    Minn.     18 
165, 
Richie,  28  La.  Ann.   327 


6 

741 
201 
326 


756 
288 
169 

238 
84 
289 
5 

327 
163 
197 

352 

288 
250 

296 
. 
845 

25 

301 
351 

268 
289 
808 
198 
294 
180 
75 

211 
260 

225 

6 

Riney.    137   Mo.    102  ____      71 
Rivers,     68     Iowa,     611 

265,   812 

Robertson,     54    S.     Car. 
147  .................    252 

Robinson,     52    La.    Ann. 
616  .................      80 

Robinson,    117    Mo.    649 

229,   304 


Ridge.  125  N.  Car.  655. 


S.  v.  Robinson,  20  Wis.  713... 

v.  Rodgers,  56  Kas.   362.  .. 

v.  Rolla,      21      Mont.      582 

256, 

v.  Roller,    30    Wash.    692.. 

v.  Rollins,    77  Me.  380 

v.  Rome,   64   Conn  329 

v.  Rorbacher,  19  Iowa,   155 

v.   Rose,  47  Minn.   47..  119, 

v.   Rose,   70  Minn.    403 

v.  Rose,    142    Mo.    418 

v.  Rosencrans,     9     N.     Dak. 

163 

v.  Rover,    1 1    Nev.    3  4  3  .... 

v.   Rowland,    72    Iowa,    327 

324, 

v.  Rue,    72    Minn.    296.... 

v.  Rutherford,   152  Mo.  124 

113,    115, 

v.  Ryan,  113  Iowa,  536.. 
v.  Ryno  (Kas.)  74  Pac. 

1111 301, 

v.  Sacre,  141  Mo.  64  .... 
v.  Saliba,  18  La.  Ann.  35.. 
v.  Sauer,  38  Minn.  439... 
v.  Saxton,  147  Mo.  89.  .. 
v.  Schaegel,  50  Kas.  325... 
v.  Schmepel,  23  Mont.  523 

v.  SchoffeT,     74    Iowa,     704 

v.  Scott,  11  La.  Ann.  429.  . 
v.  Scott,  47  La.  Ann.  251. 

v.   Scott,  49  La.  R.  253 

v.  Seossoni,     48    La.     Ann. 

1464 

v.  Serenson,  7   S.  Dak.  277 

v.  Settleworth,      18      Minn. 

208 

v.  Sexton,   10    S.  Dak.    127 

v.  Seymour,    94    Iowa,    699 
310,  311, 
v.  Shadwell,  26  Mont.  52 

247, 

v.  Shaeffer,  116  Mo.  96.  . 
v.  Shafer,  22  Mont.  17 

276, 

v.  Shaw,    102    Ga.    660 

v.  Shelledy,     8     Iowa,     486 
761,   763, 

v.  Sheppard,  49  W.  Va.  582 

80,  279. 

v.  Sherman,  106  Iowa,  684 


63 
301 

260 
163 
38 
307 

301 
170 
840 

48 

6 
359 

325 

301 


374 
347 
169 
294 
269 
340 

170 

295 
169 
331 
201 


294 
295 
219 
326 

272 
331 

282 
191 

794 

297 
268 


exxvin 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


S.  v.  Shunka,  116  Iowa,  206...      25 

v.  Silk,    145    Mo.    240 279 

v.  Simas,  25  Nev.  432...  63 
v.  Sipsey,  14  N.  Car.  485 

119 
v.  Slingerland,  19  Nev.  135 

303,  306 
v.  Smallwood,    75    N.    Car. 

104 217.   222 

v.  Smith,     65     Conn.     283 

6,  90,   294 

v.  Smith,  142  Ind.  288..  20,  22 
v.  Smith,  102  Iowa 

269,    282,   289 
v.  Smith,     106     Iowa,    701 

9    289 
v.  Smith,   53  Mo.    267 

115,    331 

v.  Smith,    125   Mo.   2 259 

v.  Smith,    164  Mo.   567 

278     337 

v.  Smith,    10   Nev.    123 '      30 

v.  Smith,  8  S.  Dak.  547..  223 
v.  Soper,  148  Mo.  217 

304,  335 
v.  Spears,  46  La.  Ann.  1524 

260 
v.  Spencer,    1   Zab.    (N.   J.) 

202 331 

v.  Spengler,  74  Miss.  129..  129 
v.  Spooner,  41  La.  Ann. 

780 344 

v.  Spotted  Hawk,   22  Mont. 

33 291,  323 

v.  St.    John,    94    Mo.    App. 

229    80 

v.  Staley,  45  W.  Va.  792..  25 
v.  Stanley,  48  Iowa,  221..  43 
v.  Stantz  (Wash.)  74  Pac. 

590 25 

v.  Starnes,   94  N.  Car.  973 

323 
v.   Steffens,    116   Iowa,  227 

238 
v.  Sterrett,   71   Iowa,  386..    373 

v.  Stevens.   53  Me.  548 165 

v.  Stewart,  52  Iowa,  284..  299 
v.  Stickley,  41  Iowa,  232 

234,  331 
v.  Stout,   49   Ohio   St.    281 

1     32     768 
v.  Straub.    16     Wash.'    ll'l 

198 

v.  Streeter.  2  Nev.  403...  215 
v.  Strong.  153  Mo.  548...  75 
v.  Stubb'lefield,  157  Mo. 

360 336 


S.  v.  Sullivan,  43   S.  Car.  205 

v.  Summar,  143  Mo.   220.. 

v.  Sutton,   99   Ind.   307 

v.  Sutton,    70    Iowa,    268 

323, 
v.  Swallum,    111    Iowa,    37 

v.  Swayne,      30     La.     Ann. 

1323  

v.  Tally,  23  La.  Ann.  677.  . 

v.  Tate.  156  Mo.  119 

v.  Tatlaw,    136    Mo.    678.. 

v.  Taylor,      118     Mo.      167 

322, 

v.  Taylor.  134  Mo.  109.  .. 
v.  Taylor,  57  S.  Car.  483.. 
v.  Tettaton,  159  Mo.  354.. 
v.  Thomas,  47  Conn.  546 
166, 

v.  Thomas,  58  Kas.  805... 
v.  Thomas,  34  La.  Ann. 

1084  

v.  Thompson,  137  Mo.  620 


v.  Thompson,     21     W.     Va. 

746    218. 

v.  Thornton     (S.    Dak.)     73 

N.  W.   196   

v.  Tibbs.  48  La.  Ann.  1278 
48, 

v.  Tiekel,     13    Nev.    502... 
v.   Tighe.    27    Mont.    327.  . 

v.  Tilton,  63  Iowa,  117 

v.  Tincher,     21      Ind.    App. 

142    

v.  Tippet,  94  Iowa,  646 

21. 
v.  Tisdale,  41  La.  Ann.  338 

v.  Tobie,    141   Mo.    547 

v.  Todd,   110  Iowa.   631 

6, 

v.  Tomasitz,    144    Mo.   86.. 
v.  Tommy,   19  Wash.  270.. 

v.  Tozier,    49    Me.    404 

v.  Tucker,  38  La.  Ann.  789 

v.  Tucker,    36    Ore.    291 

25. 
v.  Turlington,  102  Mo.  568 

v.  Tattle.   67  Ohio   St.   440 

v.  Turner,    110    Mo.    196.  . 
v.  Turner,    63    S.   Car.    548 


7 

227 
247 

326 

80 

182 
169 
206 
247 

323 

301 

206 

52 

167 
741 

11 

89 

336 

743 

348 
170 
271 

812 

849 
273 

169 
316 

206 
269 
109 

758 

87 
811 
267 

207 
214 

265 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CXX1X 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


8.  v.  Urie,  101  Iowa,  411. 

71, 
v.  Ussery,  1 1 8  N.  Car.  1177 

v.  Utley,  126  N.  Car.  997 
v.  Utley,  132  N.  Car.  1022 

v.  Valle,    164   Mo.    539 

v.  Van   Kuran,   25   Utah,   8 
340, 

v.  Vansant,   80  Mo.   69 
295,  344,  716,  756,  774, 
797, 

v.  Van  Tassel,   103   Iowa,  6 
277, 

v.  Varner,  115  N.  Car.  744 
7, 

v.  Vaughan,  141  Mo.  514.. 
v.  Vaughan,  22  Nev.  285. 
v.  Vickers,  47  La.  Ann. 

1574  .  .  .  .  

v.  Vincent   (S.  Dak.)   91  N. 

W.   347   

v.  Vinso,  171  Mo.  5  7  6  ... 
v.  Waddle,  100  Iowa,  57 

v.  Walker,   4 1    Iowa,   217.. 

v.  Ward,    19    Nev.    297 

v.  Ward,    61   Vt.    194 

90,  198,  322,  323,  324, 

v.  Warner   69   Vt.   30 

v.  Warren,    1   Marv.    (Del.) 

487    

v.  Washington,  107  La.  298 

v.  Watkins,    106    La.    380 
28,    169, 

v.  Watkins,  11  Nev.  30... 
v.  Weakly  (Mo.)  77  S.  W. 

527  ... 

v.  Weaver,  165  Mo.  1 

v.  Webb,    6   Idaho,   428 

v.Webb,  20  Wash.  484.. 
v.  Weber,  156  Mo.  249.... 
v.  Webster,  107  La.  45... 
v.  Webster,  121  N.  Car.  586 
350, 

v.  Weems,  96  Iowa,  426.. 
v.  Wells,  54  Kas.  161.  .40, 
v.  West,  43  La.  Ann.  1006 

v.  West.    157    Mo.    309 

v.  Westlake,    159    Mo.    669 

v.  Wheeler,  79  Mo.  366... 
v.  White,  15  S.  Car.  293.  . 


178 
191 
151 

247 
80 

S.  v.  White,    10   Wash.   611 
227,    261 
v.  Whitier,    21    Me.    341...    225 
v.  Whitny,   7   Ore.   386 
.98,   326 
v.  Whittle,  59   S.  Car.    297 
162,    172 
v.  Wiggins,    50     La.     Ann. 
330  227 

343 
807 

v.  Williams,  32  S.  Car.  123 
156 
v.  Wilner,    40    Wis.    306..    330 
v.  Wilson,  3  111.   (2  Scam.) 
225  31 

295 

351 
80 
263 

347 

26 
269 

108 
266 

v.  Wilson,    137    Mo.    592..    265 
v.  Wilson,   10   Wash.   402..    151 
v.  Wines,    65    N.   J.    L.    31 
229 
v    Wisdom,   84  Mo.   190 
279,   806 
v.  Wood,   20   Iowa,   541  841 
v.  Wood,  46  Iowa.    116  815 
v.  Woodruff,    47    Kas.    151 
815 
v.  Woods,    124   Mo.    412...    268 
v.  Woolard,   111  Mo.  248..    288 
v.  Woolard,     119    N.    Car. 
779    178 

19 

326 

227 

260 
206 

v.  Wright,    112    Iowa,    436 
86 
v.Wright,    53    Me.    328...    165 
v.  Wright,   134  Mo.  404...    331 
v.   Wright.     141     Mo.     333 
239    325 
v.  Wroth,    15   Wash.    621..'      39 
v.  Wyse,  32  S.  Car.   45  182 
v.  Yohe,    87    Iowa,    35  812 

296 
173 

272 
93 
247 
25 

75 
348 

351 

v.  Young,    104    Iowa,    730 
7,   52,    227 
v.  Young,    105    Mo.    640...    301 
v.  Young,   67  N.  J.   L.   223 
269 
v.  Young,  9  N.  Dak.   165..    312 
v.  Yourex,   30   Wash.   611..    163 
v.  Zarn,    22    Ore.    591  281 
v.  Zeibart,    40     Iowa,    173 
282,  777 
v.  Zorn,  7  1  Mo.  415  214 

229 
253 

49 
251 

347 
195 
208 

Sack  v.   Dolese.    137   111.    138..    126 
Sackett  v.  Stone,   115  Ga.  466 
102 
Sadler  v.  Peoples,  105  Fed.  712 
161 
Saffold  v.  S.   76  Miss.  258..  40,   192 
Sage  v.  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co. 
134    Ind.    100    34,    40 
v.  Haines,    76    Iowa,    581..    00 

cxxx 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Saine  v.   S.   68   Ind.    129 838 

Saint  v.  Guerrerio,  17  Colo.  448 

6 

Salem,  v.    S.    89    Ala.    56 336 

Salem  Iron  Co.  v.  Commonwealth 

Iron    Co.    119    Fed.    593..       7 
Salem,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son,  51    Minn.    829 156 

Salem   Stone,  &c.  Co.  v.  Griffin, 

139    Ind.    141 19y 

Sales    v.    Western    Stage   Co.    4 

Iowa.  547 550 

Salmon  v.    Cress,   22    Ore.    177 

48,    80 
Sample  v.  Rand,   112  Iowa,  616 

94,   195 

v.  S.     104    Ind.    289 41,    45 

Sams   A.   C.   Co.    v.   League,    25 

Colo.  129 200,  358 

Samuels  v.  Knight,  9  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  352 102,  185 

San   Antonio,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   De 
Haren     (Tex.     Cv.    App.) 

54  S.   W.  395 90 

v.  Green     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

49   S.   W.   672 113 

v.  Griffin    (Tex.    Cv.   App.) 

48   S.   W.   542 196 

v.  lies    (Tex.  Cv.   App.)    59 

S.  W.    564 197 

v.   Jazo    (Tex.   Cv.   App.)    25 

S.  W.  712 97 

v.  Kniffin,   4   Tex.   Cv.  App. 

484 8 

v.  Long,    4    Tex.    Cv.    App. 

497    183 

v,  Waller,  27  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

4 383 

v.  Watzlavzick      (Tex.      Cv. 
App.)     28    S.    W.     115..      72 

v.  Wright,  20  Tex.   136 196 

San  Antonio  Trac.  Co.  v.  Welter 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   77  S.  W. 

414    194 

Sanches  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   55 

S.  W.  44 21 

Sandaee  v.  S.  61  Neb.  240.224,  378 
Sandell    v.    Sherman,    107    Cal. 

391 71 

Sander  v.  S.   134  Ala.  74..  192,  261 
Sanders  v.  Brock  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

31   S.  W.   311    363 

v.  P.  124  111.  218 

65,   115,    116,    339 

v.  S.    134    Ala.    74 116 

v.   S.    94    Ind.    147 330 

v.    S.  41  Tex.  306 3 


Sanders  v.  Wettermark,  20  Tex. 

Cv.   App.    175 

Sandoval  v.  Ter.  8  N.  Mex.  573 

Sands  v.  Potter,   165  111.  402.. 
Sanford  v.  Gates,   38   Kas.   405 

Sanger  v.   Thompson    (Tex.   Cv. 

App.)    44   b.   W.   408 

Santee  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   37 

S.  W.  436 

Sargent    v.    Chapman,     12    Colo, 

App.    529    

v.  Lawrence    (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

40   S.  W.   1075 

v.  Linden    M.    Co.    55    Cal. 

204 

v.  Roberts,   1  Pick.   (Mass.) 

337 

v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  325 

Sater  v.  S.  56  Ind.  378 

325    378 
Sattler  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &'  P.  R 

Co.      (Neb.)      98     N.     W. 

664 

Saunders    v.    Closs,     1.17     Mich. 

130 25 

Saunders'  Ex'rs  v.  Weeks    (Tex. 

Cv.  App.)    55  S.  W.   33.. 
Savannah,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Austion, 

104    Ga.    614 

v.  Beasley,     94    Ga.    142.. 

v.  Tiedman,   39    Fla.    196.. 

Savannah  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Ficklin, 

94  Ga.  146 

Sawyer    v.    S.    15    Lea    (Tenn.) 

695 
Sax  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &.  M.  R. 

Co.     (Mich.)     89    N.    W. 

368    

Scanlon    v.     Warren,     169     111. 

142 

Scarbrough    v.    Blackman,    108 

Ala.   656 

Schafer  v.  Gilmer,  13  Nev.  330 

Schaff  v.  Miles,  31  N.  Y.  S.  134 

Schafstelle  v.  St.  Louis  &  M.  R. 
Co.  175  Mo.  142 

Schatzlein  Paint  Co.  v.  Pass- 
more.  26  Mont.  500.... 

Scheel  v.  City  of  Detroit,  130 
Mich.  51 

Schenck  v.  Butsch,  32  Ind.  344 


126 

269 
249 

182 

94 

191 

359 

186 

94 

35 

41 

745 

126 

,   26 

94 

58 

4 

94 

26 
328 

126 

48 

117 

94 

358 

20 

244 

237 

356 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXX1 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Schier   v.    Dankwardt,    88    Iowa, 

750     87 

Schiller   v.   Dry   Dock,   E.    B.    & 
13.    R.    Co.    56    N.    Y.    S. 

184   121 

Schintz  v.  P.   178  111.   320..  21,  300 
Schmidt  v.   Chicago,   &c.  R.  Co. 

83    111.   412    361 

v.  Chicago,    &c.    R.    Co.    90 

Wis.   504 129 

v.  Missouri   Pac.  R.  Co.   20 
Am.   &  Eng.  R.  Gas.   219 

630 
v.  Pfau,    114   111   494 

105,   172 
v.  Sinnatt,    103  111.   160 

74,  533 
Schmidt  &  Bro.  Co.  v.  Mahoney, 

60   Neb.    20 356 

Schmitt    v.    Murray,    87    Minn. 

250 12 

Schmuck   v.  Hill    (Neb.)    96   N. 

W.   158 119 

Schneider  v.  Hosier,  21  Ohio  St. 

113    6,    48 

Schnieder  v.    P.    23    111.    25 709 

Schnier  v.  P.  23  111.  11 153 

Schoefield,  uear  &  Pulley  Co.  v. 
Schoefield,    71    Conn.     11 

185,    191 

Schollay  v.  Moffitt  W.  Drug  Co. 
(Colo.     App.)      67     Pac. 

182    351 

Scholtz  v.  Northwertern  M.  L.  I. 

Co.    100   Fed.   573   ....    100 
Schoolcraft    v.    P.    117    111.    277 

729 
Schrader    v.    Hoover,    87    Iowa 

654 94 

Schroeder   v.  Rinhard,    25    Neb. 

75 347 

v.Walsh.    120    111.    410...    514 
Schrvver  v.  Hawks,  22  Ohio  St. 

316 7 

Schultz  v.  Bower,  57  Minn.  493 

107 

v.  Bower,  64  Minn.   123  ..      26 
v.  Schultz,    113    Mich.    502 

195 
Schwabacher  v.  P.    165  111.  624 

251,  281 
Schwabeland  v.  Buchler,    31   N. 

Y.   S.    143 358 

Schwarz  v.  Schwarz,   26  111.   81 

243 
Schwarzbach  v.  Ohio.  &c.  Union, 

25  W.  Va.  640  .  ...420,  421 


Schweinfurth    v.    Cleveland,    &c. 
R.    Co.   60    Ohio   St.   225 

192,  379,  640 
Scott  v.   Boyd    (Va.)    42    S.   E. 

918 80 

v.  Chope,   33   Neb.    75 

487,    489 

v.  Delany,   87    111.    146 25 

v.  P.   141  111.   195 

113,    115,    195,   242 
v.  Provo  City,  14  Utah,  31 

90 

v.    S.    105    Ala.    57 343 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     68 

S.  W.   680 109 

v.  Smith,   70  Ind.  298   .  .  .  360 
Scovill  v.  Baldwin,  27  Conn.  316 

222 
v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     77 

S.  W.  792 110 

v.  Salt  Lake  City,   11   Utah 

60 25,  351 

Scrivani   v.    Dondero,    128    Cal. 

31    244 

Scroggi'ns   v.    S.    120    Ala.    369 

172,  260 
Scruggs  v.  S.  35  Tex.   Cr.  App. 

622    22 

Scully  v.  S.   39  Ala.  240 6 

Scutt  v.  Woolsey,  47  N.  Y.  S. 

320 242 

Seaboard  Air  Line  R.  v.  Phillips, 

117  Ga.  98 7 

Seacord  v.  P.   121   111.  631 52 

Seagrave  v.  Hall,  3  Ohio  Cir.  Dec. 

221 35 

v.  Hall,  10  Ohio  C.  C.  395.      35 
Searcy  v.  Martin  Woods  Co.  93 

Iowa,  420 244 

Searles  v.  S.  97   Ga.   692..  175,   179 
Sears  Admr.  v.  Louisville,  &c.  R. 

Co.  22  Ky.  152   244 

Secor  v.  Oregon  I.  Co.   15  Wash. 

35 243 

Seefeld     v.     Thacker,     93     Wis. 

518 26 

Seekel  v.  Norman,  71  Iowa,  264 

48 

Seffel    v.    Western    U.    Tel.    Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   67  S.  W. 

897 355 

Segrest    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 

57   S.  W.   845    112 

Seibrecht  v.  Hogan,  99  Wis.  437 

232 


CXXX11 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Seigel,  Cooper  &  Co.  v.  Connor, 

171  111    572   235 

Seller  v.  S.  112  Wis.  293 113 

Selling   v.    Clark,    41    N.    Y.    S. 

982 191 

Selensky   v.   Chicago   G.    W.   R. 

Co.   120  Iowa,   113 

119,  192,  205 
Seligman    v.    Rogers,    113    Mo. 

642 218 

Sellars   v.  Johnson,   65   N.   Car. 

104 156 

Selleck  v.  Selleck,  107  111.  396.      80 
Seller    v.    Johnson,    65    N.    Car. 

104 156 

Sellers  v.  Greencastle,   134  Ind. 

645 11 

v.  S.  99  Ga.  212   321 

Sellman    v.    Wheeler    (Md.)    54 

Atl.  512  ....*. 25 

Selma,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Owen,  132 

Ala.  420 245 

Selser  v.  Brock,  3  Ohio  St.  302 

415 

Senter  v.  Carr,   15  N.  H.  351..   218 
Sergest  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  57 

S.  W.  845    103 

Setchell   v.   Keigeoin,    57    Conn. 

478 171 

Sexton     v.     School     District,     9 

Wash.  5 113 

v.  Steele,  60  Minn.  336 

129,   130 

Seymour  v.  Rice,  94  Ga.   183..    130 
Shackelford  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

53  S.  W.   884    40 

Shaefer   v.    St.    Louis    &    S.    R. 

Co.  128  Mo.  64   237 

Shaeffer  v.  S.  61  Ark.  241 267 

Shafer  v.  Stinson,  76  Ind.  374 

4,  5,  362 

Shaffel  v.  S.  97  Wis.  377 75 

Shaffer  v.  Cincinnati,  &c.  R.  Co. 

14  Ohio  C.  C.  488   351 

Slianck  v.  Morris,  2  Sweeney  (N. 

Y.)   464 170 

Shank  v.  S.  25  Ind.  208 191 

Shannon  v.  Jefferson  City,   125 

Ala.  384 244 

Shano   v.    Fifth,   &c.    Bridge    Co. 

189  Pa.  St.  245   247 

Shapleigh  Hardware  Co.  v.  Ham- 
ilton, 70  Ark.  319   65 

Sharpv.  S.  105  Ga.  588   118 

Shartle  v.  Minneapolis,  1 7  Minn. 

292 601 


Shaughnessy  v.  Sewell  &  D.  C. 

Co.  160  Mass.  331    80,  94 

Shaw  v.  Camp,   160  111.  430...      34 
v.  Missouri  &  K.  D.  Co.  56 

Mo.  App.   521    72 

v.  P.  81  111.  150   250 

v.  S.   125   Ala.   80    297 

v.  S.  102  Ga.  660.223,275,323 

Shea    v.    City    of    Muncie,    148 

Ind.  34 172,  876 

Shealy  v.  Edwards,  75  Ala.  411 

183 
Shebeck  v.  National  Cracker  Co. 

120  Iowa,  414    90 

Sheehan  v.  P.    131    111.   25 

66,    113,   322 

Sheets  v.  Stark,  14  Ga.  429 119 

Sheffield   v.    Eveleth    (S.    Dak.) 

97  N.  W.   367    84 

Sheilds  v.  S;   104  Ala.  35 240 

v.  S.  149  Ind.  395 

43,   240,  277 
Sheldon  v.  Chicago  &  M.  &  St. 

P.  R.  Co.  6  S.  Dak.  606..    134 
Shely   v.   Shely,   20   Ky.    L.   R. 

1021   38 

Shenandoah  V.,  R.  Co.  v.  Moore, 

83  Va.  823 548,  550 

Shenk  v.  Hager,  24  Minn.  339.   219 
Shenkenberger    v.    S.    154    Ind. 

630,  640 

20,  25,   180,  301,  325 
Shepard  v.  Goben,  142  Ind.  322 

404 

Shepherd  v.  S.  36  Fla.  374 347 

Shepperd  v.  S.  94  Ala.   104....   265 
Sherman  v.  Dutch,  16  111.  282..    172 

v.  Kreul,  42   Wis.   33 116 

Sherman  S.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bell 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   58  S.  W. 

147 198 

Sherrill  v.  S.   (Ala.)   35  So.  131 

723,  777 
v.  Western  1ST.  T.  Co.  116  N. 

Car.  655 183 

Sherwin  v.  Rutland,  74  Vt.   1..   361 
Sherwood  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co. 

132  Mo.   339    50,   118 

Shibek     v.     Nat.     Cracker     Co. 

(Iowa)    94  N.  W.  930...      90 
Shields  v.  S.   39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

13 215 

Shinn  v.  Tucker,  37  Ark.  580..    321 
Shipp    v.    Com.    19    Ky.    L.    R. 

634  .  .    Ill 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXX111 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Shiver  v.  S.  41  Fla.  630 

9,  288, 
Shiverick  v.   R.  J.   Gunning  Co. 

58  Neb.  29   

Shober  v.  Wheeler,  113  N.  Car. 

370 

Shockley  v.  Mills,  71  Ind.  292.. 

Shoemaker  v.  Bryant  Lumber  & 

S.  M.  Co.  27  Wash.  637.. 

v.  Ter.   4   Okla.    11 8...  322, 

v.  Turner,  117  Iowa,  340.. 

Shoninger  v.   Latimer,    165   Pa. 

St.  373 

Shoohn  v.  Com.  106  Pa.  St.  369 

Shook  v.  Blount,  67  Ala.  301.. 
Shorb  v.  Kinzie,  100  Ind.  429.. 

v.  Webber,  188  111.  126 

Short  v.  Kelly    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

62  S.  W.  944    

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    29  S. 

W.  1072  

Shotz  v.  P.   121   111.   562 

Showman  v.  Lee,  86  Mich.  564 

Shrawley    v.    S.    153    Ind.    375 

Shrewsbury  v.  Tufts,  41  W.  Va. 

217 442,  470, 

Shreyer  v.  Jordan,  61  N.  Y.  S. 

889 , 

Shulter  v.  Ins.  Co.  62  Mo.  237 .. 
Shultz  v.  Babcock,  166  111.  398 

Shultz  v.  Shultz,  113  Mich.  502 

v.  Ter.  (Ariz.)  52  Pac.  352. 
Siberry  v.  S.   133  Ind.  677 

717,  718, 

v.  S.   149   Ind.   684 

Sibila   v.   Bahney,    34    Ohio   St. 

399   

Sibley  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Durand 

Co.  200  111.  357    

Sickle  v.  Wolf,  91  Wis.  396 

Siddall  v.  Jansen.  168  111.  45.. 
Sidway  v.  Missouri  L.  &  L.  S. 

Co.   163  Mo.  342    

Siebert  v.  P.  143  111.  592 

Siese  v.  Meyer,  143  Mo.  547.  .. 
Si'evers  v.  Peters  B.  &  L.  Co. 

151    Ind.    661    

Sigal  v.  Miller   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

25  S.  W.   1012    

Sigerson    v.    Pomeroy,    13    Mo. 

620 ' 


376 
80 

14 

466 

351 
743 
347 

140 

171 

158 

208 

25 

182 

112 
206 

511 
229 
867 

145 

427 

243 

181 
743 

722 
20 

487 

363 
212 
126 

19 
372 

238 

383 

8 

116 


Sigler  v.  McConnell,  45  Neb.  598 

358 
Signa  Iron  Co.  v.  Green,  88  Fed. 

207 145,  147 

Sigsbee  v.  S.  43  Fla.  524 

187,  361,  707 
Silberberg   v.   Pearson,   75    Tex. 

287   105 

Silsby   v.   Michigan   Car  Co.   95 

Mich.  207 483 

Silver  v.  Parr,  115  Ind.   113...    346 

Simmons  v.  S.  61  Miss.  243 325 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   34  S. 

W.  019 277 

v.  United  States,  142  U.  S. 

148 171 

Simnacher  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

43  S.  W.  354    25 

Simonds  v.  City  of  B.   93   Wis. 

40 358 

Simons  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   34 

S.  W.   619    275,   284 

Simpson  v.  Post,  40  Conn.  321.      80 
Simpson     Brick     Press     Co.     v. 

Wounley,  166  111.  383...    113 
Simrell   v.   Miller,    169    Pa.    St. 

326 126 

Sims  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 

72  N.   Y.   S.   835 126 

v.  S.  43  Ala.  33   309 

Sinclair  v.  Berndt,  87  111.  174..      92 

Sindram  v.  P.  88  N.  Y.  203 171 

Sines      v.      Superintendent,      55 

Mich.  383 157 

Sinnet  v.  Bowman,  151  111.  156 

250 
Sittig  v.  Birkestack,  38  Md.  158 

40 
Skeen  v.  S.   (Miss.)    16  So.  495 

240 

Skipper  v.  S.  59  Ga.  63 219 

Skow    v.    Locks    (Neb.)     91    N. 

W.   204 80,   209 

Slack  v.  Harris,  200  111.  115 

54,  105,  113,  363 
Slaughter  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 

Co.   116  Mo.   269    162 

Sledge  v.  S.  99  Ga.  684 

3,  6,  105   228.276 
Slingerland  v.  Keyser,  127  Mich. 

7 80 

Slingloff  v.  Bruner,  174  111.  570 

235 
Sloan  v.   Fist   (Neb.)    89  N.  W. 

760 70 

v.  Petzer,  54  S.  Car.  314.      123 


CXXX1V 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Slossen  v.  Burlington,  &c.  R.  Co. 

60  Iowa,  217    645 

Smaggart  v.  Ter.  (Okla.)   50  Pac. 

96 4 

Small  v.  Brainard,  44  111.  355.  .    193 

v    S.   105  Ga.  669 71 

Smalley   v.   Hendrickson,   29   N. 

J.   L.   373    157 

Smalls  v.  S.   105  Ga.  669 71 

Smallwood   v.   Com.    19   Ky.   L. 

R.  344 178 

Smart  v.  Hodges,  105  Ala.  634.  129 
Smiley  v.  Scott,  179  111.  142...  48 
SmiseV  v.  S.  17  Ind.  App.  519.  487 
Smith  v.  Bank  of  New  England, 

70  N.  H.   187    48,  94 

v.  Chicago    &    W.   I.   R.   Co. 

105   111.   511    208,  223 

v.  Cohn,  170  Pa.  St.  132..  126 
v.  Com.  17  Ky.  439.. 252,  253 
v.  Com.  1  Dur.  (Ky.)  224, 

228   331 

v.  Cornett,  18  Ky.  L.  R.  818 

163 

v.  Crichton,  33  Md.  103...  4 
v.  Dawley,  92  Iowa,  312..  191 

v.  Dukes,   5   Minn.   373 195 

v.  Easton   Tr.   Co.    167    Pa. 

St.    209    133 

v.  Faulkner,  12  Gray  (Mass.) 

251 160 

v.  Gillett,  50  111.  301    123 

v.  Gray,  46  N.  Y.  S.  180..      26 
v.  Grimes,  43  Iowa,  365...   220 
v.  Gulf,  W.  T.  &  P.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   65  S.  W. 

88 191 

v.  Hall,  69  Conn.  651   25 

v.  Henline,  174  111.  184 74 

v.  Hutchinson,  83  Mo.  683.  157 
v.  Independent  School  Dist. 

1 1 2  Iowa,  38   412 

v.  Kennard,  54  Neb.  523...  360 
v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  170  N. 

Y.  394 221 

v.  McMillen,  19  Ind.  391 ...      39 
v.  Mayfield,  163  111.  447   ..      40 
v.  Merchants,  &c.  Co.   (Tex. 
Cv.  App.)   40  S.  W.  1038 

365 

v.  Meyers,  52  Neb.  70  ..71,  182 
v.  Middleton,  112  Ky.  592.  652 

v.  P.  25  111.  11 759 

v.  P.  74  111.  146 297,  716 

v.  P.  103  111.  85 816 

v.  P.  115  111.  17  265 


Smith  v.  P.  142  111.  123 

42,  201,  250,  251,  283 
v.  Pittsburg,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R. 

Co.  23  Ohio  St.  10 7 

v.  Richardson     Lumber    Co. 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   47  S.  W. 

386 26 

v.  Roundtree,  185  111.  219.  236 

v.  S.  103  Ala.  40  4,  254 

v.  S.  107  Ala.  139  214 

v.  S.  118  Ala.  117  227 

v.  S.  63  Ga.  170  337 

v.  S.  94  Ga.  591 228 

v.  S.  95  Ga.  472  49 

v.  S.  109  Ga.  479  113 

v.  S.  117  Ga.  59  6 

v.  S.  28  Ind.  321  196 

v.  S.  58  Ind.  340  266,  816 

v.  S.  142  Ind.  289 

169,  214,  216,  220,  221  367 
v.  S.  75  Miss.  542.  .32a,  80,  280 

v.  S.  61  Neb.  296 307,  312 

v.  S.  41  N.  J.  L.  374 171 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  49  S. 

W.  583 223 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  50  S. 

W.  362 326 

v.  S.  1  Tex.  App.  416......  43 

v.  S.  24  Tex.  Cr.  App.  265.  304 
v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  618 

307,  310 

v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  442.  290 

v.  S.  10  Wyo.  157  290 

v.  Schultz,     1     Scam.     (111.) 

490 815 

v.  Seattle    (Wash.)    74   Pac. 

676 215 

v.  Sioux  City  (Iowa)   93  N. 

W.  8 1 1 

v.  Smith,  169  111.  623 21,56 

v.  Snyder,  77  Va.  440 412 

V.  South   Carolina   &   G.   R. 

62  S.  Car.  322   6 

v.  Southern  R.  Co.  53  S.  Car. 

121 20 

v.  Sovereign,   &c.    (Mo.)    77 

S.  W.  867   192 

v.  United  States,  161  U.  S. 

85 210 

v.  Warden,  86  Mo.  395 532 

v.  Weston,  34  N.  Y.  S.  557 

145 
v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co. 

126  N.  Car.  712   94 

Smitson  v.   Southern  P.  Co.   37 

Ore.  74 244 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXV 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Smoke,  &c.  Co.  v.  Lyford,   123 

111.  300 286 

Smurr  v.  S.   88  Ind.  504 

4,  11,  70,  755 

Snell  v.  S.  50  Ind.  516 324 

Snider  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  63  Mo. 

376 588 

Snolley  v.  Hendrickson  29  N.  J. 

L.  371 157 

Snowden  v.   Town  of  Somerset, 

64  N.  Y.  S.  1088  347 

v.  Waterman,  105  Ga.  384 

26a,  309 

Snyder  v.  Lake  Shore,  &c.  R.  Co. 
Co.  (Mich.)  91  N.  W.  643 

119 

v.  Nelson,  31  Iowa,  238 347 

v.  S.  51  Ind.  Ill    296 

v.  S.  59  Ind.  105 119 

v.  Wilson,  65  Mich.   336...      39 
Solomon  v.  City  Compress  Co.  69 

Miss.   319    116 

v.  Trisarri,  9  N.  Mex.  480..    126 
Solomon   v.   Reis,   5   Ohio  C.   C. 

375 38 

v.  Yrissarri,  9  N.  Mex.  480 

136 
Sommer  v.  Gilmore,  168  Pa.  St. 

117 40 

v.  Huber,  183  Pa.  St.   162.      39 
Sommers  v.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co. 

01  Fed.  337    189 

Soney  v.  S.  13  Lea  (Tenn.)  472 

26a,  245 
Sonka  v.  Sonka  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

75   S.  W.  325    25 

Sonnefield  v.  Mayton    (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)    39  S.  W.   166    ....    198 

South  v.  P.  98  111.  263 320 

South  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Du- 
freene,  200  111.  464 

68,  235,  243 

South  Covington  &  C.  St.  R.  Co. 
v.    Stroth,    23    Ky.    L.   R. 

1807 * 97 

Southerland  v.  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   50  S.  W. 

195   549 

v.  Venard,   34   Ind.   390 4 

Southern   Bell    T.    &    T.    Co.   v. 

Mayo,  133  Ala.  641   ..49,  113 
Southern    Ind.    R.    Co.   v.   Davis 

(Ind.) 9  6  N.  E.  554  25 

v.  Harrell  (Ind.  App.)   66  N. 
E.  1016 25,  70 


Southern  Ind.  R.  Co.  v.  Peyton, 

157    Ind.    690.. 53,    115,    633 
Southern  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hudson, 

113  Ga.  434 206 

v.  White,  58  Ark.  277   186 

Southern   Pac.    Co.    v.    Ammons 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   26  S.  W. 

135   195 

v.  Smith,  95  Va.   190..  652,  653 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Bryan,   115 

Ga.  659 204 

v.  Coursey,  115  Ga.  602.. 8,  26 
v.  O'Bryan  (Ga.)  45  S.  E. 

1001    94,   205 

v.  Hageman,  121  Fed.  262.  25 
v.  Howell,  135  Ala.  639..  66,  68 
v.  Kendrick,  40  Miss.  374.  170 
v.  Longbridge,  114  Ga.  173 

7 
v.  Reaves  (Ala.)  29  So.  594 

223 

v.  Smith,  95  Va.  189.. 565,  570 
Southwestern    T.    &    T.    Co.    v. 
Newman   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

34  S.  W.  661 79 

Soyer  v.  Great  Falls  Water  Co. 

1 5  Mont.   1    121 

Spahn  v.  P.   137  111.  543 20,206 

Sparf  v.  U.  S.   156  U.  S.  51 

112,   153,   165,  269 
Sparks  v.  Dawson,  47  Tex.  138 

204 

v.  S.   Ill  Ga.  380   48 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  86 

48,  275,  318 
Spaulding  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co. 

98   Iowa,   219    650 

Spear  v.  Sweeney,  88  Wis.  545 

176 
Spears  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  527 

21,   71 
v.  Town    of    Mt.    Ayr,     66 

Iowa,  721 363 

v.  U.  S.  81  Fed.  694 351 

Speir  v.  P.  122  111.  1   .105 

Spence  v.  Huckins,  208  111.  309 

25,  48 

Spencer  v.  S.  50  Ala.  124 325 

v.  Terry's  Estate  (Mich.)  94 

N.  W.   372    247 

Spensley  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co. 

62  Wis.  453   203 

Sperry  v.  Spaulding,  45  Cal.  544 

245 
Spicer  v.  S.  105  Ala.  123.. 210,  221 


CXXXV1 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Spies  v.  P.  122  111.  1 

3,  235,  709,  718,  722,  760 

Spigner  v.  S.  103  Ala.  30 196 

Spitalera  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co. 

25  N.  Y.  S.  919   94 

Spradley  v.  S.  80  Miss.  82 80 

Spraggins   v.   S.    (Ala.)    35    So. 

1003 66,  80,  297 

Sprague,  Warner  &  Co.  v.  Ha- 

zenwinkle,  53   111.  419...    467 
Springdale    Cemetery    Asso.    v. 

Smith,  24  111.  481    19,  70 

Springer  v.  City  of  Chicago,  135 

111.   552/560    363 

Springfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Punten- 

ney,  200  111.  9   239 

Springfield,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoeff- 
ner,  175  111.  642.. 58,  104, 

119,  238,  565,  652,  653 
v.  Puntenney,    200    111.    12 

126,  238,  363 
Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Robi- 

zas,  207  111.  22   363 

v.  Rowatt,  196  111.  156 241 

Sproul    v.    City   of    Seattle,    17 

Wash.    256    Ill 

St.  Clair  M.  S.  Co.  v.  City  of  St. 

Clair,   96  Mich.   463    25 

St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
rows, 62  Kas.  89    234 

v.  Dawson,  7  Kas.  App.  466 

14 

St.    Louis    &    S.   W.   R.   Co.   v. 
Ball,  28  Tex.  Cv.  App.  287 

33 
v.   Byas,    12   Tex.   Cv.   App. 

657 7 

v.  Casedy  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  40 

S.   W.    198    184 

v.  Cates,    15   Tex.   Cv.   App. 

135 588 

v.  Ferguson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

64  S.  W.  797   25,  71 

v.  Hughes    (Tex.   Cv.   App.) 

.     73  S.  W.  976 7 

v.  McAdams  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

68  S.  W.  319   94 

v.  McCullough       (Tex.      Cv. 

App.)   32  S.  W.  285 193 

v.  Silbey   (Tex.  Cv.  App.  68 

S.  W.  516   191,  198 

v.  Smith  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   63 

S.  W.  1064  .  .   , 192 

v.  Smith  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  77 
S.  W.  28 529 


St.    Louis    &    S.    W.    R.    Co.    v. 
Spivey     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

73    S.   W.   973 191 

St.  Louis,  &c.  Co.  v.  Union,  &c. 

Bank,  209  111.  457   385 

St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Beecher, 

65  Ark.  44   247 

v.  Magness,  68  Ark.  289...  244 
-v.  Norton  (Ark.)  73  S.  W. 

1095 351 

v.  Parks     (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

73  S.  W.  439   194 

v.  Philpot   (Ark.)    77    S.  W. 

901     80 

St.  Louis,  &c.  Yards  v.  Godfrey, 
198   111.   294 

74,  542,  543,  638,  655 

St.  Louis  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v. 

Barrett   152  111.   168    ....     25 

v.  Bauer  156  111.  106   133 

v.  Holman,   155  111.  21 53 

v.  Manley,  58  111.  304    ..81,  94 

v.  Odurn,  156  111.  78 238 

St.  Louis  B.  Co.  v.  Miller,    138 

111.    475   238 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

Baker,   67    Ark.    531 236 

v.  Britz,  72  111.  256 119 

v.  Cantrell,   37   Ark.  523 

522,  566 

v.  Hecht,  38  Ark.  357....  347 
v.  Kirby,  104  111.  345 

114,   196 
v.  Neal     (Ark.)     78    S.    W. 

220 122 

v.  Phillips,  66  Fed.  35.211,223 
v.  Vickers,  122  U.  S.  360.  189 
v.  Warren,  65  Ark.  619..  30 
v.  Woodward,  70  Ark.  441 

80,  244 
St.   Louis,   K.   C.   &  N.    R.    Co. 

v.   Cleary,    77    Mo.    634....     94 
St.  Louis.  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis     U.     Stock     Yards 
(Mo.)    29    S.  W.   399 

192,    195 
Staats   v.    Byers,    73    N.    Y.    S. 

893    80 

Stafford    v.    City   of  Oskaloosa, 

57   Iowa/ 748 90 

Stalling*   v.    Newman,   26    Ala. 

304. .491,  492,  493,  496,  500 
Standard.  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davis, 

59  Kas.   521 351 

v.  Schmaltz,   66  Ark.   588..      71 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXVll 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Stanfield  v.  Phoenix  L.  Asso.  53 

Mo.  App.   595 118 

Stanley  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  &c.  R. 
Co.   119  Iowa,   52,6 

216,  652,  653 
v.  Montgomery,      102      Ind. 

102 209,  308 

v.  Sutherland,   54  Ind.   339 

41 
Stanton  v.    Southern  R.  Co.   56 

S.    Car.    398 27 

Starch  v.  S.  63   Ind.   283 815 

Starr  v.  U.  S.  164  U.  S.  627 

119,    170,   317 
Starrette  Co.  v.  O'Rourke,    172 

111.    177    25 

State  Nat.   Bank  v.    Bennett,   8 

Ind.  App.   679 43 

Statford    v.    Goldring,    197    111. 

156   85 

Stauning  v.  Great  N.  R.  Co.  88 

Minn.   480 6 

Staylor  v.  Ball,  24  Md.  190...  415 
Stayner  v.  Joyce,  120  Ind.  99.  232 
Steadman  v.  Keets,  129  Mich. 

669    195 

Stearnes   v.   Farrand,   60   N.  Y. 

S.    501   145 

v.  Johnson,    17   Minn.    142.    360 
Stebbins  v.  Keene  Tp.   55  Mich. 

552   154 

Steed  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    67 

S.   W.   328 85 

Steele  v.  Davis,  75  Ind.  197 

193,    507 

v.   P.  45  111.  157 340 

Steen  v.   Sanders,   116  Ala.   155 

213 
Steers  v.  Holmes,  79  Mich.  434 

415 
Stein  v.  Vanice,  44   Neb.   132 

71,    243 
Steiner    v.    Jeffries,     118    Ala. 

573    80 

v.  P.  187  111.  245. .21,  256,  773 
Steinmeyer  v.  P.  95  111.  389 

195,  250.  256 
Stell  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    58 

S.  W.   75 258 

Stephan     v.    Metzger,     95     Mo. 

App.   609   87 

Stephens  v.  Anderson    (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)    36   S.  W.   1000.  .  .      26 
v.  Koken  Barber  S.  Co.   67 

Mo.   App.    587 137 

v.  Porter,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
556   .  .    197 


Stephens  v.  S.  10  Tex.  App.  120 
Stephenson  v.  S.    110  Ind.  358 


170 


v.  Stephenson,      62      Iowa, 

166    696 

v.  Wright,  111  Ala.  579   ..    196 
Sterling  Hydraulic  Co.  v.  Will- 
iams,  66    111.    400 545 

Sterling  Organ  Co.  v.  House,  25 

W.  Va.   65 18 

Stern  v.  Frommer,   30   N.  Y.  S. 

1067    125 

v.  P.    102    111.    555 192 

Sternberg    v.    Mailhos,    99    Fed. 

43    360 

Steven  v.  Talcott,   1 1   Vt.   25...    171 
Stevens  v.  Com.   20   Ky.  L.   R. 

48    25 

v.   Com.   20  Ky.  L.  R.   544 

260 

v.  Maxwell,  65  Kas.  835.. 53,  90 
v.  Metzger,     95    Mo.    App. 

609    80 

v.  Minneapolis,     42     Minn. 

136    211 

v.  Pendleton,       94       Mich. 

405   199 

v.  S.    133  Ala.   28 88 

v.  S.    (Ala.)    35   So.    124.  .    780 

v.  S.   65  Miss.   330 837 

v.  S.    19   Neb.   650 772 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   49  S. 

W.    105 84,   280 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    58  S. 

W.   96    25 

v.   Stevens,   127   Ind.   560..    200 
v.  Walton    (Colo.  App.)    68 

Pac.   834    80 

Stevenson  v.   Chicago   &  N.    W. 

R.  Co.   94  Iowa,   719 45 

v.  Elberrale    Coal    Co.    201 

Pa.   St.    121 672 

v.  U.   S.    86    Fed.    106  259 

v.  U.   S.    162   U.  S.   313...    272 
Stewart  v.  Anderson,   111  Iowa, 

329    206 

v.  De  Loach,   86  Ga.   729..    321 
v.  Fowler,    37    Kas.    679...    439 

v.  Mills,    18    Fla.    57 44 

v.  Nelson.  79  Mo.  522 197 

v.  S.  133  Ala.  105 724 

v.  S.  22  Ohio  St.  478 340 

v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  174 

289.  290 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  77 

S.  W.  791 304 


cxxxvni 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Stewart  v.   Schall,   63  Md.   294 
438,   439,   443, 

Stickney's  Will,  104  Wis.  581. 
Stiles  v.  Neillsville  Milling  Co. 

87    Wis.    266 

Stillwell  v.  Gray,  17  Ark.  473. 

Stitz  v.  S.  104  Ind.  359 

Stoball  v.   S.    116  Ala.  452 

Stobie  v.  Dills,   62   111.  432 

Stocker  v.  Green,  94  Mo.  280.. 
Stocks  v.  Scott,  188  111.  266.. 
Stockslager  v.  U.  S.  116  Fed. 

(C.  C.)    599 

25,  715,  843, 
Stockwell  v.  S.  27  Ohio  St.  566 

Stoffer  v.  S.   15  Ohio  St.   47... 

Stokes  v.  P.  53  N.   Y.    183 

v.  Ralph    Tp.    187    Pa.    St. 
333 

v.  Saltonstall,    13    Pet.    (U. 

S.)    181   , 

Stoll  v.  Loving,  120  Fed.  805.. 
Stondt  v.  Shepherd,  73  Mich. 

58 

Stone  v.  S.  105  Ala.  60..  113, 
Stone  &  ±larrison  v.  Fesselman, 

23   Ind.  App.   293 

Stoneking  v.  S.   118  Ala.   70 

253, 
Stoner  v.  Mau   (Wyo.)    73   Pac. 

548   

v.  Millikin,  85  111.   218 

Story  v.   S.   99   Ind.   413 

Stough  v.  Ogden,  49  Neb.  291. 
Stout  v.  S.  90  Ind.  12 

707.  716, 
Stover  v.  P.  56  N.  Y.  317 

222, 
Stowell  v.  Moore,  89  111.  563.. 


528 
80 

107 

172 
301 
269 
182 
116 
200 


844 

98 
.218 
337 

70 

538 
118 

187 
318 

356 

783 

363 
415 
260 
353 

730 

266 
47 

Stowers  v.  Singer,  24  Ky.  395.  244 
Strader  v.  Monroe,  202   Pa.  St. 

626 480,  482 

Strahle  v.  First  Nat.   Bank,   47 

Neb.    319    127 

Stratton    v.    Central     City,    &c. 

Co.  95   111.  32 56,  250 

v.  Dale,  45  Neb.  472 243 

Straus  v.  Minzesheeiner,  78  111. 

497    80 

Street  v.  S.  67  Ala.  87 63 

Street  R.  Co.  v.  Bolton,  43  Ohio 

St.   226    560 

v.  Stone,   54  Kas.  83 . .  14 

Stribling  v.   Prettyman,    57    111. 

377    156 


Strickt'adden     v.     Yipprick,     49 

111.    288   347 

Strickland   v.   S.   98   Ga.   84.... 3.    6 

v.   S.    1,15   Ga.   222 228 

Stringam    v.    Parker,     159    111. 

310    53,   71 

Stringer  v.  Singleteny   (Tex.  Cv. 

App.)    23  S.  W.   1117...      96 
Stringham  v.  Cook,  75  Wis.  590 

13 

Strohm  v.  Hayes,  70  111.  41 243 

Strong  v.  S.  95   Ga.    499 243 

v.  S.  61  Neb.  35 

206,  221,  366,  367 
Stroud  v.    Simith,    194    Pa.    St. 

502   71 

Stryker  v.  Goodnow,   123  U.  S. 

527    48 

Stuart  v.  Line,   1 1  Pa.  Sup.  Ct. 

345   90 

v.  Mitchum,    135    Ala.    546 

25 

v.  P.   42   Mich.    260 324 

Stuck    v.    Yates,    30    Ind.    App. 

441   244 

Stumer   v.    Pitchman,    124    111. 

250   65 

Stumph  v.  Miller,   142  Ind.  446 

47 

Stumps  v.  Kelly,  22  111.  140..  3 
Stutsman  v.  Ter.  7  Okla.  490..  222 
Suddeth  v.  S.  112  Ga.  407 

80,  290,   321 

Sugar  Creek  Min.   Co.  v.  Peter- 
son,   177    HI.    329 80,    192 

Sullivan  v.  Brooks,  31  N.  Y.  S. 

36    124 

v.  Collins,  107  Mich.  291.  63 
v.  Eddy,  164  111.  391  ....  113 
v.  Jefferson  Ave.  R.  Co. 

133   Mo.    1 243 

v.  McManers,   45    N.   Y.   S. 

1079    261. 

v.   Market   St.    R.    Co.    136 

Cal.   479    191 

v.  P.  114  111.  27 226,  227 

v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  Co.  30 

Pa.   St.   234 .-.    538 

v.  S.    117    Ala.   214 48 

v.  S.   52  Ind.  309 295 

v.  S.  80  Miss.   596 101,  255 

v.  S.  9  Ohio  C.  C.   652....    229 

v.  S.   100  Wis.  283 277 

Suiter  v.   S.    76   Ga.    105 296 

Sulyewski   v.    Windholz,    30   N. 

Y.   S.   230 124 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CXXX1X 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Summerlot    v.     Hamilton,     121 

Ind.  91   247 

Summitt  Coal  Co.  v.   Shaw,    16 

Ind.   App.   9 7 

Sumner  v.  S.    109  Ga.   142 272 

v.  S.  5   Blackf.   (Ind.)    579 

299 
Sumpter    v.    S.    (Fla.j     33    So. 

981    204 

Sunberg   v.    Babcock,    66    Iowa, 

519    514 

Sunnyside,  &c.  Co.  v.  Reitz,   14 

Ind.    App.    478 126 

Sunset  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Day,   70 

Fed.    364    236 

Supreme    Council   C.    K.   v.   Fi- 
delity &   C.   Co.    63    Fed. 

48    117 

Surber    v.    Mayfleld,     156    Ind. 

375    200 

Susquehana,  &c.  Co.   v.  Malone, 

73   Md.   268 681 

Suther  v.  S.   118  Ala.  88 102 

Sutherland  v.  Hankins,  56  Ind. 

343    4 

v.  Holliday    (Neb.)     90    N. 

W.   937   118 

v.  S.    148    Ind.    695 7 

v.  Venard,    34    Ind.    390 

13,   358 

Sutherlin  v.  S.   148  Ind.  695...    721 
Suttle  v.  Finnegan,  86  111.  App. 

423    245 

Sutton    v.    Madre,    47    N.    Car. 

320    85 

Swaggert  v.  Ter.  6  Okla.  344..       13 

Swan  v.  P.  98  111.  612 250 

v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  531 

269 

Swann  v.  S.   64  Md.  423 168 

Swanson  v.  Menominee  E.  L.  R. 
&   P.  Co.    113   Mich.   603 

141 
Swearingen    v.    Inman,     198    111. 

255    243 

Sweenie  v.  S.   59   Neb.   269....    247 
Sweet  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  S.  P.  R. 

Co.   6   S.  Dak.   281 131 

v.  Excelsior    E.    Co.    57    N. 

J.    L.    224 94 

Swensen  v.  Bender,  114  Fed.  1.      25 
Swift  &  Co.  v.  Fue,  167  HI.  443 

120.    123 
v.  Rutkowski,  167   111.   159 

250,   363 
v.  Williams,   2   Ind.   366...    399 


Switzer  v.  Norton,  38  N.  Y.  S. 

350    145 

Swope  v.  S.    115  Ala.  40 251 

Sword  v.  Keith,  31  Mich.  247 

28,    87 

Sykes  v.  P.  127   111.  117 55 

Symmes,  v.  Brown,  13  Ind.  318 

158 
Syndicate  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cutchings, 

104    Ala.    176 351 


T 


Taft  v.  Wildman,  15  Ohio,  123 
Talbort  v.  Mearns,  21  Mo.  427 

Talbotton  R.  Co.  v.  Gibson,  106 
Ga.  229 130, 

Tanderup  v.  Hansen,  8  S.  Dak. 
375  

Tapley  v.  Tapley,  10  Minn.  458 

Tarbell    v.    Forbes,    177     Mass. 

238 206,  211, 

Tate  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  77 

S.  W.  796 

v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  231 

Tathwell  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rap- 
ids, 114  Iowa,  180 

Tatum  v.  Mohr.   21   Ark.  349.. 

v.  S.    131    Ala.    32 

v.  S.    61    Neb.    229 

Tawma   Coal  Co.  v.  Bradley,   2 

Wash.    606    

Taylor  v.  Bartholomew   (Idaho) 

53    Pac.    325 

v.  Burrell,  7  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

461    

v.  Corley,   113  Ala.   580... 
v.  Cox,    153    111.   228 

21,   211, 
v.  Felder,   5    Tex.  Cv.  App. 

417 

v.  Felsing,    164   111.   331 
25.  183,  231.  368,  382, 

v.  Laden,   33  Mo.   205 

v.  Pegram,    151   111.   117 

25, 

v.  Pullen,  152  Mo.  434 

v.  S.  97  Ga.  432 

v.  S.  105  Ga.  746  

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  42  S. 
W.  285 25. 


6 

19 
142 
120 
527 
221 
376 
258 

100 
211 
327 
310 

410 
126 

191 
130 

692 
94 

620 
660 

696 

347 

26 

6 


cxl 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Taylor  v.  Scherpe  &  K.  A.  T.  Co. 

133   Mo.    349 196 

v.  Ter.   (Ariz.)    64  Pac.  423 

265 
Teague    v.    Lindsey,     106    Ala. 

266    66 

Tedbetter   v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.)    32 

S.   W.   903 109 

Tedens    v.    Sanitary    Dist.    149 

111.  87 241 

v.  Schumers,    112   111.   268.    383 
Teel  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  App.)    67 

S.  W.    531 255 

Telegraph    Co.    v.    Lowrey,    32 

Neb.  732 243 

Telker  v.  S.  54  Ark.  489 215 

Templeton   v.    Green    (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    25   S.   W.   1073...        8 
Ten  Eyck  v.  Witbeck,  55   App. 

Div.    (N.  Y.)    165 94 

Tennessee   Coal,   I.   &  R.   Co.   v. 
Stevens  (Ala.)    16  So.  22 

120 
Tennessee,    C.    J.    &    R.    Co.    v. 

Stevens,   115  Ala.  461...    129 
Tensing  v.   S.    (Tex.    Cr.  App.) 

45   S.  W.   572 296 

Terre     Haute,     &c.     R.     Co.     v. 

Brunker,    128   Ind.   551..    652 
v.  Eggman,    159  111.   550 

119,   231,   233 
v.  Hybarger,    67    111.    App. 

480   44 

v.Jackson,    81    Ind.    19...    187 
v.  MeCorKle,   140  Ind.   613 

349 
Terrell    v.    McCowen,    91    Tex. 

231    26 

v.  Rittenhouse,  28  Ind.  App. 

633   71 

v.  Russell,  16  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

573  .  .    80,   196 

Terrill  v.  Tillson   (Vt.)    54  Atl. 

187   27 

Territory  v.  Baca  (N.  Mex.)  71 
Pac.    460 

3,  55,  102.  255,  767 
v.  Baker,  4  N.  Mex.  236..  44 
v.  Burgess,  8  Mont.  57 

52,   336,    339 

v.  Chavez,  8  N.  Mex.  528..    288 
v.    Claypool    (N.   Mex:)    71 

Pac.   463    82 

v.  Cordova    (N.    Mex.)     68 

Pac.   919   44 

v.  De    Gutman    8   N.   Mex. 
92    .  88 


Territory  v.  Friday,   8  N.  Mex. 

204 270 

v.  Gatliff    (Okla.)    37    Pac. 

809    214,   268 

v.  Gonzales    (N.    Mex.)    68 

Pac.  925... 23,  213,  226,  258 
v.  Griego,  8  N.  Mex.  133..  188 
v.  Guillen  (N.  Mex.)  66 

Pac.  527   86 

v.  Harper,   1    Ariz.   399 14 

v.  Lermo,  8  N.  Mex.  566..  303 
v.  Leyba  (N.  Mex.)  47 

Pac.   718   215 

v.  Lucero,  8  N.  Mex.  543 

178,  21-9 

v.  Mahaffey,  3  Mont.  116..  284 
v.  O'Hare,  1  N.  Dak.  30..  208 
v,  Padilla,  8  N.  Mex.  510.  270 
v.  Turner  (Ariz.)  31  Pac. 

368    192 

v.  Vialpando,     8     N.     Mex. 

211    270 

Terry  v.  Beatrice  Starch  Co.  43 

Neb.   866   195 

v.  Buffington,  11  Ga.  337.  696 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  66 

S.  W.  451 80 

v.  Shively,  64  Ind.  112....      94 
Tettle  v.  S.   fTex.  Cr.  App.)    31 

S.  W.    677 93 

Texarkana   &  Ft.   S.   R.   Co.    v. 

Spencer,  28  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

251    8 

Texas,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Ballinger 

(Tex.    Cv.    App.)     40    S. 

W.   822   200 

v.  Birchfield,    12    Tex.    Cv. 

App.    145 53 

v.  Brick,   83   Tex.   598 619 

v.  Burnett,  80  Tex.  536...  183 
v.  Carr  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  42 

S.   W.    126 627 

v.  Cody,    67   Fed.    71 8 

v.  Durrett,  2  6  Tex.  Cv.   App. 

268   170 

v.  Durrett,  24  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

103   84,   106 

v.  Echols,  17  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

677   198 

v.  Gentry,  163  U.  S.  353..  196 
v.  Gevin  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

68   S.  W.   721: 80 

v.  Gray  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  71 

S.  W.  316 94 

v.  Johnson,  75  Tex.  161..  640 
v.  Jones  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

39    S.  W.    124 191 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxli 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Texas,  &c.  R,  Co.  v.  McCoy,   90 

Tex.    264    ' 71 

v.  Magill,  15  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

353    7 

v.  Mitchell    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

26    S.  W.   154 43 

v.  Moore,    8    Tex.    Cv.   App. 

289    172 

v.  Mortenen    (Tex.   Cv. 

App.  66  S.  W.  99 90,   191 

v.  Nelson,   9    Tex.   Cv.  App. 

156    183 

v.  Nolan.    62    Fed.    552 243 

v.  Reed   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)    32 

S.   W.    118 243 

v.  Robinson,,     4     Tex.     Cv. 

App.    121    6 

v.  Scott,    30   Tex.   Cv.   App. 

496    238 

v.  Smissen    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

73  S.  W.   42 20 

v.  Terns   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  77 

R.    W.   231 569 

v.  Vaughan,     16     Tex.    Cv. 

App.  403   94 

Texas     Brew.     Co.     v.     Walters 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.)     43    S. 

W.    548    360 

v.  Watson,   112  Fed.   402..        7 
Texas  Loan  Agency   v.   Fleming 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.)     46    S. 

W.    63 119 

Tharp  v.   S.   15  Ala.   749 361 

Thatcher  v.  Quirk,  4  Idaho,  267.      19 
Thayer   County    Bank   v.    Hud- 
dleston    (Neb.)    95   N.  W. 

471    196 

Thiede  v.  P.  159  U.  S.  510.  .  .  .    351 
v.  Utah,    159   U.   S.   510...    347 
Thill  v.   Hoyt,  56  N.  Y.  S.  78.    127 
Thirkfield    v.    Mountain    V.    C. 

Asso.    12    Utah,    76 358 

Thistle    v.    Frostburg    Coal    Co. 

10  Md.    129 3 

Thorn  v.  Pittard,   62  Fed.   232.    351 
Thomas  v.  Gary,  26  Colo.  485.    120 
v.  Gates,    126   Cal.    1 

48,   71,  223 

v.  S.   103  Ala.   18 102 

v.  S.    126   Ala.   4 48,   80,   94 

v.  S.  133  Ala.  139.27,  63,  192 
v.  S.  95  Ga,  484.... 7,  68,  220 
v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cr.  App.  386 

254 

v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)     73 
S.    W.    1045...  .    290 


Thomas  v.  Union  R.  Co.   45  N. 

Y.  S.  920 348 

Thomley  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

118  Ill 

Thompson  v.  Anderson,  86  Iowa, 

703  80 

v.  Avery,  11  Utah,  214...  144 

v.  Boden,  81  Ind.  176 118 

v.  Brannin,  19  Ky.  L.  R. 

454  196 

v.  Brerman,  104  Wis.  564.  145 
v.  Com.  88  Va.  45... 322,  324 

v.  Duff,  119  111.  226 20,  86 

v.  Force,  65  111.  370.. .66,  243 
v.  Johnson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

58  S.  W.  1030 172 

/  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  51 

Neb.  527  125 

v.  O'Conner,  115  Ga.  120.  27 

v.  P.  6  Colo.  496 25 

v.  P.  125  111.  261 243 

v.  S.  106  Ala.  67 208,  223 

v.  S.  131  Ala.  18 295 

v.  S.  73  Miss.  584 317 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  30 

S.  W.  667 236 

v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  217 

v.  Security,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  63 

S.  Car.  290 347, 

v.  Simpson,  128  N.  Y.   270 

v.  U.  S.  157  U.  S.  271.... 
Thork  v.  Goewy,  85  111.  616.. 
Thorn  v.  Cosand,  160  Ind.  566 

Thome  v.  McVeagh,   75  111.  81. 
Thornton     v.     Perry,     105     Ga. 

837    

v.  S.   113  Ala.   43 

v.  S.    20   Tex.   App.    535.  .. 

v.  Thornton,  39  Vt.   122... 

Thorp  v.  Carvalho,  36  N.  Y.  S. 

1    

Thorton  v.  S.  117  Wis.  338.  . 


304 
351 

145 

257 

1 

7 
408 

141 
306 
744 
211 

25 
110 


Thrall  v.  Wilson,  17  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  376  67 

Thrawley  v.  S.  153  Ind.  375 

25,  71,  374 

Threadgill  v.  Commissioners, 

116  N.  Car.  616 175 

Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  Hoff- 
man, 86  Minn.  30 8 

Throckmorten  v.  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  14  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  222 198 

Tibbe  v.  Kamp,   154  Mo.   545..    113 


cxlii 


TABLE     OF     CASES. 


( References  are  to  Sections.) 


Tichenor    v.   Newman,    186    111. 

264 
Tidwell  v.   New  South  B.   &  L. 

Asso.   Ill   Ga.   807 

v.  S.   (Tex    Cv.  App.)   48  S. 

W.    184   

v.  S.  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.   38. 
Tiffiany    v.    Com.     121    Pa.    St. 

180    

Tigerina  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

302    

Tillery   v.   S.   99    Ga.   209    

Tillinghast  v.  McLeod,  17  R.  I. 

208    

Tillman    v.    St.    Louis    Tr.    Co. 

(Mo.  App.)  77  S.  W.  321 

544, 

Tilly  v.  Hudson,  &c.   R.  Co.   29 

N.  Y.   252 

Timmons  v.  S.  34  Ohio  St.  426 

Tinney  v.  New  Jersey  Steamboat 
Co.  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
3 

Tischler  v.  Kurtz,  35  Fla.  323. 

Tittle  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
96 

Tobey  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N. 
R.  Co.  94  Iowa,  256 

Tobias  v.  Tn'est,    103   Ala.   664 

Tobin  v.  Gregg,  34  Pa.  St.  446 

v.  P.    101    111.    123 

Todd    v.    Banner,    7    Ind.    App. 

368 113,    478, 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   44  S. 

W.   1096  

Toledo,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  145 

111.    159 21,'    153, 

v.  Bray,    57    111.    514 

v.  Cline,    135    111.    48 

v.  Ingraham,    77    111.    313 
80, 

v.  Larmon,    67   111.    71 

v.  Lockhart,     71     111.     630, 

568       

v.  Maine.    67    111.    299 

v.  Patterson,    63   111.   306.. 
v.  Schuckman,   50   Ind.    42. 

Toler  v.  S.   16  Ohio  St.  585 

Toll  v.  S.  40   Fla.    169 

Toilet  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    55 

S.   W.   335 

Toluca.  M.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Haws, 
194  111.  92 


63 
136 

320 
293 

329 

252 

274 

131 

549 
649 
808 

211 

48 

326 
25 

347 

157 
44 

531 
800 

155 
646 
250 

639 

248 

589 
567 

80 
247 
323 

25 

278 
238 


Tomle  v.  Hampton,  129  111.  384 

238 
Tomlinson  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

43  S.  W.  332 294,  295 

v.  Wallace,    16    Wis.   234..    347 
Tompkins  v.  Gardner,   69   Mich. 

58    156 

v.  Montgomery,      123      Cal. 

219    80,    163 

Toole  v.  Bearce,  91  Me.   209...    196 

Toops  v.  S.  92  Ind.   16 716 

Toplitz  v.  Bauer,  161  N.  Y.  325 

71 
Torey   v.   S.    41     Tex.    Cr.    App. 

543    229 

Torres  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    55 

S.  W.  828   196,  291 

Totten  v.  Burhans,   103  Mich.  6   144 
Tower   v.    McFarland    (Neb.)    96 

N.   W.    172 94 

v.  Haslam,  84  Me.  86 27 

Towle     v.      Stimpson     Mill     Co. 

(Wash.)  74  Pac.  471....  80 
Town  of  Boswell  v.  Wakley,  149 

Ind.  64    480 

Town    of   Elkhart    v.    Ritter,    66 

Ind.     136 594 

Town   of   Evans   v.   Dickey,    117 

111.    291     116 

Town  of  Fox,  v.  Town  of  Ken- 
dall 97  111.  80   284 

Town    of    Havana    v.    Biggs,    58 

111.    483    200 

Town    of    Noblesville    v.    Vestal, 

118  Ind.  80    14 

Town  of  Vinegar  Hill  v.  Busson, 

42  111.   45    238 

Town     of     West     Oovington     v. 

Schultz,     16    Ky.    L.    R. 

831       236 

Town    of    Wheatfield    v.    Grund- 

mann,   164  111.  250 102 

Town  of  Wheaton  v.  Hadley,  131 

111.  644   48 

Town   of   Windsor   v.    Stockdate, 

95   Md.    196    83 

Towns  v.  S.  Ill  Ala.  1.60,  322,  323 
Townsend's  Estate,  In  re  (Iowa) 

97  N.  W.  111.  183,703.  704 
Tozer  v.  Hersbey,  15  Minn.  257.  321 
Trabue  v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R. 

2135    255 

Tracy   v.   Hacket,    19    Ind.    App. 

133     6 

Traders  Deposit  Bank  v.  Henry, 

20  Ky.  L.  R.  1506  4 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cxliii 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Trager    v.    Shepherd    (Miss.)     18 

So.    122 197 

Trask  v.    P.    104   111.   569    104 

Travelers'    Ins.    Co.    v.    Harvey, 

82    Va.    951    422,423 

v.    Randolph,    78    Fed.    754 

121,    124,    129 
Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  R.  Co.    25 

Wash.  244 

529,  634,  639,  640,  644,  530 
Travers  v.  U.  S.,  6  App.  Cas.  (D. 

C.)     450     25 

Traxler    v.'  Greenwich    Tp.    168 

Pa.    St.    214    244 

Traylor    v.    Townsend,    61    Tex. 

147     25 

Treat  v.  Bates,  27  Mich.,  390.  211 
Treece  v.  American  Asso.  (C.  C. 

A.)    122   Fed.    598    189 

Treiber  v.  Burrows,  27  Md.    132 

435 
Treschman  v.  Treschman,  28  Ind. 

App.    206    7-,    367 

Tresh  v.  Newell,  62  111.  196 1 

Trezevant    v.   Rains     (Tex.    Civ. 

App.)    25  S.  W.   1092 32 

Trimble  v.   Ter.    (Ariz.)    71    Pac. 

932    368 

Trinity  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Schofield, 

72  Tex.  496    1 

Triolo  v.  Foster  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 

57   S.  W.  698 109,   198 

Trish  v.  Newell,  62  111.  202..  694 
Trodgen  v.  Deckard,  47  Ind. 

358,    472 
Trogdon  v.  S.  133  Ind.   7..  796,  802 

Troy  v.  Rogers,  113  Ala.  131..  48 
Troy  Min.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  15  S. 

Dak.  238 250 

Truelove  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

71  S.  W.  601  289 

Truesdale  v.  Ford,  37  HI.  210.  .659 
Trumble  v.  Happy,  114  Iowa 

624  53 

Trumbull  v.  Erickson,  97  Fed. 

'891  25,113 

Truskett  v.  Bronaugh  (Indian 

Ter.)  76  S.  W.  294 126 

Truslow  v.  S.  95  Tenn.  189 80 

Trustees  v.  McCormick  &  Bros. 

41  111.    323    48 

Truxton  v.  Dait  Stayle  Co.  (Del.) 

42  Atl.   131   '. 196 

Tubbs  v.  Ogden,  46  Iowa.   137.    869 
Tuberson  v.    S.    26    Fla.    472..    288 


Tucker  v.  Call,  45  Ind.  31    500 

v.  S.    114    Ga.    61     56,  228 

v.  S.    89  Md.   472    649 

Tudor   v.    Com.     19    Ky.     L.     R. 

1039     255 

Tudor  Iron  Works  v.  Weber,  129 

111.    539    652 

Tully    v.    Despard,    31    W.    Va. 

370 17 

v.  Excelsior  Iron  Works,  115 

111.    544    80 

Tunnicliffe  v.  Fox   (Neb.)    94  N. 

W.     1032     198 

Turley  v.  Griffin,   106  Iowa,   161 

44 

Turly  v.  P.    188   111.   633 119 

Turner  v.  Com.  86  Pa.  St.  54..   328 

v.  Cook,    36    Ind.    129    696 

v.  First  Nat.   Bank,   78    Ind. 

19    158 

v.  Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)   30  S.  W. 

253     243 

v.  Goldsboro      Lumber      Co., 
119  N.  Car.   387    ......     347 

v.  S.     124   Ala.    59    65 

v.  S.     102   Ind.    427    714 

v.  Ter.    11  Okla.  660   86 

v.  Tootle,  9  Kas.  App.   765 

7 
Tusley  v.  White   (Ky.)    54  S.  W. 

'169    360 

Tutt  v.  Com.   20  Ky.  L.   R.  492 

282.   276 

Tuttle  v.  Wood,    115   Iowa,   507       7 
Tutwiler  Coal  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Ens- 

len,   129   Ala.   336    27 

Twining  v.  Martin,  65  111.  157.  .      20 
Tyler  v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  R.  Co. 

88  Va.   389 170,    613,621 

v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.    41   N. 

Y.    S.    523     207 

v.  Tyler,  78  Mo.  App.  240.  .    196 
Tyler,  Ullman  &  Co.  v.  Western 

U.  Tel.  Co.  60  111.  421  308 
Tyree  v.  Parham,  66  Aid.  424.  .  43 
Tyson  v.  Williamson,  96  Va. 

636    .  86 


U 


U.  S.  v.  Connelly,   1   Fed.  779..  189 

v.  Faulkner',  35  Fed.  731..  329 
v.  Fenwick,    4    Cranch     (U. 

S.)    680   765 


cxliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


U.  S.  v.  Folson,  7  N.  Mex.  532.  279 
v.  Harper,  33  Fed.  471...  299 
v.  Jackson,  29  Fed.  503..  295 

v.Keller,    19    Fed.    633 165 

v.  Long,    30   Fed.    678 840 

v.  Neverson,   1   Mackey    (D. 

C.)    154   288 

v.  Schneider,  21  D.  C.  381 

189 

v.  Sykes,  58  Fed.    1004....    288 
U.    S.   Brewing  Co.    v.   Stolten- 

berg,  211   111.  585 382 

U.    S.    Ex.    Co.    v.    Jenkins,    64 

Wis.    542    303 

LT.     S.     Fidelity    &    G.    Co.     v. 

Charles,   131   Ala.  657...   200 
U.    S.    Life   Ins.    Co.    v.   Lesser, 

126    Ala.    568 170 

U.    S.    Sugar    Refiner    v.    Prov. 
Steam  &  G.  P.  Co.  62  Fed. 

375   347 

Udell  v.  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  152 

Ind.   507 , 232 

Uhl   v.  Robison,   8  Neb.   272...    116 

Ulmer  v.  S.  14  Ind.  52 288 

Ulun  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    32 

S.   W.    699   255 

Underwood   v.   American   Mortg. 

Co.  97   Ga.  238 174 

v.  Hart,    23   Vt.    120 27 

v.  White,   45   111.    438 25 

v.  Wolf.  131  111.  425... 46,   249 
Union,   &c.  Ins.   Co.   v.  Buchan- 
an,  100  Ind.  63.86,   181,  308 
v.  Skipper,    115   Fed.   69...    307 
Union,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Callaghan, 

161    U.  S.   91 351 

v.  Ruzicka     (Neb.)      91     N. 

W.  543. .25,  80.,  86,   118,  244 
v.  Stanwood    (Neb.)    91    N. 

W.    191    12 

v.  Sternberger,  8  Kas.  App. 

131    53 

v.  Sue,   25    Neb.   779 567 

Union    Bank   v.    Stone,    50    Me. 

595    222 

Union  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Nixon,  199 

111.   235 48 

Union  Gold   Min.  Co.  v.  Craw- 
ford,  29   Co]o.   511 90 

Union   St.   R.   Co.   v.   Stone,    54 

Kas.    83    5 

Union    Tr.     Co.    v.    Vandercook 

(Ind.)    69   N.  E.  487 234 

v.  Vandercook,  32  Ind.  App. 
621    .  .    634 


University    Press    v.    Williams, 

62   N.  Y.  S.  986 145 

Unruh   v.   S.    105   Ind.    118 

209,  216 
Upchurch  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

39   S.    W.    371 281,   304 

Upstone   v.   P.    109   111.    169 

48,    ,    5,   782 
Utah   Optical   Co.   v.  Keith,    18 

Utah,   477 357 

Utterback  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R. 

1515  263 

v.  S.  153  Ind.  545... 357 


Vale  v.  P.  161  111.  310 215 

Valentine    v.    Hickle,     39    Ohio 

St.  23 460 

v.  Sweatt    (Tex.   Cv.   App.) 
78  S.   W.  385 196 

Valette  v.  Bilinski,  167  HI.  565 

124,    149 

Vanardsdale    v.   Hax,    107    Fed. 

878    171 

Vanardsdell's  Adm'r  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  <Jo.  23  Ky. 
L.  R.  1666 124 

Van    Bergen     v.    Eulberg,     111 

Iowa,    139 94 

Van  Brown  v.  S.  34  Tex.  186..   296 

Van  Buren  v.  S.  63  Neb.  453. .  .    225 

Van  Buskirk  v.  Day,  32  111.  266 

235 

Van  Camp  Hardware  Co.  v.  O'- 
Brien (Ind.  App.)  62  N. 
E.  464 191 

Vance  v.   S.    34    Tex.    Cr.  App. 

395   103 

v.Vance,    74    Ind.    370 126 

Vancleave    v.    Clark,    118    Ind. 

61    360 

Vanderhorst  Brewing  Co.  v. 
Armhine  (Md.)  56  Atl. 
834  . 


Van  Duzor  v.  Allen,  90  111.  499 


144 

170 
Van  Etten  v.  Edwards,  47  Neb. 

279  129 

Vanhousen  v.  Broehl,  59  Neb. 

48  243 

Vann  v.  S.  83  Ga.  44 295 

Van  Patton  v.  Beals,  46  Iowa, 

62  403 

Van  Pelt  v.  Davenport.  42  Iowa. 

314 348.   349 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlv 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Van    Straaten    v.    P.     26    Colo. 

184 816 

Van  Syoc  v.  S.   (Neb.)   96  N.  W. 

266    715 

Van    Winkle    v.    Chicago   M.    & 

St.    P.    R.    Co.    93    Iowa, 

509 118 

Varner  v.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co. 

108  Ga.  813 185 

Vanghan  v.  Com.  85  Va.  672 

337,  728,  781 

v.  S.  37  Ark.   1 304 

Vaughn  v.  Ferrall,  57  Ind.   182 

347 

v.  S.    130  Ala.   18 113 

v.  S.   88  Ga.  371 228 

Veach  v.  State,   60  Ind.   291...    100 

Veatch  v.  S.  56  Ind.    184 209 

Veneman  v.  McCurtain,  33  Neb. 

643 13 

Venway  v.   S.   41   Tex.   639 13 

Vetterly  v.  McNeal,    129   Mich. 

507    25 

Vick  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    69 

S.  W.    156 12 

Vickers  v.    Kennedy    (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    34    S.  W.   458 236 

Vider  v.  O'Brien,  62  Fed.  326.  351 
Vierling  v.  Iriquois  Furnace  Co. 

170   111.    189 117 

Village   v.    Altamont   v.   Carter, 

196   111.   286 21 

Village    of    Cullom    v.    Justice, 

161    II.    372 25 

Village   of   Fairbury   v.    Rogers, 

98    111.    554 182 

Village  of  Jefferson  v.  Chapman, 

127   111.  447 54 

Village   of  Monroeville  v.   Root, 

54   Ohio   St.   523 14,   538 

Village  of  Sheridan  v.  Hibbard, 

119    111.    307 56 

Village    of    Warren    v.    Wright, 

103    111.   298 113 

Villereal  v.    S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.) 

61   S.  W.   715 314 

Vincent  v.  S.    37    Neb.    672 340 

Vinson  v.  Scott,  198  111.  542..  243 
Virgie  v.  Stetson,  73  Me.  452..  113 
Virginia,  &c.  Co.  v.  Chalkley, 

98    Va,    62 '.  .    247 

Viser  v.  Bertrand,   14  Ark.  267 

3 
Vocke  v.  City  of  Chicago,   208 

111.    194 153,    380 

Voegeli  v.  Pickel.  Marble   &  G. 

Co.  56  Mo.  App.  678 132 


Voelckel  v.  Banner  Brew.  Co.  9 

Ohio  C.  C.   318 350 

Vogeler    v.    Devries     (Ind.)     56 

Atl.   782    196 

Vogg  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  138 

Mo.   172 243 

Voght  v.  S.   145  Ind.    12 

12,  279,   298 

Volk  v.  Roche,  70  111.  299.118,  250 

Von  Glahn  v.  Von  Glahn,  46  111. 

134  116 

Voris  v.  Shotts,  20  Ind.  App. 

220  119 

Vredenburge  v.  Pall,  28  N.  Y. 

S.   88 25 


W 


Wabash    R.    Co.    v.    Biddle,    27 

Ind.   App.    161 208,   216 

v.  Hanks,    91    111.    407 250 

v.  Jaggerman,    115  111.  411 

153,    155 

v.  Rector,    104  111.   305 58 

v.  Schultz,  30  Ind.  App.  495 

233 
v.  Stewart,  87  111.  App.  446 

94 
v.  Williamson,  104  Ind.  157 

126,   196 
Wacaser  v.  P.  134  111.  438 

26b,  201,  296 

Wachstetter  v.  S.  99  Ind.  290..    169 
Waco   A.   Water  Co.   v.   Cauble, 

19   Tex.  Cv.  App.   317...      27 
Wade   v.   Columbia   Electric   St. 
R.  Light  &  Power  Co.  51 

S.   Car.   296    25 

v.  Guppinger,  60  Ind.  378..   417 
v.  Ordway,  1  Baxt.   (Tenn.) 

229 35 

v.  S.  71  Ind.  541   296,  735 

Wadley  v.  Com.  (Va.)   30  S.  E. 

452 103 

Wadsworth  v.  Dunnam,  98  Ala. 

610 80,  195 

v.  Laurie,  164  HI.  48 127 

v.  Walker,  5 1  Iowa,  6 1 3  ...    517 
v.  Williams,    101    Ala.   264 

25,  48,  113 
Waechter  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

297 6 

Wagener  v.  Kirven,  56  S.  Car. 

126   .  6 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Waggoner  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

199   290 

Wagner  v.   Lament    (Mich.)    98 

N.  W.  2    121 

v.  S.  107  Ind.  71    756 

v.  S.  116  Ind.  186 

211,  281,  329 
v.  Wabash   R.   Co.    185    111. 

154   243 

Wait  v.  Westfall,  161  Ind.  648 

692,  697 
Walbert  v.  Trexler,  156  Pa.  St. 

112 25 

Walcot  v.  Heath,  78  111.  433   ..  192 

Waldie  v.  Doll,  29   Cal.   555...  14 

Waldron  v.  Marcier,  82  111.  551 .  81 
Walker  v.  Devlin,  2  Ohio  St.  593 

28 

v.  P.   88  N.  Y.   81 331 

v.  Rogers,  24  Md.  237 438 

v.  S.  117  Ala.  138 296,  313 

v.  S.  134  Ala.  86 225 

v.  S.  (Ala.)  35  So.  1012 

299,  742 

v.  S.  8  Ind.  292  768 

v.  S.  136  Ind.  663 

166,  169,  756 

v.  S.  6  Tex.  App.  576 327 

v.  S.  42  Tex.  360  322 

v.  Stetson,  14  Ohio  St.  100 

31 

Walkley  v.  S.  133  Ala.  183....  68 
Wall  v.  Goodenough,  16  111.  415 

172,  195 

v.  S.   112  Ga.  336    211 

Wallace  v.  Cravens,  34  Ind.  534 

243 

v.  Curtis, *36  111.  156 80 

v.  De  Young,  98  111.   638..  196 

v.  Goff,   71   Ind.  294 357 

v.  P.   159   111.   446 773 

v.  Ransdell,    90    Ind.    173..  484 

v.  S.    124   Ala.   87 65 

v.  S.  41   Fla.  547.. 48,  80,  717 
v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    66  S. 

W.    1102 191,  304 

v.  Waltice,  118  Ind.  59 200 

v.  Wren,   32   111.    146 96 

Waller  v.  Missouri  K.   &  T.  R. 

Co.   59  Mo.  App.  410 238 

v.  S.   110  Ga.  250    269 

Wallis  v.  Luhring,  134  Ind.  450 

700 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   40  S. 

W.  794  .                             .  265 


Walls  v.  Southern  B.  T.  T.  Co. 

66   Fed.    453    189 

v.  Walls,   170  Pa.  St.  48..      86 
Walrod  v.  Webster  County,  110 

Iowa,  349 71 

Walsh  v.  P.  65  111.  64 757 

Walter  v.  Victor  G.  Bloede  Co. 

90    Ind.    80 80 

Walters  v.  American  Jewelry  & 

M.  Co.   114  Ga.  564 192 

v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

41   Iowa,  75   536 

v.  Laurens  Cotton  Mills,  53 

S.   Car.    155    348 

v.  Philadelphia  Tr.  Co.   161 

Pa.  St.  36   213 

v.  S.  39  Ohio  St.  217 

322,  323,  743 

v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  388.    255 
Walthelm  v.  Artz,  70  Iowa,  609 

157 
Walton  v.  S.   114  Ga.   112 80 

Wampler  v.  House,  30  Ind.  App. 

513 70 

v.  S.  28  Tex.  Cr.  App.  352.    304 

Wantland  v.  S.   145  Ind.  38 

310,  729,  730 
Waples  P.  Co.  v.  Turner,  82  Fed. 

64 351 

Warbosse  v.  Card,  74  Iowa,  306 

361 
Ward  v.  Bass   (Ind.  Ter.)   69  N. 

W.  879 363 

v.  Brown,  53  W.  Va.  237 

119,  170 
v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 

Co.    102  Wis.   215    231 

v.  Cochran,  71  Fed.  128 

232.  243 

v.  Henry,  19  Wis.  76   48 

v.  Odell'  Mfg.    Co.    123    N. 

Car.  248 195 

v.  Odell    Mfg.    Co.    126    N. 

Car.  946 244 

v.  S.   102  Ga.  531 80 

v.  S.  52  Ind.  454   361 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   29  S. 

W.   274 358 

v.  Ward,  25   Colo.  33    219 

v.  Ward.   47   W.  Va.   766..    119 
Warden  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 

167   Pa.'  St.   523    8 

v.  Henry,  117  Mo.  530    ...      75 
v.  Miller,  112  Wis.  67.. 25,  113 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlvii 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Ware  v.  S.  59  Ark.  379 322 

v.  S.  96  Ga.  349  171 

Ware    Cattle    Co.    v.    Anderson, 

107  Iowa,  231   7 

Wai-field  v.  Clark,  118  Iowa,  69 

119 
v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  104 

Tenn.  74 71 

Warlick  v.  Plonk,   103  N.  Car. 

81 188 

Warner  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.    120   Iowa,   159 25 

v.  S.  25  Ark.  447    225 

Warren    v.    Chandler,    98    Iowa, 

237 156 

v.  Nash,  24  Ky.  L.  R.  479.    359 
v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  502.        3 

Wartena  v.  S.  105  Ind.  450 753 

Washington  v.  S.  63  Ala.  135..    165 

v.  S.  106  Ala.  58 44 

v.  S.  125  Ala.  40   255 

Washington,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.   La- 

cey,   94   Va.   460    161 

v.  Quayle,  95  Va.  747 

536,  559,  652 

Washington   County   Water   Co. 
v.  Carver,  91  Md.  398 

80,  347 
Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  Bradley, 

171  111.  258   94,  97 

Wason  v.  Rowe,  16  Vt.  525 156 

Wastl  v.  Montana  N.  R.  Co.  17 

Mont.  213 203,  218,  319 

Waterhouse  v.  Jos.  S.  Brew.  Co. 

(S.  Dak.)   94  N.  W.  587.      25 
Waters  v.  Greenlief,  John,  Lum- 
ber Co.   115  N.  Car.  648.    164 
v.  Kansas  City,  94  Mo.  App. 

413 192 

v.  P.  172  111.  371 

288.  368,  376,  745 
Watkins  v.  Moore,   196  Pa.  St. 

469 364 

v.  S.  133  Ala.  88   68,  191 

v.  U.  S.  5  Okla.  729    25 

Watson  v.  Com.  95  Pa.  St.  422.   322 

v.  S.   83   Ala.   60    253 

Watt  v.  P.   126  111.   30.... 7 18,  722 

Watts  v.  Southern  Bell  T.  &  T. 

Co.  66  Fed.  460  85,  102 

Waxahachie,  &c.  Co.  v.  McLain, 

27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  334..  249 
Way  v.  Ills.  Cent.  R.  Co.  40 

Iowa,   344 616,   617 


Waybright  v.  S.  56  Ind.   122 

115, 

WTear  v.  Sanger,  91  Mo.  348... 
Weatherford  v.  Strawn,  8  Kas. 

App.    206   

Weaver  v.  P.  132  111.  536.  .279, 

v.  S.   77   Ala.   26    

Webb  v.  Big  Kanawha  &  O.  R.  P. 

Co.  43  W,  Va.  800   

v.  S.    106  Ala.   52    

v.  S.    73   Miss.   456    .  .296, 
Webber  v.  Sullivan,  58  Iowa,  265 

Weber  v.  Germania   F.  Ins.   Co. 

44  N.  Y.  S.  976  

v.  Whetstone,  53  Neb.  371 

Webster  v.  Yorty,  194  111.  408. 
Weeks  v.  Hutchinson  (Mich.)   97 

N.  W.   697    

v.  Southern  R.  Co.    119  N. 

Car.   740 

v.  Texas   Midland   R.    (Tex. 

C.  App.)    67   S.  W.   1071. 

Weidman  v.   Symes,    116   Mich. 

619 

Weightnovel  v.  S.   (Fla.)   35  So. 

862 43, 

Weiss  v.  Bethleham  Iron  Co.  88 

Fed.  23 

v.  Dittman,  4  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

35   

Welch  v.   Browning,    115   Iowa, 

690   

v.  S.   124  Ala.  41    258, 

v.  Union    C.    Life    Ins.    Co. 

117  Iowa,  394    

v.  Watts,  9  Ind.  115  

Welden  v.   Omaha,  K.   C.   &  E. 
R.  Co.   93   Mo.  App.   668 

Weller  v.  S.  19  Ohio  C.  C.  166. 
Wellman  v.  Jones,  124  Ala.  580 

Wells  v.   Clements,   48  N.  Car. 

168 

v.  Houston,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App 

619 

v.  S.  131  Ala.  48  

v.  S.  99  Ga.  206  

v.  Snow  (Cal.)  41  Pac.  858 

Wells   &   Co.    v.   Heintz    (Neb.) 
72  N.  W.   1034    


742 
162 

140 
299 
815 

101 
345 
309 

694 

149 

6 
193 

458 
134 
114 
116 
252 
113 
116 

667 
304 

53 
3 

196 

198 

195 
174 

244 
223 
313 

130 
94 


cxlviii 


TABLE    OF     CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Wellston  Coal  Co.  v.  Smith,  65 

Ohio  St.   81    26 

Welsh  v.   S.   60   Neb.    101 198 

Welter    v.    Leistikow,    N.    Dak. 

283 48 

Welty  v.  Ward  (Ind.)   72  N.  E. 

596 150 

Wendler  v.   People's   H.   F.   Co. 

165  Mo.  539    618 

Wenger  v.  Calder,  78  111.  275.  .  81 
Wenning    v.    Teeple,    144    Ind. 

189    ..40,    247,  361 

Wenona  Coal  Co.  v.  Holmquist, 
152  111.  581 

71,  120,   123,   133,  235 

Werner  v.  Jewett,  54  Kas.  530.  358 
West  v.  Averill  Grocery  Co.  109 

Iowa,  488 90,  119 

v.  Sanders,   104  Ga.  727...  128 

v.  S.   48   Ind.   483 323 

v.  S.    63    Neb.    257 91 

v.  Smith,   101  U.  S.  263...  160 
West    Chicago,    &c.    R.    Co.    v. 
Buckley,  200  111.  262 

53,  54,  363 

v.  Dougherty,  172  111.  365.  250 

v.  Dwyer,   162   111.   482 25 

v.  Estep,   162  111.    130 

25,   195,  369 

v.  Feldstein,   169   111.   139..  124 

v.  Fishman,  169  111.  196..  124 
v.  Foster,  175  111.  396. .120,  123 
v.  Lieserowitz,  197  111.  616 

25,   53,   70,   90,   203,  385 

v.Lyons,    157    HI.    593 129 

v.  McCallum,   169   111.   241.  149 

v.  McNulty,  166  111.  203..  551 
v.  Martin,  154  111.  523 

346,  352 

v.  Mueller,  165  111.  499...  205 
v.  Nash,  166  111.  528... 25,  369 
v.  Scanlan,  168  111.  34..  56,  238 
v.  Shiplett,  85  111.  App.  683 

121 

v.  Yund,  169  111.  49    124 

West  Memphis  P.  Co.  v.  White, 

99   Tenn.   256    48 

West  Va.  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  S. 

96  Md.   652    25 

Westbrook  v.  S.  97  Ga.   189 

64,   636 
Western  C.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Ingra- 

ham,  70  Fed.  219 71 


Western   Ins.   Co.  v.   Tobin,   32 

Ohio   St.    88    351 

Western  M.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bough- 
ton,  136  111.  317   198 

Western   Stone   Co.   v.   Musical, 

196  111.  382   25 

v.  Whalen,   151   111.   472...      92 
Western   U.   Tel.   Co.   v.   Baker, 

85    Fed.    690    360 

v.  Burgess    (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

56   S.  W.   237    191 

v.  Chambers  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

77  S.  W.  273    194 

v.  Giffin  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  65 

S.   W.    661    6 

v.  James  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  73 

S.  W.    79    6,    199 

v.  Johnson   (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

67   S.  W.  338    100 

v.  Seals  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   45 

S.   W.    964    « 

v.  Sorsby,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

345 .'...   244 

v.  Thorn,  67  Fed.  287    144 

v.  Waller    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

47   S.  W.   396    80 

Westervelt  v.  Phelps,  171  N.  Y. 

212 146 

Westinghouse    Co.  v.  Gainor,  130 

Mich.  393 244 

Weston  v.  Brown,  30  Neb.  609 

211 
Westra  v.  Westra  Estate,    101 

Mich.  526 26,  238 

Westside   Auction  House   Co.  v. 
Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins. 
Co.   186  111.   156 136 

Wettengel  v.  City  of  Denver,  20 

Colo.  552 4 

Weybright  v.  Fleming,  40  Ohio 

St.  55 192 

Weyrich  v.  P.  89  111.  99.... 66,  175 
Whalen  v.  Kinsley,  26  Ohio  St. 

137 * 48 

Whaley  v.  Bartlett,  42  S.  Car. 

454 122,  230 

Wharton  v.  S.  45  Tex.  2 105 

Whatley  v.  S.  91  Ala.  108....  297 
Wheat  v.  Brown,  3  Kas.  App. 

431  "> 

Wheatley  v.  Philadelphia.  W.  & 

B.  R.  Co.    1   Marv.    (Del.) 

305  126 

Wheeler  v.  Baars,  33  Fla.  696.  177 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cxlix 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Wheeler  v.  Grand  T.  R.  Co.  70 

N.  H.    607 25 

v.  S.   114   Ala.   22    82 

v.  S.  158  Ind.  687 

21,  65,  85,  264,  747,  781 

v.  S.  42  Md.  563    168 

v.  S.   76  Miss.   265    .  ..      80 

v.  Schroeder,  4  R.  I.  383 

174,  181 
v.Thomas,   67   Conn.   577 

186,  188 
Whelan  v.  Kinsley,  26  Ohio  St. 

137 48 

Wheschel  v.  Gainesville  &  D.  E. 

R.  Co.    116   Ga.   431 355 

Whelpley    v.     Stroughton,     119 

Mich.  314 70 

Whipple  v.  Preece,  18  Utah,  454 

199 

v.  Preece,   24   Utah,   364...    350 
Whitaker   v.   Engle,    111    Mich. 

205 24 

v.  S.   106  Ala.  30 297,  360 

Whitcomb    v.    S.    30    Tex.    Cv. 

App.  269 275,  284 

White  v.  Blum,  79  Fed.  271...    120 
v.Bryan,   96    Iowa,    166...   236 

v.  Cole,  20  Ky.   858    6 

v.  Dinkins,   19   Ga.   285 102 

v.  Epperson  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

73   S.  W.   851    113 

v.  Ferris,   124  Ala.  461 200 

v.  Harris,   206   111.   596 65 

v.  Hoster  B.  Co.  51  W.  Va. 

259 126 

v.  McCracken,  60  Ark.  619.  3 
v.  McPherson,  183  Mass. 

533 119 

v.  New  York,  C.  &  S.  L.  R. 

Co.   142  Tnd.  654    ,...70,  367 

v.  Ross,   35   Fla.   377    243 

v.  S.   Ill   Ala.  92    68.   115 

v.   S.     133    Ala.    122.  .49. 

85.   88,   211,   297 

v.  S.   153  Ind.  689 119 

v.  S.   52  Miss.   216    219 

v.  S.  21  Tex.  App.  339.265,816 
v.  S.  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  625.  304 
v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  153 

240 

v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cr.  App.  567.  290 
v.  Smith,  54  Iowa,  237....  522 
v.  Ter.  3  Wash.  Ter.  397..  319 
v.  Thomas,  39  111.  227.397.  400 
v.  U.  S.  164  U.  S.  100....  342 


White  y.  Van  Horn,   159  U.  S. 
1    .................... 

v.  Walker,  31  111.  422..  109, 

White,    Kingsland    Mfg.    Co.    v. 

Herdrich,  98  111.  App.  607 

Whitehead  &  A.  M.  Co.  v.  Ry- 

der, 139  Mass.  366...".. 
Whitehouse  v.  Bolster,  95  Md. 

458   .................. 

Whitford    v.    Inhabitants,     119 

Mass.  571  .........  594, 

Whiting  v.  Carpenter  (Neb.)   93 

N.  W.   926    ............. 

Whitman  v.  S.  42  Neb.  841  ____ 

Whitney  v.  Cook,  53  Miss.  531. 
v.  S.  154  Ind.  573 

25,   196,   198, 
Whitney  S.  Co.  v.  O'Rourke,  172 

ill.  177  .....  25,  76,  238, 
Whitten  v.  S.  115  Ala.  72  ..... 
Whittlesey  v.  Burlington,  C.  R. 

&   N.    R.    Co.    (Iowa)    90 

N.  W.   516    ............. 

Wiborg  v.  U.  S.   163  U.  S.  632 

189, 
Wickham  v.  Wolcott  (Neb.)    95 

N.  W.   366    ............. 

Wier  Plow  Co.  v.  Walmsley,  110 

Ind.  242  ........  ....... 

Wiggins  v.  Holley,  11  Ind.  5... 
v.  S.  103  Ga.  559  ......... 

Wilber  v.  Wilber,  129  111.  392 

195,  250, 
Wilber  Lumber  Co.  v.  Overbeck 

Bros.    Mfg.    Co.    96    Wis. 

383     ................... 

Wilbur  v.  Stoepel,  82  Mich.  344 

Wilcox  v.  Hines,  100  Tenn.  524. 
v.  Kinzie,   4   111.    (3    Scam.) 

218 

v.  McCune,  21  Iowa,  294   .. 
v.  S.  94  Tenn.   106  ........ 

v.  Willmington  R.  Co.  2  Pen. 
(Del.)   157  ............. 

Wildey  v.  Crane,  69  Mich.   17.. 
Wildman    v.    S.    (Ala.)     35    So. 
995  ..................  25 

Wi'lev  v.  Man-a-to-wah,  6  Kas. 
' 


195 
454 


v.  S.  5  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  662.. 

Wilkerson  v.  S.  103  Iowa,  6  ---- 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    57  S. 

W.  956  ...........  112, 


41 
361 
117 
606 

58 
266 
153 

240 

359 
281 

70 
196 

7 

301 
657 

80 

696 

142 

53 
203 

192 
361 
223 

120 
199 

,  80 

197 
326 
269 

196 


el 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Wilkins  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

525 269 

Wilkinson    v.    St.    Louis    S.    D. 

Co.   102  Mo.   130 34 

Willard  v.  Petitt,  153  111.  663..  347 
v.  Swansen,  126  111.  384..  238 
v.  Williams  (Colo.)  50  Pac 

207 7 

Williams  v.  Andrew,  185  111.  98 

80 

v.Atkinson,  152  Ind.  98..  84 
v.  Avery,  131  N.  Car.  188.  80 
v.  Barrett,  52  Iowa,  638 

348,   349 
v.  Belmont  Coal  &C.  Co.  (W. 

Va.)    46   S.   E.   802 126 

v.  Casebeer,  126  Cal.  86...  351 
v.  Chapman,  160  Ind.  130 

346 
v.  City   of   West   Bay,    119 

Mich.   395 210 

v.  Com.    80   Ky.    315.. 348,   349 

v.  Com.  85  Va.  607 17 

v.  Dickenson,  28  Fla.  90...  170 
v.  Finley,  40  Ohio  St.  342.  162 
v.  Hoehle,  95  Wis.  510 

199,  200 
v.  La  Penatiere,  32  Fla.  491 

177 
v.  Miller,  2  Lea  (Tenn.)  406 

14 
V.  P.    164   111.   481 

9,   196,   198,   336 

v.  P.    166   111.    136 299,    342 

v.  S.  44  Ala.  396   815 

v.  S.  81  Ala.  1   112 

v.  S.  130  Ala.  107  49 

v.  S.   50  Ark.   511    211 

v.  S.  46  Neb.  704 

113,  170,  175,  192 

v.  S.   73   Miss.    820 296 

'v.  S.   42   Tex.   392 292 

v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  606.  339 
v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  147.  318 
v.  S.  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  144.  275 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  40  S. 

W.  801 215 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    45  S. 

W.   494 304 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   55  S. 

W.  500 71 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   65  S. 

W.  1059 198 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    69  S. 
W.  415   258 


Williams  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R. 

Co.    123   Mo.   573 45 

v.  Southern   P.   R.   Co.    110 

Cal.    457 94,    248 

v.  Watcon,  71  111.  App.  180.      86 
Williamson    v.    Gore    (lex.    Cv. 

App.)   73  S.  W.  563 7 

v.  Toby,  86  Cal.   497 28 

v.  Tyson,   105  Ala.   644 

113,  195 

Willingham  v.  S.   130  Ala.  35..    113 
Willis  v.  Branch,  94  N.  Car.  142 

174 
v.  Chowning,  90  Tex.  617..    200 

v.  Hudson,  72  Tex.  598 192 

v.  Locket    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

26   S.  W.   419    8 

v.  S.   134  Ala.  429    66,   195 

v.  S.  89  Ga.  188  34 

v,  S.   27  Neb.   98    361 

v.  S.  43  Neb.  102.716,  718,722 
Willoughby   v.   Northeastern   R. 

Co.  52  S.  Car.   166.. 242,  351 
Wills  v.  Hardcastle,  19  Pa.  Super 

Ct.  525 351 

v.  Lance,  28  Ore.  371    19] 

v.  Tanner,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  795 

355 
Willson    v.    Whitefield,    38    Ga. 

269    158 

Wilson  v.  Board,  &c.  63  Mo.  142 

159 
v.  Commercial  Union  Ins.  Co. 

15  S.  Dak.  322  3,  146 

v.  Coulter,  51  N.  Y.  S.  804 

219 

v.  Crosby,   109  Mich.  449..    192 
v.  Huguenin,    117    Ga.    546 

119,  192,  199 
v.  Marvin-Rulofson   Co.   201 

Pa.  St.   29   .  . 49 

v.  P.    94   111.    327 243 

v.  S.  68  Ga.  827   37 

v.  S.    71    Miss.    880.  ..179,   288 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   34  S. 

W.  284 193 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)   36  S. 

W.  587 113 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    73  S. 

W.  964 268 

v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.   156 

6,  35 

v.  White,  71   Ga.  507    45 

v.  White,  80  N.  Car.  280..    113 
v.  Williams,  52  Miss.  487..    172 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cli 


(References  are  to  Sections.} 


Wimberly  v.  S.   (Ga.)    31    S.  E. 

102 320 

Wimbish    v.    Hamilton,    47    La. 

Ann.   246  . 26,  351 

Winchester    v.    Carroll,    97    Va. 

727   247 

v.  Charter,  102  Mass.  273.   517 
Winfield   v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.) 

72  S.  W.  182  291 

Winfrey  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

539 109 

Winkler   v.   Winkler    (Tex.    Cv. 

App.)    26   S.  W.    893 172 

\YTinkles  v.  S.  114  Ga.  449 284 

Winn    v.    Sanborn,    10    S.    Dak. 

642 6 

Winne  v.  Hammond,  37  111.  99.      86 
Winstandley   v.   Breyfogle,    148 

Ind.  618 47 

Winter  v.  S.   133  Ala.   176 

68,  191,  223,  299 
v.  Supreme  Lodge  K.  P.  96 

Mo.  App.  67 171 

v.  Supreme  Lodge  K.  P.  101 

Mo.  App.   550    80 

v.  Williamsbaugh    S.    Bank, 

74  N.  Y.  S.  140   146 

Winters  v.  Mowrer,  163  Pa.  St. 

239   .   .   .    .: 172 

v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  582.    258 
Wintz  v.  Morrison,  17  Tex.  387 

197 
Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross, 

142  111.   9    133 

Wisdom  v.  P.  11  Colo.   170.288,324 
v.  Reeves,   110  Ala.  418...      80 
Wissler   v.   Atlantic    (Iowa)    98 

N.  W.  131   119 

Wiswell    v.    Doyle,     160    Mass. 

44 536 

Witsell  v.  West  Ashville  R.  Co. 

120  N.  Car.  557   232,  350 

Wittenberg    v.    Mollyneaux,    59 

Neb.   203 6 

Wittleder   v.   Citizens'  Elec.   111. 

Co.  62  N.  Y.  S.  297 27 

Wohlford  v.  P.  148  111.  301 

153,  166 

Wolcott  v.  Heath,  78  111.  433..    182 
Wolf    v.    Hemrich    Bros.    Brew. 

Co.  28  Wash.  187   25 

v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.)    53  S. 

W.  108 304 

v.  Troxell,   94   Mich.    575..   415 


Wolf    v.    Van    Housen,    55    111. 

App.    295    200 

v.  Wolf,   158  Pa.  St.  621..   247 

Wolfe  v.  Pugh,   109  Ind.   309..   243 
v.  S.  25  Tex.  App.  698 220 

Wolff  Mfg.   Co.   v.   Wilson,    152 

111.  9    231 

Wollf  v.  Van  Housen,  55  111.  App. 

295   200 

Wonderly    v.    Nokes,    8    Blackf. 

(Ind.)    589 502 

Wood   v.   Collins,    111    Ga.    32..        6 
v.  Long    I.    R.    Co.    159    N. 

Y.  546 7 

v.  S.  64  Miss.  761   17 

v.  Steinau,  9  S.  Dak.   110..    195 
v.  Wells,   103  Mich.   320...    347 
Woodbury  v.  S.  69  Ala.  242...    117 
Woodman  v.  Chesney,  39  Me.  45 

155 
v.  Town   of   Northwood,   67 

N.  H.  307    50 

Woodmen,    &c.    v.    Locklin,    28 

Tex.  Cv.  App.  486    8,  230 

Woodruff    v.    Hensley,    26    Ind. 

App.  592   .  .  ." 53 

v.  King,  47  Wis.  261    34,37 

Woods  v.  Berry,  7  Mont.  201..    348 
v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  42  N. 

Y.   S.    140    7 

v.  S.  81  Miss.  408   118 

Woodworth  v.  Parrott,  48  Neb. 

675 26 

Woolen  v.  Whitacre,  91  Ind.  502 

216 

v.  Wire,   100  Ind.   251    232 

Wooley  v.  Lyon,  117  111.  244..    110 
Woolsey  v.   Lake  Shore,  &c.  R. 

Co.  33  Ohio  St.  227 611 

v.  Lasher,  54  N.  Y.  S.  737.    340 
v.  Trustees  of  Village,   155 

N.  Y.   573 84 

Wool  weaver   v.    S.    50   Ohio   St. 

287 792 

Wooten  v.  S.  99  Tenn.  189 

261.  283 

Wooters  v.  King,  54  111.  343 80 

Worden    v.   Humeston    &    S.    R. 

Co.  72  Iowa,  201    56 

v.  S.   24  Ohio  St.   143    192 

Workingmen's    Banking    Co.    v. 

Blell,  57  Mo.  App.  410..    132 
World  M.  B.  Asso.  v.  Worthing, 

59   Neb.   587    351 


clii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Worswick  v.  Hunt,  106  Ala.  559 

195 
Worthan  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 

65  S.  W.  526    55 

Worthington  v.  Yormey,  34  Md. 

185 438,   441 

Wragge  v.  S.  Car.  &  G.  R.  Co. 

(S.  Car.)   25  S.  E.  76 45 

Wray  v.  Tindall,  45  Ind.  517..   385 
Wreggitt   v. .  Barnett,    99    Mich. 

477 198 

Wright  v.  Brosseau,  73  111.  381.      45 
v.  Cincinnati    St.    R.   Co.    9 

Ohio  C.  C.  503   8 

v.  Com.  85  Ky.   123    215 

v.  Griffey,   146  111.   394 361 

v.  Hardie    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

30  S.  W.  675   93    196 

v.  S.  69  Ind.  165   154,  294 

Wright  Fire  P.  Co.  v.  Poezekai, 

130  111.  139 129 

Wright  Investment  Co.  v.  Fris- 
coe,  &c.  Co.  (Mo.)  77  S.  W. 

296 415 

Wrigley  v.  Comelins,  162  111.  92 

25 
Wrisley  v.  Burke,  203  111.  259 

20,  652,  653 

Wrought  Iron  B.  Co.  v.  Commis- 
sioners, 101  111.  522   47 

Wry  v.  Wry,  33  Ala.  187   330 

Wunderlich  v.  Palatine  Ins.  Co. 

115  Wis.  509    26 

Wylie  v.  Commercial  &  F.  Bank, 

63   S.  Car.  406    191 

Wyman  v.  Turner,  14  Ind.  App. 

118   .  .    119 


Yale  v.  Newton,  130  Mich.  434 


244 


Yankton  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Freemont 
E.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  7  S.  Dak. 

428 136 

Yarborough  v.  S.  86  Ga.  396...    171 
v.  Weaver,  6  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

215 28 

Yarbrough  v.  S.  105  Ala.  43...   723 

v.  S.  115  Ala.  92   88,  297 

Yates  v.  U.  S.  90  Fed.  57 

347,  361,  362 


Yazoo,    &c.    R.    Co.     v.     Smith 

(Mass.)   35  So.   168 106 

Yeomans  v.  C.  S.  N.  Co.  44  Cal. 

81 580 

v.  Page,  98  111.  App.  288..      80 
Yerkes  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  112 

Wis.   184 74 

Yetter  v.  Zurick,  55  Minn.  452.    199 
Yoacham   v.   McCurdy,    27    Tex. 

Cv.  App.   183 191 

Yoakum  v.  Kelly  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 

30  S.  W.   836    25 

Yoe  v.  McCord,  74  111.  40. .695,  705 
Yontz    v.    Com.    23    Ky.    L.    R. 

1868 85,  288 

Yore  v.  Mueller  Coal  H.  H.  &  T. 

Co.  147  Mo.  679  14 

York  v.  Maine  C.  R.  Co.  84  Me. 

128 119 

York    County,    &c.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Brooks,  51  Me.  506   415 

York  Park  .Bldg.  Asso.  v.  Barns, 

39  Neb.  834 355 

Young  v.   Alford,    118   N.   Car. 

215    86 

v.  Com.  19  Ky.  L.  R.  929..   259 

v.  Com.    16  Ky.   496 268 

v.  Hahn  (Tex.'Cv.  App.)   69 

S.  W.  203 38 

v.  Jeffreys,  20  N.  Car.  220 

157 
v.  Market,  163  Pa.  St.  513 

101 

v.  P.  193  111.  236  73 

v.  S.  95  Ga.  456   313 

v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  290 

103 

v.  Sage,  42  Neb.  37    25 

v.  Town  of  Macomb,  42  N. 

Y.  S.  351   12 

v.  West  Va.  C.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

42  W.  Va.  112 144 

Youngstown  Bridge  Co.  v.  Barnes, 

98  Tenn.   401    7 

Yundt  v.  Hartrunft,  41  111.  16 

175,  218,  219,  238,  874 


Zehner  v.  Kepler,  16  Ind.  290..      84 

Zeigler   v.   Pennsylvania   Co.    63 

111.  App.  410  129 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cliii 


(References  are  to  Sections.) 


Zenor  v.  Johnson,    107   Ind.   69 

156,  160,  319 
Zibbell  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids, 

129  Mich.  659   192 

Zimmer  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  55 

N.  Y.  S.  308    70 

Zimmerman    v.    Brannon,     163 


Iowa,    144 


238 


Zimmerman  v.  Kearney  County 
Bank     (Neb.)     91    N.    W. 

497   126 

v.  Knox,  34  Kas.  245   80 

Zimmerson  v.  S.   133  Ala.   18..   295 
Zook  v.  Simonson,  72  Ind.  88 

415,  416 


THE  LAW  OF  INSTRUCTIONS. 

CHAPTER  I. 
PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1.  Object    and    office    of    instruc-      26a. 

tions. 

2.  Propriety     of    giving    instruc-      26b. 

tions. 

3.  Court    instructing    of    its    own     27. 

motion.  28. 

4.  Written    instructions    required. 

5.  Oral    charge    taken    down    by      29. 

stenographer. 

6.  Party  must  request  written  in-      30. 

structions. 

7.  Specific    instructions    must    be      31. 

requested.  32. 

8.  Neither    party    requesting,    ef-      32a. 

feet.  33. 

9.  Must  request  in  criminal  cases.      34. 

10.  Presumed  in  writing — When. 

11.  Written  and  oral  charge.  35. 

12.  Waiving    written    instructions. 

13.  Exceptions  to  oral  charges.  36. 

14.  Time    of    requesting — Rule    of 

court.  37. 

15.  Time   of   requesting — Too   late. 

16.  Error   to    refuse    instruction —     38. 

When. 

17.  Court  may  give  time.  39. 

18.  Court's  power  to  make  rules.        40. 

19.  Too  many  instructions. 

20.  Repeating    generally     not    re-      41. 

quired. 

21.  Repeating   on   preponderance —      42. 

Reasonable  doubt. 

22.  Repeating     in     detail— Words,      43. 

phrases. 

23.  Repeating — As   to  defense.  44. 

24.  Repeating — As   to  witnesses. 

25.  Repeating — Request       substan-       45. 

tially  given  by  others. 

26.  Repeating — When,  general  and      46. 

special  charge. 

47. 


Repetition    when    evidence    is 
close. 

Court   may   refuse  all   instruc- 
tions. 

Defective   instructions   refused. 

Clauses   or   paragraphs   defect- 
ive. 

Incomplete    instruction    defect- 
ive. 

Modifying     defective     instruc- 
tions. 

Modifying    correct    instruction. 

In   language  of  request. 

Modifying    in    criminal    cases. 

Changing  to  conform  to  issues. 

Further  instructions  after  jury 
retires. 

Further  instructions  in  absence 
of   counsel. 

Further  instructions  in  absence 
of  defendant. 

Instructing    further    on    other 
points. 

Recalling  jury  for  further  in- 
structions. 

Judge   calling  on   jury — Effect. 

-Withdrawing  erroneous  instruc- 
tions— Amending. 

Rulings    and    remarks    not   in- 
structions. 

Directions  as   to  form   of  ver- 
dict. 

Signing     and     numbering     in- 
structions. 

Marking    "given,"    "refused" — ' 
Effect. 

Marking    for    plaintiff — Under- 
scoring. 

Court's     manner     of    charging 
jury. 

Trial  by  court — Jury  waived. 


§    1  PURPOSE    AND    PREPARATION.  2 

§  1.  Object  and  office  of  instructions. — The  object  of  instruc- 
tions is  to  inform  the  jury  what  are  the  precise  principles  or 
rules  of  law  applicable  to  the  evidence  in  the  case,1  and  to  ex- 
plain the  issues  that  the  jury  may  have  a  clear  understanding 
of  their  duty  in  reaching  a  verdict.2  Instructions  should  there- 
fore be  clear  and  simple,  and  consist  of  a  plain  statement  of  the 
law  applicable  to  the  evidence  or  facts  in  the  case;  and  they 
should  be  couched  in  such  terms  that  they  may  be  readily  under- 
stood by  ordinary  men  acting  as  jurors.3 

The  instructions  given  should  not  only  be  correct,  but  so  ex- 
plicit as  not  to  be  misleading  or  misconstrued.4  In  other  words, 
the  instructions  given  should  be  in  plain  English,  and  should 
avoid  as  far.  as  posible  the  use  of  technical  terms.5  The  safer 
course  is  to  draw  them  in  the  language  of  the  approved  and  well 
settled  forms;6  and  each  party  should  see  that  his  own  instruc- 
tions are  properly  drawn.7 

§  2.  Propriety  of  giving  instructions. — The  propriety  of  giv- 
ing or  refusing  instructions  must  always  be  determined  by  the 
facts  in  the  particular  case.  Hence  it  frequently  happens  that 
an  instruction  may  be  entirely  proper  in  one  case  and  erroneous 
in  another,  although  the  two  cases  may  be  similar  in  many  re- 
spects ;  but  a  different  element  may  be  found  in  one  not  entering 
into  the  other  which  would  require  the  giving  of  different  in- 
structions in  the  two  cases.8 

iMontag  v.  P.  141  111.  81,  30  N.  Newell,  62  111.  196,  202;  Peri  v.  P. 
E.  337;  Lehman  v.  Hawks,  121  Ind.  65  111.  26;  Smith  v.  City  of  Sioux 
541,  23  N.  E.  670;  Lander  v.  P.  104  City  (Iowa)  93  N.  W.  81.  See  gen- 
Ill.  248;  Dodd  v.  Moore,  91  Ind.  erally:  Hyde  v.  Shank,  77  Mich. 
523;  McCallister  v.  Mount,  73  Ind.  517,  43  N.  W.  890;  Trinity  &  S.  R. 
567;  Thork  v.  Goewy,  85  111.  616;  Co.  v.  Schofield,  72  Tex.  496,  10  S. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Murray,  W.  575;  Loeb  v.  Weis,  64  Ind.  285; 
62  111.  326,  331;  S.  v.  Stout,  49  Ohio  Goffney  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.  81 
St.  282,  30  N.  E.  437;  Crane  Co.  v.  Minn.  459;  Parmlee  v.  Adolk,  28 
Tierney,  175  111.  82,  51  N.  E.  715;  Ohio  St.  13;  Aikin  v.  Weckerly, 
Chicago,  &c.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Utley,  19  Mich.  482;  Parrish  v.  S.  14  Neb. 
38  111.  411;  Baxter  v.  P.  3  Gilm.  60,  15  N.  W.  357. 
(111.)  381;  Morse  v.  Ryland,  58  4  yEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reed,  33  Ohio 
Kas.  250.  St.  255,  31  Am.  R.  539;  Little  M.  R. 

2  Illinois   Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    King,  Co.  v.  Wetmore,  19  Ohio  St.  134. 
179  111.  96,  53  N.  E.  552;  North  Chi-  s  Chappell    v.    Allen,    38   Mo.    213, 
cago  St.  R.   Co.   v.   Polkey,  203   111.  222. 

232.  e  Lawless  v.  S.  4  Lea  (Tenn.)  179; 

3  Armour     v.     Brazeau,     191     111.      S.   v.   Murray,  91  Mo.   95,   3   S.  W. 
124,  60  N.  E.  904;   City  of  Freeport      ;{97. 

v.  Isbell,  83  111.  440;  Herrick  v.  ?  Denman  v.  Bloomer,  11  111.  193. 
Gary,  83  111.  86;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  s  Lamb  v.  P.  96  111.  84;  Leavitte 
v.  Hammer,  72  111.  347;  Tresh  v.  v.  Randolph  County,  85  111.  507. 


ON  COURT'S  MOTION — IN  WRITING. 


§  3.  Court  instructing  of  its  own  motion. — The  court  un- 
doubtedly has  the  right  to  instruct  the  jury  on  its  own  motion-, 
and  it  may  be  added  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  do  so 
when  the  promotion  of  justice  demands  it.0  In  some  of  the 
states  the  court  is  required  to  instruct  the  jury  on  its  own  mo- 
tion upon  the  general  features  of  the  law  which  control  the 
substantial  issues  whether  requested  to  do  so  or  not  ;10  but  in  some 
jurisdictions  this  requirement  applies  to  criminal  cases  only.11 

In  Arkansas  and  Missouri  the  court  is  not  required  to  instruct 
on  its  own  motion  in  civil  cases.12  Under  the  practice  in  Texas 
the  court  must  instruct  the  jury  in  felony  cases  whether  re- 
quested or  not.13 

§  4.  Written  instructions  required. — A  statute  requiring  that 
all  instructions  to  the  jury  shall  be  given  in  writing  is  manda- 
tory;14 and  the  failure  of  the  court  to  reduce  the  instructions 


»  Roy  v.  Goings,  112  111.  667;  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Keefe,  114  111.  230, 
2  N.  E.  267,  55  Am.  R.  860;  O'Reily 
v.  Fitzgerald,  40  111.  310;  Stumps  v. 
Kelly,  22  111.  140;  Galena  C.  &  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs,  20  111.  478;  Driver 
v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  160,  38  S.  W. 
1020;  Gwatkin  v.  Com.  9  Leigh 
(Va.)  678,  33  Am.  Dec.  264;  see 
also  Viser  v.  Bertrand,  14  Ark.  267; 
Hanchette  v.  Kimbark,  118  111.  132, 
7  N.  E.  491;  Brown  v.  P.  9  111.  (4 
Gilm.)  439;  S.  v.  Pierce,  8  Nev. 
291;  Thistle  v.  Frostburg  Coal  Co. 
10  Md.  129;  Bunnell  v.  Greathead, 
49  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  106;  Spies  v.  P. 
122  111.  244,  12  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E. 
898. 

10  Welch  v.  Watts,  9  Ind.  115; 
Krack  v.  Wolf,  39  Ind.  88;  Strick- 
land v.  S.  98  Ga.  84,  25  S.  E.  908; 
Sledge  v.  S.  99  Ga.  684,  26  S.  E.  756. 
59  Am.  St.  251;  Kyd  v.  Cook,  56 
Neb.  71,  76  N.  W.  534,  71  Am.  St. 
661;  S.  v.  Fulford,  124  N.  Car.  798, 
32  S.  E.  377;  S.  v.  Clark,  147  Mo.  20, 
47  S.  W.  886;  Wilson  v.  Commercial 
U.  Ins.  Co.  15  S.  Dak.  322,  89  N.  W. 
649;  Ter.  v.  Baca  (N.  Mex.),  71  Pac. 
460,  (in  criminal  cases) ;  S.  v.  Ans- 
linger,  171  Mo.  600,  71  S.  W.  1041; 
Donahue  v.  Windsor  Co.  M.  F.  Ins. 
Co.  56  Vt.  374;  P.  v.  Byrnes,  30  Cal. 
206,  89  Am.  D.  85;  Sanders  v.  S. 
41  Tex.  306;  Pryor  v.  Coggin,  17 


Ga.  444;  Barton  v.  Gray,  57  Mich. 
622;  24  N.  W.  638;  S.  v.  Phipps, 
95  Iowa,  487,  64  N.  W.  410;  Douglass 
v.  Geiler,  32  Kas.  499,  4  Pac.  1039; 
Heilman  v.  Com.  84  Ky.  461,  4  Am. 
St.  207;  1  S.  W.  7731.  In  Indiana 
the  omission  to  give  any  instruc- 
tions is  not  available  error  unless 
instructions  were  asked  and  an  ex- 
ception reserved  to  the  court's  re- 
fusal to  give  them,  Marks  v.  Ja- 
cobs, 76  Ind.  216;  Rauch  v.  State, 
110  Ind.  384.  11  N.  E.  450. 

n  Potter  v.  S.  85  Tenn.  88,  1  S. 
W.  614,  4  Am.  St.  744;  S.  v.  Palmer, 
88  Mo.  572;  Heilman  v.  Com.  84  Ky. 
461,  1  S.  W.  731  4  Am.  St.  207;  P. 
v.  Byrnes,  30  Cal.  206,  89  Am.  Dec. 
85;  P.  v.  Murray,  72  Mich.  10,  40  N. 
W.  29. 

12  White  v.  McCracken,  60  Ark. 
619,  31  S.  W.  882;  Farmer  v.  Farm- 
er, 129  Mo.  530,  31  S.  W.  926,  36  L. 
R.  A.  806. 

is  Miers  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
161,  29  S.  W.  1074,  53  Am.  St.  705; 
Moore  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  33  S. 
W.  980;  Sanders  v.  S.  41  Tex.  306; 
Barbee  v.  S.  23  Tex.  App.  199,  4  S. 
W.  584;  Bishop  v.  S.  43  Tex.  390; 
Warren  v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  502, 
26  S.  W.  1082. 

i*  Ellis  v.  P.  159  111.  339,  42  N.  E. 
873;  P.  v.  Beeler,  6  Cal.  246;  Helm 
v.  P.  186  111.  153,  57  N.  E.  886; 


PURPOSE    AND    PREPARATION. 


to  writing  when  requested  by  either  party  is  error  per  se  for 
which  the  judgment  will  be  reversed.15  So  the  giving  of  oral 
instructions  when  requested  to  instruct  in  writing,  is  error.16 

If  it  be  desirable  to  modify  a  written  instruction,  such  modifi- 
cation must  be  reduced  to  writing,  especially  where  the  court 
asks  counsel  to  reduce  it  to  writing.  The  court  is  not  bound  to 
give  an  oral  modification  of  a  written  instruction.17  It  follows 
that  the  court  is  not  required  to  regard  an  oral  request  where 
a  statute  requires  that  the  instructions  shall  be  given  in  writ- 
ing.18 The  court  is  not  bound,  however,  to  give  written  in- 
structions ' unless  requested  to  do  so;19  but  may  instruct  orally 
if  neither  party  asks  for  written  instructions.20  In  the  absence 
of  a  statute  the  court  may  instruct  the  jury  either  orally  or  in 
writing  in  its  discretion.21 

Where  the  court  is  authorized  to  instruct  the  jury  orally  and 
in  writing,  it  is  improper  to  call  their  attention  to  the  written 

ney,  9  Ohio  St.  400;  Stephenson  v. 
S.  110  Ind.  358,  11  N.  B.  360,  59 
Am.  R.  216;  Smur  v.  S.  88  Ind. 
504;  Jaqua  v.  Cordesman,  106  Ind. 
141,  5  N.  E.  907;  Head  v.  Lang- 
worthy,  15  Iowa,  235;  S.  v.  Harding, 
81  Iowa,  599,  47  N.  W.  877;  Ellis 
v.  P.  159  111.  337,  42  N.  E.  873;  S.  v. 
Porter,  35  La.  Ann.  585;  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Oo.  v.  Banks  (Ky.),  23  S. 
W.  627. 

16  Householder  v.  Grandy,  40 
Ohio  St.  430.  See  Powers  v.  Hazel- 
ton,  &c.  L.  R.  Co.  33  Ohio  St.  438; 
Bosworth  v.  Barker,  65  Ind.  596; 
Southerland  v.  Venard,  34  Ind.  390; 
Shafer  v.  Stinson,  76  Ind.  374. 

IT  Savannah  T.  &c.  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
Beasley,  94  Ga.  142,  21  S.  E.  285. 
See  Provines  v.  Heaston.  67  Ind. 
482;  La  Selle  v.  Wells,  17  Ind.  33, 
79  Am.  Dec.  453;  Lung  v.  Deal,  16 
Ind.  349;  Ray  v.  Wooters,  19  111. 
82,  68  Am.  Dec.  583. 

is  Hacker  v.  Heiney,  111  Wis.  313, 
87  N.  W.  249. 

is  Blackburn  v.  S.  23  Ohio  St.  146; 
Bradford  v.  P.  (Gal.),  43  Pac.  1013; 
Davis  v.  Wilson,  11  Kas.  74. 

20  Hopkins    v.    Dipert,    11    Okla. 
630,  69  Pac.  883;  Sutherland  v.  Han- 
kins,  56  Ind.  343;    Mutual  B.   L.   I. 
Co.  v.  Miller,  39  Ind.  475. 

21  Smith  v.  Crichton,  33  Md.  103. 


Smaggart  v.  Ter.  (Okla.),  50  Pac. 
96;  S.  v.  DeWitt  152  Mo.  76,  53  S. 
W.  429;  S.  v.  Fisher,  23  Mont.  540, 
59  Pac.  919;  Murray  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  44  S.  W.  830;  Harvey  v. 
Keegan,  78  111.  App.  682;  S.  v.  Colter, 
15  Kas.  302;  City  of  Atchison  v. 
Jansen,  21  Kas.  560,  48  Kas.  3&8; 
Morrison  v.  S.  42  Fla.  149,  28  So. 
97;  P.  v.  Sanford,  43  Cal.  29,  1 
Green,  Cr.  R.  682;  Mobile  Fruit  & 
T.  Co.  v.  Potter,  78  Minn.  487,  81  N. 
W.  392;  Ray  v.  Wooters  19  111.  81; 
68  Am.  Dec.  583;  Columbia  Veneer 
&  Box  Co.  v.  Cottonwood  Lumber 
Co.  99  Tenn.  123,  41  S.  W.  351; 
S.  v.  Miles,  15  Wash.  534,  46  Pac. 
1047;  Wettengel  v.  City  of  Denver, 
20  Colo.  552.  39  Pac.  343;  Ehrlick 
v.  S.  44  Neb.  810,  63  N.  W.  35; 
Hopt  v.  Utah,  104  U.  S.  631,  4  Am. 
Cr.  R.  368;  Bradway  v.  Waddell, 
95  Ind.  171;  Davis  v.  Foster,  68 
Ind.  238;  Shafer  v.  Stinson,  76  Ind. 
374;  Bosworth  v.  Barker,  65  Ind. 
595;  Southerland  v.  Venard,  34  Ind. 
390;  Mazzia  v.  S.  51  Ark.  177,  10 
S.  W.  257;  Blashfield  Instructions, 
§  117;  Arnold  v.  S.  (Ark.),  74  S.  W. 
513. 

is  P.  v.  Ah  Fong,  12  Cal.  345; 
P.  v.  Payne,  8  Cal.  341;  Traders  De- 
posit Bank  v.  Henry,  20  Ky.  L.  R. 
1506,  49  S.  W.  536;  Hardy  v.  Tur- 


ORAL    CHARGE    TAKEN — WRITTEN    REQUESTS. 


§  6 


instructions  and  say  that  they  should  consider  and  apply  the 
law  as  therein  set  forth  as  well  as  in  the  oral  charge,  in  that  it 
gives  undue  influence  to  the  written  instructions.22 

§  5.  Oral  charge  taken  down  by  stenographer. — The  giving 
of  oral  instructions  which  are  taken  down  at  the  time  by  a 
stenographer,  and  extended  by  him  immediately,  and  as  so  ex- 
tended, given  to  the  jury  upon  their  retirement,  is  not  a  com- 
pliance with  the  statute.23 

§  6.  Party  must  request  written  instructions. — In  the  absence 
of  a  proper  request  for  instructions  a  party  will  not  be  heard  to 
complain  of  the  failure  of  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury.24  The* 


22  Martin  v.  S.  104  Ala.  71,  16  So. 
82,  53  Am.  St.  24;    Smith  v.  S.  103 
Ala.   40,   16  So.  12. 

23  Crawford    v.    Brown,    21    Colo. 
272.    40    Pac.    692;    Shafer   v.    Stin- 
son,    76   Ind.    374;    Rich   v.    Lappin, 
43    Kas.    666;    Wheat   v.    Brown,   3 
Kas.  App.  431,  43  Pac.  807.  Contra: 
S.  v.  Preston,  4  Idano,  215,  38  Pac. 
694,  95  Am.  St.  59.     See  Union  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Stone,  54  Kas.  83,  37  Pac. 
1012.     Ind.  Acts,  1903,  p.  339,  §  1. 

24  McDonall   v.    P.    168   111.   93,   48 
N.  E.   86;    New  York  Life  Ins.   Co. 
v.  Brownis'  Admr.  23  Ky.  L.  R.  2070, 
66    S.    W.    613;    American    T.    &    T. 
Co.  v.  Kersh  27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  127, 
66  S.  W.  74  (as  to  impeaching  tes- 
timony);   O'Toole   v.   Post   P.   Pub. 
Co.    179    Pa.    St.    271,    36    Atl.    288; 
Smith  v.  S.  117  Ga.  59,  43  S.  E.  703 
(as  to  theory  of  a  party) ;   Lawns- 
dale      v.      Grays      Harbor      Boom 
Co.  21  Wash.   542,   58  Pac.  663;   P. 
v.    Oliveria,    127   Cal.    376;    59   Pac. 
772;    Wittenberg  v.   Mollyneaux,  59 
Neb.  203,    80  N.  W.  824;   Boyard  v. 
Johnson     (Ky.),     53     S.     W.     651; 
French  v.  Town  of  Watterbury,  72 
Conn.   435,   44  Atl.   740;    Howard  v. 
Turner,  125  N.  Car.  126,  34  S.  E.  229; 
Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Crowder, 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.),    53    S.    W.    380: 
Halff     v.     Wangemann     (Tex.     Cv. 
App.),  54  S.  W.  967;  Clark  v.  Clark, 
16  Ohio  C.  C.  103;  Bailey  v.  Carn- 
duff,  14  Colo.  App.  169,  59  Pac.  407; 
Burr  v.  McCullum,  59  Neb.  326,  80 
N.  W.  1040,  80  Am.  St.  677;  Fergu- 
son v.  S.  52  Neb.  432,  72  N.  W.  590, 
66     Am.     St.     512     (alibi);     S.     v. 


Ridge,  125  N.  Car.  655,  34  S.  E.  439; 
Rutherford  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  56  S. 
Oar.  446,  35  S.  E.  136;  Rosenbaum 
Bros.  v.  Levitt,  109  Iowa, '  292,  80 
N.  W.  393;  Wagener  v.  Kirven,  56 
S.  Car.  126,  34  S.  E.  18;  Bass  v.  S. 
103  Ga.  227,  29  S.  E.  966;  Lackey  v. 
S.  67  Ark.  416,  53  S.  W.  213;  Tracey 
v.  Hacket,  19  Ind.  App.  133,  49  N. 
E.  185,  65  Am.  St.  398;  Weber  v. 
Whetstono,  53  Neb.  371,  73  N.  W. 
695;  Boynton  v.  S.  115  Ga.  587,  41 
S.  E.  995  (relating  to  impeach- 
ment) ;  Justice  v.  Gallert,  131  N. 
Car.  393,  42  S.  E.  850;  S.  r. 
Donette  (Wash.),  71  Pac.  556;  Carr 
v.  Frick  Coke  Co.  170  Pa.  St.  62, 
32  Atl.  656;  Humes  v.  Gephart,  175 
Pa.  St.  417,  34  Atl.  790;  P.  v. 
McLaughlin,  37  N.  Y.  S.  1005,  2 
App.  Div.  419;  Hepler  v.  S.  58  Wis. 
49,  16  N.  W.  42;  Rolling  Mill  Co. 
v.  Corrigan,  46  Ohio  St.  294,  15  Am. 
St.  596;  Brantley  v.  S.  9  Wyo.  102, 
61  Pac.  139;  S.  v.  Chiles,  58  S.  Car. 
47,  36  t3.  E.  496;  Gruesendorf  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  56  S.  W.  624;  S.  v. 
Todd,  110  Iowa,  631,  82  N.  W.  322; 
Burgess  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  42  S. 
W.  562;  Child  v.  Boyd  &  Corey  Boot 
&  Shoe  Mfg.  Co.  175  Mass.  493,  56 
N.  E.  608;  Drury  v.  Connell,  177 
111.  43,  52  N.  E.  368;  Home  v.  Mc- 
Rea,  53-  S.  Car.  51,  30  S.  E.  701; 
White  v.  Cole,  20  Ky.  858,  47  S.  W. 
759;  Waechter  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
297,  30  S.  W.  444,  800;  see  Kostuch 
v.  St.  P.  City  R.  Co.  78  Minn.  459, 
81  N.  W.  215,  47  L.  R.  A.  136;  Lucio 
v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  320,  33  S.  W. 
358;  Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 


PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION. 


6 


failure  of  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  upon  any  proposition 
of  law  deemed  essential  cannot  be  complained  of  as  error  unless 
the  complaining  party  made  proper  request  for  instructions.25 
Hence,  if  the  court  fails  to  instruct  on  the  burden  of  proof 
where  no  instructions  in  that  respect  are  requested  and  the  at- 
tention of  the  court  is  not  called  to  the  omission,  there  can  be 
no  ground  to  complain  of  error.20  Also  an  instruction  stating 


Steinberger,  60  Kas.  856,  55  Pac. 
1101;  Mineral  R.  &  M.  Co.  v. 
Auten,  188  Pa.  St.  568,  41 
Atl.  327;  Parish  v.  Williams,  (Tex. 
.Cv.  App.),  53  S.  W.  79;  Keyes 
v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids,  107  Iowa, 
509,  78  N.  W.  227;  Rawlins  v.  S. 
40  Fla.  155,  24  So.  65;  S.  v.  Ken- 
dall, 54  S.  Car.  192,  32  S.  E.  300; 
Chezem  v.  S.  56  Neb.  496,  76  N. 
W.  1056;  Taylor  v.  S.  105  Ga.  746, 
31  S.  E.  764;  Barfield  v.  S.  105  Ga. 
491,  30  S.  E.  743;  Roark  v.  S.  105 
Ga.  736,  32  S.  E.  125;  S.  v.  Can- 
ceinne,  50  La.  Ann.  847,  24  So.  134; 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  4 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  121,  23>  S.  W.  433; 
Miller  v.  Haas  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  27 
S.  W.  263;  Lueck  v.  Heisler,  87 
Wis.  644,  58  N.  W.  1101;  Robinson 
v.  Mcllver  (  Tex.  Cv.  App.),  23  S. 
W.  915;  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  McMonigal  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
25  S.  W.  341;  Com.  v.  Washington, 
202  Pa.  St.  148,  51  Atl.  759;  Hall- 
Moody  Institute  v.  Copass,  108  Tenn. 
582,  69  S.  W.  327;  Jones  v.  Spartan- 
burg  Herald  Co.  44  S.  Car.  526,  22  S. 
E.  731;  Scully  v.  S.  39  Ala.  240; 
Ewing  v.  Sanford,  19  Ala.  605;  Saint 
v.  Guerrerio,  17  Colo.  448,  30  Pac. 
335,  31  Am.  St.  320;  Carpenter  v. 
S.  43  Ind.  371;  Moore  v.  Shields, 
121  Ind.  267,  23  N.  E.  89;  S.  v. 
Helvin,  65  Iowa,  289,  21  N.  W.  645; 
Copas  v.  Anglo-American  Prov.  Co. 
73  Mich.  541,  41  N.  W.  690;  Ed- 
wards v.  S.  47  Miss.  589;  Brinser  v. 
Longenecker,  169  Pa.  St.  51,  32  Atl. 
60;  Porath  v.  S,  90  Wis.  537,  63  N. 
W.  1061,  48  Am.  St.  954;  Missouri  K. 
&  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  15  Tex.  Civ. 
Ap.  428,  39  S.  W.  588;  Feinstein  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  73  S.  W.  1052; 
Winn  v.  Sanborn,  10  S.  Dak.  642, 
75  N.  W.  201;  Paine  v.  Incorporated 
Town,  etc.  103  Iowa,  481,  72  N.  W. 


693;  P.  v.  Winthrop,  118  Cal.  85, 
50  Pac.  390;  Johnson  v.  S.  53  Neb. 
103,  73  N.  W.  463;  Driver  v.  Atch- 
ison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  59  Kas. 
773,  52  Pac.  79;  Patterson  v.  Mills, 
48  N.  Y.  S.  781  (fellow  servant); 
S.  v.  Pitts,  156  Mo.  247,  56  S.  W. 
887;  S.  v.  Rosencrans,  9  N.  Dak.  163, 
82  N.  W.  422;  Conway  v.  Jordan, 

110  Iowa,  462,  81  N.  W.  703;  Pearson 
v.   Spartenberg  Co.   51  S.   Uar.   480, 
29  S.  E.  193;   Chicago  G.  W.  R.  Co. 
v.    Healey,    86    Fed.    245;    Western 
U.  T.  Co.  v.  Seals  (lex.  Cv.  App.), 
45    S.    W.    964;    Race   v.    American 
F.    S.    &    M.    Co.    (Tex.    Cv.    App.), 
43  S.  W.  36.     See  Wood  v.  Collins, 

111  Ga.  32,  36  S.  E.  423;    Dominick 
v.    Randolph,    124    Ala.    557,    27    So. 
481;  Bowen  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  58  S 
Car.    222,    36    S.    E.    590;    Jones    v. 
Heirs,  57  S.  Car.  427,  35  S.  E.  748; 
Jackson   v.    International   &   G.    N. 
R.   Co.    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),   5?    S.   W. 
869;  Felton  v.  S.  139  Ind.  531,  39  N. 
E.  228;  P.  v.  Ezzo,  104  Mich.  341,  62 
N.   W.   407;    S.   v.   Smith,   65   Conn. 
283,  31  Atl.  206  (reasonable  doubt); 
Porath  v.  S.  90  Wis.  527,  63  N.  W. 
1061,  48  Am.  St.  954  (accomplice  cor- 
roborated) ;  Carson  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  342,  30  S.  W.  799;  P.  v.  War- 
ner,   104    Mich.    337,    62    N.    W.    405 
(defendant  failing  to  testify. 

25  p.  v.  Oliveria,  127  Cal.  376,  57 
Pac.   772;    P.   v.    Fice,   97   Cal.   460, 
32  Pac.  531;  S.  v.  Pfefferle,  36  Kas. 
90,  54  Kas.  107;   Taft  v.  Wildman, 
15   Ohio,    123;    Hills   v.    Ludaig,   46 
Ohio  St.  373    24  N.  E.  596,  15  Am. 
St.  608;   Georgia  S.  &  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Young  Ins.  Co.   (Ga.)  46  S.  E.  644; 
Marks  v.  Jacobs,  76  Ind.  216. 

26  Lampman   v.   Van   Alstyne,   94 
Wis.  417,  69  N.  W.  171;  Osborne  v. 
Ringland   (Iowa),  98  N.  W.  116. 


7  REQUESTS  IN  WRITING  REQUIRED.  ,       §    6. 

that  the  plaintiff  must  prove  the  affirmative  issues  alleged  in 
his  complaint  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  is  sufficient 
in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  further  instructions  as  to  the 
burden  of  proof.27  Also  the  fact  that  no  instruction  was  given 
restricting  the  jury  to  the  evidence  in  their  deliberations  is  no 
ground  for  error  where  no  instruction  in  that  respect  was  re- 
quested.28 

On  the  same  principle  a  defective  instruction  as  to  the  defini- 
tion of  negligence  cannot  be  the  basis  of  error  in  the  absence  of 
a  request  for  a  better  instruction.29  Thus  an  instruction  which 
states  that  by  the  term  "negligence"  is  meant  the  omission 
or  failure  to  do  something  which  an  ordinarily  prudent  and 
careful  person  would  have  done  under  like  circumstances,  can- 
not be  objected  to  for  not  including  the  doing  of  an  affirmative 
act  where  no  request  is  made  for  a  further  charge  to  that  effect.30 

So  also  the  giving  of  an  instruction  for  one  party  containing 
terms  or  expressions  which  perhaps  ought  to  be  explained,  cannot 
be  complained  of  as  error  if  the  party  complaining  fails  to  re- 
quest instructions  explaining  such  terms  or  expressions.31  Thus, 
where  an  instruction  contains  the  expression  "subsidiary  facts," 
""evidentiary  facts"  or  "essential  elements  of  the  crime  charged," 
if  the  opposing  party  desires  these  or  other  such  terms  explained 
he  should  prepare  and  request  instructions  explaining  them,  else 
he  will  not  be  heard  to  complain  of  error.32  And  in  a  murder 
case  the  failure  of  the  court,  in  defining  the  crime  of  murder,  to 
charge  that  the  slayer  must  have  been  of  sound  mind  cannot 
be  urged  as  error,  no  request  having  been  made  for  such  in- 

27  Nichol  v.  Laumeister,  102  Cal.  (contributory  negligence).     See  al- 
€58,   36   Pac.   925.     See   Gottstein  v.  so    Magoon    v.    Before,    73   Vt.    231, 
Seattle  L.  &  C.  Co.  7  Wash.  424,  35  50  Atl.   1070;    Smith  v.   South  Car- 
Pac.   133.  olina  &  G.  R.  62  S.  Car.  322,  40  S. 

28  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Baker,  E.   665. 

10  Tex.  Cv.  App.  515,  31  S.  W.  1072.  ^  Hinshaw  v.  S.  147  Ind.  335,  47 

29  Milligan  v.   Texas  &   N.   O.   R.  N.  E.  157;   Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Co.  27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  600,  66  S.  W.  Giffin      (Tex.      Cv.      App.),      65     S. 
896;    Myer  v.  Milwaukee  E.  R.  Co.  W.  661;  Kelly  v.  Cable  Co.  7  Mont. 
(Wis.),    93    N.    W.    &;    Internation-  70,  14  Pac.  633;  Malott  v.  Hood,  201 
al   &  G.   N.   R.   Co.   v.   Clark   (Tex.  111.  202,  66  N.  E.  247;   bchneider  v. 
Cv.  App.),  71  S.  W.  585.  Hosier,  21  Ohio  St.  113. 

so  Campbell  v.  Warner  (Tex.  Cv.  32  Hinshaw  v.  S.  147  Ind.  335,  47 

App.),   24   S.   W.   703;    Stauning   v.  N.  E.  157;   Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  v. 

Great   N.    R.    Co.    88   Minn.    480,   98  James    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    73    S.    W. 

N.  W.  518;  Lane  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  79    (ordinary  care). 
Co.   132   Mo.   4,   33   S.   W.   645,   1128 


§ 


PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION. 


struction.33-  But  in  some  states  it  has  been  held  that  for  a 
failure  of  the  trial  court  to  give  instructions,  where  none  were 
requested,  error  may  be  urged  if  the  defendant  in  a  criminal 
case  has  been  deprived  of  a  fair  trial.3* 

§  7.  Specific  instructions  must  be  requested. — Specific  or  more 
particular  instructions  must  be  requested  by  the  party  desiring 
them,  although  a  statute  requires  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury 
on  all  material  issues.35  Where  the  instructions  correctly  state 
the  law  applicable  to  the  case  as  far  as  they  go,  then  a  party 
will  not  be  heard  to  complain  because  the  charge  may  be  in- 
complete or  not  sufficiently  specific.36 

If  a  party  desires  that  the  charge  should  be  more  specific  and 
sufficiently  full  to  cover  any  phase  of  the  case  which  may  have 
been  omitted,  he  should  request  further  instructions,  and  failing 
to  do  so,  cannot  complain  of  error  in  that  respect.37  Or  if  an 

ss  Cincinnati,  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smock,  133  Ind.  411,  33  N.  E.  108, 
18  L.  R.  A.  774;  McAfee  v.  Mont- 
gomery, 21  Ind.  App.  196,  51  N.  E. 
957;  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Oyster,  58  Neb.  1  78  N.  W.  359; 
Ware  Cattle  Co.  v.  Anderson,  107 
Iowa,  231,  77  N.  W.  1026;  National 
Bank  v.  Illinois  &  "W.  Lumber 
Co.  101  Wis.  247,  77  N.  W.  185; 
Schryver  v.  Hawks,  22  Ohio  St. 
316;  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Edmunds  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
26  S.  W.  633;  First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Ragsdale,  171  Mo.  168,  71  S.  W. 
178;  Du  Souchet  v.  Butcher,  113  Ind. 
249,  15  N.  E.  459;  Conard  v.  Kinzie, 
105  Ind.  281,  4  N.  E.  863;  Louis- 
ville N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Grant- 
ham,  104  Ind.  358,  4  N.  E.  49;  Co- 
lumbus R.  Co.  v.  Ritter,  67  Ohio  St. 
53,  65  N.  E.  613;  First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Ragsdale,  171  Mo.  168,  71  S.  W. 
178;  Harper  v.  S.  101  Ind.  113; 
Indianapolis  &  G.  R.  Tr.  Co.  v. 
Haines  (Ind.)  69  N.  E.  188;  Phin- 
ney  v.  Bronson,  43  Kas.  451;  Hoyt 
v.  Dengler,  54  Kas.  309. 

ST  Hamilton  v.  Pittsburg  B.  &  T. 
E.  Co.  194  Pa.  St.  1,  45  Atl.  67; 
Pope  v.  Branch  County  Sav.  Bank, 
23  Ind.  App.  210,  54  N.  E.  835;  Nix- 
on v.  Jacobs,  22  Tex.  Cv.  App.  97, 
53  S.  W.  595;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Mangham,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App. 


ss  S.  v.  Seossoni,  48  La.  Ann. 
1464,  21  So.  33. 

34  Wilson  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
373,  39  S.  W.  373;  S.  v.  Hathaway, 
100  Iowa,  225,  69  N.  W.  449;  Strick- 
land, v.  S.  98  Ga.  84.  25  S.  E. 
908;  Sledge  v.  S.  99  Ga.  684,  26  S.  E. 
756,  59  Am.  St.  251. 

ss  p.  v.  Matthai,  135  Cal.  442,  67 
Pac.  694;  Caveny  v.  Neeley,  43  S. 
Car.  70,  20  S.  E.  806;  Quirk  v.  St. 
L.  N.  E.  Co.  126  Mo.  279,  28  S.  W. 
1080;  Treschman  v.  Treschman,  28 
Ind.  App.  206,  61  N.  E.  961,  91  Am. 
St.  120;  Texas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Watson, 
112  Fed.  402;  Hammel  v.  Lewis,  23 
Ky.  L.  R.  2298,  66  S.  W.  1041  (as 
to  damages) ;  Abilene  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  v.  Briscoe,  27  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
157,  66  S.  W.  315,  11  Am.  St.  182; 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Longbridge,  114 
Ga.  173,  39  S.  E.  882;  Internation- 
al &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  65  S.  W.  885;  Peterson 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  88  S.  W. 
549;  Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
din,  114  Ga.  548,  40  S.  E.  738,  58 
L.  R.  A.  181;  Rolling-Mill  Co.  v. 
Corrigan,  46  Ohio  St.  294,  20  N.  *3. 
466,  15  Am.  St.  596,  3  L.  R.  A.  385; 
Denver  Tr.  Co.  v.  Crumbaugh,  23 
Colo.  363,  48  Pac.  503;  S.  v.  Varner, 
115  N.  Car.  744,  20  S.  E.  518;  Long 
v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  50  S.  Car. 
49,  27  S.  E.  531;  Thomas  v.  S.  95 
Ga.  484,  22  S.  E.  315. 


REQUESTING    SPECIFIC    INSTRUCTIONS. 


§  7 


instruction  states  a  general  principle  of  law  correctly  it  cannot 
be  objected  to  as  erroneous  in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  a  more 
specific  instruction  limiting  its  application;37*  or  the  fact  that  a 
charge  may  be  too  general  cannot  be  assigned  for  error  unless 
the  complaining  party  made  request  for  more  specific  instruc- 
tions.38 

Where  the  instructions  given  cover  all  points  involved  in  the 
case,  there  is  no  ground  for  error  if  no  request  be  made  for  more 


486,  69  S.  W.  80;  Lewin  v.  Pauli,  19 
Pa.  Super.  447;  Moore  v.  Graham, 
29  Tex.  Cv.  App.  235,  69  S.  W.  200; 
Kirby  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  63  S. 
Car.  494,  41  S.  B.  765;  Lampley  v. 
Atlantic,  C.  L.  R.  Co.  63  S.  Car. 
462,  41  S.  E.  517;  Keller  v.. Lewis, 
116  Iowa,  369,  87  N.  W.  1102;  In 
re  Hull's  Will,  117  Iowa,  738,  89  N. 
W.  979;  S.  v.  Young,  104  Iowa,  730, 
74  N.  W.  693;  Owen  v.  Long,  97 
Wis.  78,  72  N.  W.  364;  Baltimore 
&  O.  S-W.  R.  Co.  v.  Conoyer,  149 
Ind.  524,  48  N.  E.  352;  Summitt 
Coal  Co.  v.  Shaw,  16  Ind.  App.  9, 
44  N.  E.  676;  Sutherland  v.  S.  148 
Ind.  695,  48  N.  E.  246;  Carter  White- 
Lead  Co.  v.  Kinlin,  47  Neb.  409, 
66  N.  W.  536;  Housh  v.  S.  43  Neb. 
163,  61  N.  W.  571;  Fortson  v.  Mikell, 
97  Ga.  336,  22  S.  E.  913;  P.  v.  Apple- 
ton,  120  Gal.  250,  52  Pac.  582;  Cleve- 
land C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 19  Ohio  Cir.  385;  Willard 
v.  Williams  (Colo.),  50  Pac.  207; 
Wood  v.  Long  I.  R.  Co.  159  N.  Y. 
546,  54  N.  E.  1095;  Turner  v.  Tootle, 
9  Kas.  App.  765,  58  Pac.  562; 
Harris  v.  Flowers,  21  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
669,  52  S.  W.  1046;  Felton  v. 
Clarkson,  103  Tenn.  457,  53  S.  W. 
733;  Burgett  v.  Burgett,  43  Ind.  78; 
Doll  v.  S.  45  Ohio  St.  452,  15  N.  E. 
293,  4  Am.  St.  542;  Jones  v.  S.  20 
Ohio  St.  34;  Smith  v.  Pittsburg, 
Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  23  Ohio  St.  ±0; 
S.  v.  Pfefferle,  36*  Kas.  90,  12  Pac. 
406;  P.  v.  Byrnes,  30  Cal.  206,  89 
Am.  Dec.  85;  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Byas,  12  Tex.  Cv.  App.  657, 
35  S.  W.  22;  Reynolds  v.  Weiman, 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  40  S.  W.  560; 
Leary  v.  Electric  Tr.  Co.  180  Pa. 
St.  136,  36  Atl.  562;  Muncy  v.  Matt- 
field  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  40  S.  W. 
345;  Moore  v.  Brown,  27  Tex.  Cv. 


App.  208,  64  S.  W.  946;  Green- 
wood v.  Houston  I.  &  B.  Co.  27 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  590,  66  S.  W.  585; 
Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Buch  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  65  S.  W.  681; 
Rowland  v.  Day,  56  Vt.  324,  48  Am. 
R.  791;  McGee  v.  Smitherman,  69 
Ark.  632,  65  S.  W.  461;  Lake  S.  & 
M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Whidden,  23  Ohio 
Cir.  85;  Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dilworth  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  65  S-  W. 
502;  Wickham  v.  Wolcott  (Neb.), 
95  N.  W.  366;  Crosette  v.  Jordan 
(Mich,),  92  N.  W.  782;  Palmer  v. 
Smith  (Conn.),  56  Atl.  516;  Thorn 
v.  Cosand,  160  Ind.  566;  Little  Dor- 
ritt  Gold  Mining  Co.  v.  Arapahoe 
Gold  Mining  Co.  30  Colo.  431,  71 
Pac.  389;  Seaboard  Air  Line  R.  v. 
Phillips,  117  Ga.  98;  Lahr  v.  Krae- 
mer  (Minn.),  97  N.  W.  418. 

37*  Brasington  v.  South  Bend  R. 
Co.  62  S.  Car.  325,  40  S.  E.  665,  89 
Am.  St.  905;  Parkins  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  C.  (Ncb.j  93  N.  W.  197; 
S.  v.  Phipps,  95  Iowa,  487,  64  N. 
W.  410;  Parman  v.  Kansas  City 
(Mo.)  78  S.  W.  1046.  See  also 
Hoyt  v.  Dengler,  54  Kas.  309, 
38  Pac.  260;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Peay,  7  Tex.  Cv.  App.  400,  26- 
S.  W.  768;  Receivers  of  M.  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  v.  Pfluger  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
25  S.  W.  792;  Gibson  v.  S.  114 
Ga.  34,  39  S.  E.  948;  Little  Dor- 
rit  Gold  Min.  Co.  v.  Arapahoe  Gold 
Min.  Co.  30  Colo.  431,  71  Pac.  389; 
S.  v.  Jelinek,  95  Iowa,  420,  64  N. 
W.  250. 

ss  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Rossman, 
13  Ohio  C.  C.  Ill,  7  Ohio  Dec.  119; 
Woods  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  42 
N.  Y.  S.  140,  11  App.  Div.  16:  Texas 
&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Magill,  15  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  353,  40  S.  W.  188. 


§    8  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  10 

specific  instructions.39  And  although  a  special  charge  may  doubt- 
less be  proper  on  account  of  the  other  instructions  being  too 
general,  a  party  is  not  in  a  position  to  complain,  if  he  fails  to 
request  the  court  to  give  such  special  charge.40  And  where  an 
instruction  correctly  states  a  proposition  of  law  applicable  to  the 
evidence,  a  party  will  not  be  heard  to  complain  of  error  on  ap- 
peal, to  some  particular  feature  of  it,  in  the  absence  of  a  request 
for  further  instructions  eliminating  the  objectionable  feature.41 

§  8.  Neither  party  requesting,  effect. — So  by  the  same  prin- 
ciple, if  neither  party  asks  instructions  on  any  question  involved 
in  a  case  there  will  be  no  ground  on  which  to  base  error  for  a 
failure  to  instruct  the  jury  as  to  such  question.42  And  where 
one  party  makes  the  proper  request  for  written  instructions,  and 
afterwards  withdraws  it,  the  opposing  party  cannot  be  heard  to 
complain,  even  where  it  was  too  late  for  him  to  make  such  re- 
quest after  the  withdrawal  by  the  first  party.43  And,  generally 
speaking,  under  the  rule  requiring  that  instructions  shall  be  pre- 
sented to  the  court,  a  party  will  not  be  heard  to  complain  of  a 
failure  of  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  on  any  fact,  feature  or 
element  of  a  case  on  either  side  in  the  absence  of  a  proper  re- 
quest for  such  instructions.44 

39  s.  v.  Sullivan,  43  S.  Car.  205,  21      40   S.   W.   591;    Priel   v.    S.    (Neb.), 
S.    E.    4;    S.    v.    Harrison,    66    Vt.      91  N.  W.  536. 

523,   29   Atl.    807,   44   Am.    St.    864;  «  Youngstown     Bridge      Co.      v. 

Harness  v.  Steele,  159  Ind.  268,  64  Barnes  98  Tenn.  401,  39  S.  W.  714. 

N.  E.  875;   Kirsher  v.  Kirsher,  120  42  Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Has- 

lowa,  337,  94  N.  W.  846;  S.  v.  Hood,  kins,  115  111.  307,  2  N.  E.  654. 

120  Iowa,  238,  94  N.  W.  564,  98  Am.  43  Mutual,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Miller, 

St.    352;    Salem    Iron   Co.   v.    Com-  39   Ind.   475. 

monwealth   Iron  Co.   119  Fed.   593;  44  Brinser    v.     Longenecker,     169 

Tuttle  v.  Wood,  115  Iowa,  507,  88  N.  Pa.    St.    51,   32   Atl.   60;    Gulf   C.   S. 

W.    1056;    St.    Louis    S.    W.    R.    Co.  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Perry  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 

v.     Hughes     (Tex.     Cv.     App.),     73  30  S.   W.   709;    Warden   v.   City   of 

S.    W.    976;     Williamson    v.    Gore,  Philadelphia,    167    Pa.    St.    523,    bl 

(Tex.     Cv.    App.),    73    S.    W.    563;  Atl.  928,  46  Am.  St.  689;  Wright  v. 

Gwaltney    v.    Scottish    C.    F.    &    L.  Cincinnati  St.  R.  Co.  9  Ohio  C.  C. 

Co.   115   N.   Car.   579,  20  S.  E.  465;  503;   Dimmick  v.  Babcock,  92  Iowa, 

P.  v.  Willett,  105  Mich.  110,  62  N.  692,  61  N.  W.  394;   International  & 

W.  1115;  Leeper  v.  S.  12  Ind.  App.  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Beasley,  9  Tex.  Cv. 

637,  40  N.  E.  1113;  Jones  v.  Matheis,  App.  569,  29  S.  W.  1121;  Dollman  v. 

17    Pa.    Super.    220;    Musfelt    v.    S.  Haefner,  12  Ohio  C.  C.  721;  O'Dris- 

64  Neb.  445,  90  N.  W.  237;  Kendrick.  coll   v.   Lynn    &  B.   St.  R.   Co.   180 

v.  Dillinger,  117  N.  Car.  491,  23  S.  Mass.    187,    62    N.    E.    3    (correcting 

E.     438;     Reichsletter     v.     Bostick  counsel   in   argument);    Texas,   &c. 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  33  S.  W.  158.  R.  Co.  v.  Cody,  67  Fed.  71  (measure 

40  Arnold   v.    S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  of  damages);    Texarkana  &   Ft.   S. 


11 


ORAL   AND    WRITTEN — PRESUMED    IN    WRITING. 


§  9.  Must  request  in  criminal  cases. — The  same  rule  applies 
in  charging  the  jury  in  criminal  cases.  Thus,  the  fact  that  the 
court  failed  to  instruct  as  to  the  presumption  of  innocence  can- 
not be  urged  as  error  in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  such  in- 
struction.45 Or  that  the  court  did  not  fully  and  clearly  define 
or  describe  the  doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  in  charging  the  jury 
cannot  be  urged  as  error  in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  in- 
structions in  that  respect.46  So  if  the  defendant  fails  to  make 
a  request  for  other  or  more  specific  instructions  on  any  point  he 
will  not  be  heard  to  complain  of  the  instructions  given.47 

§  10.  Presumed  in  writing — When. — Where  it  does  not  appear 
from  the  record  in  a  court  of  appeal  or  review  whether  the  trial 
court  instructed  the  jury  orally  or  in  writing,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed the  instructions  were  given  in  writing  as  required  by 
statute.48  But  in  Indiana  the  record  must  show  that  written 
instructions  were  requested,  or  the  objection  that  they  were  not 
given  in  writing  will  not  be  considered.49 


R.  Co.  v.  Spencer,  28  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
251,  67  S.  W.  196  (defining  market 
value) ;  Woodmen,  &c.  v.  Locklin, 
28  Tex.  Cv.  App.  486,  67  S.  W.  331; 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Coursey,  115 
Ga.  602,  41  S.  E.  1013;  Oberdorfer 
v.  Newberger,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  2323,  67 
S.  W.  267;  J.  I.  Case  Threshing 
Machine  Co.  v.  Hoffman,  86  Minn. 
30,  90  N.  W.  5  (sufficiency  of  evi- 
dence) ;  American  Cotton  Co.  v. 
Smith,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App.  425,  69  S. 
W.  443  (contributory  negligence) ; 
Miles  v.  Stanke,  114  Wis.  94,  89  N. 
W.  833  (proximate  cause) ;  Brown 
v.  Foster,  41  S.  Car.  118,  19  S.  E. 
2"99;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kniffin,  4  Tex.  Cv.  App.  484,  23 
S.  W.  457;  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Waldo  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 

26  S.    W.    1004    (definition   of   neg- 
ligence);     Gulf     C.     &     S.     F.     R. 
Co.    v.    Pendery    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

27  S.    W.    213     (contributory    neg- 
ligence) ;    Buzzell    v.    Emerton,    161 
Mass.    176,    36   N.    E.    796;    Sigal   v. 
Miller    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    25    S.    W. 
1012;    Templeton     v.     Green    (Tex. 
Cv.   App.),   25   S.   W.   1073;    Doll   v. 
S.   45  Ohio  St.  452,  15  N.   E.   293,   4 
Am.  St.  542;  State  v.  Bennett,  8  Ind. 
App.  679,  36  N.  E.  551,  construction 
of  document;  Fink  v.  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F. 


R.  Co.  4  Tex.  Cv.  App.  269,  23  S.  W. 
330;  Hargadine  v.  Davis  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.)  26  S.  W.  424;  Willis  v.  Lock- 
et (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  26  S.  W.  419; 
Kerr  v.  S.  63  Neb.  115,  88  N.  W. 
240;  Clemmons  v.  S.  43  Fla.  200, 
30  So.  699;  Martin  v.  S.  (Neb.),  93 
N.  W.  161;  Jones  v.  S.  20  Ohio,  34. 

45  Williams    v.    P.    164    111.    481, 
45  N.  E.  987;  P.  v.  Hinshaw  (Mich.), 
97   N.   W.   758. 

46  Miller  v.   S.    (Wis.),   81  N.   W. 
1020;  Burgess  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
42  S.  W.  562;  Meehan  v.  S.   (Wis.), 
97    N.    W.    174;    Herman    v.    S.    75 
Miss,  340,  22  So.   873;    Shiver  v.   S. 
41  Fla.   630,   27  So.  36;    P.   v.   Brit- 
tain,  118  Cal.  409,  50  Pac.  664;  By- 
num  v.  S.   (Fla.),  35  So.  65. 

'  47  Douthill  v.  Ter.  7  Okla.  55,  54 
Pac.  312;  S.  v.  Smith,  106  Iowa, 
701,  77  N.  W.  499;  Cupps  v.  S. 
(Wis.),  97  N.  W.  218;  Cramer  v. 
S.  21  Ind.  App.  502,  52  N.  E.  239; 
Com.  v.  Washington,  202  Pa.  St. 
148,  51  Atl.  757  (instruction  re- 
viewing the  testimony). 

48  Condon    v.    Brockway,    157    111. 
91,  41  N.  E.  634;   Citizens,  &c.  Ins. 
Co.   v.   Short,   62   Ind.   316. 

49  Nickless    v,    Pearson,    126    Ind. 
477,    26    N.    E.    478. 


§  13  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  12 

§  11.  Written  and  oral  charge. — In  some  jurisdictions  the 
court  may  read  to  the  jury  from  the  statutes  of  the  state  with 
out  violating  the  statute  requiring  that  the  instructions  shall  be 
in  writing.50  According  to  the  practice  in  North  Carolina,  while 
the  entire  charge  to  the  jury  must  be  given  in  writing,  yet  the 
court  may  give  an  oral  summary  of  the  evidence.61 

§  12.  Waiving  written  instructions. — The  right  to  have  the 
jury  instructed  in  writing  as  provided  by  statute  may  be  waived 
by  the  parties  agreeing  that  the  court  may  instruct  orally.52  Or 
if  a  party  sits  by  and  without  objection  allows  the  court  to 
instruct  the  jury  orally,  the  same  being  taken  down  by  a  ste- 
nographer, he  thereby  waives  written  instructions.53  And  where 
a  party  neglects  to  prepare  and  ask  instructions  on  a  particular 
phase  or  feature  of  a  case  he  waives  any  rights  he  may  have 
had  in  that  respect.54 

Thus,  where  the  instructions  given  do  not  state  the  law  ac- 
curately and  with  certainty,  a  party  waives  his  right  to  object 
on  that  account  if  he  fails  to  ask  additional  instructions  to 
cover  the  deficiency.55  So  where  a  party  fails  to  request  writ- 
ten instructions,  he  cannot  complain  that  his  opponent's  in- 

so  p.    v.    Brown,    59   Cal.    345;    S.  392,  61  N.  W.  161;  Heaston  v.  Cin- 

v.   Mortimer,  20  Kas.   93;    Palmore  cinnati    &    Ft.   W.    R.    Co.    16    Ind. 

v.    S.   29   Ark.    248;    S.   v.   Thomas,  275,  79  Am.  Dec.  430.     See  Johnson 

34  La.  Ann.  1084;  Contra:  Smur  v.  S.  v.   Gulledge,   115  Ga.   981,  42   S.   E. 

88  Ind.  509.     See  Sellers  v.  City  of  354. 

Greencastle,  134  Ind.   645,  34  N.  E.  54  City   of  Chicago   v.   Keefe,   114 

534;    Manier  v.   S.    6  Baxt.    (Tenn.)  111.  230,  2  N.  "3.  267,  55  Am.  R.  860; 

595;    S.    v.    Birmingham,    74    Iowa,  Young  v.  Town  of  Macomb,  42  N. 

407,  38  N.  W.   121.  Y.  S.  351,  11  App.  Div.  480;  Frye  v. 

si  Phillips  v.  Wilmington,  130  N.  Ferguson,  6  S.  Dak.  392,  61  N.  W. 

Car.  582,  41  S.  E.  805.    See  Aiken  v.  161;  Caveny  v.  Neely,  43  S.  Car.  70, 

Com.  24  Ky.  L.  R.  523   68  S.  W.  849;  20  S.  E.  806;   Browning  v.  Wabash 

see  Green  v.  Com.  17  Ky.  L.  R.  943,  W.    R.    Co.    124   Mo.    55,   27    S.    W. 

33  S.  W.  100.  644;    Quirk  v.  St.  L.  N.  E.  Co.   126 

52  Bates  v.  Ball,  72  111.  108,  112;  Mo.  279,  28  S.  W.  1080;   Union  Pac. 
Cutter  v.   P.   184  111.  395,  56  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Stanwood  (Neb.),  91  N.  W. 
412;    Vick    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),  191;    Hindman    v.    Timme,    8    ind. 
69  S.  W.  156;    Bruen  v.   P.  206  111.  App.  416,  35  N.  E.  1046;  S.  v.  Beatt*, 
425;    see   Voght  v.   S.   145   Ind.   12,  51  W.   Va.  232    (imprisonment  reo 
43  N.   E.   1049;    Keith  v.  Wells,  14  ommended   by  the  jury  instead   of 
Colo.    321,    23    Pac.    991;    Kuhn    v.  death  penalty). 

Nelson,  61  Neb.  224,  85  N.  W.  56;          5R  Cincinnati  &  H.  T.  Co.  v.  Hes- 

Clark  v.  S.  31  Tex.  574;  S.  v.  Chev-  ter,   12   Ohio   C.    C.   350;    Pierce  v. 

allier,  36  La.  Ann.  85;   Continental  Arnold  Print  Works,  182  Mass.  260, 

Nat.  Bank  v.  Folson,  67  Ga.  624,  44  65  N.  E.  368  (instruction  obscure) ; 

Am.   R.   739.  Schmitt  v.  Murray,  87  Minn.  250,  91 

53  Frye    v.    Ferguson,    6    S.    Dak.  N.  W.  1116. 


13  EXCEPTIONS — TIME    OF    REQUESTING.  §    14 

structions  were  not  given  in  writing.56  And  where  under  the 
rules  of  practice  a  party  is  permitted  to  have  instructions 
given  to  the  jury  before  arguments  of  counsel,  and  he  fails  to 
insist  on  that  right,  the  fact  that  the  court  gives  the  instruc- 
tions after  arguments  in  the  final  charge  is  not  error  of  which 
complaint  can  be  made,  although  the  instructions  were  sub- 
mitted to  the  court  before  arguments.67 

§  13.  Exceptions  to  oral  charges. — The  giving  of  an  oral 
charge  where  a  statute  requires  written  instructions,  affords  no 
ground  to  complain  of  error  if  no  exceptions  be  taken  to  such 
charge,  especially  where  a  party  sits  by  and  allows  the  court 
to  thus  instruct  without  making  objection  or  taking  exception.58 
The  fact  that  the  court  may  hand  the  instructions  to  the  jury 
without  reading  them  is  not  ground  for  error  in  the  absence 
of  an  exception  to  such  course.59 

§  14.  Time  of  requesting — Rule  of  court. — Instructions  should 
be  requested  within  the  time  stated  by  the  rules  of  the  court, 
and  if  not  so  requested  the  court  may  in  its  discretion  refuse 
them,60  and  such  refusal  affords  no  ground  for  error.61  In  the 
absence  of  a  rule  of'  the  court,  instructions  may  be  presented 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  introduction  of  the  evidence.6-2 

se  Jacqua  v.  Cordesman  &  E.  Co.  A.     134;     Venway    v.     S.     41    Tex. 

106   Ind.   141,   5  N.   E.   907;    Mutual  639;    Sutherland  v.  Venard,  34  Ind. 

B.   S.   I.   Co.  v.  Miller,  39  Ind.  475.  390;    S.  v.  DeMosse,  98  Mo.  340,  11 

57  City   of   Toledo  v.   Higgins,   12  S.  W.  731,  14  Am.  St.  645,  4  L.  R. 
Ohio  C.   C.  646.  A.  776. 

58  Hefling    v.    Vanzandt,    162    111.  eo  Arnold   v.   Lane,   71   Conn.    61, 
166,  44  N.  E.  424;   Swaggart  v.  Ter.  40  Atl.   921;    Chicago  C.   R.  v.   Sul- 
6  Okla.  344,  50  Pac.  96;  Frye  v.  Fer-  livan,   76   111.   App.   505.     See  Hoye 
guson,  6  S.  Dak.  392,  61  N.  W.  161;  v.    Turner,    96    Va.    624,    32    S.    E. 
Phillips    v.    Wilmington    &    W.    R.  291;    Phillips    v.    Thome,    103    Ind. 
Co.   130  N.   Car.   582,   41   S.   E.   805;  275,   2   N.    E.   747;    Waldie   v.    Doll, 
Heaston    v.    Cincinnati    &    Ft.    W.  29  Cal.  555;  Town  of  Noblesville  v. 
R.  Co.  16  Ind.  275,  79  Am.  Dec.  430.  Vestal,    118   Ind.    80,   20   N.    E.    479. 
See    Deets    v.    National    Bank,    57  ci  Shober  v.  Wheeler,  113  N.  Car. 
Kas.   288,   46   Pac.   306.     When   not  370,   18  S.   E.   328;    Marsh  v.   Rich- 
waived:    S.  v.  Bungardner,  7  Baxt.  ardson,   106   N.   Car.   539,   11   S.    E. 
(Tenn.)    163;    S.  v.   Cooper,  45   Mo.  522;    Ter.   v.   Harper,   1   Ariz.   399; 
66;   S.  v.  Hopkins,  33  La.  Ann.  34.  Cady    v.    Owen,    34    Vt.    598;    Ben- 

59  Little  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Washburn,  son   v.    S.    119    Ind.    488,    21    N.    E. 
22  Ohio  St.   333.     See  S.  v.  Missio,  1109;    Street    R.    Co.    v.    Stone,    54 
105  Tenn.  218;  Veneman  v.  McCur-  Kas.  83. 

tain,    33    Neb.    643,    50   N.    W.    955.  In   some   of  the   states   the  time 

See    also    Stringham    v.    Cook,    75  when  instructions  must  be  present- 

Wis.   590,  44  N.  W.   777;   Prater  v.  ed   to   the   court   is   fixed   by    stat- 

Snead,    12    Kas.    447;    Louisville   &  ute. 

N.   R.   Co.     v.   Hall,     91     Ala.     113,  62  st.    Louis    &.  S.    F.    R.    Co.    v. 

8  So.  371,  24  Am.  St.  863,  12  L.  R.  Dawson,   7   Kas.   App.   466,   53   Pac. 


§  14  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  14 

Under  a  rule  of  court  requiring  instructions  to  be  presented 
to  the  court  before  the  close  of  the  arguments  to  the  jury,  they 
are  in  time  if  presented  to  the  court  before  the  close  of  the 
argument  for  the  plaintiff,  and  it  is  error  to  refuse  them  on 
the  ground  that  they  were  not  presented  in  time.63  And  under 
a  statute  requiring  that  instructions  shall  be  given  before  ar- 
guments, it  is  error  to  give  them  after  arguments.64 

But  according  to  the  practice  in  Missouri  the  court  may  give 
instructions  after  arguments  of  counsel,  although  the  statute 
provides  that  the  court  may  instruct  the  jury  "when  the  evi- 
dence is  concluded  and  before  the  case  is  argued."65  But  in- 
structions may  be  asked  at  the  conclusion  of  the  charge  on  any 
matter  which  has  been  omitted  or  in  which  the  charge  is  im- 
proper.66 Also  the  giving  of  instructions  after  arguments  for 
the  purpose  of  advising  the  jury  as  to  mistakes  or  misconduct 
in  argument  is  perfectly  proper.67 

In  North  Dakota  instructions  are  requested  in  time  if  pre- 
sented before  the  jury  retire  to  consider  of  their  verdict.68  In 
some  jurisdictions  instructions  should  be  presented  to  the  court 
before  the  general  charge,  to  be  of  any  avail  in  the  assignment 
of  error  on  appeal.69  If  special  instructions  should  be  sub- 
mitted before  the  court  has  given  the  general  charge,  the  refusal 
to  give  them  will  not  be  ground  for  error,70  but  in  other  jurisdic- 

892;  S.  v.  Haerston,  121  N.  Car.  579,  v.    O'Connor,   137    Mass.    216;    P.   v. 

28  S.  E.  492;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.   25,  97  Am.   Dec. 

Haskins,   115  111.   300,   311,  2  N.   E.  162. 

654;    Manning  v.  Gasharie,  27  Ind.  «?  Yore    v.    Mueller    Coal    H.    H. 

399.  &   T.    Co.    147    Mo.    679,    49    S.    W. 

es  Bowman  v.  Witlig,  39  111.  416,  855;   P.  v.  Sears,  18  Cal.  635;   Crip- 

429.     See  Root  v.  Boston  E.  R.  Co.  pen  v.  Hope,  38  Mich.  344;    Kellog 

183  Mass.  418.  v.    Lewis,   28    Kas.    535;    Foster   v. 

64  Root  v.  Village  of  M.  16  Ohio  Turner,  31  Kas.  58,  I  Pac.  145. 

C.  C.  457;  Village  of  Monroeville  v.  es  s.   v.   Barry    (N.    Dak.),   94   N. 

Root,  54  Ohio  St.  523,  44  N.  E.  237,  W.    809. 

56  Am.   St.  731;    Atchison,  T.   &  S.  eo  City  of  Chicago  v.   Le  Moyne, 

F.  R.  Co.  v.  Franklin,  23  Kas.  74;  119  Fed.   662;    Gallagher  v.  McMul- 

P.   v.    Silva,   121   Cal.    66S,    54   Pac.  len,  40  N.  Y.  S.  222  (additional  in- 

146,  unless  in  case  of  exception  to  s-tructions      requested      after      the 

the  rule.  charge      held      not       unseasonably 

05  Boggess  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  made);    Fitch  v.  Belding,  49  Conn. 

Co.   118  Mo.   328,  24  S.  W.  210.  469;    Marsh   v.    Richardson,    106   N. 

ee  Brick    v.    Rosworth,    162    Mass.  Car.   539,   11   S.   E.   522;    Billings  v. 

334,  39  N.  E.  36,  44  Am.  St.  362,  26  McCoy,  5  Neb.   187. 

L.  R.   A.   256;    Brooks  v.  S.  96  Ga.  ™  Myers  v.  Taylor,  107  Tenn.  364, 

353,     23    S.     E.     413;     Chapman    v.  64    S.    W.    719. 
McCormick,  86  N.  Y.  479:  McMahon 


15  COURT  EXTENDING  TIME — RULE  OF  COURT.       §  18 

tions  requests  for  additional  instructions  may  be  made  after  the 
general  charge.71 

§  15.  Time  of  requesting — Too  late. — Instructions  are  not  pre- 
sented in  time  after  the  arguments  have  commenced,  where  they 
are  required  to  be  presented  at  the  close  of  the  evidence,72  or 
presenting  written  instructions  after  the  court  has  commenced 
the  oral  charge  is  too  late.73 

§  16.  Error  to  refuse  instruction — When. — Where,  under  the 
practice,  counsel  has  the  right  to  assume  that  the  court  will, 
without  request,  state  such  rules  of  law  as  are  pertinent  and 
applicable  to  the  evidence,  the  refusal  of  an  instruction  embody- 
ing a  correct  rule  not  embraced  in  the  charge  is  error,  and  should 
not  be  refused  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  requested  before 
the  charge  was  given  to  the  jury.74 

§  17.  Court  may  give  time. — Where  the  statute  requires  the 
instructions  to  be  requested  and  presented  before  the  argu- 
ment, the  court  in  its  discretion  may  defer  the  argument  until 
counsel  have  time  to  prepare  and  present  instructions;  but  it  is 
not  error  for  a  court  to  refuse  to  grant  such  time  unless  it  ap- 
pears that  the  court  has  abused  its  discretion;75  but  the  court 
in  its  discretion  may  give  instructions  though  not  requested  in 
time.76 

§  18.  Court's  authority  to  make  rules. — The  court,  undoubt- 
edly, has  power  to  make  a  rule  as  to  when  in  the  progress  of 

71  Boone   v.    Miller,    73    Tex.    557,     Pac.  479;  S.  v.  Forbes  (La.),  35  So. 
11   S.   W.   551;    Williams   v.   Miller,      710. 

2    Lea    (Tenn.)    406;    Brooks   v.    S.  74  Malone   v.    Third   Ave.    R.    Co. 

96  Ga.  353,  23  S.  B.  413.  42   N.   Y.    S.   694,   12   App.   Div.   508. 

72  Evansville   &   T.    H.   R.   Co.    v.  75  Phillips    v.    Thome,    103    Ind. 
Crist,    116    Ind.    457,    19    N.    E.    310,  275,  2  N.  E.  747;   Williams  v.  Com. 
9    Am.    St.    865,    2    L.    R.    A.    450;  85  Va.   607,   8  S.   E.   470;    O'Neil   v. 
Bartley  v.  S.  Ill  Ind.  358,  12  N.  E.  Dry   Dock,    &c.    Co.    129   N.    Y.    130, 
503.  See  German  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Co-  29  N.  E.  84,  26  Am.   St.   512. 
lumbia  E.  T.  Co.  15  Ind.  App.  623,  43  70  Buck  v.  People's  St.  R.  &  E.  L. 
N.  E.  41;    Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  &    P.    Co.    108    Mo.    129,    18    S.    W. 
Brafford,  15  Ind.  App.  655,  43  N.  E.  1090;    Tully  v.  Despard,   31  W.  Va. 
882;   Ransbottom  v.  S.  144  Ind.  250,  370,    6    S.    E.    927;    Phillip's    Case, 
43  N.  E.  218;   Gould  v.  Gilligan,  181  132    Mass.    233;    Engeman    v.    S.    54 
Mass.    600,    64    N.    E.    409.  N.  J.   L.  247,  23  Atl.  676;   Wood  v. 

73  Boggs   v.   Clifton,   17   Ind.   217;  S.    64    Miss.    761,    2    So.    247.      See 
Newton  v.  Newton,  12  Ind.  527.  See  P.   v.   Reefer,  18  Cal.   636. 

Flint   v.    Nelson,   10   Utah,   261,   37 


.§  19  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  16 

.a  trial  instructions  shall  be  presented  to  the  court,  and  such 
rule  will  be  enforced  if  it  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  law.  But 
to  make  such  rule  valid  and  obligatory  upon  suitors  it  must  be 
in  writing  and  spread  upon  the  records  of  the  court  and  given 
reasonable  publicity.77  But  such  a  rule  must  be  fair  and  reason- 
able,78 and  not  repugnant  to  the  law.79 

§  19.  Too  many  instructions. — The  giving  of  many  instruc- 
tions upon  every  conceivable  phase  of  the  law  is  a  pernicious 
practice,  and  tends  to  confuse  rather  than  to  enlighten  the  jury 
upon  the  issues.80  The  issues  in  a  case  being  very  simple,  there 
should  be  only  a  few  brief  instructions.  The  giving  of  many 
on  either  side  in  such  case  naturally  leads  to  confusion.81  When 
instructions  are  numerous  or  prolix  they  are  more  apt  to  mislead 
the  jury,  unless  prepared  with  great  care,  than  when  they  are 
few  in  number  and  simple  in  structure.82 

Where  the  instructions  requested  are  too  numerous  or  volu- 
minous, the  court  may  refuse  them  and  charge  the  jury  on  its 
own  motion.83  But  the  court  cannot  arbitrarily  limit  the  number 
of  instructions  each  side  shall  be  entitled  to  request.84  The 
fact  that  more  instructions  have  been  requested  than  necessary 

77  Illinois   Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Has-  as      language      can      make      them, 
kins,  115  111.  311,  2  N.  E.  654.  Miller  v.  P.  39  111.  466;   Gilmore  v. 

78  Prindeville    v.    P.    42    111.    217,  P.   124  111.  383,  15  N.  E.  758;    Barr 
221;    Sterling  Organ   Co.   v.   House,  v.    P.    113    111.   471. 

25  W.  Va.  65.  si  Chicago    P.    &    M.    R.    Co.    v. 

79  Laselle  v.  Wells,  17  Ind.  33,  79  Mitchell,  159  111.  406,  42  N.  E.  973; 
Am.  Dec.  453;   Conner  v.  Wilkie,  I  Jacobson  v.  Gunzburg,  150  111.  135, 
Kas.   App.  492.  37    N.    E.    229;    Omaha    St.    R.    Co. 

so  Gilmore   v.   P.    124   111.   380,   15  v.  Boeson  (Neb.),  94  N.  W.  619;   S. 

N.    E.    758;    Chicago   &    E.    R.    Co.  v.    Mix,    15    Mo.    159;     Talbort    v. 

v.   Holland,    122    111.   469,   13   N.   E.  Mearns,  21  Mo.  427;  Hanger  v.  Ev- 

145;    Dunn   v.    P.    109   111.    635,   646;  ins,  38  Ark.  338. 
Adams  v.  Smith,  58  111.  419;   Mur-          «2  Springdale    Cemetery    Asso.    v. 

phy  v.   Chicago,  R.   I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  Smith,    24    111.    480,    483;    P.    v.    Ah 

38  Iowa,   539;    S.  v.  Ward,  19  Nev.  Fung,    17    Gal.    377. 
297,   10  Pac.   133;    Brant  v.   Gallup,          83  Moriarty    v.    S.    62    Miss.    661; 

111   111.   487,   53   Am.   R.   638;    S.   v.  Crawshaw  v.  Summer,  56  Mo.  517; 

Floyd,  15  Mo.  355;   Haney  v.  Cald-  Hanger  v.  Evins,  38  Ark.  338.   See 

well,  43  Ark.  184;   Ingram  v.  S.  62  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Sandusky,  99 

Miss.   142;    Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  111.  App.  164;   Roe  v.  Taylor,  45  111. 

Kelly,  25  111.  Ap.  19;  Mutual  B.  L.  485;    McCaleb    v.    Smith,    22    Iowa, 

I.  Co.  v.  French,  2  Cin.  (Ohio),  321;  244;    Mabry  v.    S.   71   Miss.    716,   14 

S.  v.  Ott,  49  Mo.  326.  So.    267. 

The   state's   attorney   should   ask         84  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  O'Don- 

very    few    instructions    in    criminal  nell,   208   111.    280;    Cobb   Chocolate 

cases,  and  those  as  plain  and  simple  Co.  v.   Kundson,  207   111.   461. 


17 


REPEATING    UNNECESSARY. 


20 


will  not  justify  the  court  in  the  refusal  of  necessary  and  proper 
instructions  which  have  been  requested.85  The  giving  of  volu- 
minous instructions  which  tend  to  confuse  and  mislead  may  be 
ground  for  a  new  trial.88 

§  20.    Repeating  generally    not  required.— Where  all  the  in- 

structions  as  given  fully  and  clearly  cover  every  phase  or  branch 
of  the  case,  that  is  sufficient  without  repetition.  The  court  is 
not  bound  to  repeat  in  other  instructions  any  of  the  principles 
embraced  in  those  given  at  the  request  of  either  party  or  by  the 
court  on  its  own  motion.87 


ss  North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Polkey, 
203  111.  231. 

so  Thatcher  v.  Quirk,  4  Idaho, 
267,  38  Pac.  652;  Sidway  v.  Missouri 
L.  &  L.  S.  Co.  163  Mo.  342. 

ST  Montag  v.  P.  141  111.  75,  81, 
30  N.  E.  337;  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Van  Vleck,  143  111.  480,  484,  32  N. 
E.  262;  City  of  Salem  v.  Webster, 
192  111.  369,  61  N.  B.  323;  City  of 
Sterling  v.  Merrill,  124  111.  522,  17 
N.  E.  6;  S.  v.  Grant,  152  Mo.  57,  53 
S.  W.  432;  S.  v.  Kearley,  26  Kas. 
77;  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Groves, 
56  Kas.  601;  Spahn  v.  P.  137  111.  545, 
27  N.  E.  688;  Lyons  v.  P.  137  111. 
619,  27  N.  E.  677;  Thompson  v. 
Duff,  119  111.  226,  10  N.  E.  399; 
Preidberg  v.  P.  102  111.  164;  Great 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  McLaughlin,  70  Fed. 
669;  Bowen  v.  Sweeney,  35  N.  Y. 
S.  400;  Bon  v.  S.  23  Ohio  St.  349, 
13  Am.  R.  253;  Wrisley  v.  Burke, 
203  111.  259;  S.  v.  Linhoff  (Iowa) 
97  N.  W.  77;  Heltonville  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Fields,  138  Ind.  58,  36  N.  E.  529, 
46  Am.  St.  368;  Siberry  v.  S. 
149  Ind.  684,  39  N.  E.  936;  Deitz 
v.  Regnler,  27  Kas.  94;  S.  v.  Bailey, 
32  Kas.  83,  3  Pac.  769;  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  44  Kas. 
660,  24  Pac.  1116;  Muncie  Natural 
Gas  Co.  v.  Allison  (Ind.),  67  N. 
E.  Ill;  Foster  v.  Pacific  C.  S. 
30  Wash.  515,  71  Pac.  48;  S.  v. 
Parker,  172  Mo.  191,  72  S.  W.  650; 
Texas,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Smissen 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  73  S.  W.  42;  S. 
v.  Dent,  170  Mo.  1,  70  S.  W.  881; 
Bond  v.  S.  23  Ohio  St.  349,  13  Am. 
R.  253;  Schafstelle  v.  St.  Louis  & 


M.  R.  Co.  175  Mo.  142,  74  S.  W.  826; 
S.  v.  Pancoast  (N.  Dak.),  67  N.  W. 
1052;  S.  v.  Smith,  142  Ind.  288,  41  N. 
E.  595;  Painter  v.  P.  147  111.  444, 
469,  35  N.  E.  64;  Field  v.  Crawford, 

146  111.   136,   34   N.   E.   481;    Cleve- 
land, C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Walter, 

147  111.    60,   35   N.   E.   529;    Howard 
v.    Supervisors,   54   Neb.   443,   74   N. 
W.  953;    Crane  Co.  v.  Tierney,   175 
111.    79,   51    N.    E.    715;    Alton   Pav. 
B.  &  Fire  B.  Co.  v.  Hudson,  176  111. 
270,  52  N.  E.  256;   Lincoln  v.  Felt 
(Mich.),  92  N.  W.  780;  New  Omaha 
Thompson-Houston  Elec.  Light  Co. 
v.    Johnson    (Neb.),   93    N.    W.    778, 

(contributory  negligence) ;  Morgan 
v.  S.  (Neb.),  i>3  N.  W.  743;  Coombs 
v.  Mason,  97  Me.  270,  54  Atl.  728, 
(d/ue  care  and  contributory  negli- 
gence); Howe  v.  Miller,  23  Ky.  L.  R. 
1610,  65  S.  W.  353;  Boyd  v.  Port- 
land Elec.  Co.  40  Ore.  126,  66  Pac. 
576;  Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  Tram- 
mell,  114  Ga.  312,  40  S.  E.  259; 
Nebraska  M.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sasek, 
64  Neb.  17,  89  N.  W.  428;  Lobdell 
v.  Keene,  85  Minn.  90,  88  N.  W. 
426;  Kowalski  v.  Chicago  G.  W.  R. 
Co.  (Iowa),  87  N.  W.  409;  Basset  t 
v.  S.  (Fla.),  33  So.  262;  Belding 
v.  Archer,  131  N.  Car.  287,  42  S. 
E.  800;  Rockford  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Nelson,  65  111.  415,  425;  Davis 
v.  Wilson,  65  111.  525,  531;  Twining 
v.  Martin,  65  111.  157,  160;  Reid 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  57  S.  W. 
662;  Shenenberger  v.  S.  154  Ind. 
630,  57  N.  E.  519;  Ragland  v.  S. 
125  Ala.  12,  27  So.  983;  P.  v.  Thiede, 
11  Utah,  241,  39  Pac.  837;  Bryant 


§  21 


PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION. 


18 


§  21.  Repeating  on  preponderance — Reasonable  doubt. — Thus, 
for  instance,  the  rule  requiring  the  plaintiff  to  prove  his  case 
by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  need  not  be  repeated  when 
once  correctly  stated  in  an  instruction  given;88  or  the  rule  re- 
quiring the  prosecution  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  before  a  conviction  can  be  had,  need  not 
be  repeated.89 

§  22.  Repeating  in  detail — Words,  phrases. — And  under  this 
rule  the  refusal  of  an  instruction  which  presents  a  subject  mat- 


v.  S.  34  Fla.  291,  16  So.  177;  Phil- 
lips v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  31  S. 
W.  644;  S.  v.  La  Grange,  94 
Iowa,  60,  62  N.  W.  664;  Dunn  v. 
Bushnell  (Neb.),  83  N.  W.  693; 
Myer  v.  Richards,  111  Fed.  296; 
S.  v.  Prater,  52  W.  Va.  132,  43  S. 
E.  230,  241;  Fletcher  v.  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.  102  Tenn.  1,  49  S. 
W.  739;  Coghill  v.  Kennedy,  119 
Ala.  641,  24  So.  459;  Moratsky  v. 
Wirth,  74  Minn.  146,  76  N.  W.  1032; 
Pearce  v.  Strickler,  9  N.  Mex.  467, 
54  Pac.  748;  Smith  v.  Southern  R. 
Co.  53  S.  Car.  121,  30  S.  E.  697; 
Clark  v.  Bennett,  123  Cal.  275,  55 
Pac.  908;  Bates-Smith  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Scott,  56  Neb.  475,  76  N.  W.  1063; 
Lyne  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  123 
N.  Car.  129,  31  S.  E.  350;  Missouri 
K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Hennessy  (Tex.) 
49  S.  W.  641;  Bacon  v.  Bacon,  76 
Miss.  458,  24  So.  968;  Prosser  v. 
Pretzel,  8  Kas.  App.  856,  55  Pac. 
854;  Indiana  I.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bundy, 
152  Ind.  590,  53  N.  E.  175,  71  Am. 
St.  345;  National  Bank  of  Merrill 
v.  Illinois  &  W.  Lumber  Co.  101 
Wis.  247,  77  N.  W.  185;  Leifheit  v. 
Jos.  Schlitz  Brewing  Co.  106  Iowa, 
451,  76  N.  W.  730;  Keyes  v.  City  of 
Cedar  Rapids,  107  Iowa,  509,  78  N. 
W.  227. 

The  court  in  charging  the  jury 
may  refer  to  other  parts  of  the 
charge  without  repeating:  O'Leary 
v.  German  A.  Ins.  Co.  100  Iowa, 
390,  69  N.  W.  686;  Jensen  v.  Seiber, 
(Neb.),  93  N.  W.  697. 

ss  Decatur  Cereal  Mill  Co.  v. 
Gogerty,  180  111.  197,  54  N.  E.  231; 
Metropolitan  W.  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v. 


Skola,  183  111.  454,  458,  56  N.  E. 
171,  75  Am.  St.  115;  S.  v.  Pyscher 
(Mo.),  77  S.  W.  841;  Smith  v. 
Smith,  169  111.  624,  48  N.  E.  306; 
Taylor  v.  Cox,  153  111.  220,  229,  38 
N.  E.  656;  Riepe  v.  Elting,  86  Iowa, 
82,  56  N.  W.  285,  48  Am.  St.  356; 
Mitchell  v.  Hindman,  150  111.  538, 
37  N.  E.  916;  Village  of  Altamont 
v.  Carter,  196  111.  286,  97  111.  App. 
196. 

ss  Schintz  v.  P.  178  111.  320,  328. 
52  N.  E.  903;  Toledo,  St.  L.  K.  C. 
R.  Co.  •  v.  Bailey,  145  111.  162,  33 
N.  E.  1089;  Mackin  v.  P.  115  111. 
312,  329,  3  N.  E.  222,  56  Am.  R.  167; 
P.  v.  Gilmore,  (Cal.)  53  Pac.  806; 
Jones  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  45  S. 
W.  596;  Davis  v.  S.  51  Neb.  301,  70 
N.  W.  984;  Miller  v.  S.  106  Wis. 
156,  81  N.  W.  1020;  Kennedy  v.  P. 
44  111.  283;  Peri  v.  P.  65  111.  17,  25; 
Sanches  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  55  S. 
W.  44;  Spears  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
527,  56  S.  W.  347;  Ford  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  56  S.  W.  338; 
Edens  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  522, 
55  S.  W.  815;  S.  v.  Currie,  8  N. 
Dak.  545,  80  N.  W.  475.  See  Cook 
v.  P.  177  111.  146,  155,  52  N.  E. 
273;  Franklin  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
625,  31  S.  W.  643;  Carleton  v.  S. 
43  Neb.  373,  61  N.  W.  699;  S.  v. 
Tippet,  94  Iowa,  646,  63  N.  W.  445; 
Deilks  v.  S.  141  Ind.  23,  40  N.  E. 
120;  S.  v.  Hopkins,  94  Iowa,  86.' 
62  N.  W.  656;  Ramirez  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  65  S.  W.  1101: 
Wheeler  v.  S.  158  Ind.  687,  63  N.  E. 
975;  McCulley  v.  S.  62  Ind.  428; 
Lewis  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  59  S. 
W.  886;  Steiner  v.  P.  187  111.  244. 


19  REPEATING  AS  TO  DEFENSE — SUBSTANCE.          §  25 

ter  more  in  detail  than  a  very  general  one  given  on  the  same 
subject,  cannot  ordinarily  be  urged  as  error.90 

It  is  not  necessary  to  instruct  upon  each  separate  item  of 
evidence  when  the  court  has  given  full  instructions  covering  the 
whole  case.91  Also  any  word,  phrase  or  expression  which  has 
once  been  explained  need  not  be  again  explained  when  used  in 
other  parts  of  the  charge.92 

§  23.  Repeating — As  to  defense. — So  also  the  court  having  once 
charged  that  a  certain  defense  must  be  established  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence,  a  refusal  to  instruct  that  the  ver- 
dict must  be  according  to  the  weight  of  the  evidence  is  not 
error.93  So  when  a  defense  has  once  been  fully  and  clearly 
stated  in  one  instruction  the  court  is  not  required  to  reiterate 
it  in  each  of  the  others.94 

§  24.  Repeating — As  to  witnesses. — Likewise  under  the  same 
rule  the  refusal  to  instruct  on  the  credibility  of  the  plaintiff  as 
a  witness,  that  if  the  jury  believe  he  has  testified  wilfully 
falsely  to  any  material  fact,  they  may  take  that  fact  into  con- 
sideration in  weighing  his  testimony  is  not  material  error  where 
the  general  charge  states  substantially  the  same  principal  ap- 
plicable to  any  or  all  of  the  witnesses.95  Nor  need  the  court 
repeat  an  instruction  as  to  the  interest  any  witness  may  have 
in  the  result  of  the  suit  or  trial,  though  the  requested  instruc- 
tion be  in  somewhat  different  language.96 

§  25.  Repeating — Request  substantially  given  by  others. — It 
follows  from  what  has  been  said  that  although  the  requested 
instructions  may  correctly  state  the  law  applicable  to  the  facts  in 
issue,  they  are  properly  refused  if  the  same  principles  or  doc- 
trines are  substantially  embodied  in  others  given  at  the  request 
of  either  party.97  Thus  in  an  action  where  negligence  is  a 

90  O'Rourke     v.     Vennekohl,     104  Ins.  Co.  95  Wis.  445,  70  N.  W.  554. 
Cal.    254,   37   Pac.    930.  »*  Canthem  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

91  S.    v.    Smith,   142    Ind.    288,   41  65  S.  W.  96;   Ter.  v.  Gonzales   (N. 
N.  E.  595.  Mex.),  68  Pac.  925. 

92  Griffin   v.    Mulley,    167   Pa.    St.  9o  Whitaker  v.   Engle,   111   Mich. 
339,   31   Atl.    664;    French  v.   Ware,  205,   69   N.   W.   493. 

65  Vt.  338,  26  Atl.  1096,  36  Am.  St.  9«  Chicago  City  R.   Co.  v.  Mayer, 

R.   864;    Scruggs  v.   S.   35    Tex.   Cr.  185  111.   336,  56  N.  E.  1058,  76  Am. 

App.   622,   34  S.  W.  951   ("adequate  St.     R.     30;     Dunham     Towing     & 

cause"  in  homicide  case);  Childs  v.  Wrecking  Co.  v.  Dandelin,  143  111. 

S.   35   Tex.   Cr.   App.  573,  34  S.  W.  414,   32   N.  E.   258. 

939.  97  Indianapolis  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Hock- 

93  Agnew  v.  Farmers'  M.  P.  Fire  ett,  159  Ind.  683;    City  of  Joliet  v. 


§  25 


PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION. 


material  element  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  the  refusal  of  the  general 


Johnson,  177  111.  183,  52  N.  E. 
498;  England  v.  Fawbush,  204  111. 
400;  Crane  Co.  v.  Tierney,  175  111. 
79,  82,  51  N.  E.  715;  Spence  v. 
Huckins,  208  111.  309;  Whitney  S. 
Co.  v.  O'Rourke,  172  111.  177,  186, 

50  N.    E.    242;    Franklin    v.    Krum, 
171  111.  378,  49  N.  E.  513;  S.  v.  Clark, 

51  W.  Va..457,  90  Am.  St.  819;  Davis 
v.  Hall,  (Neb.),  97  N.  W.  1023;  Kid- 
man v.  Garrison   (Iowa),  97  N.  W. 
1078;  Collins  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  Co.  (Iowa),  97  N.  W.  1103;  Jones 
v.  Johnson  (N.  Car.),  45  S.  E.  828; 
S.  v.  Stantz   (Wash.),  74  Pac.  590; 
Morrison  v.   Northern  Pac.   R.   Co. 
(Wash.),  74  Pac.  1066;   Wildman  v. 
S.    (Ala.),   35   So.    995;    Baldwin   v. 
S.    (Fla.),    35    So.    221;    Cook   v.    S. 
(Fla.),    35    So.    669;    Kilpatrick    v. 
Grand    T.    R.    Co.    74    Vt.    288,    52 
Atl.  531,  93  Am.  St.  887;    Southern 
I.   R.   Co.   v.  Davis    (Ind.)    69  N  E. 
554;    Copeland    v.    Hewitt,    96    Me. 
525,     53  Atl.     36;     Chicago     C.     R. 
Co.     v.     Fennimore,     199     111.     18; 
Crossen    v.    Grandy,    42    Ore.    282, 
70    Pac.    906;    West   C.    St.    R.    Co. 
v.    Lieserowitz,    197    111.    616;    S.    v. 
Ashcraft,  170  Mo.  409,  70  S.  W.  898; 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Groves, 
56  Kas.  601,  44  Pac.  628;    Missouri, 
K.   &   T.   R.   Co.  v.  Fuller,  72   Fed. 
468;  Thorp  v.  Carvalho,  36  N.  Y.  S. 
1,   14   Misc.    554;    Pyle   &   Pyle,   15b 
111.    289,    41    N.    E.    999;    Burgess   v. 
Davis    Sulphur   Ore    Co.    165    Mass. 
71,  42  N.  E.  501;   Arthur  v.  City  of 
Charleston,  51  W.  Va.  132,  90  Am. 
St.  772;  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hewitt,  202  111.  28,  66  N.  E. 
829;    Golibart   v.    Sullivan,   30    Ind. 
App.    428,    66    N.    E     188;    Southern 
Ind.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrell   (Ind.  App.), 
66  N.  E.  1016;   Frank  Bird  Tr.  Co. 
v.  Krug,  30  Ind.  App.  602,  65  N.  E. 
309;     Continental     Nat.     Bank     v. 
Tradesmen's   Nat.   Bank   173   N.   Y. 
272,     65     N.     E.     1108;     Stuart     v. 
Mitchum,  135  Ala.  546,  33  So.  670; 
West  Va.   C.  &  P.   R.   Co.  v.   S.   96 
Md.  652,  54  Atl.  669,  61  L.  R.  A.  574; 
Copeland  v.  Hewitt,  96  Me.  525,  53 
Atl.  36;  Southern  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Hage- 
man,  121  Fed.  262  (substance  given 
in  different  language) ;   Stockslager 
v.   U.    S.   116   Fed.   590;    Marcus   v. 


Leake  (Neb.),  94  N.  W.  100;  S. 
v.  Shunka,  116  Iowa,  206,  89  N.  W. 
977;  Waterhouse  v.  Jos.  S.  Brew. 
Co.  (S.  Dak.),  94  N.  W.  587; 
S.  v.  Landano,  74  Conn.  638,  51  Atl. 
860;  Gill  v.  Donovan,  96  Md.  518, 
54  Atl.  117;  Hartsel  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  68  S.  W.  285;  Warner 
v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  120 
Iowa,  159,  94  N.  W.  490;  Bell  v.  In- 
corporated Town  of  Clarion,  120  Io- 
wa, 332,  94  N.  W.  907;  Sellman  v. 
Wheeler  (Md.),  54  Atl.  512;  Rey- 
nolds v.  Pierson,  29  Ind.  App.  273,  64 
N.  E.  484;  Kennard  v.  Grossman 
(Neb.),  89  N.  W.  1025;  Wbstern 
Stone  Co.  v.  Musical,  196  111.  382, 

63  N.  E.  664,  89  Am.  St.  325;   Him- 
rod  Coal  Co.  v.  Clark,  197  111.  514, 

64  N.  E.  282;   Corbus  v.  Leonhardt, 

114  Fed.    10;    Moran    Bros.    Co.    v. 
Snoqualmie    Falls     Power    Co.    29 
Wash.  292,  69  Pac.  759;  Lee  v.  Ham- 
mond, 111  Wis.  550,  90  N.  W.  1073; 
Record  v.  Chickasaw  Cooperage  Co 
103   Tenn.    657,   69   S.   W.   334;    Mc- 
Knight  v.  Detroit,  M.  R.  Co.  (Mich.), 
97  N.  W.  772;  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co. 
v.  Courtney,  186  U.  S.  342,  22  Sup. 
Ct.    833;     Kilpatrick    v.    Grand    T. 
R.  Co.  74  Vt.  288,  52  Atl.  531,  93  Am. 
St.  887;  Swensen  v.  Bender,  114  Fed. 
1;    Arthur   v.    City    of    Charleston, 
51  W.  Va.  132,  41  S.  E.  171,  90  Am. 
St.  772;    Cupps  .v.  S.    (Wis.),   97  N. 
W.  217;  Christensen  v.  Lambert,  67 
N.  J.  L.  341,  51  Atl.  702;   Cauble  v. 
Worsham  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  69  S.  W. 
194;   Wolf  v.  Hemrich  Bros.  Brew. 
Co.  28  Wash.  187,  68  Pac.  440;  Con- 
naughton   v.   Sun   Printing  &   Pub. 
Co.  Asso.  76  N.  Y.  S.  755,  73  App 
Div.  316;  Laflan  v.  Missisquoi  Pulp 
Co.  74  Vt.  125,  52  Atl.  526;   Downey 
v.   Germini  Min.   Co.   24  Utah,  431, 
68  Pac.  414,  91  Am.  St.  798;  Ray  v. 
S.  108  Tenn.  282,  67  S.  W.  553;    S. 
v.  Barnes  (Utah),  69  Pac.  70;  S.  v. 
Hicks,  130  N.  Car.  705,  41  S.  E.  803; 
Danforth  v.   S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  69 
S.  W.  159;   Myers  v.  S.  43  Fla.  500, 
31  So.  275;  Johnson  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  67  S.  W.  412;  S.  v.  Brennan 
(Mo.),  65  S.  W.  325;   Bannen  v.  S. 

115  Wis.  317,  91  N.  W.  107;  Curry  v. 
Catlin,    12   Wash.   322,   41   Pac.   55; 
Huston  v.  P.  121  111.  497,  500  13  N. 


REPEATING  SUBSTANCE  OF  REQUEST. 


§    25 


definition  of  negligence  is  not  error  where  the  court  in  another 


E.  538;  Crews  v.  P.  120  111.  317, 
320,  11  N.  E.  404;  May  v.  Tall- 
man,  20  111.  443;  S.  v.  McDonald, 
57  Kas.  537,  46  Pac.  966;  S.  v. 
Eastern,  138  Mo.  103,  39  S.  W.  461; 
Lake  R.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  McKewen,  80 
Md.  593,  31  Atl.  797;  Bewley  v. 
Massie  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  31  S. 
W.  1086;  Bushnell  v.  Chamberlain, 
44  Neb.  751,  62  N.  W.  1114;  Scoville 
v.  Salt  Lake  City,  11  Utah,  60,  39 
Pac.  481;  S.  v.  Harrison,  66  Vt. 
523,  29  Atl.  807,  44  Am.  St.  864;  Lud- 
wig  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  75 
N.  Y.  S.  667,  71  App.  Div.  210;  Car- 
stens  v.  Stetson  &  P.  M.  Co.  14 
Wash.  643,  45  Pac.  313;  Crown  Coal 
&  Tow  Co.  v.  Taylor,  184  111.  260, 
56  N.  E.  328;  Kendall  v.  Young,  141 
111.  188,  194,  30  N.  E.  538,  16  L.  R.  A. 
492;  Trumbull  v.  Erickson,  97  Fed. 
891;  Fleming  v.  Dixon,  194  Pa.  St. 
67,  44  Atl.  1064;  Reilly  v.  Con  way, 
121  Mich.  682,  80  N.  W.  785;  Duncan 
v.  Borden,  13  Colo.  App.  481,  59 
Pac.  60;  Gordon  v.  Burris,  153  Mo. 
223,  54  S.  W.  546;  Ronsh  v.  Ronsh, 
154  Ind.  562,  55  N.  E.  1017;  Pecha 
v.  Kastl,  64  Neb.  380,  89  N.  W. 
1047;  S.  v.  Rathbone  (Idaho),  67 
Pac.  186;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Ru- 
zicka  (Neb.),  91  N.  W.  543; 
Chicago  T.  T.  Co.  v.  Kotoski,  199 
111.  383,  65  N.  E.  350;  Chicago  T. 
T.  Co.  v.  Gruss  (111.),  65  N.  E. 
693;  Greaney  v.  Holyoke  Water 
Power  Co.  374  Mass.  437,  54  N.  E. 
880;  Breedlove  v.  Dennie,  2  Indian 
Ter.  606,  53  S.  W.  436;  O'Neil  v. 
Hanscom,  175  Mass.  313,  56  N.  E. 
587;  City  of  Chicago  v.  Hastings, 
136  111.  251,  254,  26  N.  E.  594; 
City  of  Madison  v.  Moore,  109  Iowa, 
476,  80  N.  W.  257;  Gemmill  v. 
Brown  (Ind.),  56  N.  E.  691;  Gor- 
don v.  Alexander,  122  Mich.  107, 

80  N.    W.    978;    Ittner    v.    Hughes, 
154  Mo.  55,  55  S.  W.  267;   Hicks  v. 
Nassau    Electric    R.    Co.    62    N.    Y. 
S.  597;   Clifford  v.  Minneapolis,  St. 
P.   and   S.   S.   R.   Co.   105  Wis.  618, 

81  N.  W.  143;    Kansas  City,  Ft.  S. 
&  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Chamberlin,  61  Kas. 
859,   60  Pac.   15;    Griffin  v.   Manice, 
62   N.   Y.   S.   364;    Anson   v.   P.   148 


111.  494,  508.  35  N.  E.  145;  Robinson 
v.  Brewster,  140  111.  649,  660,  30 
N.  E.  683,  33  Am.  St.  265;  Thrawley 
v.  S.  153  Ind.  375,  55  N.  E.  95;  P.  v. 
Hettick,  126  Cal.  425,  58  Pac.  918; 
Thompson  v.  P.  26  Colo.  496,  59  Pac. 
57;  Buel  v.  S.  104  Wis.  132,  80  N.  W. 
78;  Miller  v.  S.  106  Wis.  156,  81  N. 
W.  1020;  Drye  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
55  S.  W.  65;  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Cowherd,  120  Ala.  51,  23  So. 
793;  Childs  v.  Muckler,  105  Iowa, 
279,  75  N.  W.  100;  Hummel  v. 
Stern,  48  N.  Y.  S.  528;  Wade  v. 
Columbia  Electric  St.  R.  Light  & 
Power  Co.  51  S.  Car..  296,  29  S.  E. 
233,  64  Am.  St.  676;  Franklin  v. 
Krum,  171  111.  378,  49  N.  E.  513; 
Starrette  Co.  v.  O'Rourke,  172  111. 
177,  50  N.  E.  242;  Saunders  v.  Gloss, 
117  Mich.  130,  75  N.  W.  295;  Rogers 
v.  S.  117  Ala.  192,  23  So.  82;  LevI 
v.  Gardner,  53  S.  Car.  24,  30  S.  E. 
617;  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Holland, 
122  111.  461,  471,  13  N  E.  145;  Smith 
v.  Hall,  69  Conn.  651,  38  Atl.  386; 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Krueger,  124  111.  457,  17  N.  E.  52; 
Perin  v.  Parker,  126  111.  201,  213, 
18  N.  E.  747,  9  Am.  St.  571 ;  Chicago 
&  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunleavy,  129  111.  132, 
150,  22  N.  E.  15;  Keastner  v.  First 
National  Bank,  170  111.  322,  48  N.  E. 
998;  Mason  v.  Jones,  36  111.  212; 
City  of  Peoria  v.  Gerber,  •  168  111. 
318,  48  N.  E.  152;  Jacobson  v. 
Gunzburg,  150  111.  135,  37  N.  E, 
229;  James  v.  Gilbert,  168  111.  627, 
48  N.  E.  177;  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K. 
City  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  165  111.  88, 
46  N.  E.  208;  West  Chicago  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Nash,  166  111.  528,  46  N.  E. 
1082;  Taylor  v.  Felsing,  164  111.  331, 
338,  45  N.  E.  161;  National  Linseed 
Oil  Co.  v.  McBlaine,  164  111.  597, 
602,  45  N.  E.  1015;  Ashley  Wire  Co. 
v.  Mercier,  163  111.  487,  45  N.  E. 
222;  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Estep, 
162  111.  131,  44  N.  E.  404;  Wrigley 
v.  Comelins,  162  111.  92,  44  N.  E. 
406;  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Dwyer, 
162  111.  482,  490,  44  N.  E.  815;  Vil- 
lage of  Cullom  v.  Justice,  161  111. 
372,  43  N.  E.  1098;  Grier  v.  Cable, 
159  111.  29,  38,  42  N.  E.  395;  Pyle 


PURPOSE    AND    PREPARATION. 


instruction  tells  the  jury  what  facts  would  constitute  negligence 


v.  Pyle,  158  111.  289,  300,  41  N.  E. 
999;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Stan- 
ley, 158  111.,  396,  400,  41  N.  E. 
1012;  St.  L.  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co. 
v.  Barrett,  152  111.  168,  38  N.  E. 
554;  Burke  v.  Sanitary  District, 
152  111.  125,  134,  38  N.  E.  670;  Tay- 
lor v.  Pegram,  151  111.  106,  121, 
37  N.  E.  837;  Carlton  v.  P.  150  111. 
181,  191,  37  N.  E.  244,  41  Am.  St.  346; 
Shorb  v.  Webber,  188  111.  126,  58  N. 
E.  949;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  Pe  R.  Co. 
v.  Feehan,  149  111.  202,  213,  36  N.  E. 
1036;  Cheshire  v.  Tappan,  94  Ga. 
704,  19  S.  E.  992;  Chambers  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  44  S.  W.  495;  S. 
v.  Bauerle,  145  Mo.  1,  46  S.  W. 
609;  S.  v.  Gushing,  17  Wash.  544, 
50  Pac.  514;  Watkins  v.  U.  S.  5 
Okla.  729,  50  Pac.  88;  Long  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App),  46  S.  W.  640; 
Stevens  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R.  48,  45 
S.  W.  76;  Simnacher  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Or.  App.),  43  S.  W.  354;  Travess 
v.  U.  S.  6  App.  Cas.  (D.  C.)  450; 
Taylor  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  42  S. 
W.  285;  S.  v.  Bow,ser,  21  Mont.  133, 
53  Pac.  179;  S.  v.  Fogerty,  105 
Iowa,  32,  74  N.  W.  754;  McAlpine 
v.  S.  117  Ala.  93,  23  So.  130;  P. 
v.  Prather,  120  Cal.  660,  53  Pac. 
259;  Harris  v.  U.  S.  8  App.  Cas.  (D. 
C)  20,  36  L.  R.  A.  465;  Burton  v.  S. 
118  Ala.  109,  23  So.  729;  P.  v. 
Barthleman,  120  Cal.  752  Pac.  112; 
Toll  v.  S.  40  Fla.  169,  23  So.  943; 
Beard  v.  Trustees  of  School,  106  111. 
659;  City  of  Chicago  v.  Stearns,  105 
111.  554,  559;  Hay  ward  v.  Merrill,  94 
111.  349,  356,  34  Am.  R.  229;  Freid- 
berg  v.  P.  102  111.  160,  164;  Richmond 
v.  Roberts,  98  111.  472,  478;  Frank 
&  Sons,  v.  Welch,  89  111.  38;  S.  v. 
Webb,  20  Wash.  484,  55  Pac.  935; 
Carter  v.  S.  106  Ga.  372,  32  S.  E. 
345,  71  Am.  St.  262;  P.  v.  Chaves, 
122  Cal.  134,  54  Pac.  596;  S.  v. 
Branton,  33  Ore.  533,  56  Pac.  267, 
43  L.  R.  A.  128;  Dennis  v.  S.  118 
Ala.  72,  23  So.  1002;  Com.  v.  Ma- 
goon,  172  Mass.  214,  51  N.  E.  1082; 
S.  v.  Burlingame,  146  Mo.  207,  48  S. 
W.  72;  S.  v.  Booker,  123  N.  Car.  713, 

31  S.  E.  376;  Battle  v.  S.  105  Ga.  703, 

32  S.  E.  160;  S.  v.  Cochran,  147  Mo. 
504.    49    S.    W.    558;    Donaho   v.    S. 


(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  47  S.  W.  469; 
S.  v.  Staley,  45  W.  Va.  792,  32  S. 
E.  198;  Holcomb  v.  P.  79  111.  409, 
416;  Underwood  v.  White,  45  111. 
438;  Allen  v.  P.  77  111.  484,  487; 
Keller  v.  Stuppe,  86  111.  309,  311; 
Scott  v.  Delany,  87  111.  146;  S.  v. 
Tucker  36  Ore.  291,  61  Pac.  8i>4, 
51  L.  R.  A.  246;  Castlin  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  57  S.  W.  827;  Stevens  v. 
S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  18  S.  W.  96;  S.  v. 
West,  157  Mo.  309,  57  S.  W.  1071; 
Whitney  v.  S.  154  Ind.  573,  57  N. 
E.  398;  S.  v.  Peterson,  110  Iowa, 
649,  82  N.  W.  329;  Blume  v.  S. 
154  Ind.  343,  56  N.  E.  771;  S.  v. 
Mahoney,  24  Mont.  281,  61  Pac. 
647;  Liner  v.  S.  124  Ala.  1,  27 
So.  438;  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v 
Nash,  166  111.  '528,  46  N.  E.  1082; 
Goldsmith  v.  City  of  New  York, 
43  N.  Y.  S.  447,  14  App.  Div.  ]35; 
Koch  v.  S.  115  Ala.  99,  22  So.  471; 
Diggers  v.  S.  38  Fla.  7,  20  So.  758; 
Hinshaw  v.  S.  147  Ind.  334,  47  N. 
E.  157;  Yoakum  v.  Kelly  (Tex 
Cv.  App.),  30  S.  W.  836;  S.  v. 
Case,  99  Iowa,  743,  68  N.  W.  434; 
Cox  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 
95  Iowa,  54,  63  N.  W.  450;  Tobey 
v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co 
94  Iowa,  256,  62  N.  W.  761,  33  L.  R. 
A.  496;  Lazarus  v.  Pheps,  156  U.  S. 
202,  15  S.  Ct.  271;  Hoehn  v.  Chicago, 
P.  St.  L.  R.  Co.  152  111.  223,  38  N. 
E.  549;  Young  v.  Sage,  42  Neb.  37, 
60  N.  W.  313;  Ronnsaville  v.  Wal- 
ters, 94  Ga.  707,  20  S.  E.  .93;  St. 
Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Barrett, 
152  111.  168,  38  N.  E.  554;  Hodg- 
man,  v.  Thomas,  37  Neb.  568,  56 
N.  W.  199;  Wheeler  v.  Grand  T. 
R.  Co.  70  N.  H.  607,  50  Atl.  103, 
54  L.  R.  A.  955;  Puff  v.  Lehigh 
V.  R.  Co.  24  N.  Y.  S.  1068,  71  Hun, 
(N.  Y.)  577;  Faulkner  v.  Mammoth, 
23  Utah,  437,  66  Pac.  799;  Brown  v. 
U.  S.  150  U.  S.  93,  14  Sup.  Ct.  37; 
French  v.  Seattle  Tr.  Co.  26  Wash. 
264,  66  Pac.  404;  Brown  v.  Porter,  7 
Wash.  327,  34  Pac.  1105;  Maxwell 
v.  Cunningham,  50  W.  Va.  298.  40 
S.  E.  499;  Bluedom  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.  (Mo.),  24  S.  W.  57;  War- 
den v.  Miller,  112  Wis.  67,  87  N. 


REPEATING  SUBSTANCE  OF  REQUEST. 


§    25 


on  the  part  of  the  defendant.98  Or  in  a  personal  injury  case 
the  refusal  of  an  instruction  that  the  plaintiff  cannot  be  held 
to  have  assumed  any  extraordinary  danger  if  it  appears  that  he 
did  not  know  and  appreciate  such  danger  is  not  error,  where 
in  other  instructions  the  court  charges  that  if  the  plaintiff  knew 
the  risk  and  voluntarily  assumed  it,  he  cannot  recover,  and  if  he 
did  not  know  it  he  can  recover." 

The  frequent  repetition  of  a  correct  principle  of  law  may  be 
material  error.  Such  practice  gives  undue  prominence  to  the 
facts  or  subject  matter  to  which  the  instruction  relates,  and 
tends  to  mislead  the  jury,  indicating  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  one  of  the  parties  has  the  advantage  over  the  other  on 
the  evidence  relating  to  the  particular  question  involved.100  The 
repetition  in  a  special  instruction  of  matters  as  to  a  certain 
element  or  defense  which  has  been  fully  covered  in  the  general 
charge  is  error.101 


~W.  828;  Vredenburge  v.  Pall,  28 
N.  Y.  S.  88,  7  Misc.  567;  Walbert 
v.  Trexler,  156  Pa.  St.  112,  27  Atl. 
65;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Bab- 
cock,  154  U.  S.  190,  14  Sup.  Ct.  978; 
Largey  v.  Mantle.  26  Mont.  264, 
€7  Pac.  114;  Indianapolis  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  Robinson,  157  Ind.  414,  61  N.  E. 
936;  Lovick  v.  Atlantic  Coast  L. 
R.  Co.  129  N.  Car.  427,  40  S.  E.  191; 
Cook  v.  Los  Angeles  &  P.  E.  R. 
Co.  134  Gal.  279,  66  Pac.  306,  86  Am. 
St.  246;  Keesley  v.  Doyle,  8  Ind. 
App.  43,  35  N.  E.  126;  Kischman  v. 
Scott,  166  Mo.  214,  65  S.  W.  1031; 
General  Fire  E.  Co.  v.  Schwartz  165 
Mo.  121,  65  S.  W.  318;  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  Pittmrn,  23  Ky.  L.  R. 
877,  64  S.  W.  460;  Farmers'  Bank 
v.  Garrow,  63  Neb.  64,  88  N.  W.  131; 
Collins  v.  City  of  Janesville,  111 
Wis.  348,  87  N.  W.  241;  Missouri, 
K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Avery  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  64  S.  W.  935;  McLane  v.  Mau- 
rer  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  66  S.  W.  693; 
Daugherty  v.  Herndon,  27  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  175,  65  S.  W.  891;  Vetterly 
v.  McNeal,  129  Mich.  507,  89  N.  W. 
441;  St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ferguson,  26  Tex.  Cv.  App.  460, 
•64  S.  W.  797;  Murray  v.  Boston 
Ice  Co.  180  Mass.  165,  61  N.  E. 
1001,  91  Am.  St.  269;  McGee  v. 


Smitherman,  69  Ark.  636,  65  S.  W. 
461;  S.  v.  Howell,  26  Mont.  3,  66 
Pac.  291;  S.  v.  Dotson,  2*6  Mont.  305, 
67  Pac.  938;  S.  v.  Hendricks,  172 
Mo.  654,  73  S.  W.  194  (evidence  cir- 
cumstantial) ;  Jacksonville  &  St.  L. 
R.  Co.R.  Co.  v.  Wilhite,  209  111.  87; 
Illinois  I  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Freeman, 
210  111.  270,  277;  Chicago  U.  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Reuter,  210  LI.  279,  282. 

as  St.  Clair  M.  S.  Co.  v.  City  of 
St.  Clair,  96  Mich.  463,  56  N.  W. 
18. 

99  Breen  v.   Field,  159  Mass.   582, 
35  N.  E.  95. 

100  Cross    v.    Kennedy    (Tex.    Cv. 
App.),    6*6    S.    W.    318;    Chisum    v. 
Chestnut  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  36  S.  W. 
758;  Gulf  C.  S.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
riett, 80  Tex.  81,  15  S.  W.  556;  Pel- 
frey  v.   Texas  C.   R.   Co.    (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),   73   S.   W.   411;    Chapman   v. 
Conway,  50  111.  513;  Kraus  v.  Haas, 
6  Tex.  Cv.  App.  665,  25  S.  W.  1025; 
Mendes  v.   Kyle,   16   Nev.   370   (the 
repetitions  are  set  out  in  the  opin- 
ion in  this  case) ;  Chicago,  W.  &  V. 
C.    Co.    v.    Moran,    210    111.    9,    14; 
Kroeger  v.  Texas  &c.  R.  Co.  30  Tex. 
Cv.  App.  87,  69  S.  W.  809;  Miller  v. 
Coulter,  156  Ind.  290,  59  N.  E.  853. 

101  Highland  v.  Houston  E.  &  W. 
T.     R.     Co.     (Tex.     Cv.     App.),     65 


§  26 


PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION. 


24 


The  practice  of  repeating  and  reiterating  in  a  charge  the 
principle  of  law  applicable  to  a  particular  issue  has  been  uni- 
formly condemned,  because  it  is  likely  to  lead  the  jury  to  be- 
lieve that  in  the  opinion  of  the  court  the  evidence  in  the  case 
establishes  facts  which  require  the  application  of  the  proposition 
of  law  thus  sought  to  be  impressed  upon  the  minds  of  the  jury. 
Such  repetition  emphasizes  and  gives  undue  prominence  to  the 
question  to  which  it  refers.102  But,  on  the  contrary,  such  repeti- 
tion of  a  proposition  several  times  in  an  instruction  is  not  or- 
dinarily such  error  as  will  be  ground  for  reversal  where  it  oc- 
curs in  connection  with  facts  or  questions  involved  in  th^  case.103 
Nor  does  the  repetition  of  the  same  principles  or  rules  of  law  in 
different  instructions  ordinarily  render  the  charge  erroneous.104 

§26.  Repetition — When,  general  and  special  charge. — Where 
the  general  charge  fully  covers  all  the  legal  principles  embraced 
in  a  special  charge  it  is  not  eror  to  refuse  the  latter.105  And 
if  the  general  charge  contains  all  the  legal  principles  embodied 


S.    W.     649;     Wadsworth    v.    Wil- 
liams,   101    Ala.    264,    13    So.    755. 

102  Kroeger   v.    Tex.    &c.    R.    Co. 
30  Tex.  Cv.  App.  87,  69  S.  W.  809; 
Irvine  v.  S.  20  Tex.  App.  12;  Shen- 
kenberger  v.  S.  154  Ind.  630,  642,  57 
N.    E.    519;    Traylor   v.    Townsend, 
61  Tex.  147. 

103  Denise  v.   City  of  Omaha,   49 
Neb.    750,   69   N.   W.   119;    Maes   v. 
Texas    &    N.    O.    R.    Co.    (Tex.    Cv. 
App.),   23   S.   W.   725.     See   Murray 
v.  New  York,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  103 
Pa.   St.   37;    see   Gaudy  v.   Bissell's 
Estate  (Neb.),  97  N.  W.  632;  Sonka 
v.  Sonka  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  75  S.  W, 
325;   Herbert  v.  Drew,  32  Ind.  364. 

104  Nashville      St.     R.       Co.       v. 
O'Bryan,  104  Tenn.  28,  55  S.  W.  300; 
Coffman    v.    Reeves,    62    Ind.    334; 
Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    v.    Foley, 
88  Fed.  240;    Keating  v.  S.   (Neb.), 
93   N.    W.    980,    (credibility   of   de- 
fendant as  a  witness) ;   Murray  v. 
New    York,    L.    &   W.    R.    Co.    103 
Pa.   St.   37. 

ice  Noble  v.  Worthy,  1  Indian 
Ter.  458,  45  S.  W.  137;  Dorrance  v. 
McAlister,  1  Indian  Ter.  473,  45  S. 
W.  141;  Saunder  v.  Gloss,  117  Mich. 


130,  75  N.  W.  295;  Louisville  &  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Cowherd,  120  Ala.  51,  23 
So.  793;  Anacostia  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Klein,  8  App.  Gas.  (D.  C.)  75;  John- 
son v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  45  S.  W. 
901;  Costello  v.  Kottas,  52  Neb.  15, 
71  N.  W.  950;  Miller  v.  Miller,  17 
Ind.  App.  605,  47  N.  E.  338;  Can- 
field  v.  City  of  Jackson,  112  Mich. 
120,  70  N.  W.  444;  Com.  v.  Carter, 
(Mass.),  66  N.  E.  716;  Richmond 
Tr.  Co.  v.  Wilkinson,  (Va.),  43  S.  E. 
622;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Holt, 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  70  S.  W.  591; 
Schultz  v.  Bower,  64  Minn.  123,  66 
N.  W.  139;  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  82 
Md.  17,  33  Atl.  317,  34  L.  R.  A.  773; 
Woodworth  v.  Parrott,  48  Neb.  675, 
67  N.  W.  761;  La  Grande  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Blum,  2<  Ore.  215,  41  Pac.  659,  50 
Am.  St.  710;  Garbaczewski  v.  Third 
Ave.  R.  Co.  39  N.  Y.  S.  33,  5  App, 
Div.  186;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Duvall,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  348,  35  S. 
W.  649;  Norton  v.  North  Carolina 
R.  Co.  122  N.  Car.  910,  29  S.  E. 
886;  Terrell  v.  McCowen,  91  Tex. 
231,  43  S.  W.  2;  Barnes  v.  S.  39 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  342,  45  S.  W.  495; 
S.  v.  Fontenot,  50  La.  Ann.  537, 


25  REPEATING GENERAL  AND  SPECIAL   CHARGE.  §    26 

in  the  special  charge,  though  differing  somewhat  in  form  and 
wording,  the  special  charge  is  properly  refused.106 

A  special  request  for  a  charge  that  a  fact  may  be  proved'  by 
circumstantial  evidence  may  be  refused  where  the  same  fact 
is  properly  submitted  by  other  instructions.106*  But  if  the  general 
charge  does  not  fully  cover  all  the  issues  involved  which  the  evi- 
dence tends  to  establish,  the  court,  when  requested,  should  give 
further  instructions.107  And  in  a  criminal  case  where  the  identity 
of  the  accused  is  the  material  issue,  a  special  charge  on  that  issue 
should  be  given  where  the  punishment  for  the  crime  charged 
is  practically  equivalent  to  a  life  sentence.108  So  where  the 
general  charge  states  that  the  plaintiff  must  prove  the  facts 
of  the  alleged  negligence  in  order  to  recover,  the  refusal  to  in- 
struct the  jury  that  proof  of  mere  injury  would  not  raise  a 
presumption  of  negligence,  is  not  error,  the  general  charge 
covering  the  refused  instruction.109  So  also  in  a  case  where  the 
questions  involved  are  very  simple  and  the  evidence  is  limited 
to  a  small  compass,  the  refusal  to  instruct  the  jury  how  they 
should  find  in  the  event  they  should  determine  the  facts  the 
one  way  or  the  other,  is  not  error,  where  previous  to  the  request 

23  So.  634,  69  Am.  St.  435;  S.  v.  Can-  W.    347;    Wunderlich     v.     Palatine 

non,  52  S.  Car.  452,  30  S.  E.  589;  Bal-  Ins.  Co.  115  Wis.  509,  92  N.  W.  264; 

timore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Hollenthal,  88  S.   v.   Caymo,  108  La.  Ann.  218,  32 

Fed.  116;  Taylor  v.  S.  97  Ga.  432,  25  So.  357,  61  L.  R.  A.  781;   Seefeld  v. 

S.  E.  320,  54  Am.  St.  433;  Harper  v.  Thacker,  93  Wis.  518,  67  N.  W.  1142; 

S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  40  S.  W.  272;  Stephens    v.    Anderson     (Tex.    Cv. 

Producer's     Marble    Co.    v.    Bergen  App.),  36  S.  W.  1000;  Wellston  Coal 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  31  S.  W.  89;  Wes-  Co.  v.  Smith,  65  Ohio  St.  81,  61  N. 

tra  v.  Westra  Estate,  101  Mich.  526,  E.  143    87  Am.  St.  547,  55  L.  R.  A. 

60  N.  W.   53;    Messmann  v.   Ihlen-  99. 

feldt,  89  Wis.  585,  62  N.  W.  522;  ioe  Kenyon  v.  City  of  Mondovi, 
Wimbish  v.  Hamilton,  47  La.  Ann.  98  Wis.  50.  73  N.  W.  314;  Chicago, 
246,  16  S.  856;  Savannah  St.  R.  Co.  R.  I.  &  p.  R.  Co.  v.  Parks,  59 
v.  Ficklin,  94  Ga.  146,  20  S.  E.  646;  Kas.  790,  54  Pac.  1052;  S.  v.  Can- 
Hay  v.  Carolina  M.  R.  Co.  41  S.  Car.  non,  52  S.  Car.  452,  30  S.  E.  589. 
542,  19  S.  E.  976;  Rogers  v.  Black,  ioe*  Smith  v.  Richardson  Lumber 
99  Ga.  139,  25  S.  E.  23;  Johnson  Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  47  S.  W.  386. 
v.  Galveston  H.  &  N.  R.  Co.  27  JOT  Carrell  v.  Kalamazoo  Cold 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  616,  66  S.  W.  906;  Storage  Co.  112,  Mich.  34,  70  N.  W. 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Coursey,  115  323,  67  Am.  St.  381,  36  L.  R.  A. 
Ga.  602,  41  S.  E.  1013;  Missouri,  523. 

K.    &   T.   R.    Co.    v.    Walden    (Tex.  ios  Ford   v.   S.   101   Tenn.   454,   47 

Cv.   App.),   66   S.   W.   584;    Missouri  S.    W.   713. 

Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Hildebrand,  52  Kas.  109  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ray, 

284,  34  Pac.  738;  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  101    Tenn.    1,    46    S.    W.    554;    S.    v. 

v.  Groves,  56  Kas.  601,  44  Pac.  628;  Dudoussat,  47  La.  Ann.  977,  17  So. 

S.     v.     Vincent     (S.     Dak.),     91     N.  685. 


§  27  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  26 

the  court  had  stated  the  general  propositions  of  law  applicable 
to  the  issues  in  the  case.110 

§"26a.  Repetition  when  evidence  is  close. — But  where  the  sub- 
ject matter  is  covered  only  in  general  and  abstract  terms  by 
instructions,  a  special  request  should  not  be  refused  where  the 
evidence  is  close  as  to  the  facts  of  the  matter  on  which  the 
special  request  is  made.111 

§  26b.  Court  may  refuse  all  instructions. — It  is  not  error  for 
the  court  to  refuse  all  the  instructions  asked  by  a  party  and 
prepare  and  give  a  full  charge  on  its  own  motion,  but  the  in- 
structions thus  given  must  fully  cover  the  law  of  the  case.111* 
And  the  court  may  refuse  all  the  instructions  asked  by  both 
of  the  parties  and  prepare  others  on  its  own  motion,  and  there 
will  be  no  ground  for  error.112  But,  of  course,  it  is  error  if  the 
court  in  charging  the  jury  on  its  own  motion  fails  to  embody 
all  the  questions  of  law  properly  presented  in  the  refused  in- 
structions. For  instance,  where  the  court,  after  instructing  the 
jury  for  both  parties,  gives  an  instruction  on  its  own  motion, 
remarking  as  follows:  ''I  have  taken  upon  myself  to  concen- 
trate all  there  is  in  those  instructions  into  this  one,  as  embodying 
all  the  law  necessary  for  this  case,"  it  is  error,  when  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  the  instruction  thus  given  did  not  state  all  the 
law  applicable  to  the  case.113  The  court  may  properly  ask 
the  views  of  opposing  counsel  as  to  the  propriety  of  giving 
certain  instructions.114 

§  27.  Defective  instructions  refused. — If  an  instruction  is  ma- 
terially defective  or  imperfect  in  any  particular,  the  court  is 
not  bound  to  give  it.115  The  court  is  not  bound  to  correct  a 

no  Smith    v.    Gray,    46    N.    Y.    S.  A.   696;    Birmingham  Fire  Ins.   Co. 

180,  19  App.  Div.  262.  v.  Pulver,  126  111.  329,  18  N.  E.  804, 

in  Snowden     v.     Waterman,     105  9  Am.  St.  587;  S.  v.  Collins,  20  Iowa, 

Ga.    384,    31    S.    E.    110;    Souey    v.  85;    Fowler   v.    Hoffman,    31    Mich. 

S.    13    Lea    (Tenn.)    472.  215. 

in*  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Versteu,  n3  McEwen  v.  Morey,   60  111.  38. 

140  111.  641,  30  N.  E.  540,  15  L.  R.  A.  «*  Sullivan    v.    McManers,    45    N. 

798;    North    Chicago   St.    R.    Co.    v.  Y.  S.  1079,  19  App.  Div.   167;   East 

Louis,  138  111.  12,  27  N.  E.  451;  Hill  Tenn.   V.    &   G.    R.    Co.   v.    Gurley, 

v.  Parson,  110  111.  ill;   Pennsylva-  12    Lea    (Tenn.)    46. 

nia     Co.   v.     Rudel,     100    111.     609;  n&  Freidman    v.    Weisz,    8    Okla. 

Bromley    v.    Goodwin,    95    111     122;  392,    58    Pac.    613;    Howe    v.    West 

Key  v.  Dent,  6  Md.  142  S.  Land  &  I.  Co.  21  Wash.  594,  59 

112  Wacaser    v.    P.    134    111.    438,  Pac.    495:    Preston    v.    Dunham,    52 

25  N.  E.  564,  23  Am.  St.  683,  10  L.  R.  Ala.  217;  Wittleder  v.  Citizens'  Elec. 


DEFECTIVE    AND    IMPERFECTIVE. 


§  28 


faulty  instruction  requested.116  An  instruction  which  omits  any 
material  element  or  fact  on  the  subject  to  which  it  relates  is 
defective,  and  for  that  reason  is  properly  refused.117  Such 
defective  instructions,  though  correct  in  other  respects,  may  be 
refused.118  And  a  defective  instruction  is  properly  refused,  al- 
though the  court  may  have  previously  indicated  that  it  would 
be  given;119  or  it  may  be  modified,  although  the  court  had  in- 
dicated that  it  would  be  given  as  requested.120 

§  28.  Clauses  or  paragraph  defective. — And  where  an  instruc- 
tion is  divided  into  several  clauses  or  propositions  it  may  be 
refused  if  any  one  of  such  propositions  be  erroneous.121  But 
it  is  generally  the  better  practice  to  give  the  good  and  refuse 
the  bad  of  such  instructions.122  And  it  has  been  held  that  where 


111.  Co.  62  N.  Y.  S.  297;  Stan  ton  v. 
Southern  R.  Co.  56  S.  Oar.  398,  34  S. 
E.  695;  Keithley  v.  Stafford,  126  111. 
507,  524,  18  N.  E.  740  (will  contest) ; 
Tutwiler  Coal  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Enslen, 
129  Ala.  336,  30  S.  E.  600;  Charter 
v  Lane,  62  Conn.  121,  25  Atl.  464; 
Thompson  v.  O'Conner,  115  Ga.  120, 
41  S.  .E.  242;  Earle  v.  Poat,  63  S. 
Car.  439,  41  S.  E.  525,  90  Am.  St.  681; 
Christian  v.  S.  7  Ind.  App.  417,  34 
N.  E.  825;  Terrill  v.  Tillson  (Vt.), 
54  Atl.  187;  Ricketts  v.  Harvey,  106 
Ind.  564,  6  N.  E.  325;  Over  v.  Schif- 
fling,  102  Ind.  194,  26  N.  E.  91; 
Cleveland  &  Pittsburg  R.  Co.  v.  Sar- 
gent, 19  Ohio  St.  452;  Eckels  v.  S.  20 
Ohio  St.  508;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Shultz, 
43  Ohio  St.  273,  1  N.  E.  324,  54  Am. 
R.  805;  Barnes  v.  S.  103  Ala.  44,  15 
So.  901;  P.  v.  Harlan,  133  Cal.  16, 
65  Pac  9;  Underwood  v.  Hart,  23 
Vt.  120;  Tower  v.  Haslam,  84  Me. 
86,  24  Atl.  587;  Mariner  v.  Dennison, 
78  Cal  202.  20  Pac.  386. 

us  Harris  v.  First  N.  Bank  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  45  S.  W.  311;  Earth  v. 
Kansas  City  E.  R.  Co.  142  Mo. 
535,  44  S.  W.  778;  McGee  v.  Wells, 
52  S.  Car.  472,  30  S.  E.  602; 
Amsden  v.  Atwood,  69  Vt.  527,  38 
Atl.  263;  Alabama  S.  L.  Co.  v. 
Slaton,  120  Ala.  259,  24  So.  720,  74 
Am.  St.  31;  Croft  v.  Northwestern 
S.  S.  Co.  20  Wash.  175,  55  Pac  42; 
Milmo  N.  Bank,  v.  Convery  (Tex 
Cv.  App.),  49  S.  W.  926;  Waco  A. 
Water  Co.  v.  Cauble,  19  Tex.  Cv. 


App,  317,  47  S  W.  538;  Kluse  v. 
Sparks,  10  Ind.  App,  444,  37  N.  E. 
1047;  Mosier  v.  Stall,  119  Ind  244, 
20  N.  E.  752;  Callan  v.  McDaniel,  72 
Ala.  96;  Rolfe  v.  Rich,  149  111.  4o6, 
35  N.  E.  352;  Douglas  v.  Wolf,  6 
Kas.  88. 

117  American  Bible  Society  v. 
Price,  115  111.  623,  638,  5  N.  E.  126; 
Britton  v.  S.  61  Ark.  15,  31  S.  W. 
569;  Jacobi  v.  S.  133  Ala.  1,  32  So. 
158;  Thomas  v.  S.  133  Ala.  139,  32 
So.  250;  S.  v.  Burns  (Nev.),  74  Pac. 
984. 

us  S.  v  Nichols,  50  La.  Ann.  699, 
23  So.  9>80;  S.  v.  Neal,  120  N.  Car. 
613,  27  S.  E.  81,  58  Am.  St.  810. 

us  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hubbard,  116  Ind.  193,  18  N.  E. 
611;  Carleton  v.  S.  43  Neb.  373,  61 
N.  W.  699. 

120  City   of   Logansport   v.   Dyke- 
man,  116  Ind.  26,  17  N.  E.  587. 

121  Riviere   v.   Missouri,   K.   &  T. 
R.     Co.     (Tex.     Cv.     App.),     40     S. 
W.   1074;    Inglebright  v.   Hammond, 
19  Ohio,  346,  53  Am.  Dec.  430;  Con- 
solidated Tr.  Co.  v.  Chenowith  (V. 
J.),   34  Atl.   817;    Boyden   v.   Fitch- 
burg  R.   Co.   72  Vt.   89,  47  Atl.   409. 
Contra:  Burnham  v.  Logan,  88  Tex. 
1,  29  S.  W.   1067;    Sword  v.   Keith, 
31  Mich.   247;    Peshine  v.   Shepper- 
son,  17  Gratt.  (Va.)  472,  94  Am.  Dec. 
468. 

122  Walker  v.   Devlin,  2  Ohio  St. 
593;    Mitchell    v.    Charleston    L.    & 
P.  Co.  45  S.  Car.  146,  22  S.  E.  767, 


§  89  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  28 

instructions  are  requested  in  the  aggregate  (apparently  one  en- 
tire charge)  if  any  part  thereof  is  erroneous  it  is  not  error 
to  refuse  the  entire  charge.123 

Also  where  the  requested  instruction  contains  two  proposi- 
tions, a  correct  and  incorrect  one,  so  united  that  the  court,  in 
passing  upon  one  of  them,  will  be  required  also  to  pass  upon 
,the  other,  the  whole  instruction  may  be  refused.124  Or  where 
several  propositions  of  law  are  requested  in  one  charge  as  a 
whole,  if  any  part  of  the  charge  is  erroneous,  the  whole  may 
be  refused.125  In  Texas,  if  several  instructions  are  written 
on  separate  sheets  and  fastened  together  and  the  last  one  is 
signed,  as  required  by  statute,  all  may  be  refused  if  one  of 
them  is  improper.126 

§  29.  Incomplete  instruction  defective. — Or  it  is  proper  to 
refuse  an  instruction  which  is  but  an  incomplete  statement  of 
the  law  on  the  point  in  question.127  Thus,  where  in  one  count 
of  an  indictment  the  defendant  is  charged  with  unlawfully 
altering  the  mark  on  a  sheep  and  in  another  count  with  steal- 
ing the  sheep,  an  instruction  that  if  the  jury  have  a  reasonable 
doubt  of  the  defendant's  guilt  from  the  evidence,  they  should 
acquit  him,  is  properly  refused,  in  that  it  is  not  a  complete 
statement  of  the  law  covering  both  charges  as  stated  in  the  in- 
dictment.128 It  has  been  held  that  if  an  instruction  be  incom- 
plete the  opposing  or  complaining  party  should  request  the 
court  to  modify  it  so  as  to  make  it  conform  to  the  law.129 

§  30.    Modifying   defective   instructions. — But   instead   of   re- 

31  L.  R.  A.  577  (not  the  duty  of  the  v.  Weaver,  6  Tex.  Cv.  App.  215, 
court  to  eliminate  the  defective  part  25  S.  W.  468;  Price  v.  S.  107  Ala. 
of  a  charge);  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  161,  18  So.  130;  Inglebright  v.  Ham- 
Co,  v.  Kelly,  13  Tex.  Cv.  App.  1,  rnond,  19  Ohio,  337,  53  Am.  Dec.  430. 
34  S.  W.  809;  French  v.  Millard,  2  120  international  &  G.  N.  R.  Co. 
Ohio  St.  44.  v.  Niff  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  26  S.  W. 

123  p.  v.  Thiede,  11  Utah,  241,  39  784;    Missouri   P.    R.    Co.   v.    King, 
Pac.    837;    S.    v.    Watkins,    106    La.  2  Tex.  Cv.  App.   122,  23  S.  W.  917. 
380,  31  So.  10;   Price  v.  S.  107  Ala.  127  Keithley   v.    Stafford,    126    111. 
161,  18  So.  130;   Bedford  v.  Penny,  524,    18    N.    B.    740;    Hooper    v.    S. 
58   Mich.    424,   25   N.   W.   381;    Wil-  106  Ala.  41,  17  So.  679,  34  L.  R.  A. 
liamson    v.    Toby,    86    Cal.    497,    25  634;  Kelly  v.  Palmer  (Minn.),  97  N. 
Pac.    65.  W.  578. 

124  Burnham  v.  Logan    (Tex.  Cv.  128  Barnes   v.   S.   103   Ala.   44,   15 
App.),  29  S.  W.  1067.  So.  901. 

125  Oliver    v.    S.    38    Fla.    46,    20  129  Baltimore  &  O.   S.  W.  R.  Co. 
So.   803;   Lanyon  v.  Edwards   (Tex.  v.    Young,    153    Ind.    163,   54   N.   B. 
Cv.  App.),  26  S.  W.  524;  Yarborougu  791. 


29  MODIFYING   WHEN    DEFECTIVE   OR    CORRECT.  §    31 

fusing  a  defective  instruction  the  court  may  modify  it  in  such 
manner  as  will  cure  the  defect  and  give  it  as  modified;  and  if 
the  instruction  as  modified  correctly  states  the  law,  there  can 
be  no  ground  for  complaint.130  The  modification  may  consist 
of  striking  out  any  objectionable  word,  phrase  or  clause,  as 
for  instance,  "as  testified  to  by  the  justice."131  An  instruction 
as  to  whether  an  injury  was  caused  by  accident  may  be  mod- 
ified by  adding  to  it  a  definition  of  the  term  "accident."132  The 
modification  of  an  instruction  by  substituting  "due  care"  for 
"ordinary  care"  is  not  error.133  And  where  the  court  modifies 
an  instruction  for  the  purpose  of  reconciling  it  with  others 
asked  by  the  complaining  party,  such  modification  cannot  be 
urged  as  ground  for  error,  although  the  modification  may  be 
improper.13*  Nor  will  a  party  be  allowed  to  complain  of  a 
modification  of  one  of  his  instructions  to  make  it  conform  to  an- 
other asked  by  him.135 

§  31.  Modifying  correct  instructions. — But  should  the  court 
modify  a  correct  instruction,  the  modification  will  be  regarded 
as  immaterial  if  it  in  no  manner  changes  the  meaning  of  the 
instruction  as  originally  requested.136  The  modification  of  an 

iso  Crown  C.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  isi  Lovick   v.    Atlantic    C.    L.    R. 

184   111.   250,   56   N.   E.   388;    Illinois  Co.   129   N.    Car.   427,   40  S.   E.   191. 

Cent.  R.   Co.  v.  McClelland,  42  111.  1-12  Barnett  &  R.  Co.  v.  Schlapka, 

359;  Morgan  v.  Peet,  32  111.  287;  Hin-  208  111.  436. 

shaw  v.  S.  147  Ind.  334,  47  N.  E.  157;  isa  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

Conkey  Co.  v.  Bueherer,  84  111.  App.  Warren,  65  Ark.  619,  48  S.  W.  222. 

633;     Meigs    v.    Dexter,    172    Mass.  134  Funk  v.   Babbitt,   156   111.   408, 

217,  52  N.  E.  '<5;    Cook  v.  Los  An-  41  N.  E.  166;  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T. 

geles  &  P.  E.   R.   Co.  134  Cal.  279,  R.    Co.    v.    Suddoth,    70    Miss.    265, 

66    Pac.    306;    Bartlett    v.    Hawley,  12  So.  333. 

38  Minn.  308,  37  N.  W.  580;   Eilard  iss  Judy    v.    Sterrett,    153    111.    94, 

v.    S.    52    Ala.    330;     Brown    v.    S.  38  N.  E.  633.    See  Cicero  &  P.  St.  R. 

72    Miss.    990,    18    So.    431;    Jansen  Co.  v.  Meixner,  160  111.  320,  43  N.  E. 

v.   Grimshaw,  125  111.  468,  17  N.  E.  823,   31  L.   R.   A.   831;    Hamilton  v. 

850;    Evans  v.  Givens,  22  Fla.  476;  Hartinger,  96  Iowa,  7,  64  N.  W.  592, 

P.  v.   Hall,  94  Cal.  595,  30  Pac.  7;  59  Am.  St.  348;  Feary  v.  Metropol- 

Large  v.  Moore,  17  Iowa,  258;  Mus-  itan  St.  R.  Co.  162  Mo.  75. 

grave   v.   S.   133   Ind.  297,   32   N.   E.  ™*  Chicago  &  A.   R.  Co.  v.   Fiet- 

885;     Evans     v.     Montgomery,     95  sam,    123    111.    518,    15    N.    E.    169; 

Mich.    497,    55    N.    W.    362;     Lace-  Chicago  &  W.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bingen- 

well  v.  S.  95  Ga.  346,  22  S.  E.  546;  heimer,    116    111.    226,   4   N.   E.    840; 

3.  v.  Horton,  100  N.  Car.  443,  6  S.  Chicago,   B.   &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.   Avery, 

E.  238,  6  Am.  St.  613;   S.  v.  Smith,  109    111.    322;    P.    v.    Ashmead,    118 

10  Nev.   123;    Kimmel   v.   P.   92   111.  Cal.     508,     50     Pac.     681;     Dilling- 

457;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Bun-  ham   v.   Fields,   9   Tex.   Cv.   App.   1. 

dy,  210  111.  49.  29    S.   W.   214;    Brink   v.    Black,    77 


PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION. 


30 


instruction  which  ought  to  be  given  as  asked  is  not  material 
error  if  it  states  the  law  substantially  as  the  one  requested.137 

And  if  the  modification  correctly  states  the  law  pertinent  to 
the  issue  and  is  applicable  to  the  evidence,  and  does  not  in- 
terfere with  a  comprehension  of  the  legal  proposition  as  sub- 
mitted before  modification,  there  is  no  ground  for  error.138  But 
it  is  error  to  modify  an  instruction  by  adding  to  it  a  material 
qualification  unauthorized  by  the  evidence.139  The  modification 
of  an  instruction  in  such  manner  as  to  introduce  an  element 
in  the  case  which  finds  no  support  in  the  evidence  is  error.140 

§  32.  In  language  of  request. — The  court  is  not  bound  to  give 
instructions  in  the  language  of  the  request  unless  required  by 
statute  or  local  practice  to  do  so,  but  may  modify  them.141  In 
some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  instructions  must  be  given 
in  the  exact  language  of  the  request  ;142  and  where  the  requested 
instructions  are  pertinent  and  correctly  state  the  law,  they 
should  be  given  in  the  language  as  submitted,  instead  of  the 


N.  Car.  59;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kinnare,  90  111.  9;  S.  v.  Fan- 
non',  158  Mo.  149;  P.  v.  Davis,  47 
Cal.  93. 

137  s.  v.  Wilson,  3  111.  (2  Scam.) 
225;  Meul  v.  P.  198  111.  258,  64  N.  E. 
1106;  Fells  Point  S.  Inst.  v.  Weed- 
on,  18  Md.  320,  81  Am.  Dec.  597;  P. 
v.  Stewart,  75  Mich.  29,  42  N.  W. 
662;  Jamson  v.  Quivey,  5  Cal.  490; 
S.  v.  Davis  (N.  Car.),  46  S.  E.  722; 
S.  v.  Hicks,  130  N.  Car.  710,  41  S. 
E  803 

128  Myer  v.  Mead,  83  111.  19,  21. 
See  Creed  v.  P.  81  111.  565,  569; 
P.  v.  Williams,  17  Cal.  142;  Cook 
v.  Brown,  62  Mich.  477,  29  N.  W. 
46,  4  Am.  St.  870. 

139  Walker    v.    Stetson,    14    Ohio 
St.    100;     McHugh    v.    S.    42    Ohio 
St.    152    (an    alteration    of    an    in- 
struction is  the  same  as  a  refusal). 
See  Chicago,  W.  V.  C.  Co.  v.  Moran, 
210   111.   9,   14,    (improper   modifica- 
tion of  an  irrelevant  instruction  is 
not  error). 

140  Badger  v.  Batavia  Paper  Mfg. 
Co.  70  111.  302,  305. 

"I  S.  v.  Petsch,  43  S.  Car.  132, 
20  S.  E.  993;  S.  v.  Mills,  116  N.  Car. 


992,  21  S.  E.  106;  Lou  v.  Grimes 
Drygoods  Co.  38  Neb.  215,  56  N.  W. 
954;  Carroll  v.  Tucker,  26  N.  Y. 
S.  86,  6  Misc.  613;  Percival  v.  Chase, 
182  Mass.  371,  65  N.  E.  800;  Daven- 
port v.  Johnson,  182  Mass.  269,  65  N. 
E.  392;  McDonald  v.  New  York, 
N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (R.  I.),  54  Atl. 
795;  Edwards  v.  Wessinger,  65 
S.  Car.  161,  43  S.  E.  518,  95  Am.  St. 
789;  S.  v.  Stout,  49  Ohio  St.  283, 
30  N.  E.  437;  McHugh  v.  S.  42  Ohio 
St.  154;  Crisman  v.  McDonald,  28 
Ark.  8;  Jackson  v.  Com.  17  Ky.  L. 
R.  1197,  34  S.  W.  14;  Robinson  v.  S. 
82  Ga.  535,  9  S.  E.  528;  Bond  v.  S. 
23  Ohio  St.  349,  13  Am.  R.  253. 

142  Grace  v.  Dempsey,  75  Was. 
313,  43  N.  W.  1127;  Lake  S.  &  M. 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Shultz,  19  Ohio.  C.  C. 
639;  Bush  v.  Glover,  4/  Ala.  167,  11 
Am.  R.  768;  Rogers  v.  Brightman, 
10  Wis.  55;  East  Tenn.  V.  &  G.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bayless,  77  Ala.  430,  54  Am. 
R.  69;  P.  v.  Stewart,  75  Mich.  21,  42 
N.  W.  662;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co. 
v.  Laffertys,  14  Gratt.  (Va.)  478; 
Peart  v.  Cnicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co. 
8  S.  Dak.  431,  66  N.  W.  814. 


31  MODIFYING    CRIMINAL — CHANGING    TO    SUIT    ISSUES.          §    33. 

court  giving  others  on  its  own  motion  of  a  more  general  na- 
ture.143 

In  Texas  the  rule  is  that  whenever  a  special  instruction  is 
requested  the  court  should  give  or  refuse  it  as  requested;  and 
it  is  an  improper  practice  for  the  court  to  make  any  alteration 
of  the  instruction  as  requested,  yet  a  qualification  may  be  harm- 
less.144 

§  32a.  Modifying  in  criminal  cases. — Instructions  requested  by 
the  defendant  in  a  criminal  case  may  be  modified  by  the  court 
so  as  to  make  them  show  the  theory  of  the  prosecution,  although 
such  theory  is  presented  in  the  instructions  given  for  the  prose- 
cution.145 And  likewise  where  a  requested  instruction  contains 
the  caution  to  the  jury  that  they  should  consider  the  danger 
of  convicting  an  innocent  person,  it  may  be  modified,  directing 
them  also  to  consider  the  danger  to  society  in  acquitting  a  guilty 
person.146  And  it  is  also  proper  to  change  an  instruction  so  as 
to  confine  it  to  the  evidence  in  the  case.147 

§  33.  Changing  to  conform  to  issues. — The  court  may  modify 
an  instruction  to  make  it  comprehensive  enough  to  cover  the 
issues  and  evidence.148  An  instruction  charging  the  jury  that 
the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  prove  every  material  allegation  con- 
tained in  his  declaration  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence 
is  properly  modified  by  adding  the  words  "or  in  some  count 
thereof,"  where  all  the  counts  are  good.149 

An  instruction,  though  proper  under  one  branch  of  a  case 
as  alleged  in  one  count  of  the  declaration,  may  be  modified  to 
make  it  cover  another  element  or  branch  alleged  in  another 
count.  Instructions  should  not  be  so  drawn  as  to  ignore  any 
issue  raised  by  the  pleadings.150  So  also  where  an  instruction 
requested  to  be  given  for  the  defendant  charges  that  if  certain 

us  Jordan  v.  City  of  Benwood,  42  146  p.  y.  Stegenberg,  127  Cal.  510, 

W.  Va.  312,  26  S.  E.  266,  57  Am.  St.  59    Pac.    942. 

859;  36  L.  R.  A.  519;  S.  v.  McCann,  147  Kimmel  v.  P.  92  111.  457,  460. 

16  Wash.  249,  49  Pac.  216.  "8  Hays     v.     Border,     6     111.     (1 

i**  Trezevant  v.   Rains   (Tex.   Cv.  Gilm.)    46,    65. 

App.),    25    S.    W.    1092;    Dillingham  149  Joliet    R.    Co.    v.    McPherson, 

v.  Fields,  9  Tex.  Cv.  App.  1,  29  S.  W.  193  111.  629;    St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  R. 

214.  Co.  v.  Ball,  28  Tex.  Cv.  App.  287,  66 

i«  Smith   v.    S.    75    Miss.    542,    23  S.  W.  879. 

So.    260;    Bingham    v.    Lipman,    40  IGO  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Marshall, 

Ore.  363,  67  Pac.  98.  119   111.   399,   406,   10  N.  B.   220. 


§    34  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  32 

enumerated  facts  are  established  by  the  evidence,  then  the  de- 
fendant would  be  free  from  liability,  the  court  may,  on  its  own 
motion,  modify  the  instruction  by  stating  the  converse  of  the 
proposition.151 

An  instruction  which  charges  that:  "If  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  in  his  application  for  insurance 
made  a  false  or  untrue  statement  as  to  the  value  or  ownership 
of  the  property  insured,  as  an  inducement  to  the  company  to 
enter  into  the  contract  of  insurance,  and  that  the  company  relied 
upon  such  statement,  and  was  induced  thereby  to  enter  into 
such  contract  of  insurance,  then  such  contract  is  voidable  by  its 
own  terms  and  conditions,  by  the  company,  and  it  cannot  be 
enforced  against  it,  and  the  verdict  should  be  for  the  company," 
is  properly  modified  by  adding:  "Unless  you  further  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  after  it  had  full  knowledge 
of  such  representations,  waived  its  right  to  a  forfeiture  of  said 
policy  on  that  ground. ' '  The  right  to  a  forfeiture  and  the  waiver 
of  that  right  are  properly  submitted  in  the  one  instruction.152 

§  34.  Further  instructions  after  jury  retire. — The  court  may 
recall  the  jury  after  they  have  remained  out  some  time  and  give 
them,  at  their  request,  further  instructions  where  equal  oppor- 
tunity is  given  each  party  to  submit  such  further  instructions.15" 
And  it  is  not  only  the  right,  but  it  may  be  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  further  instruct  the  jury  at  their  request.154  Such  further 
instructions  must  be  reduced  to  writing  if  the  original  instruc- 
tions were  required  to  be  in  writing.155 

isi  Missouri,   K.    &   T.   R.   Co.   v.  S.   31  Tex.   Cr.   App.   173,  20  S.   W. 

Evans  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  41  S.  W.  80.  369,    37    Am.    St.    799;    Nichols    v. 

152  German  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gru-  Munsel,    115    Mass.    567;    National 

nert,   112   111.   68,   77.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Snell,  47  Ark.  407,  1 

iss  Shaw    v.    Camp,    160    111.    430,  S.W.   708;    City  of  Morris  v.   S.   25 

43    N.    E.    608;    Crowell    v.    P.    190  Ala.    57;    Breedlove   v.   Sunday,    96 

111.  514,  60  N.  E.  872;  City  of  Joliet  Ind.  319;   P.  v.  Mayes,  113  Gal.  618, 

v.    Looney,    159    111.    471,    42    N.    E.  45  Pac.  860,  54  Am.  St.  373;   Hayes 

854;  Lee  v.  Quick,  20  111.  392;  Farley  v.   Williams,   17   Colo.   465,   30  Pac. 

v  S.  57  Ind.  335;   Guy  v.  S.  96  Md.  352. 

692;    Wilkinson  v.   St.   Louis   S.   D.          is-*  Dowzelot  v.  Rowlings,  58  Mo. 

Co.    102    Mo.    130;    Richlands    Iron  75;    King   v.    S.    86   Ga.    355,   12    S. 

Co.  v.  Elkins,  90  Va.  249,  17  S.  E.  E.    943. 

890;    Hulse   v.   S.   35  Ohio   St.   421;          iss  Bowden  v.  4rchor,  95  Ga.  243, 

Sage  v.  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  22  S.  E.  254;  P.  v.  Charles,  26  Cal. 

134   Ind.   100,  33  N.  E.   771;   Wood-  78;    S.    v.    Harding,    81    Iowa,    599, 

ruff  v.  King,  47  Wis.  261,  2  N.  W.  47   N.   W.   877;    P.   v.   Wappner,   14 

452.     See   generally:    Cox  v.    High-  Cal.  437;   Columbia  V.  &  B.  Co.  v. 

ley,   100   Pa.   St.   252;    Benavides  v.  Cottonwood    L.    Co.    99    Tenn.    122, 


33  FURTHER    CHARGING    THE    JURY.  §    36 

§  35.  Further  instructions  in  absence  of  counsel. — But  the 
court  cannot  send  to  the  jury  material  additional  instructions 
after  they  have  retired,  in  the  absence  or  without  the  knowledge 
or  consent  of  counsel  of  the  respective  parties,  though  such  ad- 
ditional instructions  be  requested  by  the  jury.150  The  mere 
giving  of  further  instructions,  however,  in  the  absence  of  counsel 
is  not  of  itself  error  if  given  in  open  court.157  In  such  case  the 
court  is  not  bound  to  send  for  the  parties  or  their  counsel, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  remain  in  court  until  the  jury  return  a  ver- 
dict.158 If  it  appears  that  no  injury  was  done  to  the  complain- 
ing party,  the  error  in  thus  instructing  is  harmless.159  It  is  not 
error  to  thus  give  further  instructions  when  counsel  are  present 
and  make  no  objection,  if  the  additional  instructions  correctly 
state  the  law.160 

§  36.  Further  instructions  in  absence  of  defendant. — The  mere 
giving  of  further  instructions  in  any  criminal  case  in  the  ab- 
sence of  the  defendant  is  -error,  unless  in  case  the  defendant 
has  absconded,  or  in  some  manner  waived  his  right  to  be 
present.161  And  it  is  error  to  further  instruct,  in  the  absence  of 
the  defendant,  although  the  court  may  merely  re-read  the  in- 

41   S.   W.   351;    Willis  v.   S.   89   Ga.  Dec.  430  (not  error  if  counsel  have 

188,   15   S.   E.   32.  been    called);    Feibelman    v.    Man- 

ise  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Rob-  Chester  F.  A.  Co.  108  Ala.  180,  19  So. 

bins,    159    111.    602,    43    N.    B.    332;  540. 

Com.   v.   Howe   (Pa.   Super.   Ct),   4  157  Aerheart   v.    St.    Louis,    I.    M. 

W.  N.  Oas.  246;  Felker  v.  Douglass,  &  S.  R.   Co.   90  Fed  907;   Wade  v. 

(Tex.    Cv.     App.),     57    S.    W.    323;  Ordway,   I   Baxt.    (Tenn.)    229. 

Seagrave  v.  Hall,  3  Ohio  Cir.  Dec.  158  Cooper  v.  Morris,  48  N.  J.  L. 

221.     See  City  of  Joliet  v.  Looney,  607,    7   Atl.   427;    Cornish   v.    Graff, 

159  111.  471,  42  N.  B.  854;    Kehrley  36   Hun    (N.   Y.)    160. 

v.  Shafer,  36  N.  Y.  S.  510,  92  Hun,  159  Moseley     v.     Washburn,      165 

N.  Y.  196;   Fisher  v.  P.  23  111.  218.  Mass.   417,  43  N.  E.  182;    Felker  v. 

Contra:  S.  v.  Dudousot,  47  La.  Ann.  Douglass,     (Tex.    Cv.    App.)    57    S. 

977,  17  So.  685.     See  also  Seagrave  W.    323;    Glenn    v.    Hunt,    120    Mo. 

v.  Hall,  10  Ohio  C.  C.  395   (no  at-  330,  25  S.  W.  181;  Galloway  v.  Cor- 

tempt    made    to    notify    parties    or  bitt,  52  Mich.  461,  18  N.  W.  218. 

counsel) ;     Sargent    v.     Roberts,     1  18°  Wilson  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

Pick.  (Mass.),  337,  11  Am.  Dec.  185;  156,  38  S.  W.  1013;  Barnett  v.  Salo- 

S.   v.   Davenport,   33   La.   Ann.   231;  mon,  118  Mich.  460,  76  N.  W.  1035; 

Parkinson  v.  Concord  St.  R.  Co.  71  see    McMahon    v.     Eau    Claire  W. 

N.  H.  28,  51  Atl.  268;  S.  v.  Paterson,  Works,  95  Wis.   640,  70  N.  W.  829. 

45  Vt.  301,  1  Green  Cr.  R.  492;  Kuhl  iei  Maurer  v.  P.  43  N.  Y.  1;  Bon- 

v.  Long,  102  Ala.  569,  15  So.  267,  (no  ner  v.  S.  67  Ga.  510;   Benavides  v. 

effort    was    made    to    have    counsel  S.   31   Tex.   Cr.   App.   173,  20  S.  W. 

present);  Low  v.  Freeman,  117  Ind.  369,  3  Am.  St.  799;   Jones  v.  S.  26 

345,    20    N.    E.    242;     Campbell    v.  Ohio  St.  208;  Hulse  v.  S.  35  Ohio  St. 

Beckett,    8    Ohio    St.    211;    Preston  429  (defendant  absconding);  Raff er- 

v.   Bowers,  13   Ohio  St.   14,  82   Am.  ty  v.  P.  72  111.  46. 


§  37  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  34 

structions  exactly  as  given.162  But  in  several  states  the  courts 
hold  that  if  the  defendant,  in  criminal  cases,  is  present  it  is  not 
improper  to  give  such  additional  instructions,  although  his  coun- 
sel may  not  be  present.163 

§  37.  Instructing  further  on  other  points. — In  the  absence  of 
a  statute  to  the  contrary  it  is  not  error  in  further  charging 
the  jury  to  instruct  on  other  points  in  addition  to  those  on  which 
the  jury  requested  information,  providing  the  instructions  are 
otherwise  correct.16*  But  in  Texas  such  practice  is  prohibited 
by  statue.165  But  the  court  cannot  go  to  the  extent  of  giving 
substantially  a  new  and  complete  charge  on  the  issues.166  Nor 
is  it  a  wise  practice  to  repeat  the  entire  charge  as  originally 
given,  when  the  jury  ask  for  further  instructions,  for  fear  of 
confusion.167  But  if  the  jury  say  they  do  not  understand  the 
instructions,  they  may  be  re-read  if  the  parties  are  present.168 
On  the  other  hand,  to  repeat  only  a  portion  of  the  charge  may 
be  error,  especially  if  no  request  has-been  made  by  the  jury  for 
further  instructions.169 

§  38.  Recalling  jury  for  further  instructions. — The  court,  in 
its  discretion,  in  furtherance  of  justice,  may  recall  the  jury  and 
give  additional  instructions,  and  the  action  of  the  court  in  this 
respect  will  not  be  the  subject  of  review  unless  it  appears  that 
such  discretion  was  abused.170  And  it  has  been  held  that  the 
court  may,  on  its  own  motion,  recall  the  jury  after  they  have 
been  deliberating,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  them  when  they 
were  involved  in  any  difficulty  in  reaching  a  verdict.171 

So  for  the  court  to  say  to  the  jury  in  asking  them  to  deliberate 

162  Kinnemer   v.    S.    66   Ark.   206,  i«6  Foster  v.   Turner,  31  Kas.   65, 

49   S.   W.   815.  1  Pac.  145. 

las  p.   v.   Mayes,  113  Cal.   618,   45  "7  Gravett  v.  S.  74  Ga.  196;  Wil- 

Pac.  860,  54  Am.  St.  373;  S.  v.  Mil-  son  v.   S.   68  Ga.  827. 

ler,  100  Mo.  606,  13  S.  W.  832,  1051;  ios  Woodruff  v.  King,  47  Wis.  261, 

Jones  v.  S.  26  Ohio  St.  208;  Bonner  2    N.    W.    452;     Goff    v.    Greer,    88 

v.  S.  67  Ga.  510;  Hulse  v.  S.  35  Ohio  Ind.  122.  45  Am.  R.  449. 

St.  429;   Johnson  v.  S.  100  Ala.  55,  ISQ  Cranberry  v.  Frierson,  2  Baxt. 

14  So.  627.  (Tenn.)    326;    Cockrill    v.    Hall,    76 

in*  P.   v.   M'Kay,   122   Cal.   628,   55  Cal.    193,    18    Pac.    318.      See    Lloyd 

Pac.    594;     Harper    v.    S.    109    Ala.  v.    Moore,    38   Ohio    St.    100. 

66,  19  So.  901;   Chouteau  v.  Jupiter  170  McClary  v.  Stull,  44  Neb.  191, 

Iron   Works,    94    Mo.    388,    7    S.   W.  61  N.  W.  501.     See  Young  v.  Hahn, 

467.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  69  S.  W.  203. 

IBS  Hannahan  v.  S.  7  Tex.  Cr.  App.  ITI  Allis   v.    U.    S.    155   U.    S.    117,. 

610;   Chamberlain  v.  S.  2  Tex.  App.  39  Sup.  Ct.  91. 
451. 


35  JUDGE    VISITING    JURY — WITHDRAWING    INSTRUCTIONS       §    40 

further  (after  they  had  been  considering  the  case  for  two  days), 
"I  feel  that  no  twelve  men  can  be  found  better  qualified  than 
you  to  decide  this  case,"  is  not  error.172  Also  the  jury  may  be 
recalled  by  the  court  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  errors  in  the 
giving  of  instructions.173  It  has  been  held  in  one  jurisdiction 
that  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  recall  the  jury  and  amplify 
or  enlarge  on  the  instructions,  though  not  requested  to  do  so.174 
The  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  refuse  to  recall  the  jury  after 
they  have  retired,  for  further  instructions  at  the  request  of 
a  party.175 

§39.  Judge  calling  on  jury — Effect. — The  court  has  no  au- 
thority to  call  on  the  jury  in  the  jury  room  and  confer  with  them 
about  the  case  without  the  consent  of  the  parties,  and  to  do 
so  is  error;176  and  when  the  judge  does  so  call  on  the  jury  it 
must  appear  that  the  consent  of  both  sides  was  expressly  given.177 
The  mere  presence  of  the  judge  of  the  court  in  the  jury  room, 
watching  the  deliberations  of  the  jury,  is  error,  whether  he  may 
have  said  anything  or  not.178 

§  40.     Withdrawing      erroneous      instructions — Amending. — 

"Where  erroneous  instructions  have  been  given  the  court  may 
withdraw  them  from  the  consideration  of  the  jury  at  any  time 
before  a  verdict  has  been  reached,179  especially  if  they  are  with- 

172  Shely  v.   Shely,  20  Ky.   L.  R.  St.  480;  S.  v.  Alexander,  66  Mo.  148; 

1021,    47   S.   W.    1071;    McDaniel   v.  Reed    v.    City    of  Cambridge,    124 

Crosby,  19  Ark.  533.  See,  also,  Sol-  Mass.  567,  26  Am.  R.  690;   Sommer 

omon   v.    Reis,    5   Ohio   C.    C.   375;  v.   Huber,   183   Pa.   St.   162,   38  Atl. 

Hannon  v.  S.  70  Wis.  448.  36  N.  W.  595;  Kirk  v.  S.  14  Ohio  St.  511;  Sny- 

1;  S.  v.  Rollins,  77  Me.  380,  52  Am.  der  v.  Wilson,  65  Mich.  336,  32  N. 

R.  779;  S.  v.  Pitts,  11  Iowa,  343;  S.  W.  642;   Hoberg  v.  S.  3  Minn.  262; 

v.  Chandler,  31  Kas.  201,  1  Pac.  787.  Gibbons  v.  Van  Alstyne,  29  N.  Y.  S. 

ITS  s.  v.  Lightsey,  43  S.  Car.  114,  463. 

20   S.   E.   975;    Florence  Sewing  M.  177  Smith    v.    McMillen,    19    Ind. 

Co.  v.  Grover  &  B.  Sewing  M.  Co.  391;   Bunn  v.  Growl,  10  Johns.   (N. 

110  Mass.  70,  14  Am.  R.  579.  Y.)    239. 

174  Jones  v.  Swearingen,  42  S.  Car.  «s  Gibbons    v.    Van    Alstyne,    29 
58,   19   S.   E.   947.  N.  Y.  S.  461;  S.  v.  Wroth,  15  Wash. 

175  Young  v.  Hahn  (Tex.  Cv.  App),  621,   47  Pac.  106. 

69  S.  W.  203.  179  Resmer     v.     Thornbury,     111 

176  Lester  v.  Hays  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  Iowa,  515,   82  N.  W.   950;    Sittig  v. 
38    S.    W.    52;    Jones    v.    Johnson,  Birkestack,  38  Md.  158;   Sommer  v. 
61    Ind.    257;    Quinn   v.    S.    130   Ind.  Gilmore,    168    Pa.    St.    117,    31    Atl. 
340,  30  N.   E.   300.     See,  also,  gen-  884;    Sage    v.    Evansville    &    T.    H. 
erally,  Goode  v.  Campbell,  14  Bush.  R.  Co.     134  Ind.  100,  33  N.  E.  771; 
(Ky.)    75;    Johnson    v.    S.    100    Ala.  P.    v.    Benham,    160    N.    Y.    402,    55 
55,  14  So.  629;  S.  v.  Wroth,  15  Wash.  N.   E.   11,   14   N.   Y.   S.   188;    Shack- 
621,  47  Pac.  106;  Hopkins  v.  Bishop,  elford    v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    53 
91  Mich.  328,  51  N.  W.  902,  30  Am.  S.  W.  884;   Reed  v.  S.   (Neb.),  92  N 


§    41  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  36 

drawn  in  such  manner  as  to  be  clearly  understood  by  the  jury.180 
And  where  the  parties,  by  agreement,  submit  a  cause  to  be  tried 
by  the  court  without  a  jury,  any  legal  proposition  submitted  as  the 
law  of  the  case  may  be  withdrawn  before  the  court  has  passed 
upon  the  same.181  Instructions  may  be  amended  during  the  ar- 
guments where  counsel  are  not  thereby  deprived  of  the  right 
to  discuss  the  effect  of  such  amendments.182 

§  41.  Rulings  and  remarks  not  instructions. — Remarks  made 
by  the  court  during  the  introduction  of  the  evidence,  stating 
for  what  particular  purpose  certain  evidence  is  admitted, 
that  the  jury  may  understand  its  proper  application  to  the  issues, 
are  not  instructions  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  requiring 
instructions  to  be  in  writing.183  Rulings  of  the  court  in  passing 
upon  a  motion  to  exclude  from  the  jury  certain  testimony  do 
not  come  within  the  rule  of  written  instructions.18*  It  is  not 
error  for  the  court  to  give  the  jury  oral  directions  on  matters 
which  do  not  relate  to  the  merits  of  the  case.183  An  oral  state- 
ment by  the  court  that,  "you  must  not  arrive  at  your  verdict 
by  lot  or  chance,  but  only  by  considering  the  evidence,"  was 
held  not  to  be  prejudicial  error.186  A  direction  to  the  jury  to 
return  a  verdict  in  favor  of  a  party  is  not  an  instruction  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  requiring  instructions  to  be  given  in 
writing.187 

W.  321;  Bonner  v.  S.  107  Ala.  97,  ISB  White,  Kingsland  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

18  So.  226;  Chicago  &  B.  I.  R.  Co.  Herdrich,  98  111.  App.  607;  Dodd  \. 

v.  Zapp,  209  111.  341  (withdrawn  Moore,  91  Ind.  522;  Pate  v.  Wight, 

orally  after  reading  to  the  jury).  30  Ind.  476,  95  Am.  Dec.  705;  Sample 

iso  s.  v.  Wells,  54  Kas.  161,  37  v.  S.  104  Ind.  289,  4  N.  E.  40  (oral 

Pac.  1005;  Lower  v.  Franks,  115  statement  that  counsel  have  re- 

Ind.  334,  17  N.  B.  630;  Wenning  v.  quested  written  instructions  not  er- 

Teeple,  144  Ind.  189,  41  N.  E.  600.  ror) ;  Sargent  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

isi  Smith  v.  Mayfield,  163  111.  447,  325,  33  S.  W.  364;  Hasbrouck  v.  City 

45  N.  B.  157.  of  Milwaukee,  21  Wis.  219;  Lehman 

182  Powers  v.  Com.  22  Ky.  L.  R.  v.  Hawks,  121  Ind.  543,  23  N.  E.  670; 

1807,  61  S.  W.  735.  McCallister  v.  Mount,  73  Ind.  566; 

iss  Farmer  v.  Thrift,  94  Iowa,  Bradway  v.  Waddell,  95  Ind.  170; 

374,  62  N.  W.  804;  Stanley  v.  Suth-  Clouser  v.  Ruckman,  104  Ind.  588, 

erland,  54  Ind.  339;  Bradway  v.  4  N.  E.  202,  (reading  the  pleadings 

Waddell,  95  Ind.  170;  Madden  v.  to  the  jury  has  been  held  not  to 

State,  148  Ind.  183,  47  N.  E.  220;  be  error);  Moore  v.  City  of  Plat- 

Hatfield  v.  Chenoworth,  24  Ind.  App.  terville,  78  Wis.  644,  47  N.  W.  1055. 

343,  56  N.  E.  51;  S.  v.  Good,  132  iso  Lankster  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 

Mo.  114,  33  S.  W.  795.  App.),  72  S.  W.  388. 

184  Bloomer  v.  Sherrill,  11  III.  1*7  Liggett  &  M.  T.  Co.  v.  Collier, 

483,  485.  89  Iowa,  144,  56  N.  W.  417. 


37  SIGNING,   NUMBERING  AND  MARKING.  §    43 

§  42.  Directions  as  to  form  of  verdict. — The  form  of  the  ver- 
dict which  calls  for  the  statement  of  any  legal  proposition  is 
included  under  a  statute  requiring  instructions  to  be  in  writ- 
ing.188 But  to  instruct  the  jury  orally  as  to  the  form  of  the 
verdict  is  not  a  violation  of  the  statute,  unless  some  rule  or 
principle  of  law  applicable  to  the  case  should  be  given  in  di- 
recting the  jury  as  to  the  form  of  the  verdict.189  If  the  de- 
fendant in  a  criminal  case  desires  that  a  form  of  verdict  should 
be  given  as  to  a  lesser  or  included  offense,  he  should  prepare 
and  request  such  form.190  The  giving  of  a  form  of  verdict  for 
a  conviction  without  submitting  a  form  for  acquittal  is  not  error 
in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  such  form.191 

§  43.  Signing  and  numbering  instructions. — In  some  of  the 
states,  requested  instructions  must  be  signed  by  counsel,  other- 
wise it  is  not  error  to  refuse  them;192  and  in  other  states  they 
must  be  signed  by  the  judge  of  the  court,  as  well  as  by  counsel.193 
But  the  giving  of  instructions  which  are  not  signed  by  counsel 
as  required  by  statute  is  not  error  where  the  court  signs  them.194 
It  has  been  held  that  a  statute  requiring  instructions  to  be 
signed  by  the  judge  of  the  court  is  only  directory,  and  that  if  they 
are  not  so  signed  the  error  is  immaterial.195  The  failure  of  the 

IBS  Ellis    v.    P.    159    111.    337,    339,  Buchart  v.  Ell.  9  Ind.  App.  353,  36 

42   N.    B.    873;    Helm  v.   P.    186   111.  N.  E.  762;   Board  v.  Legg,  110  Ind. 

153,   57   N.   E.   886.  474,    11    N.    E.    612;    Hutchinson    v. 

189  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheel-  Lemcke,  107   Ind.   121,   8  N.  E.   71; 
er,  149  111.  525,  36  N.  E.  1023;  Helm  Chicago  &  E.   I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hedges, 
v.    P.    186    111.    153;    Ellis   v.    P.    159  105  Ind.  398,  7  N.  E.  801;    Citizens 
111.    337,    42    N.    E.    873,    57    N.    E.  St.   R.   Co.   v.    Hobbs,    15   Ind.   App. 
886;    Carlyle    Canning   Co.    v.    Bal-  610,  43  N.  E.  479;  Craig  v.  Frazier, 
timore    &    O.    S.    W.    R.    Co.    77    111.  127   Ind.  286,  26  N.  E.  842;    Farrer 
App.  396;  Smith  v.  P.  142  111.  124,  31  v.  McNair,  65  Kas.  147,  69  Pac.  167. 
N.  E.  599;    Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  i»a  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 
Hammer,  85  111.  526.  v.   Neel    (Tex.   Cv.   App.),  26   S.   W. 

190  Dunn  v.  P.  109  111.  646;  Dacey  788;    Denmark   v.    S.    43    Fla.    182, 
v.    P.    116    111.    575,    6    N.    E.    165;  31    So.    269    (signature    under    seal 
Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3240.  not  required). 

191  Green  v.  S.  40  Fla.  474,  24  So.  i»*  Galveston,   H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 
537.  v.   Neel    (Tex.   Cv.   App.),   26  S.   W. 

The   court   may    read    the   forms  788. 

of  verdict  to  the  jury.  P.  v.  Chaves,  195  Halley  v.   Tichenor,   120  Iowa, 

122  Cal.  134,  54  Pac.  596.  164,  94  N.  W.  472;   S.  v.  Stanley,  48 

192  State    Nat.    Bank    v.    Bennett,  Iowa,    221;    Dlllingham   v.    Bryant 
8  Ind.  App.  679,  36  N.  E.  551;  Texas  (Tex.      App.),      14      S,      W.      1017; 
&   P.   R.   Co.   v.   Mitchell    (Tex.   Cv.  Parker  v.   Chancellor,   78  Tex.   524, 
App.),  26  S.  W.  154;  Mason  v.  Sieg-  15    S.    W.    157.      Contra:    Baker    v. 
litz,     22    Colo.     320,    44    Pac.     588;  S.    17    Fla.    410;    Tyree   v.    Parham, 


§  44  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  38 

court  to  number  the  instructions  or  paragraphs  is  not  ground 
for  reversal,  although  by  statute  the  court  is  required  to  number 
and  sign  them.196 

§44.  Marking  "given,"  "refused,"  effect.— Under  a  statute 
requiring  instructions  which  are  given,  to  be  marked  on  the 
margin  "given,"  and  those  which  are  refused  to  be  marked 
"refused,"  it  is  not  material  error  if  they  are  not  so  marked.197 
A  statute  requiring  instructions  to  be  thus  marked  is  only  di- 
rectory, and  not  mandatory.198  Hence,  the  giving  of  an  instruc- 
tion, though  not  marked  as  required,  is  not  material  error,199 
especially  if  no  objection  was  made  to  the  giving  of  it  without 
thus  marking  it.200  So  when  it  is  difficult  to  determine  whether 
an  instruction  which  was  given  was  marked  ' '  given "  or  "  re- 
fused," there  is  no  ground  for  complaint.201 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  said  that  an  instruction  which 
is  neither  marked  "given"  nor  "refused,"  and  not  read  to 
the  jury  will  be  regarded  as  refused.202  In  some  jurisdictions 
where  instructions  are  given  by  the  court  on  its  own  motion  they 
are  not  required  to  be  marked  "given."203  But  where  a  cor- 
rect instruction  which  was  proper  to  be  given  was  marked  "re- 
fused," but  read  to  the  jury  and  given  with  others  marked 
"given,"  it  was  held  to  be  error  in  the  absence  of  any  other 

66    Ala.    424;    Smith    v.    S.    1    Tex.  76   N.   W.   660;    Daxanbeklav  v.   P. 

App.  416    (as  to  felony);    Carter  v.  93  111.  App.  553. 

S.  22  Fla.  553  (the  manner  of  sign-  100  Tobin  v.   S.   101   111.  121;    Mc- 

ing  held  sufficient).  Clellan  v.  Hem,  56  Neb.  600,  77  N. 

196  Shields  v.   S.   149   Ind.   412,  48  W.    120. 

N.  E.  346;  Coryell  v.  Stone,  62  Ind.  200  Jolly  v.  S.  43  Neb.  857,  62  N. 

312;     S.    v.    Booth     (Iowa),    88    N.  W.  300;  City  of  Chadron  v.  Glover, 

W.    344;    Miller    v.    Preston,    4    N.  43    Neb.    732,    62    N.    W.    62. 

Mex.  (Johns.)   314,  17  Pac.  565.  See  201  Washington     v.     S.     106    Ala. 

Weightnovel    v.    S.    (Fla.),    35    So.  58,   17   So.   546. 

862.  202  buffln  v.  P.  107  111.  113,  122,  47 

i»7  McDonald  v.  Fairbanks,  Morse  Am.  R.  431;  Calef  v.  Thomas,  81  111. 

&  Co.  161  111.  124,  131,  43  N.  B.  783;  486.  See  Flower  v.  Beveridge,  161  111. 

McKinzie  v.  Remington,  79  111.  388,  53,  43  N.  E.  722";  Little  v.  S.  58  Ala. 

390;   Cook  v.  Hunt,  24  111.  536,  551.  265;   Tobin  v.  P.  101  111.  123;   S.  v. 

See  Kepperly  v.  Ramsden,  83  111.  354,  Hellekson,  13  S.  Dak.  242,  83  N.  W. 

359;  Bressemer  Sav.  Bank  v.  Ander-  254. 

son,  134  Ala.  343,  32  So.  716,  92  Am.  203  Ter.  v.  Cordova  (N.  Mex.),  68 

St.    38;    Barnewall    v.    Murrell,    108  Pac.    919;     P.    v.    Samsels,    66  Cal. 

Ala.  366,  18  So.  831;  Goodwin  v.  S.  99,    4    Pac.    1061;    Gillen    v.    Riley, 

(Ala.),  18  So.  694;   Moore  v.  Swee-  27   Neb.    158,    42    N.    W.    1054      See 

ney,  28  111.  App.  547  (writing  on  an  Harvey  v.   Tama  Co.  53  Iowa.  228, 

instruction  the  reason  for  refusing  5  N.   W.   130   ("instructions  one  to 

is  a  compliance  with  the  statute),  seven    all    refused."    is    sufficient). 

198  Turley  v.  Griffin,  106  Iowa,  161,  Lawrenceville  Cement  Co.  v.  Park, 


39  MARKING    AND    UNDERSCORING.  §    45 

instructions  on  the  same  point  in  a  case  where  the  facts  were 
closely  contested.204 

§  45.  Marking  for  plaintiff — Underscoring, — The  charge 
should  be  given  to  the  jury  as  the  instructions  of  the  court  with- 
out anything  appearing  on  them,  showing  at  whose  instance  they 
were  given.  The  instructions  should  not  be  marked  or  indi- 
cated as  "for  the  plaintiff"  or  "for  the  defendant."205  But  to 
give  instructions  thus  marked  is  not  reversible  error.206  Sub- 
mitting to  the  jury  instructions  with  the  authorities  noted  on 
them,  showing  the  volume  and  page  of  the  book  in  which  the 
law  may  be  found,  will  not  be  presumed  to  be  prejudicial  error, 
although  such  practice  is  improper.207 

Underscoring  words  in  instructions  given  is  improper  as  it 
gives  them  undue  weight.208  But  it  has  been  held  not  to  be 
error  to  underscore  words  of  an  instruction  where  such  words 
are  usually  italicised  in  legal  treatises.209  The  giving  of  such 
an  instruction,  however,  cannot  be  urged  as  error  unless  it  ap- 
pears to  have  been  prejudicial.210  The  giving  of  instructions 
in  which  display  type  are  used  is  harmless  error,  where  they 
are  used  only  in  ordinary  and  general  instructions  on  questions 
not  involving  specific  facts;  though  such  practice  is  improper.211 

€0  Hun  (N.  Y.)  586;  Ter.  v.  Baker,  aoe  Sample   v.    S.    104   Ind.   289,   4 

4  N.  Mex.  236,  13  Pac.  30  (marking  N.  E.  40. 

on  the  last  page  that  the  foregoing  207  Herzog  v.    Campbell,   47   Neb. 

are   all   refused   is   sufficient).  370,  66  N.  W.  424;   In  re  Goldthorp 

204  Terre    Haute    &    I.    R.    Co.    v.  Estate,  115  Iowa,  430,  88  N.  W.  944; 
Hybarger,    67    111.    App.    480.      The  Wright    v.    Brosseau,    73    111.    381; 
court  is  not  authorized  to  mark  in-  City    of   South    Omaha   v.    Fennell 
structions  after  the  verdict,  Bacon  (Neb.),    94    N.    W.    632;     Williams 
T.   Bacon,  76  Miss.   458,  24   So.   968.  v.    St.    Louis    &    S.    F.    R.    Co.    123 
Only  such  instructions  as  the  court  Mo.    573,    27    S.    W.    387    (held    not 
holds  to  be  the  law  need  be  read  error  unless  the  jury  had  the  books 
to  the  jury:    Com.  v.  Clark,  3  Pa.  or  knew  what  was  decided  in  the 
Super.  141;   Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  cases    cited).      See    Wragge    v.    S. 
v.  Friel,  77  Fed.  126;  Long  v.  South-  Car.  &  G.  R.  Co.  (S.  Car.),  25  S.  E. 
era  R.  Co.   50  S.  Car.  49,  27  S.  E.  76   (rule  of  court  requiring  the  au- 
531;   Stewart  v.  Mills,  18  Fla.  57.  thorities   to  be  noted   on  the  mar- 

205  Aneals  v.   P.   134  111.   401,  416,  gin  of  instruction). 

25  N.  E.  1022;  Stevenson  v.  Chicago  208  S.   v.   Cater,  100  Iowa,  501,  69 

&   N.    W.    R.    Co.    94   Iowa,   719,    61  N.   W.    880;    McCormick   H.   M.   Co. 

N.    W.    964;    Wilson    v.    White,    71  v.  Sendzikowski,  72  111.  App.  402. 

Ga.  507,  51  Am.  R.  269;  S.  v.  Cotrill,  209  Philpot    v.    Lucas,    101    Iowa, 

52  W.   Va.   363,   43   S.   E.   244,   59   L.  478,   70   N.   W.   625. 

R.  A.  513.     See  Gutzman  v.  Clancy,  210  Wright  v.  Brosseau,  73  111.  381. 

114  Wis.  589,  90  N.  W.  1081,  58  L.  R.  211  Hagenow    v.    P.    188    111.    553, 

A.  744.,  See  also  Barkman  v.  S.  13  59    N.    E.    242;    Featherstone   v.    P. 

Ark.  706;  Anderson  v.  City  of  Bath,  194   111.   325,   62   N.   E.   684;    Wright 

42    Me.    346.  v.  Brosseau,  73  111.  387. 


§  46  PURPOSE  AND  PREPARATION.  40 

§  46.  Court's  manner  of  charging  the  jury. — The  manner  in 
which  the  court  charges  the  jury — his  tone  of  voice  or  peculiar 
methods  of  emphasis  or  the  like — cannot  be  urged  as  error.  The 
reviewing  courts  are  powerless  to  afford  relief  for  such  griev- 
ances.212 

§  47.  Trial  by  court,  jury  waived. — In  cases  tried  by  the 
court  without  a  jury,  if  a  party  desires  to  preserve  the  rulings 
of  the  court  as  to  the  law  of  the  case,  he  should,  as  required 
by  statute,  prepare  and  submit  formal  propositions  to  be  held 
or  refused,  and  take  exceptions  to  the  rulings  if  adverse  to  him 
and  preserve  the  propositions  and  rulings  thereon  in  a  bill  of 
exceptions.213  In  Indiana,  in  order  to  preserve  the  holding  of 
the  court  as  to  the  law,  the  court  is  required  by  statute,  at  the 
request  of  either  party,  to  make  a  special  finding  of  the  facts 
and  conclusions  of  law  thereon,  in  writing,  and  to  which  con- 
clusions of  law  exceptions  must  be  properly  taken.214  In  the  trial 
of  a  case  without  a  jury,  where  the  decision  depends  entirely 
upon  the  view  the  court  may  take  of  the  evidence,  whether  the 
evidence  of  the  one  or  the  other  party  is  most  reliable  when 
conflicting,  no  difference  what  view  the  court  may  take  of  the 
abstract  propositions  of  law,  it  will  be  immaterial.215  The 
rulings  of  the  court  in  rejecting  propositions  requested,  where 
the  case  is  tried  by  the  court  without  a  jury,  cannot  be  urged 
as  error  if  the  propositions  actually  held  to  be  the  law  appli- 
cable state  every  principle  of  law  necessary  to  be  considered 
in  the  decision  of  the  case.216 

212  Horton  v.  Chevington  &  B.  C.  150,  4  N.  E.  652;  Wrought  Iron  B. 
Co     2    Penny.    (Pa.)    1;    Gibbs    v.  Co.  v.  Commissioners,  101  111.   522. 
Johnson,    63    Mich.    674,    30    N.    W.          21*  Hartlep  v.   Cole,  120  Ind.  247, 
343;    Rountree  v.  Gurr,  68  Ga.  292;  22  N.  E.  130;  Winstandley,  v.  Brey- 
Bishop    v.    Journal    Newspaper    Co.  fogle,   148   Ind.    618,   48   N.    E.    224; 
168  Mass.   327,   47  N.  E.   119;    S.   v.  Nelson  v.  Cottingham,  152  Ind.  135, 
Howell,  28  S.  Car.  250,  5  S.  E.  617.  52  N.  E.  702;   Hoover  v.  S.  110  Ind. 

213  Hobbs    v.    Ferguson,    100    111.  349,  11  N.  E.  434;  Stumph  v.  Miller, 
232;    Merrimac    Paper    Co.    v.    Illi-  142  Ind.  446,  41  N.  E.  812;   McCray 
nois  Trust  &  S.  Bank,  129  111.  296,  v.    Humes,    116    Ind.    Ill,    18   N.    E. 
21     N.     E.     787;      Montgomery     v.  500;   Branch  v.  Faust,  115  Ind.  464, 
Black,    124    111.    62,    15    N.    E.    28;  17  N.  E.  898. 

Christy  v.   Stafford,  123  111.  466,   14          215  Stowell  v.  Moore,  89  111.  563,  31 
N.    E.    680;     Mclntyre    v.    Sholtey,       Am.   R.   105. 

121  111.  665,  13  N.  E.  239,  2  Am.  St.          210  Germania     Fire     Ins.     Co.     v. 
140;    Kelderhouse   v.    Hall,    116    111.       Hicks,  125  111.  364,  17  N.  E.  792,  8 

Am    St.   384. 


CHAPTER   II. 


QUALITIES      AND      REQUISITES. 


Sec. 

48.  Abstract    propositions    of    law. 

49.  Cautionary    instructions — Gen- 

erally. 

50.  Cautionary    instructions — 

Matters    not    raised    on    the 
trial. 

51.  Cautionary    instructions — 

Against     opinion     of     court. 

52.  Cautionary  instructions — Crim- 

inal cases. 

53.  Referring  jury  to  the  pleadings. 

54.  Instructions    limited    to    some 

counts. 

55.  In  criminal  cases — Referring  to 

indictment. 

56.  Whole  law   in   one  instruction 

unnecessary. 

57.  Instructions    as    to    damages — 

Measure   of. 

58.  Instructions    as    to    damages — 

Personal  injury. 

59.  Instructions    as    to    damages — 

Exemplary  or  punitive. 

60.  Misleading       instructions — Ob- 

scure,   though    correct. 

61.  Misleading     instructions — Sus- 

ceptible   of    two    meanings. 

62.  Misleading  instructions — If  ev- 

idence   is    conflicting. 

63.  Misleading     instructions — Gen- 

erally erroneous. 


Sec. 

64.  Misleading   instructions — Cured 

by   others. 

65.  Misleading    instructions — Illus- 

trations. 

66.  Argumentative      instructions — 

Generally. 

67.  Argumentative      instructions — 

Not  necessarily  erroneous. 

68.  Argumentative      instructions- 

Illustrations. 

69.  Interrogative  instructions — Im- 

proper. 

70.  Instructions     construed     as     a 

whole. 

71.  Instructions     of     both     parties 

construed   together. 

72.  If  instructions  be  harmonious, 

defects  are  harmless. 

73.  Grouping  instructions  into  one 

series. 

74.  Words,   phrases  and  clauses. 

75.  Definition   of   terms. 

76.  Definition     of     terms— Contin- 

ued. 

77.  Ungrammatical  and  awkwardly 

arranged. 

78.  Misuse  of  names,  terms,  etc. — 

Effect. 

79.  Words    omitted    from    instruc- 

tions. 


§  48.  Abstract  propositions  of  law. — Instructions  should  be  so 
framed  as  to  inform  the  jury  what  the  law  is,  as  applicable  to 
the  facts  in  evidence,  and  not  in  general  terms  in  the  form  of 

41 


QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES. 


abstract  propositions  of  law.1  Such  instructions,  although  ab- 
stractly correct,  are  likely  to  be  misleading,  and  for  that  rea- 
son should  not  be  given.2 

Ah  instruction,  though  correctly  stating  an  abstract  proposi- 
tion of  law,  may  be  refused  if  there  is  no  evidence  upon  which 
to  base  it,  or  if  it  in  no  wise  has  any  application  to  the  facts  of 
a  case.3  But  the  giving  of  instructions  which  merely  announce 


1  Morris    v.    Platt,    32    Conn.    75. 
See  Hassett  v.  Johnson,  48  111.   68, 
D5  Am.  Dec.  519;  Seekel  v.  Norman, 
71   Iowa,  264,  32   N.  W.  334;    Bald- 
win v.  S.  75  Ga.  489;  S.  v.  Jones,  87 
N.   Car.  542;    Pittsburg  Coal  Co.  v. 
Estievenard,  53  Ohio  St.  43,  40  N.  E. 
725;  Parmlee  v.  Adolph,  20  Ohio  St. 
10;    Fisher  v.  Central  Lead  Co.  156 
Mo.  479,  56  S.  W.  1107;  P.  v.  Hart- 
man,  130  Cal.  487,  62  Pac.  823;  Smi- 
ley v.   Scott,  179   111.   142,  53  N.   E. 
544;  Thomas  v.  S.  126  Ala.  4,  28  So. 
591;  P.  v.  Considine,  105  Mich.  149, 
63  N.  W.  196. 

2  Caughlin    v.    P.    18    111.    266,    68 
Am.    Dec.    541;    Collins   v.    City    of 
Janesville,   107  Wis.   436,   83  N.  W. 
695,  51  L.  R.  A.  917;  Smith  v.  Bank 
<N.   H.),   54   Atl.   385;    S.  v.   Prater, 
52  W.  Va.  132,  43  S.  E.  230;    Cobb 
v.    Simon     (Wis.)     97    N.    W.    279. 

s  Martinez  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
57  S.  W.  670;  S.  v.  Goff,  62 
Kas.  104,  61  Pac.  683;  Jesse  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  57  S.  W.  826; 
Kassman  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  153 
Mo.  293,  54  S.  W.  513;  Sparks  v. 
S.  Ill  Ga.  380,  35  S.  E.  654;  Cham- 
bers v.  P.  105  111.  409,  416;  Whelan 
v.  Kinsley,  26  Ohio  St.  137;  Lewis 
v.  S.  4  Ohio,  389;  Davis  v.  S.  25 
Ohio  St.  373;  Lexington  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Paver,  16  Ohio  324;  City  of  Aledo 
v.  Honeyman,  208  111.  415;  Spence 
v.  Huckins,  208  111.  309;  Rankin 
v.  Sharpies,  206  111.  309;  Germania 
Fire  Ins.  Co.-  v.  McKee,  94  111. 
494,  500;  Crane  Co.  v.  Tierney,  175 
111.  79,  82,  51  N.  E.  715;  Atkinson 
v.  Lester.  2  111.  (1  Scam.)  409; 
Gray  v.  Sharpe  (Colo.  App.),  67  Pac. 
375  (held  error  to  give  abstract  in- 
structions if  there  is  no  evidence 
on  which  to  base  them) ;  Hurlbut 
v.  Hall,  39  Neb.  889,  58  N.  W..  538; 
Omaha  Nat.  Bank  v.  Thompson, 


39  Neb.  269,  57  N.  W.  997;  Wads- 
worth  v.  Williams,  101  Ala.  264,  IS 
So.  755;  S.  v.  Hicks,  130  N.  Car.  705, 
41  S.  E.  803;  Union  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
Nixon,  199  111.  235,  65  N.  E.  314; 
Oliver  v.  Sterling,  20  Ohio  St.  399; 
S.  v.  Tibbs,  48  La.  Ann.  1278,  20  So. 
735;  Farmers'  Banking  Co.  v.  Key, 
112  Ga.  301,  37  S.  E.  447;  Smith  v. 
Bank,  &c.  70  N.  H.  187,  46  Atl.  230; 
Long  v.  Hunter,  58  S.  Car.  152,  36  S. 
E.  579,  79  Am.  St.  836;  Collins  v. 
City  of  Janesville,  107  Wis.  436,  83 
N.  W.  695,  51  L.  R.  A.  917;  Lear 
v.  McMillen,  17  Ohio  St.  464;  Cast- 
lin  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  57  S.  W. 
827;  Kirk  v.  Ter.  10  Okla.  46,  60  Pac. 
797;  Wallace  v.  S.  41  Fla.  547,  26 
So.  713;  Mansfield  v.  Neese,  21  Tex. 
Cv.  App.  584,  54  S.  W.  370;  Thomas 
v.  Gates,  126  Cal.  1,  58  Pac.  315; 
City  of  Marshall  v.  McAlister,  22 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  214,  54  S.  W.  1068; 
Safford  v.  S.  76  Miss.  258,  26  So. 
945;  Matula  v.  Lane,  22  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  391,  55  S.  W.  502;  Chicago  West 
Division  R.  Co.  v.  Ingraham,  131. 
111.  659,  667,  23  N.  E.  350;  Belk 
v.  P.  125  111.  584,  591,  17  N.  E.  744; 
Smiley  v.  Scott,  179  111.  142,  53  N. 
E.  544;  Montag  v.  P.  141  111.  75,  81, 
30  N.  E.  337;  City  of  Joliet  v.  John- 
son, 177  111.  178,  184,  52  N.  E.  498, 
69  Am.  St.  216;  Alton  Paving,  &c. 
Co.  v.  Hudson,  176  111.  270,  275,  52 
N.  E.  256;  Scanlon  v.  Warren,  169 
111.  142,  48  N.  E.  410;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  v.  Marshall,  119  111.  399,  406,  10 
N.  E.  220;  Bressler  v.  P.  117  111.  422, 
442,  8  N.  E.  62;  City  of  Lynchburg 
v.  Wallace,  95  Va.  640,  29  S.  E.  675; 
Gwin  v.  Gwin,  5  Idaho,  271,  48  Pac. 
295;  Davis  v.  S.  25  Ohio  St.  373; 
Whalen  v.  Kinsley,  26  Ohio  St.  137; 
Gray  v.  Callender,  181  111.  173,  54 
N.  E.  910;  Byers  v.  Maxwell,  22 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  269,  54  S.  W.  789; 


43 


ABSTRACT    PROPOSITIONS    OF    LAW. 


§    48 


abstract  principles  of  law  cannot  be  urged  as  material   error 
unless  they  are  prejudicial  or  misleading.4 

If  an  irrelevant  instruction  be  given,  although  unobjectionable 
as  an  abstract  proposition  of  law,  which  is  calculated  to  mislead 
the  jury  and  affect  their  conclusion  upon  the  issue  submitted 
to  them  it  is  error.5  And  where  the  instructions  taken  as  a  whole 


Oftelie  v.  Town  of  Hammond,  78 
Minn.  275,  80  N.  W.  1123;  Hart  v. 
Bowen,  80  Fed.  877;  Heinman  v. 
Kinnare,  73  111.  App.  184;  Campbell 
v.  P.  109  111.  565,  577,  50  Am.  R.  621; 
TJpstone  v.  P.  109  111.  169,  176;  John- 
son v.  Hirsehburg,  85  111.  App.  47; 
Hyde  &  Leather  National  Bank  v. 
Alexander,  184  111.  416,  56  N.  E.  809; 
Louisville,  New  Albany  &  Chicago 
R.  Co.  v.  Patchen,  167  111.  204,  211, 
47  N.  E.  368;  Long  v.  Hunter,  58  S. 
Car.  152,  36  S.  E.  579,  79  Am.  St. 
836;  Sullivan  v.  S.  117  Ala.  214,  23 
So.  678;  Bondurant  v.  S.  125  Ala.  31, 
27  So.  775;  Troy  v.  Rogers,  113  Ala. 
131,  20  So.  i99;  Tischler  v.  Kurtz, 
35  Fla.  323,  17  So.  661;  Oliver  v.  Ster- 
ling, 20  Ohio  St.  391;  Stryker  v. 
Goodnow,  123  U.  S.  527,  8  Sup.  Ct. 
203;  Coffin  v.  United  States,  162  U. 
S.  664,  16  Sup.  Ct.  943;  Allen  v.  Ham- 
ilton, 109  Ala.  634;  19  So.  906;  May- 
er v.  Wilkins,  37  Fla.  244,  19  So. 
632;  Reilly  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  35 
N.  Y.  S.  1030  14  Misc.  445;  Chapman 
v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  12  Utah,  30, 
41  Pac.  551. 

*  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Pontiac,  169  111.  172,  48  N.  E. 
485;  Pate  v.  P.  8  111.  (3  Gilm.)  661; 
Betting  v.  Hobbett,  142  111.  72,  30 
N.  E.  1048;  Town  of  Wheaton  v. 
Hadley,  131  111.  644,  23  N.  E.  422; 
Herbich  v.  North  Jersey  St.  R.  Co. 
67  N.  J.  L.  574,  52  Atl.  357;  Doyle 
v.  S.  39  Fla.  155,  22  So.  272,  63  Am. 
St.  159;  Payne  v.  Crawford,  102  Ala. 
387,  14  So.  854;  Cooke  v.  Cook,  100 
Ala.  175,  14  So.  171,  46  Am.  St.  33; 
Denver  Tr.  Co.  v.  Owens,  20  Colo. 
107,  36  Pac.  848,  (such  instruction 
is  harmless  if  it  states  the  law  cor- 
rectly) ;  Meiners  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
130  Mo.  274,  32  S.  W.  637;  Bosqui 
v.  Sutro  R.  Co.  131  Cal.  390,  63  Pac. 
682,  82  Am.  St.  355;  Johnson  v.  Mc- 
Kee,  27  Mich.  471  (instruction  com- 
plained of  favorable);  Moore  v. 


People,  190  111.  331,  338,  60  N.  E.  535; 
Greene  v.  Greene,  145  111.  271,  33 
N.  E.  941;  Hurst  v.  McMullen  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  48  S.  W.  744;  Doolittle  v. 
Southern  R.  Co.  62  S.  Car.  130,  40 
S.  E.  133;  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v. 
Anderson,  193  111.  9,  14,  61  N.  E. 
999;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Dick- 
son,  143  111.  374,  32  N.  E.  380;  Grier 
v.  Puterbaugh,  108  111.  602,  607; 
Denton  v.  Jackson,  106  111.  433,  438; 
Corbin  v.  Shearer,  8  111.  (3  Gilm.) 
482;  Bandalow  v.  P.  90  111.  218; 
Needham  v.  P.  98  111.  280;  Healey 
v.  P.  163  111.  383,  45  N.  E.  230; 
Cook  v.  P.  177  111.  146,  52  N.  E.  273. 
See  Underbill  Cr.  Ev.  §  278.  S. 
v.  Rose,  142  Mo.  418,  44  S.  W.  329; 
Salomon  v.  Cress,  22  Ore.  177,  29 
Pac.  439,  15  L.  R.  A.  614;  Canon  v. 
Farmers'  Bank  (Neb.)  91  N.  W.  585; 
Reed  v.  Commonwealth,  98  Va.  817, 
36  S.  E.  399;  Hough  v.  Grant's  Pass 
Power  Co.  41  Ore.  531,  69  Pac.  655; 
Anthony  Ittner  Brick  Co.  v.  Ashby, 
198  111.  562,  64  N.  E.  1109;  Caw  v.  P. 
3  Neb.  357;  Schneider  v.  Hosier, 
21  Ohio  St.  113;  Bank  of  C.  v.  Eure- 
ka B.  &  L.  Co.  108  Ala.  89,  18  So. 
600;  Ward  v.  Henry,  19  Wis.  76,  88 
Am.  Dec.  672;  Jones  v.  Williams, 
108  Ala.  282,  19  So.  317;  Benjamin 
v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  133  Mo. 
274,  34  S.  W.  590;  State  v.  Canty, 
41  La.  Ann.  587  6  So.  338;  McCutch- 
en  v.  Loggins,  109  Ala.  457,  19  So. 
810;  P.  v.  March,  6  Cal.  543;  Pitts- 
burg,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Slusser, 
19  Ohio  St.  157;  Beidler  v.  King,  209 
111.  302,  312. 

•r-  Caughlin  v.  P.  18  111.  266,  68  Am. 
Dec.  541;  Trustees  v.  McCormick 
&  Bros.  41  111.  323;  McNair  v.  Platt, 
46  111.  211,  214.  See  Healy  v.  P.  163 
111.  383,  45  N.  E.  230;  Welter  v. 
Leistikow,  N.  Dak.  283,  83  N.  W.  9; 
Smith  v.  Bank  (N.  H.)  54  Atl.  385; 
State  v.  Prater,  52  W.  Va.  132,  43 
S.  E.  230,  241;  Meyer  v.  Reimer,  65 


§    49  QUALITIES  AND  KEQUISITES.  44 

are  mere  abstract  propositions  of  law,  having  no  application 
to  the  facts  in  issue,  they  are,  in  fact,  misleading.0  It  is  error 
to  give  such  an  instruction  if  it  leaves  the  jury  in  doubt  as  to 
what  application  it  has  to  the  evidence.7  But  a  charge  con- 
sisting of  general  abstract  propositions  given  for  the  purpose 
of  illustrating  the  rules  governing  the  facts  in  issue  is  not  er- 
roneous.* The  court,  in  charging  the  jury,  may  use  illustrations 
by  stating  a  hypothetical  case  without  reference  to  the  evidence. 
But  such  illustrations  should  be  used  with  great  caution  and 
should  guard  against  the  intimation  of  an  opinion  by  the  court  on 
the  facts.9 

§  49.  Cautionary  instructions — Generally — The  giving  of  cau- 
tionary instructions  is  necessarily  a  matter  very  much  within 
the  discretion  of  the  court.  The  judge  is  in  a  position  to  ob- 
serve and  know  whether  the  situation  is  such  as  to  require  such 
instructions,  and  a  refusal  to  give  them  cannot  ordinarily  be 
assigned  as  error.10  And  in  giving  cautionary  instructions  to  the 
jury  as  to  their  duties  the  court  is  not  bound  to  instruct  in  the 
precise  form  requested.11 

It  is  proper  for  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  to  caution  them 
to  be  governed  by  the  law  and  the  evidence,  and  not  be  in- 
fluenced by  any  falacious  views  or  notions  of  counsel  in  his  ar- 
gument where  any  such  false  position  may  have  been  taken  by 
counsel.12  Thus,  for  instance,  where  counsel  for  the  defendant 

Kas.  822,  70  Pac.  869;  Holmes  v.  of  as  error,  in  the  absence  of  a  re- 

Ashtabula  R.  T.  Co.  10  Ohio  C.  C.  quest  that  it  be  explained,  Hanson 

638;  East  Tenn.  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  v.  Gaar,  Scott  &  Co.  68  Minn.  68, 

Toppins,  10  Lea  (Tenn.)  64.  70  N.  W.  853. 

«  Fisher  v.  Central  Lead  Co.  156  10  Birmingham  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Mo.  479,  56  S.  W.  1107;  Gorman  v.  Pulver,  126  111.  339,  18  N.  E.  804,  9 

Campbell,  14  Ga.  142.  Am.  St.  581;  Dinsmore  v.  State,  61 

T  Davis  v.  S.  152  Ind.  34,  51  N.  E.  Neb.  418,  85  N.  W.  445;  Lyle  v.  Mc- 

928,  71  Am.  St.  322.  See  Mason  v.  Cormick  H.  M.  Co.  108  Wis.  81,  84 

Silver,  1  Aik.  (N.  S.)  (Vt.),  367.  N.  W.  18,  51  L.  R.  A.  906. 

s  West  Memphis  P.  Co.  v.  White,  "  Hay  v.  Carolina  M.  R.  Co.  41 

99  Tenn.  256,  41  S.  W.  583,  38  L.  R.  S.  Car.  542,  19  S.  E.  976;  Southern 

A.  427.  See  McGrew  v.  Missouri  Bell  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Watts,  66  Fed. 

Pac.  R.  Co.  109  Mo.  582,  19  S.  W.  53.  460. 

»  Boyd  v.  Blue  Ridge  R.  Co.  65  12  Rucker  -v.  State,  114  Ga.  13, 

S.  Car.  326,  43  S.  E.  817;  State  v.  39  S.  E.  902;  Williams  v.  State,  130 

Godfrey,  60  S.  Car.  498,  39  S.  E.  1;  Ala.  107,  30  So.  484;  State  v.  Bur- 

Allis  v.  U.  S.  155  U.  S.  117,  39  Sup.  ton,  27  Wash.  528,  67  Pac.  1097; 

Ct.  91 ;  Sparks  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  State  v.  Gannon,  75  Conn.  206,  52 

86,  29  S.  W.  264.  An  instruction  Atl.  727.  See  White  v.  State,  133 

merely  announcing  an  abstract  Ala.  122,  32  So.  139;  State  v.  West, 

proposition  cannot  be  complained  43  La.  Ann.  1006,  10  So.  364. 


45  CAUTIONARY    CHARGES.  §    50 

stated  that  the  accused.,  in  his  statement,  impressed  him  with 
the  belief  that  he  was  innocent,  the  court  may  instruct  that  what 
counsel  "believe"  is  to  have  no  influence  with  the  jury.13 

An  instruction  that  the  jury  in  arriving  at  their  verdict  should 
not  be  influenced  by  any  feeling  of  sentiment,  but  that  they 
should  apply  the  law,  as  given  them  by  the  court,  to  the  facts 
of  the  case,  is  proper.14  Or  that  the  jury  may  apply  to  the  facts 
of  the  case  "the  same  rules  of  good  common  sense,  subject,  of 
course,  to  a  conscientious  exercise  of  that  common  sense  that 
you  would  apply  to  any  other  subject  that  comes  under  your 
consideration  and  that  demands  your  judgment,"  is  not  im- 
proper.15 

Where  ancient  documents  and  old  notes  of  survey  in  the 
custody  of  the  trustees  of  an  estate  were  introduced  in  evidence 
in  an  ejectment  suit  it  was  held  proper  for  the  court  in  charg- 
ing the  jury  to  caution  them  to  scrutinize  carefully  the  documents 
to  determine  their  genuineness.16  An  instruction  in  a  civil  case 
directing  the  jury  that  it  is  their  sworn  duty  to  enforce  the  law 
is  of  doubtful  propriety,  especially  in  an  action  brought  by  a 
wife  against  a  dramshop  keeper,  for  damages  based  upon  the 
dram-shop  law,  for  unlawfully  selling  intoxicating  liquor  to  her 
husband,  where  punitive  damages  are  not  allowed  unless  actual 
damages  are  shown.17 

§  50.  Cautionary  instructions — Matters  not  raised  on  the  trial. 
An  instruction  cautioning  the  jury  as  to  a  matter  not  raised 
on  the  trial  is  properly  refused;  as,  for  instance,  the  refusal  of 
a  charge  that  there  is  no  evidence  to  warrant  a  finding  of  the  ex- 
istence of  a  conspiracy  to  defraud  the  creditors  of  a  certain  per- 
son, is  proper,  where  no  such  claim  had  been  made  or  suggested 
in  the  general  charge  or  otherwise.18  So  an  instruction  caution- 
is  Smith  v.  S.  95  Ga.  472,  20  S.  B.  U.  S.  486,  17  Sup.  Ct.  375.  See  Hin- 
291.  Contra:  Reeves  v.  S.  34  Tex.  shaw  v.  State,  147  Ind.  334,  47  N. 
Cr.  App.  483,  31  S.  W.  382.  Telling  E.  157. 

the  jury  that  they  should  be  close-         ie  Wilson  v.  Marvin-Rulofson  Co. 
ly  governed  by  the  instructions  of      201  Pa.  St.  29,  50  Atl.  225. 
the   court   is   not   improper   in   the          IT  Henewacker  v.  Ferman,  152  111. 
way    of    caution.,    First    C.    M.    H.      325,    38   N.   E.    924. 
Soc.  v.   Town   of  Rochester,  66  Vt.          is  Rindskopf    v.    Myers,    87    Wis. 
501,  29  Atl.  810.  80,    57   N.   W.    967,   41   Am.    St.    23; 

n  State  v.  Petsch,  43  S.  Car.  132,  Johnson  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  R.  Co. 
20  S.  E.  993.  173  Mo.  307,  73  S.  W.  173  (relating 

is  Dunlap    v.    United    States,    165      to  sympathy). 


§    51  QUALITIES'  AND    REQUISITES.  46 

ing  the  jury  that  it  is  improper  for  them  to  arrive  at  the  damages; 
by  taking  the  average  of  the  different  amounts  each  of  the 
jurors  may  believe  should  be  awarded,  is  properly  refused,  it 
being  the  duty  of  the  court  to  instruct  only  as  to  the  law 
of  the  case.19  The  refusal  of  an  instruction  that  the  jury  should 
not  draw  any  inference  unfavorable  to  the  credibility  of  certain 
witnesses  brought  from  another  state,  because  their  expenses  had 
been  paid  by  the  defendant,  is  proper  where  opposing  counsel 
has  made  no  unfavorable  comment  on  the  presence  of  such  wit- 
nesses.20 

§  51.    Cautionary  instructions — Against  opinion  of  court. — An 

instruction  charging,  by  way  of  caution,  that  the  jury  should 
not  regard  anything  contained  in  any  of  the  instructions  as  in- 
timating, in  the  slightest  degree,  any  opinion  of  the  court  as 
to  what  any  of  the  facts  are,  but  that  they  should  determine 
from  the  evidence,  and  from  that  alone,  what  are  the  facts, 
is  a  qualification  of  every  instruction  given  on  that  branch  of 
the  case.21 

§  52.  Cautionary  instructions — Criminal  cases. — So  in  a 
criminal  case  an  instruction  cautioning  the  jury  that  the  crime 
with  which  the  accused  is  charged  is  a  very  serious  one,  is  not 
improper  where  they  are  also  charged  that  the  fact  of  the  of- 
fense, being  a  serious  one,  will  not  warrant  a  conviction  on 
slight  evidence.22  Also  where  several  persons  are  jointly  indicted, 
and  one  of  them  secures  a  separate  trial  from  the  others,  the  court 
may  properly  instruct  the  jury,  that  if  they  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  the  defendants  are  guilty  they  should  find  a  verdict 
accordingly,  whether  they  believe  the  defendant,  who  secured 
the  separate  trial,  had  anything  to  do  with  the  crime  charged 
or  not ;  that  the  jury  may  convict  one  or  more  of  the  defendants 
as  the  evidence  may  warrant;  that  they  have  nothing  to  do 

is  Sherwood  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.  ceeding;  caution  as  to  reaching  ver- 

132  Mo.    339,    33    S.    W.    774;    Ben-  diet    by    averaging    is    proper), 
jamin    v.    Metropolitan    St.    R.    Co.  20  Klepsch  v.  Donald,  8  Wash.  162, 

133  Mo.  274,  34  S.  W.  590   (by  lot).  35  Pac.  621. 

The  refusal  to  instruct  that  a  cer-  21  Chicago    &    N.    W.    R.    Co.    v. 

tain  manner  of  arriving  at  a  ver-  Snyder,    117   111.   383,   7   N.   E.    604. 

diet    in    fixing    damages    is    illegal  See  Baldwin  v.  Lincoln  County,  29 

is  not  error,  Woodman  v.  Town  of  Wash.   509,   69  Pac.   1081. 

Northwood,    67   N.    H.   307,   36   Atl.  22  Commonwealth    v.    Harris,    168 

255;  Illinois,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Freeman,  Pa.  St.  619,  32  Atl.  92. 
210  111.  270,  278  (condemnation  pro- 


47  JURY  REFERRED  TO  PLEADINGS.  §  53 

with  the  influence  a  verdict  of  guilty  may  have  in  the  trial  of 
the  defendant  who  secured  sUch  separate  trial.23  An  instruc- 
tion stating  that  it  is  the  policy  of  the  law  that  it  is  better 
that  ninety  and  nine,  or  any  number  of  guilty  persons,  should 
escape  rather  than  that  one  innocent  person  should  be  con- 
victed is  improper  and  may  be  refused.24  The  court  after  charg- 
ing the  jury  as  to  the  law  of  self-defense  may,  without  com- 
mitting error,  properly  add  by  way  of  caution  that  "courts  and 
jurors,  however,  must  exercise  due  caution  in  applying  these 
principles."25 

§53.  Referring  jury  to  the  pleadings. — It  is  common  prac- 
tice to  refer  to  the  pleadings  in  the  giving  of  instructions  in 
both  civil  and  criminal  cases.  But  if  reference  be  made  to 
the  pleadings  in  such  manner  as  to  make  the  jury  the  judges 
of  what  are  the  material  allegations  it  is  error ;  it  is  for  the  court 
to  determine  as  a  question  of  law  what  are  the  material  allega- 
tions.26 Thus  an  instruction  otherwise  correct  is  not  erroneous 
in  directing  the  jury,  if  they  find  for  the  plaintiff,  to  assess 
the  damages  at  such  sum  as  from  the  evidence  will  be  just 
compensation  for  the  injury  sustained,  not  exceeding  the  sum 
claimed  in  the  declaration;27  or  an  instruction  that  if  the  jury 
find  the  defendant  guilty  as  alleged  in  the  declaration,  or  some 
count  thereof,  they  should  find  for  the  plaintiff  is  not  erroneous 
in  referring  the  jury  to  the  declaration  to  ascertain  the  charges 
of  negligence.28 

A  charge  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 

23  James  v.  S.  104  Ala.  20,  16  So.  S.  W.  1022.     See  Christie  v.  P.  206 
94.  111.    343;    Pittsburg,    &c.    R.    Co.    v. 

24  Adams  v.  P.  109  111.  451,  50  Am.  Kinnare,  203  111.  388,  392,  67  N.  E. 
R   617;  Seacord  v.  P.  121  111.  631,  13  826. 

N.  E.  194;   P.  v.  Eubanks,  117  Cal.  2?  Calumet  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Pelt, 

652,  49  Pac.  1049,  40  L.  R.  A.  269;  173  111.  70,  73,  50  N.  E.  678;   Trum- 

Coleman  v.  S.  Ill  Ind.  563,  13  N.  E.  ble  v.  Happy,  114  Iowa,   624,  87  N. 

100;  Barnes  v.  S.  Ill  Ala.  56,  20  So.  W.  678. 

565;  S.  v.  Tettaton,  159  Mo.  354,  60  28  Central    R.    Co.    v.    Bannister, 

S.  W.  743;  Cardon  v.  S.  84  Ala.  417;  195   111.   48,   51,   62   N.   E.   864;    Chi- 

Ter.  v.  Burgess,  8  Mont.  57,  19  Pac.  cago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher,  141  111. 

558;  P.  v.  Machado  (Cal.)  63  Pac.  66.  624,    31    N.    E.    406;    Southern    Ind. 

25  S.    v.    Young,    104    Iowa,    730,  R.   Co.   v.    Peyton,   157   Ind.   690,   61 
74  N.  W.  693.  N.  E.  722;   Malott  v.  Hood,  201  111. 

26  Baker  v.  Summers,  201  111.   52,  202,  66   N.   E.   247;    West  C.   St.   R. 
66  N.  E.  302;   McClure  v.  Williams,  Co.  v.  Lieserowitz,  197  111.  607,  612, 
65    111.    390;    Texas   &   P.   R.    Co.   v.  64  N.  E.  718. 

Birchfleld,  12  Tex.  Cv.  App.  145,  33 


§    53  QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES.  48 

defendant  is  guilty  of  negligence  as  alleged  in  the  declaration 
then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  is  a  proper  form  of  in- 
struction.-9 So  an  instruction  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  without  fault  or  negligence  on  his 
part,  was  injured  by  the  wrongful  acts  of  the  defendant  as  al- 
leged in  the  plaintiff's  declaration  they  should  find  the  defendant 
guilty,  is  proper  although  the  evidence  tends  to  support  only 
one  of  the  several  counts  of  the  declaration.30 

An  instruction  referring  the  jury  to  the  plaintiff's  petition  for 
a  description  of  the  land  or  lots  involved  in  the  controversy 
is  not  improper.31  Also  an  instruction  setting  out  the  material 
allegations  of  the  plaintiff's  declaration  and  then  concluding 
by  stating  that  "if  the  jury  believe  from  a  preponderance  of 
the  evidence  that  the  material  allegations  of  the  plaintiff's  decla- 
ration are  true  the  verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiff,"  is  proper 
and  not  objectionable  as  submitting  to  the  jury  a  question  of 
law.32  Also  the  giving  of  an  instruction  stating  the  nature 
of  the  action,  the  issues  to  be  determined,  what  is  necessary 
for  the  plaintiff  to  prove  to  entitle  him  to  recover  and  then 
concluding  that  the  grounds  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  are  more 
fully  set  out  in  his  petition  to  which  the  jury  are  referred  is  not 
prejudicial  error.33  So  the  fact  that  the  court  in  charging  the 
jury  sets  out  the  pleadings  in  full,  affords  no  ground  for  error, 
where  in  another  part  of  the  charge  the  real  issues  are  clearly 

29  Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v.  &  St.  J.   R.   Co.  v.  Martin,  111  111. 

Payne,   59   111.   534,   542;    Chicago   &  219,  234. 

A.    R.    Co.    v.    Harrington,    192    111.         si  Jenks   v.   Lansing  Lumber  Co. 

9,  25,  61  N.  E.  622;  Malott  v.  Hood,  97  Iowa,  342,  66  N.  W.  231.  An  in- 

201    111.    202,    206,    66    N.    E.    247;  struction    that    the    affidavit    in    an 

Lake  S.   &   M.   S.   R.   Co.   v.  Mcln-  attachment  suit  is  not  evidence,  but 

tosh,    140    Ind.    261,    38    N.    E.    476;  that    it    is    proper   for   the   jury    to 

Illinois   Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Jernigan,  find  whether  the  statements  in  the 

101  111.  App.  1,  65  N.  E.  88;  Illinois  affidavit  are  true  or  not,  is  proper, 

Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Jernigan     198   111.  Gosch  v.  Niehoff,  162  111.  395,  44  N. 

297,  65  N.  E.  88;  West  Chicago  St.  E.  731. 

R.  Co.  v.  Buckley,  200  111.  260,  65  N.          32  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Daven- 

E.  708;  Britton  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  port,  177  111.  110,  52  N.  E.   266,  69 

120  Mo.  437.  25  S.  W.  366,  41  Am.  Am.  R.   212;    East  St.  L.  R.   Co.  v. 

St.    705;     Illinois    Cent.    R.   Co.   v.  Eggman,  170  111.  539,  48  N.  E.  981; 

Eicher,  202  111.  556,  572,  67  N.  E.  376.  Stringam  v.  Parker,  159  111.  304,  310, 

Contra:    Murray  v.  Burd  (Neb.),  91  42  N.  E.  794;  St.  Louis,  Alton  &  T. 

N.   W.   278;    Illinois,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Holman,  155  111.  21  39 

Thompson,  210  111.  226,  238.  N.  E.  573;  Hartpence  v.  Rogers,  143 

so  Pennsylvania     Co.     v.     Backes,  Mo.  623,  45  S.  W.  650. 
133  111.  259,  24  N.  E.  563;  Hannibal         33  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Sternberger, 

8  Kas.  App.  131,  54  Pac.  1101. 


49  LIMITING  TO  SOME  COUNTS.  §    54 

stated,  so  that  the  jury  may  know  the  exact  points  to  be  de- 
cided.34 

But  an  instruction  directing  the  jury  to  find  the  issues  for  the 
plaintiff  if  she  has  proved  the  material  allegations  of  her  declara- 
tion, is  erroneous  in  the  absence  of  further  instruction  as  to  what 
are  the  material  allegations.  What  are  material  allegations  is  a 
question  of  law.35  Also  an -instruction  which  states  that  the  de- 
fendant by  withdrawing  his  plea  of  general  issue  thereby  admits 
all  the  material  averments  in  the  declaration  without  stating 
what  are  the  material  averments,  is  erroneous  as  tending  to  mis- 
lead the  jury.36  And  an  instruction  referring  the  jury  to  the 
pleadings  in  a  complicated  case  for  a  particular  statement  of 
the  facts  in  issue  upon  which  the  plaintiff  must  recover,  if  at 
all,  is  erroneous.37  But  if  the  pleadings  are  short  and  simple 
the  court,  in  charging  the  jury,  may  refer  to  them  without  any 
further  explanation  as  to  the  issues.38 

§  54.  Instructions  limited  to  some  counts. — If  a  declaration 
contains  counts  upon  which  a  recovery  cannot  be  had  under  the 
evidence  then  any  reference  to  the  declaration  in  charging  the 
jury  should  be  restricted  to  the  counts  upon  which  a  recovery 
may  be  had.  In  such  case  it  is  error  to  instruct  the  jury,  that 
"if  you  believe  the  plaintiff  has  made  out  his  case  as  laid  in 
his  declaration  the  finding  must  be  for  the  plaintiff."39  And 
when  an  instruction  is  applicable  to  the  facts  of  only  one  of 
the  counts  of  the  declaration  which  differs  materially  from  the 
allegations  of  the  other  counts,  forming  the  basis  of  a  .different 

34  Welch    v.    Union    C.    Life    Ins.  344,  46  N.  W.  7724,  21  Am.  St.  563; 

Co.  117  Iowa,  394,  90  N.  W.  828.  See  Porter  v.   Knight,  63  Iowa,  365,   19 

Britton    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,    120  N.  W.  282;   East  Tenn.  V.  &  G.  R. 

Mo.   437,  25  S.  W.   366,  41  Am.   St.  Co.  v.  Leo,  90  Tenn.  570,  18  S.  W. 

705;    (Instruction  held  not  referring  268;   Baker  v.  Summers,  201  111.  52, 

to  petition  for  the  issues).     Kelt  v.  56,  66  N.  E.  302. 

Smith,  74  Iowa,  667,  39  N.  W.   81;  ™  McClure    v.    Williams,    65    111. 

Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Mclntosh,  390. 

140  Ind.  261,  38  N.  E.  476.  37  Keatley  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 

ss  Baker  v.  Summers,  201  111.  52,  94  Iowa,  685,  63  N.  W.  560;   Wood- 

66  N.   E.   302;    Stevens  v.  Maxwell,  ruff  v.  Hensley,  26  Ind.  App.  592,  60 

65  Kas.  835,  70  Pac.  873  (pleadings  N.  E.   312. 

intricate    and    some    of    the    issues  ss  Graybill    v.    Chicago,   M.    &   St. 

not  proved);    Texas,  &c.   R.   Co.  v.  P.   R.   Co.  112  Iowa,  738,  84  N.  W. 

Birchfield,  12  Tex.  Cv.  App.  145,  33  946. 

S.  W.  1022;   Dicken  v.  Liverpool  S.  so  Chicago  N.  S.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Me- 

&   C.   Co.   41   W.   Va.   511,  23   S.   E.  Carthy,  66  111.  App.  667. 
582;    Wilbur    v.    Stoepel,    82    Mich. 


§    55  QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES.  50 

right  of  action,  then  the  instruction  should  be  limited  to  that 
count;  otherwise  it  should  be  refused.40  Where  one  or  more  of 
the  counts  of  the  declaration  have  been  dismissed  in  the  presence 
and  hearing  of  the  jury,  an  instruction  referring  to  the  declara- 
tion or  any  count  thereof  will  be  understood  to  refer  only  to 
the  counts  which  have  not  been  abandoned  or  dismissed.41  There 
may  be  defective  counts  in  a  declaration  upon  which  a  recovery 
could  not  be  had,  and  if  so,  an  instruction  referring  to  the 
declaration  should  be  limited  to  the  good  counts.42 

§  55.  In  criminal  cases — Referring  to  indictment. — In  a  crim- 
inal case  the  court  in  its  instructions  may  properly  refer  the  jury 
to  the  indictment  for  a  description  of  the  offense  charged  in- 
stead of  setting  it  out  in  the  language  of  the  statute.44  And  it 
is  proper  for  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  to  state  the  different 
degrees  or  included  offenses  contained  in  the  indictment,  and  to 
inform  the  jury  on  which  charge  the  defendant  is  on  trial.45 
And  a  charge  that  the  jury  must  determine  of  which  one  or  more 
of  the  counts  of  an  indictment  the  defendant  is  guilty  is  not  ob- 
jectionable where  the  jury  are  also  instructed  that  if  they  con- 
clude the  defendant  is  not  guilty,  then  they  should  so  state  in 
their  verdict.46  Where  the  prosecution  is  limited  to  some  one 
or  more  of  the  counts  of  an  indictment  an  instruction  charging 
that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  certain  facts 
(stating  them)  have  been  established  as  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment they  should  find  the  defendant  guilty,  instead  of  limiting 
the  inquiry  to  the  facts  in  the  particular  count  or  charge  on 
which  the  defendant  is  on  trial  is  not  erroneous  where  the  in- 

40  Village    of   Jefferson    v.    Chap-  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  to  dis- 
man,  127  111.  447,  20  N.  E.  33;  First  regard  any  faulty  counts  of  a  dec- 
National     Bank    of    Monmouth    v.  laration,    means    such    counts    only 
Dunbar,  118  111.  630,  9  N.  E.  186.  as  would  be  insufficient  to  support 

41  Slack  v.  Harris,  200  111.  96,  115,  a   judgment   after   verdict,    Consol- 
65  N.  E.  669;   West  Chicago  St.  R.  idated  Coal  Co.  v.  Scheiber,  167  111. 
Co.  v.  Buckley,  200  111.  260,  262,  65  539,  543,  47  N.  E.  1052. 

N.  E.  708.  44  Parker  v.  P.  97  111.  32,  37.  See 

42  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Eselin,  S.  v.  David,  131  Mo.  380,  33  S.   W. 
86  111.  App.  94;    Grand  Tower  Mfg.  28.  Contra:  Ter.  v.  Baca  (N.  Mex.), 
Co.  v.  Ullman,  89  111.  244.    See   Chicu-  71    Pac.    460. 

go  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  166  111.  45  Worthan    v.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 

572,   46  N.   E.   1125.     Contra:    Kim-  App.),  65  S.  W.  526. 

ball    v.    Paye,    96    Me.    487,    52    Atl.  4«  s.  v.  Moore,  49  S.  Car.  438,  27  S. 

1010.     A   statute   which   authorizes  E.  454. 


51  WHOLE    LAW    IN    ONE    CHARGE    UNNECESSARY.  §    56 

struction  enumerates  the  facts  constituting  the  crime  as  set  forth 
in  the  count  or  charge  to  which  the  prosecution  is  limited.47 

§  56.    Whole  law  in  one  instruction  unnecessary. — It  is  not 

necessary  that  each  instruction  should  contain  the  whole  law 
of  the  case,  nor  that  it  should  call  attention  to  the  contentions 
of  the  parties  to  the  action.  It  is  sufficient  if  the  series  of  in- 
structions considered  as  a  whole  fully  and  fairly  announce  the 
rules  of  law  applicable  to  the  issues  involved.48  Nor  is  the  court 
required  to  give  a  separate  instruction  on  each  material  fact  or 
element  of  a  case.49  But  the  fact  that  an  instruction  embraces 
more  than  one  proposition  of  law  does  not  render  it  bad.50 

So  an  instruction  which  is  complete  within  itself  and  relates 
to  the  issues,  is  not  erroneous  simply  because  it  does  not  embrace 
other  propositions  which  would  be  appropriate.51  It  is  there- 
fore not  improper  to  state  the  law  applicable  to  particular  ques- 
tions or  particular  parts  of  the  case  as  separate  questions  in 
giving  instructions.52  But  an  instruction  relating  to  a  particular 
proposition  or  element  involved  in  a  case  should  be  complete 
within  itself.  For  instance,  an  instruction  applying  the  law  of 
reasonable  doubt  to  self-defense  is  imperfect  if  it  fails  to  set 
forth  the  constituents  of  self-defense.53  So  every  instruction 
asked  by  the  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  have  embodied  in  it 
every  fact  or  element  essential  to  sustain  his  cause  of  action ; 

47  Sykes    v.    P.    127    111.    117,    126,  234,  62  N.  W.  452.     See  also  Cath- 
19  N.  E.  705.     An  instruction  prop-  olic  Order  of  Foresters  v.  Fitz,  181 
erly    refers    to    the    time    when    an  111.  206,  54  N.  E.  952;   Cole  v.  S.  75 
offense  is  alleged  to  have  been  com-  Ind.  511;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co. 
mitted,   as   "on   or  about"   the   day  v.  Groves,  56  Kas.  611,  44  Pac.  628; 
stated  in  the  indictment,  or  at  any  S.   v.   Hope,   102   Mo.   410,   14  S.   W. 
time  within   the  statute  of  limita-  985. 

tions,   Ferguson  v.   S.   52   Netr.   432,          *»  S.    v.    Garth,    164    Mo.    553,    65 

72   N.  W.  590;    Phillips  v.   S.    (Tex.  S.    W.    275. 

Cr.  App.),  45  S.  W.  709.  so  Gemmill  v.  Brown,  25  Ind.  App. 

48  Lilly   v.    P.   148   111.   477,   36   N.  6,  56  N.   E.   691. 

E.   95;    Stratton  v.   Central  City   H.          51  Hayes  v.    S.    114   Ga.   25,   40   S. 

R.    Co.    95    111.    33:    Hessing   v.    Me-  E.  13.     See  Tucker  v.  S.  114  Ga.  61, 

Closkey,    37    111.    351;    Illinois    Iron  39  S.  E.  926. 

&  M.  Co.  v.  Weber,  196  111.  526,  63          52  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines, 

N.  E.  1008;  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  132   111.   161,  169,  23  N.  E.   1021,  22 

v.  Scanlan,  168  HI.  34,  48  N.  E.  149;  Am.  St.  515.     See  also  Tucker  v.  S. 

Smith  v.  Smith,  169  111.  623,  48  N.  114  Ga.  61,  39  S.  E.  926;    Hayes  v. 

E.    306;     Pardridge    v.    Cutter,    168  S.  114  Ga.  25,  40  S.  E.  13. 

Til.  504,  512,  48  N.  E.  125;    Judy  v.          ™  Miller  v.  S.  107  Ala.  40,  19  So. 

Sterrett,  153  111.  94,  100,  38  N.  E.  633;  37;    Worden    v.    Humeston   &   S.   R. 

Nebraska  N.  Bank  v.  Burke,  44  Neb.  Co.  72  Iowa,  201,  33  N.  WT.  629. 


§    57  QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES.  52 

nor  is  it  necessary  to  negative  matters  of  mere  defense.54  So 
where  one  instruction  states  one  ground  of  liability  and  another 
states  another  ground,  there  is  a  sufficient  statement  of  the  law 
without  stating  both  grounds  in  one  instruction.53  Thus  where 
negligence  is  alleged  as  a  material  element  in  the  plaintiff's 
declaration  each  instruction  is  not  required  to  state  every  ground 
of  liability  averred  in  the  different  counts  of  the  declaration. 
On  the  contrary,  an  instruction  may  be  framed  touching  upon 
each  separate  charge  of  negligence  as  set  out  in  any  of  the 
counts.56  An  instruction  to  guide  the  jury  as  to  the  measure 
of  damages  is  not  required  to  recapitulate  all  the  different  ele- 
ments constituting  a  cause  of  action  which  have  been  stated  in 
other  instructions.  Its  design  is  to  inform  the  jury  what  damages 
they  shall  award  in  case  they  find  the  plaintiff  entitled  to  re- 
cover.57 

§  57.  Instructions  as  to  damages — Measure  of. — A  proper  in- 
struction should  be  given  the  jury,  when  requested,  stating  the 
rule  as  to  the  measure  of  damages.58  But  where  the  charge  as  a 
whole  correctly  states  the  rule  as  to  the  measure  of  damages  that  is 
sufficient  without  stating  the  rule  in  any  one  instruction.59  A 
charge  that  the  jury  may  give  such  damages  as  they  think  to  be 
in  proportion  to  the  injury  resulting  from  the  death  of  the 
plaintiff's  husband  is  sufficient  where  no  instructions  are  asked 
for  correct  measure  of  damages.60  If  an  instruction  as  to  the 
measure  of  damages  should  be  so  broad  as  to  allow  remote  or 
fanciful  damages  it  is  erroneous.01  The  instructions  should  con- 
fine the  jury  to  such  damages  as  are  reasonably  certain  to  follow 
from  the  injury  alleged.62 

s*  Underwood  v.  Wolf,  131  111.  425,  os  Cole    v.    City    of    Boston,    181 

442,   23  N.   E.    598,   19   Am.   St.    40;  Mass.   374,   63  N.   E.   1061;    Carpen- 

Village  of  Sheridan  v.  Hibbard.  119  ter  v.   City  of  Red  Cloud,  64   Neb. 

111.  307,  310,  9  N.  E.  901.  126,   89   N.   W.   637. 

ss  Nebraska  Nat.  Bank  v.  Burke,  ™  Rath  v.  Rath  (Neb.)   89  N.  W. 

44  Neb.  234,  62  N.  W.  452.  612. 

se  Chicago  &  A.   R.   Co.  v.  Maro-  GO  Galveston,   H.    &   S.    A.    R.   Co. 

ney,   170   111.   525,   48  N.   E.   953,   62  v.    Worthy    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),   27    S. 

Am.  St.  396.  W.    426. 

57  Chicago   &   A.   R.   Co.   v.   Har-  01  Ramsey  v.  Burns,  27  Mont.  154, 

rington,  192  111.  9,  27,  61  N.  E.  622;  69   Pac.   711. 

McMahon    v.    Sankey,    133    111.    636,  02  Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Files,    65 

641,  24  N.  E.  1027;  Pennsylvania  Co.  Ohio    St.    403,    407,    62    N.    E.    1047. 
v.    Marshall,    119    111.    399,    404,    10 
N.    E.    220. 


53  DIRECTIONS   AS    TO    DAMAGES.  §    59 

§  58.  Instructions  as  to  damages — Personal  injury. — Where 
an  instruction  properly  presents  the  theory  of  the  plaintiff  as 
to  the  amount  of  damages  it  is  not  erroneous  in  not  excluding  the 
idea  of  damages  arising  from  injuries  aggravated  by  the  plain- 
tiff's own  negligence.62*  An  instruction  charging  that  the  jury 
should  allow  such  damages  as  "under  all  the  evidence  would 
be  just  compensation  for  the  injury"  is  not  erroneous  in  not 
excluding  punitive  damages.63  In  a  personal  injury  case  a  charge 
that  the  jury  should  give  "such  damages  for  bodily  pain  and 
mental  anxiety,  as  they  believe  the  plaintiff  is  justly  entitled  to 
recover,"  is  proper  in  connection  with  another  instruction,  stat- 
ing that  "the  damages  should  be  no  greater  and  no  less  than  they 
believe  from  the  evidence  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover."64 
An  instruction  that  if  the  jury  find  the  defendant  guilty,  and 
that  the  plaintiff  has  sustained  damages  from  the  injury,  they 
ha"ve  a  right,  in  estimating  such  damages,  to  take  into  considera- 
tion all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence  before  them,  and 
the  nature  and  effect  of  the  plaintiff's  physical  injuries,  if  any. 
shown  by  the  evidence  to  have  been  sustained  from  the  cause 
alleged  in  the  declaration,  her  suffering  in  body  and  mind,  if 
any,  resulting  from  such  injuries,  is  proper.65 

§  59.  Instructions  as  to  damages — Exemplary  or  punitive. — An 
instruction  as  to  exemplary  damages  which"  fails  to  state  what 
facts  must  be  established  by  the  evidence  to  warrant  such  dam- 
ages, is  improper.66  In  an  action  of  trespass  for  assault  and 

62*  Hannibal  v.  St.  Joseph  R.  Co.  N.  B.   884;    Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v. 

v.  Martin,  111  111.  233;  Wabash,  St.  Anderson,    182    111.    298,    55    N.    E. 

L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Rector,  104  111.  305.  "366;     Gartside    Coal    Co.    v.    Turk, 

es  Whiting    v.    Carpenter    (Neb.),  147  111.  120,  126,  35  N.  E.  467;   Lake 

93  N.  W.  926.  Shore    &    M.    S.    R.    Co.    v.    Hundt. 

o*  Boltz  v.  Town  of  Sullivan,  101  140  111.  525,  30  N.  E.  458;  Chicago 
Wis.  608,  77  N.  W.  870.  In  Tennes-  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Mead,  206  111.  177; 
see  it  has  been  held  that  there  Hannon  v.  St.  Louis  Tr.  Co.  (Mo. 
can  be  no  judgment  for  damages  App.),  77  S.  W.  158.  For  the  purpose 
in  a  personal  injury  case  where  no  of  determining  the  amount  of  dam- 
instructions  have  been  given  on  ages  where  an  injury  to  the  per- 
the  subject  of  damages,  Citizens'  son  is  permanent,  it  is  proper  for 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  BurKe,  98  Te^nn.  650,  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  as  to 
40  S.  W.  1088.  tho  use  of  tables  of  mortality,  Sa- 

es  City    of    Chicago    v.    McLean,  vannah  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Austion, 

133   111.   148,  24  N.   E.   527;    Central  104  Ga.  614,  30  S.  E.  770. 

R.   Co.  v.  Serpass,  153  111.  379,  384,  oe  Kutner   v.    Fargo,   45   N.    Y.    S. 

39    N.    E.    119;     Springfield    C.    R.  753,    20    Misc.    207. 
Co.     v.     Hoeffner,     175    111.    634,    51 


§    60  QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES.  54 

battery  it  is  proper  to  instruct  that  if  the  jury  find  the  defendant 
guilty  they  have  a  right  to  take  into  consideration  the  financial 
circumstances  of  both  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant  in  as- 
sessing damages.67 

§  60.  Misleading  instructions — Obscure,  though  correct. — 
When  instructions  are  so  drawn  that  they  will  be  more  likely 
to  mislead  than  instruct  a  jury  they  should  be  refused,  al- 
though by  careful  study  and  analysis  it  may  appear  that  such' 
instructions  announce  correct  principles  of  law.68  Although  an 
instruction  may  technically  state  the  law  correctly,  yet  if  ex- 
pressed in  such  language  as  to  be  misunderstood  by  the  jurors 
in  its  application  the  court  is  not  bound  to  give  it,  and  does  not 
err  in  refusing  it.69  So  a  charge,  though  not  objectionable  in 
point  of  law,  but  which  leaves  the  jury  to  draw  incorrect  in- 
ferences, is  erroneous  where  a  different  verdict  would  have  been 
rendered  had  the  jury  not  been  mislead.70  But  the  mere  fact 
that  an  instruction  may  have  a  tendency  to  mislead  the  jury 
cannot  be  urged  as  material  error.71  A  specific  charge  based  on 
particular  facts,  which,  if  followed  by  the  jury,  would  cause  an 
erroneous  verdict,  is  not  cured  by  general  charges.72 

§  61.  Misleading  instructions — Susceptible  of  two  meanings. 
Also  an  instruction  which  is  susceptible  of  two  meanings,  one 
stating  the  law  correctly  and  the  other  incorrectly,  having  a 
tendency  to  mislead  the  jury,  is  erroneous.73  So  if  an  instruction 
is  so  framed  that  others  are  needed  to  explain  it,  it  is  properly 
refused.74 

§  62.  Misleading  instructions — If  evidence  is  conflicting. — An 
instruction  that  "if  the  jury  do  not  believe  the  evidence  they 
will  find  the  defendent  not  guilty,"  is  properly  refused  in  that 

67  McNamara  v.  King,  7  111.  (2  Ala.  222,  52  Am.  R.  322.  See  Pal- 
Gil.)  432.  more  v.  S.  29  Ark.  248. 

es  Baxter  v.  P.  8  111.  (3  Gil.)  72  Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 

368,  380;  Cunningham  v.  P.  210  111.  Krouse,  30  Ohio  St.  240,  27  Am.  R. 

410.  443. 

«»  Ramsey  v.  Burns,  27  Mont.  154,  73  McCracken  v.  Webb,  36  Iowa, 

69  Pac.  711.  See  Calquhour  v.  551;  Gordon  v.  City  of  Richmond, 

Wells  &  Fargo  Co.  21  Nev.  359,  83  Va.  436,  2  S.  E.  727;  JEtna.  Ins. 

33  Pac.  977  (unintelligible).  Co.  v.  Reed,  33  Ohio  St.  283. 

70  Little  M.   R.   Co.   v.   Wetmore,  74  Crawford   v.   S.   112   Ala.   1,   21 
19  Ohio  St.  134.  So.  214.    See  Adams  v.  S.  29  Ohio  St. 

71  Towns    v.    S.    Ill    Ala.    1,    20  412. 
So.    598;    O'Donnell    v.    Rodiger,    76 


55  MISLEADING WHEN    CURED.  §    65 

it  is  obscure  and  tends  to  confuse  and  mislead.  Especially  is  this 
true  where  the  evidence  is  conflicting.75  An  instruction  stating 
that  the  undisputed  evidence  does  not  show  that  the  plaintiff 
is  entitled  to  recover,  though  true,  is  misleading  where  the  evi- 
dence is  conflicting.76 

§  63.  Misleading  Instructions — Generally  erroneous. — Gener- 
ally instructions  which  are  misleading  or  confusing  are  er- 
roneous.77 An  instruction  which  is  obscure  and  uncertain  in  its 
meaning  is  improper.  For  instance,  it  is  improper  to  instruct 
the  jury  that  if  they  believe  that  such  mental  difficulty  existed 
as  would  preclude  the  exercise  of  malice  they  must  find  the  de- 
fendant not  guilty.78 

§  64.  Misleading  instructions — Cured  by  others. — Although  an 
instruction  may  appear  to  be  misleading  or  confusing,  if  when 
taken  in  connection  with  others  it  forms  part  of  a  correct 
statement  of  the  law,  the  error  in  that  respect  will  become 
harmless.  Thus,  for  example,  for  the  court  to  charge  the 
jury  "to  find  out  what  the  truth  of  the  case  is,  what  the  real  facts 
are,  and  look  to  the  evidence  for  that  purpose  and  to  the  pris- 
oner's statement,  if  you  think  it  worthy  of  credit,"  was  held 
not  to  be  misleading,  where  the  jury  were  also  instructed  that 
they  could  believe  a  part  of  such  statement  and  reject  a  part.79 

§  65.    Misleading    instructions — Illustrations. — An    instruction 

75  Koch  v.  S.  115  Ala.  99,  22  So.  O'Brien    v.    Northwestern    I.    &    B. 
471.  Co.  82  Minn.  136,  84  N.  W.  735;   S. 

76  Birmingham,    R.    &    E.    Co.    v.  v.    Komstett,    62    Kas.   221,    61   Pac. 
Wildman,   119  Ala.   547,  24  So.  548.  805;    P.    v.    Kelly,    132    Cal.    430,   64 

TT  Tichenor    v.    Newman,    186    111.  Pac.   563. 

264,  57  N.  E.   826;    Sullivan  v.  Col-  78  p.    v.    Barthleman,    120   Cal.    7, 

lins,   107  Mich.   291,   83  N.  W.   310;  52  Pac.  112;   Thomas  v.  S.  133  Ala. 

Louisville  &   N.   R.   Co.  v.   Sandlin,  139,    32    So.    250;    Adams    v.    S.    133 

125  Ala.  585,  28  So.  40,  82  Am.   St.  Ala.  166,  31  So.  851.     See  generally: 

264;   Nicklaus  v.  Burns,  75  Ind.  98;  Morehead    v.    Adams,    18    Neb.    569, 

Moore  v.  S.  65  Ind.  385;  Hill  v.  New-  26  N.  W.  242;    Street  v.   S.   67  Ala. 

man,  47  Ind.  187;   ^Etna  Ins.  Co.  v.  87;    Perry    v.    Dubuque,    S.    W.    R. 

Reed,  33  Ohio  St.  292;   Littleton  v.  Co.    36    Iowa,    102;    Gordon   v.    City 

S.  128  Ala.  31,  29  bo.  390;   S.  v.  Si-  of   Richmond,    83   Va.    436,   2    S.    E. 

mas,  25  Nev.  432,  62  Pac.  242;   Pe-  727:    McKinney    v.    Snyder,    78    Pa. 

terson  v.   S.  74  Ala.  34;    Horton  v.  St.    497;    S.    v.    Robinson,    20    Wis. 

Com.  99  Va.  848,  38  S.  E.  184;  Hoff-  713;  James  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 

mann  v.  Cockrell,  112  Iowa,  141,  83  107  Mo.   480,   18  S.   W.   31;    Chatta- 

N.    W.    898;    Miller    v.    Dumon,    24  nooga  R.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Owen,  90 

Wash.  648,  64  Pac.  804;  Fruit  D.  Co.  Ga.  265,  15  S.  E.  853;  Central  R.  Co. 

v.   Russo,   125  Mich.   306,   84  N.  W.  v.  Haslett,  74  Ga.  59. 

308;    North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Hutch-  73  Westbrook  v.  S.  97  Ga.  189,  22 

inson,    191    111.    104    60    N.    E.    850;  S.   E.   398. 


§    65  QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES.  56 

that  criminal  intent  must  be  "strictly  proved"  in  order  to  war- 
rant a  conviction  is  properly  refused,  as  it  tends  to  mislead  the 
jury.80  To  state  that  if  the  jury  "find  certain  facts  from  the 
evidence,  those  facts  are  proved"  is  confusing  and  meaning- 
less.81 So  also  an  instruction  directing  the  attention  of  the  jury 
to  a  single  fact  which  has  no  bearing  on  the  merits  of  the  case, 
is  misleading.82  Instructions  attempting  to  blend  separate  and 
distinct  legal  propositions  in  the  same  sentence  or  paragraph  are 
usually  erroneous  in  that  such  blending  tends  to  confuse  and  mis- 
lead.83 An  instruction  stating  that  "fraud  is  never  presumed, 
but  must  be  affirmatively  proved;  that  the  law  presumes  that 
all  men  act  fairly  and  honestly;  that  their  dealings  are  in  good 
faith  and  without  intention  to  wrong,  cheat  or  defraud  others; 
and  when  a  transaction  called  in  question  is  equally  capable  of 
two  constructions,  one  that  is  fair  and  honest  and  one  that  is  dis- 
honest, then  the  law  is  that  the  fair  and  honest  construction  must 
prevail  and  the  transaction  called  in  question  must  be  presumed 
to  be  honest  and  fair"  was  held  to  be  misleading,  as  having  a 
tendency  to  induce  the  jury  to  disregard  the  preponderance  of 
evidence  in  the  event  they  found  that  it  showed  that  the  trans- 
action was  dishonest.84 

An  instruction  which  charges  that  "if  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  sidewalk  in  question,  where  the  plaintiff 
claims  to  have  received  her  injury,  was  repaired  and  placed  in 
good  condition  by  the  city  within  a  reasonable  time  prior  to 
the  alleged  accident,  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  said  walk  afterwards  became  out  of  repair  without  actual 
notice  to  the  city  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover"  was  held 
to  be  obscure  and  misleading.  It  is  not  clear  what  is  meant 
by  the  expression  "within  a  reasonable  time  prior  to  the  al- 
leged accident."  The  city  was  bound  to  exercise  reasonable 
prudence  and  diligence  in  the  construction  and  maintenance 
of  its  sidewalks.  But  just  what  period  of  time  between  the  al- 
leged repair  of  the  sidewalk  and  the  happening  of  the  accident 

so  s.  v.  Debott,  104  Iowa,  105,  73  ss  Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v. 

N.  W.  490.  Johnson,   103   111.   512,  525. 

si  Sanders    v.    P.    124    111.    227,    16  &*  A.   F.   Shapleigh   Hardware  Co. 

N.  E.  81;  P.  v.  Carroll,  92  Cal.  568,  v.  Hamilton,  70  Ark.  319,  68  S.  W. 

28  Pac.   600.  490. 

82  Emery    v.     Hoyt,     46    111.    258, 
262. 


57 


ARGUMENTATIVE — IMPROPER. 


§    66 


should  be  regarded  as  reasonable,  and  for  what  purpose  it  should 
be  so  regarded,  is  not  apparent.85  In  an  action  for  personal  in- 
jury, where  the  plaintiff:  in  his  pleading  alleges  several  acts  of 
negligence  of  the  defendant  as  the  cause  of  his  injury,  it  is  mis- 
leading and  improper  in  charging  the  jury  to  single  out 
each  of  the  several  acts  and  state  that  any  one  of  such  acts  alone 
would  not  entail  liability.80  Also  an  instruction  is  misleading 
which  conveys  the  impression  that  only  one  witness  testified  to 
a  material  fact  in  issue,  when  other  witnesses  testified  on  the 
same  issue.87  And  an  instruction  that  a  person  dealing  with  an 
agent  is  bound  to  know  at  his  peril  what  the  power  of  an  agent 
is,  and  to  understand  its  legal  effect,  is  erroneous.88 

§  66.    Argumentative   instructions  —  Generally  —  Instructions 


ss  City  of  Sterling  v.  Merrill,  124 
111.  522,  525,  17  N.  E.  6. 

ss  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Whidden,  23  Ohio  C.  C.  85. 

87  Idaho  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Ka- 
lanquin  (Idaho),  66  Pac.  933. 

ss  Colquhonn  v.  Wells,  Fargo  & 
Co.  21  Nev.  459,  33  Pac.  977. 

Instructions  in  the  following 
cases  were  held  misleading:  Rum- 
bold  v.  Royal  League,  206  111.  518; 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lon- 
ergan,  118  111.  41,  47,  7  N.  B.  55; 
McHale  v.  McDonnell,  175  Pa.  St 
632,  34  Atl.  966,  34  L.  R.  A.  159; 
Grim  v  Murphy,  110  111.  271,  276; 
White  v.  Harris,  206  111.  596;  Cni- 
cago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs,  110  111. 
415;  Elston  &  Wheeling  Gravel  Co. 
v.  Pierce,  96  111.  584;  S.  v.  Grugin, 
147 -Mo.  39,  47  S.  W.  1058,  42  L.  R. 
A.  774;  Nelson  v.  Spears,  16  Mont. 
351,  40  Pac.  786;  Anderson  v.  Avis, 
62  Fed.  227;  Gambrill  v.  Schooley, 
95  Md.  260,  52  Atl.  500;  S.  v.  Ander- 
son, 6  Idaho,  706,  59  Pac.  180;  Wal- 
lace v.  S.  124  Ala.  87,  26  So.  932;  Mc- 
Coggle  v.  S.  41  Fla.  525,  26  So. 
734;  Turner  v.  S.  124  Ala.  59,  27  So. 
272;  Morris  v.  S.  124  Ala.  44,  27 
So.  336;  Buel  v.  S.  104  Wis.  132, 
80  N.  W.  78;  Dixon  v.  Labry,  16 
Ky.  L.  R.  522,  29  S.  W.  21;  Parks  v. 
Gulf,  C.  S.  &  F.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 
AppJt,  30  S.  W.  708;  Anderson  v. 
Timfterlake,  114  Ala.  377,  22  So.  431; 
Hebbe  v.  Town  of  Maple  Creek, 
111  Wis.  480,  87  N.  W.  459;  S.  v. 


McDowell,  129  N.  Car.  523,  39  S.  E. 
840,  (stating  that  defendant  went 
out  of  his  way  to  go  home) ;  Gulf 
C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  35  S.  W.  319;  Har- 
ter  v.  City  of  Marshall  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  36  S.  W.  294. 

Instructions  held  not  misleading 
in  the  following  cases:  Stumer  v. 
Pitchman,  124  111.  250,  15  N.  E.  757 
(slander) ;  Citizens'  Gas  L.  Co.  v. 
O'Brien,  118  111.  174,  182,  8  N.  E. 
310;  Wheeler  v.  S.  158  Ind.  687,  63 
N.  E.  975;  Mosher  v.  Rogers,  117 
111.  446,  456,  5  N.  E.  583;  Interna- 
tional &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Bonatz 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  48  S.  W.  767; 
Knowles  v.  Murphy,  107  Cal.  107, 
40  Pac.  Ill;  Larkin  v.  Burlington, 
C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co.  91  Iowa,  654, 
60  N.  W.  195;  Landrum  v.  Guerra 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  28  S.  W.  358;  Riley 
v.  Salt  Lake  R.  T.  Co.  10  Utah,  428, 

37  Pac.   681;    Hildreth   v.    Hancock, 
156   111.   618,   41  N.   E.   155;    Chapell 
v.    Schmidt,    104    Cal.    511,    38    Pac. 
892;    P.  v.   McKane,   143   N.   Y.   455, 

38  N.    E.    950;    Galveston,    H.    &   S. 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Buch   (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
65   S.   W.   681;    Galveston,  H.   &   S. 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Parvin  (Tex.  Cv.  App.). 
64    S.    W.    1008;    Elliott    v.    Elliott, 
15  Ky.  L.  R.  274,  23  S.  W.  216;  Gulf, 
C.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co.    v.    Dansbank, 
6  Tex.  Cv.  App.  385,  25  S.  W.  295; 
S.  v.  Dunn,  116  Iowa,  219,  89  N.  W. 
984. 


§  67 


QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES. 


58 


containing  the  reasons  for  a  conclusion  are  argumentative,  es- 
pecially if  they  are  long,  verbose  and  uncertain  in  their  meaning. 
Such  instructions  are  generally  confusing  and  misleading,  and 
should  be  refused.89  Thus  an  instruction  which  tells  the  jury 
(that  their  verdict,  whatever  it  may  be,  will  not  mean  that  any 
witness  has  sworn  falsely  is  argumentative  and  improper.90  An 
instruction  stating  the  reasons  why  the  testimony  of  expert  wit- 
nesses is  unreliable  and  unsatisfactory  is  erroneous  as  being  ar- 
gumentative.91 So  an  instruction  containing  a  lengthy  recital  of 
the  facts  on  one  side  of  a  case  without  reference  to  the  facts  on 
the  other  side  is  argumentative,  and  should  be  refused.92 

§  67.  Argumentative  instructions — Not  necessarily  erroneous. 
But  the  fact  that  an  instruction  may  be  argumentative  is  not  of 
itself  material  error.93  Argumentative  instructions  cannot  be 
urged  as  ground  for  reversal  unless  they  contain  incorrect  state- 
ments of  the  law.94  So  where  a  charge  contains  a  statement 


89  Freidman  v.  Wersz,  8  Okla.  392, 
58  Pac.  613;  Riddle  v.  Webb.  110 
Ala.  599,  18  So.  323;  Hanna  v/Han- 
na,  3  Tex.  Cv.  App.  51,  21  S.  W. 
720;  Spraggins  v.  S.  (Ala.)  35  So. 
1003;  Pittsburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bau- 
fill  (111.),  69  N.  E.  499;  Southern  R. 
Co.  v.  Howell,  135  Ala.  639,  34  So. 
€. 

so  Boyett  v.  S.  130  Ala.  77,  30  So. 
475. 

»i  In  re  Blake's  Estate,  136  Cal. 
306,  68  Pac.  827,  89  Am.  St.  35. 

»2  Coal  Run  Coal  Co.  v.  Jones, 
127  111.  379,  385,  8  N.  E.  865,  20  N. 
E.  89;  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.  v.  Banflll,  206  111.  556;  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Sykes,  96  111. 
162,  171;  Huschle  v.  Morris,  131 
111.  575,  587,  23  N.  E.  643;  Burns 
v.  P.  126  111.  282,  18  N.  E.  550; 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Krueger, 
124  111.  457,  17  N.  E.  52;  Ludwig  v. 
Sager,  84  111.  100;  Fuller  v.  Gray, 
124  Ala.  388,  27  So.  458;  Cowie  v. 
City  of  Seattle,  22  Wash.  659,  62 
Pac.  121;  Merritt  v.  Merritt,  20  111. 
80;  Teague  v.  Lindsey,  106  Ala.  266, 
17  So.  538;  Sheehan  v.  P.  131  111. 
22,  25,  22  N.  E.  818;  Lake  S.  & 
M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker,  131  111. 


557,  566,  23  N.  E.  237;  American 
Bible  Soc.  v.  Price,  115  111.  623,  638, 
5  N.  E.  126;  Hunt  v.  McMullen 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  46  S.  W.  666; 
Thompson  v.  Force,  65  111.  370; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin, 
68  111.  499,  505;  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  York,  128  Ala.  305,  30  So. 
676;  King  v.  Franklin,  132  Ala.  559, 
31  So.  467;  Hall  v.  S.  130  Ala.  45, 
30  So.  422;  Willis  v.  S.  134  Ala. 
429,  33  So.  226.  See  generally,  Chap- 
man v.  S.  61  Neb.  888;  86  N.  W.  907; 
Gilmore  v.  S.  126  Ala.  20,  28  So. 
595;  Keeler  v.  Stuppe,  86  111.  309; 
City  of  Birmingham  v.  Starr,  112 
Ala.  98,  20  So.  424;  Boiling  v.  S. 
54  Ark.  588,  16  S.  W.  658;  Bodine 
v.  S.  129  Ala.  106,  29  So.  926;  Bates 
v.  Benninger,  2  Gin.  Super.  Ct. 
(Ohio)  568;  P.  v.  Crawford,  48  Mich. 
498,  12  N.  W.  673;  Weyrich  v.  P. 
89  111.  90. 

as  Coghill  v.  Kennedy,  119  Ala. 
641,  24  So.  459;  Carleton  v.  S.  43 
Neb.  373,  61  N.  W.  699;  Karr  v.  S. 
106  Ala.  1,  17  So.  328. 

94  Karr  v.  S.  106  Ala.  1,  17  So. 
328;  Baldwin  v.  S.  Ill  Ala.  11,  20 
So.  528;  Cesure  v.  S.  1  Tex.  <^ 
19;  Hurley  v.  S.  29  Ark.  17. 


59  ARGUMENTATIVE — INTERROGATIVE.  §    69 

of  the  reasons  for  a  conclusion,  and  in  so  doing  the  court  elabo- 
rates more  than  necessary,  there  can  be  no  ground  for  error  if 
the  instructions  are  relevant  and  otherwise  correct.95 

§  68.  Argumentative  instructions — Illustrations. — An  instruc- 
tion which  directs  the  jury  that  if  they  believe  that  certain 
witnesses  testified  that  the  offense  was  committed  on  the  14th  or 
15th  day  of  April,  and  that  the  defendant  was  sick  in  bed  from 
the  10th  to  the  20th  of  that  month,  they  should  acquit  the  de- 
fendant, was  properly  refused  as  being  argumentative.96  A 
charge  that  if  the  testimony  be  such  that  two  conclusions  may 
be  reasonably  drawn  from  it,  one  tending  to  prove  the  defendant's 
innocence  and  the  other  tending  to  establish  his  guilt,  justice, 
humanity  and  the  law  demand  that  the  jury  should  adopt  the 
former  and  acquit  the  defendant,  is  argumentative,  and  there- 
fore properly  refused.97 

§  69.  Interrogative  instructions — Improper. — Instructions  sub- 
mitted in  the  form  of  questions  to  the  jury  are  improper  as 
intimating  an  opinion  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.  Thus, 
for  instance,  to  charge  the  jury  by  asking:  Is  that  the  way  an 
honest  man  would  act?  Do  honest  people  act  so?  amounts  to 
the  expression  of  an  opinion.98 

95  Thrall      v.      Wilson,      17     Pa.  v.  Webb,  110  Ala.  599,  18  So.  323; 
Super.  Ct.  376.  Kansas    City,    M.    &    B.    R.    Co.    v. 

96  Frost  v.  S.  124  Ala.   71,  27  So.  Henson,    132    Ala.    528,    31    So.    590; 
550;     Southern    R.    Co.    v.    Howell,  Watkins   v.    S.    133    Ala.    88,   32    So. 
135  Ala.  639,  34  So.  6;   Rumbold  v.  627    (on  character);   South  Chicago 
Supreme   Council,   &c.    (111.),  69    N.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Dufresne,  200  111.  456, 
R.    590;    Chicago,    M.    &    St.    P.    R.  65  N.  E.   1075;    City  of  Bonham  v. 
Co.  v.  O'Sullivan,  143  111.  60,  32  N.  Crider    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    27    S.    W. 
E.   398;    Ragland  v.   S.  125  Ala.  12,  419;    Mitchell  v.   S.   133   Ala.  65,  32 
27  So.  983.     See  Com.  v.  Brubaker,  So.  132    (on  flight);  Walkley  v.  S. 

13  Pa.    Super.    Ct.    14;    Chicago,   B.      133    Ala.    183,    31    So.    854;     Camp- 
&  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner,  123  111.  49,      bell   v.   S.   133   Ala.   81,  31   So.   802; 

14  N.  E.  206;    Jacksonville,  &c.  St.  R.      Winter   v.    S.    133    Ala.    176,    31   So. 
Co.  v.  Wilhite,  209  111.  84,  86.  717;    Morris    v.    Lachman,    68    Cal. 

97  Bryant   v.    S.    116    Ala.    445,    23      112.    8    Pac.    799. 

So.  40;   Rogers  v.  S.  117  Ala.  9,  22          98  BLashfield    Instructions,    §     51, 

So.  666;  Naugher  v.  S.  116  Ala.  463,  p.    127,    citing   S.    v.    Norton,    28    S. 

23   So.   26.     Held  to  be  argumenta-  Car.  572,  6  S.  E.  820;  S.  v.  Addy,  28 

tive:     Dennis    v.    S.    118    Ala.    72,  S.  Car.  4,  4  S.  E.  814;   Freidrick  v. 

23    So.    1002;    Cordill    v.    Moore,    17  Ter.   2   Wash.   358,   26  Pac.   976;    S. 

Tex.    Cv.   App.   217,   43    S.   W.    298;  v.  Jenkins,  21  S.  Car.  595.     Instruc- 

White  v.  S.  Ill  Ala.  92,  21  So.  330;  tions  in  this  form  are  argumenta- 

Thomas  v.   S.   95  Ga.   484,  22   S.  E.  tive.     But  see  McLain  v.  Common- 

315;    Missouri,    K.    &    T.    R.    Co.    v.  wealth,    99    Pa.'  St.    86. 
Carter  (Tex.),  68  S.  W.  159;  Riddle 


§   70 


QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES. 


GO 


§  70.  Instructions  construed  as  a  whole. — It  is  a  familiar  rule 
that  in  passing  upon  a  single  instruction  it  must  be  considered 
in  connection  with  all  the  other  instructions  bearing  on  the  same 
subject,  and  if,  when  thus  considered,  the  law  appears  to  have- 
been  fairly  presented  to  the  jury,  the  court  will  not  entertain 
complaint  because  the  instruction  complained  of  does  not  con- 
tain all  the  law  relating  to  the  particular  subject,  unless  under 
•all  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case  the  court  is  of  the 
opinion  that  it  is  misleading."  The  instructions  will  not  be 
construed  in  fragmentary  parts,  but  all  of  them  must  be  con- 
strued together.100  Where  the  whole  charge  clearly  states  the 
law  of  a  case  an  imperfection  in  an  instruction  or  paragraph 
standing  alone  will  be  harmless.101  The  presumption  is  that 


so  McCoy  v.  P.  175  111.  224,  230, 
51  N.  E.  777;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 
v.  Cosby,  174  111.  109,  119,  50  N.  E. 
1011;  Baker  v.  Baker,  202  111.  595, 
618,  67  N.  E.  410;  Gainey  v.  P. 
97  111.  370,  377;  Bartley  v.  S.  53 
Neb.  310,  73  N.  W.  744;  Harrell  v. 
S.  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  204,  45  S.  W. 
581;  S.  v.  McCoy,  15  Utah,  136,  49 
Pac.  420;  Murray  v.  Burd  (Neb.), 
91  N.  W.  278;  Sloan  v.  Fist  (Neb.), 
89  N.  W.  760;  Cleveland,  C.  &  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Terry,  8  Ohio  St.  570;  White 
v.  New  York,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
142  Ind.  648,  42  N.  E.  456;  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Lieserowitz, 
197  111.  607,  610,  64  N.  E.  718;  P. 
v.  Glover  (Cal.),  74  Pac.  749-;  Law- 
der  v.  Henderson,  36  Kas.  754,  14 
Pac.  164;  Beidler  v.  King,  202  111. 
302,  314. 

100  Newport  v.  S.  140  Ind.  299, 
39  N.  E.  926;  State  v.  Kennedy 
(Iowa),  62  N.  W.  673;  P.  v.  Ander- 
son, 105  Cal.  32,  38  Pac.  513;  S.  v. 
Rathbun,  74  Conn.  524,  51  Atl.  540; 
Conway  v.  Vizzard,  122  Ind.  271,  23 
N.  E.  771;  Knight  v.  S.  (Fla.),  32 
So.  110;  Brown  v.  S.  105  Ind.  385,  5 
N.  E.  900;  Atkinson  v.  Dailey,  107 
Ind.  117,  7  N.  E.  902;  Deig  v.  More- 
head,  110  Ind.  461,  11  N.  E.  458; 
Jenks  v.  Lansing  Lumber  Co.  97 
Iowa,  342,  66  N.  W.  231;  S.  v. 
Martin,  47  S.  Oar.  67,  25  S.  E. 
113:  Omaha,  &c..  R.  &  B.  Co. 
v.  Levingston,  49  Neb.  17,  67  N. 


W.  887;  Whelpley  v.  Stroughton, 
119>  Mich.  314,  78  N.  W.  137;  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Oyster, 
58  Neb.  1,  78  N.  W.  359;  Zimmer  v. 
Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  55  N.  Y.  S.  308; 
Stokes  v.  Ralph  Tp.  187  Pa.  St. 
333,  40  Atl.  958;  Kiekhoefer  v.  Hi- 
dershide,  113  Wis.  280,  89  N.  W.  189; 
Haydensville  M.  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Stef- 
fler,  17  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  609;  Bay  City 
Iron  Co.  v.  Emery,  128  Mich.  506,  87 
N.  W.  652;  Kohn  v.  Johnson,  97  Io- 
wa, 99,  66  N.  W.  76;  Decatur  C.  S.  O 
M.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
35  S.  W.  951;  Farmers'  &  Mer.  Bank 
v.  Riddle,  115  Ga.  400,  41  S.  E. 
580;  Blacman  v.  Edsall  (Colo.  App.), 
68  Pac.  790;  Hufford  v.  Lewis,  29 
Ind.  App.  202,  64  N.  E.  99;  Edwards 
v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  94  Mo.  App. 
36,  67  S.  W.  950;  Whittlesey  v.  Bur- 
lington, C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (Iowa) 
90  N.  W.  516;  Southern  Ind.  R.  Co. 
v.  Harrell  (Ind.  App.),  66  N.  E. 
1016;  Wampler  v.  House,  30  Ind. 
App.  513,  66  N.  E.  500;  Lofland  v. 
Goben,  16  Ind.  App.  67,  44  N.  E.  553. 
i°i  Bay  City  Iron  Co.  v.  Emery, 
128  Mich.  506,  87  N.  W.  652;  Faust 
v.  Hosford,  119  Iowa,  97  93  N.  W. 
58;  City  of  Omaha  v.  Meyers  (Neb.), 
92  N.  W.  743;  Smurr  v.  S.  88 
Ind.  504;  De  Goey  v.  Van  Wyk,  97 
Iowa,  491,  66  N.  W.  787;  P.  v. 
Ricketts,  108  Mich.  584,  66  N.  W. 
483;  S.  v.  Butler,  47  S.  Car.  25,  24 
S.  E.  991. 


61 


CONSTRUED  AS   A   WHOLE. 


§    71 


the  jury,  in  arriving  at  their  verdict,  will  consider  the  instruc- 
tions as  a  whole ;  that  they  will  notice  the  qualification  which  one 
instruction  makes  of  another  when  considered  together.102  But 
whether  one  instruction  qualifies  another  without  reference  to 
it,  must  depend  upon  its  position  in  the  series  and  its  connection 
with  the  others  given.103 

§  71.    Instructions  of  both  parties  construed  together. — The 

instructions  given  for  both  parties  must  be  construed  together, 
and  when  so  considered,  if  they  correctly  state  the  law  as  a 
whole,  any  error  appearing  in  one  series  will  be  deemed  corrected 
by  the  other.104  And  although  an  instruction  may  be  faulty  in 
some  particular  when  standing  alone,  yet  when  construed  in 
connection  with  all  the  others  given  for  both  sides  on  the  same 
subject  the  error  may  be  cured.105  Hence  there  can  be  no  ground 

669,  31  S.  E.  571;  Northern  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lynch,  79  Fed.  268;  Texas 
&c.  R.  Co.  v.  McCoy,  90  Tex.  264, 
38  S.  W.  36;  Grant  v.  Roberts  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.)  38  S.  W.  650;  P.  v. 
Armstrong,  114  Cal.  570,  46  Pac. 
611;  S.  v.  Riney,  137  Mo.  102,  38 
S.  W.  718  (alibi  and  possession 
of  stolen  goods) ;  Board  of  Comrs. 
v.  Nichols,  139  Ind.  611,  38  N.  E. 
526;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Boyd,  156  111.  416,  40  N.  E.  955; 
Greenwood  v.  Davis,  106  Mich.  230, 
64  N.  W.  26;  Masonic,  &c.,  Asso.  v. 
Collins,  210  111.  482,  48ft 

105  Sandell  v.  Sherman,  107  Cal. 
391,  40  Pac.  493;  Gray  v.  S.  42  Pla. 
174,  28  So.  53;  S.  v.  Lee,  58 
S.  Car.  335,  36  S.  E.  706;  Spears  v. 
S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  56  S.  W.  347; 
Howard  v.  P.  185  111.  552,  57  N.  E. 
441;  S.  v.  Cocoran,  7  Idaho,  220, 
61  Pac.  1034;  P.  v.  Burgle,  123 
Cal.  303,  55  Pac.  998;  Joiner  v.  S. 
105  Ga.  646,  31  S.  E.  556;  Ballou  v. 
Young,  42  S.  Car.  170,  20  S.  E.  84; 
Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3261.  citing: 
Bonardo  v.  P.  182  111.  418,  55  N.  E. 
519;  Kennedy  v.  S.  107  Ind.  144, 
6  N.  E.  305,  7  Am.  Cr.  R.  426;  Boy- 
kin  v.  P.  22  Colo.  496,  45  Pac.  419; 
S.  v.  McCoy,  15  Utah,  136,  49  Pac. 
420;  Thrawley  v.  S.  153  Ind.  375, 
55  N.  E.  95;  Williams  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  55  S.  W.  500;  Small  v.  S. 
105  Ga.  669,  31  S.  E.  571;  Kerr-Mur- 


102  Galesburg  &  Great  E.   R.   Co. 
v.  Milroy,  181  111.  243,  247,  54  N.  E. 
939;   Rock  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Leisly 
Brewing    Co.    174    111.    547,    556,    51 
N.  E.  572. 

103  Springdale  Cemetery  Asso.  v. 
Smith,   24   111.   481,   483;    Murphy  v. 
P.    37    111.   447,   458. 

104  Lourance  v.  Goodwin,  170  111. 
390,    394,    48    N.    E.    903;    Lawrence 
v.    Hagerman,   56   111.   68;    Stringam 
v.     Parker,     159     111.     310,     42     N. 
E.    794;    England    v.    Fawbush,    204 
111.  384,  395,  68  N.  E.  526;   Wenona 
Coal  Co.  v.  Holmquist,  152  111.  581, 
593,    38    N.    E.    946;    Chicago    C.    R. 
Co.   v.  Mead,  206  111.   178;    East  St. 
Louis    Connecting    Co.    v.    Enright, 
152  111.  246,  38  N.  E.  553;  Cleveland, 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Monaghan, 
140  111.  474,  479,  30  N.  E.  869;   Car- 
stens   v.    Earles,   26   Wash.    676,   67 
Pac.  404;   Western  C.  &  M.  Co.  v. 
Ingraham,    70   Fed.    219;    St.    Louis 
S.   &  W.  R.   Co.   v.  Ferguson   (Tex. 
Cv.    App.    64    S.    W.    797;    Lyon    v. 
Watson,    109    Mich.    390,    67    N.    W. 
512;     Meyer     v.     Southern     R.    Co. 
(Mo.)    36    S.    W.    367;    Hamilton   v. 
Great   F.   St.   R.   Co.   17   Mont.    334, 
42    Pac.    860;     Ritzman    v.    P.    110 
111.    362,    372;    Fessenden   v.    Doane, 
188    111.    228,    58    N.    E.    974;    Stein 
v.   Vannice,  44  Neb.   132,   62  N.  W. 
464;    Durham    v.    Goodwin,    54    111. 
169,     471;     Smalls     v.     S.     105    Ga. 


§  72 


QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES. 


for  complaint  of  the  giving  of  an  instruction  which  ignores  the 
facts  tending  to  establish  the  defense,  where  it  appears  that  the 
instructions  given  for  the  defendant  fully  cover  the  theory,  of 
the  defense.100  So  where  an  instruction  may  be  faulty  in  that  it 
conveys  the  impression  that  if  either  of  two  persons  who  are  on 
trial  is  guilty  both  should  be  convicted,  yet  where  by  other  in- 
structions the  court  states  that  the  guilt  of  one  would  not  neces- 
sarily warrant  a  conviction  of  the  others  there  is  no  substantial 
error;  the  instructions  being  considered  as  a  whole,  the  error  is 
harmless.107 

§  72.    If  instructions  be  harmonious,  defects  are  harmless. — If 

all  the  instructions  considered  together  are  harmonious  and  con- 
sistent, and  cover  all  the  material  issues  involved  in  the  ease, 
then  the  charge  is  sufficient,  notwithstanding  a  single  instruc- 
tion standing  alone  may  not  correctly  or  fully  state  the  law.10* 
So  if  an  instruction  be  faulty  in  that  it  requires  a  greater  de- 


phy  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hess,  98  Fed.  56; 
Standard  Life  &  Accident  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Schmaltz,  66  Ark.  588,  53  S.  W. 
49;  Miller  v.  Stevens,  23  Ind.  App. 
365,  55  N.  E.  262;  Green  v.  Eden, 
24  Ind.  App.  583,  56  N.  E.  240; 
Krause  v.  Plumb,  195  Pa.  St.  65, 
45  Atl.  648;  City  of  Louisville  v. 
McGill  (Ky.),  52  S.  W.  1053;  Thom- 
as v.  Gates,  126  Cal.  1,  58  Pac. 
315;  Walrod  v.  Webster  County, 
110  Iowa,  349,  81  N.  W.  598,  47  L. 
R.  A.  480;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Zerneeke,  59  Neb.  689,  82 
N.  W.  26;  Ohio  &  I.  Torpedo  Co. 
v.  Fishburn,  61  Ohio  St.  608,  56  N. 
E.  457;  Bowman  v.  Bowman,  153 
Ind.  498,  55  N.  E.  422;  Missouri, 
K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Lyons  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.)  58  S.  W.  96;  Toplitz  v.  Bauer, 
161  N.  Y.  325,  56  N.  E.  1059;  Kim- 
ball  v.  Borden,  97  Va.  477,  34  S. 
E.  45;  Kleiner  v.  Third  Ave.  R. 
Co.  162  N.  Y.  193,  56  N.  E.  497; 
Stroud  v.  Smith,  194  Pa.  St.  502, 
45  Atl.  329;  Warfleld  v.  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.  104  Tenn.  74,  55  S.  W. 
304;  Hockaday  v.  Wartham,  22  Tex. 
Cv.  App.  419,  54  S.  W.  1094;  S.  v. 
Darrough,  152  Mo.  522,  54  S.  W. 
226;  Edwards  v.  P.  26  Co.o.  539, 
59  Pac.  56;  Burns  v.  Woolery, 
15  Wash.  134,  45  Pac.  894;  Williams 


v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  55  S.  W.  500 
Keesier  v.  S.  154  Ind.  242,  56  N.  E. 
232;  P.  v.  Anderson,  105  Cal.  32, 
3-8  Pac.  513;  Smith  v.  Meyers  (Neb.), 
71  N.  W.  1006;  Benham  v.  Taylor, 

66  Mo.  App.  308;   Butler  v.  Greene, 
49    Neb.   280,    68   N.    W.   496;    Cren- 
shaw   v.   Johnson,   120   N.   Car.   270, 
26   S.   E.   810;    P.   v.   Ross,   115   Cal. 
233,    46   Pac.    1059;    S.    v.    Urie,    101 
Iowa,    411,    70    N.    W.    603;    Bell    v. 
Martin    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    28    S.    W. 
108;     Barr    v.    S.     (Miss.),    21    So. 
131;   Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Poirier, 

67  Fed.   881;    Butler  v.   Machen,  6& 
Fed.  901;    Housh  v.  S.  43  Neb.  163, 
61  N.  W.  571;    Hollins  v.   Gorham, 
23  Ky.  L.  R.  2185,  66  S.  W.  823;  Cof- 
fin v.  U.  S.  162  U.  S.  664,  16  Sup  Ct. 
943;   McFaul  v.  Madero  F.  &  F.  C. 
134   Cal.    313,   66    Pac.    308;    Debney 
v.    S.    45    Neb.    856,    64    N.    W.    446; 
Mulvihill    v.    Thompson,    114    Iowa, 
734,    87    N.    W.    693;    Terre    Haute 
&  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Rittenhouse,  28  Ind. 
App.  633,  62  N.  E.  295. 

ice  Meadows  v.  Pacific  M.  L.  Ins. 
Co.  129  Mo.  76,  31  S.  W.  578. 

107  Baker  v.  S.  17  Ga.  452,  25  S. 
E.  341. 

i<>8  Shaw  v.  Missouri  &  K.  D.  Co. 
56  Mo.  App.  521. 


63  GROUPING    IN    SERIES — WORDS,    CLAUSES.  §    74- 

gree  of  care  than  the  law  calls  for,  the  error  is  not  material  when 
the  instructions,  considered  as  a  whole  advise  the  jury  as  to 
the  degree  of  care  the  law  requires.109  Or  where  an  instruc- 
tion, standing  alone,  omits  to  state  that  the  burden  of  proof  is 
on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  an  essential  element  of  his  case  there, 
is  no  material  error  when  other  instructions  clearly  state  that 
the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  plaintiff.110  Or  where  an  instruction 
as  to  the  burden  of  proof  is  obscure  the  error  is  immaterial 
where  others  given  on  the  same  subject  clearly  state  the  law.111 
There  can  be  no  ground  for  complaint  that  an  instruction  as- 
sumes the  existence  of  a  material  fact  where  it  appears  from  the 
whole  evidence  that  the  jury  must  have  understood  that  such 
fact  must  be  established  by  the  evidence.112 

§  73.  Grouping  instructions  into  one  series.— The  court  in 
charging  the  jury  may  group  the  instructions  asked  by  both 
parties  by  arranging  them  on  each  particular  subject,  and  read 
them  together  as  one  series.113  The  order  in  which  the  in- 
structions -are  arranged,  in  charging  the  jury,  is  discretionary 
with  the  court;  and  the  fact  that  they  may  not  be  logically  ar- 
ranged cannot  ordinarily  be  urged  as  error  in  the  absence  of 
prejudicial  error.114 

§  74.  Words,  phrases  and  clauses. — The  term  ' '  difficulty, ' ' 
when  used  in  drawing  instructions,  is  well  understood  by  all 
persons.  It  is  of  constant  application  in  legal  proceedings, 
and  is  expressive  of  a  group  or  collection  of  ideas  that  cannot, 
perhaps,  be  imparted  so  well  by  any  other  term.  Its  use,  there- 
fore, avoids  a  great  deal  of  circumlocution  which  generally  leads 
to  confusion  and  misapprehension.115 

The  word  "while"  used  in  an  instruction  relating  to  an  in- 
jury alleged  to  have  been  sustained  through  the  negligence  of 
the  defendant  while  the  plaintiff  was  in  the  exercise  of  or- 

109  San     Antonio     St.     R.     Co.   v.  61  N.  E.  1104;  Crowell  v.  P.  190  111. 

Watzlavzick   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  28  S.  508,  519,  60  N.  E.   872;    Bonardo  v. 

W.    115.  P.  182  111.  411.  55  N.  E.  579. 

no  Crutcher    v.    Sechick,    10    Tex.  n*  Atcbison,    T.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co. 

Cv.   App.  676,  32   S.  W.  75.  v.    Calvert,    52    Kas.    547,    34    Pac. 

in  Bingham   v.    Hartley,   44   Neb.  976;    Gulf,    C.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co.    v. 

682,  62  N.  W.  1089.  Dunlap    (Tex.    Cv.   App.),  26   S.   W. 

112  City   of  Atlanta  v.   Young,   93  655. 

Ga.  265,  20  S.  E.  317.  us  Gainey  v.  P.  97  111.  270,  279. 

us  Young  v.  P.   193   111.   236,  239, 


§    75  QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES.  64 

dinary  care  does  not  mean  at  the  particular  point  of  time  when 
the  injury  was  received;  it  relates  to  the  entire  transaction  in 
question.116  Also  the  words  "at  the  time"  when  used  in  draw- 
ing instructions  refer  to  the  whole  transaction.117  The  employ- 
ment of  the  word  "purported"  in  drawing  instructions  in  a  will 
contest  is  not  improper  in  referring  to  the  will  as  the  "pur- 
ported will;"  it  is  more  accurate  than  "the  will."  And  to  say 
the  "pretended  will"  is  not  objectionable.118 

An  instruction  defining  ordinary  care  to  be  "such  care  as 
a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  and  skill  would  usually  exercise 
under  the  circumstances"  is  not  improper.119  The  expressions 
' '  due  care, "  "  ordinary  care  "  "  and  reasonable  care ' '  are  converti- 
ble terms  and  mean  in  the  same  degree ;  so  that  if  in  a  series  of 
instructions  these  different  terms  are  used  in  different  instruc- 
tions there  is  no  error.120  The  use  of  the  words  "punitive 
damages"  in  an  instruction,  instead  of  "exemplary  damages," 
is  not  error.  They  are  synonymous  terms.121 

§  75.  Definition  of  terms. — The  term  ' '  prima  facie ' '  used  in 
an  instruction  in  referring  to  the  evidence  is  as  well  under- 
stood as  a  large  share  of  the  words  employed,  and  requires  no 
explanation ;  it  is  recognized  as  an  English  term.122  Using  the 
words  "ratification,"  " acquiescense "  and  " repudiation "  in  the 
giving  of  instructions  without  defining  them  is  not  error.123  Nor 

lie  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher,  111  Wis.  655,  87  N.  W.  826;  Yerkes 

141    111.    625,    31    N.    E.    406.      See  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  112  Wis.  184, 

North   Chicago   St.   R.   Co.   v.   Cos-  88  N.  W.  33  (ordinary  care  not  cor- 

sar,   203    111.    608,   613,   68   N.    E.    88  rectly  defined), 

(instruction    improper) ;    St.    Louis  120  Baltimore     &     O.     R.     Co.    v. 

N.  Stock  Yards  v.  Godfrey,  198  111.  Faith,    175    111.    58,    51    N.    E.    807; 

288,   294,   65   N.   E.   90.  Chicago,  B.   &  Q.   R.   Co.  v.   Yortz, 

117  McNulta  v.  Lockridge,  137  111.  158    111.    321,   42    N.    E.    64;    Illinois 

288.    27    N.    E.    452;    Lake    Shore   &  Cent.   R.   Co.  v.  Noble,  142   111.  584, 

M.    S.    R.    Co.    v.    Johnson,    135    111.  32   N.   E.   684;    Schmidt  v.    Sinnatt, 

653,  26  N.  E.  510;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  103  111.  160,  164;  Louisville  &  N.  R. 

S.    R.    Co.    v.    Parker,    131    111.    566,  Co.    v.    Pointer's   Adm'r    (Ky.)(    69 

23   N.   E.   237.  S.  W.  1108. 

us  Egbers  v.   Egbers,   177  111.  82,  121  Roth  v.  Eppy,  80  111.  283,  287. 

90,  52  N.  E.  285;   Smith  v.  Henline,  122  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Esten, 

174  111.  184,  200,  51  N.  E.  227;  Keith-  178  111.  198,  52  N.  E.  954;  Louisville, 

ley  v.  Stafford,  126  111.  507,  521,  18  E.   &   St.   L.   C.   R.   Co.   v.   Spencer, 

N.    E.    740;    Campbell    v.    Campbell,  149  111.  103,  36  N.  E.  91. 

138  111.  612,  28  N.  E.  1080.  123  Iowa     State     Sav.     Bank     v. 

ii»  Chase  v.  Blodgett  Milling  Co.  Black,  91  Iowa,  490,  59  N.  W.  283. 


65  DEFINITION    OF    TERMS.  §    75 

is  it  necessary  to  define  the  term  negligence  when  used  in  an 
instruction.124 

The  word  "carelessly"  used  in  an  instruction  as  to  knowingly 
and  carelessly  permitting  stock  to  injure  trees,  need  not  be 
defined.125  Nor  need  the  word  "contributed"  be  defined  when 
used  in  an  instruction.126  It  is  not  necessary  to  define  the  words 
^'fraud,"  "preponderance"  and  "presumption"  when  using 
them  in  instructions.127 

The  words  "felonious"  and  "feloniously,"  when  used  in  in- 
structions, need  not  be  defined.128  But  on  the  other  hand,  it  has 
been  held  that  the  word  felonious  should  be  explained.  "To 
charge  a  jury  of  even  more  than  average  intelligence,  but  who 
are  unlearned  in  the  law,  that  one  who  acted  under  the  fears 
of  a  reasonable  man  that  a  felony  was  about  to  be  committed 
on  him  by  another  would  be  justified  in  taking  the  life  of  such 
person  without  explaining  what  is  meant  by  the  term  'felony,' 
leaves  the  jury  almost,  if  not  entirely,  in  the  dark  as  to  what 
is  necessary  to  constitute  a  defense  in  such  a  case."  In  all  cases 
where  the  term  "felony"  or  other  technical  term  of  the  law  is 
contained  in  the  statute  the  meaning  should  be  explained  to  the 
jury.129  Nor  need  the  words  "falsely"  and  "fraudulently"  be 
defined  when  used  in  instructions.130 

The  court  is  not  required  to  instruct  as  to  the  meaning  of 
a  particular  word  used  in  the  indictment  in  describing  the  of- 
fense which  may  be  eliminated  as  mere  surplusage,  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  the  word  "feloniously"  under  a  statute  for  wilfully 
shooting"  at  another.131  The  words  "cool,"  "sedate"  and  "de- 
liberate" used  in  an  instruction  need  not  be  defined.  They 
should  be  received  in  their  usual  and  ordinary  acceptation.132 
In  a  homicide  case  the  giving  of  an  instruction  containing  the 

•     124  American  Cotton  Co.  v.  Smith  129  Roberts  v.  S.   114  Ga.   450    40 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  69  S.  W.  443.  S.   E.   297.     See   Cobb   v.    Covenant 

125  Warden  v.  Henry,  117  Mo.  530,  M.    B.    Asso.    153   Mass.    176,   26   N. 
23   S.   W.   776.  E.   230. 

126  Bunyan    v.    Loftus,    90    Iowa,  iso  S.  v.  Gregory,  170  Mo.  598,  71 
122,   51  N.  W.   685.  S.  W.  170. 

127  Kischman    v.    Scott    166    Mo.  i"  S.    v.    Beck,    46    La.    1419,    16 
214,  65  S.  W.  1031.  So.    368. 

128  s.    v.    Barton,    142    Mo.    450,  132  Beard   v.    S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.), 
44    S.    W.    239;     S.    v.    Weber,    156  53  S.  W.  348. 

Mo.  249,  56  S.  W.  729;  S.  v.  Penney, 
113  Iowa,  691,  84  N.  W.  509. 


§    76  QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES.  b'6 

words  in  the  "heat  of  passion,"  without  denning  that  expression 


133 


is  erroneous. 

"Malice  aforethought"  need  not  be  denned  where  malice  and 
express  malice  have  been  properly  denned  in  the  same  charge.13* 
So  instructions  containing  the  words  "deliberation"  and  "pre- 
meditation" are  improper  without  denning  these  terms.133  The 
use  of  the  words  "deadly  violence"  to  the  person  instead 
of  "great  violence"  is  not  error  where  it  clearly  appears  from 
the  charge  that  the  one  expression  was  used  in  the  sense  of  the 
other.136  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  define  the  term  "great  bodily 
injury"  when  used  in  an  instruction.137  On  a  burglary  charge 
in  the  night  time  the  failure  of  the  court  to  define  the  term 
"night  time"  in  giving  instructions  cannot  be  complained  of  as 
error  in  the  absence  of  a  request  to  define  the  term.138 

§  76.  Definition  of  terms — Continued. — The  use  of  the  term 
"fellow  servant"  in  charging  the  jury  without  defining  it  is  er- 
roneous. The  definition  of  fellow  servant  is  a  question  of  law. 
But  when  an  instruction  correctly  defines  the  meaning  of  this 
term  it  is  then  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  to  determine, 
whether  the  person  alleged  to  be  a  fellow  servant  comes  within 
the  definition  of  the  term.139  Or  reading  to  the  jury  the  statute 
defining  fellow  servant  without  any  explanation,  is  error.140 
An  instruction  relating  to  master  and  servant,  which  states  that 
the  servant  does  not  assume  those  "risks  due  to  the  master," 
was  held  not  objectionable  on  the  ground  that  these  words  are 
too  indefinite  in  their  meaning.141  The  court  need  not  define 
the  term  "common  laborer"  in  giving  instructions.142 

iss  S.   v.   Strong,   153   Mo.   548,  55  Co.  v.  Becker,  63  Ark.  477,  39  S.  W. 

S.  W.  78;    S.  v.  Reed,  154  Mo.  122,  358. 

55  S.  W.  278.  141  Eastman  v.  Curtis,  67  Vt.  432, 

134  Hatcher  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  32    Atl.    232.      See    also    Pittsburg 

65  S.  W.  97.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Walker,    170   111.   550, 

"5  S.  v.   Foster,  130  N.  Car.   666,  554,  48  N.  E.  915;   Chicago  &  E.   I. 

41  S.  E.  284.  R.  Co.  v.  Kneirim,  152  111.  458,  466, 

ise  Acers  v.   U.   S.   164  U.   S.   388,  39    N.    E.    324. 

17  S.  Ct.  91.  142  Boeltger  v.   Scherpe  &  Koken 

137  S.   v.  Bone,   114  Iowa,   537,   87  A.   &  I.   Co.  136  Mo.  531,  38  S.  W. 

N.  W.  507,  55  L.  R  A.  378.  298.     An   instruction  using  the  ex- 

iss  Shaffel   v.    S.    97   Wis.    377,   72  pression       "respondeat      superior," 

N.  W.  888.  without    explanation,    is    improper, 

139  Whitney     &     Starrette   Co.   v.  Chicago,   &c.    R.   Co.   v.   White,   209 
O'Rourke,  172  111.  186,  50  N.  E.  242.  111.   124,   132.     See   Kehl   v.   Abram, 

140  Kansas   City,   Ft    S.    &   M.    R.  210  111.  218  (material  inducements). 


67  NAMES   AND   TERMS    MISUSED.  §    78 

§  77.  Ungrammatical  and  awkwardly  arranged. — The  fact 
that  an  instruction  is  ungrammatical  and  awkward  in  its  phrase- 
ology does  not  render  it  erroneous  if  it  is  clear  in  its  meaning.143 
An  instruction  which  states  that  a  certain  presumption  "may 
be  overcome  by  any  evidence  that  satisfies  your  minds  to  the 
contrary,"  instead  of  stating  that  such  presumption  "may  be 
overcome  by  evidence  to  the  contrary  which  satisfies  your  minds" 
is  not  material  error.144 

§  78.  Misuse  of  names,  terms,  etc. — Effect. — The  use  of  the 
word  ' '  plaintiff, ' '  instead  of  ' '  defendant, "  in  an  instruction  is  not 
harmful  error  where  it  is  clear  from  the  instruction  that  it  cor- 
rects itself;145  or  where  the  context  plainly  shows  which  of  the 
two  words  was  intended  to  be  used;140  or  the  use  of  the  word 
"prisoner"  for  defendant  is  not  material  error.147  The  use  by 
mistake  of  the  word  "acquit,"  instead  of  "convict,"  in  framing 
an  instruction,  renders  it  erroneous.  Thus,  when  the  court  in- 
structs that  if  the  jury  find  that  the  prosecution  has  proven  all 
the  essential  facts  necessary  to  establish  guilt  they  should 
"acquit"  it  is  error.148 

The  improper  use  of  the  word  "testimony,"  instead  of  "evi- 
dence," in  drawing  instructions  is  not  material  error.149  Nor  is 
it  objectionable  to  make  use  of  the  word  "will,"  instead  of 
"may,"  in  directing  the  jury  that  if  they  find  from  the  evidence 
that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  damages  they  "will" 
determine  the  amount  to  which  he  is  entitled.150  The  word 
"must"  should  not  be  improperly  used  for  the  word  "may"  in 
the  giving  of  instructions.  If  the  jury  believe  a  witness  has  wil- 
fully testified  falsely  as  to  any  material  fact  in  issue  they  may 
disregard  the  testimony  of  such  witness,  but  they  are  not  bound 

1*3  Langdon     v.     Winterstein,     58  147  Dinsmore    v.    S.    61    Neb.    418, 

Neb.  278,  78  N.  W.  501.  85  N.  W.  445. 

144  Rule  v.  Bolles,  27  Ore.  368,  41  i«  Cummins    v.    S.    50    Neb.    274, 
Pac,  691.  69  N.  W.  756. 

145  McKinzie  v.  Remington,  79  111.  149  p.    v.    Hubert,    119    Cal.    216, 
388;    Nichols  v.  Mercer,  44  111.  250.  51  Pac.  329;   Padgett  v.  Jacobs,  128 

146  Central  Texas  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  Mich.    632,    87   N.   W.    898. 

v.   Bush,   12   Tex.   Cv.   App.    291,   34  iso  North    Chicago    St.    R.    Co.    v. 

S.  W.   133;   Flam  v.  Lee,  116  Iowa,  Zeigler,   182   111.   13,   54  N.   E.   1006; 

289,  90  N.  W.  70;  Pittman  v.  Weeks,  Kane  v.   Footh,  70   111.   590   ("may" 

132  N.  Car.  81,  43  S.  E.  582;   O'Cal-  or  "shall");  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v. 

laghan    v.    Bode,    84    Cal.    489,    24  Meech,    163    111.    305,   315,    45   N.    E. 

Pac.    269.  290. 


§    79  QUALITIES  AND  REQUISITES.  68 

to  do  so.151  The  word  "ought"  used  in  an  instruction  means,  in 
its  ordinary  sense,  to  be  held  or  bound  in  duty  or  moral  obliga- 
tion.152 

§79.    Words  omitted  from  instructions. — The   omission  of  a 
word  will  sometimes  render  an  instruction  erroneous.153 

"I  Hoge  v.   P.   117   111.   46,   6  N.  (Neb.)  92  N.  W.  606  ("and"  omitted 

E.    7%.  between  fairly  and  truthfully  is  not 

152  otmer  v.  P.  76  111.  152.  error) ;    Southwestern   T.   &   T.   Co. 

153  Carleton   Min.   &   Mill.   Co.   v.  v.  Newman   (Tex.   Cv.  App.),  34  S. 
Ryan,    29    Colo.    401,    68    Pac.    279  W.'  661    (inadvertent   use   of   "not" 
("not"   omitted);    McCormick  v.   S.  is    error). 


CHAPTER  III. 


BASED    ON    EVIDENCE    AND  PLEADINGS. 


Sec. 

80.  Supported   by   evidence. 

81.  Supported    by    evidence — Illus- 

trations. 

82.  Supported    by    evidence — Crim- 

inal cases. 

83.  Defense    unsupported    by    evi- 

dence. 

84.  Based  on  incompetent  evidence. 

85.  Speculative      evidence — Insuffi- 

cient. 

86.  Slight    evidence    will    support 

instructions. 

87.  Circumstantial    evidence    suffi- 

cient. 

88.  Evidence      sufficient — Criminal 

cases. 

89.  Evidence    sufficient  —  Larceny. 

90.  Instructions  stating  issues  arid 

contentions. 

91.  Instructions   as    to    immaterial 

issues. 

92.  Instructions   ignoring   issues. 

93.  Issues     unsupported     by     evi- 

dence. 

93a.  Issues  unsupported  by  evidence 
— Illustrations. 

94.  Instructions    based    on    plead- 

ings. 

95.  Based  on  evidence  rather  than 

pleadings. 

96.  Instructions     confined     to     de- 

fenses  alleged. . 

97.  Instructions    based    on    plead- 

ings— Illustrations. 

98.  Instructions  limited  to  counts. 

99.  Issues  raised  outside  of  plead- 

ings. 


Sec. 

100.  Issues  abandoned. 

101.  Theory  of  party — Instructions. 

102.  Instructions  when  several  the- 

ories. 

103.  Instructions  when  several  the- 

ories— Illustrations. 

104.  Instructions    need    not    notice 

opposing  theory. 

105.  Instructions  confining  jury  to 

evidence. 

106.  Confining  jury  as  to  damages. 

107.  Common  and  personal  knowl- 

edge. 

108.  Confined  within  statute  of  lim- 

itations. 

109.  Limiting   evidence   to   specific 

purpose. 

110.  Limited    to    impeaching    Wit- 

nesses. 

111.  Limited    to   malice   or   intent. 

112.  Limited  to  certain  defendants. 

113.  Instructions      giving      promi- 

nence to   certain  facts. 

114.  Singling  out  facts — When  not 

objectionable. 

115.  Singling    out    facts — Criminal 

cases. 

116.  Instructions     ignoring     facts. 

117.  Instructions    with  dr  awing 

facts. 

117a.  Actions    for    personal    injury 
from  negligence. 

118.  Instructions  ignoring  defense. 

119.  Instructions   summing   up  the 

evidence. 


§  80.     Supported  by  evidence. — One  of  the  familiar  rules  to 
be  observed  in  charging  the  jury  is  that  the  instructions  must 

69 


§  80 


BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS. 


70 


be  based  upon  evidence ;  for  if  there  is  no  evidence  adduced  tend- 
ing to  'prove  a  material  fact,  or  state  of  facts  in  issue,  the  giving 
of  instructions  as  to  such  facts  is  improper.1  And  this  rule  ap- 


i  Entivistle  v.  Meikle,,  180  111.  28, 
54  N.  E.  217;  Lusk  v.  Throop,  189 
111.  127,  142,  59  N.  E.  529;  Baxter 
v.  Campbell  (S.  Dak.),  97  N.  W. 
368;  Glucose  Sugar  R.  Co.  v.  Flinn, 

184  111.  128,  56  N.  E.  400;  American 
Strawboard    Co.    v.    Chicago    &    A. 
R.    Co.    177    111.    513,    53    N.    E.    97; 
Sugar   Creek   Mining  Co.   v.   Peter- 
son, 177  111.  329,  52  N.  E.  475;  Doyle 
v.    P.    147    111.    398,    35    N.    E.    372; 
Moore    v.    Barker*  Asphalt    Paving 
Co.   118   Ala.   563,   23   So.   798;    Birr 
v.    P.    113    111.    648;    Rice   v.    P.    38 
111.    436;    S.   v.    Hicks    (Mo.),    77    S. 
W.    542;     Romine    v.    San    Antonio 
Tr.   Co.    (Tex.   Cv.   App.),   77   S.   W. 
35;  Denison  &  P.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Ma- 
ley   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  45  S.  W.  225; 
Wadsworth    v.    Dunman,    117    Ala. 
661,    23    So.    699;    Plumb    v.    Camp- 
bell,   129    111.    109,    18    N.    E.    790; 
Chicago,  R.   I.   &  P.   Co.  v.   Lewis, 
109   111.   125;    Farlow  v.   Town,  &c. 
186  111.  256,  57  N.  E.  781;  Murphy  v. 
Farlow,    124    Ala.    279,    27    So.    442; 
Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  Windham, 
126  Ala.  552,  28  So.  392;  Rock  I.  & 
E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Gordon,  184  111.  456, 
56  N.  E.  810;   Williams  v.  Andrew, 

185  111.    98,   56   N.   E.    1041;    Hersey 
v.   Hutchins,   70  N.   H.   130,   46  Atl. 
33;   Bennett  v.   McDonald,   60  Neb. 
47,  80  N.  W.  110;  Einseidler  v.  Whit- 
man Co.  22  Wash.  388,  60  Pac.  1122; 
Washington  Co.  W.  Works  v.  Gar- 
ver,  91  Md.  398,  46  Atl.  979;  Steiner 
v.    Jeffries,    118    Ala.    573,    24    So. 
37;  Burke  v.  Sanitary  Dist.  152  111. 
134,  38  N.  E.  670;  Hubuer  v.  Friege, 
90    111.    212;    Frost   v.    Foote    (Tex. 
Cv.    App.),    44    S.    W.    1071;    Frantz 
v.  Rose,  89  111.  594;  Howe  S.  M.  Co. 
v.  Layman,  88  111.  39;    Bank  of  M. 
v.    Page,    98    111.    125;    Yeomans    v. 
v.   Page,   98   111.    App.   228    (error); 
Parker    v.    National    M.    B.    &    L. 
Asso.    (W.    Va.),    46    S.    E.    811;    S. 
v.  DeWolfe   (Mont),   74  Pac.   1086; 
Krish  v.  Ford,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  1167,  43 
S.   W.   237;    Selleck  v.   Selleck,   107 
111.    396;     S.    v.    Petsch,  43  S.  Car. 


132,  20  S.  E.  993;  Truslow  v.  S.  95 
Tenn.  189,  31  S.  W.  987;  American 
T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Kersh  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  66  S.  W.  74;  Jones  v.  Col- 
lins, 94  Md.  403,  51  Atl.  398;  Walter 
v.  Victor  G.  Bloede  Co.  90  Md.  80, 
50  Atl.  433;  Butterfield  v.  Kirtley, 
114  Iowa,  520,  87  N.  W.  407;  Gam- 
brill  v.  Schooley,  95  Md.  260,  52 
Atl.  500;  Griswold  v.  Town  of  Guil- 
ford,  75  Conn.  192,  52  Atl.  742; 
Ward  v.  S.  102  Ga.  531,  28  S.  E. 
982;  Wiggins  v.  S.  103  Ga.  559, 
29  S.  E.  26;  Smith  v.  S.  75  Miss. 
542,  23  So.  260;  Dyal  v.  S.  103  Ga. 
425,  30  S.  E.  254;  Patterson  v.  S. 
75  Miss.  670,  23  So.  647;  Herrick 
v.  Gary,  83  111.  86;  Lehman  v.  Press, 
106  Iowa,  389,  76  N.  W.  818;  Braley 
v.  Powers,  92  Me.  203,  42  Atl.  362; 
Hughie  v.  Hammett,  105  Ga.  368, 
31  S.  E.  109;  Shiverick  v.  R.  J. 
Gunning  Co.  58  Neb.  29,  78  N.  W. 
460;  Nof singer  v.  Goldman,  122  Cal. 
609,  55  Pac.  425;  Western  U.  Tel. 
Co.  v.  Waller  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  47 
S.  W.  396;  Oliver  v.  Ohio  River  R. 
Co.  42  W.  Va.  703,  26  S.  E.  444; 
Nite  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  54  S.  W. 
763;  Griffin  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
53  S.  W.  848;  Boone  v.  Ritchie 
(Ky.)  53  S.  W.  518;  Howard  v. 
Schwartz  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  55  S.  W. 
348;  Dolphin  v.  Plumley,  175  Mass. 
304,  56  N.  E.  281;  Wallace  v.  Curtis, 
36  111.  156,  160;  Hodgen  v.  Latham, 
33  111.  344,  349;  New  England  F.  & 
M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wetmore,  32  111. 
221,  249;  Lawrence  v.  Jarvis,  32 
111.  304,  312;  Pfund  v.  Zimmerman, 
29  111.  269;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co. 
v.  Feev's  Ex'r,  94  Va.  82,  26  S.  E. 
406;  Kelly  v.  S.  51  Neb.  572,  71  N. 
W.  299;  Edwards  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  38  S.  W.  779;  West  Chicago 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Fetters,  196  111.  298, 
63  N.  E.  662;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
v.  Baker,  106  Ala.  624,  17  So.  452; 
Lucia  v.  Meech,  68  Vt.  175,  34 
Atl.  695;  Hodo  v.  Mexican  N.  R. 
Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  31  S.  W.  708; 
Wheeler  v.  S.  76  Miss.  265,  24  So. 


71 


SUPPORTED  BY  EVIDENCE. 


80 


plies  to  any  feature  or  element  of  a  case.  So  if  the  evidence 
is  wanting  on  any  material  fact,  an  instruction  submitting  such 
fact  to  the  jury  is  improper,  and  should  be  refused.2  And,  gener- 


310;  Caledonian  Ins.  Co.  v.  Traul, 
80  Md.  214,  30  Atl.  904;  Fletcher  v. 
Post,  104  Mich.  424,  62  N.  W.  574; 
Ashworth  v.  East  Tenn.  V.  &  G. 
R.  Co.  94  Ga.  715,  20  S.  E.  424; 
Irby  v.  S.  95  Ga.  467,  20  S.  E.  218 
(confession) ;  Mittwer  v.  Stremel, 
69  Minn.  19,  71  N.  W.  698;  Hart 
v.  S.  93  Ga.  160,  18  S.  E.  550  (good 
character) ;  Stevens  v.  Walton 
(Colo.  App.),  68  Pac.  834;  Norfolk 
R.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Corletto,  100  Va. 
355,  41  S.  E.  740;  Crete  M.  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Patz,  64  Neb.  676,  90 
N.  W.  546;  Texas  T.  &  L.  Co.  v. 
Gevin  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  68  S.  W. 
721,  67  S.  W.  892;  Chesapeake  & 
O.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers'  Adm'x,  100 
Va.  324,  41  S.  E.  732;  Illinois  Steel 
Co.  v.  McFadden,  196  111.  344,  98 
111.  App.  296,  63  N.  E.  671;  Ficken 
v.  City  of  Atlanta,  114  Ga.  970, 
41  S.  E.  58;  Gulf,  C.  S.  &  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  68 
S.  W.  559;  Hicks  v.  Southern  R. 
Co.  63  S.  Car.  559,  41  S.  E.  753;  Skow 
v.  Locks  (Neb.)  91  N.  W.  204;  Dow- 
ney v.  Gemini  Min.  Co.  24  Utah, 
431,  68  Pac.  414;  Walton  v.  S. 
114  Ga.  112,  39  S.  E.  877;  P.  v. 
Ward,  134  Cal.  301,  66  Pac.  372; 
Jacobi  v.  S.  133  Ala.  1,  32  So. 
158;  Jones  v.  Wattles  (Neb.),  92 
N.  W.  765;  Cartiledge  v.  S.  132 
Ala.  17,  31  So.  553;  Lyman  v.  P. 
198  111.  544,  64  -N.  E.  974;  S.  v. 
Sheppard,  49  W.  Va.  582,  39  S.  E. 
676;  McEldon  v.  Patton  (Neb.), 
93  N.  W.  938;  Braxton  v.  S.  157 
Ind.  213,  61  N.  E.  195;  Barnett 
v.  Fearig,  101  Ind.  96;  Rhea  v. 
S.  63  Neb.  461,  88  N.  W.  789;  Clem 
v.  S.  31  Ind.  480;  Moore  v.  S.  114 
Ga.  256,  40  S.  E.  295;  S.  v.  North- 
way,  164  Mo.  513,  65  S.  W.  331; 
Green  v.  S.  43  Fla.  556,  30  So. 
656;  Terry  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
66  S.  W.  451;  P.  v.  Ross,  134  Cal. 
256,  66  Pac.  229;  Allen  v.  Fuller, 
182  Mass.  202,  65  N.  E.  31;  Broy- 
hill  v.  Norton,  175  Mo.  190,  74  S. 
W.  1024;  Prentice  Co.  v.  Page, 


164  Mass.  276,  41  N.  E.  279;  Davis 
v.  Bingham  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  33  S. 
W.  1035;  Zimmerman  v.  Knox,  34 
Kas.  245,  8  Pac.  104. 

2  Tompkins  v.  Montgomery,  123 
Cal.  219,  55  Pac.  997;  Gilbertson  v. 
Forty-Second  St.  M.  &  St.  N.  Ave. 
R.  Co.  43  N.  Y.  S.  782,  14  App.  Div. 
294;  Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Prouty,  55  Kas.  503,  40  Pac.  909; 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Waldo  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  26  S.  W. 
1004;  Wisdom  v.  Reeves,  110  Ala. 
418,  18  So.  13;  Hasson  v.  Klee, 
168  Pa.  St.  510,  32  Atl.  46;  S.  v. 
Hertzog  (W.  Va.),  46  S.  E.  796; 
Joines  v.  Johnson,  133  N.  Car.  487, 
45  S.  E.  828;  Towle  v.  Stimpson 
Mill  Co.  (Wash.),  74  Pac.  471;  Wild- 
man  v.  S.  (Ala.)  35  So.  995; 
Spraggins  v.  S.  (Ala.)  35  So.  1003; 
Honick  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 
66  Kas.  124,  71  Pac.  265;  Winter 
v.  Supreme  Lodge  K.  P.  lol  Mo. 
App.  550,  73  S.  W.  877  (suicide); 
Fritz  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  25 
Utah,  263,  71  Pac.  209;  S.  v.  Bart- 
ley,  56  Neb.  8,10,  77  N.  W.  438; 
.Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ruzika  (Neb.), 
91  N.  W.  543;  Hunt  v.  Searcy,  167 
Mo.  158,  67  S.  W.  206;  Parker  v. 
Wells  (Neb.),  94  N.  W.  717;  St. 
Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Philpot  (Ark.), 
77  S.  W.  901;  Bullard  v.  Brewer 
(Ga.),  45  S.  E.  711;  Bullard  v.  Smith 
(Mont.),  72  Pac.  761;  Denver,  &c. 
R.  Co.  v.  Young,  30  Colo.  349,  70 
Pac.  688;  Scott  v.  Boyd  (Va.),  42  S. 
E.  918;  Williams  v.  Avery,  131  N. 
Car.  18*8,  42  S.  E.  582;  Burton  v. 
Rosemary  Mfg.  Co.  132  N.  Car. 
17,  43  S.  E.  480;  Crossette  v.  Jordan 
(Mich.),  92  N.  W.  782;  Aldous  v. 
Olverson  (S.  Dak.),  95  N.  W.  917; 
Central  City  v.  Engle  (Neb.),  91  N. 
W.  849;  McDonald  v.  McDonald, 
94  Ga.  675,  20  S.  E.  5;  Morton  v. 
Gately,  2  111.  (1  Scam.)  210;  Davis 
v.  Searey,  79  Miss.  292,  30  So.  823 
(fraud) ;  Harrington  v.  Claplin 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  66  S.  W.  898 
(fraud);  Challis  v.  Lake,  71  N.  H. 


§  80 


BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS. 


ally  speaking,  the  giving  of  instructions  reciting  matters  of  fact 
of  a  prejudicial  character  unsupported  by  any  evidence  what- 
ever, is  material  error.3 


90,   51   Atl.   260;    Mitchell   v.   Poto- 
mac Ins.  Co.  183  U.  S.  42,  22  Sup. 
Ct.  22;  Stoats  v.  Byers,  73  N.  Y.  S. 
'893,   68  App.   Div.   634. 

a  Redding  v.  Redding  Estate,  69 
,Vt.  500,  38  Atl.  230;  Hansberg  v. 
P.  120  111.  21,  11  N.  E.  526;  Green 
v.  Willingham,  100  Ga.  224,  28  S.  E. 
42;  Birr  v.  P.  113  111.  649;  Knight 
v.  Overman  Wheel  Co.  174  Mass. 
455,  54  N.  E.  890;  Chicago  &  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bragonier,  119  111.  51,  61, 
7  N.  E.  688;  Mohrenstecher  v. 
Westervelt,  87  Fed.  157;  Cannon  v. 
P.  141  111.  283,  36  N.  E.  1027;  Mon- 
tag  v.  P.  141  111.  80,  30  N.  E. 
337;  Belk  v.  P.  125  111.  584,  17  N. 
E.  714;  Healy  v.  P.  163  111.  383,  45 
N.  E.  230;  Wallace  v.  S.  41  Fla. 
547,  26  So.  713;  Echols  v.  S.  (Ga.) 
46  S.  E.  409;  Rooks  v.  S.  (Ga.) 
46  S.  E.  631;  Johnson  v.  Com. 
(Va.)  46  S.  E.  790;  S.  v.  St.  John, 
94  Mo.  App.  229,  68  S.  W.  374; 
Scott  v.  Boyd  (Va.),  42  S.  E. 
918;  Spradley  v.  S.  80  Miss.  82,  31 
So.  534;  Chrisholm  v.  Keyfauver, 
110  Cal.  102,  42  Pac.  424;  Interna- 
tional &  G.  N.  R'.  Co.  v.  Eason 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)  35  S.  W.  208;  Mar- 
tin v.  Union  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  13 
Wash.  275,  43  Pac.  53;  Thomas  v. 
S.  126  Ala.  4,  28  So.  591;  Mahan 
v.  Com.  (Ky.)  56  S.  W.  529;  S.  v. 
Swallum,  111  Iowa,  37,  82  N.  W. 
439;  Suddeth  v.  S.  112  Ga.  407  37 
S.  E.  747;  P.  v.  Kelly,  133  Cal.  1, 
64  Pac.  1091;  Rosenkrans  v.  Bar- 
ker, 115  111.  336,  3  N.  E.  93;  Gordon 
v.  Alexander,  122  Mich.  107,  80  N. 
W.  978;  Conner  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.  78  Mo.  App.  131;  Archer 
v.  U.  S.  9  Okla.  569,  60  Pac.  268; 
Tully  v.  Excelsior  Iron  Works,  115 
111.  544,  549,  5  N.  E.  83;  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Bundy,  210  111.  49; 
Boone  v.  P.  148  111.  440,  451,  36 
N.  E.  99;  In  re  Stickhey's  Will, 
104  Wis.  581,  80  N.  W.  921;  Den- 
ver &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Spencer, 
25  Colo.  9,  52  Pac.  211;  Com.  v. 
Reid,  175  Mass.  325,  56  N.  E.  617; 


Arismendis  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  54 
S.  W.  599;  P.  v.  Matthews,  126 
Cal.  17,  58  Pac.  371;  S.  v.  Calla- 
way,  154  Mo.  91,  55  S.  W.  444; 
Haggarty  v.  Strong,  10  S.  Dak.  585, 
74  N.  W.  1037;  Gandy  v.  Orient 
Ins.  Co.  52  S.  Car.  224,  29  S.  E. 
655;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bryan,  90  111.  126,  132;  Terrell  v. 
Russell  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  42  S.  W. 
129;  Fore  v.  S.  75  Miss.  727,  23  So. 
710;  Brin  v.  McGregor  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.)  45  S.  W.  923;  S.  v.  Robinson,. 
52  La.  Ann.  616,  27  So.  124;  S.  v. 
Vaughan,  141  Mo.  514,  42  S.  W.  1080; 
Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingra- 
ham,  77  111.  313;  Frame  v.  Badger, 
79  111.  441,  446;  Nichols  v.  Bradley, 
78  111.  44;  Plumner  v.  Rigdon,  78  111. 
222;  Straus  v.  Minzesheeiner,  78- 
111.  497;  Andreas  v.  Ketcham,  77 
111.  380;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  Irwin,  202  111.  345,  356,  66  N. 
E.  1077;  City  of  Chicago  v.  Shol- 
ten,  75  111.  468;  Roach  v.  P.  77 
111.  29;  Toledo,  P.  &  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Patterson,  63  111.  306;  Paulin 
v.  Howser,  63  111.  312;  Albrecht  v. 
Walker,  73  111.  73;  St.  Louis,  I.  M, 
&  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Woodward,  70  Ark. 
441,  65  S.  W.  55;  S.  v.  Valle,  164 
Mo.  539,  65  S.  W.  232;  Stevens 
v.  Metzger,  95  Mo.  App.  609,  69  S. 
W.  625;  P.  v.  Mendenhall,  135 
Cal.  344,  67  Pac.  325,  (intoxicating 
liquor);  Johnson  v.  S.  36  Ark.  242; 
Eggett  v.  Allen,  106  Wis.  633,  82 
N.  W.  556;  Hot  Springs  R.  Co.  v. 
Williamson,  136  U.  S.  121,  10  Sup. 
Ct.  955;  Northern  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Husson,  101  Pa.  St.  7;  Lurssen  v. 
Lloyd,  76  Md.  360,  25  Atl,  294; 
Simpson  v.  Post,  40  Conn,  321;  S.  v. 
Labuzan,  37  La.  Ann.  489;  Thomp- 
son v.  Anderson,  86  Iowa,  703,  53  N. 
W.  418;  Penobscot  R.  Co.  v.  White, 
41  Me.  512;  Layton  v.  S.  56  Miss. 
791;  S.  v.  Parker,  13  Lea  (Tenn.) 
221;  Shaughnessey  v.  Sewell  &  D. 
C.  Co.  160  Mass.  331,  35  N.  E.  861; 
Consolidated  Tr.  Co.  v.  Haight,  5» 
N.  J.  L.  577,  37  Atl.  135;  Harrison. 


73  SUPPORTED    BY    EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATIONS.  §    81 

§  81.  Supported  by  evidence — Illustrations. — Thus  in  an  ac- 
tion for  malicious  prosecution  an  instruction  that  probable  cause 
cannot  exist  when  good  faith  is  lacking,  is  erroneous,  if  there  is 
no  evidence  that  the  defendant  acted  in  bad  faith.4  In  an  action 
of  trespass  where  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  prove  wilful 
or  wanton  conduct  on  the  part  of  persons  in  charge  of  a  train 
in  expelling  a  passenger  therefrom,  an  instruction  submitting 
the  issue  of  wilfulness  or  wantonness  in  estimating  the  amount 
of  damages  is  erroneous.5  Or  where  there  is  no  evidence  to  show 
that  an  injury  complained  of  was  the  result  of  wilfulness  or 
wantonness,  it  is  improper  to  instruct  on  that  question.6 

The  giving  of  an  instruction  on  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
conductor  maliciously  ejected  the  plaintiff  from  the  car  of  the 
defendant,  is  prejudicial,  where  there  is  no  evidence  whatever 
tending  to  support  it.7  Also  where  there  is  no  evidence  tending 
to  show  undue  influence  in  the  making  or  destruction  of  a  will, 
an  instruction  on  that  subject  is  erroneous.8  Or  the  giving  of  an 
instruction  as  to  the  nature  or  character  of  undue  influence  suf- 
ficient to  invalidate  a  will,  is  improper  where  there  is  no  evidence 
whatever  of  such  undue  influence.9 

An  instruction  directing  the  jury  to  assess  the  plaintiff's  dam- 
ages at  the  cash  value  of  one  half  of  his  probable  earnings  dur- 
ing life,  is  erroneous  where  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  prove 

T.  Baker,  15  Neb.  43,  14  N.  W.  541;  *  Harris    v.    Woodford,    98    Mich. 

Crowder  v.   Reed,   80   Ind.  1;    P.   v.  147,  57  N.  W.  96. 

Devine,    95    Cal.    227,    30    Pac.    378;  $  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Connell, 

Zimmerman  v.   Knox,   34   Kas.   245,  127  111.  419,  20  N.  E.  89;  Waldron  v. 

8  Pac.  104:   ^Etna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reed,  Marcier,  82  111.  551;  Wenger  v.  Cal- 

33    Ohio    St.    283;    Case    v.    Illinois  der,  78  111.  275. 

Cent.    R.    Co.    38    Iowa,    581.      See  6  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v. 

also   S.    v.    Myer,    69    Iowa,    148,    28  Manly,    58    111.    300,    304;    Atchison, 

N.  W.  484;  Hines  v.  Com.  (Ky.)  62  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Wells,  56  Kas. 

S.    W.    732;    McMahon   v.    Flanders,  222,    42    Pac.    699    (malicious   negli- 

€4   Ind.    334;    Salomon   v.    Cress,   22  gence). 

Ore.  177,  29  Pac.  439;    Montgomery  ?  Pittsburg,    Ft.   W.   &   C.   R.   Co. 

v.  Com.    (Ky.)    63  S.  W.  747;    Kirk  v.  Slusser,  19  Ohio  St.  161. 

v.    Ter.    10    Okla.    46,    60    Pac.    797;  8  Mclntosh  v.  Moore,  22  Tex.  Cv. 

Slingerland    v.    Keyser,    127    Mich.  App.    22,    53    S.    W.    611;    Boone    v. 

7,    86    N.    W.    390;     Donald    v.    S.  Richie    (Ky.),   53   S.   W.   518;    *'olks 

21  Ohio  C.  C.  124;  Jackson  v.  S.  91  v.  Folks,  107  Ky.  561,  54  S.  W.  837; 

Ga.    271,    18    S.    E.    298;    Moore    v.  Calkins,  Estate  of,  112  Cal.  296,  44 

Ross,    11    N.    H.    547;    P.    v.    Hong  Pac.    577. 

Fong,  85  Cal.  171,  24  Pac.  726;  Ben-  9  Blough    v.    Parry,    144   Ind.    463, 

nett   v.    McDonald,    60    Neb.    47,    82  40  N.  E.  70,  43  N.  E.  560. 

N.  W.  110. 


§    82  BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS.  74 

what  he  could  earn,  or  what  loss  he  had  sustained  in  that  re- 
spect.10 So  an  instruction  that  the  jury  may  take  into  considera- 
tion the  expenses  incurred  for  medical  treatment,  is  improper  and 
erroneous  where  there  is  no  evidence  showing  any  such  expendi- 
ture or  obligation  incurred  for  such  treatment.11  And  the  failure 
to  comply  with  certain  statutory  provisions  in  conducting  a  bus- 
iness will  not  warrant  the  giving  of  instructions  based  upon  the 
statute  if  there  is  no  evidence  that  such  failure  in  any  way  con- 
tributed to  the  accident  resulting  in  the  damages  complained  of. 
The  tendency  of  such  instructions  is  confusing  and  misleading.12 

§  82.  Supported  by  evidence — Criminal  cases. — On  a  charge 
of  having  sexual  intercourse  with  a  female  under  the  age  of  six- 
teen years,  it  appearing  that  the  parish  register  of  births  had 
been  changed  so  as  to  show  from  it  that  the  prosecutrix  was  over 
sixteen  years  of  age  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  intercourse,  it 
is  improper  and  erroneous  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  issue  as  to 
whether  the  defendant  changed  the  register  of  birth,  where  it  ap- 
pears from  all  the  evidence  on  that  issue  that  the  register  was 
not  altered  by  him,  and  that  he  had  no  opportunity  to  alter  it.13 
And  in  a  case  where  the  evidence  in  a  prosecution  for  rape  strong- 
ly tends  to  impeach  the  prosecutrix,  there  being  no  evidence 
whatever  tending  to  corroborate  her,  it  is  error  to  instruct  the 
jury  as  to  corroboration  of  the  prosecuting  witness.14 

Or  on  a  charge  for  maliciously  destroying  a  fence  the  defendant 
is  not  entitled  to  an  instruction  charging  that  if  the  fence  was 
on  the  dividing  line  between  the  premises  of  the  prosecutor  and 
the  defendant  he  should  be  acquitted,  there  being  no  evidence 
that  the  fence  was  a  partition  fence.15  Also  an  instruction  as 
to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  an  explanation  by  the  defendant  as  to 
his  possession  of  stolen  goods  is  improper  and  erroneous  where 

10  Alabama  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Marcus,  &  St.  L.   R.  Co.  v.   McCune   (Ky.), 
115  Ala.  389,  22  So.  135.     See  Coyle  72  S.  W.  756  (error  held  harmless). 
v.  Pittsburg,  B.   &  L.  E.  R.  Co.  18  12  Coal    Run    Coal    Co.    v.    Jones, 
Pa.    Super.    235;    Tuller   v.    City    of  127   111.   382,  8   N.   B.   865,   20  N.   E. 
Mt.  Vernon,  171  N.  Y.  247,  72  N.  Y.  89. 

S.  1103.  13  P.   v.   Flaherty,   162   N.   Y.   532, 

11  Andrews    v.    Toledo,    A.    A.    &      57  N.  E.  73. 

N.    M.    R.    Co.    8    Ohio    C.    D.    584;  i*  Coney  v.  S.  108  Ga.  773,  36  S. 

Alabama,  G.   S.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  E.  907. 

119  Ala.  572,  24  So.  862;  Ft.  Worth  ir,  Wheeler  v.   S.   114   Ala.   22,   21 

&  R.   G.  R.  Co.  v.  Greer   (Tex.  Cv.  So.  941. 

App.),  09  S.  W.  421;   Louisville,  H. 


75 


NO    EVIDENCE    OF    DEFENSE INCOMPETENT    EVIDENCE.       §    84 


there  is  no  evidence  that  he  gave  any  explanation  as  to  how  he 
came  into  possession  of  the  goods  in  question.16  It  is  error  to 
give  instructions  on  the  theory  of  a  conspiracy  in  the  absence  of 
any  evidence  tending  to  prove  a  conspiracy.17 

§  83.  Defense  unsupported  by  evidence. — It  follows  from  the 
rule  mentioned  that  the  court  in  the  giving  of  instructions  is  not 
required  to  recognize  any  defense  presented  by  the  pleadings 
which  is  unsupported  by  any  evidence.18  Thus  in  an  action  on  a 
replevin  bond  where  the  defendant  pleads  that  the  goods  and 
chattels  alleged  to  have  been  taken  by  virtue  of  the  writ  of  re- 
plevin were  not  the  goods  and  chattels  mentioned  and  described 
in  the  bond,  but  were  other  and  different  goods,  the  court  in 
charging  the  jury  may  properly  ignore  the  defense  set  up  by 
that  plea,  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  whatever  tending  to 
support  it.19  So  in  a  criminal  case  where  the  defense  is  insanity 
and  the  evidence  is  entirely  inadequate  to  establish  it,  the  court 
may  ignore  and  withdraw  from  the  consideration  of  the  jury 
such  defense.20 

§  84.  Based  on  incompetent  evidence.— Incompetent  or  ir- 
relevant evidence,  though  admitted  without  objection,  will  not 
justify  the  giving  of  instructions  based  thereon  ;21  and,  of  course, 

16  Grande  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 
38  S.  W.  613. 

IT  Cunningham  v.  P.  195  111.  550, 
63  N.  B.  517;  Ter.  v.  Claypool  (N. 
Mex.)  71  Pac.  463;  Crane  v.  S.  Ill 
Ala.  45,  20  So.  590. 

is  Kellogg  v.  Boyden,  126  111.  378, 
18  N.  E.  770;  Town  of  New  Wind- 
sor v.  Stockdate,  95  Md.  196,  52 
Atl.  596;  Deatley  v.  Com.  (Ky.)  29 
S.  W.  741;  S.  v.  Morledge,  164  Mo. 
522,  65  S.  W.  226  (insanity);  Barg- 
na  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  68  S.  W. 
997  (on  receiving  stolen  goods). 

is  Kellogg  y.  Boyden,  126  111.  378, 
18  N.  E.  770. 

20  S.  v.  Morledge,  164  Mo.  522,  65 
S.  W.  226. 

21  Eller  v.  Loomis,  106  Iowa,  276, 
76   N.    W.    686;    Kohl    v.    S.    59    N. 
J.  L.  445,  37  Atl.  73;  Herring  v.  Her- 
ring,   94    Iowa,    56,    62    N.    W.    666; 
Covington  v.  Simpson  (Del.  Super.) 
52    Atl.    349;     Elsworth    v.    Newby 
(Neb.),  91  N.  W.  517;  Provident  S. 


L.  A.  Soc.  v.  Berger,  23  Ky.  L.  R. 
2460,  67  S.  W.  827.  See  Christian 
v.  Connecticut  M.  L.  I.  Co.  143  Mo. 
460,  45  S.  W.  268;  Crews  v.  Lack- 
land, 67  Mo.  621;  Dingee  v.  Unrue's 
Adm'x,  98  Va.  247,  35  S.  E.  794; 
Coos  Bay  R.  Co.  v.  Siglin,  26  Ore. 
387,  38  Pac.  192;  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co. 
v.  Durrett,  24  Tex.  Cv.  App.  103,  58 
S.  W.  187;  Capital  Bank  v.  Arm- 
strong, 62  Mo.  65;  Norfolk  &  West 
R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  97  Va.  631,  34 
S.  E.  525,  46  L.  R.  A.  367;  Fox  v. 
P.  95  111.  75.  See  Nye  v.  Kelly, 
19  Wash.  73,  52  Pac.  528;  Williams 
v.  Atkinson,  152  Ind.  98,  52  N.  E. 
603;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Kee,  43  111.  119, '122;  Kohl  v.  S.  57 
N.  J.  L.  445,  37  Atl.  73;  Hollins  v. 
S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  69  S.  W.  594; 
American  Harrow  Co.  v.  Dolvin 
(Ga.),  45  S.  E.  983.  But  see  Qualy 
v.  Johnson,  80  Minn.  408,  83  N.  W. 
393;  Collins  v.  Collins,  46  Iowa,  60; 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Hubbard,  86  Ga. 


§  84 


BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS. 


76 


evidence  which  has  been  excluded  as  incompetent  will  not  sup- 
port instructions.22  It  is  not  necessary  to  instruct  the  jury  in 
reference  to  evidence  which  has  been  ruled  out  as  incompetent; 
but  if  an  instruction  be  given,  directing  the  jury  to  disregard 
such  evidence,  it  is  harmless.23 

The  court  is  not  required,  in  charging  the  jury,  to  caution  them 
against  drawing  any  inference  from  evidence  which  has  been 
excluded.24  Incompetent  evidence  which  might  have  been  ex- 
cluded at  any  time  during  the  trial  may  be  excluded  from  the 
consideration  of  the  jury  by  instructions  if  objection  was  prop- 
erly made  to  it.25  And  the  court  should  specifically  point  out 
to  the  jury  by  instruction  what  portion  of  the  evidence  is  in- 
competent,25* and  when  thus  instructed,  the  error  in  admitting 
such  incompetent  evidence  will,  as  a  general  rule,  be  regarded  as 
cured.26  But,  on  the  contrary,  it  has  been  held  that  any  dam- 
age done  to  the  rights  of  a  litigant,  by  the  admission  of  improper 
and  prejudicial  evidence,  cannot  well  be  remedied  by  the  with- 
drawing such  evidence  from  the  consideration  of  the  jury  by 


623,  12  S.  E.  1020.  When  incompe- 
tent evidence  is  introduced  at  the 
instance  of  a  party,  he  has  no 
right  to  complain  of  an  instruc- 
tion based  on  such  evidence,  Phe- 
nix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilcox  &  G.  G.  Co. 
65  Fed.  724. 

22  McGinnis  v.  Fernandes,  126  111. 
232,  19  N.   E.   44;    Pease  Piano  Co. 
v.  Cameron,  56  Neb.  561,  76  N.  W. 
1053;   Mefford  v.  Sell  (Neb.),  92  N. 
W.   148;    Pfaffenback  v.  Lake  S.  & 
M.  S.  R.  Co.  142  Ind.  246,  41  N.  E. 
530;    Atkinson  v.   Gatcher,  23   Ark. 
101;    Hayes    v.    Kelley,    116    Mass. 
300;   New  York,  &c.  Co.  v.  Fraser, 
130  U.  S.  611,  9  Sup.  Ct.  665;  Cald- 
well  v.  Stephens,  57  Mo.  589;   Shef- 
field v.  Eveleth  (S.  Dak.),  97  N.  W. 
368;   Sheffield  v.  Eveleth   (S.  Dak.), 
97  N.  W.  367;    Honingstein  v.  Hol- 
lingsworth,  85  N.  Y.  Supp.  818. 

23  Keegan    v.    Kinnare,    123    111. 
290,  14  N.  E.  14;  Martin  v.  McCray, 
171  Pa.  St.  575,  33  Atl.  108. 

24  S.   v.   Gates    (Wash.),    69   Pac. 
385. 

25  Foxworth    v.    Brown,    120    Ala. 
59,  24  So.  1,  41  L.  R.  A.  335;  Stevens 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  49  S.  W.  105; 


Woolsey  v.  Trustees  of  Village,  155 
N.  Y.  573,  50  N.  E.  270;  Price  v. 
Wood,  9  N.  Mex.  397,  54  Pac.  231. 
See  also  Henkle  v.  McClure,  32  Ohio 
St.  202;  Boston  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Scales,  101  Tenn.  628,  49  S.  W.  743; 
Russell  v.  Nail,  79  Tex.  664,  15  S.  W. 
635;  Maxwell  v.  Hannibal  &  St. 
J.  R.  Co.  85  Mo.  106;  Becker  v. 
Becker,  45  Iowa,  239;  S.  v.  Pratt, 
20  Iowa,  269.  Contra:  S.  v.  Owens, 
79  Mo.  619. 

25*  Colby  v.  Portman,  115  Mich. 
95,  72  N.  W.  1098. 

26  s.  v.  Meller,  13  R.  I.  66<9; 
Indianapolis,  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bush,  101  Ind.  582;  Links  v.  S. 
13  Lea  (Tenn.)  701;  Pfaffenback 
v.  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  142 
Ind.  246,  41  N.  E.  530;  Busch  v. 
Fisher,  89  Mich.  192,  50  N.  W.  788; 
Deerfield  v.  Northwood,  10  N.  H. 
269;  Griffith  v.  Hanks,  91  Mo.  109, 
4  S.  W.  508;  Mimns  v.  S.  16  Ohio 
St.  221;  Bridyers  v.  Dill,  97  N.  Car. 
222,  1  S.  E.  767;  Beck  v.  Cole, 
16  Wis.  95;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Roy,  102  U.  S.  451;  King  v.  Rea, 
13  Colo.  69,  21  Pac.  1084;  Zehner 
v.  Kepler,  16  Ind.  290. 


77  WHEN  EVIDENCE  SPECULATIVE — SLIGHT.  §    86 

instructing  them  to  disregard  it.27  An  instruction  based  upon 
incompetent  and  irrelevant  evidence  is  erroneous  in  that  it  is  mis- 
leading.28 

§  85.  Speculative  evidence — Insufficient. — Evidence  which  is 
so  slight  that  it  is  merely  speculative  on  any  material  matter  of 
fact  in  a  case  will  not  warrant  the  giving  of  instructions.29  So 
an  instruction  founded  upon  an  hypothesis  of  fact  of  which 
there  is  no  direct  evidence,  but  only  the  possibility  of  an  infer- 
ence, is  improper  and  not  a  sufficient  basis  for  the  giving  of 
instructions.30  And  although  an  instruction  may  be  properly 
drawn  and  applicable  to  the  facts  of  a  case,  yet  where  there  is 
such  a  slight  weight  of  evidence  that  the  verdict  could  not 
reasonably  be  different  than  the  one  rendered,  the  refusal  to  give 
the  instruction  is  but  harmless  error.31 

§  86.  Slight  evidence  will  support  instructions.— But  on  the 
other  hand  if  there  is  any  evidence,  though  slight,  fairly  tending 
to  support  a  proposition  of  law  applicable  to  the  case,  a  party 
is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed  accordingly.  The  court 
has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  weight  or  value  of  the  evi- 
dence. It  is  the  province  of  the  jury,  and  not  the  court,  to  de- 
termine the  facts.32  Thus  in  an  action  for  personal  injury,  if 

27  Prior  v.  White,  12  111.  260,  265.  (Neb.)    91    N.    W.    537;    Sutton    v. 

See  Quinn  v.  P.  123  111.  347,  15  N.  Madre,    47    N.    Car.    320;    Bloyd    v. 

E.  46.  Pollock,   27  W.   Va.   75;    Lemasters 

ss  Evans    v.    George,    80    111.    51.  v.  Southern  P.  R.  Co.  131  Cal.  105, 

See    also    Harding    v.    Wright,    119  63  Pac.   128. 

Mo.   1,  24  S.  W.  211;   Dickerson  v.          si  Grain   v.   First  Nat.   Bank,   114 

Johnson,    24    Ark.    251;    Willits    v.  111.  516,  527,  2  N.  E.  486.     Evidence 

Chicago,  B.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  80  Iowa,  held   sufficient   to   support   instruc- 

531,  45  N.  W.  916.  tions  in  the  following  cases:  Pence 

29  Com.   v.   Hillman,   189   Pa.   St.  v.    Wabash    R.    Co.    116   Iowa,    279, 

548,   42   Atl.   196;    S.   v.   Evans,   138  90  N.  W.  59;   Yontz  v.  Com.  23  Ky. 

Mo.    116,    39    S.    W.    462;    Watts   v.  L.  R.  1868,  66  S.  W.  383  (conspiracy 

Southern     Bell     T.     &     T.     Co.     66  in   murder  case);    White  v.    S.   133 

Fed.  453;   Statford  v.  Goldring,  197  Ala.   122,   32   So.   139    (conspiracy); 

111.    156,    64    N.    E.    395;     Steed    v.  Wheeler  v.    S.    158   Ind.    687,    63   N. 

S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.)    67    S.   W.    328;  E.    975     (relating    to    violent    tem- 

Gambrill    v.    Schooley,    95   Md.    260,  per  as  a  basis  for  insanity).     Evi- 

52    Atl.    500;    Cawfield    v.    Ashville  dence    held    not   sufficient    to   war- 

St.  R.  Co.  Ill  N.  Car.  597,  16  S.  E.  rant     the     giving   of     instructions: 

703;    S.   v.   Evans,    138   Mo.    116,   39  Com.    v.    Hillman,   189   Pa.    St.    548, 

S.    W.    462.      See    Cleveland,    C.    C.  42  Atl.   196   (insanity);   Grace  v.  S. 

&   St.   L.   R.    Co.   v.   Drumm    (Ind.)  (Tex.   Cr.   App.)    69  S.   W.   529. 
70    N.    E.    286    (possible    benefits).          32  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Faith, 

so  Com.    v.    Boutwell,    162    Mass.  175   111.   58,  51  N.   E.   807;    Edwards 

230,  38  N.  E.  441;  Parker  v.  Taylor  v.   Dellenmair,     85   111.     App.     366; 


§  87 


BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS. 


78 


the  testimony  of  the  plaintiff  alone  tends  to  show  permanent 
injury,  it  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  as  to  such  injury.  Ex- 
pert testimony  in  such  case  is  not  necessary.33  And  the  fact  that 
the  evidence  may  appear  unreasonable  or  inconsistent  will  not 
warrant  the  court  in  refusing  an  instruction  based  thereon.34 

§  87.  Circumstantial  evidence  sufficient. — An  instruction  may 
properly  be  given,  though  not  supported  by  direct  statement 
of  witnesses ;  any  inference  which  may  be  fairly  drawn  from  the 
evidence  is  sufficient  to  warrant  the  giving  of  instructions  if 
otherwise  correct.35  Thus  where  there  is  no  direct  evidence 
that  a  deed  was  delivered,  but  there  was  evidence  that  it  was 
recorded,  that  is  sufficient  to  warrant  the  giving  of  instructions 
on  the  issue  as  to  whether  the  deed  was  delivered  or  not.36 


House  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  69  S. 
W.  417;  Jones  v.  Fort,  36  Ala.  449; 
Richmond  P.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Allen 
(Va.)  43  S.  E.  356;  Bradford  v. 
Pearson,  12  Mo.  71;  Turner  v.  Ter. 
11  Okla.  660,  69'  Pac.  804;  Com. 
v.  Rogers,  181  Mass.  184,  63  N.  E. 
421;  Walls  v.  Walls,  170  Pa  St. 
48,  32  Atl.  649;  Union  M.  L.  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Buchanan,  100  Ind.  73; 
Brannum  v.  O'Conner,  77  Iowa, 
632,  42  N.  W.  504;  S.  v.  Ezzard, 
40  S.  Car.  312,  18  S.  E.  1025; 
Chicago  Packing  &  Provision  Co. 
v.  Tilton.  87  111.  547;  City  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Shelton,  75  111.  468;  Kendall 
v.  Brown,  74  111.  232;  Harmon  v. 
S.  158  Ind.  37,  63  N.  630;  Winne  v. 
Hammond,  37  111.  99;  Newbury  v. 
Getchell  &  M.  L.  Mfg.  Co.  100  Iowa, 
441,  69  N.  W.  743;  Brooks  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.)  31  S.  W.  410;  Cal- 
lahan  v.  City  of  Port  Huron,  128 
Mich.  673,  87  N.  W.  880;  Union  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ruzika  (Neb.)  91  N.  W. 
543;  Ter.  v.  Guillen  (N.  Mex.)  66 
Pac.  527;  Grimsinger  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.)  69  S.  W.  583;  Young  v.  Al- 
ford,  118  N.  Car.  215,  23  S.  E. 
978;  Honesty  v.  Com.  81  Va.  283; 
S.  v.  Wright,  112  Iowa,  436,  84 
N.  W.  541;  Hanes  v.  S.  155  Ind. 
112,  57  N.  E.  704  (rape);  Williams 
v.  Watson,  71  111.  App.  130;  S. 
v.  Mahoney,  24  Mont.  281,  61  Pac. 
647;  Thompson  v.  Duff,  119  111. 
226,  10  N.  E.  399;  Chicago  R. 
I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  109  111. 


120,  131;  Chicago  &  W.  I.  R.  Co. 
v.  Bingenheimer,  116  111.  226,  230, 
4  N.  E.  840;  Chicago  W.  D.  R. 
Co.  v.  Mills,  105  111.  70;  Enright  v. 
P.  155  111.  34,  39  N.  E.  561;  Brown 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  29  S.  W. 
772;  Brown  v.  Everett  Ridley  Ra- 
gan  Co.  Ill  Ga.  404,  36  S.  E.  813; 
Missouri  Furnace  Co.  v.  Abend,  107 
III.  50;  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Faith,  175  111.  58,  51  N.  E.  807; 
Kehoe  v.  Allentoron  &  L.  V.  Tr. 
Co.  187  Pa.  St.  474,  41  Atl.  310,  43 
W.  N.  C.  189;  Reusens  v.  Lawson, 
96  Va.  285,  31  S.  E.  528;  Tyson  v. 
Williamson,  96  Va.  636,  32  S.  E. 
42;  Wooters  v.  King,  54  111.  343; 
Richmond  P.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Allen 
(Va.),  43  S.  E.  356;  Carter  v.  Kauf- 
man (S.  Car.),  45  S.  E.  1017. 

«3  North    Chicago    St.    R.    Co.    v, 
Shreve,   171   111.   441,   49   N.    E.    534. 

34  Hayes    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.) 
39    S.    W.    106;    Campbell    v.    Pre- 
ferred M.  A.  Asso.  172  Pa.  St.  561, 
33  Atl.  564,  32  L.  R.  A.  766. 

35  Maes  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.    Cv.    App.)     23     S.     W.     725; 

Stephan  v.  Met/ger,  95  Mo.  App. 
609,  69  S.  W.  625;  Quinn  v.  Eagal- 
ston,  108  111.  256;  Chicago.  R.  I.  & 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  109  111.  134. 
See  also  Sword  v.  Keith,  31  Mich. 
247;  Peoria,  M.  &  I.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Anapow,  45  111.  86;  S.  v.  Tucker, 
38  La.  Ann.  789. 

36  Horton   v.    Smith,    115   Ga.   66, 
41  S.  E.  253. 


79  CRIMINAL  CASE — EVIDENCE  SUFFICIENT.  §    88 

Where  there  is  any  evidence,  though  slight,  tending  to  prove 
a  material  point  or  fact,  the  opposing  party  will  not  be  heard 
to  complain  of  the  refusal  of  an  instruction  submitting  the  in- 
sufficiency of  the  evidence  as  to  such  fact  when  it  was  not  dis- 
puted by  him  on  the  trial.37 

§  88.  Evidence  sufficient — Criminal  case. — And  in  a  criminal 
case  if  there  is  any  evidence,  though  weak  or  slight,  tending  to 
prove  a  legal  defense  or  material  fact,  it  is  error  to  refuse  instruc- 
tions based  on  such  evidence.38  Thus  where  there  is  some  evidence, 
though  weak,  tending  to  show  that  the  defendant  was  mentally 
incapable  of  committing  the  crime  charged,  it  is  error  to  refuse 
instructions  as  to  his  mental  condition.39  And  according  to  this 
rule,  where  the  testimony  of  the  defendant  alone  tends  to  es- 
tablish a  legal  defense,  as  self-defense,  he  has  a  right  to  have 
the  jury  correctly  instructed  as  to  the  law  applicable  to  that 
defense.40 

Thus  on  a  charge  of  assault  with  intent  to  kill,  where  the 
defendant  shows  by  his  own  testimony  that  he  did  not  use  his 
weapon  until  he  had  been  beaten  by  the  prosecuting  witness 
and  another,  he  is  entitled  to  instructions  on  the  law  of  self- 
defense.41  And  on  a  charge  of  larceny,  there  being  evidence 
tending  to  prove  that  certain  property  alleged  to  have  been 
stolen  from  a  smokehouse  by  the  accused  was  obtained  by  him 
from  a  third  person,  he  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed 
that  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence  that  he  got  the  property 
from  such  third  person  they  should  acquit  him,  and  a  refusal  to  so 
instruct  is  error.42  Where  there  is  some  evidence,  though  slight, 
tending  to  prove  a  conspiracy,  that  issue  should  be  submitted  to 
the  jury  by  proper  instructions.43  For  instance,  in  a  larceny  case 
where  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  other  persons  besides 

37  Schier  v.  Dankwardt,  88  Iowa,          «  Rucker  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.) 

750,  56  N.  W.  420.  40  S.  W.  991. 

ss  s.    v.    Newman,    57    Kas.    705,          42  Yarbrough  v.   S.    (Ala.)   20  So. 

47   Pac.    881;    Bargna   v.    S.    (Tex.  534. 
Cr.  App.)   68  S.  W.  997.  43  Mitchell   v.    S.    133    Ala.   65,    32 

39  S.    v.    Newman,    57    Kas.    705,  So.  132;    Stevens  v.  S.  133  Ala.  28, 

47  Pac.   881.  32    So.    270;    White   v.    S.    133    Ala. 

«  Enright  v.  P.  155  111.  34,  39  N.  122,    32    So.    139;    S.    v.    Finley,   118 

E.    561;    S.    v.    Fredericks,    136   Mo.  N.  Car.  1161,  24  S.  E.  495;   Bridges 

51,    37    S.    W.    832;    Bedford    v.    S.  v.  S.  110  Ala.  15,  20  So.  348. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.)   38  S.  W.  210. 


§    89  BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS.  80 

the  defendant  were  present  when  the  crime  is  alleged  to  have 
been  committed,  who  may  have  acted  in  concert  with  the  de- 
fendant, it  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  if  they  find  the 
offense  was  committed  by  the  defendant  as  the  sole  perpetrator, 
or  that  she  acted  in  concert  with  others  in  the  perpetration 
of  the  offense,  they  should  find  her  guilty.44 

§  89.  Evidence  sufficient — Larceny. — Where  the  value  of  a 
portion  of  stolen  property  which  was  found  in  possession  of  the 
defendant  made  the  offense  only  petit  larceny  it  was  held  error 
to  refuse  to  instruct  on  petit  larceny,  although  the  value  of  all 
the  property  taken  was  much  in  excess  of  the  value  constituting 
petit  larceny,  in  a  case  where  it  appeared  from  the  evidence  that 
there  were  several  persons  in  the  house  from  which  the  property 
was  stolen.45  Also  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  an  instruction 
on  petit  larceny  under  an  indictment  charging  grand  larceny, 
where  it  is  doubtful  from  the  evidence  whether  the  property 
taken  was  of  sufficient  value  to  make  the  stealing  grand  larceny.46 

§  90.  Instructions  stating  issues  and  contentions. — While  it  is 
customary  for  the  trial  court  to  make  a  brief  presentation  of  the 
issues  raised  by  the  pleadings  as  a  preface  to  the  law  embodied 
in  the  charge  to  the  jury,  there  is  no  rule  requiring  the  court  to 
make  such  presentation,  and  a  charge  cannot  be  held  defective 
on  that  ground.47  In  Kentucky  it  has  been  held  that  the  prac- 
tice of  stating  the  issues  in  charging  the  jury  is  unusual  and  not 
to  be  commended,  but  not  error  to  do  so.48  But  the  jury  should 
have  a  clear  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  issues  and  con- 
tentions of  the  parties,  and  to  that  end  it  is  proper  for  the  court 
to  briefly  state  the  substance  of  the  pleadings.  This  is  better 
than  to  refer  the  jury  to  the  pleadings.49 

44  Ter.  v.  De  Gutman,  8  N.  Mex.  Dupee's  Adm'r,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  2349, 
92,  42  Pac.  68.  67  S.  W.  15. 

45  p.  v.  Comyus,  114  Cal.  107,  45  4o  San    Antonio   A.    P.    R.    Co.    v. 
Pac.   1034.  De  Ham   (Tex.  Cv.  App.)   54  S.  W. 

40  s.  v.  Thompson,  137  Mo.  620,  395;  Conley  v.  Redwine,  109  Ga. 

39  S.  W.  83,  59  L.  R.  A.  581;  P.  v.  640,  35  S.  E.  92;  West  v.  Averill 

Comyus,  114  Cal.  107,  45  Pac.  1034.  Grocery  Co.  109  Iowa,  488,  80  N. 

47  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  W.  555;  City  of  Ft.  Madison  v. 

v.  Hitzfelder  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  66  Moore,  109  Iowa,  476,  80  N.  W. 

S.  W.  707.  Contra:  Texas  &  N.  O.  527;  Stuart  v.  Line,  11  Pa.  Sup. 

R.  Co.  v.  Mortensen  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  Ct.  345;  Polykranas  v.  Kransz,  77 

66  S.  W.  99.  N.  Y.  S.  46,  73  Ap.  Div.  583;  Bryce 

«  Chesapeake    &    O.    R.    Co.    v.  v.    Cayce,    62    S.    C.    546,   40   S.    E. 


81 


ISSUES    AND    CONTENTIONS — IMMATERIAL    ISSUES 


,§  91 


An  explanation  of  the  contentions  of  the  respective  claims  of 
the  parties  enables  the  jury  to  act  more  intelligently  in  deciding 
the  issues,  and  to  reach  a  fair  verdict.50  However,  the  court, 
in  stating  the  issues,  should  not  copy  the  pleadings  into  the 
instructions,  as  this  is  a  bad  practice  and  should  be.  avoided.50* 
It  is  sufficient  to  state  the  substance  of  the  pleadings,  but  the 
court  should  guard  against  a  misstatement  of  the  issues,  that 
the  jury  may  not  be  misled.50**  After  once  stating  the  ma- 
terial allegations  of  the  pleadings  and  the  contentions  of  the 
parties  they  may  afterwards  be  referred  to  in  general  terms  in 
the  charge  by  stating  that  the  plaintiff  is  required  to  establish 
each  of  the  material  allegations  of  his  complaint  by  <a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence.51  Where  some  of  the  issues  may 
have  been  abandoned,  or  other  change  has  taken  place  since 
the  suit  was  instituted,  the  court  may,  in  charging  the  jury, 
state  how  the  issues  originally  stood,  and  may  restrict  them 
in  their  deliberations  to  the  issues  after  such  changes.52 

§  91.  Instructions  as  to  immaterial  issues. — The  court  in  charg- 
ing the  jury  should  state  which  are  the  material  issues,  es- 


948;  Nashville  R.  Co.  v.  Norman, 
108  Tenn.  324,  67  S.  W.  479;  Sage 
v.  Haines,  76  Iowa,  581,  41  N.  W. 
366;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Polkey,  203  111.  225,  232,  67  N.  E. 
793.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  issues 
involved:  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  R.  Co.  v.  Kinnare,  203  111.  388, 
392,  67  N.  E.  826;  S.  v.  Davis, 
(N.  Car.)  46  S.  E.  723.  See  Union 
Gold  Min.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  29  Colo. 
511,  69  Pac.  600;  Ferris  v.  Marshall 
(Neb.),  96  N.  W.  602;  Stevens  v. 
Maxwell,  65  Kas.  835,  70  Pac.  873. 
so  s.  7.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153,  17  Atl. 
483,  8  Am.  Cr.  R.  219;  P.  v.  Worden, 
113  Oil.  569,  45  Pac.  844;  S.  v. 
Smith,  65  Conn.  283,  31  Atl.  206; 
Pritclett  v.  S.  92  Ga.  65,  18  S.  E. 
536;  Hawes  v.  S.  88  Atl.  37,  7  So. 
302;  Hawley  v.  Chicago  &  C.  R.  Co. 
71  bwa,  717,  29  N.  W.  787;  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Lieserowitz, 
197  111.  607,  64  N.  E.  718;  Gilchrist 
v.  Hartley,  198  Pa.  St.  132,  47  Atl. 
97f;  S.  v.  Davis  (N.  Car.)  46  S. 
E  723. 


so*  Parkins  v.  Mo.  P.  R.  Co.  (Neb.) 
93  N.  W.  197;  Shebeck  v.  National 
Cracker  Co.  120  Iowa,  414,  94  N.  W. 
930.  See  Livingston  v.  Stevens 
(Iowa)  94  N.  W.  925. 

so**  Howell  v.  Wilcox  &  Gibbs  S. 
M.  Co.  12  Neb.  177,  10  N.  W.  700; 
Stafford  v.  City  of  Oskaloosa,  57 
Iowa,  748,  11  N.  W.  668;  Reed  v. 
Gould,  93  Mich.  359,  53  N.  W.  356; 
Hall  v.  Woodin,  35  Mich.  67;  Shibek 
v.  Nat.  Cracker  Co.  (Iowa),  94  N.  W 
930. 

si  Scott  v.  Provo  City,  14  Utah, 
31,  45  Pac.  1005;  Texas  &  N.  O.  R. 
Co.  v.  Mortenen  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 
66  S.  W.  99.  See  Jensen  v.  Steiber 
(Neb.)  93  N.  W.  697.  For  the  pur- 
pose of  avoiding  repetition,  instruc- 
tions may  refer  to  others  given  in 
the  charge;  McElya  v.  Hill,  105 
Tenn.  319,  59  S.  W.  1025;  S.  v. 
Haines,  160  Mo.  555,  61  S.  W.  621. 

52  Rome  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  101 
Ga.  26,  28  S.  E.  429.  See  City  of 
Peoria  v.  Gerber,  168  111.  323,  48  N. 
E.  152. 


§    92  BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS.  82 

pecially  if  immaterial  issues  become  involved  in  the  case.53  The 
court  is  not  required  to  take  notice  of  an  immaterial  issue; 
hence  instructions  requested  on  such  an  issue  are  properly  re- 
fused.54 But  as  a  general  rule  the  giving  of  an  instruction  on 
an  immaterial  issue  is  harmless.55 

§  92.  Instructions  ignoring  issues. — The  giving  of  an  instruc- 
tion designed  to  call  the  attention  of  the  jury  to  the  issues 
presented  by  the  pleadings,  but  which  omits  any  material  issue, 
is  error.06  Thus  in  an  action  for  personal  injury  an  instruction 
given  which  wholly  ignores  the  necessity  for  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  care  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  is  erroneous,  unless 
cured  by  other  instructions  ;57  or  an  instruction  ignoring  the 
fact  that  the  defendant  is  required  to  exercise  care  and  caution 
is  also  erroneous.58  Or  to  single  out  one  of  the  several  im- 
portant issues  and  submit  it  as  the  controling  issue  is  improper 
and  prejudicial.59  So  it  is  likewise  error  for  the  court  to  direct 
the  attention  of  the  jury  to  a  subordinate  issue,  and  to  return 
a  verdict  based  upon  their  finding  on  such  issue.00 

§  93.  Issues  unsupported  by  evidence.— As  a  general  rule  it 
is  error  in  the  giving  of  instructions  to  submit  to  the  jury  for 
their  determination  any  issue  presented  by  the  pleadings  which 
the  evidence  does  not  tend  to  establish.01  Thus,  for  example  it 

ss  West  v.   S.  63  Neb.   257,  88  N.  ™  Bowden   v.    Achor,   95   Ga.   243, 

W.  503.  22  S.  E.  254;   Dallas  &  0.  O.  C.  E. 

54  Maher  v.  James  Hanley  Brew-  R.   Co.   v.   Harvey   (Tex.   Cv.   App.) 

ing  Co.    23   R.   I.   343,   50   Atl.   392;  27   S.   W.   423. 

S.  v.  Clark,  51  W.  Va.  457,  41  S.  E.  GO  Northern  Pac.  R.   Co.   r.   Bab- 

204.  ccck,  154  U.  S.  190,  14  Sup.  Ct.  978. 

ss  ^F.tna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sanford,  6i  Alabama  &  V.  R.  Co.  r.  Hoyne, 

200  111.   126,  65  N.  E.   661.  24  So.  907;   Burnet  v.  Cavanagh,  56 

56  Carruth  v.  Harris,  41  Neb.  789,  Neb.   190,   76  N.  W.   578;   Hamilton 
60  N.  W.  106;   Leiter  v.  Lyons   (R.  v.    Singer    S.    M.    Co.    54    111.    370; 
I.)    52    Atl.    78.  Harris   v.    Higden   (Tex.   Cv.    App.) 

57  Western  Stone  Co.  v.  Whalen,  41  S.  W.  412;  Myers  v.  S.  (rex.  Cv. 
151  111.  472,  487,  38  N.  E.  241,  42  Am.  App.)  39  S.  W.  938;  Dooner  v.  Del- 
St.   244;    Sinclair  v.   Berndt,   87   111.  aware  &  H.   C.   Co.  164  Pa.  St.   17, 
174;    Chicago   &    N.    W.    R.    Co.    v.  30  Atl.   269;    Tettle  v.  S.    (Ttx.   Cr. 
Clark,  70  111.  276;  Denver  Tr.  Co.  v.  App.)    31   S.  W.   677;    Prewitt  v.   S. 
Lassasso,   22   Colo  444,   45   Pac.   409  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  29  S.  W.  792;  Bar- 
(issue  of  contributory  negligence  ig-  ron    v.    Barren,    122    Ala.    19s    25 
nored);    McVey  v.   St.   Glair  Co.  49  So.    55;    S.    v.    Weaver,    165    IVb.    1, 
W.  Va.  412,  38  S.  E.  648   (ignoring  65  S.  W.  308,  88  Am.  St.  406;  /lien 
issue   of   contributory    negligence).  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  66  S.  W.  >71; 

ss  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.      Griffin  v.  Henderson,  117  Ga.  382  43 
O'Conner,  115  111.  254,  263,  3  N.  E.       S.  E.  712. 
501. 


83  ISSUES    UNSUPPORTED   BY    EVIDENCE — ILLUSTRATIONS.       §    93a 

is  error  to  submit  to  the  jury  whether  or  not  a  party  caused  an 
injury  by  negligence,  under  a  complaint  or  declaration  charg- 
ing damages  to  have  been  sustained  by  unlawful  and  wilful  con- 
duct, where  the  evidence  fails  to  show  negligence.62 

And  where  there  are  several  issues  presented  by  the  plead- 
ings, and  the  evidence  tends  to  support  only  one  or  a  part  of 
them,  it  is  error  to  submit  to  the  jury  all  of  the  issues ;  only  such 
of  the  issues  should  be  submitted  as  the  evidence  tends  to  prove.63 
Also  if  some  of  the  issues  or  facts  a're  admitted  it  is  improper 
to  give  an  instruction  calling  for  proof  of  all  of  the  issues  set 
out  in  the  pleadings.64  The  fact  that  the  court  limits  the  in- 
structions to  the  issues  set  out  in  the  pleadings  where  a  party 
has  the  right,  under  -statutory  provision,  to  prove  certain  mat- 
ters without  setting  the  same  out  in  the  pleadings  cannot  be 
complained  of  as  error  when  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  prove 
such  other  matters.65 

§  93a.  Issue  unsupported  by  evidence — Illustrations. — "You 
are  charged  that  if  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  received  an  elec- 
tric shock  while  attempting  to  board  one  of  defendant's 
cars,  then  you  are  instructed  that  if  the  defendant,  by  the  use 
of  the  highest  care,  could  not  have  discovered  the  danger  from 
electricity,  and  could  not  have  prevented  the  same,  then  you 
cannot  presume  that  the  defendant  was  guilty  of  negligence 
merely  from  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  was  shocked,  and  cannot 
find  any  damages  for  the  plaintiff  resulting  as  a  direct  and 
proximate  result  of  such  electric  shock  unless  you  find  that  the 
presence  of  such  electrictiy  in  the  handholds  of  said  car  was 
caused  by  some  negligence  of  defendant."  There  was  no  error 
in  refusing  this  charge  for  the  reason  that  there  was  no  evidence 
authorizing  the  submission  of  the  issue  presented  therein.  The 
witness  Gerrett  testified  that  the  car  was  bought  in  1895  or 
1896,  and  that  it  was  of  an  improved  make.  There  was  no  evi- 
dence that  at  the  time  of  the  accident  the  car,  or  its  appliances, 
was  in  proper  condition,  or  that  the  danger  from  electricity 

62  Parker  v.  Hastings,  123  N.  Car.  St.  541;   Connecticut  M.  L.  Ins.  Co. 

671,  31  S.  E.  833.  v.  McWherter,  73  Fed.  444. 

es  Hubbard  v.  Hubbard  (Tex.  Cv.  64  O'Donnell  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
App.)  38  S.  W.  388;  Wright  v.  Har-  P.  R.  Co.  (Neb.)  91  N.  W.  566;  Day- 
die  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  30  S.  W.  675;  ton  v.  City  of  Lincoln,  39  Neb.  74, 
Heller  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Co.  57  N.  W.  754. 

109  Mich.  53,  66  N.  W.  667,  63  Am.          ™  Kettry  v.  Thumma,  9  Ind.  App. 

498,   36  N.   E.  919. 


§  94. 


BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS. 


84 


could  not  have  been  discovered  by  the  exercise  of  care.  It  was 
not  shown  that  it  had  recently  been  inspected  and  found  in 
good  repair,  or  that  there  was  any  system  of  inspection  in  vogue 
by  the  defendant.66 

In  an  action  for  personal  injury,  the  defendant  having  pleaded 
a  release,  the  plaintiff  claiming  that  such  release  was  procured 
by  fraud  while  she  was  in  a  dazed  condition  of  mind  resulting 
from  the  injury,  the  issue  of  the  mental  capacity  of  the  plain- 
tiff should  not  be  submitted  to  the  jury  where  there  is  no  evi- 
dence tending  to  show  want  of  mental  capacity.67 

§  94.  Instructions  based  on  pleadings. — Instructions  must  not 
only  be  predicated  on  the  evidence  but  also  confined  to  the 
issues  set  forth  by  the  pleadings,68  and  avoid  submitting 
for  the  determination  of  the  jury  matters  of  fact  not 
in  issue.69  Thus,  for  example,  where  the  pleadings  do  not  pre- 


ee  Dallas  C.  E.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Broad- 
hurst  (Tex.  Cv.  App.)  68  S.  W.  315. 

67  Och  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
130  Mo.  27,  31  S.  W.  962. 

es  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Sanders, 
166  111.  270,  281,  46  N.  E.  799; 
Frorer  v.  P.  141  111.  171,  187,  31 
N.  E.  395;  Brant  v.  Gallup,  111 
111.  487,  493,  53  Am.  R.  638;  Grim 
v.  Murphy,  110  111.  271,  276;  Chica- 
go &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs,  110  111. 
414;  Pitstick  v.  Osterman,  107  Iowa, 
189,  17  N.  W.  845;  Mobile  £  O.  R. 
Co.  v.  Godfrey,  155  111.  78,  39  N.  E. 
590;  Boldenv/ick  v.  Cahill,  187  111. 
218,  58  N.  E.  351;  Leach  v.  Nichols, 
55  111.  273;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C. 
R.  Co.  v.  Sheris,  108  111.  631;  P.  v. 
Lehr,  196  111.  361,  63  N.  E.  725; 
Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Peterson, 
30  Colo.  77,  69  Pac.  578;  Peters  v. 
McCay  &  Co.  136  Cal.  73,  68  Pac. 
478;  Edd  v.  Union  P.  Coal  Co.  25 
Utah,  293,  71  Pac.  215;  Chicago, 
G.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  66  Kas. 
115,  71  Pac.  246  (want  of  plaintiff's 
ordinary  care) ;  Crooks  &  Co.  v. 
Eldridge  &  H.  Co.  64  Ohio  St.  195, 
203,  60  N.  E.  203  (damages  not 
claimed  by  pleadings) ;  Bartlett  v. 
Cunningham,  85  111.  22;  Sargent  v. 
Linden  M.  Co.  55  Cal.  204;  East 
St.  Louis  P.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Hightower, 
92  111.  139,  141;  Fisk  v.  Chicago,  M. 


&  St.  P.  R.  Co.  74  Iowa,  424,  38 
N.  W.  132;  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Tiedman,  39  Fla.  196,  22 
So.  658;  McCann  v.  Ullman,  109 
Wis.  574,  85  N.  W.  493;  Anderson 
v.  Baird,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  444,  40  S.  W. 
923;  Rapp  v.  Kester,  125  Ind.  79, 
25  N.  E.  141;  Austin  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Flannagan  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 
40  S.  W.  1043;  Matheson  v.  Kuhn, 
15  Colo.  App.  477,  63  Pac.  125;  Texas 
&  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Vaughan,  16  Tex. 
Cv.  App.  403,  40  S.  W.  1065;  Gibbs 
v.  Wall,  10  Colo.  153,  14  Pac.  216; 
Roddy  v.  Harrell  (Tex.  Cv.  App.) 
40  S.  W.  1064;  Chamberlain  Bank- 
ing H.  v.  Woolsey,  60  Neb.  516,  83 
N.  W.  729;  Myers  v.  S.  97  Ga.  76, 
25  S.  E.  252;  P.  v.  Topia,  131  Cal. 
647,  63  P.  1001;  Dieckerhoff  v.  Al- 
der, 32  N.  Y.  S.  698,  12  Misc.  445; 
Schrader  v.  Hoover,  87  Iowa,  654, 
54  N.  W.  463;  Shaughnessy  v.  Sew- 
ell  &  D.  C.  Co.  160  Mass.  331,  35  N. 
E.  861;  Tower  v.  McFarland  (Neb.), 
96  N.  W.  172;  Russell  v.  Huntsville 
&c.  Co.  137  Ala.  627;  Joplin  Water 
Works  v.  Joplin  (Mo.),  76  S.  W.  960. 
es  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Sanders, 
166  111.  281,  46  N.  E.  799;  Bourland 
v.  Gibson,  124  111.  602,  607,  17  N.  E. 
319;  Merrill  v.  Suing  (Neb.)  92  N. 
W.  618;  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart, 
87  111.  App.  446;  McBaine  v.  John- 


85 


CONFINED   TO   ISSUES   IN   PLEADINGS. 


§    94 


sent  the  issue  of  contributory  negligence  the  giving  of  an  in- 
struction on  such  issue  is  improper.70  And  by  the  same  rule 
an  instruction  charging  the  jury  that  the  plaintiff  may  recover 
damages  sustained  for  any  other  negligence  besides  that  al- 
leged in  his  declaration  is  erroneous.71 

A  party  is  not  entitled  to  instructions  on  any  element  or  feature 
of  a  case  not  alleged  in  his  pleadings,  or  which  is  not  an  issue 
in  the  case.72  And  if  instructions  are  not  confined  to  the  issues 
presented  they  should  be  refused,  although  otherwise  correct.73 


son,  153  Mo.  191,  55  S.  W.  1031; 
Van  Bergen  v.  Eulberg,  111  Iowa, 
139,  82  N.  W.  483;  City  of  Dallas 
v.  Beeman,  23  Tex.  Cv.  App.  315, 
55  S.  W.  762;  Horgan  v.  Brady,  155 
Mo.  659,  56  S.  W.  294;  Washington 
Ice  Co.  v.  Bradley,  171  111.  255,  49 
N.  E.  422;  Smith  v.  Bank  of  iNew 
England,  70  N.  H.  187,  46  Atl.  230; 
Rotan  Grocery  Co.  v.  Martin  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.)  57  S.  W.  706. 

70  Perez  v.  San  Antonio  &  A.  P. 
R.  Co.  28  Tex.  Cv.  App.  255,  67  S. 
W.    1082;     International    &    G.    N. 
R.    CQ.    v.    Locke    (Tex.    Cv.    App.) 

67  S.  W.  1082;    St.  Louis  S.  W.  R. 
Co.   v.    Me  Adams    (Tex.   Cv.   App.), 

68  S.  W.   319. 

71  Chicago   &  A.   R.   Co.   v.   Ray- 
burn,    153    111.    290,    38    N.    E.    558; 
Cleveland,   C.    &   St.    L.    R.    Co.    v. 
Walter,    147    111.    60,    65,    35    N.    E. 
529;    Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v. 
Libey,  68  111.  App.  144;    Chicago  & 
E.    I.    R.    Co.    v.    Kneirim,    152    111. 
465,  39  N.  E.  324,  43  Am.   St.  259; 
Lebanon  Coal  &  M    A.  v.  Zerwick, 
77  111.  App.   486;    Camp  Point  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Ballon,  71  111.  417;   Indianap- 
olis, B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v    Berney,  71 
111.  390;  Smith  v.  Wilmington  &  W. 
R.  Co.  126  N.  Car.  712,  36  S.  E.  170. 

72  Fetcher   v.   Louisville   &  N.   R. 
Co.  102  Tenn.  1,  49  S.  W.  739;   Co- 
lumbus,   C.    &    I.    C.    v.    Troech,    68 
111.  545,  549,  18  Am.  R.  578;   Taylor 
v.   Felder,  5   Tex.   Cv.  App    417,  24 
S.  W.   313;    La  Grande  Ins.   Co.   v. 
Shaw   (Ore.),  74  Pac.  919. 

73  Johnson    v.    Johnson,    114    111. 
€11,  622,  3  N.  E.  232,  55  Am.  R.  883; 
Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stoddard, 
52  Neb.  745,  73  N.  W.  291;  Sanger  v. 
Thompson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  44  S.  W. 


408;  Baldwin  v.  Cornelius,  104  Wis. 
68,  80  N.  W.  63;  Empson  Packing 
Co.  v.  Vaughn,  27  Colo.  66,  59  Pac. 
749;  Richison  v.  Mead,  11  S.  Dak. 
639,  80  N.  W.  131;  Knight  v.  Pacific 
C.  Stage  Co.  (Cal.),  34  Pac.  868; 
Gulf,  C.  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Higby  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  26  S.  W.  737;  Kyner  v. 
Sambuer  (Neb.),  91  N.  W.  491;  Ben- 
ton  Co.  Sav.  Bank  v.  Boddicker,  117 
Iowa,  407,  90  N.  W.  822;  French 
v.  Ware,  65  Vt.  338,  26  Atl.  1096; 
Kelly  v.  Fleming,  113  N.  Car.  133, 
18  S.  E.  81;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Courtney,  30  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  544,  71  S.  W.  307;  Beach  v. 
Netherland,  93  Ga.  233,  18  S.  E. 
525;  Gover  v.  Dill,  3  Iowa,  337; 
Porter  v.  White,  128  N.  Car.  42, 
38  S.  E.  24;  Ten  Eyck  v.  Witbeck, 
55  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.),  165;  Kansas 
Inv.  Co.  v.  Carter,  160  Mass.  421, 
36  N.  E.  63;  Thomas  v.  S-.  126  Ala. 
4,  28  So.  591;  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co. 
v.  Gray  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  71  S.  W. 
316;  Schafer  v.  Gilmer,  13  Nev.  330; 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  75 
Tex.  77;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mattingly,  22  Ky.  L.  R.  489;  Bender 
v.  Dugan,  99  Mo.  126,  12  S.  W. 
795;  McGar  v.  National  &  P.  W.  M. 
Co.  22  R.  I.  347,  47  Atl.  1092; 
Abernathy  v.  Southern  R.  I.  P.  Co. 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  62  S.  W.  786;  St. 
Louis,  K.  C.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleary, 
77  Mo.  634;  Omaha  L.  &  T.  Co.  v. 
Douglas  Co.  62  Neb.  1,  86  N.  W. 
936;  Atlas  Nat.  Bank  v.  Holm,  71 
Fed.  489;  Johnson  v.  Worthy,  17 
Ga.  420;  City  of  Dallas  v.  Breeman, 
23  Tex.  Cv.  App.  315,  55  S.  W. 
762;  Eklund  v.  Toner,  121  Mich. 
687,  80  N.  W.  791;  Saunders'  Ex'rs  v. 
Weeks  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  55  S.  W. 


95 


BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS. 


86 


Instructions  submitting  to  the  jury  an  issue  not  raised  by  the 
pleadings  nor  supported  by  evidence,  which  brings  into  the  case 
many  details,  having  a  tendency  to  mislead  and  draw  the  atten- 
tion of  the  jury  away  from  the  proper  issues,  are  erroneous.7* 
So  an  instruction  which  directs  the  jury  that  they  may  base  a 
verdict  on  some  matter  or  thing  not  raised  by  the  pleadings 
is  improper  and  generally  erroneous.75 

§  95.  Based  on  evidence  rather  than  pleadings. — Instructions 
should  be  based  on  the  evidence  rather  than  on  the  pleadings.78 
Thus  in  a  personal  injury  case  an  instruction  that  the  jury,  in 
estimating  the  plaintiff's  damages,  may  consider  his  loss  of  time, 
if  any,  so  far  as  shown  by  the  evidence,  is  proper,  although  the 
plaintiff's  declaration  does  not,  in  direct  terms,  allege  any  loss 
of  time,  but  alleges  in  general  terms  the  injury  which  caused 
the  loss  of  time.  It  is  sufficient  that  the  declaration  states  the 


33;  Alexander  v.  Staley,  110  Iowa, 
607,  81  N.  W.  803;  Houston  &  T. 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson,  20  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  255,  48  S.  W.  747;  Rosenblatt 
v.  Haymam,  56  N.  Y.  S.  378;  Rock- 
ford  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nelson,  65  111.  415, 
422;  Mahain  ".  Com.  21  Ky.  L.  R. 
1807,  56  S.  W.  529;  Bell  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  56  S.  W.  913;  Sample  v. 
Rand,  112  Iowa,  616,  84  N.  W.  945; 
Breneman  v.  Kilgore  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  35  S.  W.  202;  Phillips  v.  Cor- 
nell, 133  Mass.  546. 

74  Cerrillos   Coal   R.    Co.   v.   Des- 
eran,   9   N.    Mex.    49,   49   Pac.    807; 
Wells  &  Co.  v.  Heintz  (Neb.)  72  N. 
W.  1034;  Norfolk  Beet  Sugar  Co.  v. 
Hight,  56  Neb.   162,  76  N.  W.   566; 
Chicago,   B.    &   Q.   R.    Co.   v.   Greg- 
ory, 58   111.   272,  283;    St.   Louis,  A. 
&   T.   H.   R.   Co.   v.   Manley,  58  111. 
304;    Cossitt  v.   Hobbs,   56   111.   238; 
Blackman  v.  Kessler,  110  Iowa,  140, 
81  N.  W.  185;  Cunningham  v.  Davis, 
175  Mass.  213,  56  N.  E.  2;   Georgia, 
S.   &   F.   R.   Co.   v.   Zarks,   108   Ga. 
800,  34  S.  E.  127;  Rishell  v.  Weil,  63 
N.   Y.   S.   178,   61   N.   Y.    S.   1112,  30 
Misc.    805;     Houston    &    T.    C.    R. 
Co.    v.    Ritter    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    41 
S.  W.  753;  Queen  Ins.  Co.  v.  Leon- 
ard, 9  Ohio  C.  C.  46. 

75  McCready    v.    Phillips     (Neb.), 
67   N.   W.   7;    Davidson   v.   Willing- 
ford  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  30  S.  W.  827; 


Sweet  v.  Excelsior  E.  Co.  57  N.  J.  L. 
224,  31  Atl.  721;  Coos  Bay,  R.  &  E. 
R.  Co.  v.  Siglin,  26  Ore.  387,  38 
Pac.  192;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
v.  Wickham  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  28 
S.  W.  917;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Siligman  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
23  S.  W.  298;  Reed  v.  Com.  98  Va. 
817,  36  S.  E.  399;  Hartford  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Josey,  6  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
290,  25  S.  W.  685;  Mason  v.  South- 
ern R.  Co.  58  S.  Car.  70,  79  Am.  St. 
826;  Bruni  v.  Garza  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
26  S.  W.  108;  Neglev  v.  Cowell,  91 
Iowa,  256,  59  S.  W.  48;  Spitalera  v. 
Second  Ave.  R.  Co.  25  N.  Y.  S.  919, 
73  Hun.  37;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
v.  Courtney  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  23  S. 
W.  226;  Cage  v.  Tucker's  Heirs,  29 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  586,  69  S.  W.  425 
(validity  of  a  debt) ;  El  Paso  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  McComas  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  72  S.  W.  629;  Love  v.  Wyatt, 
19  Tex.  312;  Southern  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Bryan,  115  Ga.  659,  42  S.  E.  42; 
Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  Riber.  66  Ind. 
504;  Terry  v.  Shively,  64  Ind.  112'; 
Williams  v.  Southern  P.  R.  Co.  110 
Cal.  457,  42  Pac.  974;  Morrow  v. 
St.  Paul  C.  R.  Co.  65  Minn.  382, 
67  N.  W.  1002;  Holt  v.  Pearson, 
12  Utah,  63,  41  Pac.  560;  Morearty 
v.  S.  46  Neb.  652,  65  N.  W.  784. 

re  Quinn  v.  P.  123  111.  342,  15  N. 
E.    46.      See    also    Birney    v.    New 


87  CONFINED    TO    DEFENSE   ALLEGED — ILLUSTRATIONS.  §    97 

injury  without  describing  it  in  all  its  seriousness.77  So  in  a 
criminal  case  for  the  larceny  of  a  horse  an  instruction  referring 
to  the  horse  as  a  "certain  roan  horse"  is  proper  where  the  evi- 
dence shows  him  to  be  a  roan  horse,  although  the  indictment 
does  not  allege  the  color  of  the  horse.78 

§  96.  Instructions  confined  to  defense  alleged. — The  court  in 
charging  the  jury  should  disregard  any  defense  not  alleged  in 
the  pleadings.  In  other  words,  the  instructions  should  be  con- 
fined to  the  defense  set  out  in  the  pleadings.79  Thus  the  giving 
of  instructions  on  the  theory  of  fraud  as  a  defense  to  an  action 
for  the  price  of  property  is  error  where  the  defense  alleged  in 
the  pleadings  is  a  breach  of  warranty,  and  not  fraud.80  Where 
the  defendant  pleads  fraudulent  representations  as  a  defense 
to  an  action  against  him  for  the  purchase  price  of  property 
he  cannot  have  the  defense  of  mutual  mistake  submitted  to  the 
jury,  that  issue  not  being  raised  by  the  pleadings.81  So  in  an 
action  for  a  breach  of  warranty  on  the  sale  of  goods  an  instruc- 
tion as  to  what  constitutes  fraud,  is  improper  where  fraud  is 
not  an  issue  in  the  case.82 

§  97.  Instruction  based  on  pleadings — Illustrations. — A  charge 
which  states  that  if  the  jury  find  for  the  plaintiff,  such  damage 
may  be  given  as  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case  may  be 
just,  and  that  in  awarding  damages  they  may  take  into  considera- 
tion the  relation  proved  as  existing  between  the  plaintiff  and  the 
deceased,  and  the  injury  sustained  by  the  plaintiff,  if  any,  in 
the  loss  of  the  society  of  the  deceased,  is  improper  and  erroneous 

York  &  W.  P.  T.  Co.  18  Md.  341,  81  Van  Hall,  4  Tex.   Cv.   App.  404,  23 

Am.     Dec.     607'     2    Thomp.    Trials,  S.  W.  573. 

§  2310.  si  Braunschweiger   v.    Waits,   179 

77  Chicago    City    R.    Co.    v..  Has-  Pa.   St.   47.   36  Atl.   155;    Murchison 
tings,    136    111.    254,    26    N.    E.    594;  v.    Mansur-Tibbetts    Implement   Co. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Sheehan,  113  111.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  37  S.  W.  605.     See 
658.  Daniels  v.  Florida,  C.   &  P.  R.  Co. 

78  Quinn    v.    P.    123    111.    342,    15  62  S.  Car.  1,  39  S.  E.  762. 

N.  E.  46.     See  Preisker  v.  P.  47  111.  82  Wallace   v.    Wren,   32    111.    146; 

382.  Frick    v.    Kabaker,    116    Iowa,    494, 

79  Pittsburg  Spring  Co.  v.  Smith,  90  N.  W.  498.     A  plea  of  the  stat- 
115  Ga.  764,  42  S.  E.  80;   Jordan  v.  ute  of  limitations  of  three  and  five 
Indianapolis  Water  Co.  155  Ind.  337,  years   will   not  warrant  the  giving 
64  N.  E.  680.  of    instructions    on    the    statute    of 

so  Farmers'  &  M.  Bank  v.  Upton,  limitations    of    ten    years,    Stringer 

37    Neb.    417,    55   N.    W.    1044.     See  v.    Singleteny    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    23 

Burleson     v.    Lindsey      (Tex.      Cv.  S.  W.  1117. 
App.),   23  S.   W.   729.     See  Flint  v. 


§    98  BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS.  88 

where  the  complaint  or  declaration  does  not  allege  damages 
growing  out  of  the  loss  of  the  society  of  the  deceased,  and 
no  evidence  was  introduced  or  offered  as  to  the  social  relations 
existing  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  deceased.83 

In  an  action  brought  by  a  husband  for  personal  injury  to  his 
wife  an  instruction  that  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  for  mental 
suffering  is  improper  where  the  plaintiff  does  not  claim  damages 
for  mental  suffering.84  So  an  instruction  charging  that  "where 
the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  an  injury  was  wilfully 
done,  or  resulted  from  a  gross  neglect  of  duty  by  the  defendant," 
then  he  is  liable  for  such  injury,  is  misleading  and  prejudicial 
where  such  issue  is  not  involved  in  the  case  nor  supported  by 
the  evidence.85  Another  case :  Where  the  defendant  asked  the 
court  to  charge  the  jury  ''that  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  defendant's  ice  wagon  did  not  run  over  the  deceased 
they  will  find  the  defendant  not  guilty."  The  declaration  con- 
tained no  averment  that  the  wagon  ran  over  the  deceased ;  hence 
such  instruction  was  properly  refused.86 

§  98.  Instructions  limited  to  counts. — A  general  instruction 
stating  a  correct  proposition  of  law  applicable  to  any  one  or 
more  of  the  several  counts  of  a  declaration  is  proper  if  there 
is  evidence  to  support  it,  though  it  may  not  be  applicable  to 
other  counts.87  But  where  a  party  is  entitled  to  recover  on  only 
one  of  two  or  more  counts  of  his  pleadings,  if  at  all,  the  court 
should  so  instruct  the  jury.  Thus  where  the  plaintiff's  declara- 
tion contains  two  counts,  one  on  a  contract  and  one  in  tort,  the 
instructions  should  limit  the  jury  to  a  finding  on  only  one  of 
the  counts.88 

ss  Holt  v.   Spokane  &  P.   R.   Co.  South  Oovington  &  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 

3  Idaho,  703,  35  Pac.  39.  Stroth,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1807,  66  S.  W. 

84  Dallis  Rapid  Tr.  Co.  v.  Camp-  177;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 

hell   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  26  S.  W.  884.  Jazo  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  25  S.  W.  712; 

ss  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Robin-  Dallis,  0.  &  C.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Harvey 
son,    106    111.    142.      See    Louisville,  (Tex.   Cv.   App.),  27  S.  W.  423. 
N.    A.    &   C.    R.    Co.   v.    Shires,   108  so  Washington    Ice    Co.    v.    Brad- 
Ill.   617;    Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.   R.  ley,  171  111.  258,  49  N.  E.  519. 
Co.    v.    Johnson    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),  87  Greenup    v.    Stoker,    8    111.    (3 
29   S.  W.  428;    Gulf,  C.  &  S.  P.  R.  Gilm.),   202,   214;    Lake  S.   &  M.   S. 
Co.    v.    Cash    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    28  R.   Co.   v.   Hession,   150  111.   546,   37 
S.  W.  387;   Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  N.    E.    905. 

v.  Buffehr,  30  Colo.  27,  69  Pac.  582;  *«  Hoist  v.    Stewart,   161    (Mass.), 

Louisville  R.  Co.  v.  Wills'  Admr'x,  516,  37  N.  E.  577.     See  Cobb-Choc- 

28   Ky.    L.    R.   1961,   66   S.   W.   628;  olate  Co.  v.  Sandusky,  207  111.  463. 


89  LIMITING   TO    COUNTS — ISSUES    OUTSIDE   OF   PLEADINGS.       §    99 

Where  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  prove  one  or  more  of 
several  counts  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  should  confine  the 
instructions  to  the  count  or  counts  which  the  evidence  tends 
to  sustain,  and  not  instruct  as  to  the  other  counts.  Thus  in  a 
criminal  case  where  an  information  charges  in  one  count  an 
assault  with  intent  to  commit  murder  and  in  another  count  an 
assault  with  intent  to  commit  great  bodily  injury,  and  there  is  no 
evidence  tending  to  prove  the  charge  in  the  first  count,  the  court 
should  not  instruct  as  to  that  charge,  and  to  do  so  is  error, 
although  the  defendant  was  not  found  guilty  of  the  crime  charged 
in  that  count.89 

And  where  there  is  no  evidence  to  sustain  the  charge  in  one 
of  the  counts  of  an  indictment  which  charges  the  commission 
of  an  offense  by  different  means  in  different  counts,  the  court 
should  instruct  the  jury  that  there  is  no  evidence  as  to  such 
count,  and  a  refusal  to  do  so  is  error,  especially  if  the  jury  con- 
vict on  both  or  all  the  counts.90  Under  an  indictment  containing 
but  one  count  for  the  unlawful  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor,  where 
the  evidence  tends  to  prove  several  distinct  sales  at  different 
times,  covering  a  period  of  several  months,  the  prosecution  should 
be  restricted  to  some  one  particular  transaction  or  sale,  and  the 
court  in  charging  the  jury  should  confine  them  to  the  one  par- 
ticular sale  to  which  the  prosecution  is  restricted.  Under  such 
indictment  an  instruction  directing  the  jury  to  consider  all  the 
evidence  in  determining  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused 
is  erroneous.91 

§  99.  Issues  raised  outside  of  pleadings. — Where  the  parties 
raise  issues  of  fact  not  alleged  in  the  pleadings,  without  objection, 
it  is  not  error  to  instruct  the  jury  on  such  issues.92  It  is  proper 
to  give  instructions  on  the  theory  upon  which  the  parties  try 
a  case,  although  the  pleadings,  technically,  do  not  support  such 
theory.93  When  the  facts  proved  are  not  within  the  allegations 

89  Botsch    v.    S.    43    Neb.    501,    61  370,    41   S.   E.   468;    Brusie   v.'Peck 

N.    W.    730.  Bros.  &  Co.  135  N.  Y.  622,  3i2  N.  E. 

»o  P.    v.   Vanzile,   143   N.    Y.   368,  76. 
38   N.   E.   380.  93  Jarmusch  v.  Otis  Iron  &  Steel 

si  Stockwell  v.  S.  27  Ohio  St.  566.  Co.  23  Ohio  Cir.   122.     See  Hansen 

92  Qualey    v.    Johnson,    80    Minn.  v.  St.  Paul  Gas  Light  Co.    (Minn.), 

408,    83    N.    W.    393;    Davis    v.    At-  92  N.  W.  510;   Blum  v.  Whitworth, 

lanta  &  C.  A.  L.  R.  Co.  63  S.  Car.  66  Tex.  350,  1  S.  W.  108. 
577,    41   S.    E.    892,   also   63   S.   Car. 


§  100  BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS.  90 

of  the  pleadings,  and  each  of  the  parties  procures  instructions 
declaring  the  law  applicable  to  the  facts  thus  shown,  regardless 
of  the  issues  made  by  the  pleadings,  and  asks  a  verdict  in  ac- 
cordance therewith,  neither  will  be  heard  to  complain.94 

§  100.  Issues  abandoned. — If  some  of  the  issues  set  out  in 
the  pleadings  have  been  abandoned  during  the  progress  of  the 
trial,  by  admission  or  otherwise,  then  it  is  proper  for  the  court  to 
restrict  the  instructions  to  the  remaining  issues  upon  which  the 
parties  are  contending.95  Thus  where  the  defendant  claims  a 
set-off  charging  that  the  plaintiff  has  failed  to  perform  his  con- 
tract, and  the  plaintiff  in  reply  thereto  states  that  a  settlement 
had  been  made  between  them  every  month  as  to  the  obligations 
of  the  contract,  which  was  not  denied  by  the  defendant,  he  there- 
by abandoned  his  defense  of  set-off,  and  was  not  entitled  to  in- 
structions as  to  that  defense.96  So  where  the  plaintiff  has 
abandoned  a  count  in  his  declaration  or  petition  then  it  is  im- 
proper to  submit  to  the  jury  any  issue  contained  in  such  count.97 

The  giving  of  an  instruction  based  on  an  original  petition  or 
declaration  which  has  been  abandoned  by  the  filing  of  an 
amended  petition  or  declaration  is  error.98  But  the  court  in 
charging  the  jury  is  not  bound  to  withdraw  an  abandoned  issue.99 
Where  an  issue  in  a  cause  has  been  disposed  of  by  a  former  trial, 
it  is  improper  to  instruct  the  jury  in  such  manner  as  to  impress 
them  with  the  idea  that  such  issue  is  still  in  the  case.  Thus  in 
a  homicide  case  a  conviction  of  manslaughter  is  in  legal  effect 
an  acquittal  of  murder,  and  on  a  second  trial  the  court  is  not 
authorized  to  instruct  on  the  murder  charge.100 

94  Chicago   &  A.   R.   Co.   v.   Har-      S.   E.   671;    Bugbee   v.    Kendricken, 
rington,   192   111.   27,   61  N.   E.   622;       132    Mass.    349. 

Illinois    Steel    Co.    v.    Novak,    184  96  Doysher  v.  Adams,  16  Ky.  L.  R. 

111.  501,  56  N.  E.  966.  582,    29    S.    W.    348.      See    also    Fox 

95  De  Graffenried  v.   Menard,  103  v.  Utter,  6  Wash.  299,  33  Pac.  354. 
Ga.  651,  30  S.  E.  560;   Crum  v.  Yu-  07  Columbus    S.    Bank    v.    Crane 
nott  (Ind.  App.),  40  N.  E.  79;  Lake  Co.  56  Neb.  317.  76  N.  W.  557. 
Shore  &  M.   S.  R.  Co.  v.  Richards,  os  Purdom  v.  Brussells,  22  Ky.  L. 
152  HI.  59,  38  N.  E.  773.     See  Mid-  R.   1796,   66   S.   W.   22;    Western  U. 
dlebrooks    v.     Mayne,  96    Ga.   449,  Tel.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
23    S.    E.    398;     Scholtz    v.    North-  67  S.  W.  338. 

western  M.  L.  I.  Co.  100  Fed.  573;  w  Galveston,    H.   &   S.    A.    R.   Co. 

Tathwell  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids,  v.  Croskell  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  25  S.  W. 

114  Iowa,   180,   86   N.   W.   291.     See  486. 

also    Gulf,    C.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co.    v.  100  p.  v.  McFarlane,  134  Cal.  618, 

Shieder   (Tex.   Cv.   App.),  26  S.  W.  66  Pac.   865.     In   Indiana  a  defend- 

509;    Fry  v.    Leshi,   87   Va.   269,   12  ant   who   takes   a  new   trial   under 


91 


THEORY  OF  PARTY  IF  EVIDENCE  SUPPORTS. 


101 


§  101.  Theory  of  party — Instruction. — A  party  is  entitled  to 
instructions  fairly  presenting  to  the  jury  the  law  applicable  to 
the  evidence  which  tends  to  support  his  theory.101  But,  of  course, 
if  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  support  a  theory  there  can 
be  no  ground  for  complaint  in  refusing  instructions  as  to  such 
theory.102 

Instructions  stating  the  theory  of  one  party  on  any  feature 
of  a  case  and  ignoring  the  evidence  in  support  of  the  theory  of 
the  opposing  party  are  erroneous.103  Hence,  if  there  is  any  evi- 
dence tending  to  support  the  theory  of  the  defendant  the  giving 
of  an  instruction  for  the  plaintiff,  which  wholly  ignores  such 
theory,  is  erroneous.104  Or  if  the  instructions  ignore  the  theory 


such  circumstances  waives  the 
former  acquittal  and  may  be  con- 
victed of  murder  on  the  second 
trial.  Veach  v.  State,  60  Ind.  291; 
Burns'  R.  S.  1901  (Ind.)  •§  1910. 

101  Fessenden  v.  Doane,  188  111. 
232,  58  N.  E.  974;  Chicago  U.  Tr. 
Co.  v.  Browdy,  206  111.  617,  69  N. 
E.  113;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Backes, 
133  111.  261,  24  N.  E.  563;  Lamb  v. 
P.  96  111.  73,  80;  Denver  &  R.  G. 
R.  Co.  v.  lies,  25  Colo.  19,  53  Pac. 
222;  Boice  v.  Palmer,  55  Neb.  389, 

75  N.  W.   849;    Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co. 
v.    Godfrey,    155    111.    82,    39    N.    E. 
590;    Missouri,    K.    &   T.   R.    Co.    v. 
Gardenia,   22   Tex.   Cv.   App.   300,   54 
S.  W.  312;   Robertson  v.  Burton,  88 
Minn.   151,  92  N.  W.  538;    Defoe  v. 
St.    Paul    C.    R.    Co.    65    Minn.    319, 
68  N.  W.  35;   Republican  V.  R.  Co. 
v.  Fink,  18  Neb.  89,  24  N.  W.  691; 
Barker    v.    S.    126    Ala.    83,    28    So. 
589;    Beall   v.    Pearre,   12    Md.    550; 
Botkin   v.    Cassady,    106    Iowa,   334, 

76  N.   W.   72i2;    Hughes  Cr.   Law   § 
3249;     Lansing    v.    Wessell    (Neb.), 
97   N.   W.   815;    Rhoades  v.   Chesa- 
peake   &    O.    R.    Co.    (W.    Va.),    55 
L.    R.    A.    175;    Lion    v.    Baltimore 
City  P.  R.  Co.  90  Md.  266,  44  Atl. 
1045,   47  L.   R.   A.    127;    P.   v.  Rice, 
103  Mich.  350,  61  N.  W.  540;   Buck- 
ley   v.    Silverberg,    113    111.    673,    45 
Pac.    804.    See    Galveston,    H.    &   S. 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kinnebrew,  7  Tex.  Cv. 
App.    549,    27    S.    W.    631;    Poole   v. 
Consolidated    St.    R.    Co.    100   Mich. 
379,  59  N.  W.  390;   Memphis  St.  R. 
Co.   v.   Newman,   108  Tenn.   666,   69 
S.  W.  269;    Chicago,  R.   I.  &  P.  R. 


Co.  v.  Buckstaff  (Neb.),  91  N.  W. 
426;  Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Boeson 
(Neb.),  94  N.  W.  619. 

102  Moore  Furniture  Co.  v.  Sloane, 
166  111.  460,  46  N.  E.  1128;  Long- 
enecker  v.  S.  22  Ind.  247. 

ios  Mims  v.  S.  42  Fla.  199,  27  So. 
868;  Dolphin  v.  Plumley,  175  Mass. 
304,  56  N.  E.  281;  Campbell  v.  P. 
109  111.  565,  576,  50  Am.  R.  621; 
Denny  v.  Stout,  59  Neb.  731,  82  N. 
W.  18;  Young  v.  Market,  163  Pa. 
St.  513,  30  Atl.  196;  Jones  v.  Rex 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  31  S.  W.  1077; 
Howell  v.  Mellon,  169  Pa.  St.  138, 
32  Atl.  450;  Sullivan  v.  S.  80  Miss. 
596,  32  So.  2;  Banner  v.  Schles- 
singer,  109  Mich.  262,  67  N.  W.  116; 
Hays  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  196 
Pa.  St.  184,  45  Atl.  925. 

104  Mobile  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Godfrey, 
155  111.  82,  39  N.  E.  590;  Polly  v. 
Com.  16  Ky.  L.  R.  208,  27  S.  W.  862.; 
Boice  v.  Palmer,  55  Neb.  389,  75 
N.  W.  849;  Webb  v.  Big  Kanawha 
&  O.  R.  P.  Co.  43  W.  Va.  800, 
29  S.  E.  519;  Cerrolis  Coal  Co.  v. 
Deserant,  9  N.  Mex.  49,  49  Pac.  807; 
Blan chard  v.  Pratt,  37  111.  243; 
Bloch  v.  Edwards,  116  Ala.  90,  22 
So.  600;  Lindle  v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L. 
R.  1307,  68  S.  W.  986;  S.  v.  Brady, 
(Iowa),  97  N.  W.  64;  De  Foe  v. 
St.  Paul  C.  R.  Co.  65  Minn.  319, 
68  N.  W.  35;  Kadish  v.  Young,  108 
111.  170,  185,  48  Am.  R.  548;  Parker 
v.  Chancellor,  78  Tex.  524,  15  S.  W. 
157;  Laughlin  v.  Gerardi,  67  Mo. 
App.  372;  Oliver  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  43  S.  W.  812;  Atlanta  C.  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hardage,  93  Ga.  457,  21 


§    102  BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS.  92 

of  a  party  as  to  any  one  element  or  branch  of  a  case  they  are 
erroneous.105 

So  where  the  evidence  tends  to  support  two  opposing  theories 
on  a  material  issue  or  fact,  and  the  court  instructs  as  to  the 
theory  of  the  prosecution  and  refuses  to  instruct  on  the  theory 
of  the  defense  it  is  error.106  If  there  is  any  evidence  tending  to 
'support  the  theory  of  a  party  an  instruction  so  drawn  that  it 
withdraws  from  the  jury  the  consideration  of  such  theory  is  er- 
roneous.107 But  the  theory  of  each  of  the  parties  need  not  be 
stated  in  a  single  instruction.108 

§  102.  Instruction  when  several  theories. — Where  the  evidence 
tends  to  support  two  different  theories  by  which  it  is  sought 
to  prove  a  material  fact,  a  charge  to  the  jury  ignoring  the  evi- 
dence of  one  of  such  theories  is  erroneous.109  The  charge  should 
be  comprehensive  enough  to  cover  both  theories,  especially  where 
the  pleading  of  a  party  sets  out  different  theories  in  different 
counts.  And  the  court  may  properly  call  the  attention  of  the 
jury  to  the  different  theories.  This  rule  applies  to  both  civil  and 
criminal  cases.110 

So  for  the  court,  in  charging  the  jury,  to  confine  them  by  in- 
structions to  one  view  of  the  case  when  the  evidence  is  of  such 
character  that  different  constructions  or  views  may  be  drawn 
from  it,  is  error.111  Likewise  in  an  action  of  trespass  for  an 
assault,  where  there  is  evidence  tending  to  prove  self-defense, 
an  instruction  ignoring  that  issue  is  improper.112  And  where 
the  evidence  tends  to  support  several  different  defenses  it  is 

S.  E.  100;  Caraway  v.  Citizens  N.  mann,  164  111.  250,  45  N.  E.  164; 
B'k  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  29  S.  W.  506;  Collins  v.  Waters,  54  111.  486;  Suther 
Memphis  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Newman,  v.  S.  118  Ala.  88,  24  So.  43; 
108  Tenn.  666,  69  S.  W.  269;  Jack-  White  v.  Dinkins,  19  Ga.  285;  Sack- 
son  v.  Com.  96  Va.  107,  30  S.  E.  ett.  v.  Stone,  115  Ga.  466,  41 
452.  S.  E.  564;  Kennedy  v.  Forest 

105  Oliver  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Cv.  Oil  Co.  199  Pa.  St.  644,  49  AtL 

App.),  43  S.  W.  812;  Pope  v.  Riggs  138;  Ter.  v.  Baca  (N.  Mex.),  71  Pac. 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  43  S.  W.  306;  460;  McVey  v.  St.  Clair  Co.  49  W. 

Eppstein  v.  Thomas  (Tex.  Cv.  Va.  412,  38  S.  E.  648;  Deasey  v. 

App.),  44  S.  W.  893.  Thurman,  1  Idaho,  779;  Anderson 

ioe  Jackson  v.  Com.  96  Va.  107,  v.  Norwill,  10  111.  App.  240;  Blue 

30  S.  E.  452.  Valley  Lumber  Co.  v.  Newman, 

107  Liner  v.  S.  124  Ala.  1,  27  So.  58  Neb.  80,  78  N.  W.  374. 

438.  no  p.    v.    Willett,    105    Mich.    110, 

108  Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    R.    Co.      62   N.   W.    1115. 

v.  Groves,  56  Kas.  601,  44  Pac.  m  Samuel  v.  Knight,  9  Pa.  Super. 
628.  Ct.  352,  43  W.  N.  C.  392. 

108  Town  of  Wheatfield  v.  Grund-          112  Collins  v.  Waters,  54  111.  486. 


93  WHEN    SEVERAL    THEORIES — RULES    ILLUSTRATED.          §    103 

proper  to  submit  to  the  jury  whether  any  one  of  them  has  been 
established.113  But  where  two  theories  set  up  as  a  defense  are 
inconsistent  the  court  may  properly  instruct  that  both  theories 
cannot  be  true,  being  inconsistent.114  But  in  a  criminal  case, 
although  the  different  theories  urged  by  the  accused  as  a  defense 
may  be  conflicting,  it  is  not  improper  to  instruct  upon  all  of 
them.115  An  instruction  may  be  given  to  meet  a  theory  advanced 
by  the  opposing  party,  though  there  is  no  evidence  upon  which 
to  base  the  instruction.116 

To  instruct  the  jury  to  find  for  the  plaintiff  if,  from  the  evi- 
dence, his  theory  is  more  acceptable  and  more  consistent  than 
the  theory  of  the  defendant  is  error.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  jury 
to  determine  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff  has  proved  his  case 
by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.117  So  in  a  case  where  neg- 
ligence is  made  a  material  issue  by  the  pleadings  it  is  improper 
to  state  that  if  the  evidence  shows  any  other  theory  as  probable 
as  that  of  the  plaintiff  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.118  So 
in  a  criminal  case  an  instruction  that  if  the  evidence  develops 
two  theories,  one  of  guilt  and  the  other  of  innocence,  and  the 
jury  are  in  doubt  which  of  the  two  theories  is  established  they 
should  find  the  defendant  not  guilty,  is  improper.119  It  is  also 
improper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  if  the  evidence  for  the  de- 
fendant is  as  strong  as  that  for  the  state  he  should  be  ac- 
quitted.120 

§  103.  Instructions  when  several  theories — Illustrations. — 
The  following  cases  serve  as  illustrations  of  the  rule.  Thus  on  a 
charge  of  rape  where  the  defendant  gives  evidence  that  the 
alleged  sexual  intercourse  was  with  the  consent  of  the  female 
it  is  error  to  refuse  instructions  on  that  theory.121  Or  in  a  lar- 
ceny case  where  the  defense  is  that  the  defendant  took  the 
property,  believing  in  good  faith  that  it  belonged  to  him  or 

us  Liverpool    &    T.    S.    Ins.    Co.  HT  Rommeny     v.     City     of    Ne-w 

v.    Joy,    26    Tex.    Cv.    App.    613,    64  York,  63  N.  Y.  S.  186; 

S.    W.    786;    Bank  .of    Calloway   v.  us  Watts  v.   Southern  Bell  T.   & 

Henry    (Neb.),   92   N.   W.    631.  T.   Co.  66  Fed.  460. 

114  McGowen   v.    Larsen,   66   Fed.  n»  Thomas    v.    S.    103'    Ala.    18, 

910;     Anderson     v.     Oskamp    (Ind.  16  So.  4;   Johnson  v.  S.  102  Ala.  1, 

App.),  35  N.  E.  207.  16  So.   99. 

us  Carver  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  120  Mann  v.  S.  134  Ala.  1,  32  So. 

552,  38  S.  W.  183.  704. 

"6  American    M.    U.    Ex.    Co.    v.  121  Sergest  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

Milk,  73  111.  224.  57   S.   W.   845. 


§  104  BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS.  94 

his  mother,  to  refuse  to  charge  on  this  theory  is  error.1-2  And  if 
the  defendant  owned,  or  believed  he  owned,  the  property  and 
had  a  right  to  take  it,  the  court  may  explicitly  charge  the  jury 
that  in  such  case  there  is  no  offense.123 

On  a  charge  of  receiving  and  selling  stolen  property,  where 
the  evidence  tends  to  prove  that  the  defendant  reasonably  and 
honestly  believed  that  he  had  a  right  to  dispose  of  the  property, 
he  is  entitled  to  have  his  defense  affirmatively  presented  to  the 
jury  by  proper  instructions,  although  another  instruction  given 
may  state  that  the  receipt  of  the  property,  knowing  it  had  been 
stolen,  is  essential  to  a  conviction.124  Or  where  there  is  any 
evidence  tending  to  prove  that  the  defendant's  possession  of  the 
property  was  lawful  he  is  entitled  to  instructions  on  that 
theory.125  Or  on  a  trial  for  embezzlement  if  there  is  evidence 
tending  to  prove  that  the  defendant  appropriated  the  property 
under  an  honest  belief  that  he  had  a  right  to  do  so  it  is  error 
to  refuse  to  so  instruct  the  jury.126 

§  104.  Instructions  need  not  notice  opposing  theory. — But  the 
rule  which  requires  that  instructions  shall  be  given  according 
to  the  theory  of  each  party  does  not  require  that  the  instruc- 
tions shall  anticipate  the  existence  of  hypotheses  contrary  to 
that  upon  the  theory  of  which  they  are  framed.  That  an  in- 
struction rests  upon  an  hypothesis  which  is  sustained  by  evi- 
dence, and  that  it  states  accurately  and  fully  the  law  upon  that 
hypothesis,  is  sufficient  without  anticipating  any  theory  of  the 
opposing  party.  And  if  the  evidence  also  fairly  presents  hy- 
potheses sustaining,  modifying  or  repugnant  to  legal  propositions, 
a  party  desiring  to  avail  himself  of  such  propositions  may  have 
them  "presented  in  separate  instructions.127  Hence  the  plaintiff 

122  Vance  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  12*  Harris  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.   App.), 
395,    30    S.    W.    792;    Barnes    v.    S.  57   S.  W.   833;    Gann  v.   S.   42   Tex. 
103   Ala.   44,   15  So.   901.     See  S.  v.  Cr.   App.   133,  57  S.  W.   837. 
Jackson,  126  Mo.  521,  29  S.  W.  601;  125  Pace    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 
Clark     v.     S.     34     Tex.     Cr.     App.  31  S.  W.  173;   Brown  v.  S.  34  Tex. 
120,  29   S.  W.   382;    Young  v.   S.  34  Cr.  App.  150,  29  S.  W.  772. 

Tex.    Cr.    App.    290,    30   S.   W.   238;  120  Wadley   v.    Com.    (Va.),   30   S. 

Phillips  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  31  S.  E.    452. 

W.  644;  Reese  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),          127  Cook    County    v.    Harms,    108 

68  S.  W.  283;  Chambers  v.  S.   (Tex.  111.  151,  161;    Springfield  Consol.  R. 

Or.    App.),    68    S.    W.    286:    Homer  v.   Hoeffner,   175   111.   634,   51   N.   E. 

v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    68    S.    W.  884;  Trask  v.  P.  104  111.  569;  City  of 

999;    S.    v.    Main,    75    Conn.    55,    52  Chicago    v.    Schmidt,    107    111.    191; 

Atl.  257.  Illinois  Cent.  R.   Co.  v.  Byrne,  205 

123  Black   v.   S.   38  Tex.   Cr.   App.  111.  21,  68  N.  E.  720. 
58,   41   S.   W.   606. 


95  OPPOSING    THEORY — JURY    CONFINED    TO    EVIDENCE.       §    105 

is  not  bound  to  anticipate  and  exclude  the  defense.  He  is  only 
obliged  to  present  the  law  applicable  to  his  theory  of  the  case.128 
The  plaintiff  is  not  required  in  his  instructions  to  negative 
mere  matters  of  defense.129  So  where  an  instruction  tells  the 
jury  that  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 
has  proved  his  case  as  laid  in  his  declaration,  or  in  any  one 
of  the  counts  thereof,  they  will  find  for  the  plaintiff,  it  is  proper.130 
And  so  where  the  rights  of  a  party,  such,  for  instance,  as  his 
claim  of  set-off,  are  fully  stated  in  his  own  instructions  he  can- 
not complain  because  his  opponent's  instructions  may  be  silent 
as  to  such  a  claim  or  right.  The  court  is  not  required  to  em- 
brace such  party's  claim  in  the  instructions  of  the  opposing 
party.131  But,  of  course,  where  there  is  evidence  to  support  the 
claim  or  contention  of  a  party,  and  such  claim  is  ignored  by 
the  refusal  of  his  instructions  and  is  not  recognized  in  the  in- 
structions given  for  his  opponent,  it  is  manifest  error.132 

§  105.  Instructions  confining  jury  to  evidence. — The  jury  in 
their  deliberations  should  not  only  be  confined  to  the  pleadings, 
but  also  to  the  evidence  adduced,  and  the  court  should  instruct 
them  that  they  must  not  be  influenced  by  any  information  out- 
side of  the  evidence;  especially  is  this  caution  proper  when  any 
of  the  jurors  ask  questions.133  The  formula  that  "if  you  believe 
from  the  evidence"  is  the  usual  expression  used  in  drawing 
instructions  in  referring  to  the  evidence,  but  it  is  not  necessary 
that  this  should  be  stated  in  each  sentence  of  an  instruction.134 
Nor  is  it  necessary  that  all  of  the  instructions  given  should 
contain  this  requirement.135 

For,   although   an  instruction  standing  alone  may   be  faulty 

128  Eames  v.  Rend,  105  111.  506,  98  Tenn.  650,  40  S.  W.  1085;  Whar- 

509;  Logg  v.  P.  92  111.  604.  ton  v.  S.  45  Tex.  2. 

120  Mt.  Olive  &  S.  Coal  Co.  v.  134  Gizler  v.  Witzel,  82  111.  322, 

Rademancher,  190  111.  538,  544,  60  325;  Belden  v.  Woodmanse,  81  111. 

N.  E.  888.  25,  28;  Miller  v.  Bathasser,  78  111. 

130  Mt   Olive  Staunton  Coal  Co.  v.  305;    Mathews   v.    Hamilton,   23   111. 
Rademancher,    190    111.    538,   542,   60  416,   418;    Slack   v. .  Harris,    200   111. 
N.    E.    888.  96,   65   N.  E.   669;    Powers  v.   Com. 

131  Mueller  v.  Rosen,  179  111.  131,  22  Ky.  L.  R.  1807,  61  S.  W.  736;   S. 
53   N.    E.   625.  v.  Davis,  27  S.  Car.  609,  4  S   E.  567; 

132  McCormick    v.    Kreinkie,    179  Slack  v.   Harris,  200  111.  114,  65  N. 
111.   301,  53  N.   E.   549.     See  Linde-  E.   437. 

man  v.  Fry,  178  111.  174,  52   N.  E.          iss  Padfield  v.  P.  146  111.  660,  662, 
851.  35  N.  E.  469. 

iss  Citizens  St.   R.   Co.   v.   Burke, 


§    106  BASED  ON   EVIDENCE   AND   PLEADINGS.  96 

in  not  confining  the  jury  to  the  evidence,  that  is,  by  omitting  to 
charge  that  "if  they  believe  from  the  evidence,"  yet  where 
other  instructions  which  are  given,  direct  the  jury  to  confine  their 
deliberations  to  the  evidence  the  defect  will  be  regarded  cured.136 
But  it  is  only  where  the  facts  hypothetically  stated  are  con- 
troverted by  the  opposing  party  .that  the  formula  "if  you  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence"  is  important  or  essential.137 

An  instruction  which  is  but  the  statement  of  a  legal  proposi- 
tion, containing  only  a  hypotehtical  statement  of  facts,  is  not 
objectionable  in  that  it  does  not  make  reference  to  the  evidence 
or  is  not  restricted  thereto.138  It  is  not  improper  to  use  the 
words  "if  the  evidence  shows  you"  instead  of  "if  you  believe 
from  the  evidence"  in  framing  instructions.139  Where  the  court 
in  charging  the  jury  states  that  everything  done  by  them  in 
determining  the  facts  must  be  done  "under  the  evidence,"  that 
is  sufficient  caution  that  the  jury  must  confine  their  delibera- 
tions to  the  evidence  before  them  without  repeating  the  caution- 
ary words  in  every  sentence.140 

§  106.  Confining  jury  as  to  damages. — Instructions  which  do 
not  confine  the  jury  to  the  evidence,  nor  place  a  limit  upon  the 
amount  of  damages  to  be  awarded,  if  any,  are  improper.141 
Public  policy,  sympathy,  or  the  like,  are  not  proper  elements 
to  be  taken  into  account  in  assessing  damages;  so  an  instruc- 
tion authorizing  the  jury  to  take  into  consideration  such  ele- 
ments is  improper.  The  jury  should  be  confined  to  the  evi- 
dence.142 

is6  Speir  v.   P.   122   111.   1,  244,  12  1*0  Indianapolis     St.     R.     Co.     v. 

N.  E.  865,  17  N    E.  899,  3  Am.  St.  Robinson,    157    Ind.    414,    61    N.    E. 

320;   Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Mo-  936.      Charging    the    jury    that    the 

chell,    193   111.   208,   61   N.   E.   1028;  issues    are    to    be    determined    "by 

Boykin  v.  P.  22   Colo.   496,  45  Pac.  looking  to  the  testimony  of  the  wit- 

419.     See  Godwin  v.  S.  73  Miss.  873,  nesses    who    have    testified    in    the 

19  So.  712;    Ingols  v.  Plimpton,  10  case"    is    not    error,    although    the 

Colo.  535,  16  Pac.  155;   Graff  v.  P.  defendant  made  a  statement  giving 

134  111.  380,  25  N.  E.  563;  McPherson.  his  version  of  the  transaction  and 

v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  97  Mo.  denying    his    guilt;     Sledge    v.     S. 

,253;    Home  v.  Walton,  117  111.  130,  99  Ga.  684,  26  S.  E.  756,  59  Am.  St. 

7  N.   E.  100;    Rock  I.   &  P.  R.   Co.  251;  Burney  v.  S.  (Ga.),  25  S.  E.  911. 

v.  Leisy,  174  111.  547,  51  N.  E.  572;  1*1  Central    R.    Co.    v.    Barmister, 

Holliday    v.    Burgess,    34    111.    193;  195    111.   48,   62   N.   E.    864;    Oglesby 

Parker  v.   Fisher,   39   111.   164,   171.  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.   (Mo.),  37  S. 

137  Schmidt  v.   Pfau,  114  111.  494,  W.    829. 

504,  2  N.  E.  522.  1*2  Robelson    v.    Brown,    56    Neb- 

"8  Belt  v.  P.  97  111.  461,  472.  390,    76    N.    W.    891. 

139  Silberberg  v.  Pearson,  75  Tex. 
287,  12  S.  W.  850. 


9?  DAMAGES,   JURY    CONFINED   TO    EVIDENCE.  §    106 

Thus  an  instruction  that  if  the  jury  find  the  defendant  guilty 
they  may  assess  the  plaintiff's  damages  at  an  amount  not  to 
exceed  the  amount  claimed  in  the  declaration  is  erroneous  in 
not  confining  the  jury  to  the  evidence.143  So  an  instruction 
that  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  more  than  five  thousand  dollars 
if  he  is  entitled  to  recover;  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  they  will  render 
a  verdict  for  no  more  than  that  amount  is  erroneous,  in  that  it 
tells  the  jury  to  render  a  verdict  for  five  thousand  dollars  and 
does  not  confine  them  to  the  evidence.144  Also  for  the  same 
reason,  an  instruction  permitting  the  jury  to  give  such  an  amount 
"as  they  shall  deem  a  fair  and  just  compensation"  is  erroneous  ;145 
or  an  instruction  that  the  jury  may  allow  as  damages  such 
sum  as  the  evidence  proves,  is  erroneous  where  the  evidence 
shows  a  greater  amount  than  that  claimed  in  the  complaint  or 
declaration.146 

So  a  charge  that  the  jury  in  determining  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages should  allow  such  sum  as  seems  proper  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, and  shall  consider  bodily  and  mental  pain  and 
probable  future  injury  resulting  from  the  injury  inflicted,  is 
erroneous  as  authorizing  the  jury  to  find  damages  for  permanent 
injury  without  any  evidence  as  to  the  amount.147  But  an  in- 
struction that  the  jury  are  to  assess  damages  at  such  sum  as 
in  their  judgment  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  under  the  evidence, 

i«  Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v.  v.  Austin,  69  111.  426.     See  Isaac  v. 

Sykes,    96    111.    162,    173;    Martin   v.  McLean.  106  Mich.  79,  64  N.  W.  2. 

Johnson,   89  111.   537;    Gilbertson  v.  i«  Rolling  Mill  Co.  v.  Morrissey, 

Forty-Second  St.  M.  &  St.  N.  Ave.  Ill    111.    650;    Cleveland,    C.    C.    & 

R.    Co.    43    N.    Y.    S.    782,    14    App.  St.    L.    R.    Co.    v.    Jenkins,    174    111. 

Div.  294;  Hoover  v.  Haynes  (Neb.),  409,    51    N.    E.    811;    City   of   Free- 

91  N.  W.  392;    Chicago,  R.   I.  &  T.  port  v.  Isbell,  83  111.  440,  25  Am.  R. 

R.    Co.   v.   Erwin    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),  407;    Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v. 

65  S.   W.   496    (party   must  request  Levy,  160  111.  385,  43  N.  E.  357.  See 
specific   instruction).     It   has    been  Cunningham   v.    Stein,    109    111.   375 
held  improper  to  charge  that  it  is  (correct);  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v. 
the    "duty"   of   the   jury   to   assess  Smith  (Miss.),  35  So.  168;  Nashville, 
damages,  but  that  they  may  be,  or  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Witherspoon 
are,   at   liberty   to   do   so,    Chicago  (Tenn.),   78  S.   W.   1052. 

&   N.   W.    R.    Co.   v.   Chisholm,   79  i«  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Durrett, 

111.  584,  591.     Compare  Nicholson  v.  24  Tex.  Cr.  App.  103,  58  S.  W.  187; 

Merritt,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  2281,  67  S.  W.  City   of  Dallas  v  Jones    (Tex.),   53 

5;    P.  v.   McGraw,  72  N.  Y.   S.   679,  S.    W.    377. 

66  App.  Div.  372;  Yazoo,  &c.  R.  Co.  i"  Houston,   E.   &  W.   T.   R.   Co. 
v.  Smith  (Mass.),  35  So.  168.  v.   Richards,  20  Tex.   Cr.  App.  203, 

«*  Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    R.    Co.      49  S.  W.  687. 


§  107  BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS.  98 

is  not  faulty  in  stating  that  the  jury  may  make  up  their  ver- 
dict outside  of  the  evidence.148 

§  107.  Common  and  personal  knowledge. — The  court  may 
instruct  on  matters  of  common  knowledge,  or  may  refuse  to 
do  so  in  its  discretion.  It  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  charge  the 
jury  on  matters  of  common  knowledge  and  experience  of  all  men 
who  have  arrived  at  years  of  discretion.149  The  jury  in  weigh- 
ing evidence  always  exercise  their  judgment  in  the  light  of  their 
own  general  knowledge  of  the  subject  in  hand  whether  in- 
structed to  do  so  or  not;  but  a  refusal  to  so  instruct  is  not 


error.150 

But  an  instruction  permitting  the  jury  to  consider  their  own 
personal  knowledge  as  well  as  the  evidence  in  determining  a 
material  fact  is  erroneous,  as  they  are  required  to  decide  questions 
of  fact  from  the  evidence  only.151  The  belief  of  the  jury  in 
determining  the  facts  must  be  based  upon  the  evidence ;  hence  an 
instruction  that  if  the  jury  believe  "from  the  evidence  and  the 
instructions  of  the  court,  etc,"  is  improper.152 

§  108.  Confined  within  statute  of  limitations — Criminal  cases. 
The  evidence  must  be  confined  to  some  time  within  the  statute 
of  limitation.  Hence  the  failure  to  instruct  that  unless  the  al- 
leged offense  be  shown  to  have  been  committed  within  the  stat- 
utory limitation  a  conviction  cannot  be  had  is  error,  especially 
where  there  is  no  evidence  to  bring  the  offense  charged  within 
the  statute  of  limitation.153  Thus,  on  a  charge  of  adultery,  where 
it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  the  offense  was  committed 
after  the  filing  of  the  complaint,  but  before  the  filing  of  the  formal 
information,  the  refusal  to  instruct  the  jury  that  a  conviction  can- 
not be  had  on  any  evidence  of  acts  committed  after  the  filing  of 

148  Calumet     River     R.     Co.     v.  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  29 
Moore,   124   111.   337,   15   N.   E.   764;  Minn.   43,   11  N.   W.   124;    Douglass 
Illinois,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  210  v.    Trask,    77    Me.    35;    Schultz    v. 
111.   226,  238.  Bower,  57  Minn  493,  59  N.  W.  631, 

149  Lesser  Cotton  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  47  Am.  St.  630;  Petty  John  v.  Lieb- 
I.    &    M.    S.    R.    Co.    114   Fed.    133,  scher,  92  Ga.  149,  17  S.  B.  1007;   S 
144.  v.  Jones,  29  S.  Car.  201,  7  S.  E.  296; 

iso  Baker  v.  Borrelli,  136  Cal.  160,  Burrows  v.  Delta  Tr.  Co.  106  Mich. 

68  Pac.  591;   Renard  v.  Grande,  29  582,  64  N.  W.  501. 

Ind.  App.  579,  64  N.  E.  644.  152  Kranz  v.  Thieben,  15  111.  App. 

isi  Gibson    (v.    Correker,    91    Ga.  482;  Greer  v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R.  489, 

617,  17   S.   E.   965   (value  of  land);  63  S.  W.   443. 

Stiles  v.   Neillsville  Milling  Co.   87  iss  s.    v.    Kunhi,    119    Iowa,    461, 

Wis.    266,   58   N.    W.    411;    Brakken  93  N.  W.  342. 


99  LIMITING  EVIDENCE  TO  SPECIFIC  PURPOSE.  §    HO 

the  complaint  is  error.154  An  instruction  charging  the  jury  to 
determine  whether  at  any  time  within  the  statute  of  limitations 
the  defendant  committed  the  crime  alleged  is  not  improper,  al- 
though the  evidence  limits  the  inquiry  to  a  less  period  of  time.155 

§  109.  Limiting  evidence  to  specific  purpose. — Evidence  com- 
petent only  for  some  specific  purpose  should  be  limited  to  that 
particular  purpose  by  proper  instructions,  and  a  refusal  to  so 
instruct  is  error.156  This  rule  governs  in  both  civil  and  criminal 
cases  alike.157 

§  110.  Limited  to  impeaching  witnesses. — Thus  where  the 
prosecution  introduces  evidence  to  show  a  former  conviction 
of  the  defendant  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  his  testimony,  it 
is  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  limit  such  evidence  by  proper 
instructions,  and  it  cannot  be  considered  for  any  other  pur- 
pose.158 An  instruction  limiting  the  evidence  of  the  prior  con- 
viction of  the  accused  to  the  sole  purpose  of  impeaching  him 
as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  is  perfectly  proper  and  beneficial 
to  the  defendant  rather  than  hurtful.159  And  where  evidence  is 
admissible  only  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  or  impeaching  a 

IB*  Proctor  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  might  be  drawn  from  it  injurious  to 

35   S.  W.   172.  the  rights  of  the  defendant:   Win- 

iss  s.    v.    Waddle,    100    Iowa,    57,  frey  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  539,  56 

69    N.    W.    279.  S.   W.   919;    Blanco  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr. 

156  Robertson    v.    S.    40   Fla.    509,  App.),  57  S.  W.  828;   S.  v.  Tommy, 

24   So.   474;    Finley  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  19  Wash.  270,  53  Pac.  157   (confes- 

App.),   47   S.   W.   1015;    Bone  v.   S.  sion   of   co-defendant). 
102  Ga.  387,  30  S.  B.  845;   Gatlin  v.          IST  Boggess    v.    Boggess,    127    Mo. 

S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),   49   S.   W.    87;  305,  29  S.  W.  1018;   Lydick  v.  Gill 

Martin    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    53  (Neb.),   94   N.   W.   109.     But   if   at 

S.   W.   849;    Triolo  v.   Foster   (Tex.  the  time  certain  evidence  is  intro- 

Cv.   App.),   57   S.  W.   695;    Com.   v.  duced,   the   court   or   counsel   state 

Wilson,  186  Pa.  St.  1,  40  Atl.  283;  to   the   jury   that   it   is    competent 

White  v.   Walker,   31  111.   422,  433;  and    offered    only   for   a   particular 

Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins,  purpose,    a    failure    to    limit    such 

15  Tex.  Cv.  App.  21,  39  S.  W.  150;  evidence  to  that  purpose  by  proper 

Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &'  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  instruction   is   not   material    error, 

Parish,  28  Ind.  App.   189,  62  N.  B.  Roark  v.   S.   105   Ga.   736,   32   S.   E. 

514,  91  Am.  St.  120;  Roos  v.  Lewyn,  125. 

5  Tex.  Cv.  App.  593,  24  S.  W.  538;  "s  Fosdahl    v.    S.    87    Wis.    482, 

Scott  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  68  S.  W.  62   N.   W.   185;    Hulton  v.   S.    (Tex. 

680;  Faulkner  v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  Cr.  App.),  33  S.  W.  969.     See  Bout- 

311,  65  S.  W.  1093;   Camarillo  v.  S.  well   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    35    S. 

(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  68  S.  W.  795;  Ted-  W.    376;    S>coville    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr. 

better  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.)  32  S.  W.  903;  App.),  77  S.  W.  792. 
Bondurant  v.  S.  125  Ala.  31,  27  So.          "9  Thornton  v.   S.   117  Wis.   338, 

775.       Contra:      Unless     inferences  93  N.  W.  1107,  98  Am.  St.  924. 


§    111  BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS.  100 

witness  who  has  testified  on  the  trial  of  the  case,  it  is  error  to 
refuse  to  thus  limit  it.100 

§  111.  Limited  to  malice  or  intent. — Where  evidence  of  the 
declarations  of  the  defendant  as  to  any  previous  acts  not  con- 
nected with  the  transaction  described  in  the  indictment  is  com- 
petent only  on  the  question  of  malice  or  intent,  it  should  be 
limited  by  proper  instructions  to  such  malice  or  intent.161  But, 
on  the  contrary,  it  has  been  held  that  where  evidence  of  other 
acts  of  the  defendant  similar  to  that  charged  in  the  indictment 
is  admitted  to  prove  guilty  intent,  the  court  is  not  bound  to  in- 
struct for  what  purpose  such  evidence  is  admitted.162 

§  112.  Limited  to  certain  defendants. — Testimony  which  is 
competent  against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants  jointly  tried 
on  a  criminal  charge  should  be  limited  to  him  against  whom  it  is 
competent,  by  proper  instructions.163  Accordingly,  evidence  of 
any  declarations  or  statements  made  by  one  of  two  or  more 
persons  jointly  tried  which  is  competent  only  against  him  who 
made  the  same  should  be  limited  to  him  by  instruction,  and  to 
refuse  such  instruction  is  error.164 

A  confession  made  by  one  of  two  or  more  defendants  jointly 

leo  Coker   v.    S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  regard,  P.  v.  Connelly  (Cal.),  38  Pac. 

31  S.  W.   655;    Mark  v.  S.   34  Tex.  42;    Sproul    v.    City   of    Seattle,    17 

Cr.  136,  31  S.  W.  408;   Oliver  v.  S.  Wash.  256,  49  Pac.  487;   S.  v.  Gas- 

33    Tex.    Cr.    App.    541,    28    S.    W.  ton,    96    Iowa,    505,    65    N.    W.    415; 

202;    Paris    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),  Duke   v.    S.    35    Tex.    Cr.    App.    283, 

31   S.  W.   855;    Golin  v.   S.  37  Tex.  33    S.    W.    349.     The    court    is   not 

Cr.  App.  90,  38  S.  W.  794;   Gills  v.  bound   on    its    own    motion    to    in- 

Oom.  18  Ky.  L.  R.  560,  37  S.  W.  269;  struct  the  jury  for  what  particular 

Guinn  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  65  S.  W.  purpose  evidence  is  admissible,  Pur- 

376;  Ashcraft  v.  Com.  24  Ky.  L.  R.  cell  v.  Tibbies,  101  Iowa,  24,  69  N. 

488,   68  S.  W.   847;    Fuqua  v.   Com.  W.    1120;     Puth    v.   Zinbleman,   99 

24   Ky.    L.   R.   2204,   73   S.   W.   782;  Iowa,  641,  68  N.  W.  895. 

Owens  v.   S.   35  Tex.   Cr.  App.  345,  ies  Crosby   v.    P.    137    111.    334,   27 

38  S.  W.  875.  N.    E.    49;     Bennett    v.    P.    96    111. 

lei  Kollock  v.  S.  88  Wis.  663,  60  606;   Sparf  v.  U.  S.  156  U.  S.  57,  15 

N.  W.  817;   Hacker  v.   Heiney,  111  Sup.    Ct.   273,   10   Am.    Cr.   R.    174; 

Wis.  313,  87  N.  W.  249;   S.  v.  Ged-  Casner  v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cr.  App.  118, 

des,  22  Mont.  68,  55  Pac.  919,  rela-  57  S.   W.   821;    Segrest  v.   S.    (Tex. 

ting    to    motive.  Cr.  App.),  57  S.  W.  845;  Williams  v. 

,     162  Shipp  v.  Com.  19  Ky.  L.  R.  634,  S.  81  Ala.  1,  1  So.  179,  7  Am.  Cr. 

41  S.  W.  856;  Mosely  v.  S.  36  (Tex.  R.   451,   60  Am.  R.  133.     See  S.  v. 

Cr.  App.),  578,  38  S.  W.  197;  Thorn-  Bowker,  26  Ore.  309,  38  Pac.  124,  9 

ley  v.  S.   36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  118,  34  Am.  Cr.  R.  366;  Cleveland  v.  Ander- 

S.  W.  264,  61  Am.  St.  837;   But  if  son  (Neb.),  92  N.  W.  306. 

no   request  is   made   to  thus   limit  i«*  S.  v.  Collins,  121  N.  Car.  667, 

such  evidence,  a  party  will  not  oe  28  S.  E.  520;  Short  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 

heard  to  complain  of  error  in  that  App.),  29  S.  W.  1072. 


101  EVIDENCE  LIMITED — GIVING  PROMINENCE  TO  FACTS.          §    113 

indicted,  but  not  in  the  presence  of  any  of  the  others,  is  com- 
petent, if  competent  at  all,  only  against  the  one  making  the 
same,  and  the  jury  should  be  cautioned  by  proper  instructions 
not  to  consider  it  against  the  others.105  A  charge  that  a  confes- 
sion made  by  one  or  more  of  several  defendants  applies  only 
to  the  one  making  it,  and  that  it  has  no  application  to  any  one 
of  the  others,  and  does  not  implicate  any  of  them  so  far  as  that 
particular  confession  is  concerned,  sufficiently  cautions  the 
jury.166 

And  where  on  a  joint  indictment  the  evidence  shows  that  the 
defendants  have  different  and  distinct  defenses  the  court  should, 
on  proper  request,  instruct  as  to  the  defense  of  each,  and  a 
refusal  to  do  so  is  error.167  The  failure  of  the  court  to  limit 
evidence  to  the  particular  purpose  for  which  it  is  competent 
cannot  be  complained  of  as  error  in  the  absence  of  a  request 
to  do  so.168  So  where  evidence  is  competent  against  some  of 
several  joint  defendants,  but  incompetent  as  to  others,  the  fact 
that  such  evidence  was  not  limited  to  the  defendant  against 
whom  it  was  competent,  nor  the  jury  instructed  not  to  consider 
it  against  the  others,  cannot  be  complained  of  as  error  in  the 
absence  of  a  request  to  limit  the  evidence.169 

§  113.    Instructions  giving  prominence  to  certain  facts. — It  is 

the  duty  of  the  jury  to  consider  all  of  the  testimony  in  the  case. 
Therefore  the  instructions  should  be  so  drawn  as  to  avoid  giving 
prominence  to  certain  portions  of  the  evidence  to  the  exclusion 
of  other  portions.170  An  instruction  which  singles  out  and  draws 

iss  S.  v.  Oxendine,  107  N.  Car.  78'3,  Scott  v.  P.  141  111.  208,  30  N.  E. 

12  S.  E.  573;  Casner  v.  S.  42  Tex.  346;  Hartshorn  v.  Byrne,  147  111. 

Cr.  App.  118,  57  S.  W.  821  (conspir-  426,  35  N.  E.  246;  Smith  v.  S.  1U9 

acy);  Wilkerson  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  Ga.  479,  35  S.  E.  59;  Chicago  &  E. 

App.),  57  S.  W.  956.  I.  v.  Fuller,  195  111.  18,  62  N.  E. 

ICG  Nobles  v.  S.  98  Ga.  73,  26  S.  E.  919;  Christie  v.  P.  206  111.  342,  69 

64;  Wilkerson  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  N.  E.  33;  New  York,  P.  &  N.  R. 

57  S.  W.  956  (held  not  assuming  Co.  v.  Thomas,  92  Va.  606,  24  S. 

accomplice  made  a  statement).  E.  264;  Coffin  v.  U.  S.  162  U.  S. 

is?  Ross  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  43  664,  16  Sup.  Ct.  943;  Argabright 

S.  W.  1004.  v.  S.  49  Neb.  760,  69  N.  W.  102; 

163  Boggess  v.  Boggess,  127  Mo.  Burton  v.  S.  107  Ala.  108,  18  So. 

305,  29  S.  W.  1018;  Lydick  v.  Gill,  284;  Virgie  v.  Stetson,  73  Me.  452; 

(Neb.),  94  N.  W.  109.  Bush  v.  S.  37  Ark.  215;  Mendes  v. 

lea  Coddington  v.  Canaday,  157  Kyle,  16  Nev.  369;  McCorkle  v. 

Ind.  243,  61  N.  E.  567.  Simpson,  42  Ind.  453;  Mead  v. 

i™  Moore  v.  Wright,  90  111.  471;  Brotherton,  30  Mo.  201;  Holt  v.  S. 

Chesney  v.  Meadows,  90  111.  431;  62  Ga.  314;  Banner  v.  Schlessinger, 


BASED  ON   EVIDENCE   AND   PLEADINGS. 


102 


the  attention  of  the  jury  to  particular  facts  in  evidence  to  the 
exclusion  of  others  which  are  quite  as  important  in  determin- 
ing the  issues  involved  is  erroneous.171 
Instructions  which  give  prominence  to  the  testimony  of  one 


109  Mich.  262,  67  N.  W.  946;  Barker 
v.  S.  48  Ind.  163;  Heddle  v.  City 
Elec.  R.  Co.  112  Mich.  547,  70  N. 
W.  1096;  Com.  v.  Delaney,  16  Ky. 
L.  R.  509,  29  S.  W.  616;  Gross  v. 
Shaffer,  29  Kas.  442;  Slack  v-.  Har- 
ris, 200  111.  96,  65  N.  E.  669;  Mar- 
tens v.  Pittock  (Neb.),  92  N.  W. 
1038;  Vaughn  v.  S.  130  Ala.  18,  30 
So.  669;  Willingham  v.  Si  130  Ala. 
35,  30  So.  429;  Reynolds  v.  Com. 
24  Ky.  L.  R.  1742,  72  S.  W.  277; 
Southern  Bell  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Mayo, 
133  Ala.  641,  33  So.  16;  Brickill  v. 
City  of  Baltimore,  60  Fed.  98  (re- 
lating to  damages) ;  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  Banks  (Ky.),  33  S.  W. 
627;  Wadsworth  v.  Williams,  101 
Ala.  264,  13  So.  755;  Newton  v. 
S.  37  Ark.  333;  Sexton  v.  School 
District,  9  Wash.  5,  36  Pac.  1052; 
Hurlbut  v.  Boaz,  4  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
371,  23  S.  W.  446;  Lake  S.  &  M.  S. 
R.  Co.  v.  Whidden,  23  Ohio  Cir. 
85;  Birmingham  Southern  R.  Co. 
v.  Cuzzart,  133  Ala.  262,  31  So. 
979;  Crossen  v.  Oliver,  41  XDre.  505, 
69  Pac.  308;  Postal  Tel.  C.  Co.  v. 
Jones,  133  Ala.  217,  32  So.  500; 
O'Neal  v.  Curry,  134  Ala.  216,  32 
So.  697;  Alabama  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thompson  (Ala.),  32  So.  672;  Wilson 
v.  White,  80  N.  Car.  280;  Com.  v. 
Delaney,  16  Ky.  L.  R.  509,  29  S.  W. 
616;  Leise  v.  Meyer,  143  Mo.  547,  45 
S.  W.  282;  Francis  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  55  S.  W.  488;  Jones  v.  Jones, 
19  Ky.  1516,  43  S.  W.  412;  Frost  v. 
S.  124  Ala.  85,  27  So.  251;  P.  v.  Reed 
(Cal.),  52  Pac.  835;  Craig  v.  Miller, 
133  111.  305,  24  N.  E.  431;  Sheehan 
v.  P.  131  111.  25,  22  N.  E.  818; 
Chittenden  v.  Evans,  41  111.  254; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner, 
108  111.  550;  Jacksonville  &  S.  E. 
R.  Co.  v.  Walsh,  106  111.  257. 
Properly  refused:  Callaghan  v. 
Myer,  89  111.  569;  Hewitt  v.  John- 
son. 72  111.  513;  Merrill  v.  Hale, 
85  Iowa,  66;  Model  Mill  Co.  v. 
McEver,  96  Ga.  701;  Fox  v.  P. 
84  111.  App.  270;  Packer  v.  Thomp- 


son-Houston E.  Co.  175  Mass.  496, 
56  N.  E.  704;  Trumbull  v.  Erick- 
son,  97  Fed.  891;  Tibbe  v.  Kamp, 
154  Mo.  545,  55  S.  W.  440;  S.  v. 
Rutherford,  152  Mo.  124,  53  S.  W. 
417;  Todd  v.  Danner,  17  Ind.  App. 
368,  46  N.  E.  829.  See  Gordon  v. 
Burris,  153  Mo.  223,  54  S.  W.  546. 
See  Davis  v.  Concord  &  M.  R.  Co. 
68  N.  H.  247,  44  Atl.  388;  Mosely 
v.  Washburn,  167  Mass.  345,  45  N. 
E.  753;  Williamson  v.  Tyson,  105 
Ala.  644,  17  So.  336;  Stone  v.  S. 
105  Ala.  60,  17  So.  114;  Idaho  Mer- 
cantile Co.  v.  Kalanquin  (Idaho), 
66  Pac.  933;  Warden  v.  Miller,  112 
Wis.  67,  87  N.  W.  828;  Haney  v. 
Breeden,  100  Va.  781;  Martens  v. 
Pittock  (Neb.),  92  N.  W.  1038. 

i7i  Drainage  Corns,  v.  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.  158  111.  353,  35«,  41  N. 
E.  1073;  Homes  v.  Hale,  71  111.  552; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin, 
68  111.  499;  Hoge  v.  P.  117  111.  35, 
46,  6  N.  E.  796;  Crain  v.  First 
National  Bank,  114  111.  527,  2  N. 
E.  486;  Calef  v.  Thomas,  81  111. 
478,  483;  Jacobi  v.  S.  133  Ala.  1, 
32  So.  158;  S.  v.  Prater,  52  W.  Va. 
132,  43  S.  E.  230,  241;  Dobbs  v. 
Gate,  60  Mo.  App.  658;  Chaney  v. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  62  Mo.  App.  45; 
Coffin  v.  U.  S.  162  U.  S.  664,  16  Sup. 
Ct.  943;  Ball  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
36  S.  W.448;  Logg  v.  P.  92  111.  598, 
602;  Bourquin  v.  Bourquin,  110  Ga. 
440,  35  S.  E.  710;  McCartney  v. 
McMullen,  38  111.  237;  C.  A.  Fargo 
&  Co.  v.  Dixon,  63  111.  App.  22; 
Moran  v.  Higgins,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  456, 
40  S.  W.  928;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Collins,  15  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
21,  39  S.  W.  150;  Bell  v.  Hutchings 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  41  S.  W.  200; 
Com.  v.  Gray,  17  Ky.  354,  30  S.  W. 
1015;  Robinson  v.  Love,  50  W.  Va. 
75,  40  S.  E.  454;  Bachmeyer  v. 
Mutual  R.  T.  Life  Asso.  87  Wis. 
325,  58  N.  W.  399  (insanity  an  is- 
sue) ;  Bowling  Green  Stone  Co.  v. 
Caipshaw,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  945,  64  S. 
W.  507. 


103 


SINGLING  OUT  FACTS. 


114 


of  the  parties  to  the  suit  without  adverting  to  the  testimony 
of  the  other,  for  the  same  reason,  should  not  be  given.172  Espe- 
cially is  it  error  in  charging  the  jury  to  single  out  the  facts 
which  are  strongest  against  a  party  and  fail  to  refer  to  those 
favorable  to  him.173  And  if  it  clearly  appears  that  such  instruc- 
tions must  have  misled  the  jury  to  the  prejudice  of  the  rights 
of  the  complaining  party  a  new  trial  should  be  given.174 

To  single  out  an  unimportant  fact  tending  to  prove  an  element 
in  a  case,  as  if  it  were  the  only  question  to  be  considered,  and 
base  an  instruction  upon  it  is  misleading.175  Especially  where 
the  evidence  is  slight  or  highly  contradictory  is  it  improper 
for  the  court  in  giving  instructions  to  select  isolated  portions  of 
the  evidence  and  give  them  prominence.176  The  attention  of  the 
jury  should  not  be  directed  to  any  particular  circumstance 
alone  unless  there  is  some  special  reason  for  so  doing.177 

§  114.  Singling  out  facts — When  not  objectionable. — But  sin- 
gling out  some  particular  question  or  point  and  calling  the  at- 
tention of  the  jury  to  it  is  not  objectionable  where  the  other 
questions  involved  are  merely  subordinate  and  are  sufficiently 


172  McCabe  v.  City  of  Philadel- 
phia, 12  Pa.  Sup.  Ct.  383;  Hays  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  195  Pa.  St. 
184,  45  Atl.  925;  Pyle  v.  Pyle,  158 
111.  300,  41  N.  E.  999;  Simpson 
Brick  Press  Co.  v.  Wounley,  166 
111.  383,  46  N.  E.  967;  Weiss  v.  Beth- 
leham  Iron  Co.  88  Fed.  23;  Holmes 
v.  Hale,  71  111.  552;  Hatch  v.  Marsh, 
71  111.  370,  374;  Village  of  Warren 
v.  Wright,  103  111.  298,  304;  Barton 
v.  Strond  Gibson  Grocer  Co.  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  40  S.  W.  1050;  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  130  Ala.  456, 
30  So.  586;  Flowers  v.  Flowers,  92 
Ga.  688,  18  S.  E.  1006;  Haney  v. 
Breeden,  100  Va.  781,  42  S.  E.  916; 
Evans  v.  George,  80  111.  51;  Graves 
v.  Colwell,  90  111.  612;  Reber  v.  Her- 
ring, 115  Pa.  St.  599,  8  Atl.  830; 
Atlanta  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  116 
Ga.  369. 

ITS  Brantley  v.  S.  115  Ga.  229, 
41  S.  E.  695;  Jefferson  v.  S.  110 
Ala.  89,  20  So.  434;  Godwin  v.  S. 
73  Miss.  873,  19  So.  712;  Williams 
v.  S.  46  Neb.  704,  65  N.  W.  788 
(on  insanity). 

174  Jacksonville   &   S.   E.   R.   Co. 


v.  Walsh,  106  111.  253;  Polly  v. 
Com.  16  Ky.  L.  R.  203,  27  S.  W.  862; 
Bertram  v.  People's  R.  Co.  154  Mo. 
639,  55  S.  W.  1040. 

175  Bibbins    v.    City    of    Chicago, 
193  111.  363,  61  N.  E.  1030;    Protec- 
tion   Life    Ins.    Co.    v.    Dill,    91    111. 
177;   Graves  v.  Colwell,  90  111.  612, 
619;    City   of   Joliet   v.   Seward,   86 
111.    402,   405;    Manley   v.   Boston   & 
M.  R.   Co.   159  Mass.   493,  34  N.  E. 
951;  Gunther  v.  Gunther,  181  Mass. 
217,  63  N.  E.  402;   Rising  v.  Nash, 
48   Neb.   597,   67   N.  W.   460. 

176  Frame  v.   Badger,  79   111.  441, 
446;    Sullivan  v.  Eddy,  164  111.  391, 
396,  45  N.  E.  837;  Flowers  v.  Flow- 
ers, 92  Ga.  688,   18  S.   E.   1006.   See 
also  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Green    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    49    S.    W. 
672;    Meyer    v.    Pacific    R.    Co.    40 
Mo.  151;    Grube  v.   Nichols,  36  III. 
92,    98. 

177  Seiler   v.   S.   112   Wis.   293,   87 
N.    W.    1072;     White    v.    Epperson 
(Tex.    Cr.   App.),   73   S.   W.    851;    S. 
v.  Buralli   (Nev.),  71  Pac.  532   (re- 
viewing   many    cases) ;    Wilson    v. 
S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),   36   S.   W.    587. 


§  115  BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS.  104 

adverted  to  by  other  instructions;178  and  where,  in  the  contest 
of  a  will,  the  court  has  properly  charged  that  the  jury  must 
consider  all  the  evidence  in  determining  the  issues,  it  is  not 
error  then  to  direct  their  attention  to  certain  particular  matters 
and  say  that  these  matters,  of  themselves,  are  not  sufficient  to 
establish  either  claim  of  the  contestant.179 

,  Where  damages  to  be  ascertained  rest  upon  several  separate 
alleged  grievances,  which  may  be  considered  separately  as  items, 
attention  may  properly  be  called  to  any  one  of  such  subjects 
without  reference  to  the  others.180  So  where  some  particular 
portion  of  the  evidence  or  the  testimony  of  a  certain  witness, 
if  true,  is  decisive  of  the  cause,  it  is  not  improper  to  call  the 
attention  of  the  jury  to  such  evidence  or  witness,  though  refer- 
ence is  not  made  to  other  evidence.181  A  charge  that  "if  the 
jury  believe  from  all  the  evidence  before  them  that  the  plain- 
tiff did  not  receive  any  of  the  injuries  complained  of  in  his 
petition  then  it  will  be  their  duty  to  find  for  the  defendant," 
was  held  proper,  and  does  not  give  undue  prominence  to  a  par- 
ticular question.182 

§  115.  Singling  out  facts — Criminal  cases. — In  a  criminal  cause 
the  court  should  not  designate  any  particular  part  or  branch  or 
fact  of  a  ease,  and  tell  the  jury  that  unless  it  is  proved  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt  they  should  acquit.183  Especially  in  a 
summary  instruction  is  it  improper  to  single  out  and  direct  the 
attention  of  the  jury  to  particular  portions  of  the  evidence  to 
the  exclusion  of  other  parts  equally  as  important  in  determining 
the  issues.184  Singling  out  the  strong  points  for  the  prosecution 

"8  International  Bank  v.  Ferris,  v.  S.  (Tex.  Or.  App.),  36  S.  W.  448; 

118  111.  470,  8  N.  E.  825.  Morgan  v.  S.  48  Ohio,  371,  27  N.  E. 

"9  Goldthorp  v.  Goldthorp,  115  710;  McLeroy  v.  S.  120  Ala.  274,  25 

Iowa,  430,  88  N.  W.  944.  So.  247. 

iso  St.  Louis,  J.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  is*  Scott  v.  P.  141  111.  210,  30 

Kirby,  104  111.  345,  349.  N.  E.  329;  Chambers  v.  P.  105  111. 

isi  Love  v.  Gregg,  117  N.  Car.  417;  Campbell  v.  P.  92  111.  602; 

467,  23  S.  E.  332;  Hart  v.  Bray,  Coon  v.  P.  99  111.  371;  Kennedy 

50  Ala.  446.  v.  P.  44  111.  285;  Coffman  v.  Com. 

182  Weeks  v.  Texas  Midland  R.  10  Bush  (Ky.)  495.  1  Am.  Cr.  R. 

(Tex.  C.  App.),  67  S.  W.  1071.  294;  Preston  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

isa  Mullins  v.  P.  110  111.  42;  Da-  252,  53  S.  W.  881;  S.  v.  Rutherford, 

vis  v.  P.  114  111.  86,  29  N.  E.  192;  152  Mo.  124,  53  S.  W.  417.  See 

Leigh  v.  P.  113  111.  372;  Crews  v.  also:  Sanders  v.  P.  124  111.  226.  16  N. 

P.  120  111.  317,  11  N.  E.  404;  Hor-  E.  81;  Evans  v.  George,  80  111.  51; 

nish  v.  P.  142  111.  626,  32  N.  E.  Hoge  v.  P.  112  111.  46,  6  N.  E.  796; 

677;  S.  v.  Smith,  53  Mo.  267;  Ball  P.  v.  Hawes,  98  Cal.  648,  33  Pac. 


105  SINGLING  OUT  AND  IGNORING  FACTS.  §    116 

by  calling  the  witnesses  by  name  is  highly  improper  and  prej- 
udicial, especially  where  the  evidence  for  the  defendant  is  not 
thus  emphasized  and  very  material  points  in  his  evidence  not 
even  referred  to.185 

In  a  homicide  case  a  requested  instruction  telling  the  jury 
that  they  may  look  to  any  threats  made  by  the  deceased  against 
the  accused,  in  determining  whether  the  deceased  or  the  accused 
was  the  aggressor,  is  improper  as  directing  the  attention  of  the 
jury  to  a  particular  fact  to  the  exclusion  of  other  evidence  in 
the  case.180  An  instruction  that  flight  may  indicate  a  con- 
sciousness of  guilt,  or  may  be  caused  from  an  innocent  motive, 
and  that  the  jury  may  look  to  the  fact  that  the  defendant 
surrendered  himself  in  determining  his  guilt  or  innocence,  is  for 
the  same  reason  improper.187  The  court  in  charging  the  jury 
is  not  required  to  single  out  each  of  the  facts  tending  to  connect 
the  accused  with  the  crime  charged.188 

§  116.  .  Instructions  ignoring  facts. — An  instruction  which  ig- 
nores material  facts  in  issue  presented  by  the  pleadings  is  er- 
roneous when  the  evidence  tends  to  establish  such  facts.189  A 

791;   Morgan  v.  S.  48  Ohio  St.  377,  W.  488;  P.  v.  Sanders,  114  Cal.  216, 

27   N.   E.   710;    Grant  v.   S.  97  Ala.  46  Pac.  153;  Hanrahan  v.  P.  91  111. 

35,  11  So.  915;   Goley  v.  S.  85  Ala.  142,    146.      Held    not    singling    out 

333,  5  So.   167;   P.  v.   Caldwell,  107  facts:     Jackson    v.    Kas.     City,  Ft. 

Mich.  374,  65  N.  W.  213;    Miller  v.  S.   &  M.  R.   Co.   157  Mo.   621,  58  S. 

S.   107   Ala.   40,   19   So.   37;    Dobson  W.   32;    Martin  v.   St.   Louis  S.   W. 

v.  S.  61  Neb.  584,  85  N.  W.  843.  R.    Co.    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),   56   S.   W. 

iss  p.  v.  Clark,  105  Mich.  169    62  1011;   International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co. 

N.    W.    1117;    Prim   v.    S.    73   Miss.  v.  Newman   (Tex.  Cv.   App.),  40  S. 

838,   19   So.   711.  W.   854;    P.  v.   Neary,   104  Cal.  373, 

is6  Crawford  v.  S.  112  Ala.  1,  21  37  Pac.   943;    Southern  Ind.   R.   Co. 

So.    214.  v.   Peyton,   157   Ind.    690,   61   N.   B. 

is?  White    v.    S.    Ill    Ala.    92,    21  722;    Lane   v.   City   of   Madison,   8& 

So.  330;    Alberts  v.  U.  S.  162  U.  S.  Wis.  453,  57  N.  E.  93;   Missouri,  K. 

499.    But  defendant  may  sometimes  &   T.    R.    Co.    v.    Coffey    (Tex.    Cv. 

have  a  right  1,o  such  an  instruction  App.),  68  S.  W.  721;  Gran  v.  Hous- 

if  he  requests  it,  Waybright  v.  ton,  45  Neb.  813,  64  N.  W.  245. 
State,  56  Ind.  122.  iso  Dobney  v.  Conley  (Tex.  Cv. 

iss  Punk   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),  App.),    65    S.    W.    1124;    Crittenden 

48    S.    W.    171.      Instructions    inva-  v.     S.     134     Ala.     145,    32    So.   273; 

ding  the  province  of  the  jury  are  Remey  v.  Olds  (Cal.),  34  Pac.  216; 

properly   refused,   Illinois   Cent.   R.  Henry  v.   Stewart,   185   111.   448,   5V 

Co.  v.  Griffin,  184  111.  10,  16,  56  N.  E.  N.    E.    190;    Gilmore    v.    Courtney, 

337;   Pittsburg,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  158  111.  440,  41  N.  E.  1023;    Austill 

v.    Callaghan,    157    111.    406,    413,    41  v.    Heironmymus,    117   Ala.    620,   23 

N.  E.  909;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  So.  660.     See  also  Illinois  Cent.  R. 

v.    Lonergan,    118   111.    41,   57,    7   N.  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  157  111.  364,  41  N.  E. 

E.    55.      Held    singling    out    facts:  724;    Chicago    &   W.    I.    R.    Co.    v, 

Bonner  v.   Com.   18  Ky.   728,   38   S.  Flynn,   154   111.   453,   40  N.   E.   332; 


§   116 


BASED  ON   EVIDENCE   AND   PLEADINGS. 


106 


charge  which  ignores  every  material  fact  affecting  the  rights 
of  the  parties  and  submits  to  the  jury  undisputed  facts  only  is 
erroneous  and  properly  refused.190  And  to  state  in  an  instruction 
that  there  is  only  one  circumstance  tending  to  prove  a  material 
fact  and  ignoring  other  evidence  from  which  such  fact  may 
be  inferred  is  error.101 

From  this  principle  it  follows  that  an  instruction  which  pur- 
ports to  sum  up  the  principal  facts,  but  directs  the  attention 
of  the  jury  only  to  those  favorable  to  one  of  the  parties,  is  bad, 
as  giving  prominence  to  some  of  the  facts  in  evidence  and  ig- 
noring others  quite  as  material  and  important.192  Or,  in  other 
words,  an  instruction  which  states  the  facts  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  plaintiff  and  then  concludes  that  "if  you  believe  these 
facts  you  find  for  the  plaintiff"  is  improper.193  Likewise  an 
instruction  in  a  criminal  case  submitting  the  issue  on  the  evi- 

Co.  69  Miss.  319,  10  So.  446;  Hig- 
gins  v.  Grace,  59  Md.  365;  McKay 
v.  Evans,  48  Mich.  597,  12  »N.  E.  868; 
McDonough  v.  Miller,  114  Mass. 
94;  Ranney  v.  Barlow,  112  U.  S. 
207,  5  Sup.  Ct.  104;  Prothero  v. 
Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  134  Ind.  431, 
33  N.  E.  765;  Bloch  v.  Edwards, 

116  Ala.  90,  22  So.  600;   Charter  v. 
Lane,    62    Conn.    121,    25    Atl.    464; 
Glass  v.  Cook,  30  Ga.  133;  Chicago 
&c.  Co.  v.  Moran,  210  111.  9,  15. 

190  Henry  v.  Stewart,  185  111.  448, 
57  N.  E.  190.     See  Rock  Island,  &c 
v.  Pohlman,  210  111.  139. 

191  Berliner  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co. 
121    Cal.    451,    53    Pac.    922;    Costly 
v.   McGowen,   174   111.   76,   50   N.   E. 
1047.     See  Weidman  v.   Symes,  116 
Mich.  619,  74  N.  W.  1008. 

i»2  Sanders  v.  P.  124  111.  226,  16.  N. 
E.  81;  Town  of  Evans  v.  Dickey, 

117  111.  291,  7  N.  E.  263;   Dupuis  v. 
Chicago  &   N.   R.   Co.   115   111.   101. 
3   N.   E.    720;  'Pennsylvania   Co.   v. 
Sloetke,  104  111.  201,  205;  Coon  v.  P. 
99    111.    368;    Evans    v.    George,    80 
111.   54;    Martin  v.   Johnson,   89   111. 
537;    Cushman  v.    Cogswell,    86   111. 
65;    New   York   &   T.   Land   Co.   v. 
Gardner  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  25  S.  W. 
737. 

193  Mitchell-Tranter  Co.  v.  Eh- 
mett,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1788,  65  S.  W. 
835.  55  L.  R.  A.  710. 


Elgin,  J.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Raymond, 
148  111.  248,  35  N.  E.  729;  Weiss  v. 
Dittman,  4  Tex.  Cv.  App.  35,  23 
S.  W.  229;  Fiore  v.  Ladd,  25  Ore. 
423,  36  Pac.  572;  Graferman  Dairy 
Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Dairy  Co.  96  Mo. 
App.  495,  70  S.  W.  390;  Penn.  Canal 
Co.  v.  Harris,  101  Pa.  St.  93;  Plumb 
v.  Curtis.  66  Conn.  154,  33  Atl.  998; 
Stocker  v.  Green,  94  Mo.  280,  7  S. 
W.  279,  4  Am.  St.  382;  Sherman  v. 
Kreul,  42  Wis.  33;  Sigerson  v.  Pom- 
eroy,  13  Mo.  620;  Hazewell  v.  Cour- 
sen,  81  N.  Y.  630;  Uhl  v.  Robison,  8 
Neb.  272;  Kieldsen  v.  Wilson,  77 
Mich.  45.  43  N.  W-  1054;  Graves  v. 
Dill,  159  Mass.  74,  34  N.  E.  336; 
Ordway  v.  Sanders,  58  N.  H. 
132;  Jacob  Tome  Inst.  of  Port 
Deposit  v.  Crothers,  87  Md. 
569,  40  Atl.  261;  Wooley  v. 
Lyon,  117  111.  244,  250,  6  N.  E. 
885;  Lindesaan  v.  Fry,  178  111. 
174,  52  N.  E.  831;  Von  Glahn  v. 
Von  Glahn,  46  III.  134,  139;  Blair 
v.  Blanton  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  55  S. 
W.  321;  North  v.  Mallory,  94  Md. 
305,  51  Atl.  89;  Central  of  Ga.  R. 
Co.  v.  Dumas,  131  Ala.  172,  30  So. 
867;  Percival  v.  Chase,  182  Mass. 
371,  65  N.  E.  800;  Anniston  L.  & 
C.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  107  Ala.  538,  18 
So.  326;  Highland  Ave.  &  B.  R. 
Co.  v.  Sampson,  112  Ala.  425,  20 
So.  566;  Soloman  v.  City  Compress 


107  WITHDRAWING    FACTS    FROM    JURY.  §    117 

dence  of  the  prosecution  alone  is  improper  in  ignoring  the  de- 
fense.19* 

§  117.  Instructions  withdrawing  facts. — Where  there  is  evi- 
dence tending  to  support  an  issue  of  fact  properly  presented  by 
the  pleadings  an  instruction  withdrawing  such  issue  is  improp- 
er.195 And  if  any  inference  can  be  fairly  drawn  from  the  evi- 
dence which  tends  to  support  a  material  fact  an  instruction 
withdrawing  such  fact  from  the  consideration  of  the  jury  is  im- 
proper.196 

The  giving  of  an  instruction  withdrawing  from  the  considera- 
tion of  the  jury  certain  evidence,  though  slight,  which  tends 
to  prove  a  material  fact  in  issue  is  error.197  So  where  doc- 
umentary evidence  proper  to  be  considered  has  ben  introduced, 
an  instruction  so  framed  that  it  withdraws  such  documents  from 
the  jury  is  improper.  In  such  case  it  is  error  for  the  court 
to  state  that  the  evidence  is  what  the  witnesses  testify  to  on 
the  witness  stand.198  But,  on  the  other  hand,  where  there  is 
no  competent  evidence  tending  to  prove  a  particular  fact  or 
issue  involved,  it  is  proper  to  withdraw  such  fact  or  issue  by  in- 
structions.199 

194  Sanders  v.   S.   134  Ala.  74,   32  162  111.  658,  44  N.  E.   887;   Chicago 
So.  654;   Mann  v.  S.  134  Ala.  1,  32  &    A.    R.    Co.    v.    Dumser,    161    111. 
So.    704;    S.    v.    Gallivan,   75   Conn.  190,   197,   43   N.   E.   698;    Protection 
326,  53  Atl.  731,  96  Am.  St.  203.  Life   Ins.    Co.    v.    Dill,    91    111.    174; 

195  Cicero    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Brown,  Chezem  v.  S.  56  Neb.  496,  76  N.  W. 
193  111.  274,  279,  61  N.  E.  1093;  Chi-  1056;    Hayden    v.    Frederickson,    56 
cago,  B   &   Q.   R.   Co.   v.   Sykes,  96  Neb.   141,   80  N.  W.   494;    Myers  v. 
111.   162,   176;    Ayres  v.   Pittsburgh,  Walker,    31    111.    353,    363;    Orne    v. 
C.   C.   &   St.   L.   R.   Co.   201    pa.   St.  Cook,  31  111.  238;  Ayers  v.  Metcalf, 
124,    50    Atl.    958    (held    not    with-  39    111.    307;    Frasure   v.    Zimmerly, 
drawing);    Pritchett  v.   Munroe,   22  25    111.    184;    Bowden   v.    Achor,   95 
Ala.    501;     Providence    G.    M.    Co.  Ga.    243,    22    S.    E.    254;    American 
v.   Thompson    (Ariz.),   60  Pac.   874;  Oak  Ex.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  104  Ala.  267, 
Chicago,  &c.  Co.  v.  Moran,  210  111.  15  So.  807;  Woodbury  v.  S.  69  Ala. 
9,  15.  242,   44  Am.   R.   515. 

196  Whitehouse  v.  Bolster,  95  Md.          197  Anderson    v.    Timberlake,    114 
458,  50  Atl.  240.     See  also  Germania  Ala.  377,  22  So.  431,  62  Am.  St.  155. 
Fire    Ins.    Co.    v.    Klewer,    129    111.          "8  Myers   v.    S.    97   Ga.   76,   25   S. 
599,  607,  22  N.  E.  489;  Chicago  &  N.  E.   252;    Bowden  v.   Archer,   95   Ga. 
R.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  128  111.  655,  660,  21  243,    22    S.    E.    254;    Scarbrough    v. 
N.    E.    520;    Cummings    v.    Tilton,  Blackman.  108  Ala.  656,  18  So.  735; 
44  111.  172;   Dunn  v.  P.  172  111.  582,  Mode   Mill    Co.    v.    McEver,    95    Ga. 
599,  50  N.  E.   137;    Vierling  v.   Iri-  701,  22  S.  E.  705. 

quois     Furnace     Co.     170    111.    189,  ™9  Supreme  Council  C.  K.  v.  Fi- 

48   N.   E.    1069;    Ennis   v.    Pullman  delity  &  C.  Co.  63  Fed.  48;  Morgan 

P.  C.  Co.  165  111.  161,  46  N.  E.  439;  v.  Stone,  (Neb.)  93  N.  W.  743. 
Chicago   City   R.   Co.   v.   Dinsmore, 


§    117a,  BASED  ON  EVIDENCE  AND  PLEADINGS.  108 

§  117a.    Action  for  personal  injury  from  negligence. — In  an 

action  for  personal  injury  resulting  from  negligence,  an 
instruction  which  enumerates  a  certain  state  of  facts  and 
directs  the  jury  that  if  they  find  such  facts  to  be  true  then  the 
party  complaining  cannot  recover  for  an  alleged  injury,  is  er- 
roneous in  that  it  takes  from  the  jury  the  question  of  negligence, 
which  is  a  question  of  fact  for  them  to  determine.200  For  in- 
stance, an  instruction  stating  that  "it  is  the  duty  of  a  person 
before  attempting  to  cross  a  railroad  track  to  stop,  if  necessary, 
and  look  and  listen  for  the  approach  of  trains  before  entering 
upon  the  track;  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  plaintiff  in  this  case  could  have  discovered  the  approach 
of  the  defendant's  train  and  avoided  the  injury  in  question  by 
having  stopped  his  mule  before  driving  upon  the  track  and 
looking  and  listening  for  the  approach  of  said  train  then  he 
cannot  recover  in  this  case,  unless  the  jury  shall  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  agents  or  servants  of  the  defendants  were 
guilty  of  gross  negligence  in  the  operation  of  said  train,"  is 
erroneous,  in  that  it  withdraws  from  the  jury  the  determination 
of  the  fact  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  negligence.201 

§  118.  Instructions  ignoring  defense. — Where  there  is  evidence 
tending  to  establish  a  legal  defense  to  an  action,  either  civil  or 
criminal,  the  giving  of  instructions  which  ignore  or  disregard 
such  defense  is  error,  although  the  instructions  may  in  all  other 
respects  correctly  state  the  law.202  Thus  in  an  action  charging 

200  Pennsylvania     Co.    v.     Frana,  timore,   C.   &   A.   R.   Co.   v.   Kirby, 
112   111.   404.  88  Md.   489,  41  Atl.   777;    Globe  Oil 

201  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Frana,  112  Co.  v.  Powell,  56  Neb.  463,  76  N.  \V. 
111.  404.  Instructions  held  not  with-  1081;    Harris  v.   Carrington,  115  N. 
drawing     facts     from     the     jury:  Car.  187,  20  S.  E.  452;  Birmingham 
Hronek   v.    P.    134   111.    135,   147,   24  S.   R.   Co.  v.   Cuzzart,   133  Ala.  262, 
N.    E.    861;    Kirby    v.    Wilson,    98  31  So.  979;   Sutherland  v.  Holliday 
111.    240,    244;    Devine    v.    Chicago,  (Neb.),   90   N.   W.   937;    Carwile   v. 
M.   &   St.   P.  R.   Co.   100  Iowa,   692,  Carwile,    131    Ala.    603,   31    So.    568; 
69     N.    W.     1042;     Dillingham     v.  Jones   v.    Parker    (Tex.    Cv.    App.), 
Crank,    87    Tex.    104,    27    S.    W.    93.  42  S.  W.   123.  See  Clapper  v.  Men- 
It   is   improper     for     the     court   to  dill,    96    Mo.    App.    106,    69    S.    W. 
charge  that  counsel  did  not  make  669;    Hall    v.    Vanderpool,    156    Pa. 
a  certain  argument,  for  the  reason  St.     152,     26     Atl.     1069;    Burke   v. 
that  this  is  a  matter  as  much  with-  Holmes   (Tex.  Cv.   App.),  68  S.  W. 
in    the   knowledge    of   the   jury   as  52;    Remy   v.    Olds    (Cal.)    34    Pac. 
of  the  judge  of  the  court.    Binning-  216;    Eureka   F.    Co.    v.    Baltimore, 
ham,  R.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Williams,  119  C-  S.  &  R.  Co.  78  Md.  179,  27  Atl. 
Ala.    547,    24    So.    548.  1035:    American  C.  Tel.   Co.  v.   No- 

202  Commercial  Bank  v.  Chatfield,  ble,    98   Mich.   67,    56    N.   W.    1100; 
121   Mich.   641,  80  N.  W.  712;    Bal-  Stanfield    v.    Phoenix    L.    Asso.    53 


109  IGNORING  DEFENSE.  §  118 

negligence,  contributory  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  plain- 
tiff, is  a  proper  defense;  hence  the  refusal  to  instruct  on  the 
theory  of  contributory  negligence  is  error  if  there  is  any  evidence 
tending  to  prove  contributory  negligence.203 

It  has  been  held  that  the  giving  of  instructions  for  the  plain- 
tiff in  a  personal  injury  case  where  the  defense  was  contributory 
negligence,  which  ignored  the  theory  of  the  defendant,  is  error, 
although  such  defense  may  have  been  presented  in  other  in- 
structions.204 "Where  the  pleadings  properly  present  the  issue 
as  to  whether  a  claim  is  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations, 
and  there  is  evidence  tending  to  support  the  contention  that 
the  claim  is  barred,  it  is  error  for  the  court  in  charging  the 
jury  to  ignore  such  defense.205  So  if  there  is  any  evidence  tend- 
ing to  establish  a  good  defense  to  a  part  of  a  claim,  an  instruc- 
tion which  ignores  the  evidence  of  such  defense  is  erroneous.206 
And  in  a  criminal  cause  where  the  testimony  for  the  defendant 
tends  to  prove  a  defense  as  to  any  one  of  several  counts  of  an 
indictment  it  is  error  to  refuse  instructions  as  to  such  defense.207 

In  a  criminal  case  where  the  branding  of  cattle  is  relied 
upon  to  establish  the  taking  of  them,  if  there  is  evidence  that 
the  accused  was  not  connected  with  such  branding,  the  court, 
on  request,  should  instruct  that  if  the  evidence  shows  that  the 
accused  was  not  connected  with  such  branding  then  there  was 
no  taking  of  the  cattle  by  him.208  And  where  the  possession  of 
.stolen  goods  is  relied  upon  to  connect  the  accused  with  the  crime 

Mo.    App.    595:     S.    v.    Abbott,    65  W.    774;    Chicago   &   A.    R.    Co.    v. 

Kas.   139,   69   Pac.   160    (defense   of  Kuckkuck,  197  111.  304,  98  111.  App. 

alibi    ignored);    Faust    v.    Hosford,  252,  64  N.  E.  358;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co. 

119    Iowa,    97,    93    N.    W.    58;    Stoll  v.    Ruzika    (Neb.),    91    N.    W.    543; 

v.    Loving,    120   Fed.    805;    Volk   v.  Van  -Winkle  v.   Chicago,   M.   &   St. 

Roche,    70    111.    297;    Peoples    v.    S.  P.   R.   Co.   93   Iowa,   509,   61  N.  W. 

(Miss.),    33    So.    289;    Woods    v.    S.  929. 

81  Miss.  408,  33  So.  285;   Thompson  205  Miller    v.    Cinnamon,    168    111. 

v.    Boden,    81    Ind.    176;    McGehee  451,  48  N.  E.  45;  See  also  Pardridge 

v.  Lane,  34  Tex.  390;  Illinois  Cent.  v.  Culter,  168  111.  511,  48  N.  E.  125; 

R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  208  111.  618  Baltimore    &    S.    R.    Co.    v.    Then, 

203  Eastman  v.  Curtis,  67  Vt.  432,  159   111.   543,  42  N.  E.  971. 

32  Atl.  232;  McVey  v.  St.  Glair  Co.  soe  Asher  v.  Beckner,  19  Ky.  521, 

49  W.  Va.  412,  38  S.  E.  648;    Den-  41  S.  W.  35. 

ver    Tr.    Co.    v.    Lassasso,    22    Colo.  20?  Jones    v.    S.    80    Miss.    181,    31 

444,  45  Pac.  409.  So.    581;    Hammond    v.    P.    199    111. 

204  McCreery's     Adm'rs     v.     Ohio  173,  64  N.  E.  980   (self-defense). 
River  R.  Co.  43  W.  Va.  110,  27  So.  208  Black    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 
327.      See    generally:    Sherwood    v.  41  S.   W.  606. 

Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  33  S. 


§    119  BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS.  110 

charged,  the  time  which  elapsed  between  the  commission  of  the 
crime  and  the  time  when  found  in  possession  of  the  accused 
is  material,  and  the  instructions  should  cover  this  feature  of 
the  case.200  Also  on  a  charge  of  assault  with  intent  to  kill  and 
murder  it  is  error  to  instruct  that  if  the  prosecuting  witness  made 
an  attack  on  the  defendant  without  any  weapon  in  his  hands, 
•and  without  appearance  of  any  such  weapon,  then  the  defendant 
would  not  be  warranted  in  using  a  deadly  weapon,  because  it 
includes  every  conceivable  case  of  violent  attack  and  ignores 
differences  of  age  and  strength  of  the  two  persons.210 

§  119.  Instructions  summing  up  the  evidence. — The  practice 
of  summing  up  or  recapitulating  the  evidence  is  of  common  law 
origin  and  prevails  in  many  jurisdictions.  In  the  language  of 
Blackstone,  "when  the  evidence  is  gone  through  on  both  sides 
the  judge,  in  the  presence  of  the  parties,  the  counsel  and  all 
others,  sums  up  the  whole  to  the  jury;  omitting  all  superfluous 
circumstances,  observing  wherein  the  main  question  and  principal 
issue  lies,  stating  what  evidence  has  been  given  to  support  it,  with 
such  remarks  as  he  thinks  necessary  for  their  direction,  and 
giving  them  his  opinion  in  matters  of  law  arising  upon  the  evi- 
dence."211 

The  practice  of  summing  up  the  evidence  is  recognized  in 
jurisdictions  where  the  court  is  prohibited  by  constitutional  or 
statutory  provisions  from  expressing  an  opinion  on  the  facts,  as 
well  as  in  those  jurisdictions  where  the  court  may  express  an 
opinion  on  the  facts,  unless  such  provisions  also  expressly  or  im- 
pliedly  forbid  the  summing  up  of  the  evidence.212  Under  this 
practice  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  may  sum  up  all  the 
evidence  in  detail,  if  fairly  done,  and  then  state  the  rule  of 

209  Sharp    v.    S.    105    Ga.    588,    31  761;  Hannon  v.  S.  70  Wis.  448,  36  N. 
S.    E.    541.  W.  1;  Morgan  v.  S.  48  Ohio  St.  371; 

210  Davis  v.  S.  152  Ind.  34,  51  N.  First  Baptist  Church   v.   Rouse,   21 
B.  928,  71  Am.  St.  322.  Conn.   167;    Donnilly  v.  S.  26  N.  J. 

211  Blackstone   Comm.   375.  L.    480;     District    of    Columbia    v. 

212  Blaishfield    Instructions,    §    53  Robinson,  180  U.  S.  92,  21  Sup.  Ct. 
P.  130,  citing:     Mitchell  v.  Harmo-  283;    Hamlin  v.   Treat,   87  Me.   310, 
ny,  13  How.   (U.  S.),  130;   Starr  v.  32  Atl.  909;   Bellow  v.  Ahrburg,  23 
U.  S.  153  U.  S.  614,  14  Sup.  Ct.  919;  Kas.  287;  City  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Find- 
P.  v.  Fanning,  131  N.  Y.  663,  30  N.  ley,  76  Ga.  311   (and  other  cases); 
E.    569;    S.    v.    Rose,   47   Minn.    47,  Com.  v.  Barry,  9  Allen  Mass.  278; 
49   N.   W.    525;    Com.    v.    McManus,  S.   v.   Sipsey,   14   N.   Car.   485. 

143  Pa.  St.  64,  21  Atl.  1018,  22  Atl. 


Ill  SUMMING   UP  THE  EVIDENCE.  §    119 

law  applicable  to  the  facts.213  The  rule  applies  to  civil  and 
criminal  cases  alike.214  But  in  some  jurisdictions  this  practice, 
though  recognized,  has  been  condemned.215  Summarizing  in- 
structions as  such,  however,  are  not  necessarily  objectionable 
or  vicious.-16 

An  instruction  thus  summarizing  the  evidence  must  necessarily 
state  all  the  facts  or  elements  which,  as  a  matter  of  law,  will 
authorize  the  verdict  directed.  The  contentions  of  the  opposing 
party  should  not  be  ignored  in  summarizing  instructions  if  there 
is  any  evidence  tending  to  support  his  contention.217  If  such  an 
instruction  omits  material  facts  it  is  highly  objectionable.  The 
very  fact  that  the  court  gives  what  assumes  to  be  a  summary 
of  the  facts  of  a  case  may  induce  the  jury  to  believe  that  they 
are  all  the  facts  necessary  to  be  considered  in  arriving  at  a  con- 
clusion.218 An  instruction  which  thus  undertakes  to  state  all 
the  material  facts  constituting  a  cause  of  action  or  defense,  but 
omits  a  material  fact,  is  fatally  defective.219  But  a  summarizing 
instruction  is  not  erroneous  in  failing  to  state  all  the  subsidiary 
or  unimportant  facts.  It  is  sufficient  if  it  enumerates  all  the 
material  facts.220 

It  has  been  held  in  Pennsylvania  that  if  the  trial  court  in 

213  Morgan  v.  S.  48  Ohio  St.  377,      Co.  v.  Snyder,  117  111.  376,  7  N.  E. 
27  N.  E.   710;    Medearis  v.   Anchor      604;  St.  Louis  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Britz, 
Mutual  Fire  Ins.   Co.  104  Iowa,  88,      72  111.  256,  261;   McCorkle  v.  Simp- 

'73  N.  W.  495;  Mimms  v.  S.  16  Ohio  son,    42    Ind.    453;    Barker   v.    S.    48 

St.    234;    Sheets    v.    Stark,    14    Ga.  Ind.  163;   Snyder  v.  S.  -59  Ind.  105; 

429;    York  v.   Maine   C.   R.  'Co.   84  Ward  v.  Ward,  47  W.  Va.   766,  36 

Me.  128,  24  Atl.  791.  S.    E.    873;    McAleer  v.    S.   46   Neb. 

214  Turly    v.    P.    188    111.    633,    59  116,   64   N.   W.    358;    Kurstelska   v. 
N.  E.  506;   Gregg  v.  P.  98  111.  App.  Jackson,  89  Minn.  95. 

170.  218  Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v. 

215  Terre    Haute   &    I.    R.    Co.    v.  Griffin,    68    111.    499,    507;    Levy    v. 
Eggman,  159  111.  550,  42  N.  E.  970;  Cunningham,  56  Neb.  348,  76  N.  W. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Schmidt.  107  111.  882;    Ford    v.    S.    75    Miss.    727,    23 
186;  Quinn  v.  P.  123  111.  333,  342,  15  So.    710;    West   v.    Averill    Grocery 
N.    E.    46.  Co.    109    Iowa,   488,    80   N.   W.    555; 

216  Norfolk    Beet    Sugar     Co.     v.  Gallagher    v.    Williamson,    23    Cal. 
Hight,  56  Neb.  162,  76  N.  W.   566;  334,  83  Am.  Dec.  114. 

White  v.  State,  153  Ind.  689,  54  N.  219  Wyman     v.     Turner,    14    Ind. 

E.   763.  App.    118,    42    N.    E.    652;    Jackson 

217  Pardridge   v.    Cutter,    168    111.  School    Tp.   v.    Shera,    8   Ind.    App. 
512,  48  N.  E.  125;  Texas  Loan  Agen-  330,    35    N.    E.    842;    Dobson    v.    S. 
cy  v.   Fleming   (Tex.   Cv.  App.),  46  61  Neb.  584,  85  N.  W.  843. 

S.  W.  63;  Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.  220  Hutchinson     v.  Wenzel,     155 

v.    Eggman,   159    111.   550,   42   N.   E.  Ind.  49,  56  N.  E.  845;  Illinois  Cent. 

970;    City    of    Chicago    v.    Schmitt,  R.  Co.  v.  Byrne,  205  111.  21,  68  N. 

107  111.   186;    Chicago  &  N.  W.   R.  E.  720. 


§  119 


BASED  ON   EVIDENCE  AND   PLEADINGS. 


112 


summing  up  the  evidence  mistakes  the  testimony,  counsel  should 
call  the  attention  of  the.  court  to  the  mistake  immediately  after 
the  charge,  and  failing  to  do  so,  complaint  in  that  respect  will 
not  be  considered  on  review.221  But  the  rule  above  mentioned 
does  not  apply  to  an  instruction  which  merely  fails  to  embody 
evidence  tending  to  establish  a  distinct  antagonistic  theory. 
All  the  law  requires  is  that  such  an  instruction  based  upon  some 
particular  hypothesis  warranted  by  the  evidence  must  not  omit 
any  essential  element  or  material  fact  to  entitle  a  party  to  a  re- 
covery upon  such  theory.222  But  in  most  of  the  states  the  court 
is  prohibited  from  commenting  on  the  evidence,  suggesting  the 
inferences  that  may  be  drawn,  expressing  an  opinion  as  to  its 
weight,  or  assuming  that  certain  facts  have  been  proved.223 


221  Bailey  v.  Mill  Creek  Coal  Co. 
20   Pa.    Super.    186. 

222  Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoeff- 
ner,  175  111.  638,  51  N.  E.  884;  Terre 
Haute  R.   Co.  v.  Eggmann,  159  111. 
550,  42  N.  E.  970;   Chicago  &  A.  R. 
Co.    v.    Harrington,    192    111.    24,    61 
N.  E.  622;   Voris  v.  Shotts,  20  Ind. 
App.    220,   50   N.   E.    484. 

223  Fuller   v.    Ivew    York   F.    Ins. 
Co.    (Mass.)    67  N.  E.   879;    Gaynor 
v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  136  Ala. 
244,   33   So.    808;    Ray  v.   Long,   132 
N.  Car.  891,  44  S.  E.  652;   Ward  v. 
Brown,  53  W.  Va.  227,  44  S.  E.  488; 
Dodd   v.   Guiseffl    (Mo.   App.),  73  S. 
W.   304;    Griffin  v.   Southern  R.   66 
S.    Car.    77,    44    S.    E.    562;    Dobson 
v.  Southern  R.  Co.  132  N.  Car.  900, 
44  S.  E.  593;    Continental  Tob.  Co. 
v.    Knoop,    24    Ky.    L.    R.    1268,    71 
S.   W.   3;    Wilson  v.   Huguenin,  117 
Ga.  546,  43  S.  E.  857;   Ohio,  &c.  R. 
Co.   v.   Pearcy,   128   Ind.   197,  27   M. 
E.  479;  Abbitt  v.  Lake  Erie,  &c.  R. 
Co.    150    Ind.    498,    50    N.    E.    729; 


Rogers  v.  Manhattan,  &c.  Ins.  Co. 
138  Cal.  285,  71  Pac.  348;  Selensky 
v.  Chicago,  &c.  R:  Co.  100  Iowa, 
113,  94  N.  W.  272;  Lydick  v.  Gill 
(Neb.)  94  N.  W.  109;  McHenry  v. 
Bulefant  (Pa.)  56  Atl.  256;  Northern 
Ohio  R.  Co.  v.  Rigby  (Ohio),  68  N. 
E.  1046.  Violations  of  the  rule: 
Johnson  v.  Kahn,  97  Mo.  App.  628, 
71  S.  W.  725;  Allen  v,  Frost  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  71  S.  W.  767;  Meadows 
v.  West.  U.  Tel.  Co.  131  N.  Car.  73 
42  S.  E.  534;  Warfleld  v.  Clark,  118 
Iowa,  69,  91  N.  W.  833;  White  v. 
McPherson,  183  Mass.  533,  67  N. 
E.  643.  Rule  not  violated:  Gold- 
thorpe  v.  Clark-Nickerson  L.  Co. 
31  Wash.  467,  71  Pac.  1091;  Ladd  v. 
Witte,  116  Wis.  35,  92  N.  W.  365; 
Wissler  v.  Atlantic  (Iowa),  98  N. 
W.  131;  Snyder  v.  Lake  Shore,  &c. 
R.  Co.  (Mich.),  91  N.  W.  643,  Mont- 
gomery v.  Del.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  Car.)  4b 
S.  E.  934;  Coombs  v.  Mason,  97  Me. 
270,  54  Atl.  728;  Schmuck  v.  Hill 
(Neb.),  96  N.  W.  158. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


DIRECTING  VERDICT. 


Sec.  Sec. 

120.  Peremptory    instructions    de-      136. 

fined.  137. 

121.  Nature   and   effect   of   motion 

for   peremptory.  138. 

122.  Court  will  not  weigh  the  ev- 

idence on  the  motion.  139. 

123.  Requesting     peremptory     in-      140. 

structions — Waiving. 

124.  When  motion  for  peremptory      141. 

presented.  142. 

125.  Peremptory     instructions     in- 

stead of  nonsuit.  143. 

126.  Peremptory     instructions     for 

defendant.  144. 

127.  If    plaintiff's    evidence    varies 

from  his  pleadings.  145. 

128.  If     evidence    shows    contract 

to  be  illegal.  146. 

129.  Peremptory  improper  for  de- 

fendant. 147. 

130.  If  the  evidence  tends  to  prove 

plaintiff's  case.  148. 

131.  When     facts     are     doubtful—      149. 

different  conclusions. 

132.  Where     either     of     two    the-      150. 

ories    is    supported. 

133.  Evidence      strongly      against      151. 

plaintiff. 

134.  The    foregoing    principles    il-      152. 

lustrated. 

135.  Peremptory     instructions    for 

plaintiff. 


Prima  facie  case  undisputed. 

When  defendant  a,dmits  all 
allegations. 

When  defendant's  pleading 
is  insufficient. 

When    verdict    cannot    stand. 

Improper  for  plaintiff — If  any 
evidence  for  defendant. 

If  the  evidence  is  conflicting. 

If  part  only  of  plaintiff's  claim 
is  contested. 

Where  amount  of  claim  is  dis- 
puted. 

Waiving  right  to  peremptory 
instruction. 

Motion  by  both  parties — Ef- 
fect. 

Waiving  right  to  submit  facts 
to  jury. 

Motion  of  both  parties  denied 
—Effect. 

Directing  jurors  to  agree. 

Ruling  of  trial  court  review- 
able. 

Criminal  Cases! — Peremptory 
proper  for  defendant. 

When  not  proper  for  defend- 
ant. 

Peremptory  proper  for  prose- 
cution— When. 


§  120.  Peremptory  instruction  defined. — When  the  facts  of  a 
case  are  such  that  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  court,  as  a  matter 
of  law,  to  determine  what  the  verdict  shall  be,  the  jury  are  then 

•     113 


§  121 


DIRECTING    VERDICT. 


114 


instructed  by  the  court  to  find  a  verdict  accordingly.  In  some 
states  such  a  charge  is  called  a  peremptory  instruction,1  and  in 
others  it  is  called  a  "general  affirmative  charge."1*  The  court 
in  thus  charging  the  jury  need  not  give  any  specific  reasons  for 
directing  a  verdict;  it  is  sufficient  to  state  that  the  evidence  will 
not  support  any  other  verdict  than  the  one  directed.2  The  in- 
struction should  not  be  drawn  in  such  form  as  to  complicate 
it  with  statements  of  the  law  on  which  it  is  based.3  And  the  court 
in  directing  a  verdict  should  give  no  other  instructions  except 
as  to  the  measure  of  damages.4 

§  121.  Nature  and  effect  of  motion  for  peremptory. — A  motion 
for  a  peremptory  instruction  is  in  the  nature  of  a  demurrer  to 
the  evidence  and  is  governed  by  the  same  rules,  except  as  to 
technical  methods  of  procedure.  The  maker  of  the  motion  ad- 
mits the  truth  of  all  the  opposing  evidence  and  all  inferences 
which  may  be  fairly  and  rationally  drawn  from  it,  and  does 
not  involve  a  determination  of  the  weight  of  the  evidence  nor 
the  credibility  of  the  witnesses.5  The  party  requesting  such  an 


1  Offutt  v.  Columbian  Exposition, 
175   111.   473,   51   N.   E.   651;    Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  King,  179  111.  94,  53 
N.  E.  552;  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  Foster,  175  111.  396,  51  N.  E.  690; 
Swift    &    Co.    v.    Fue,    167    111.    443, 
47  N.  E.  761;    Wenona  Coal  Co.  v. 
Holmquest,    152    111.    581,    38    N.    E. 
946. 

i*  Tennessee  Coal,  I.  &  R.  Co.  v. 
Stevens  (Ala.),  16  So.  22;  Henry 
v.  McNamara,  114  Ala.  107,  22  So. 
428;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Sul- 
livan (Ala.),  35  So.  327. 

2  Hanley  v.  Balch,  106  Mich.  46, 
63   N.    W.    981;    Cowles  v.   Chicago, 
R.    I.   &   P.   Co.    (Iowa),   88  N.   W. 
1072.     Contra:    Carretson  v.  Apple- 
ton,   58   N.   J.    L.    386,   37   Atl.    150; 
Tanderup  v.  Hansen,  8  S.  Dak.  375, 
66   N.   W.    1073.     See   Robey   v.    S. 
94   Md.    61,   51   Atl.   411. 

s  Thomas  v.  Carey,  26  Colo.  485, 
58  Pac.  1093. 

*  City  of  Omaha  v.  Bowman,  63 
Neb.  333,  88  N.  W.  521.  The  fol- 
lowing has  been  held  sufficient  in 
form  for  directing  a  verdict.  "Now 
comes  the  defendants  by  their  at- 
torney and  request  the  court  to 


instruct  the  jury  that  the  evidence 
is  insufficient  to  maintain  the  plain- 
tiff's case,  as  charged  in  the  decla- 
ration, and  therefore  the  verdict 
must  be  for  the  defendants."  Ames 
&  Frost  Co.  v.  Shrackurski,  145 
111.  192,  34  N.  E.  48;  Ayers  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  111  111.  406.  See  Alexan- 
der v.  Cunningham,  111  111.  511. 
A  remark  made  by  the  court  in 
the  presence  of  the  jury  that  any 
verdict  except  one  for  the  plain- 
tiff would  be  set  aside  by  the  court, 
amounts  to  an  instruction  direct- 
ing a  verdict  for  ths  plaintiff, 
White  v.  Blum  79  Fed.  271.  The 
court  in  directing  a  verdict  under 
the  statute  of  Washington  is  not 
required  to  file  its  findings  of  facts 
and  conclusions  of  law,  Fidelity 
Trust  Co.  v.  Palmer,  22  Wash.  473, 
61  Pac.  158. 

s  Offutt  v.  Columbian  Exposi- 
tion, 175  111.  472,  51  N.  E.  651; 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dun- 
leavy,  129  111.  132,  22  N.  E.  15; 
Frazer  v.  Howe,  106  111.  563,  573; 
Joliet,  A.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Velie,  140 
111.  59,  29  N.  E.  706;  Chicago  &  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  129  111.  335,  21 


115    MOTION    FOR    PEREMPTORY — EVIDENCE    CONSIDERED    TRUE.    §    122 

instruction  admits  not  only  what  the  evidence  actually  proves, 
but  also  the  ultimate  facts  which  it  tends  to  prove  for  his  op- 
ponent.0 In  other  words,  the  evidence  of  the  opposing  party 
must  be  taken  as  true  in  determining  a  motion  for  a  peremptory 
instruction.7 

And  the  same  rules  govern  also  where  the  defendant  presents 
his  motion  to  nonsuit  the  plaintiff,  as  he  may  under  the  practice 
in  some  jurisdictions,  for  the  reason  that  the  plaintiff's  evidence 
does  not  prove  a  case.  On  a  motion  of  this  nature  the  evidence 
of  the  plaintiff  shall  be  taken  as  true  in  a  light  most  favorable 
to  him.8  The  court  will  regard  the  issues  proved  if  there  is 
any  evidence  tending  to  prove  them.9  And  all  inferences  which 
may  be  fairly  drawn  from  the  plaintiff's  evidence  shall  be 
counted  in  his  favor  by  the  court  in  passing  upon  the  motion 
for  a  nonsuit.10 

§  122.    Court  will  not  weight  the  evidence  on  the  motion. — In 

considering  the  propriety  of  giving  a  peremptory  instruction, 
when  requested,  the  court  does  not  weigh  the  evidence,  nor  does 
it  determine  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses  or  the  force  that 
should  be  given  to  the  evidence  having  a  tendency  to  impeach 
the  veracity  of  the  witnesses.11  In  deciding  the  motion  the  sole 

N.    E.    846;    Bartelott    v.    Interna-  Duffy    v.    St.    Louis    Tr.    Co.    (Mo. 
tional    Bank,    119    111.    259,    269,    9  App.),    78    S.    W.    831. 
N.  E.  898;   Doane  v.  Lockwood,  115  9  Soyer  v.  Great  Falls  Water  Co. 
111.  490,  494,  4  N.  E.  500;   Hardy  v.  15  Mont.  1,  37  Pac.  838.     See  How- 
Wise,  5  App.  Cas.   (D.  C.)   108.  ell  v.  Norfolk  &  C.  R.   Co.   124  N. 

G  Neininger    v.    Cowen,    101    Fed.  Car.  24,  32  S.  E.  317. 

787;    West   C.   St.   R.   Co.   v.   Ship-  10  Lee  v.  Publishers,  &c.  137  Mo. 

lett,  85  111.  App.  683.  385,    38    S.    W.    1107;    Cummings   v. 

7  Kirk  v.  Garrett,  84  Md.  383,  35  Helena   &    L.    S.    R.    Co.    26    Mont. 

Atl.    1089;     Martin    v.    Chicago    &  434,    68   Pac.    852;    Bohl   v.    City   of 

N.  W.  R.  Co.  194  111.  138,  62  N.  W.  Dell    Rapids    (S.    Dak.),    91    N.    W. 

599;    New    York   Dry   Goods    Store  315.     See   also   Travelers'    Ins.    Co. 

v.  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  112  Fed.  381;  v.  Randolph,  78  Fed.  754;  Howey  v. 

Newbold    v.    Hayward,    96   Md.   247,  Fisher,    111    Mich.    422,    69    N.    W. 

54    Atl.    67    (even    though    contra-  741;    Wagner    v.    Lamont    (Mich.), 

dieted  in  every  particular).  98  N.  W.  2. 

s  Schiller  v.  Dry  Dock,  E.   B.   &  n  Rack  v.  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  173 

B.  R.  Co.  56  N.  Y.  S.  184,  26  Misc.  111.   289,   50  N.   E.   668,   44   L.   R.   A. 

392;    Coley    v.    North    Carolina    R.  127;     Luhrs    v.    Brooklyn    Heights 

Co.   129  N.   Car.  407,  40  S.  E.  195;  R.     Co.     42    N.    Y.     S.    606;     Platz 

Hopkins    v.    Norfolk    &    S.    R.    Co.  v.    McKean    Tp.    178    Pa.    St.    601, 

131  N.  Car.  463,  42  S.  E.  902;  House  36     Atl.     136;     House     v.     Wilder, 

v.    Seaboard   A.   L.    R.    Co.    131   N.  47     111.     510;     Davis     v.     Kroyden, 

Car.    103,    42    S.    E.    553;    Kelly    v.  1    Mo.    App.     192;     Offutt    v.    Co- 

Strouse,  116  Ga.  872,  43  S.  E.  280;  lumbian    Exposition.    175    111.    472, 


§    123  DIRECTING   VERDICT.  116 

inquiry  will  be  whether  there  is  any  evidence  tending  to  support 
the  cause  of  action.12  The  court  may  in  its  discretion  hear 
further  evidence  before  passing  on  a  motion  for  nonsuit.13 

§  123.  Requesting  peremptory  instructions — Waiving. — In  Illi- 
nois the  practice  is  that  an  instruction  directing  the  jury  to  find 
a  verdict  for  a  party  must  be  reduced  to  writing,  the  same  as 
other  instructions,  and  it  should  be  presented  to  the  court  at 
the  proper  time,  accompanied  by  a  motion  that  it  be  given 
to  the  jury;  a  mere  motion  without  such  instruction  is  not  suffi- 
cient.14 The  right  to  have  such  an  instruction  given  to  the  jury 
is  waived  where  it  is  submitted  to  the  court,  together  with  a 
series  of  other  instructions  on  the  issues.15  Where  a  statute  re- 
quires the  grounds  for  a  peremptory  instruction  or  nonsuit  to 
be  stated,  the  party  will  be  confined  to  the  grounds  stated  in 
his  motion ;  other  reasons  will  not  be  considered.16  A  motion  by 
the  defendant  for  a  verdict  in  his  favor  on  the  ground  that 
the  plaintiff  has  not  established  his  case  by  a  preponderance  of 
the  evidence  is  not  equivalent  to  a  request  for  a  verdict  on  the 
ground  that  there  is  no  evidence  to  support  a  verdict  for  the 
plaintiff.17 

§  124.  When  motion  for  peremptory  presented. — A  peremptory 
instruction  to  find  a  verdict  for  the  defendant  must  be  presented 

51  N.  E.  651;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  ing  the  jury  to  find  a  verdict  for 

v.   Dick    (Ky.),    78   S.   W.    914;    St.  the    party,     Smith    v.     Gillett,     50 

Louis,   I.   M.   &   S.   R.   Co.  v.   Neal  111.    301;    House   v.    Wilder,    47   111. 

(Ark.),  78  S.  W.  220.  510. 

12  Whaley  v.  Bartlett,  42  S.  Car.  is  Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v. 

454,    20    S.    E.    745.  Murowski,    179    111.    77,    53    N.    E. 

is  Featherston  v.  Wilson,  123  N.  572;    Chicago,   P.    &   St.   L.   R.   Co. 

Car.  623,  31  S.  E.  843.  v.  Woolridge,  174  111.  332,  51  N.  E. 

i*  West  C.   St.   R.   Co.   v.   Foster,  701;  Pierce  v.  Walters,  164  111.  56.0, 

175  111.  396,  51  N.  E.  690;   Swift  &  45   N.    E.    1068;    Baldwin   v.    Went- 

Co.  v.  Fue,  167  111.  443,  47  N.  E.  761;  worth,    67   N.    H.    408,   36   Atl.    365. 

Wenona    Coal    Co.    v.    Holmquest,  In  Alabama  it  has  been  held  that 

152  111.  581,  38  N.  E.  946;   Offutt  v.  the  court  is  not  precluded  from  di- 

Columbian  Exposition,  175  111.  473,  recting    a    verdict    for    a    party    at 

51  N.  E.  651.     The  practice  of  ex-  his  request,  although  the  court  has 

eluding    the    evidence    amounts    to  charged    the    jury    on    the    issues, 

an  instruction  as  in  a  case  of  non-  Gary    v.    Woodham,    103    Ala.    421, 

suit,   and   is   equivalent   to   an    in-  15   So.    840. 

struction    that    the    evidence    does  ie  Sloan    v.    Petzer,    54    S.    Car. 

not  make  out  a  case.     This  prac-  314,  32  S.  E.  431. 

tice,    though    once    in    vogue,    has  i"  McDonald    v.    Minneapolis,    St. 

long  since  been  superseded  by  the  P.  R.   Co.  105  Mich.  659,  63  N.  W. 

more  appropriate  mode  of  instruct-  966. 


117 


WAIVING,    PRESENTING    MOTION. 


§    124 


to  the  court  by  proper  motion  at  the  close  of  the  plaintiff's 
evidence.18  Or  the  defendant  may  ask  that  such  an  instruction 
be  given  after  he  has  introduced  his  own  evidence ;  such  practice 
being  recognized  by  the  courts,  though  it  is  unusual.  But  such  an 
instruction  can  only  be  sustained  when,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
admitting  all  facts  which  the  plaintiff's  evidence  tends  to  prove 
and  wholly  ignoring  all  the  evidence  introduced  by  the  defendant 
the  court  can  say  the  plaintiff  has  failed  to  make  out  his  case.19 
According  to  the  practice  in  some  jurisdictions,  however,  the 
court  may  recall  the  jury  even  after  they  have  been  deliberating 
upon  the  case  and  direct  a  verdict.20  So  also  the  court  may  at 
any  time  before  the  jury  are  discharged  change  an  order  of  non- 
suit, and  direct  a  verdict  for  the  defendant.21 


is  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Murowski,  179  111.  77,  53  N.  B.  572; 
Peirce  v.  Walters,  164  111.  560,  45 
N.  E.  1068;  Chicago,  P.  &  S.  L. 
R.  Co.  v.  Woolridge,  174  111.  330, 
332,51  N.  E.  701;  Baldwin  v.  Went- 
worth,  67  N.  H.  408,  36  Atl.  365; 
Calumet  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Pett, 
173  111.  72,  50  N.  E.  678;  Gilbert 
v.  Watts-De  Golyer  Co.  169  111.  129, 
48  N.  E.  430;  Hartford  Deposit  Co. 
v.  Pederson,  168  111.  224,  48  N.  E. 
30;  Metropolitan  Bank  of  Minne- 
apolis v.  Northern  Fuel  Co.  173 
111.  345,  50  N.  E.  1062;  Hartford 
Deposit  Co.  v.  Sollitt,  172  111.  222, 
50  N.  E.  178;  Franklin  v.  Krum, 
171  111.  378,  49  N.  E.  513;  Calumet 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Christenson,  170  111. 
383,  48  N.  E.  962;  Chicago  &  Great 
Western 'R.  Co.  v.  Wedel,  144  111. 
9,  12,  32  N.  E.  547;  West  Chicago 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Yund,  169  111.  49,  48 
N.  E.  208;  Central  R.  Co.  v. 
Knowles,  191  111.  241;  Sullivan  v. 
Brooks,  31  N.  Y.  S.  36,  10  Misc. 
368;  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Feldstein,  169  111.  139,  48  N.  E. 
193;  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Delaney,  169  111.  581,  48  N.  E.  476; 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Fishman, 
169  111.  196,  48  N.  E.  447;  Val- 
lette  v.  Bilinski,  167  111.  565,  47  N. 
E.  770;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co. 
v.  Richards,  152  111.  59,  72,  38  N.  E. 
773;  Joliet,  A.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Velie, 
140  111.  59,  29  N.  E.  706;  Travelers' 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Randolph,  78  Fed.  754; 


Brunswick  Grocery  Co.  v.  Bruns- 
wick &  W.  R.  Co.  106  Ga.  270,  32 
S.  E.  92. 

is  Collar  v.  Patterson,  137  111. 
403,  406,  27  N.  E.  604;  Randall  v. 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  Co.  109  U.  S. 
478;  Reed  v.  Inhabitants,  8  Allen 
(Mass.),  524;  Bartolett  v.  Interna- 
tional Bank,  119  111.  259,  269,  9  N. 
E.  898;  Vanarsdell's  Adm'r  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1666, 
65  S.  W.  858.  But  see  McCormick 
v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  60  N.  J.  L. 
243,  37  Atl.  617.  If  no  motion  is 
made  by  the  defendant  to  dismiss 
the  case  at  the  close  of  the  intro- 
duction of  the  evidence,  it  amounts 
to  an  admission  that  the  plaintiff's 
evidence  is  sufficient  to  make  out 
his  case  and  raises  questions  of 
fact  for  the  jury,  Rouse  v.  Print- 
ers' E.  Co.  33  N.  Y.  S.  55,  12  Misc. 
114;  Sulyewski  v.  Windholz,  30  N. 
Y.  S.  230,  9  Misc.  498. 

20  Rainger    v.     Boston     M.     Life 
Asso.  167  Mass.  109,  44  N.  E.  1088. 
See    Gary    v.    Woodham,    103    Ala. 
421,  15  So.  840  (may  request  a  per- 
emptory after  the  court  has  charged 
the  jury  on  the  issues).    The  court 
should  not  direct  a  verdict  on  its 
own   motion,   Gaynor  v.   Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.  (Ala.),  33  So.  108. 

21  Portance   v.   Lehigh   Val.    Coal 
Co.    101    Wis.    574,    77    N.    W.    875; 
Rainger   v.    Boston    M.    Life   Asso. 
167  Mass.   109,  44  N.  E.  1088. 


§    125  DIRECTING   VERDICT.  118 

§  125.  Peremptory  instruction  instead  of  nonsuit. — Under 
statutory  provisions  in  some  states  the  court  is  not  authorized 
to  enter  an  order  of  involuntary  nonsuit  and  judgment  of  dis- 
missal because  the  plaintiff  has  failed  to  make  out  his  case.  In 
such  case  the  proper  practice  is  to  instruct  the  jury  to  find 
for  the  defendant.22 

§  126.  Peremptory  instruction  for  defendant. — An  instruction 
directing  a  verdict  for  the  defendant  should  only  be  given  when 
the  evidence,  with  all  the  legitimate  and  natural  inferences 
which  may  be  drawn  therefrom,  is  wholly  insufficient,  when  taken 
as  true,  to  sustain  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff.23  When  there 
is  no  evidence  to  support  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  a  peremptory 
instruction  to  find  for  the  defendant  is  proper.  But  to  say  there 
is  no  evidence  does  not  mean  literally  none,  but  that  there  is 
none  to  reasonably  satisfy  the  jury  that  the  plaintiff  has  made 
out  his  case.24  A  verdict  for  the  defendant  should  be  directed 
if  the  court  would  be  bound  to  set  aside  a  verdict  for  the  plain- 
tiff.25 So  if  the  evidence  so  greatly  preponderates  against 
the  plaintiff  that  the  court  would,  on  motion,  be  compelled  to 
set  aside  a  verdict,  a  nonsuit  is  proper  where  the  practice  of 
nonsuiting  prevails.26  The  court  is  authorized  to  direct  a  ver- 

22  Thompson  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Amble  v.  Whipple,  139  111.  322,  28 
Co.  51  Neb.  527,  71  N.  W.  61.     See  N.   E.   841;    City   of  East  St.    L.   v. 
Stern    v.    Frommer,    30    N.    Y.    S.  O'Flynn,  119  111.  207,  10  N.  E.  395; 
1067,   10   Misc.   219.  Ellermah  v.  St.  Louis  Tr.  Co.   (Mo. 

23  Lake    S.    &    M.    S.    R.    Co.    v.  App.),   76   S.   \V.    661    (injury   from 
Richards,  152  111.  72,  38  N.  E.  773,  trolley  bar  collision). 

30  L.  R.  A.  33  note;  Lake  S.  &  24  offutt  v.  Columbian  Exposi- 
M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hessions,  150  111.  tion,  175  111.  472,  51  N:  E.  651. 
559,  37  N.  E.  905;  Fugate  v.  City  See  Conner  v.  Giles,  76  Me.  132; 
of  Somerset,  97  Ky.  48,  29  S.  W.  970;  Boyle  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  88  111. 
Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Puntenney,  App.  255;  Phillips  v.  Rentz,  106  Ga. 
200  111.  12;  Day  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  249,  32  S.  E.  107;  Knapp  v.  Jones, 
(Me.),  55  Atl.  420;  Offutt  v.  Colum-  50  Neb.  490,  70  N.  W.  19;  McPeck 
bian  Exposition,  175  111.  472,  51  N.  E.  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.  79  Fed.  590, 
651;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Cozby,  25  C.  C.  A.  110;  Lacy  v.  Porter,  103 
174  111.  109,  50  N.  E.  1011;  Pennsyl-  Cal.  597,  37  Pac.  635;  Vance  v. 
vania  Co.  v.  Backes,  133  111.  264,  24  Vance,  74  Ind.  370;  Sunsyside,  &c. 
N.  E.  563;  P.  v.  Board,  &c.  of  Mad-  Co.  v.  Reitz,  14  Ind.  App.  478,  500. 
ison  County,  125  111.  340,  17  N.  E.  25  De  Graffeuried  v.  Wallace  (Ind. 
147;  Roden  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Ter.),  53  S.  W.  452;  Brown  v.  Pot- 
Co.  133  111.  72;  Ruck  v.  Chicago  C.  ter,  13  Colo.  App.  512,  58  Pac.  785; 
R.  Co.  173  111.  291  50  N.  E.  668;  McDonald  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Siddall  v.  Jansen,  168  111.  45,  48  N.  Co.  61  N.  Y.  S.  817;  Payne  Cloth- 
E.  191;  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  ing  Co.  v.  Payne  (Ky.),  54  S.  W. 
Chancellor,  165  111.  445,  46  N.  E.  709;  Howes  v.  District  of  Colum- 
269;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co  v.  Stan-  bia,  2  App.  Gas.  (D.  C.)  188. 
ley,  158  111.  396,  41  N.  E.  1012;  20  Cohn  v.  David  Mayer  Brewing 


119  PEEEMPTOEY  FOE  DEFENDANT.  §  126 

diet  for  either  party  where  a  contrary  verdict  could  not  be 
sustained  by  the  evidence.27 

If  the  plaintiff's  evidence,  including  all  inferences  which  may 
be  fairly  drawn  therefrom,  when  taken  as  true,  is  not  sufficient 
to  make  out  a  prima  facie  case  a  verdict  for  the  defendant  is 
proper.23  And  it  has  been  held  that  unless  the  plaintiff  makes 
out  a  prima  facie  case,  not  from  his  own  evidence  alone,  but 
from  the  whole  evidence,  the  court  is  authorized  to  direct  a 
verdict  for  the  defendant.29  So  it  is  proper  to  direct  a  nonsuit 
in  those  jurisdictions  where  such  practice  prevails,  if  the  plain- 
tiff's evidence  fails  to  establish  a  prima  facie  case.30  Although 
the  plaintiff  proves  every  fact  or  element  essential  to  a  recovery, 
yet  if  other  facts  are  also  proved,  which  clearly  show  that  he 
is  not  entitled  to  a  verdict,  a  nonsuit  is  proper.31  For  example, 
if  the  plaintiff  sues  on  an  account  and  proves  his  case  as  laid, 
but  also  proves  that  the  debt  has  been  fully  paid,  a  nonsuit 
should  be  awarded.  Under  such  state  of  facts  he  proves  his 
case  and  then  disproves  it.32 

If  it  appears  that  the  plaintiff's  evidence  could  not  under  any 
view  of  the  law  support  his  cause  of  action  a  verdict  should  be 

Co.    56    N.    Y.    S.    293;    Downing   v.  mark,   20  Tex.   Cv.   App.   175,   49  S. 

Murray,  113  Cal.  455,  45  Pac.   869;  W.  900.     And  where  some  of  sever- 

Wheatley    v.    Philadelphia,    W.    &  al  defendants  have  filed  cross-com- 

B.    R.    Co.   1   Marv.    (Del.),   305,   30  plaints'  the  court  is  not  authorized 

Atl.  660;  Meyers  v.  Berch,  59  N.  J.  to  dismiss  the  cross  complaints  by 

L.   238,   36  Atl.   95.  a   nonsuit  of   the  plaintiff,   Taylor 

27  Coleman  v.  Lord  (Me.),  52  Atl.  v.    Bartholomew    (Idaho),    53    Pac. 

645;   Barnett  v.  Talbot,  90  Me.  229,  325. 

38   Atl.   112;    Barnhart   v.    Chicago,          23  Anders  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.  62  Neb. 

M.    &   St.    P.   R.    Co.    97    Iowa,   654,  585,  87  N.  W.  331;  Freemont  Brew- 

66    N.    W.    902;    Reeder    v.    Dupuy,  ing    Co.    v.    Hansen    (Neb.),    91    N. 

96  Iowa,  729,  65  N.  W.  338;  Market  w.  279;   Barr  v.  Irey,  3  Kas.  App. 

&    Fulton    Nat.    Bank    v.    Sargent,  240,  45  Pac.  Ill;   Simrell  v.  Miller, 

85   Me.    349,   27   Atl.   192.     See   also  169    Pa.    St.    326,   32    At).    548.      See 

Zimmerman     v.     Kearney     County  North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Cossar,  203 

Bank    (Neb.),    91    N.    W.    497;    Els-  111.    611;    Sattler   v.    Chicago,    R.    I. 

worth  v.  Newby  (Neb.),  91  N.  W.  &  p.  R.  Co.  (Neb.),  98  N.  W.  664. 
517;  White  v.  L.  Hoster  Brewing  29  Preistly  v.  Provident  Sav.  Co. 

Co.    51   W.    Va.    259,   41    S.    E.    180;  117  Fed.   271. 

Kielbeck  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.          30  Congran  v.  Bigelow    164  U.   S. 

(Neb.),  97  N.   W.   750;    Truskett  v.  301,  17  Sup.  Ct.  117;  Baker  v.  John- 

Bronaugh    (Indian   Ter.),   76   S.   W.  son   (Del.),  42  Atl.   449;    Cummings 

294.  Where  there  are  several  defend-  v.  Halena  &  L.  S.  R.  Co.  26  Mont, 

ants  and  one  has  not  been  served  434,    68    Pac.    852. 
and   does  not  appear,  the  court  is          si  Evans  v.  Mills   (Ga.),  46  S.  E. 

not   authorized   to  direct  a  verdict  674. 

as  to  him,  but  should  dismiss  with-          32  Evans  v.  Mills  (Ga.),  46  S.  E. 

out   prejudice,    Sanders   v.    Wetter-  675. 


§    126  DIRECTING   VERDICT.  120 

directed  for  the  defendant.33  Or  where  the  evidence  is  so  clearly 
deficient  as  to  give  no  support  to  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff, 
if  rendered  in  his  favor,  it  should  be  excluded  and  a  verdict 
directed  for  the  defendant.34  Or  if  the  evidence  for  the  plain- 
tiff so  clearly  fails  to  make  out  a  case  that  reasonable  men 
could  not  differ,  or  no  reasonable  ground  could  exist  for  a 
difference  of  opinion  among  jurors  as  to  the  insufficiency  of  the 
evidence,  a  verdict  should  be  directed  for  the  defendant.35 

When  the  controlling  facts  are  admitted  or  not  controverted 
in  any  essential  respect  the  court  may  instruct  the  jury  what 
their  verdict  should  be.36  So  also  the  court  is  authorized  to  di- 
rect a  verdict  where  there  is  no  conflict  in  the  evidence  between 
the  parties  litigant.37  So  if  from  the  undisputed  evidence  the 
court  would  be  compelled  to  set  aside  a  verdict  then  the  court 
may  direct  a  verdict.38 

Where  the  admitted  facts  conclusively  show  that  an  action 
is  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations  a  peremptory  instruction 
for  the  defendant  is  proper.30  If  the  testimony  of  the  plaintiff 
himself  shows  that  he  has  no  cause  of  action  a  nonsuit  is  proper.40 

33  Chapman  v.   Yellow  P.   L.   Co.  480,   54     Pac.     752;     McCormick  v. 

89    Fed.    903;      Phoenix    A.      Co.    v.  Standard   Oil   Co.   60   N.   J.    L.   243, 

Lucker,  77  Fed.  243;  Fisher  v.  For-  37  Atl.   617. 

ter,  11  S.  Dak.  311,  77  N.  W.  112.  ss  Hurd  v.  Neilson,  100  Iowa,  555, 

See   also    Collar   v.    Patterson-,    137  69  N.  W.  867;  Sax  v.  Detroit,  G.  H. 

111.    406,   27   N.   E.    604;    Randall   v.  &  M.  R.  Co.  (Mich.),  89  N.  W.  368; 

Baltimore   &   O.   R.    Co.   109   U.    S.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Martin,  114 

478;    Reed   v.    Inhabitants,   8   Allen  Fed.   586.     Contra:    Dick  v.   Louis- 

(Mass.),    524.  ville  &  N.  R.  Co.  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1068, 

s*  Ritz   v.    City   of   Wheeling,    45  64  S.  W.  725;  Williams  v.  Belmont 

W.  Va.  262,  31  S.  E.  993,  43  L.  R.  Coal  &   C.   Co.    (W.   Va.),   46   S.   E. 

A.   148;    Cleveland,   C.   C.   &  St.   L.  802. 

R.   Co.   v.   Heath,  22   Ind.   App.   47,  39  Exchange    Bank    v.     Trumble, 

53  N.  E.  198;    Horn  v.  Hutchinson,  108    Ky.    234. 

163  Pa.  St.  435,  30  Atl.  152;   White  40  Smith  v.  Cohn,  170  Pa.  St.  132. 

v.    Hoster   B.    Co.    51   W.    Va.    259.  32    Atl.    565.     An    error   committed 

35  Fisher    v.    Porter,    11    S.    Dak.  in  denying  a  motion  to  dismiss  at 

311,  77  N.  W.  112;   Ritz  v.  City  of  the  close  of  the  plaintiff's  case  for 

Wheeling,  45  W.  Va.  262,  31  S.  E.  the  want  of  sufficient  evidence,  will 

993,   43   L.   R.   A.   148;    Rickards   v.  be  regarded  as  cured  where  the  ev- 

Bemis    (Tex.    Cv.    App.)    78    S.    W.  idence  for  the  defendant  afterwards 

240.  supplies  the  deficiency  of  the  plain- 

se  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Williamson,  tiff's    evidence,    O'Connell    v,    Sam- 

104   Ind.   157,  3  N.   E.   814;    Hall  v.  uel,  31    N.   Y.   S.   889,  81   Hun,  357; 

Durham,  109  Ind.  434,  9  N.  E.  926,  Cushman    v.    Carbondale    Fuel    Co. 

10  N.   E.   581;    Peoples   &  Drovers'  (Iowa),   88   N.   W.   817.     The  court 

Bank  v.  Craig,  63  Ohio  St.  382,  59  may  cause  a  dismissal  immediate- 

N.  E.   102.  ly   after  the  opening  statement  of 

37  Soloman  v.  Trisarri    9  N.  Mex.  counsel    for    the    plaintiff    without 


121 


PEREMPTORY    WHEN    VARIANCE. 


In  case  the  plaintiff  wholly  fails  to  prove  some  one  element 
essential  to  his  right  of  recovery  the  court  may  properly  direct 
a  verdict  for  the  defendant.41  And  for  the  same  reason  a  non- 
suit is  proper.  For  instance,  where  negligence  is  an  essential 
element  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  and  he  fails  to  prove  that  element, 
a  nonsuit  is  proper.42 

§  127.  If  plaintiff's  evidence  varies  from  his  pleadings. — Where 
there  is  a  variance  between  the  plaintiff's  pleadings  and  evi- 
dence it  is  proper  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  defendant,  if 
the  evidence  also  fails  to  prove  a  case  for  the  plaintiff;  and  in 
such  case  it  is  not  error  to  refuse  leave  to  amend  the  pleadings.43 
Thus  in  an  attachment  suit  where  the  evidence  wholly  fails  to 
sustain  the  charge  of  fraudulent  conveyance  as  alleged  in  the 
affidavit  on  which  the  action  is  based  an  instruction  directing 
the  jury  to  find  for  the  defendant  is  proper.44  So  also  a  non- 
suit is  proper  where  the  plaintiff  proves  a  different  cause  of 
action  than  that  alleged  in  his  complaint  or  declaration.45 


the  introduction  of  evidence,  it' 
such  opening  statement,  taken  as 
true,  fails  to  show  a  case  for  the 
plaintiff,  Sims  v.  Metropolitan  St. 
R.  Co.  72  N.  Y.  S.  835,  65  App. 
Div.  270. 

41  Sack  v.  Dolese,  137  111.  138,  27 
N.  E.  62   (negligence);   Bartelott  v. 
International   Bank,   119   111.   269,   9 
N.   E.    898;    Abend   v.    Terre   H.    & 
I.  R.  Co.  Ill  111.  202;   Alexander  v. 
Cunningham,   111   111.   515;    Ayer  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  111  111.  406;    Fra- 
zer  v.  Howe,  106  111.  573;   Clark  v. 
Stitt,    12    Ohio   C.    C.    759;    Lacy   v. 
Porter,    103    Cal.    597,    37    Pac.    635; 
Louisville,    St.    L.    &    T.    R.    Co.    v. 
Terry's  Adm'rx,   20  Ky.   L.   R.   803, 
47    S.    W.    588;    Jackson    v.    Ferris 
(Pa.),   8  Atl.   435;    Brehmer  v.   Ly- 
man,  71  Vt.  98,  42  Atl.  613;  Wilcox 
v.  Willmin-gton  R.  Co.  2  Pen.  (Del.) 
157,  44  Atl.  686;  Phillip  v.  Rentz,  106 
Ga.   249,   32   S.   E.   107;    Ohio  &   M. 
R.  Co.  v.  Dunn.  138  Ind.  18,  37  N. 
E.  546;   Dunnington  v.   Syfeers,  157 
Ind.    458,    62    N.    E.    29;    Cogan    v. 
Cass    Ave.    &    F.    G.    R.    Co.    (Mo. 
App.)    73   S.   W.   738. 

42  Daniels    v.    Leibig   Mfg.    Co.    2 
Marv.    (Del.)    207,   42   Atl.   447;    Mt. 


Vernor  Bank  v.  Porter,  148  Mo. 
176,  49  S.  W.  982;  Cox  v.  Norfolk 
&  C.  R.  Co.  123  N.  Car.  604,  31 
S.  E.  848:  Pace  v.  Harris,  97  Ga. 
357,  24  S.  E.  445.  See  Lyons  v. 
Wayervoss  A.  L.  R.  Co.  114  Ga. 
727,  40  S.  E.  698. 

43  Strahle  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  47 
Neb.    319,   66   N.   W.   415. 

44  Wadsworth   v.    Laurie,    164    111. 
48,   45   N.   E.   435.     See   Gilmore   v. 
Courtney,  158  111.  437,  41  N.  E.  1023. 
A    motion    for    a    peremptory    in- 
struction because  of  a  variance  be- 
tween the  pleadings  and  proof,   to 
be   of   any   avail    on    review,    must 
specifically  point  out  the  variance, 
Probst  Consolidation  Co.   v.   Foley, 
166   111.    31,  43   N.   E.   750;    Chicago 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  206  111.  327. 

45  Thill  v.  Hoyt,  56  N.   Y.   S.   78, 
37   App.   Div.   521;    Case  v.   Central 
R.  Co.  59  N.  J.   L.   471,   37  Atl.  65: 
Baker   v.   Johnson,   2   Marv.    (Del.) 
219,    42   Atl.   449.     If  a   declaration 
is   defective,   the   defect   cannot   be 
reached  by  a  motion  to  instruct  the 
jury   to  find   a  verdict  for  the  de- 
fendant, Gerke  v.   Faucher,  158  111. 
375,   382,   41   N.   E.   982. 


§  128 


DIRECTING    VERDICT. 


122 


§  128.  If  evidence  shows  contract  to  be  illegal.— The  fact  that 
the  transaction  on  which  suit  is  brought  was  illegal,  or  that  the 
action  may  be  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  is  not  suffi- 
cient reason  for  a  nonsuit  where  such  issue  is  raised  by  answer 
and  reply.  These  are  matters  of  defense.40  But  where  the 
evidence  conclusively  shows  that  a  suit  is  based  on  a  gambling 
contract  the  court  is  authorized  to  direct  a  verdict.47 

§  129.  Peremptory  improper  for  defendant. — If  there  is  any 
evidence,  though  slight,  which  tends  to  establish  the  plaintiff's 
case  a  peremptory  instruction  to  find  for  the  defendant  is  im- 
proper.48 And  if  the  natural  and  reasonable  inferences  which 
may  be  fairly  drawn  from  the  evidence  tend  to  prove  the  plain- 
tiff's case  a  general  affirmative  charge  should  not  be  given.49 


46  Fitch  v.   Bill,   71   Conn.   24,   40 
Atl.  910. 

47  West  v.   Sanders,  104  Ga.   727, 
31   S.   E.   619. 

48  New  York  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.    Luebech,   157    111.    604,   41   N.   E. 
897;   West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Lyons, 
157   111.   593,   42   N.   E.   55;    Chicago 
&    N.    R.    Co.    v.    Snyder,    128    111. 
655,    21     N.    E.     520;     Hartrich    v. 
Hawes   (111.),  67  N.  E.  13;   Agne  v. 
Seitsinger,  96   Iowa,   181,  64  N.  W. 
836;    P.  v.  People's  Ins.   Exchange, 
126  111.   466,  18  N.  E.   774;    Wright 
Fire  P.  Co.  v.  Poezekai,  130  111.  139, 
144,    22   N.   E.    543;    Lake   S.   &   M. 
S.   R.   Co.   v.   Johnson,  135   111.   641, 
649,  26  N.  E.  510;   Lake  S.  &  M.  S. 
R.   Co.   v.  Brown.  123  111.   162,  185, 
14  N.  E.  197;   Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.    v.    O'Conner,    115    111.    254,    261, 
3  N.  E.  501;   Traveler's  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Randolph,    78   Fed.    754;    Harlen   v. 
Baden    (Kas.),    49    Pac.    615;    Marx 
v.  Hess,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  42,  39  S.  W. 
249;    S.    v.    Spengler,    74    Miss.    129, 
21    So.    4;     Kurd    v.     Neilson,     100 
Iowa,   555,   69   N.  W.    867;    Schmidt 
v.    Chicago    &    N.    W.    R.    Co.    90 
Wis.    504,    63    N.    W.    1057;    Miller 
v.  Howard,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  22,  39  S.  W. 
37;    Meyers   v.    Birch,    59   N.   J.    L. 
238,    36    Atl.    95;    Hartford    v.    City 
of  Attalla,  119  Ala.  59,  24  So.  845; 
Martin    v.    Chicago    &    N.    W.    R. 
Co.   194  111.  138,  146;    Joliet  R.   Co. 
v.  McPherson,  193   111.  629;    Zeigler 


v.  Pennsylvania  Co.  63  111.  App. 
410;  Consolidated  L.  &  I.  Co.  v. 
Hawley,  7  S.  Dak.  229,  63  N.  W. 
904;  Pound  v.  Pound,  60  Minn. 
214,  62  N.  W.  264;  Dietz  v.  Met- 
ropolitan L.  I.  Co.  168  Pa.  St.  504, 
32  Atl.  119;  Rogers  v.  Brooks,  105 
Ala.  549,  17  So.  97;  Smart  v. 
Hodges,  105  Ala.  634,  17  So.  22; 
Phillips  v.  Phillips,  93  Iowa,  615, 
61  N.  W.  1071;  Chesapeake  &  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ogles  (Ky.),  73  S.  W. 
751;  Morrow  v.  Pullman  P.  Car 
Co.  (Mo.  App.),  73  S.  W.  281;  Lee 
v.  Gorham,  165  Mass.  130,  42  N.  E. 
556;  Kearns  v.  Burling-,  14  Ind. 
App.  143,  42  N.  E.  646;  Rogers  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  17  Ky.  L.  R. 
1421,  35  S.  W.  109;  McKinney  v. 
Hopwood,  46  Neb.  871,  65  N.  W. 
1055;  Davis  v.  Hoxey,  2  111.  (1 
Scam.),  406;  Van  Etten  v.  Edwards, 
47  Neb.  279,  66  N.  W.  1013;  Dirim- 
ple  v.  State  Bank,  91  Wis.  601,  65 
N.  W.  501;  Sexton  v.  Steele,  60 
Minn.  336,  62  N.  W.  392;  McCrystal 
v.  O'Neill,  86  N.  Y.  S.  84. 

49  Henry  v.  McNamara,  114  Ala. 
107,  22  So.  428;  Tennessee  C.  J.  & 
R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  115  Ala.  461,  22 
So.  80;  New  York  C.  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.  v.  Leubeck.  157  111.  604,  41 
N.  E.  897;  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lyons,  157  111.  593,  42  N.  E.  55; 
Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams, 
37  Fla.  406,  20  So.  558.  It  is  error 
for  the  court  to  exclude  proper  evi- 


123  PEREMPTORY    WHEN    EVIDENCE    CLOSE    OR    DOUBTFUL.       §    131 

§  130.  If  the  evidence  tends  to  prove  plaintiff's  case. — If  there 
is  any  evidence  tending  to  support  every  element  of  the  plain- 
tiff's case  it  is  improper  and  erroneous  to  direct  a  nonsuit,  al- 
though the  defendant  may  have  set  up  new  matter  in  defense 
which  the  plaintiff  answered  by  replication.50  The  fact  that 
there  is  no  evidence  to  prove  some  one  or  more  of  the  par- 
ticulars of  a,  case  will  not  authorize  the  dismissal  of  the  plain- 
tiff's complaint,  if  his  evidence  supports  a  cause  of  action.51  And 
if  the  evidence  tends  to  support  any  one  of  the  counts  of  the 
plaintiff's  declaration  an  instruction  to  find  a  verdict  for  the 
defendant  is  properly  refused,  although  some  of  the  counts  may 
not  be  sufficient  to  receive  the  evidence.52  So  if  there  is  any  evi- 
dence whatever  tending  to  prove  a  cause  of  action  a  nonsuit 
is  improper.53 

§  131.    When  facts  are  doubtful — Different  conclusions. — If  in 

the  opinion  of  the  court  it  is  doubtful  from  the  evidence  whether 
the  jury  should  be  instructed  to  return  a  verdict  for  the  defend- 
ant the  doubt  should  be  resolved  in  favor  of  submitting  the 
case  to  the  jury.54  And  where  the  case  is  doubtful  the  court 
is  authorized  to  exercise  its  discretion.55  Where  it  appears  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant  is  not  entitled  to  a  verdict  on 
the  merits  of  the  case  it  is  error  to  direct  a  verdict  in  his  favor, 
although  the  plaintiff's  evidence  is  not  sufficient  to  establish 
his  case  ;56  and  where  different  conclusions  might  be  drawn  from 

dence    introduced    by    the    plaintiff  (S.   Car.),   21   S.   E.   322;    Fitzwater 

and    direct    a   verdict    for    the    de-  v.  Roberts,  •  116  Pa.  St.  454,  31  AtK 

fendiant,   Huff  v.   Cole,  45  Ind.  300.  204;    Howell    v.    New    York,    C.    H. 

so  Hazy  v.  Woitke,  23  Colo.  556,  &  R.  R.  Co.  73  N.  Y.  S.  994,  68  App. 
48  Pac.  1048.  See  Cleveland  Axle  Div.  409;  Davis  v.  Kent,  97  Ga. 
Co.  v.  Zilch,  12  Ohio  C.  C.  578;  275,  23  S.  E.  88;  Davidoff  v.  Wheel- 
Wells  v.  Snow  (Gal.),  41  Pac.  858.  er  &  W.  Mfg.  Co.  37  N.  Y.  S.  661, 

si  Marden    v.    Dorthy,    42    N.    Y.  16  Misc.  31;    Evans  v.  Mills    (Ga.), 

S.    827;    Talbotton    R.    Co.    v.    Gib-  46    S.    E.    675;    Kroetch    v.    Empire 

son,  106  Ga.  229,  32  S.  E.  151;  Sex-  Mill    Co.    (Idaho),   74    Pac.    868. 

ton  v.   Steele,   60  Minn.  336,  62  N.  54  Mexican   Cent.  R.   Co.   v.   Mur- 

W.    392;    Seymore   v.    Rice,    94    Ga.  ray,  102  Fed.  264;  Howey  v.  Fisher, 

183,    21    S.   E.    293.  Ill  Mich.   422,   69   N.   W.   741.     See 

52  Illinois  Cemit.  R.  Co.  v.  Weiland,  Rinear   v.    Skinner,   20  Wash.    541, 
179  111.  609,  613,  54  N.  E.  300.     See  56  Pac.  24. 

Taylor  v.   Corley,   113   Ala.   580,   21  55  Ferguson    v.     Venice    Tr.     Co. 

So.  404.  79   Mo.   App.    352. 

53  Norris  v.  Clinkscales  (S.  Car.),  se  Dennison  v.  Musgrave,  46  N.  Y. 
22   S.  E.  1;   Drummond  v.   Nichols  S.  530,  20  Misc.  678. 


§  132 


DIRECTING   VERDICT. 


124 


the  evidence  by  different  minds  the  jury  should'  determine  the 
facts." 

§  132.  Where  either  of  two  theories  is  supported. — When  the 
evidence  is  such  that  it  tends  to  support  two  theories,  one  of 
which  renders  the  defendant  liable  and  the  other  not,  the  case 
should  be  submitted  to  the  jury.58 

§133.  Evidence  strongly  against  plaintiff. — It  follows  from 
what  has  been  said  that,  although  it  may  appear  that  the  evi- 
dence tends  strongly  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  has  failed  to 
prove  the  essential  facts  necessary  to  make  out  his  case,  yet  the 
court  is  not  authorized  to  take  the  case  from  the  jury.59  Hence 
the  court  should  not  direct  the  jury  to  find  a  verdict  for  the 
defendant  on  the  ground  that  the  evidence  for  the  plaintiff  does 
not  preponderate  in  his  favor.60 

In  New  York  the  court  has  gone  to  the  extent  of  holding  that 

57  Sweet  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  S.  P. 
R.  Co.  6  S.  Dak.  281,  60  N.  W.  77. 
According  to  the  practice  in  Rhode 
Island  it  is  discretionary  with  the 
court  to  give  an  instruction  di- 
recting a  verdict  and  no  exception 
lies  to  the  action  of  the  court  in 
giving  or  refusing  such  instruction, 
S.  v.  Collins  (R.  I.),  52  Atl.  990; 
Fillinghast  v.  McLeod,  17  R.  I.  208, 
21  Atl.  345. 

ss  Voegeli  v.  Pickel  Marble  & 
G.  Co.  56  Mo.  App.  678;  Working- 
men's  Banking  Co.  v.  Blell,  57  Mo. 
App.  410. 

59  Padbury  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co.  75  N.  Y.  S.  952,  71  App.  Div. 
616;  Baker  v.  Irish,  172  Pa.  St. 
528,  33  Atl.  558;  O'Brien  v.  Chi- 
cago &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  92  Wis.  340, 
66  N.  W.  363;  Missouri  M.  Iron  Co. 
v.  Hoover,  179  111.  107,  53  N.  E. 
560;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Eston, 
178  111.  192,  195;  52  N.  E.  954;  Pitts- 
burg,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Calla- 
ghan,  157  111.  406,  409,  41  N.  E. 
909;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Hein- 
rich,  157  111.  388,  391,  41  N.  E. 
860;  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co. 
v.  Bauer,  156  111.  106,  40  N.  E.  448; 
National  Syrup  Co.  v.  Carlson,  155 
111.  210,  40  N.  E.  492;  Weiiona 
Coal  Co.  v.  Holmquist,  152  111.  581, 
38  N.  E.  946;  Rich  &  B.  Malting 


Co.  v.  International  Bank,  185  111. 
422,  428,  56  N.  E.  1062;  Henry  v. 
Stewart,  185  111.  448,  452,  57  N.  E. 
190;  Chicago,  &c.  Foundry  Co.  v. 
Van  Dam,  149  111.  338,  36  N.  E.  1024, 
Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross, 
142  111.  9,  31  N.  E.  412;  Ames  &  F. 
Co.  v.  Strachurski,  145  111.  192,  34  N. 
E.  48;  Insurance  Co.  of  N.  A.  v. 
Bird,  175  111.  42,  51  N.  E.  686; 
Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Jenkins,  174  111.  398,  409,  51  N. 
E.  811;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ash- 
line,  171  111.  314,  320,  49  N.  E. 
921;  North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wis- 
wel,  168  111.  613,  48  N.  E.  407;  Chi- 
cago &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
162  111.  185,  44  N.  E.  390;  Gerke 
v.  Fancher,  158  111.  375,  383,  41  N. 
E.  982;  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v. 
Conlan,  101  111.  105;  American 
Strawboard  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R. 
Co.  177  111.  513,  53  N.  E.  97;  Brant- 
ley  Co.  v.  Lee,  106  Ga.  313,  32  S.  E. 
101;  Jenkins  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  (Ky.),  47  S.  W.  761;  Richards 
v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  2*0  Ky. 
L.  R.  1478,  49  S.  W.  419;  Platz  v. 
McKean  Tp.  178  Pa.  St.  601,  36  Atl. 
136;  Heydrick  v.  Hutchinson,  165 
Pa.  St.  208,  30  Atl.  918. 

«o  Mattoon  v.  Freemont,  E.  & 
M.  V.  R.  Co.  6  S.  Dak.  196,  60  N. 
W.  740. 


Ti5  PRINCIPLES    ILLUSTRATED.  §    134 

the  fact  that  the  evidence  preponderates  so  strongly  in  favor 
of  the  defendant  that  the  court  would  set  aside  a  verdict  for 
the  plaintiff  as  against  the  weight  of  the  evidence,  does  not 
warrant  the  court  in  directing  a  verdict  for  the  defendant.61 
Where  the  evidence  is  such  that  under  any  view  that  can  be 
taken  of  it  questions  of  fact  are  involved  which  must  be  de- 
termined by  the  jury,  a  binding  or  peremptory  instruction  is 
properly  refused.02 

§  134.  The  foregoing  principles  illustrated. — In  an  action  for 
personal  injury  if  the  plaintiff  introduces  any  evidence  tend- 
ing to  show  the  defendant  to  be  guilty  of  negligence  the  court 
is  not  authorized  to  instruct  the  jury  to  return  a  verdict  for 
the  defendant.63  Also  in  an  action  for  the  loss  of  goods  through 
negligence  in  shipping,  if  there  is  any  evidence  tending  to  prove 
the  negligence  charged,  a  motion  to  find  for  the  defendant  should 
be  denied.64 

And  in  an  action  for  killing  stock,  although  the  defendant's 
evidence  has  fully  overcome  the  presumption  of  negligence  from 
the  fact  of  killing  the  stock,  yet  if  the  plaintiff's  evidence  in 
rebuttal  raises  a  material  conflict  on  the  point,  an  instruction 
to  find  for  the  defendant  is  properly  refused.65  But  if  the  evi- 
dence as  to  negligence  is  wholly  speculative  an  instruction  to 
find  a  verdict  for  the  defendant  is  proper.66  A  nonsuit  on  the 
ground  of  contributory  negligence  will  be  denied,  unless  the 
evidence  clearly  shows  that  the  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  negli- 
gence.67 

In  an  action  brought  on  a  promissory  note,  given  in  settle- 
ment of  disputed  claims,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  not 
entitled  to  have  a  verdict  directed  in  his  favor  unless  the  facts 

ei  Luhrs   v.   Brooklyn   H.   R.   Co.  64  Memphis  &  C.  P.  Co.  v.  Abell, 

42  N.  Y.  S.  606,  11  App.  Div.  173.  17  Ky.  L.  R.  191,  30  S.  W.  658. 

62  Smith  v.  Easton  Tr.  Co.  167  Pa.  es  Sheldon    v.    Chicago    &    M.    & 

St.  209,  31   S.  W.   557.  St.  P.   R.  Co.  6  S.  Dak.  606,   62   N. 

ss  Weeks  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  119  W.   955.     See  Robertson  v.   Illinois 

N.   Car.   740,  26   S.  E.   124;    Rickert  Cent.  R.  Oo.   (Miss.),  17  So.  235. 

v.  Southern  R.  Co.  123  N.  Car.  255,  e«  Gerwe  Consolidated  Fire  W.  Co. 

31  S.  E.  497;   Central  P.  R.  Co.  v.  12  Ohio,  C.  C.  420. 

Chatterson,  17  Ky.  L.  R.  5,  29  S.  W.  GT  Mahnken   v.   Board   of   Chosen 

18.  Freeholders,    62    N.    J.    L.    404,    41 

Atl.   921. 


§    135  DIRECTING   VERDICT.  126 

essential  to  make  the  note  valid  are  so  apparent  that  reasonable 
men  could  not  differ  as  to  such  facts.08 

§  135.  Peremptory  instructions  for  plaintiff. — The  court  may 
instruct  the  jury  to  find  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  where  there 
is  no  evidence  whatever  tending  to  support  a  different  verdict;69 
or  where  the  evidence  would  not  warrant  a  verdict  otherwise 
than  for  the  plaintiff.70  And  it  has  also  been  held  that  where 
the  burden  is  on  the  defendant  to  establish  his  defense  it  is 
not  error  to  take  the  case  from  the  jury  by  directing  a  ver- 
dict, even  before  the  defendant  has  rested  his  case,  if  his  re- 
maining evidence,  with  that  already  introduced,  would  not  make 
out  his  defense.71  The  court  may  direct  the  jury  to  find  a  ver- 
dict for  the  amount  sued  for,  subject  to  the  court's  opinion,  on 
a  demurrer  to  the  evidence.72 

§  136.  Prima  facie  case  undisputed. — Where  the  plaintiff 
makes  out  a  prima  facie  case,  and  the  defendant  introduces 
no  evidence  tending  to  dispute  his  claim  or  to  establish  a  de- 
fense, it  is  proper  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff.73  Thus 
in  a  suit  in  ejectment  if  the  plaintiff  makes  out  a  case  by  prima 
facie  proof,  and  there  is  no  rebutting  evidence,  his  right  to 
a  verdict  follows  as  a  matter  of  law.74  Also  a  verdict  may  be 

es  Morey  v.  Laird,  108  Iowa,  670,  421,  56  N.  E.  807;  Barrett  v.  Boddie, 

77  N.  W.  835.  158  111.  479,  42  N.  B.  143;  Solomon 

C9  Anthony  v.  Wheeler,  130  111.  v.  Yrisarri,  9  N.  Mex.  480,  54  Pac. 

128,  132,  22  N.  E.  624  (ejectment);  752;  Tidwell  v.  New  South  B.  &  L. 

Heinsen  v.  Lamb,  117  111.  549,  557,  Asso.  Ill  Ga.  807,  35  S.  E.  648; 

7  N.  E.  75;  Caveny  v.  Weiller,  90  Arabak  v.  Village  of  Dodge,  62 

111.  159.  Neb.  591,  87  N.  W.  358;  Graham  v. 

70  Lancaster  G.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Mur-  St.    Louis,    I.    M.    &    S.    R.    Co.    69 
ry  G.  S.  Co.  19  Tex.  Cv.  App.  110,  Ark.  562,  65  S.  W.  1048,  66  S.  W,  344; 
47    S.    W.    387;    Gichrist   v.    Brown,  Faircloth   v.    Fulghum,   97   Ga.   357, 
165    Pa.    St.    275,    30    Atl.    839;    Me-  23    S.    E.    838.      See    also    Kahrs   v. 
Waters  v.  Equitable  Mort.   Co.   115  Kahrs,   115    Ga.    288,    41   S.    E.   649; 
Ga.  723,  42  S.  E.  52;   Concord-Wil-  Hazzard  v.   Citizens'  Bank,  72   Ind. 
liamis  Lumber  Co.  v.  Warren  Grain  130;    Beckner  v.    Riverside,   &c.   65 
Co.  114  Ga.  966,  41  S.  E.  41.  Ind.    468;    Yankton   F.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

71  Davis  v.  Holbrook,  25  Colo.  493,  Freemont,  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.   7  S. 
55   Pac.     730.     See     also     Jones   v.  Dak.  428,  64  N.  W.  514;  Ketchum  v. 
Achey,   105   Ga.   493,   30   S.   E.   810;  Wilcox  (Kas.),  48  Pac.  446.  Contra: 
McNeel   v.   Smith,   106   Ga.   215,   32  Devine   v.    Murphy,   168   Mass.   249, 
S.   E.    119.  46  N.  E.  1066;   Hillis  v.  First  Nat. 

72  Mathews    Adm'rs    v.    Traders'  Bank,  54  Kas.  421,  38  Pac.  565. 
Bank    (Va.),  27  S.  E.  609.  74  Anderson    v.    McCormlck,    129 

"Westside  Auction  House  Co.  v.  111.  308,  309,  21  N.  E.  803;   Heinsen 

Connecticut  Mut.   Life  Ins.   Co.   186  v.  Lamb,  117  111.  549,  557,  7  N.  E. 

111.  156,  57  N.  E.   839;    Marshall   v.  75. 
John   Grosse   Clothing   Co.   184   111. 


127  ALLEGATIONS    ADMITTED,    PLEADING    INSUFFICIENT.       §    141 

directed  for  the  plaintiff  in  a  suit  touching  the  title  to  real  estate, 
where  he  shows  a  complete  chain  of  title  from  the  government 
to  himself,  there  being  no  evidence  in  opposition  to  his  deeds 
or  documents  proving  his  title.75 

§  137.  When  defendant  admits  all  allegations. — And  it  is 
proper  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  where  the  defendant, 
by  his  answer  and  evidence,  admits  all  the  allegations  of  the. 
plaintiff's  claim.73 

§  138.  When  defendant's  pleading  is  insufficient. — The  court 
may  instruct  the  jury  to  find  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  in  a 
case  where  the  defense  could  not  be  shown  under  the  general 
issue,  and  where  the  special  pleas  relied  upon  were  properly 
held  demurrable.77 

§  139.  When  verdict  cannot  stand — And  it  has  been  held 
that  a  peremptory  instruction  should  be  given  for  the  plaintiff 
where  the  evidence  is  such  that  the  court  would  be  bound 
to  set  aside  a  verdict  for  the  defendant  as  being  against  the 
weight  of  the  evidence.78 

§  140.    Improper  for  plaintiff — If  any  evidence  for  defendant. 

The  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  a  peremptory  instruction  if  there 
is  any  evidence,  though  slight,  tending  to  support  the  defense 
set  up  by  the  defendant.79 

§  141.  If  the  evidence  is  conflicting. — Where  the  evidence 
which  would  sustain  or  defeat  a  recovery  is  conflicting,  the  ques- 
tion is  for  the  jury,  and  the  giving  of  a  peremptory  instruction 
to  find  a  verdict  for  the  defendant  is  error.80  A  nonsuit  is  also 

75  Quinn  v.  Eagleston,  108  111.  248,  v.  Wolf  rani.  71  Wis.  809,  71  N.  W. 

255;  Los  Angeles  Farming  &  Mill-  809;  Dooley  v.  Gorman,  104  Ga. 

ing  Co.  v.  Thompson,  117  Cal.  594,  767,  31  S.  B.  203;  Weatherford  v. 

49  Pac.  714.  Strawn,  8  Kas.  App.  206,  55  Pac. 

7c  Gifford  v.  Ammer,  7  Kas.  App.  485;  Forst  v.  Leonard,  116  Ala.  82, 

365,  54  Pac.  802.  See  Stephens  v.  22  So.  481;  Mixon  v.  Warren,  94  Ga. 

Koken  Barber  S.  Co.  67  Mo.  App.  688,  21  S.  E  714;  Shoninger  v.  Lat- 

587.  imer,  165  Pa.  St.  373,  30  Atl.  985; 

77  Moore  v.  Trussing,  165  111.  319,  Lau  v.  Fletcher,   104  Mich.  295,  62 
324,   46   N.   E.   184.  N.  W.  357. 

78  Reading  Braid  Co.  v.   Stewart,  so  Hargraves   v.    Home   Fire   Ins. 
43  N.  Y.  S.  1129,  19  Misc.  431.     See  Co.  43  Neb.  271,  61  N.  W.  611;  Leiser 
Decker  v.   Sexton,  43  N.   Y.  S.  167,  v.  Kieckhefer,  95  Wis.  4,  69  N.  W. 
19  Misc.   59.  979;  Lewellen  v.  Fatten,  73  Mo.  App. 

79  Minnesota    Thresher    Mfg.    Co.  472;  Thornton  v.  Perry,  105  Ga.  837, 


§  142  DIRECTING  VERDICT.  128 

improper,  although  the  testimony  of  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  may 
seem  to  be  inconsistent,  contradictory  or  conflicting.81 

§  142.    If  part    only    of  plaintiff's  claim    is  contested. — The 

plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  have  a  verdict  directed  in  his  favor 
where  the  defendant,  by  his  evidence,  contests  only  a  part  of 
the  claim  for  which  suit  was  brought;82  or  where  one  of  several 
/persons  against  whom  suit  is  brought  as  a  firm  makes  defense 
and  contests  the  claim  of  the  plaintiff  a  verdict  should  not  be 
directed  for  the  plaintiff.83 

§  143.  Where  amount  of  claim  is  disputed. — The  court  is  not 
authorized  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  if  there  is  any 
dispute  as  to  the  amount  due  him.8* 

§  144.  Waving  right  to  peremptory  instruction. — If  the  de- 
fendant introduces  evidence  on  his  side  of  the  case  after  the 
court  has  overruled  his  motion,  made  at  the  close  of  the  plain- 
tiff's evidence,  for  a  verdict  in  his  favor,  he  thereby  waives  the 
right  to  submit  a  peremptory  instruction,  and  will  not  be  heard 
to  complain  of  error  in  that  respect  unless  he  renews  the  former 
motion  at  the  close  of  all  the  evidence.86  Likewise  where  a  mo- 

31  S.  E.  797;   Crawford  v.  Wittish,  ber  Lumber  Co.  v.  Oberbeck  Bros. 

4  Pa.  Super.  585;   McNight  v.  Bell,  Mfg.  Co.  96  Wis.  383,  71  N.  W.  605. 

168  Pa.  St.  50,  31  Atl.  942;  Lever  v.  ss  McKissack    v.    Witz,    120    Ala. 

Foote,  31  N.  Y.  S.  356,  82  Hun  (N.  412,  25  So.  21. 

Y.)    392;    Leob   v.    Huddleston,    105  »*  Brown  v.  Baird,  5  Okla.  133,  48 

Ala.   267,   16   So.   714;    McQuown   v.  Pac.   180. 

Thompson,  5  Colo.  App.  466,  39  Pac.  ss  Baltimore    &    O.    S.    R.    Co.    v. 

68;   Mayer  v.  Thompson  B.  Co.  104  Alsop,    176    111.    474,    52    N.    E.    253, 

Ala.  611,  16  So.  620;   Marx  v.  Hess,  752;      Hamilton     Keeling     Co.     v. 

19  Ky.  L.  42,  39  S.  W.  249;   Rogers  Wheeler,  175  111.  514,  51  N.  E.  893; 

v.  Kansas  C.  &  O.  R.  Co.  52  Neb.  86,  Lynch    v.    Johnson,    109    Mich.    640, 

71  N.  W.  977;   Swanson  v.  Menomi-  67  N.  W.  908;    Young  v.  West  Va. 

nee,  E.    L.   R.    &   P.   Co.    113   Mich.  C.   &  P.   R.   Co.  42  W.  Va.   112,  24 

€03,  71  N.  W.  1098.  S.    E.    615;     Vanderhorst    Brewing 

*i  Crowe  v.  House  of  Good  Shep-  Co.  v.  Armhine  (Md.),  56  Atl.  834; 

herd.  56  N.  Y.  S.  223;  Cohn  v.  Da-  Totten  v.  Burhans,  103  Mich.  6,  61 

vid  Mayer  Brewing  Co.  56  N.  Y.  S.  N.  W.  58;  Bell  v.  Sheriden,  21  D.  C. 

293;    Cook  v.  Morris,  66  Conn.  196,  370;  American  C.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heiser- 

33   Atl.   994;    Larkin  v.   Burlington,  man,  67  Fed.  947;   Goss  v.  Calkins, 

C.    R.    &    N.    R.    Co.    91    Iowa,    654,  162  Mass.  492,  39  N.  E.  469;  Freese 

60  N.  W.  195;  Pacific  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kemplay,  118  Fed.  428  (the  fail- 

v.    Fisher,    109    Cal.    566,    42    Pac.  ure  to  move  for  a  verdict  is  an  ad- 

154;  Reilly  v.  Atlas  I.  C.  Co.  38  N.Y.  mission  that  there  is  sufficient  ev- 

S.  485,  3  App.  Div.  363.  iden.ce  to  go  to  the  jury);    Hansen 

R2  Carter  v.  Fischer,  127  Ala.  52,  v.  Boyd,  161  U.  S.  397,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
28  So.  376;  Talbotton  R.  Co^  v.  Gib-  571.  In  some  jurisdictions  the  de- 
son.  106  Ga.  229,  32  S.  E.  157;  Wil-  fendant  may  renew  his  motion  for 


129  WAIVING    PEREMPTORY,     MOTION     BY    BOTH.  §    145 

tion  for  a  nonsuit  is  overruled  the  defendant  waives  the  right  to 
claim  error  as  to  such  ruling  by  introducing  his  evidence  after 
the  court  has  thus  ruled.87 

But  in  the  State  of  Washington  it  has  been  held  that  if  the 
defendant's  evidence,  together  with  that  of  the  plaintiff  in  re- 
buttal, in  no  manner  strengthens  the  plaintiff's  case,  then  the 
motion  for  a  nonsuit  must  be  given  force;  and,  therefore,  the 
defendant,  by  proceeding  with  his  evidence,  waives  his  right 
to  claim  error  in  the  court's  ruling  only  to  the  extent  of  allow- 
ing the  plaintiff  any  benefit  he  may  derive  from  the  evidence 
introduced  after  the  overruling  of  the  motion  for  a  nonsuit.88 
And  where  there  are  two  defendants  an  instruction  directing  the 
jury  to  find  in  favor  of  one  of  them  is  waived  by  the  other, 
unless  he  objects,  and  excepts  to  the  court's  ruling.89 

§  145.  Motion  by  both  parties — Effect. — If  each  of  the  parties 
at  the  close  of  the  evidence  moves  the  court  to  direct  a  verdict 
in  his  favor  then  the  finding  of  the  court  in  passing  upon  the 
motions  is  conclusive,  unless  the  evidence  is  wholly  insufficient 
to  support  the  conclusion.90  Or  if  the  plaintiff  asks  the  court 
for  a  peremptory  verdict  in  his  favor  and  the  defendant  moves 
for  a  nonsuit,  they  both  consent  that  the  facts  shall  be  de- 
termined by  the  court;91  and  in  such  case  the  finding  of  the 
court  in  favor  of  one  of  the  parties  settles  the  facts  in  favor 

a  verdict  in  his  favor  at  the  close  dons  his  plea  and  is  not  put  to  its 

of   the   entire   evidence,    Baltimore  proof,    Garcia   v.    Candelaria,    9    N. 

&  0.   R.   Co.  v.   Alsop,  176  111.   471,  M.  374,  54  Pac.  342. 

474,    52    N.    E.    253,    752;    Hannton  oo  Stearns  v.  Farrand,  60  N.  Y.  S. 

Keeling  Co.  v.  Wheeler,  175  111.  514,  501,  29  Misc.  292;  Shreyer  v.  Jordan, 

51  N.  E.  893;  Harris  v.  Shebeck,  151  61  N.  Y.  S.  889,  30  Misc.  764;   Nor- 

111.  287,  292,  37  N.  E.  1015.  tham    v.    International    Ins.    Co.    61 

87  Thompson   v.    Avery,   11   Utah,  N.   Y.    S.    45;    Mascott   v.    National 

214,   39   Pac.   829;    Western   U.    Tel.  Fire    Ins.    Co.    69    Vt.    116,    37    Atl. 

Co.  v.  Thorn,  67  Fed.  287;  Ratliff  v.  255;    Signa  Iron  Co.  v.  Brown,  171 

Ratliff    (N.    Car.),    42    S.    E.    887;  N.  Y.  488,  64  N.  E.  194;   Merwin  v. 

Jones  v.  Warren  (N.  Car.),  46  S.  E.  Magone,    70    Fed.    776;    Magone    v. 

740.  Origet,     70     Fed.      778.        Contra: 

ss  Matson    v.    Port   Townsend,    S.  Thompson  v.  Brerman,  104  Wis.  564, 

R.    Co.    9    Wash.    449,    37    Pac.    705.  80  N.   W.   947;    German   Sav.   Bank 

Compare    Cushman    v.    Carbondate  v.    Bates'    Add.    S.    Co.    (Iowa),    82 

Fuel  Co.   (Iowa),  88  N.  W.  817.  N.   W.    1005. 

8»  Pioneer    Fire   Proof   C.    Co.    v.  si  Guenther  v.  Amsden,  44  N.  Y. 

Hansen,    176    111.   100,   52   N.   E.    17.  S.    982;    McGuire   v.    Hartford    Fire 

Where  the  defendant's  plea  is  one  Ins.    Co.    158   N.    Y.    680,    52    N.    E. 

of  set-off,  and  he  moves  for  a  ver-  1134;   Smith  v.  Weston,  34  N.  Y.  S. 

diet  in  his  favor,  he  thereby  aban-  557,  88  Hun,  25;   Fogarty  v.  Hook, 


§    146  DIRECTING   VERDICT.  130 

of  the  judgment.92  Also  if  both  of  the  parties  agree  that  the 
jury  may  be  dismissed  and  a  verdict  rendered  by  the  court,  this 
is  equivalent  to  both  asking  the  court  to  direct  a  verdict,  and 
is  an  admission  by  the  parties  that  only  questions  of  law  are 
involved  to  be  determined  by  the  court.93 

Where  each  of  the  parties  moves  for  a  verdict  in  his  favor, 
if  the  party  whose  motion  is  denied  does  not  thereupon 
ask  to  have  the  case  submitted  to  the  jury  the  verdict  directed 
by  the  court  for  the  other  party  shall  stand  as  the  finding  of  the 
jury.94  And  in  such  case  if  the  party  whose  motion  is  thus 
denied  desires  to  have  the  case  submitted  to  the  jury  he  must 
state  the  specific  questions  he  wishes  submitted;  he  cannot  ask 
to  have  the  case  submitted  generally  to  the  jury  on  all  ques- 
tions.95 But  where  both  parties  move  for  a  verdict  in  order  to 
submit  to  the  court  some  particular  matter  only,  such  as  a  ques- 
tion of  notice,  this  act  does  not  amount  to  a  waiver  of  the  right 
to  have  the  facts  of  the  case  submitted  to  the  jury.  The  court, 
under  such  circumstances,  is  not  authorized  to  direct  a  verdict.98 
And  the  court  is  not  authorized,  over  objection,  to  direct  a  ver- 
dict where  the  plaintiff  moves  for  a  verdict  and  the  defendant 
for  a  dismissal  in  a  case  where  the  question  of  damages  is  in- 
volved, it  being  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  determine  the  dam- 
ages.87 

§146.  Waiving  right  to  submit  facts  to  jury. — The  right  to 
have  the  facts  submitted  to  a  jury  is  waived  where  each  party 
moves  for  a  verdict  in  his  favor.98  Or  if  the  plaintiff  moves 

32  N.  Y.  S.  555,  84  Hun,  165;   Gro-  Norton,  38  N.  Y.  S.  350,  3  App.  Div. 

gan    v.    U.    S.    Industrial    Ins.    Co.  173;   Campbell  v.  Prague,  39  N.  Y. 

36  N.  Y.  S.  687,  90  Hun,  521.  S.    55-8,    6   App.    Div.    554.     In    such 

»2  Martin  v.   Home  Bank,  160  N.  case  the  defeated  party  will  be  re- 

Y.  190,  54  N.  E.  717.  garded     as    having    submitted     all 

93  Cutter  v.  Parsons,  43  N.  Y.  S.  controverted    questions    of    fact    to 
187.  the  court  for  determination,   First 

94  Pickett    v.     Metropolitan    Life  M.  E.  Church  v.  Fadden,  8  N.  Dak. 
Ins.  Co.  46  N.  Y.  S.  693;  Thompson  162,  77  N.  W.  615. 

v.   Simpson,   128   N.    Y.   270,   28   N.  96  University    Press   v.    Williams, 

E.   627;    First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hayes,  62  N.  Y.   S.  986. 

64  Ohio  St.  101,  59  N.  E.  893;  Beut-  97  Litt   v.   Wabash   R.    Co.    64    N. 

tell  v.  Magone,  157  U.  S.  154;  Clason  Y.  S.  108,  54  App.  Div.  550. 

v.  Baldwin,  152  N.  Y.  204,  46  N.  E.  98  Cleason  v.  Baldwin,  152  N.   Y. 

322;    Mascott   v.    Insurance    Co.    69  204,  46  N.  E.  322;  New  England  M. 

Vt.  116,  37  Atl.  255.  S.   Co.   v.  Great  W.   &  E.  Co.   6  N. 

95  Groves   v.   Acker,   33   N.    Y.   S.  Dak.  407,  71  N.  W.  130;   Angier  v. 
406,    85   Hun,   492.     See   Switzer  v.  Western  Ass.  Co.  10  S.  Dak.  82,  71 


131  RIGHT    WAIVED,    DENIAL    OF    MOTION.  §    149 

for  a  verdict  and  the  defendant  for  a  nonsuit  they  both  waive 
the  right  to  submit  the  facts  to  the  jury." 

§  147.  Motion  of  both  parties  denied — Effect. — Where  the 
court  denies  the  motions  of  both  parties  to  direct  a  verdict,  and 
thereupon  submits  a  single  issue  of  fact  to  the  jury,  error  may 
be  assigned  for  a  failure  to  submit  the  whole  case,  if  the  party 
complaining  shall  have  properly  taken  exceptions  to  the  action 
of  the  court.100 

§  148.  Directing  jurors  to  agree. — The  court  is  authorized  to 
direct  a  juror  that  he  must  agree  with  the  other  jurors  in  a 
case  where,  in  the  judgment  of  the  court,  a  peremptory  verdict 
should  be  rendered;  and  on  refusal,  the  juror  may  subject  him- 
self to  punishment  for  contempt  of  court.101 

§  149.  Ruling  of  trial  court  reviewable. — The  action  of  the 
trial  court  in  refusing  to  give  to  the  jury  an  instruction  directing 
them  to  find  a  verdict  may  be  reviewed  on  appeal  or  writ  of 
error,  where  the  ruling  of  the  trial  court  is  properly  preserved 
in  the  record  by  a  bill  of  exceptions.102  In  order  to  make  the  rul- 
ing of  the  trial  court  the  subject  of  review  on  appeal  or  writ 
of  error  the  party  complaining  must,  at  the  proper  time,  pre- 
sent a  written  instruction,  asking  that  the  court  direct  a  ver- 
dict in  his  favor.103  The  ruling  of  the  trial  court  on  a  motion 
for  a  nonsuit,  as  to  some  particular  point,  will  not  be  considered 
by  a  court  of  review  on  appeal,  unless  the  attention  of  the  trial 
court  was  called  to  the  precise  point  contended  for.104  The 

N.    W.    761;    Winter    v.    Williams-  101  Cahill    v.    Chicago,    M.    &    St. 

baugh    S.    Bank,    74    N.    Y.    S.    140,  P.  R.  Co.  74  Fed.  285;  Grimes  Dry- 

68    App.    Div.    193;     Westervelt    v.  goods    Co.    v.    Malcolm,    164    U.    S. 

Phelps,    171    N.    Y.    212,    63    N.    E.  483,    17   Sup.    Ct.    158,    58   Fed.    670. 

962.      Contra:     Poppitz    v.    German  102  Gall  v.  Beckstein,  173  111.  187, 

Ins.    Co.    88    Minn.    118,    88    N.    W.  50  N.  E.  711;    Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 

438.  v.  Nowicki,  1*8  111.  29.  35  N.  E.  358. 

»»  Page    v.    Shainwald,    65    N.    Y.  103  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  McCal- 

S.    174,    52    App.    Div.    349;     Blass  lum,    169    111.    241,    48    N.    E.    424; 

v.  Ferry,  34  N.   Y.  S.  475,  87  Hun,  Vallette    v.    Blenisld,    167    111.    565, 

563.      Contra:    Wilson    v.    Commer-  47    N.    E.    770;    Peirce   v.    Walters, 

cial  Union  Ins.  Co.  15  S.  Dak.  322,  164  111.  561,  565,  45  N.  E.  1068. 

89  N.  W.  649.     See  Clark  v.  Clark,  i«*  Jackson    v.    Consolidated    Tr. 

36  N.  Y.  S.  294,  91  Hun,  295.  Co.   59  N.  J.   L.   25,  35  Atl.   75. 

100  Signa    Iron    Co.    v.    Green,    88 
Fed.  207. 


§    150  DIRECTING    VERDICT.  132 

action  of  the  trial  court  will  not  be  reviewed  if  the  motion  is  too 
general.105 

§150.  Criminal  cases — Peremptory  proper  for  defendant. — 
In  a  criminal  case  if  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to 
convict  the  accused,  or  if  the  evidence  is  so  weak  that  a  con- 
viction could  only  be  attributable  to  passion  or  prejudice,  then 
it  is  proper  to  direct  the  jury  to  acquit  the  accused.100  The 
court  should  not  submit  a  case  to  the  jury  where  a  verdict  of 
guilty  would  be  palpably  or  flagrantly  against  the  evidence.107 
Where  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  that  the  crime  charged 
was  committed  in  the  county  of  the  indictment  it  is  error  for 
the  court  to  refuse  to  instruct  that  if  the  jury  believe  the  evi- 
dence they  must  find  him  not  guilty.108 

§  151.  When  not  proper  for  defendant. — But  where  the  evi- 
dence, though  wholly  circumstantial,  shows  a  state  of  facts 
disclosing  motive,  threats  or  conduct  of  the  defendant  tending 
to  prove  his  guilt,  an  instruction  requesting  that  the  jury  be 
directed  to  find  him  not  guilty  is  properly  refused.109  In  other 
words,  where  the  weight  of  the  evidence  tends  to  support  the 
offense  charged  in  the  indictment  a  motion  for  a  peremptory 
instruction  to  find  the  defendant  not  guilty  should  be  over- 
ruled.110 

105  Kafka    v.    Levensohn,    41    N.  the   evidence   to   be    insufficient   to 
Y.   S.   368,   18  Misc.   202;    Weber  v.  warrant    a    conviction,    advise    the 
Germania    F.    Ins.    Co.    44    N.    Y.  jury    to    acquit,    but    the    court    is 
S.   976;    Hartley  v.   Mullane,  45   N.  not  authorized  to  instruct  the  jury 
Y.    S.    1023,   20   Misc.   418.  that   there   is  no   evidence   to   sus- 

106  s.   v.   Couper,   32   Ore.   212,   49  tain  a  conviction,  P.  v.  Daniels,  105 
Pac.  959;  S.  v.  Feisher,  32  Ore.  254,  Cal.  362,  38  Pac.  720.     In  Indiana  if 
50  Pac.  561;   Com.  v.  Yost,  197  Pa.  it  appears  that  the  crime  was  com- 
St.  171,  46  Atl.  845.     But  see  P.  v.  mitted,  but  in  another  county,  the 
Streuber,  121  Cal.  431,  53  Pac.  918;  court  must  arrest  the  proceedings 
P    v    Daniels    105  Cal.  362,  38  Pac.  and  certify  the  case  to  that  county 
720  for  trial,  Burns'  R.  S.  1901,  \  1900; 

107  Com.  v.  Hall,  18  Ky.  L.  R.  783,  Welty    v.    Ward    (Ind.),    72    N.    E. 
38  S.  W.  498;    S.  v.  Bartlett  (Mo.),  596. 

71  S.  W.  149;    P.  v.  Bennett,  49  N.  109  S.   v.    Hallock,    70   Vt.    159,   4 

Y.   137;    S.   v.    Flanagan    (W.   Va.).  Atl.    51;    Com.     v.     Williams,     171 

35  S    B.   862;    Baker  v.   S.  31  Ohio  Mass.  461,  50  N.  E.  1035;  S.  v.  Wil- 

St.   314.     See   S.   v.   Brown,   119   N.  son,    10    Wash.    402,    39    Pac.    106 

Car.  789,  26  S.  E.  121.  (facts  stated);   Ter.  v.   Padilla   (N. 

108  Harvey   v.    S.    125   Ala.    47,   27  Mex.),  71  Pa«.  1084;   S.  v.  Hyde,  22 
So.   763;    Bailey  v.   S.   116  Ala.   437,  Wash.  551,  61  Pac.  719. 

22    So.    918.      By    statute    in    Cali-          no  Com.    v.    Brooks,     164     Mass, 
fornia   the  court  may,  if  it  deems      397,    41    N.    E.    660;    S.    v.    Green, 


133  PEREMPTORY  FOR  PROSECUTION — WHEN.  §    152 

§  152.  Peremptory  proper  for  prosecution — When. — The  court 
may  properly  direct  the  jury  to  find  for  the  prosecution  on  the 
issues  of  once  in  jeopardy  and  former  acquittal  where  it  clearly 
appears  that  the  first  information  was  fatally  defective  in  that 
it  contained  no  allegation  whatever  as  to  the  ownership  of  the 
property  charged  to  have  been  taken  by  robbery,  and  the  infor- 
mation was  dismissed  after  the  jury  was  impanelled  but  before 
any  evidence  was  offered.111  And  on  the  merits  in  one  state 
it  has  been  held  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  direct  the 
jury  to  return  a  verdict  of  guilty  where  the  undisputed  facts 
in  evidence  warrant  a  conviction.112 

117  N.  Car.  695,  23  S.  E.  98;   Craw-  Pa.   Super.   542;    Gott  v.  P.   187  111. 

ford  v.  Com.  18  Ky.  L.  R.  16,  35  S.  261,  58  N.  E.  293. 

W.   114;    Com.   v.   Foster   (Ky.),   61  m  P.  v.  Ammerman,  118  Cal.  23, 

S.    W.    271;     S.    v.    Utley,    126    N.  50    Pac.    15. 

Car.   997;    S.   v.   Costner   (N.   Car.),  112  p.    v.    Elmer,    109    Mich.    493, 

37    S.    E.    326;    Com.    v.    George,    13  67   N.   W.   550. 


CHAPTER  V. 
LAW     DETERMINED     BY     THE    COURT. 

Sec.  Sec. 

153.  Jury  bound  by  law  given  by      161.    Validity     of    ordinances     and 

the  court.  statutes  for  court. 

154.  Court  should  not  belittle  the      162.    Foreign    law    a    fact    to    be 

law.  proved. 

155.  Submitting     legal     questions      163.    Illustrations  of  the  principles 

to  jury  improper.  — Legal    questions. 

156.  Court    interprets    written    in-      164.     Illustrations  of  the  principles 

struments.  — Questions  of  fact. 

157.  Jury      interprets      oral      con-      165.    In  criminal   causes   court   de- 

tracts, termines  law. 

158.  Wills    are    construed    by    the      166.    Jury   made   judge   of   law   by 

courts.  statute. 

159.  Writing  as  a  fact  in  chain  of      167.     In    Massachusetts    and    Con- 

evidence,  necticut. 

160.  Some    phases    of   writing   ex-      168.     In    Maryland    and    Georgia. 

plained   by   oral   evidence.          169.     In    Louisiana    and    Indiana. 

§  153.  Jury  bound  by  law  given  by  the  court. — In  the  absence 
of  specific  constitutional  or  statutory  provisions  expressly  em- 
powering the  jury  to  determine  both  law  and  facts  the  principle 
that  the  court  shall  determine  the  law  and  the  jury  the  facts, 
in  both  civil  and  criminal  cases,  has  become  firmly  established.1 
And  even  in  those  jurisdictions  where  the  jury  are  authorized 
to  determine  the  law,  as  well  as  the  facts,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
court  to  fully  instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  law.  Thus  in  Missouri, 
although  the  constitution  of  that  state,  in  an  action  for  libel,  pro- 
vides that  the  jury  shall  be  the  judges  of  the  law  and  the  facts 

i  Sparf  v.  U.  S.  156  U.  S.  51,  case  reviewing  a  long  line  of  de- 
15  Sup.  Ct.  273  (a  well  considered  oisions,  and  eminent  text  writers). 

134 


135  JURY   BOUND   BY   THE   LAW   AS   GIVEN.  §    154 

the  court  is  not  divested  of  the  right  to  fully  instruct  them  as 
to  the  law  of  the  case.2 

So  in  Illinois,  under  a  statutory  provision  that  in  all  criminal 
cases  the  jury  shall  be  the  judges  of  the  law  as  well  as  the  fact, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  receive  and  act  upon  the  law  as 
given  them  by  the  court,  and  they  are  not  warranted  in  dis- 
regarding it  unless  they  can  say  upon  their  oaths  that  they 
know  the  law  better  than  the  court  does.3  The  rule  that  the 
court  must  determine  the  law  and  instruct  the  jury  accord- 
ingly is  so  familiar  and  has  been  so  often  decided  by  the  courts 
that  the  citation  of  authorities  seems  unnecessary.*  And  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  jury  to  be  governed  by  the  law  as  given  them 
by  the  court.6  The  jury  are  bound  to  accept  and  apply  the  law 
as  laid  down  by  the  court,  and  while  they  have  the  power  to 
disregard  it,  yet  in  doing  so  they  violate  their  oaths.6 

§  154.  Court  should  not  belittle  the  law. — The  court  in  charg- 
ing the  jury  should  not  criticise  or  condemn  the  law.7  Any 
remark  made  by  the  court  as  to  the  law  in  charging  the  jury, 
having  a  tendency  to  cause  the  jury  to  disregard  or  discredit 
any  of  the  instructions,  to  the  prejudice  of  a  party,  is  error.8 
To  tell  the  jury  that  common  sense  is  their  "best  guide",  amounts 

2  Jones    v.    Murray,    167    Mo.    25,  1089;     Wabash     St.     L.     &     P.     R. 

€6    S.    W.    981;    Heller    v.    Pulitzer  Co.    v.    Jaggerman,    115    111.    411,    4 

Pub.    Co.    153    Mo.    203,    54    S.    W.  N.  E.  641. 
457.  *  Moore  v.    Hinkle,   151   Ind.    343. 

s  Wohlford  v.   P.   148   111.   301,   36  50    N.    E.    822;    Com.    v.    Anthes,    5 

N.  E.  107;   Schnier  v.  P.  23  111.  11;  Gray    (Mass.),    185;     Adams    v.    S. 

Davison  v.  P.  90  111.  221.  29  Ohio  St.  412;   Com.  v.  McManus, 

*  Henderson     v.     Henderson,     88  14»  Pa.  St.  64,  21  Atl.  1018,  22  Atl. 

111.  248;   Mitchell  v.  Town  of  Fond  761;    Brown    v.    Com.    86    Va.    466, 

du   Lac,    61    111.    176;    S.   v.    Cough,  472,  10  S.  E.   745;    Carpenter  v.   P. 

Ill  Iowa,  714,  83  N.  W.  727;  Drake  8   N.    Y.    (8  Barb.),   603. 
v.  S.  60  Ala.  62;   Whitney  v.  Cook,          6  s.  v.  Matthews,  38  La.  795.  See 

53    Miss.    531;    Albert    v.    Besel,    88  P.     v.     Worden,    113    Cal.    569,    45 

Mo.  150;   Vocke  v.  City  of  Chicago,  Pac.    844. 

208    111.    194;    Byers    v.    Thompson,          i  Clifford  v.  S.  56  Ind.  245;   Steb- 

66   111.   421;    Gehr  v.   Hagerman,   26  bins    v.    Keene    Tp.    55    Mich.    552, 

111.    442;     Gilbert    v.    Bone,    79    111.  22    N.   W.   37. 

345;    P.   v.   Ivey,   49   Cal.   56;    Riley         «  Horton    v.    Williams,    21    Minn, 

v.  Watson,  18  Ind.  291;   P.  Ex.  rel.  187;    Head   v.   Bridges,   67   Ga.   227; 

Bibb.    193    111.    309,    61    N.    E.    1077;  Cone    v.     Citizens'     Bank,     4     Kas. 

Matthews  v.  S.  55  Ala.  65;   Hyde  v.  App.    470,    46    P.    414.    See    Roberts 

Town    of    Swanton,    72    Vt.    242,    47  v.    Neal,    62    Ga.    163;     McCord    v. 

Atl.    790;    Toledo,    St.    L.   &   R.    Co.  S.  83  Ga.  521,  10  S.  E.  437. 
v.    Bailey,    145    111.    159,    33    N.    E. 


§  155  LAW  DETERMINED  BY  THE  COURT.  136 

to  telling  them  that  common  sense  is  superior  to  law  in  determin- 
ing the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused.9 

§155.     Submitting  legal   questions  to  jury  improper. — As   a 

general  rule  the  giving  of  instructions  which  submit  legal  propo- 
sitions to  the  jury  for  their  determination  is  error.10  But  when 
a  question  of  law  has  been  erroneously  submitted  to  the  jury  by 
(instructions,  and  they  decide  it  correctly,  the  error  is  harmless.11 
Under  the  rule  mentioned  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  de- 
termine what  allegations  in  the  pleadings  are  material  and  nec- 
essary to  be  proved,  this  being  a  question  of  law.12  Hence  an 
instruction  that  the  plaintiff  must  prove  all  the  material  al- 
legations of  his  declaration  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  requires  the 
jury  to  determine  what  are  the  material  allegations;13  but  error 
committed  in  this  respect  may  become  harmless  where  other 
instructions  in  the  charge  clearly  and  plainly  state  the  material 
issues  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.14  .  , 

But  an  instruction  referring  to  the  declaration  and  stating 
that  "if  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 
has  made  out  her  case  as  laid  in  her  declaration  then  the  jury 
must  find  for  the  plaintiff",  is  not  subject  to  the  crit- 
icism, that  it  makes  the  jury  the  judges  of  the  effect  of  the 
averments  of  the  declaration ;  it  merely  empowers  them  to  de- 
termine whether  the  evidence  introduced  sustains  the  issues 

9  Wright  v.  S.  69  Ind.  165;  Dens-  n  Comfort   v.   Bollingal,   134   Mo. 
more   v.   S.   67   Ind.   306.     See  Clif-  281,   289,   35    S.    W.    609;    Woodman 
ford  v.  S.  56  Ind.  245;   Kennedy  v.  v.    Chesney,    39    Me.    45;    Morse   v. 
Bebout,  62  Ind.  363.  Weymouth,   28   Vt.    824;    Knoxville, 

10  p.   v.   Mayor,   &c.    193   111.    309.      C.  G.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Beeler,  90  Tenn. 
61    N.    E.    1077,    56    L.    R.    A.    95;       548,  18  S.  W.  391;    Martineau  v.  S. 
Toledo,      St.      L.      &      K.      C.      R.      14  Wis.  373. 

Co.     v.     Bailey,     145     111.     159,     33  12  Endsley  v.  Johns,  120  111.  469, 

N.     E.     1089;     Wabash,     St.     L.     &  477,    12    N.    E.    247;    Toledo,    St.    L. 

P.    R.    Co.    v.    Jaggerman,    115    111.  &  K.   C.   R.   Co.  v.   Bailey,  145  111. 

407,    411,    4   N.    E.    641;    Bullock   v.  159,  33  N.  E.  1089. 

Narrott,  49  111.  62,  65;  Reno  v.  Wil-  13  Martensen   v.     Arnold,     78   111. 

son,  49  111.  95,  98;   Marsh  v.  Smith,  App.  336;   Chicago  T.  Tr.  R.  Co.  v. 

49   111.   396,   399;    Davis  v.    Kenaya,  Schmelling,   99   111.   App.   577,  64  N. 

51    111.    170;    Mitchell    v.    Town    of  E.   714;    Toledo,  St.   L.  &  K.   C.   R. 

Pond  du  Lac,  61  111.  174,  176;    Gil-  Co.  v.  Bailey,  145  111.  159,  33  N.  E. 

bert  v.  Bone,  79  111.  341,  345;   Gehr  1089;  Endsley  v.  Johns,  120  111.  469, 

v.   Hageman,  26  111.  438,  442;    Fink  477,  12  N.  E.  247. 

v.    Evans,   95   Tenn.   413,   32    S.   W.  "  Endsley  v.  Johns,   120  111.   477, 

307;     Merrill    v.    Packer,    80    Iowa,  12  N.  E.  247;    Toledo,  St.   L.   &  K. 

542,  45  N.  W.  1076;    Miller  v.  Dun-  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  145  111.  159,  33 

lap,    22    Mo.    App.    97.  N.   E.   1089. 


137  LEGAL  QUESTIONS  ARE  NOT  FOR  JURY.  §    156 

made  by  the  pleadings.15  So  where  the  declaration  charges 
negligence  in  violation  of  a  city  ordinance  an  instruction  that 
if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  that  the  plaintiff,  while 
in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  was  injured  by  the  negligence 
of  the  defendant,  as  charged  in  the  declaration,  they  should 
find  for  plaintiff,  is  not  objectionable  as  submitting  to  the  jury 
for  their  determination  the  applicability  of  the  ordinance  to 
the  circumstances  of  the  case.16 

§  156.  Court  interprets  written  instruments. — Where  papers 
or  writings  of  any  kind,  such  as  contracts,  deeds,  mortgages, 
ordinances,  by-laws,  statutes,  records  or  other  documentary  evi- 
dence of  any  nature  or  character  require  construction,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  court,  as  a  matter  of  law,  to  instruct  the  jury  as 
to  the  meaning  of  them.  It  is  the  exclusive  province  of  the 
court  to  interpret  written  instruments  affecting  the  rights  of 
the  parties ;  and  where  two  instruments  between  the  same  parties, 
conveying  different  interests  in  the  subject  matter  in  litigation 
are  admissible  in  evidence,  the  court  must  determine  the  force 
and  effect  of  each,  and  whether  the  execution  of  the  one  is  in- 
consistent with  the  delivery  of  the  other.17 

It  is  the  province  of  the  court  to  interpret  written  contracts 
knd  define  what  is  and  what  is  not  within  their  terms ;  for  when 
the  parties  have  assented  to  definite  terms,  and  incorporated 
them  in  formal  documents  the  meaning  can  be  discovered  on 
inspection.18  It  would  be  a  dangerous  principle'  to  establish 
where  parties  have  reduced  their  contracts  to  writing  and  defined 
the  meaning  by  plain  and  unequivocal  language,  to  subject  their 
interpretation  to  the  arbitrary  and  capricious  judgment  of  per- 
sons unfamiliar  with  legal  principles  and  settled  rules  of  con. 
struction.19'  Whether  a  contract  is  an  entire  one  is  a  question 

is  Laflin   R.    P.    Co.    v.    Tearney,  756;    Wason   v.   Rowe,   16  Vt.    525; 

131   111.   322,   325,   23   N.   E.   389.  Glover   v.    Gasque    (S.    Car.),   45    S. 

is  Pennsylvania     Co.     v.     France,  E.  113;   Pitcairn  v.  Philip  Hiss  Co. 

112    111.    398,    403.  (C.   C.  A.),  125  Fed.   110. 

IT  Robbins    v.    Spencer,    121    Ind.  is  McKenzie   v.    Sykes,    47    Mich. 

594,  22  N.  E.  660;  H.  G.  Olds  Wagon  294,  11  N.  W.  164;  Tompkins  v.  Gard- 

Co.  v.  Coombs,  124  Ind.  62,  24  N.  E.  ner,  69  Mich.  58,  37  N.  W.  43;  Mer- 

589.     See  Comer  v.  Himes,  49  Ind.  rill  v.  Packer,  80  Iowa,  543,  45  N. 

482;    Thompson    Tr.    §§    1065,    1066;  W.    1076;    Kingsbury    v.    Thorp,    61 

Carlisle   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    56  Mich.    216     (partnership    contract), 

S.    W.    365;    Brady   v.    Cassidy,    104  28  N.  W.  74;   Seller  v.  Johnson,  65 

N.  Y.  155,  10  N.  E.  131;  Daly  v.  Kim-  N.  Car.  104. 

ball    Co.    67    Iowa,    132,    24    N.    W.  i»  Brady    v.    Cassidy,    104    N.    Y. 


§    157  LAW   DETERMINED  BY    THE   COURT.  138 

of  law  for  the  court  to  determine.20  The  court  must  also  de- 
termine and  explain  to  the  jury  the  legal  effect  of  contracts 
or  other  documentary  evidence.21  In  charging  the  jury  on  an 
issue  as  to  whether  there  was  a  contract  between  the  parties 
the  court  should  instruct  what  would  constitute  such  contract.22 
Whether  a  correspondence  carried  on  between  the  parties  con- 
stitute a  contract  or  not  must  be  determined  by  the  court,  and 
not  by  the  jury.23 

§  157.  Jury  interpret  oral  contracts. — Whether  an  oral  con- 
tract has  been  made  between  parties,  and  what  are  its  terms, 
are  always  questions  of  fact  to  be  settled  by  the  jury.  But 
where  the  existence  and  terms  of  a  contract  have  been  estab- 
lished, its  construction  is  a  matter  of  law  for  the  court.2*  Where 
a  contract  is  by  parol  the  terms  of  the  agreement  are,  of  course, 
matters  of  fact,  and  if  those  terms  be  obscure  or  equivocal,  or 
are  susceptible  of  explanation  from  extrinsic  evidence,  it  is  for 
the  jury  to  find  also  the  meaning  of  the  terms  employed;  but 
the  effect  of  a  parol  agreement,  when  its  terms  are  given  and 
their  meaning  fixed,  is  as  much  a  question  of  law  as  the  con- 
struction of  a  written  contract.25  In  cases  of  written  contracts 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  define  the  meaning  of  the  language 
used  in  them,  but  in  verbal  contracts  such  duty  is  confined  to  the 

147,    155,   10   N.   B.    131;    Bryant  v.  register);    Salem,   M.    &   M.   R.    Co. 

Hagerty,    87    Pa.    St.    256;    Estes   v.  v.  Anderson,  51  Minn.  829. 
Boothe,    20    Ark.    590;    Comfort    v.          22  Boltz   v.    Miller,   23   Ky.    L.    R. 

Ballingal,    134    Mo.    289,    35    S.    W.  991,  64  S.  W.  630.  See  generally  on 

609;  Dwight  v.  Germania  L.  Ins.  Co.  construction!:   Mantz  v.  Maguire,  52 

103  N.  Y.  341,  8  N.  E.  654;   Harvey  Mo.    App.    137;    Jones    v.    Swearin- 

v.  Vandegrift,  89  Pa.  St.  346;  Zenor  gen,    42    S.    Car.    58,    19    S.    E.    947; 

v.  Johnson,  107  Ind.  69,  7  N.  E.  751;  McHenry  v.  Man,  39  Md.  510;  *Sel- 

Warren   v.   Chandler,   98  Iowa,   237,  lars    v.    Johnson,    65    N.    Car.    104; 

67  N.  W.  242;  Olds  Wagon  Works  v.  Burke   v.    Lee,   76   Va.    386;    Lapeer 

Coombs,  124  Ind.  62,  24  N.  E.  589;  Co.   F.   &  M.   F.   Ins.   Co.   v.   Doyle, 

S.    v.    Williams,   32   S.    Car.    123,    10  30  Mich.  159  (construction  of  insur- 

S.    E.    876;    Knoxville,    C.    G.    &   L.  ance   policy   turning  on   whether  a 

R.   Co.   v.   Beeler,   90  Tenn.   549,   18  word  was  "six"  or  "oix"). 
S.  W.  391;    Fairbanks  v.  Jacobs,  69          23  Lea    v.    Henry,    56    Iowa,    662, 

Iowa,  265,  28  N.  W.  602;    Keeler  v.  10  N.  W.  243;  Batters>hall  v.  Steph- 

Herr,    157    111.    57,     41    N.    E.    750;  ens,  34  Mich.  68;  Luckhart  v.  Ogden, 

Cohn  v.  Stewart,  41  Wis.  527.  30  Cal.   548;    Goddard  v.  Foster,  17 

20  Diefenback    v.    Stark,    56    Wis.  Wall  (U.  S.),  123. 

463,  14  N.  W.  621.  24  Snolley  v.    Hendrickson,   29   N. 

21  Libby  v.  Deake,  97  Me.  377,  54      J.    L.    371.      See    Edwards  v.    Gold- 
Atl.  856;    Barton  v.  Gray,  57  Mich.      Smith,  16  Pa.  St.  48. 

622,  24  N.  W.  638;  Stribling  v.  Pret-          25  Belt  v.   Goode,  31  Mo.  128. 
tyman,  57  111.  377  (certificate  of  the 


139  INTERPRETATION    OF   ORAL    CONTRACTS.  §    158 

jury.  They  are  not  merely  to  ascertain  the  words  and  forms 
of  expression,  but  to  interpret  their  sense  and  meaning.26 

The  question  whether  a  contract  existed  must  be  determined 
from  the  oral  proof,  from  what  the  parties  said  .and  did,  and 
the  matter  is  single  and  cannot  be  separated  so  as  to  refer  one 
part  to  the  jury  and  the  other  part  to  the  court,  but  in  its  entirety 
the  question  is  one  of  fact.27  And  the  question  as  to  what  the 
contract  really  was  between  the  parties  is  for  the  jury.28  But 
after  the  jury  shall  have  determined  what  the  oral  contract  is, 
if  any  exists,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court,  and  not  the  jury,  to 
determine  its  legal  effect  as  a  question  of  law.29  The  court 
submits  to  the  jury  the  determination  of  the  contract  by  hy- 
pothetical instructions,  and  declares  the  legal  effect  according 
to  the  finding  of  the  jury. 

Where  the  pleadings  set  out  questions  of  law  and  fact  the 
court  must  submit  to  the  jury  only  the  questions  of  fact.30 

§  158.  Wills  are  construed  by  the  court. — All  questions  touch- 
ing the  construction,  operation  and  effect  of  wills  are  also  to  be 
determined  by  the  court,  and  not  by  the  jury.31  Whether  a 
will  contains  a  special  trust,  which  requires  the  joint  action  of 
all  the  executors,  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court  to  decide, 
stnd  not  a  question  of  fact  to  be  referred  to  the  jury  for  their 
decision.32 

26  Herbert  v.  Ford,  33  Me.  90,  93;          so  Duren  v.   Kee,   41   S.   Car.   171, 
Copeland     v.     Hall,     29     Me.     93;       19  S.  E.  492. 

Walthelm    v.    Artz,    70    Iowa,    609,          si  Burke     v.    Lee,     76     Va.     386; 

31  N.  W.  953;  Chichester  v.  White-  Magee   v.    McNeil,   41   Miss.    17;    S. 

leather,  51  111.  259.  v.    Patterson,    68    Me.    473;    Roe    v. 

27  McKenzie    v.    Sykes,    47    Mich.  Taylor,     45     111.     485;     Collins     v. 
294,  11  N.  W.  164;  Sines  v.  Superin-  Green,   28  N.   Car.   139;    Willson  v. 
tendent,    55    Mich.    383,    21    N.    W.  Whitefield,  38  Ga.   269. 

428.     See  Boyce  v.  Martin,  46  Mich.  32  Willson    v.    Whitefield,    38    Ga. 

239    (whether   altered   by   parol),   9  269,   283.     Other   documentary   evi- 

N.  W.  265;  Codding  v.  Woodi,  112  Pa.  dence  is  governed  by  the  same  rule. 

St.  371,  3  Atl.  455;  Smith  v.  Hutch-  Deeds:    Bonney   v.    Monell,    52    Me. 

inson,    83     Mo.     683;     Walthelm    v.  255;   Hancock  v.  Colrybark,  66  Mo. 

Artz,    70   Iowa,    609,   31   N.   W.   953.  672;     Huth    v.    Carondelet,    56    Mo. 

28  Hughes    v.    Tanner,    96    Mich.  207;   Dean  v.  Erskine,  18  N.  H.  81; 
113,  55  N.  W.  661;  Smalley  v.  Hen-  Eddy   v.    Chase,    140    Mass.    471,    5 
drickson,   29   N.   J.   L.   373;    Folsom  N.    E.    306;    Synames    v.    Brown,    13 
v.  Plumer,  43  N.  H.  469;   Tobin  v.  Ind.  318.     Court  records:    Shook  v. 
Gregg,   34   Pa.    St.   446.  Blount,   67  Ala.   301    (decree);    Gal- 

29  Diefenback    v.    Stark,    56    Wis.  lup   v.    Fox,   64   Conn.    491,    30   Atl. 
462,  14  N.  W.  621;  Young  v.  Jeffreys,  756   (construction);   Turner  v.  First 
20  N.  Car.  220;  Barton  v.  Gray,  57  Nat.    Bank,    78    Ind.    19    (construc- 
Mich.  623,  24  N.  W.  638.  tion) ;   S.  v.  Anderson,  30  La.  Ann, 

557. 


§    159  LAW    DETERMINED   BY   THE   COURT.  140 

§  159.  Writing  as  a  fact  in  chain  of  evidence. — It  frequently 
happens  that  a  writing  is  introduced  merely  as  a  fact  or  cir- 
cumstance tending  to  prove  some  other  fact.  In  such  case  it  is 
generally  but  a  link  in  a  chain  of  evidence,  the  accompanying 
evidence  being  mostly,  or  altogether,  oral.  When  such  is  the 
case  the  jury  have  to  pass  upon  the  whole  transaction,  of  which 
the  writing  is  but  a  part.  The  question  then  is,  not  so  much  what 
the  document  means,  but  what  inference  shall  be  drawn  from  its 
meaning,  and  what  effect  it  shall  have  towards  proving  the 
point  at  issue.  The  writing  and  all  the  concomitant  evidence 
go  to  the  jury  together.  In  such  case  the  duty  of  the  court 
is  comparatively  unimportant.  It  may  pronounce  what  meaning 
the  writing  is,  or  is  not,  capable  of,  and  whether  it  is,  or  is  not, 
relevant  to  the  issue;  still  the  value  and  effect  of  such  evidence 
is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.33  So  when  a  document  is 
introduced  in  evidence  as  a  foundation  of  an  inference  of  fact 
to  establish  some  other  fact,  whether  such  inference  can  be 
drawn  from  it,  is  a  question  for  the  jury.34  In  other  words,  where 
the  question  to  be  determined  from  a  writing  is  not  the  con- 
struction of  it,  but  its  effect  as  collateral  evidence,  then  the 
question  is  for  the  jury.35 

§  160.  Some  phases  of  writing  explained  by  oral  evidence. 
There  is  a  large  class  of  writings  where  the  meaning  of  par- 
ticular words  or  phrases  or  characters  or  abbreviations  must 
be  shown  in  evidence  outside  of  the  writing,  and  there  may  be 
extrinsic  circumstances  of  one  kind  or  another  affecting  its  in- 
terpretation which  may  be  shown  by  oral  testimony.  And  it 
has  often  been  inaccurately  said  that  in  cases  of  this  kind  the 
writing  itself  is  to  be  passed  upon  and  construed  by  the  jury. 
Strictly  speaking,  this  is  not  so.  The  jury  find  what  the  oral 
testimony  shows,  and  the  court  declares  what  the  writing  means 
in  the  light  of  the  facts  found  by  the  jury.  The  facts  may  be 
found  by  a  special  verdict,  and  then  the  court  interprets  the 
.writing  in  view  of  such  finding,  or  the  case  may  go  to  the  jury 
with  hypothetical  instructions  from  the  court  to  render  a  ver- 
sa s.  v.  Patterson,  68  Me.  473;  ss  Reynolds  v.  Richards,  14  Pa. 
Wilson  v.  Board,  &c.  63  Mo.  142.  St.  205;  Robbins  v.  Spencer,  121 
«*  Prim  v.  Haren,  27  Mo.  205;  Ind.  594,  22  N.  E.  660;  Thompson 
Mantz  v.  Maguire,  52  Mo.  App.  Tr.  §§  1065,  1066. 
137. 


141  VALIDITY   OF   LAWS   AND  ORDINANCES.  §    162 

diet  if  certain  facts  are  found,  and  another  way  if  the  facts 
are  found  differently.  The  court  may  first  inform  the  jury 
as  to  the  law,  or  the  jury  may  first  inform  the  court  as  to  the 
facts,  as  may  be  most  practicable.36 

§  161.  Validity  of  ordinances  and  statutes  for  court. — It  is 
the  province  of  the  court,  and  not  the  jury,  to  construe  an 
ordinance  when  it  is  introduced  in  evidence.37  The  validity 
of  an  ordinance  is  a  question  for  the  court  to  determine,  and 
not  the  jury.38  An  ordinance  of  a  city,  is  to  be  proved  by  evi- 
dence addressed  to  the  court,  and  not  submitted  as  a  fact  to 
be  determined  by  the  jury.39  So  whether  a  statute  shall  be 
declared  void  for  uncertainty,  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court 
to  determine,  and  not  the  jury.40 

§  162.  Foreign  law  a  fact  to  be  proved. — When  the  laws 
of  another  state  come  in  question  in  the  courts  they  must  be 
pleaded  and  proved  as  a  matter  of  fact  and  determined  by  the 
jury.41  That  the  law  of  another  state  is  a  fact  to  be  determined 
by  the  jury  is  a  well  established  principle.42  But  in  such  case  it 
becomes  the  duty  of  the  court,  as  in  the  case  of  any  other 

sfi  S.    v.    Patterson,    68    Me.    473.  R.  Co.  74  Iowa,  127,  37  N.  W.  107; 

Citing:     Hutchinson   v.    Bowker,   5  Sadler  v.    Peoples,   105   Fed.   712. 

M.     &     W.     535,     540;      Smith     v.  sa  City   of  Peoria  v.   Calhoun,   29 

Faulkner,  12  Gray  (Mass.),  251,  255;  m.  317;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Frana, 

Putnam    v.     Bond,     100    Mass.    58;  13  111.  App.  91. 

Cunningham     v.      Washburn,      119  39  Ronlo    v.    Valcour,    58    N.    H. 

Mass.    224;    Mowry    v.    Stogner,    3  346;  Washington  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Lacey, 

Rich  (S.  Car.)  251;  Powers  v.  Gary,  94  Va.  460,  26  S.  E.  834. 

64  Me.  9,  21.     See  also  Olds  Wagon  40  s.    v.    Main,    69    Conn.    123,    37 

Co.    v.    Coombs,    124    Ind.    62    (con-  Atl.   80,   36   L.   R.   A.    623    (statutes 

tract    ambiguous),    24    N.    E.    589;  construed    by   the   court);    Post   v. 

Brady    v.    Cassidy,    104    N.    Y.    147,  Supervisors,  105  U.  S.  667;   Gallatin 

10    N.    E.    131;    Burke    v.    Lee,    76  Turnpike  Co.  v.  S.  16  Lea  (Tenn.), 

Va.  386;   Mantz  v.  Maguire,  52  Mo.  36. 

App.   137;    Foster  v.  Berg,   104  Pa.  41  Williams    v.    Finlay,    40    Ohio 

St.    328;      Goddard    v.     Foster,     17  St.  342;  Ely  v.  James,  123  Mass.  36, 

Wall  (U.  S.)  142;  Meyer  v.  Shamp,  44;    Kline  v.   Baker,  99   Mass.   253; 

51  Neb.  424,  71  N.  W.  57;   West  v.  Lockwood    v.    Crawford,    18    Conn. 

Smith,  101  U.  S.  263;    Helmholz  v.  361;    Hooper  v.   Moore,   50  N.   Car. 

Everingham,     24     Wis.     266;    Ken-  130. 

drick  v.  Cisco,  13  Lea  (Tenn.),  248;  42  Alexander  v.  Pennsylvania  Co. 

Philibert  v.  Burch,  4  Mo.  App.  470,  48   Ohio  St.   623,   634,   30   N.   E.   69. 

(doubtful  words  must  be  determined  See  Thompson  Tr.  §  1054;   Wear  v. 

by  the  jury);  Zenor  v.  Johnson,  107  Sanger,   91   Mo.    348,    2    S.   W.    307; 

Ind.    69;    Humes    v.    Bernstein,    72  Moore    v.    Gwynn,    27    N.    Car.     (5 

Ala.    546.  Ired.  L.)  187;  Bank  v.  Barry,  20  Md. 

37  Platt  &  S.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  287. 


§    163  LAW   DETERMINED   BY   TUB    COUBT.  142 

documentary  evidence  requiring  construction,  to  construe  the 
statutes  or  decisions  of  the  foreign  state.43  When  foreign  laws 
are  in  evidence  it  is  no  less  the  duty  of  the  court  to  determine 
the  law  of  the  case  from  them  than  it  is  the  court's  duty  to 
declare  our  own  laws  in  charging  the  jury.4*  ' '  What  is  the 
law  of  another  state  or  of  a  foreign  country,  is  as  much  a  'ques- 
tion of  law',  as  what  is  the  law  of  our  own  state.  There  is  this 
difference,  however:  the  court  is  presumed  to  know  judicially 
the  public  laws  of  our  state,  while  in  respect  to  private  laws 
and  the  laws  of  other  states  and  foreign  countries,  this  knowl- 
edge is  not  presumed;  it  follows  that  the  existence  of  the 
latter  must  be  alleged  and  proved  as  facts."45 

§  163.  Illustrations  of  the  principles  —  Legal  questions. 
Whether  the  plaintiff  or  defendant  has  the  affirmative  on  a 
particular  issue  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,  and  not  of 
fact  for  the  jury.46  The  court  may,  without  invading  the  pro- 
vince of  the  jury,  instruct  that  two  or  more  different  writings 
introduced  in  evidence  are  not  necessarily  inconsistent  in  mean- 
ing in  reference  to  some  particular  fact  in  issue.47  Also  an 
instruction  which  merely  refers  to  certain  documents  involved 
in  a  case,  stating  that  they  are  to  be  considered  and  construed 
together  as  part  of  one  and  the  same  contract,  is  not  obnoxious 
as  conveying  the  idea  that  the  jury  are  authorized  to  con- 
strue the  contract.48 

An  instruction  that  if  the  jury  find  that  a  certain  person 
(naming  him),  "by  reason  of  having  hired  the  team,  wagon 
and  driver  from  the  defendant  had  become,  as  it  were,  the 
owner  thereof  for  that  day"  the  defendant  would  not  be  re- 
sponsible for  any  injury  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  driver 
of  the  team,  is  properly  refused.  The  question  thus  submitted  is 

43  Alexander  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.          4R  Gilbert     v.   Bone,     79   111.    341, 
48  Ohio  St.   623,  634,   30  N.   E.  69;       345. 

Ely    v.    James,    123    Mass.    36,    44;          47  Home  Friendly   Soc.  v.   Berry, 

Cobb    v.    Griffin    &    A.    Co.    87    Mo.  94  Ga.  606,  21  S.  E.  583. 

90.  48  Anglo  American  Provision  Co. 

44  Slaughter    v.    Metropolitan    St.  v.  Prestiss,  157  111.  506,  518,  42  N. 
R.   Co.   116  Mo.   269,  23  S.  W.   760;  E.    157.      Held    submitting    to    the 
S.    v.    Whittle,    59    S.    Car.    297,    37  jury   questions   of  law   in   the  fol- 
S.    E.    923.  lowing    cases:      Jordan     v.     Duke 

45  Hooper   v.    Moore,    50   N.    Car.  (Ariz.),    36    Pac.     896;     Pearce     v. 
(5  Jones),  130.  Boggs,  99  Cal.  340,  33  Pac.  906. 


143  FOREIGN  LAW  A  FACT — ILLUSTRATIONS.         §  163 

one  of  law  for  the  court.49  It  is  error  for  the  court  to  charge 
that  the  jury  may  apply  certain  instructions  "so  far  as  they 
are  practicable  in  arriving  at  a  verdict;"  such  charge  submits 
to  the  jury  the  question  of  determining  the  law.50  Submitting 
to  the  jury  the  questions  as  to  what  is  "legal  possession"  and 
"color  of  title"  is  improper,  they  being  questions  of  law  for 
the  court  to  determine.51  To  instruct  the  jury  that  if  they  be- 
lieve the  defendant  was  in  actual  possession  of  the  land  in 
controversy  at  the  time  the  plaintiff  purchased  and  took  a  con- 
veyance of  it,  without  advising  them  what  would  constitute  actual 
possession,  is  error  in  requiring  the  jury  to  determine  the  law.52 

In  an  action  where  the  plaintiff's  title  to  a  tract  of  land  was 
in  issue  a  charge  that  if  the  plaintiff  is  the  owner  and  entitled 
to  the  possession  of  the  land  the  jury  should  find  for  him ;  and  if 
the  defendant  wrongfully  entered  and  wrongfully  withheld  the 
land  they  should  assess  damages,  is  erroneous  in  that  it  makes 
the  jury  judges  of  the  law  as  well  as  the  facts.53  An  instruc- 
tion charging  that  the  paper  title  introduced  by  the  plaintiff  is 
regular  on  its  face,  and  with  the  proof  of  heirship  is  sufficient 
to  vest  title  in  him  to  the  land  in  controversy,  is  proper,  and 
does  not  invade  the  province  of  the  jury  in  weighing  the  evi- 
dence.54 

Whether  a  rule  adopted  in  conducting  or  carrying  on  a  certain 
business,  such,  for  instance,  as  railroad  business,  is  reasonable 
or  not  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,  and  not  for  the  jury, 
to  determine.55  Also  the  question  of  the  obligation  of  a  rail- 
road company  to  fence  its  track  is  a  question  of  law,  and  should 
not  be  submitted  to  the  jury.56  Whether  certain  clauses  in  an 
instrument  as  to  the  description  of  property  are  repugnant 
or  not  is  a  question  of  law  to  be  determined  by  the  court.57 
And  the  sufficiency  of  the  description  of  property  in  a  deed, 
mortgage  or  other  instrument  is  a  question  of  law.58 

«  Tompkins   v.   Montgomery,   123  54  Howell    v.    Hanrick    (Tex.    Cv. 

Gal.  219,  55  Pac.  997.  App.),   24   S.  W.   823. 

BO  Duthie  v.  Town  of  Washburn,  55  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitte- 

87  Wis.  231,  55  N.  W.  380.  more,   43   111.    420,    423. 

si  Blanchard  v.  Pratt,  37  111.  243.  56  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Whalen, 

52  Mayes  v.  Kenton,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  42   111.   396. 

1052,  64  S.  W.  728.  57  Rathbun  v.  Geer,  64  Conn.  421, 

ss  Smith  v.  Cornett,  18  Ky.  L.  R.  30  Atl.  60. 

818,    38    S.     W.     689;    Ferguson    v.  BS  Austin     v.    French,     36    Mich. 

Moore,  98  Tenn.  342,  39  S.  W.  341.  199. 


§    163  LAW   DETERMINED  BY   THE   COURT.  144 

What  is  a  proper  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  a  mort- 
gage is  a  question  of  law,  and  hence  improper  to  be  submitted1 
to  the  jury  by  instruction.59  Where  there  can  be  no  controversy 
as  to  what  facts  are  established  by  the  constitution  and  by-laws 
of  an  association,  in  evidence,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court,  and 
not  the  jury,  to  determine  whether  the  association  was  or- 
ganized for  an  unlawful  purpose.00  A  charge  that  "the  records 
and  papers  which  have  been  introduced  in  evidence  are  suffi- 
cient proof  of  the  establishment  of  a  public  highway  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  plat  therein  set  forth,"  is  proper,  it  being 
the  duty  of  the  court  to  determine  the  sufficiency  of  the  records 
to  sustain  the  road.61  Where  an  instruction  states  that  if  the 
jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  act  complained  of  was 
a  lawful  act,  the  defendant  is  not  guilty,  it  submits  to  the  jury 
a  question  of  law.62 

In  an  action  for  trespass,  where  the  defense  was  justification 
under  a  replevin  writ,  an  instruction  submitting  to  the  jury 
the  question  whether  the  writ  was  duly  and  properly  executed, 
without  informing  them  what  would  constitute  a  "due  and 
proper"  execution  is  improper.63  Whether  a  warrant  issued 
for  the  arrest  of  a  person  is  valid  or  void  is  a  question  of  law, 
and  when  such  document  is  introduced  in  evidence  the  court 
may  properly  state  to  the  jury  whether  it  is  or  is  not  void.64 
The  record  of  extradition  proceedings  is  properly  passed  upon 
by  the  court  for  the  purpose  of  determining  as  a  matter  of  law 
whether  the  accused  was  extradited  upon  the  same  charge  for 
which  he  was  placed  on  trial.65  Where  by  statutory  provision 
a  court  is  authorized  to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  laws  of  na- 
ture and  the  measure  of  time,  it  is.  proper  to  instruct  the  jury 
as  to  the  time  when  the  moon  rose  on  a  particular  day,  al- 
though no  evidence  was  introduced  on  that  subject  at  the  trial.68 
So  also  the  court  may  instruct  on  what  day  of  the  week  a 
certain  day  of  the  month  occurred.67 

so  Bullock  v.  Narrott,  49  111.  62.  «*  S.  v.  Yourex,  30  Wash.  611,  71 

oo  Johnson  v.  Miller,  63  Iowa,  529,  Pac.  203. 

17  N.  W.  34.  «5  S.   v.  Roller,  30  Wash.  692,  71 

«i  S.   v.   Prine,   25   Iowa,   231.  Pac.    718. 

«2  Can*   v.    S.    104   Ala.   4,   16   So.  ««  P.    v.   Mayes,   113   Cal.    618,   45 

150.  Pac.  860. 

«»  Gusdorff     v.     Duncan,    94    Md.  ^  Koch    v.    S.    115    Ala.    99,    22 

160,  50  Atl.  57.  So.    471. 


145  PRINCIPLES  ILLUSTRATED— AS  TO  FACTS.          §  165 

§  164.    Illustrations  of  the  principles — Questions  of  fact — An 

instruction  stating  that  whether  a  certain  act  amounts  to  neg- 
ligence is  for  the  jury  to  determine  under  all  the  circumstances 
in  evidence  is  not  objectionable  as  requiring  the  jury  to  decide 
a  question  of  law  where  the  charge  contains  a  legal  defini- 
tion of  negligence.68  Where  a  writing  is  introduced  in  evidence 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  some,  extrinsic  or  collateral  fact, 
and  its  effect  does  not  depend  upon  the  construction  or  mean- 
ing of  the  instrument,  or  of  its  effect  upon  some  other  instru- 
ment, the  inference  of  fact  is  to  be  drawn  by  the  jury.69 

Where  a  memorandum  or  document  on  its  face  does  not  of 
itself  purport  to  be  a  promise  to  pay  or  other  binding  obliga- 
tion, but  which  requires  parol  evidence  to  disclose  the  inten- 
tion of  the  maker  of  it,  the  jury  must  determine  from  all  the 
facts  and  circumstances  for  what  purpose  the  same  was  made.70 
The  court  will  not  decide  as  a  matter  of  law  whether  a  way 
of  a  certain  width  is  necessary  to  the  construction  of  a  road 
on  which  to  run  or  operate  lumber  trains.  This  is  a  question 
for  the  jury  to  determine.71  The  court  after  having  defined 
probable  cause  in  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution  does  not 
submit  to  the  jury  both  the  law  and  the  facts  by  further  charg- 
ing them  that  "both  the  question  of  probable  cause  and  malice 
are  for  the  jury  to  determine"  from  the  evidence.72 

§  165.  In  criminal  causes  court  determines  law. — In  most,  if 
not  all,  jurisdictions  where  the  jury  are  not  clothed  with  power 
by  constitutional  or  statutory  provision  to  determine  the  law  they 
are  bound  to  accept  it  as  given  them  by  the  court,  in  criminal 
as  well  as  civil  cases.73  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  instruct 

ss  Conner  v.   Citizens'   St.   R.   Co.      269;    S.    v.    Rheams,    34    Minn.    18, 

146  Ind.   430,  45  N.  B.  662.  24   N.   W.    302;    Sparf  v.    U.    S.    156 
«9  Robbins    v.    Spencer,    121    Ind.      U.   S.   51,   15   Sup.   Ct.  273    (exhaus- 

594,   22   N.   E.    660,   citing:    Thomp-  tive   review   of   cases   and    authori- 

son   Tr.    §§   1065,   1066.  ties);  Adams  v.  S.  29  Ohio  St.  412; 

TO  Murphy    v.    Murphy,    95    Iowa,  S.    v.    Dickey,    48    W.    Va.    325,    37 

271,   63   N.   W.   697.  S.  E.  695;   S.  v.  Crotean,  23  Vt.  14; 

TI  Waters  v.  Greenlief  John  Lum-  S.   v.    Stevens,   53    Me.    548;    Wash- 

ber   Co.    115   N.   Car.   648,  20   S.   E.  ington  v.  S.  63  Ala.  135;   Pierce  v. 

718.  S.    13  N.   H.   536,   545;    Harrison   v. 

™  Lewton   v.    Hower,   35   Fla.    58,  Com.   123  Pa.   St.   508,   16  Atl.   611; 

16    So.    616.  Brown    v.    Com.    86   Va.    466,    10   S. 

73  Duffy  v.  P.  26  N.  Y.  588,  591;  E.    745;    S.   v.   Burpee,' 65   Vt.   1,  25 

Hamilton  v.  P.  29  Mich.  173;    Han-  Atl.  964,  19  L.  R.  A.  145. 
num   v.   S.   90   Tenn.   647,   18  S.   W. 


§    166  LAW   DETERMINED   BY    THE    COURT.  146 

the  jury  as  to  the  law  in  criminal  cases,  and  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  jury  to  follow  the  law  as  stated  by  the  court.74  Under  the 
statute  of  California,  which  requires  the  jury  to  receive  the 
law  as  laid  down  as  such  by  the  court,  an  instruction  in  sub- 
stance charging  that  the  jury  should  receive  the  law  as  the 
court  states  it  to  be,  notwithstanding  "you  may  firmly  believe" 
the  court  is  wrong,  and  that  the  law  is,  or  should  be,  otherwise 
than  as  given  by  the  court,  is  proper.75  Doubtless,  however, 
the  jury  have  the  power  to  disregard  the  law  as  given  by  the 
court,  but  they  have  neither  the  moral  nor  legal  right  to 
do  so,  and  they  cannot  do  so  without  violating  their  oaths  and 
disregarding  their  duty.76 

The  doctrine  that  the  jury  are  the  judges  of  the  law  in 
criminal  cases  is  contrary  to  the  fundamental  law;  contrary 
to  a  vast  preponderance  of  judicial  authority  in  this  country, 
and  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  meaning  of  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States.77  The  controversy  in  England  over  the  ques- 
tion whether  jurors  are  judges  of  the  law  originated  largely 
from  the  course  of  procedure  in  prosecutions  for  libel.  The 
judges  in  such  cases  were  accustomed  to  direct  the  jury  to  re- 
turn a  verdict  of  guilty  upon  proof  of  publication  and  the  truth 
of  the  inuendoes,  without  instructing  them  as  to  whether  the 
paper,  if  they  so  found,  was  or  was  not  libel.  The  question  of 
malicious  intent  charged  in  the  indictment  was  not  submitted 
to  the  jury.78 

§  166.  Jury  made  judge  of  law  by  statute. — By  either  con- 
stitutional or  statutory  provisions  of  several  of  the  states  the 
jury  are  made  the  judges  of  the  law  and  the  facts  in  all  criminal 
cases.79  Hence  the  jury  are  not  absolutely  bound  to  accept  the 
law  as  given  them  by  the  court.  In  Illinois  under  a  statute 
which  provides  that  "juries  in  all  criminal  cases  shall  be  judges 

74  Brown  v.  Com.  86  Va.  466,  472,          ™  S.  v.  Wright,  53  Me.  328. 

10    S.    E.    745;    Com.    v.    McManus,  78  S.   v.   Burpee,   65   Vt.   1,   21,   25 

143  Pa.  St.  64,  21  Atl.  1018;  Carpen-  Atl.  964,  19  L.  R.  A.  145. 

ter  v.  P.  8  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  603;  Roto-  ™  McCarthy    v.    S.    56    Ind.    203; 

bins    v.    S.    8    Ohio    St.    167;    Com.  Broil    v.    S.    45    Md.    359;    Com.    v. 

v.    Anthes,    5    Gray    (Mass.),    198.  Anthes,    71    Mass.     (5    Gray),    185; 

75  p.    v.    Worden,    113    Cal.    569,  S.   v.   Buckley,   40  Conn.   246;    S.   v. 
45  Pac.   844.  Thomas,    47    Conn.    546;    Malone   v. 

TO  Parrish    v.    S.    14    Neb.    61,    63,      S.  66  Ga.  540;  S.  v.  Ford,  37  La.  Ann. 
15  N.  W.  357;  U.  S.  v.  Keller,  19  Fed.      443,   465. 
633,  636. 


147  JURY  JUDGES  OF  LAW,  WHEN.  §    167 

of  the  law  and  the  fact,"  while  it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to 
receive  and  act  upon  the  law  as  given  by  the  court  they  are 
not  bound  to  do  so  if  they  believe  upon  their  oaths  the  court 
is  wrong.80 

In  Indiana,  under  a  constitutional  provision  which  declares 
that  "in  all  criminal  cases  whatever,  the  jury  shall  have  the 
right  to  determine  the  law  and  the  fact,"  while  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  jury  to  give  careful  and  respectful  consideration  to  the 
instructions  of  the  court,  and  not  disregard  such  instructions 
except  for  some  good  and  sufficient  reason,  yet  they  have  the 
right  to  determine  the  law  for  themselves.81  In  view  of  this 
provision  the  refusal  of  an  instruction  "that  the  jury  in  this 
case  are  the  exclusive  judges  of  the  law  and  facts"  was  held 
to  be  error.82  The  jury  may  disregard  the  court's  instructions 
and  follow  their  own  convictions,  but  they  should  give  respect- 
ful consideration  to  the  law  as  given  by  the  court,  especially 
if  they  are  in  doubt  as  to  what  is  the  law.83  The  decisions  of 
the  Supreme  Court  are  no  more  binding  on  the  jury  in  a  crim- 
inal case  than  the  instructions  of  the  trial  court.84 

§  167.  In  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut. — The  statute  of  Mas- 
sachusetts which  provides  that  "in  all  criminal  offenses  it  shall 
be  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  try,  according  to  the  established 
forms  and  principles  of  law,  all  cases  which  shall  be  com- 
mitted to  them,  and  after  having  received  the  instructions  of 
the  court  to  decide  at  their  discretion  by  a  general  verdict  both 
the  fact  and  the  law  involved  in  the  issue,  or  to  return  a  special 
verdict  at  their  election,"  has  been  construed  as  not  conferring 
on  the  jury  the  power  to  determine  questions  of  law  against 
the  instructions  of  the  court.  Such  power  under  the  constitu- 
tion of  that  state  cannot  be  conferred  upon  the  jury.85 

In  Connecticut,  under  a  statute  which  provides  that  "the  court 
shall  state  its  opinion  to  the  jury  upon  all  questions  of  law  aris- 
ing in  the  trial  of  a  criminal  cause  and  submit  to  their  con- 
so  Davison  v.  P.  90  111.  221;  Wohl-  f*  Bird  v.  S.  107  Ind.  154,  8  N.  B. 
ford  v.  P.  148  111.  301,  36  N.  E.  14;  Blaker  v.  S.  130  Ind.  203,  29  N. 
107;  Mullinix  v.  P.  76  111.  211.  E.  1077;  Hudelson  v.  S.  94  Ind.  426; 

si  McDonald    v.    S.    63    Ind.    544;       McDonald  v.  S.  63  Ind.  544. 
Reiser  v.  S.  83  Ind.  234;  Bird  v.  S.          «4  Reiser  v.  S.  83  Ind.  234;   Fow- 
107  Ind.  154;   Walker  v.  S.  136  Ind.      ler  v.  S.  85  Ind.  538. 
663.  ss  Com.    v.    Anthes,    71    Mass.    (5 

82  McCarthy   v.    S.    56    Ind.    203.          Gray),    185. 


§    168  LAW   DETERMINED   BY   THE   COURT.  148 

sideration  both  the  law  and  the  facts  without  any  direction 
how  to  find  their  verdict,"  the  jury  are  the  judges  of  the  law, 
but  not  in  the  sense  that  they  are  at  liberty  to  disregard  it; 
nor  are  they  at  liberty  to  set  aside  the  law  and  substitute  for  it 
something  else  which  suits  their  notions.  They  cannot  make  law 
for  the  occasion.86 

§  168.  In  Maryland  and  Georgia.— The  constitution  of  Mary- 
land provides  that  "in  the  trial  of  all  criminal  cases  the  jury  shall 
be  the  judges  of  the  law,  as  well  as  the  fact.87"  The  jury  being 
thus  authorized  to  determine  the  law,  as  well  as  the  facts,  are  not 
bound  by  any  instructions  given  them  by  the  court,  but  are  at 
liberty  to  disregard  them.88  The  court's  instructions  in  such  case 
are  regarded  as  merely  advisory.89 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Maryland  has  declared  that  in  view 
of  the  constitutional  provision  mentioned  it  is  discretionary 
with  the  trial  court  to  instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  law,  at  their 
request,  though  the  court  is  not  bound  to  do  so.90  The  constitu- 
tion of  Georgia  declares  that  "in  all  criminal  cases  the  jury 
shall  be  the  judges  of  the  law  and  fact."91  But  notwithstand- 
ing such  constitutional  provision  the  jury  should  listen  to  the 
law  given  by  the  court  and  adopt  it  if  they  can  conscientiously 
do  so;  if  not,  then  they  are  at  liberty  to  judge  the  law  for 
themselves.92  And  it  is  proper  for  the  court  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  they  cannot  set  up  ideas  of  their  own  in  opposition 
to  the  charge  of  the  court.93  But  the  right  of  the  jury  to  judge 
of  the  law  is  guaranteed  to  them  and  the  accused  by  statute, 
and  that  right  cannot  be  abridged,  weakened  or  thwarted  by 
the  thunder  of  the  court  in  their  ears.94  An  instruction  charg- 
ing the  jury  that  they  should  be  clearly  satisfied  that  the  court 

se  S.    v.    Buckley,    40   Conn.    246;  Wheeler  v.   S.   42  Md.   569;    Guy  v. 

S.  v.  Thomas,  47  Conn.  546.  S.  96  Md.  692,  54  Atl.  879;  Beard  v. 

87  Beard  v.  S.  71  Md.  275,  17  Atl.  S.  71  Md.  280,  17  Atl.  1044,  4  L.  R. 

1044;    Broil  v.   S.  45  Md.  359.  A.   675;    Swann  v.   S.  64  Md.  425,  1 

ss  Broil  v.  S.  45  Md.  359;   Swann  Atl.  872, 

v.  S.  64  Md.  423,  1  Atl.  872;  Wheeler          »i  Malone  v.  S.   66  Ga.   540. 
v.    S.    42    Md.    563;    Franklin    v.    S.          ^  McDaniel  v.  S.  30  Ga.  853;  Dan- 

12  Md.  236;  Beard  v.  S.  71  Md.  275,  forth  v.  S.  75  Ga.  614,  623. 
17  Atl.  1044,  4  L.  R.  A.  675.  93  Akridge  v.  Noble,  114  Ga.  949, 

so  Swann  v.  S.  64  Md.  423,  1  Atl.  41  S.  E.  78. 

872;      Wheeler     v.    S.    42    Md.    563;  94  Dickens     v.      S.    30     Ga.    383; 

Nuzum  v.  S.  88  Ind.  594;   Beard  v.  Keener  v.  S.  18  Ga.  194;   McDaniel 

S.  71  Md.  275,  17  Atl.  1044.  v.  S.  30  Ga.  855. 

so  Forwood    v.     S.    49    Md.    537; 


149  JURY   JUDGES   OF   LAW,    WHEN.  §    1G9 

is  wrong  before  they  are  authorized  to  differ  from  the  court 
is  erroneous.95 

§  169.  In  Louisiana  and  Indiana. — The  constitution  of  Louis- 
iana provides  that  "the  jury  in  all  criminal  cases  shall  be  the 
judges  of  the  law  and  of  the  facts  on  the  question  of  guilt  or 
innocence,  having  been  duly  charged  as  to  the  law  applicable 
to  the  case  by  the  presiding  judge."96  Although  the  jury  are 
the  judges  of  the  law,  as  well  as  the  fact,  in  criminal  cases,  as 
thus  provided,  they  shall  heed  the  law  as  given  them  by  the 
court;  by  which  is  meant  that  the  charge  of  the  court  shall 
have  its  moral  weight  with  the  jury.97  Still,  the  jury  should 
not  be  tied  down  by  peremptory  instructions  from  the  court  as 
to  their  duty  in  respect  to  any  particular  testimony  nor  what 
their  course  should  be  as  a  matter  of  law  in  respect  to  the  tes- 
timony, in  view  of  the  fact  that  they  are  the  judges  of  the  law 
and  the  evidence.98 

The  court  is  required  to  instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  law  appli- 
cable to  the  case,  and  they  ought  to  receive  it  as  given  to  them, 
though  they  are  under  no  obligation  to  do  so.99  But  in  that 
state  it  has  been  held  error  to  charge  the  jury  that  if  they  "can- 
not conscientiously  believe  that  the  court  has  given  the  law 
correctly  they  do  not  violate  their  oaths  in  disregarding  it," 
for  the  reason  that  they  are  bound  to  accept  the  law  as  given 
them  by  the  court.100  "That  the  jury  are  the  sole  judges  of 
the  law  and  the  facts  of  this  case,  and  that  they  have  the  right 
to  ignore  the  law  given  them  by  the  court  should  they  deem 
proper  to  do  so,"  is  also  erroneous.101 

In  Indiana  the  statute  requires  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury 
and  to  inform  them  that  they  have  the  right  to  determine  the 
law.  But  the  jury  may  disregard  the  instructions  of  the  court 
and  determine  the  law  for  themselves.  In  other  words,  the 
instructions  of  the  court  are  advisory  only  in  their  influence 
upon  the  ultimate  judgment  of  the  jury,  both  as  to  the  law  and 

05  Golden  v.   S.   25  Ga.   527.  v.  Ballerio,  11  La.   Ann.   81;    S.   v. 

ss  S.    v.    Ford,    37   La.    Ann.   443,  Scott,  11  La.  Ann.  429;  S.  v.  Saliba, 

465.  18  La.  Ann.  35.    But  see  S.  v.  Mat- 

9?  S.    v.    Desforges,    47    La.    Ann.  thews,  38  La.  Ann.  795. 

1167,   17   So.   811;    S.  v.  Tisdale    41  100  s.   v.   Matthews,   3-8  La.   Ann. 

La.  Ann.  338,  6  So.  579.  795. 

as  S.   v.   Watkins,   106  La.   380,  31  101  S.   v.   Powell,   109   La.    727,   33 

So.  10.                   .  So.    748. 

99  s.  v.  Tally,  23  La.  Ann.  677;  S. 


§  169  LAW  DETERMINED  BY  THE  COURT.  150 

the  facts.102  While  the  jury  are  the  judges  of  the  law  and  the 
facts,  yet  this  does  not  give  them  the  right  to  decide  the  law, 
regardless  of  all  law,  but  it  is  their  duty  to  follow  or  determine 
the  law  as  established  by  the  proper  tribunals.  Under  their  oaths 
they  are  required  to  determine  the  law  correctly.  But  a  trial 
court  may  not  instruct  that  the  law  as  decided  by  the  Supreme 
Court  is  binding  upon  the  jury.103 

102  McDonald  v.  S.  63  Ind.  544;  1077;  Walker  v.  S.  136  Ind.  663,  36 

Nuzum  v.  S.  88  Ind.  599;  Wachstet-  N.  E.  356;  Smith  v.  S.  142  Ind.  288, 

ter  v.  S.  99  Ind.  290.  41  N.  E.  595;  Reynolds  v.  S.  147  Ind. 

icsKeiser  v.  S.  83  Ind.  234;  Ander-  3,  46  N.  E.  31;  Dean  v.  S.  147  Ind. 

son  v.  S.  104  Ind.  467,  4  N.  E.  63;  215,  46  N.  E.  528;  Bridgewater  v.  S. 

Blaker  v.  S.  130  Ind.  203,  29  N.  E.  153  Ind.  560,  55  N.  E.  737. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


JURY  DETERMINE   THE  FACTS. 


Sec. 

170.  Court     prohibited     from     ex- 

pressing opinion. 

171.  By    common    law    court    may 

express    opinion. 

172.  Submitting  facts  hypothetical- 

ly. 

173.  Instructing      that      "evidence 

tends  to  show." 

174.  Competency     of     evidence — Is 

there  any  evidence? 

175.  Intimating  opinion  is  improp- 

er. 

176.  Opinion  not  intimated — Illus- 

trations. 

177.  Opinion    intimated  —  Illustra- 

tions. 

178.  Opinion       not       intimated  — 

Criminal    cases. 

179.  Opinion    intimated — Criminal 

cases. 

180.  Instructions      as      to      dying 

declarations. 


Sec. 

181.  Inferences     and     conclusions 

are   for   the   jury. 

182.  Weight    of    evidence    is    for 

jury    to    determine. 

183.  Negligence — When  a  question 

of  fact,  when  of  law. 

184.  Instructions     improper — Illus- 

trations. 

185.  Remarks      and      conduct      of 

court    influencing    jury. 

186.  Instructions    urging    jury    to 

agree. 

187.  Instructions      attempting      to 

coerce   jury. 

188.  Instructions     not     attempting 

to    coerce    jury. 

189.  When  court  may  comment  on 

evidence    and    express   opin- 
ion. 

190.  Illustrations   of   the   rule. 

191.  Instructions      reviewing      the 

evidence. 


§  170.  Court  prohibited  from  expressing  opinion. — By  con- 
stitutional and  statutory  provisions  of  many  of  the  states  the 
judges  in  charging  the  jury  are  prohibited  from  expressing  or 
intimating  an  opinion  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence,  or  what 
the  evidence  proves  or  does  not  prove.  Under  these  provisions 
the  jury  are  the  sole  judges  of  the  facts  and  of  the  weight  of  the 
evidence.1  And  by  such  provisions  in  some  of  the  states  the 

i  P.  v.  Welch,  49  Cal.  181;  P.  v.  S.  29  Tex.  499;  Chicago  &  N. 
v.  Casey,  65  Cal.  260,  3  Pac.  874;  R.  Co.  v.  Moranda,  108  111.  582; 
Beverly  v.  Burke,  9  Ga.  447;  Ross  Cameron  v.  Vandergriff,  53  Ark. 

151 


171 


JURY  DETERMINE  THE  FACTS. 


152 


courts  in  charging  the  jury  are  prohibited  not  only  from  ex- 
pressing opinions  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence,  but  are  also 
forbidden  to  sum  up  or  recapitulate  the  evidence,  and  'are  only 
permitted  to  declare  the  law.2  Hence  it  is  error  to  instruct  the 
jury  in  such  manner  as  to  impress  them  with  the  idea  that  they 
are  bound  by  the  opinion  of  the  court  as  to  what  the  evidence 
proves  or  does  not  prove.3 


381,  13  S.  W.  761;  S.  v.  Benner,  64 
Me.  267;  S.  v.  Barry,  11  N.  Dak. 
428,  92  N.  W.  809;  S.  v.  Carter, 
112  Iowa,  15,  83  N.  W.  715;  Kear- 
ney v.  P.  (Gal.),  17  Pac.  782;  P. 
v.  Webster,  59  Hun  (N.  Y.)  398,  13 
N.  Y.  S.  414.  See,  also,  Hempton  v. 
S.  Ill  Wis.  127,  86  N.  W.  596;  Van 
Duzor  v.  Allen,  90  111.  499;  Myrick 
v.  Wells,  52  Miss.  149;  United  States 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lesser,  126  Ala.  568, 
28  So.  646;  Clark  v.  Goddard,  39 
Ala.  164;  S.  v.  Dorland,  103  Iowa, 
168,  72  N.  W.  492;  Ryder  v.  S.  100 
Ga.  528,  28  S.  E.  246;  Tyler  v. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  88  Va. 
389,  13  S.  E.  975;  Florida  C.  & 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lucas,  110  Ga.  121, 
35  S.  E.  283;  S.  v.  Hahn,  38  La.  Ann. 
169;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearcy, 
128  Ind.  197,  27  N.  E.  479;  P.  v. 
O'Brien,  130  Cal.  1,  62  Pac.  297;  Earp 
v.  Edginton,  107  Tenn.  23,  64  S. 
W.  40;  Riviere  v.  McCormick,  14 
La.  Ann.  139;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Robinson,  106  111.  142;  Fulwider 
v.  Ingels,  87  Ind.  414;  S.  v.  Ma- 
honey,  24  Mont.  281,  61  Pac.  647; 
Kearney  v.  S.  68  Miss.  233,  8  So. 
492;  S.  v.  Reed,  62  Me.  129;  Lorie 
v.  Adams,  51  Kas.  692,  33  Pac.  599; 
Granby  Mining  &  S.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
156  Mo.  422,  57  S.  W.  126;  S.  v.  Daly, 
16  Ore.  240,  18  Pac.  357;  S.  v.  Greer, 
22  W.  Va.  801;  Kirk  v.  Ter.  10  Okl. 
46,  60  Pac.  797;  Williams  v.  Dicken- 
son,  28  Fla.  90,  9  So.  847;  Com. 
v.  Briant,  142  Mass.  463,  8  N.  E.  338; 
Texas,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Durrett,  26  Tex. 
Cv.  App.  268,  63  S.  W.  904;  S.  v. 
Tickel,  13  Nev.  502;  Meadows  v. 
Truesdale  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  56  S.  W. 
&32;  Carroll  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M. 
&  O.  R.  Co.  (Iowa),  84  N.  W.  1035; 
Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3246,  citing: 
Andrews  v.  P.  60  111.  354;  S.  v. 
Pepo,  23  Mont.  473.  59  Pac.  721; 


Logg  v.  S.  92  111.  598;  S.  v.  Kerns, 
47  W.  Va.  266,  34  S.  E.  734;  Delvin 
v.  P.  104  111.  504;  S.  v.  Mitchell, 
56  S.  Car.  524,  35  S.  E.  210;  P.  v. 
Travers,  88  Cal.  233,  26  Pac.  88; 
S.  v.  Rose,  47  Minn.  47,  49  N.  W. 
404;  Stephens  v.  S.  10  Tex.  App. 
120;  Barnett  v.  Com.  84  Ky.  449, 
1  S.  W.  722;  Starr  v.  United  States, 
153  U.  S.  614,  14  Sup.  Ct.  919;  Chap- 
man v.  S.  109  Ga.  157,  34  S.  E. 
369;  P.  v.  Plyler,  126  Cal.  379,  58 
Pac.  904;  Williams  v.  S.  46  Neb. 
704,  65  N.  W.  783;  Merritt  v.  S. 
107  Ga.  675,  34  S.  E.  361;  S.  v. 
Austin,  109  Iowa,  118,  80  N.  W. 
303;  P.  v.  Ferraro,  161  N.  Y.  365, 
55  N.  E.  931,  15  N.  Y.  Cr.  266; 
S.  v.  Schmepel,  23  Mont.  523,  59 
Pac.  927;  Fuller  v.  New  York  L. 
Ins.  Co.  (Mass.),  67  N.  E.  879;  Ward 
v.  Brown,  53  W.  Va.  237;  Central 
Tobacco  Co.  v.  Knoop,  24  Ky.  L.  R. 
1268,  71  S.  W.  3;  Potter  v.  S.  117 
Ala.  693 ;  Galveston,  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Karver  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  70  S.  W.  328. 

2  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Kendrick, 
40  Miss.  374;  Renand  v.  City  of 
Bay  City,  124  Mich.  29,  82  N.  W. 
1008;  S.  v.  Asberry,  37  La.  Ann.  125 
(as  to  criminal  cases) ;  S.  v.  Green, 
7  La.  Ann.  518;  Hannah  v.  S.  1  Tex. 
App.  579  (as  to  criminal  cases). 
In  North  Carolina  the  court  in 
charging  the  jury  is  required  by 
statute  to  state  "in  a  plain  and 
correct  manner  the  evidence  given 
in  the  case,  and  declare  and  ex- 
plain the  law  arising  thereon," 
S.  v.  Norris,  10  N.  Car.  391;  S. 
v.  Brady,  107  N.  Car.  822,  12  S. 
E.  325. 

s  Shanck  v.  Morris,  2  Sweeney 
(N.  Y.),  464;  Heydrick  v.  Hutch- 
inson,  165  Pa.  St.  208;  30  Atl.  819; 
Burke  v.  Maxwell,  81  Pa.  St.  139; 
Burdick  v.  P.  58  Barb.  (N.  Y.),  51. 


153 


SUBMITTING  FACTS  TO  JURY. 


172 


§  171.    By  common  law  court  may  express  opinion. — But  in  the 

absence  of  such  constitutional  or  statutory  provisions  under  the 
common  law  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  may  comment  upon 
the  facts  and  express  an  opinion  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence 
as  to  what  it  proves  or  tends  to  prove  or  does  not  prove,  provided 
the  jury  are  ultimately  left  free  to  determine  the  facts.4 

§  172.  Submitting  facts  hypothetically. — But  the  provisions 
above  mentioned  do  not  prohibit  the  court  from  enumerating 
the  facts  hypothetically  which  the  evidence  tends  to  prove  with- 
out intimating  an  opinion  as  to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  facts, 
and  charging  that  if  the  jury  believe  the  facts  thus  enumerated 
they  should  find  for  the  plaintiff,  or  find  the  defendant  guilty, 
as  the  case  may  be.5  Thus,  for  example,  it  is  not  a  violation 


*  Vanarsdale  v.  Hax,  107  Fed. 
878;  Steven  v.  Talcott,  11  Vt.  25; 
Pool  v.  White,  175  Pa.  St.  459. 
34  Atl.  801;  Setchel  v.  Keigeoin,  57 
Conn.  478,  18  Atl.  594;  Smith  v.  S. 
41  N.  J.  L.  374;  Hurlburt  v.  Hurl- 
burt,  128  N.  Y.  420,  28  N.  E.  651; 
Rowell  v.  Fuller,  59  Vt.  688,  10 
Atl.  853;  Simmons  v.  United  States, 
142  U.  S.  148;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ho- 
lan,  63  Minn.  525,  65  N.  W.  952; 
Holder  v.  S.  5  Ga.  444;  Goldsworthy 
v.  Town  of  Linden,  75  Wis.  24,  43 
N.  W.  656;  Durkee  v.  Marshall, 
7  Wend.  (N.  Y.),  312;  S.  v.  Lynott, 
5  R.  I.  295;  Shoohn  v.  Com.  106 
Pa.  St.  369;  New  York  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Walden,  12  Johns,  (N.  Y.), 
519.  See,  also,  Ames  v.  Cannon 
River  Mfg.  Co.  27  Minn.  245,  6 
N.  W.  787;  Follmer  v.  McGinley,  146 
Pa.  St.  517,  23  Atl.  393;  Anderson 
v.  Avis,  62  Fed.  227;  Bonner  v. 
Herrick,  99  Pa.  St.  225;  Sindram 
v.  P.  88  N.  Y.  203;  Haines  v.  Mc- 
Laughlin,  135  U.  S.  584;  Ketchum 
v.  Ebert,  33  Wis.  611;  Knapp  v. 
Griffin,  140  Pa.  St.  604,  21  Atl.  449. 
Under  such  constitutional  provis- 
ion of  South  Carolina  it  is  error 
for  the  court  to  comment  on  the 
facts  in  charging  the  jury,  al- 
though the  evidence  is  not  dis- 
puted or  contradicted,  S.  v.  Can- 
non, 49  S.  Car.  550,  27  S.  E.  526. 


See,  generally,  cases  prohibiting 
comment  on  the  evidence  by  the 
court:  Winter  v.  Supreme  Lodge 
K.  P.  96  Mo.  App.  67,  68  S.  W. 
662;  City  of  Bonham  v.  Crider 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  27  S.  W.  419  (re- 
fused) ;  Hartshorns  v.  Byrne,  147 
111.  418,  35  N.  E.  622;  Rawls  v. 
S.  97  Ga.  186,  22  S.  E.  529;  Ware 
v.  S.  96  Ga.  349,  23  S.  E.  410; 
Com.  v.  Flynn,  165  Mass.  153,  42 
N.  E.  562;  P.  v.  Brow,  35  N.  Y.  S. 
1009,  90  Hun,  509;  Yarborough  v. 
S.  86  Ga.  396,  12  S.  E.  650. 

s  P.  v.  Hitchcock,  104  Cal.  482,  38 
Pac.  198;  S.  v.  Mitchell,  41  La.  Ann. 
1073,  6  So.  785;  Davis  v.  Elmore,  40 
S.  Car.  533,  19  S.  E.  204;  Shea  v. 
City  of  Muncie,  148  Ind.  14,  46  N. 
E.  138;  Norris  v.  Clinkscales,  47 
S.  Car.  488,  25  S.  E.  797.  Facts 
must  be  stated  hypothetically. 
Gable  v.  Rauch,  50  S.  Car.  95, 
27  S.  E.  555.  Rattlemiller  v. 
Stone,  28  Wash.  104,  68  Pac.  168; 
S.  v.  Means,  95  Me.  364,  50  Atl. 
30;  Ryan  v.  Los  Angeles  I.  &  C. 
S.  Co.  112  Cal.  244,  44  Pac.  471; 
Lagrone  v.  Timmerman,  46  S.  Car. 
372.  24  S.  E.  290;  S.  v.  Whittle, 
59  S.  Car.  "297,  37  S.  E.  923;  Thomp- 
son v.  Johnson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
58  S.  W.  1030;  Hamlin  v.  Treat, 
87  Me.  310,  32  Atl.  909.  See,  also, 
Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  v.  Mar- 


§    173  JURY   DETERMINE    THE    FACTS.  154 

of  the  constitutional  provision  which  confines  the  court  to  a 
statement  of  the  law,  to  charge  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  beyond, a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  testified 
to  a  certain  state  of  facts  (enumerating  them)  knowingly  and 
wilfully  he  is  guilty.6  But  where  the  facts  are  in  dispute,  or 
the  evidence  is  conflicting,  the  instructions  should  be  hypothetical 
in  form,  that  is,  they  should  state  the  law  upon  a  supposed 
state  of  facts  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.7  But  where  the 
evidence  clearly  and  conclusively  shows  without  dispute  that 
a  material  averment  or  fact  is  true  it  is  error  to  submit  the 
same  to  the  jury  hypothetically  as  though  it  were,  in  dispute.8 

A  fact  which  is  admitted  or  undisputed  by  the  parties  should 
not  be  submitted  for  the  jury  to  determine.9  For  to  call  upon 
the  jury  to  decide  whether  an  undisputed  fact  is  or  is  not 
proved  is  to  mislead  them  to  the  supposition  that  they  may 
find  either  way  when  the  evidence  warrants  but  one  conclusion.10 

§173.  Instructing  that  "evidence  tends  to  show." — It  is  not 
error  for  the  court  in  reciting  the  substance  of  the  testimony 
to  say  "the  evidence  tends  to  show"  a  certain  fact.  The  use 
of  such  expression  does  not  imply  an  opinion  of  the  court  on 

tin,    111   111.    219;    Ladd   v.    Pigott,  proposition  hypothetically  need  not 

114   111.   647,   2   N.   E.   503;    Morgan  make  reference  to  the  evidence,  by 

v.   Wattles,   69   Ind.   260;    O'Connell  the  use  of  the  words  "from  the  ev- 

v.   St.   Louis   C.   &   W.   R.   Co.    106  idence  in  the  case"). 

Mo.  482,  17  S.  W.  494.  8  Galveston    H.    &    S.    A.    R.    Co. 

6  P.    v.    Hitchcock,    104    Cal.    482,  v.  Dyer   (Tex.   Cv.   App.),  38  S.  W. 
38  Pac.  198;  S.  v.  Fetterer,  65  Conn.  218;    Houston    &    T.    C.    R.    Co.    v. 
287,  32  Atl.  394.  But  see  P.  v.  Land-  Harion    (Tex.   Cv.   App.),   54   S.   W. 
man,  103  Cal.  577,  37  Pac.  518;  P.  v.  629;    Galveston,   H.   &  S.   A.  R.   Co. 
Hertz,  105  Cal.  660,  39  Pac.  32.  v.    Thompson    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    44 

7  Sherman   v.   Dutch,   16   111.   282;  S.   W.   8;    Scroggins   v.   S.   120  Ala. 
Wall    v.    Goodenough,    16    111.    415;  369,    25    So.    180.      See    Johnson    v. 
Gowen  v.  Kehoe,  71  111.  66;   Eames  International    &    G.     Co.     24    Tex. 
v.    Blackhart,    12    111.    195;     Cham-  Cv.   App.   148,   57   S.   W.    869;    Win- 
bers    v.    P.    105    111.    409;    Bond    v.  ters    v.    Mowrer,    163    Pa.    St.    239, 
P.    39    111.    26;     Bartling    v.    Behr-  29  Atl.   916;    Texas  &  P.   R.   Co.   v. 
'ends,    20   Neb.    211,   29    N.    W.    472;  Moore,    8    Tex.    Cv.    App.    289.    27 
Wilson   v.   Williams,   52   Miss.   487;  S.  W.   962. 

Linville  v.   Welch,   29  Mo.   203;    P.  »  Winkler   v.    Winkler    (Tex.    Cv. 

v.   Levison,   16  Cal.  98;    Stillwell  v.  App.),    26    S.    W.    893. 

Gray,  17  Ark.  473;  Dodge  v.  Brown,  *°  Hawk  v.  Brownell.  120  111.  161, 

22   Mich.   446;    Bartley  v.  Williams,  165,    11    N.    E.    416.      See    Schmidt 

66    Pa.    St.    329;    Hopkinson    v.    P.  v.   Pfau,   114   111.   494,   503,   2   N.   E. 

18   111.   264.     See  Belt  v.   P.   97   111.  522. 

473  (an  instruction  stating  a  legal 


155  COMPETENCY    OF    EVIDENCE — INTIMATING   OPINION.  §    174 

the  weight  of  the  evidence.11  Or  to  charge  that  "there  is 
some  evidence  tending  to  show"  a  certain  fact  is  not  error  as 
a  comment  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.12  Nor  is  it  improper 
to  instruct  the  jury  that  a  party  claims  that  a  certain  fact 
is  shown  by  the  evidence.13  The  respective  claims  of  the  parties 
may  be  stated,  when  fairly  done,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a 
proper  application  of  the  law  to  facts  in  evidence.14 

§  174.    Competency  of  evidence — Is  there  any  evidence? — But 

the  court  must  determine  whether  there  is  any  evidence  for  the 
consideration  of  the  jury,  tending  to  prove  an  issue  or  fact  in- 
volved ;  and,  of  course,  if  there  is  no  evidence  the  court  may, 
as  a  matter  of  law,  instruct  to  that  effect  without  invading  the 
province  of  the  jury.15  And  whether  evidence  is  competent  or 
not  must  be  determined  by  the  court.16  "Where  there  is  no  evi- 
dence tending  to  prove  a  fact  the  court  may  instruct  the  jury 
to  disregard  such  fact.17  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  is  any 
evidence  tending  to  prove  a  material  fact  in  issue  an  instruc- 
tion stating  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  such  fact  is  improper, 
as  invading  the  province  of  the  jury.18  The  court  cannot,  as  a 
matter  of  law,  instruct  the  jury  what  constitutes  prima  facie 
evidence  of  a  fact  unless  the  law  so  provides.19 

11  Lewis  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  S.  Car.  546,  40  S.  E.  948;  Underwood 
132  N.  Car.  382,  43  S.  E.  919;  Gra-  v.  American  Mortg.  Co.  97  Ga.  238, 
ham  v.  Nowlin,  54  Ind.  389;  S.  v.  24  S.  E.  847;  P.  v.  Welch,  49  Cal. 
Watkins,  11  Nev.  30;  P.  v.  Flan-  174;  P.  v.  Sternberg,  111  Cal.  3, 
nelly,  128  Cal.  83,  60  Pac.  670.  Oon-  48  Pac.  198  (accomplice);  .Wells  v. 
tra:  S.  v.  Donovan,  61  Iowa,  369,  Clements,  48  N.  Car.  168;  Willis 
16  N.  E.  206;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Branch,  94  N.  Car.  142;  S.  v. 
v.  Ohristman,  65  Tex.  369.  Banks,  48  Ind.  197;  Lange  v.  Wei- 
is.  Michie  v.  Cochran,  93  Va.  614,  gan,  125  Mich.  647,  85  N.  W.  109. 
25  So.  884;  S.  v.  Brown,  28  Ore.  i«  International  Farmer's  Live 
147,  41  Pac.  1042.  See  S.  v.  Ed-  Stock  Ins.  Co.  v.  Byrkett  (Ind. 
wards,  126  N.  Car.  1051,  35  S.  E.  App.),  36  N.  E.  779. 
540;  P.  v.  Wong  Ah  Foo,  69  Cal.  IT  Lange  v.  Weigan,  125  Mich. 
180,  10  Pac.  375.  647,  85  N.  W.  109. 

is  Hawley    v.    Chicago    B.    &    Q.  is  Hunter   v.    Third    Ave.    R.    Co. 

R.  Co.  71  Iowa,  717,  29  N.  W.  787.  45    N.    Y.    S.    1044,    20    Misc.    432; 

i*  Minims  v.    S.   16   Ohio  St.   234.  Jones  v.  Cleveland,  6  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

IB  Com.  v.  Mulrey,  170  Mass.  103,  640;    S.  v.  Horton  L.  &  L.  Co.  161 

49    N.    E.    91;    Kent   v.    S.    64    Ark.  Mo.    664;     Cederson    v.    Oregon    R. 

247,    41   S.   W.    849;    King   v.    King,  &  N.  Co.  38  Ore.  343,  62  Pac.  637,  63 

155    Mo.    406,    56    S.    W.    534;    S.    v.  Pac.  763. 

Gibbons,    10    Iowa,    117;    Pepperall  19  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Byars, 

v.    City   P.    Tr.    Co.    15   Wash.    176,  58    Ark.    108,    23    S.    W.    583.      See 

45    Pac.    743;    Bryce    v.    Cayce,    62  Wheeler  v.   Schroeder,  4  R.   I.   383. 


§  175  JURY  DETERMINES  THE  FACTS.  156 

§  175.  Intimating  opinion  is  improper. — The  giving  of  instruc- 
tions which  intimate  what  the  judge  of  the  court  believes  the 
evidence  establishes  as  to  any  of  the  material  facts  in  issue  is 
improper,  it  being  the  province  of  the  jury,  and  not  the  court, 
to  determine  the  facts.20  The  expression  of  an  opinion  by  the 
court  as  to  what  has  been  proved  by  the  evidence  is  not  only 
improper,  but  erroneous.21  Especially  is  it  improper  for  the 
court,  by  instructions,  to  express  any  opinion  upon  any  com- 
bination of  facts  which  does  not  embrace  every  contrary  hy- 
pothesis which  the  evidence  tends  to  establish.22  And  although 
the  court's  opinion  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence  may  be  cor- 
rect as  expressed,  that  will  not  cure  the  mischief.23 

§  176.  Opinion  not  intimated — Illustrations. — An  instruction 
that  if  the  plaintiff  by  his  negligence  contributed  to  his  injury, 
so  that  but  for  it  he  would  not  have  been  hurt,  the  jury  should 
find  for  the  defendant,  is  not  objectionable  as  invading  the  pro- 
vince of  the  jury.24  A  charge  that  "if  the  agent  of  the  de- 
fendant knew  at  the  time  of  the  delivery  of  the  certificate  or 
policy  of  insurance  whether  the  party  was  sick  or  not,  and  knew 
he  was  sick  and  delivered  the  policy,  then  it  would  be  a  waiver; 
that  a  waiver  implies  the  idea  that  one  has  a  right,  and,  with 
knowledge  of  his  rights  and  that  which  might  defeat  his  rights, 
does  an  act  by  which  he  waives  the  right  to  stand  upon  his 
legal  position  or  his  legal  right,"  is  not  a  charge  on  the  testi- 
mony.25 

A  charge  in  substance  stating  that  direct  evidence  is  not  es- 
sential to  prove  fraud,  but  that  it  may  be  inferred  from  all  the 

20  S.    v.    Allen,    45    W.    Va.    65,  2A  So.  188;  Dorsey  v.  S.  110  Ga.  331, 
30    S.    E.    209;    Coon    v.    P.    99    111.  35   S.   E.  651;    Searles  v.   S.   97  •  Ga. 
368;    Martin  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  692,   25   S.   E.    388;    Ezell   v.    S.    103 
43    S.    W.    91;    Yundt   v.    Hartrunft,  Ala.    8,    15    So.    818;    Florida    C.    & 
41     111.     14;     Highway     Comrs.     v.  P.    R.    Co.    v.    Lucas,    110   Ga.    121, 
Highway    Comr.     60     111.     58;     An-  35    S.    E.    283. 

rlrews   v.    P.    60   111.    354,   357;    Cut-  22  Weyrich    v.    P.    89    111.    99. 

ter    v.    Callison,    72    111.    113,    117;  23  Acme   Brewing   Co.    v.    Central 

Citizens'    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Burke,    98  R.   &  B.   Co.  115  Ga.   494,  42   S.   E. 

Tenn.  650,  40  S.  W.  1085;  Williams  8;    S.    v.    Hyde,    20    Wash.    234,    55 

v.    S.    46   Neb.    704,   65    N.    W.    783;  Pac.    49. 

Hine     v.     Commercial     Bank,     119  24  Campbell  v.  McCoy,  3  Tex.  Cv. 

Mich.   448,   78   N.   W.   471;    Thread-  App.   298,   23   S.   W.    34. 

gill  v.   Commissioners,  116  N.   Car.  25  Rollings  v.   Banker's  Union  of 

616,  21  S.  E.  425;   Davis  v.  Dregne,  the  World,  63  S.  Car.  192,  41  S.  E. 

(Wis.),  97  N.  W.  512.  90. 

21  S.  v.  Hopkins,  50  La.  Ann.  1171, 


157  COURT  INTIMATING  OPINION.  §    176 

facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case ;  and  that  if  the  jury  believe 
certain  facts  (enumerating  them)  they  will  find  that  there  was 
a  fraudulent  conveyance,  is  not  objectionable  as  telling  the  jury 
that  fraud  has  been  established.26  A  charge  stating  that  "if 
the  truth  comes  from  the  lips  of  a  negro  you  are  bound  to  be- 
lieve it  just  as  much  as  if  it  comes  from  the  lips  of  a  white 
man"  is  not  a  charge  on  the  evidence.27  Telling  the  jury  that 
they  may  ' '  consider  what  influence,  if  any,  the  passing  of  the 
engine  would  have  upon  the  mind  and  conduct  of  a  prudent 
person  placed  as  the  plaintiff  was,"  was  held  not  an  improper 
comment  on  the  evidence.28 

In  determining  whether  the  employes  in  charge  of  an  engine 
at  the  time  it  was  approaching  a  public  crossing  were  exercising 
ordinary  care,  .or  were  guilty  of  negligence,  an  instruction  stat- 
ing that  the  jury  might  consider  the  rate  of  speed  of  the  engine, 
the  signals,  if  any  were  given,  the  place  of  the  accident,  and  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  as  to  the  movement  and  manage- 
ment of  the  train,  is  not  erroneous,  but  rather  a  proper  guide 
to  aid  the  jury  in  determining  what  would,  under  the  circum- 
stances, constitute  negligence.29  In  an  action  for  assault  and 
battery,  for  the  court  to  instruct  that  the  plaintiff's  injuries  are 
either  very  severe  and  serious,  or  very  slight  and  that  the 
plaintiff  is  shamming,  has  been  held  not  to  be  error  where 
the  evidence  showed  that  the  plaintiff  had  either  become  a  men- 
tal wreck  frem  the  alleged  assault,  or  that  he  was  in  fact  sham- 
ming and  practicing  a  fraud.30 

The  court  by  instructing  the  jury  that  the  case  is  "one  mostly 
of  positive  testimony"  does  not  by  such  statement  express  an 
opinion  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence,  where,  in  fact,  the  evidence 
is  mostly  positive.31  A  remark  by  the  court  that  "I  will  allow 
any  testimony  that  will  tend  to  elucidate  the  facts  in  this  case," 
cannot  be  held  objectionable  as  intimating  an  opinion  of  the 
court  on  the  weight  or  value  of  the  testimony.32 

26  Alberger    v.    White,    117    Mo.  so  Spear  v.  Sweeney,  88  Wis.  545, 
347,    23    S.    W.    92.  60    N.    W.    1060. 

27  McDaniels    v.     Monroe,    63    S.  ai  S.    v.   Burns,    19   Wash.    52,   52 
Car.    307,   41   S.   B.    456.  Pac.    316. 

28  Baker  v.   Kansas   City,  &c.   R.  32  Hoxie    v.    S.    114    Ga.    19,    39 
Co.  147  Mo.  140,  48  S.  W.  838.  S.  E.   944. 

29  Lloyd  v.   St.   Louis,  I.  M.   &  S. 
R.   Co.   128   Mo.   595,   31  S.   W.   110. 


§  177  JURY  DETERMINE  THE  FACTS.  158 

§  177.  Opinion  intimated — Illustrations. — For  the  court  to 
charge  the  jury  that  the  contract  in  question  is  conceded,  when 
in  fact  it  was  denied,  is  error,  although  the  jury  may  have  been 
recalled  by  the  court  and  informed  that  the  court  was  in  error, 
that  counsel  says  that  the  court  instructed  wrong.33  An  in- 
struction charging  the  jury  to  give  more  weight  to  one  kind  of 
evidence  than  to  another  kind  is  improper,  especially  where  the 
evidence  is  conflicting.34  A  charge  that  if  the  jury  believe  the 
evidence  for  the  defendant  they  must  find  for  the  defendant  is 
erroneous  when  there  is  other  testimony  in  the  case.35  It  is  an 
improper  comment  on  the  evidence  for  the  court  to  charge  that 
"fraud  will  never  be  presumed  from  mere  obscurity,  or  ap- 
parent error  or  incorrectness  of  the  plaintiff's  valuation  of  his 
property"  in  a  suit  to  recover  on  an  insurance  policy  for  loss 
by  fire.36  Also,  in  an  action  against  a  railroad  company  for  the 
destruction  of  grass  by  fire,  charging  the  jury  that  they  may 
consider  the  fact  of  burning  by  other  fires  and  the  volume  and 
quantity  of  sparks  emitted  from  the  engine,  is  improper  as  in- 
vading the  province  of  the  jury  in  weighing  the  evidence.37 

For  the  court  to  charge  the  jury  that  if  the  defendants  were 
insolvent  and  unable  to  pay  for  goods  at  the  time  they  pur- 
chased them  an  intent  not  to  pay  for  them  should  be  presumed 
is  improper  as  charging  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.38  A 
charge  that  "if  the  bridge  was  defective  and  unsafe  on  account 
of  decay  of  the  timbers,  and  considering  the  length- of  time  the 
bridge  has  been  built,  this  condition  ought  to  have  been  an- 
ticipated and  known  by  the  officers  of  the  town,  using  ordinary 
care  and  precaution^'  is  an  invasion  of  the  duty  of  the  jury.3* 
Also  a  charge  stating  that  "there  is  evidence  showing  plain- 
tiff did  not  stop  the  cattle  before  going  upon  the  crossing"  is. 

33  Hawley  v.  Corey,  9  Utah,  175,         37  Galveston,   H.   &   S.   A.   R.   Co. 
33    Pac.    695.  v.    Knippa    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    27    S. 

34  Williams    v.    La   Penatiere,    32  W.   730;    Blashfield   Instructions,    § 
Fla.    491,    14    So.    157;    Wheeler    v.  47,  p.  111. 

Baars,  3'3  Fla.  696,  15  So.  584;  Bowie         38  Barton   v.    Strond-Gibson   Gro- 
v.  Maddox,  29  Ga.  286.  eery  Co.   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  40  S.  W. 

35  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice,      1050. 

101    Ala.    676,    14    So.    639.  39  Bredlau  v.   Town  of  York,  115 

36  F.     Dohmen     Co.     v.     Niagara      Wis.  554,  92  N.  W.  261. 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  96  Wis.  38,  71  N.  W. 

69. 


159  COURT  INTIMATING  OPINION — CRIMINAL  CASES.  §    178 

erroneous,  as  it  is  the  exclusive  province  of  the  jury  to  find 
what  is  shown  by  the  evidence.40 

§  178.  Opinion  not  intimated — Criminal  cases. — The  expres- 
sion of  an  opinion  by  the  court  that  there  is  no  evidence  tending 
to  reduce  the  charge  of  murder  to  manslaughter  affords  no 
ground  for  complaint  where  the  jury  are  further  instructed 
that  the  facts  were  to  be  determined  by  them  from  the  evi- 
dence, and  not  by  the  court.41  A  charge  that  if  the  jury  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  wilfully  struck 
another  with  a  pistol  which  was  a  deadly  weapon,  or  calculated 
to  produce  death,  when  used  in  the  way  and  manner  the  same 
was  used,  is  not  improper  as  taking  from  the  jury  the  duty  of 
determining  whether  the  pistol  was  a  deadly  weapon,  consider- 
ing the  manner  in  which  it  was  used  by  the  defendant.42  An 
instruction  stating  in  substance  that  if  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant  took  hold  of  the  prosecutrix 
and  tore  open  her  coat,  and  seized  her  arm  with  intent  to  have 
carnal  knowledge  of  her  against  her  will  and  with  the  intent 
to  accomplish  his  object  at  all  events,  without  regard  to  any 
resistance  she  might  make,  he  is  guilty  of  assault  with  intent 
to  commit  rape,  is  not  an  invasion  of  the  province  of  the  jury.4a 

A  charge  that  "innocent  men,  men  conscious  of  innocency,  do 
not  have  much  occasion  to  fear  a  grand  jury,  and  it  is  rather 
unusual,  I  think  you  will  say  in  your  own  experience,  that 
men  who  are  conscious  of  having  committed  no  offense  either 
to  fear  an  indictment  or  to  undertake  to  get  out  of  the  juris- 
diction when  a  grand  jury  is  sitting,"  was  held  not  to  be  the 
expression  of  an  opinion  by  the  court  in  violation  of  a  statute 
prohibiting  the  court  from  expressing  an  opinion  during  the 
trial.44  An  instruction  charging  that  the  jury  may  disregard 
any  testimony  which  they  believe  from  the  evidence  to  be  false, 
is  proper  where  the  evidence  is  conflicting.45  And  where  the 
testimony  of  the  witnesses  for  the  defense  is  controverted  by 

40  Kinyon    v.    Chicago    &    N.    W.  43  s.    v.    Urie,    101    Iowa,    411,    70 

R.    Co.    118    Iowa,    349,    92    N.    W.  N.   W.   603. 

40.  44  S.    v.    Means,    95    Me.    364,    50 

•ti  Com.   v.   McGowan,   189   Pa.   St.  Atl.  30.     See  Adams  v.   S.   133  Ala. 

641,   42   Atl.   365.  166,  31  So.  851. 

42  Smallwood  v.  Com.  19  Ky.  L.  R.  45  3.   v.   Goforth,   136   Mo.   Ill,   37 

344,  40  S.  W.  248.  S.    W.    801;    Allen   v.   U.    S.    164   U. 

S.    492,   17    Sup.    Ct.    154. 


§    179  JURY    DETERMINE   THE    FACTS.  160 

the  prosecution  it  is  not  improper  to  instruct  that  if  the  jury 
believe  the  defendant  has  knowingly  introduced  false  testimony 
this  fact  may  be  considered  as  tending  to  show  his  guilt.46 

Charging  the  jury  that  if  they  believe  the  evidence  intro- 
duced by  the  state  to  be  true  it  is  their  duty  to  convict  the 
defendant,  if  such  evidence  establishes  his  guilt  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt,  is  not  improper  where  the  jury  are  also  instructed 
as  to  what  is  meant  by  a  reasonable  doubt.47  Or  that  if  the 
jury  believe  the  testimony  of  the  defendant  as  given  by  him 
in  his  own  behalf  they  may  convict  him  where  the  evidence 
otherwise  justifies  the  giving  of  such  an  instruction.48 

§  179.  Opinion  intimated — Criminal  cases. — A  charge  that 
"the  flight  of  a  person  suspected  of  a  crime  is  a  circumstance 
to  be  weighed  by  the  jury  as  tending  in  some  degree  to  prove 
a  consciousness  of  guilt,  and  is  entitled  to  more  or  less  weight, 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case  in  which 
such  evidence  is  received,  not  as  a  part  of  the  doing  of  the 
criminal  act  itself,  but  as  indicative  of  a  guilty  mind;  that  at 
most  it  is  but  a  circumstance  tending  to  establish  a  conscious- 
ness of  guilt  in  the  person  fleeing,"  is  erroneous  as  on  the 
weight  of  the  evidence.49  So  to  instruct  that  if  the  testimony 
of  a  witness  is  true  then  the  defendant  is  guilty,  is  improper  as 
being  an  invasion  of  the  province  of  the  jury  where  it  appears 
from  the  evidence  that  such  witness  did  not  see  the  crime  com- 
mitted by  the  defendant.50 

Charging  the  jury  that  "the  evidence  as  to  stolen  property — 
as  to  recovering  possession  of  any  property — was  introduced 
by  the  £tate  to  show  that  the  defendant  had  possession  of 
stolen  property,  and  is  only  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  the  crime 
on  him,"  is  improper  as  intimating  an  opinion  of  the  court.51 

In  a  homicide  case  an  instruction  which  states  that  if  the 
defendant  inflicted  the  blow  designedly  he  will  be  presumed  to 

"  Allen   v.   U.   S.   164  U.    S.   492,  •»»  S.    v.    Woolard,    119    N.     Car. 

17  Sup.   Ct.   154;    S.  v.   Magoon,   68  779,    25    S.    E.    719. 

Vt.  289,  35   All.  310.     Contra:    Ter.  « Cleavenger    v.    S.    43    Tex.    Cr. 

v.   Lucero    (N.  Mex.),   46  Pac.   18.  App.   273,   65  S.  W.   89. 

47  Derby  v.  S.  60  N.  J.  L.  258,  37  so  s.  v.  Green,  48  S.  Car.  136,  26 

Atl.    614.     See    S.    v.    Green,    48    S.  S.    E.    234. 

Car.  136,  26  S.  E.  234.  si  Seals    v.    S.    97    Ga.    692,    25    S. 

E.  388. 


161  RELATING  TO  DYING  DECLARATIONS.  §  181 

have  intended  the  probable  consequences  of  his  act  is  erroneous 
in  that  it  invades  the  province  of  the  jury.52  Also,  telling 
the  jury  that  certain  facts  (enumerating  them)  or  circumstances 
do  not  prove  the  guilt  of  the  defendant  is  improper  as  an 
invasion  of  the  province  of  the  jury  when  such  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances, together  with  other  evidence,  tend  to  prove  the 
defendant's  guilt.53 

§  180.  Instructions  as  to  dying  declarations. — The  admissi- 
bility  of  a  dying  declaration  is  a  question  exclusively  for  the 
court  to  determine,  but  its  credibility  is  for  the  jury,  and  the 
court  should  so  instruct  the  jury;54  hence  the  court  cannot 
instruct  as  to  the  weight  of  such  statements.55  Dying  declara- 
tions should  be  weighed  by  the  ordinary  rules  governing  the 
admission  of  other  evidence;  hence  an  instruction  that  "this  kind 
of  evidence  is  not  so  satisfactory  as  the  evidence  of  the  wit- 
nesses upon  the  witness-stand,  and  should,  therefore,  be  care- 
fully scrutinized"  is  improper  as  discrediting  and  casting  sus- 
picion upon  such  evidence.08 

An  instruction  that  dying  declarations  are  not  entitled  to  the 
same  weight  as  would  be  the  testimony  of  the  deceased  were 
he  present  in  court  and  testifying  as  a  witness  is  properly  re- 
fused as  being  an  improper  comment  upon  the  weight  of  the 
evidence.57  Also,  a  charge  that  dying  declarations  should  be 
received  with  great  caution  is  likewise  improper.58  Where  the 
deceased,  in  his  dying  statement,  positively  declared  that  the 
defendant  shot  him;  that  he  knew  it,  because  he  was  very 
near  to  him  at  the  time,  an  instruction  submitting  to  the  jury 
whether  such  statement  was  merely  an  opinion,  and  if  so,  it 
should  not  be.  considered  as  evidence,  is  erroneous.59 

§  181.  Inferences  and  conclusions  are  for  the  jury. — It  is  not 
within  the  province  of  the  court  by  instruction  to  tell  the  jury 

52  pt.   v.   Martin,  53  N.  Y.   S.   745,          ne  Shenkenberger    v.    S.    154    Ind. 
33   App.    Div.   282.  630,   639,    57   N.    E.    519. 

53  Wilson    v.    S.  71   Mies.    880,    16          57  s.   v.   Reed,  137  Mo.   125,  38  S. 
So.    304.  W.    574. 

5*  S.  v.  Phillips,  118  Iowa,  660,  ss  s.  v.  Gay,  18  Mont.  51,  44  Pac. 

92  N.  W.  876.  411. 

"  p.  v.  Amaya,  134  Cal.  531,  66  »»  Allen  v.  S.  70  Ark.  22,  68  S. 

Pac.  794.  W.  28. 


§  182  JURY  DETERMINE  THE  FACTS.  162 

that  an  ultimate  fact  is  established  from  the  proof  of  certain 
evidentiary  facts;  that  is,  that  if  certain  facts  (enumerating 
them)  are  established  then  the  ultimate  fact  is  proved.  To 
so  instruct  would  be  invading  the  province  of  the  jury.60  What 
inferences  may  be  drawn  from  the  evidence  should  be  left  en- 
tirely to  the  jury  without  any  intimation  by  the  court  in  that 
respect.01  In  Massachusetts  it  has  been  held  not  to  be  error  for 
the  court,  in  commenting  on  the  evidence,  to  state  that  it  has  a 
tendency  to  prove  or  is  prima  facie  proof  of  a  fact;  that  such 
charge  is  not  a  direction  to  the  jury  to  find  such  fact,  but 
merely  that  an  inference  of  such  fact  would  be  supported  by 
the  evidence.62  But  where  a  presumption  of  law  arises  from 
the  existence  of  certain  facts  then  the  court  is  authorized  to 
instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  inference  to  be  drawn  in  the  event 
the  evidence  establishes  the  necessary  facts  to  constitute  the 
basis  of  such  presumption.63  But  it  is  not  proper  for  the  court 
by  instruction  to  say  that  the  evidence  admits  of  only  one  par- 
ticular construction.  It  is  for  the  jury  to  draw  their  own  con- 
clusions from  the  evidence — what  it  proves  or  does  not  prove.6* 

§  182.    Weight  of  evidence  is  for  the  jury  to  determine. — The 

weight  of  the  evidence  must  be  determined  by  the  jury ;  hence  it 
is  improper  for  the  court  to  instruct  that  certain  facts  are  en- 
titled to  little  weight.05  "Whether  circumstances  shown  in  evi- 
dence are  entitled  to  any  weight  or  not  is  purely  a  matter  for 

eo  Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v.  62  Cormody    v.    Boston    Gaslight 

Warner,   123   111.   49,  14  N.  E.   206;  Co.   162   Mass.   539,  39   N.  E.   184. 

Mayer  v.   Wilkins,   37   Fla.   244,   19  ss  Wheeler  v.   Schroeder,  4  R.   I. 

So.   639    (fraud).  383. 

ei  Omaha  Fair  &  E.  Asso.  v.  Mis-  e-*  Langdon  v.   P.   133   111.   408,   24 

souri   Pac.   R.   Co.   42   Neb.    105,    60  N.   E.  874;    Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co. 

N.    W.    330;    City    of    Columbus    v.  v.    O'Conner,    119    111.    598,    9    N.    E. 

Strassner,    138    Ind.    301,    37    N.    E.  263;     McQuay    v.    Richmond    &    D. 

719;    Howard  v.   Carpenter,   22   Md.  R.    Co.    109    N.    Car.    585,    13    S.    E. 

10;  Bluedorn  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  944;    Burkham    v.    Mastin,    54    Ala. 

(Mo.),  24  S.  W.  57;   Clifford  v.  Lee  122. 

(Tex.    Cv.    App.),    23    S.    W.    843;  65  Smith    v.    Meyers,    52    Neb.    70, 

Louisville,    N.    A.    &    C.    R.    Co.    v  71    N.    W.    1006;    Bonner  v.    S.    107 

Falvey,    104    Ind.    409;    Brownell    v.  Ala.   97,   18  So.   226;    Granby  M.   & 

Fuller,  60  Neb.  558,  83  N.  W.  669;  S.  Co.  v.  Davis,  156  Mo.  422,  57  S. 

Cain  v.   Hunt,   41   Ind.   466;    Union  W.     126;     Knowles    v.     Nixon,     17 

M.    L.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Buchanan,    100  Mont.    473,    43    Pac.    628;    Davis    v. 

Ind.  81;   Shultz  v.  Shultz,  113  Mich.  Hays,    89   Ala.    563,   8   So.   131    (full 

502,  71  N.  W.   854;    S.  v.  Mahoney,  weight). 
24  Mont.   281,   61   Pac.   647. 


163 


WEIGHT   OF   EVIDENCE — NEGLIGENCE   A   FACT. 


183 


the  jury  to  determine;  hence  it  is  improper  for  the  court  to  say 
that  the  jury  must  give  weight  to  certain  circumstances."0  The 
weight  of  the  evidence  is  a  matter  exclusively  for  the  jury,  and 
it  is  not  within  the  province  of  the  court  by  instructions  to  in- 
timate anything  on  the  subject.67  In  testing  the  truth  and 
weight  of  evidence,  and  what  it  proves,  the  jury  must  do  so 
by  their  knowledge  and  judgment  derived  from  experience, 
observation  and  reflection.  They  are  not  bound  to  regard  evi- 
dence precisely  as  given,  but  must  consider  its  truth  and  weight 
by  their  knowledge  of  men  and  the  business  affairs  of  life,  to- 
gether with  the  motives  which  influence  men.68 

§  183.  Negligence — When  a  question  of  fact,  when  of  law. 
Where  the  question  of  negligence  is  an  element  of  the  case 
it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  from  all  the  evidence  whether  the 
party  charged  with  negligence  is  guilty  or  not.  The  court 
cannot  say  by  instructions  that  a  certain  fact  or  state  of  facts, 
constitute  negligence.69  For  to  say  to  the  jury  as  a  matter  of 
law  that  certain  facts  per  se  constitute  negligence  is  improper. 


ee  Moody  v.  S.  114  Ga.  449,  40 
S.  E.  242.  See  Dickenson  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  63  S.  W.  328; 
Phillips  v.  Williams,  39  Ga.  602; 
Marr  v.  Marr,  5  Sneed  (Term.), 
385. 

67  Richmond  v.  Roberts,  98  111. 
472,  479;  Village  of  Fairbury  v. 
Rogers,  98  111.  554;  Johnson  v.  S. 
(Miss.),  27  So.  880;  Stobie  v.  Dills, 
62  111.  432,  438;  Rice  &  Bullen  Mat- 
ting Co.  v.  International  Bank,  185 
111.  422,  56  N.  E.  1062;  City  of  Dal- 
las v.  Breeman,  23  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
315,  55  S.  W.  762;  Granby  Min- 
ing &  Smelting  Co.  v.  Davis,  156 
Mo.  422,  57  S.  W.  126;  Hull  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  138  Mo.  618,  39  S.  W. 
446;  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Burke, 
98  Tenn.  650;  Bunting  v.  Saltz,  84 
Cal.  168,  24  Pac.  167;  S.  v.  Wyse,  32 
S.  Car  45,  40  S.  W.  1085;  Harts- 
horn v.  Byrne,  147  111.  418,  35  N.  E. 
622;  Kinney  v.  North  Carolina  R. 
Co.  122  N.  Car.  961,  30  S.  E.  318; 
Short  v.  Kelly  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  62 
S.  W.  944;  Canado  v.  Curry,  73  Ind. 
246  (stating  that  testimony  is  even- 
ly balanced);  S.  v.  Swayne,  30  La. 
Ann.  1323;  Bardwell  v.  Ziegler,  3 


Wash.  34,  28  Pac.  360;  McVeigh  v.  S. 
43  Tex.  Cv.  App.  17,  62  S.  W.  757; 
Leonard  v.  Ter.  2  Wash.  Ter.  381 
(disproving  circumstances),  7  Pac. 
872;  Burkham  v.  Martin,  54  Ala. 
122  (stating  that  the  evidence  is 
conclusive) ;  Jenkins  v.  Tobin,  31 
Ark.  307;  Wolcott  v.  Heath,  78  111. 
433. 

es  Ottawa  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co. 
v.  Graham,  28  111.  73,  78;  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Krayenbuhl 
(Neb.),  91  N.  W.  880.  See  Sanford 
v.  Gates,  38  Kas.  405,  16  Pao.  807. 

69  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  McCaffrey. 
173  111.  175,  50  N.  E.  713;  Chicago 
&  Alton  R.  Co.  v.  Maroney,  170 
111.  526,  48  N.  E.  953;  City  of  Peoria 
v.  Gerber,  168  111.  323,  48  N.  E. 
152;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  140  111.  281,  29  N.  E. 
672;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Slater, 
139  111.  199,  28  N.  E.  830;  Lake  S. 
&  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Conner,  115  111. 
254,  262,  3  N.  E.  501;  Taylor  v. 
Felsing,  164  III.  331,  338,  45  N.  E. 
161;  New  York  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Blumenthal,  160  111.  40,  49,  43  N. 
E.  809;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Keefe,  154  ill.  508,  514,  39  N.  E. 


§  183  JURY  DETERMINE  THE  FACTS.  164 

Negligence  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  proved  like  any  other  fact 
in  issue.  But,  of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  definition 
of  negligence  is  a  question  of  fact.70 

Courts  are  not  at  liberty  to  say,  as  a  matter  of  law,  by  in- 
structions that  a  person  must  conduct  himself  in  a  particular 
manner  and  observe  a  certain  line  of  conduct  under  all  circum- 
stances. Negligence  does  not  become  a  question  of  law  alone, 
unless  the  acts  constituting  it  are  of  such  a  character  that  all 
reasonable  men  would  concur  in  pronouncing  it  so.71  Nor  can 
the  court  tell  the  jury  what  does  not  constitute  negligence,  as 
by  instructing  "that  the  mere  fact  that  a  drawbar  of  a  car 
should  break  when  struck  by  another  car  in  motion  is  not  suf- 
ficent  to  establish  negligence."  It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine 
whether  the  facts  proved  do  or  do  not  constitute  negligence.72 
Nor  has  the  court  the  right  to  charge,  where  negligence  is  an 
element,  that  if  all  the  evidence  be  believed  the  plaintiff  cannot 
recover,  where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  plaintiff  has  made 
out  a  prima  facie  case.  The  weight  of  the  evidence  is  for  the 
jury  to  determine.73 

On  the  same  principle  it  is  improper  for  the  court  to  state 
to  the  jury  that  if  a  person  gets  upon  a  street  car  drawn  by 
horses,  while  it  is  in  motion,  his  act  is  such  conclusive  proof  of 
contributory  negligence  that  he  cannot  recover  for  an  injury 

606;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Byrum,  W.   25.     The   court  cannot  say   by 

153  111.  131,  135,  38  N.  E.  578;  East  instruction  what  facts  do  or  do  not 

St.  L.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Harra,  150  111.  constitute    fraud,    Leasure    v.    Col- 

580,  586,  37  N.  E.  917;  Chicago  &  A.  burn,     57     Ind.     274.     See    Higgin- 

R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  182  111.  167,  173,  54  botham    v.    Campbell,    85    Ga.    638, 

N.    E.    979;    Consolidated   Coal    Co.  11  S.  E.   1027;    Shealy  v.   Edwards, 

v.  B6kamp,  181  111.  9,  18,  54  N.  E.  75    Ala.    411;    nor   what   facts    con- 

567;    Gohn   v.    Doerle,    85    111.    514;  stitute    undue    influence    in    a   will 

Texas,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Nelson.  9  Tex.  contest,     Higginbotham  v.    Higgin- 

Cv.  App.  156,  29  S.  W.  78;   Chicago  botham,    106   Ala.    314,    17    So.    516; 

&   A.   R.   Co.   v.   Anderson,   162   111.  In    re    Townsend's    Estate    (Iowa), 

572,    46    N.    E.    1125;    San    Antonio  97    N.    W.    1111. 

&  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  4  Tex.  Cv.  ?i  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Pol- 

App.  497,  23  S.  W.  499;   Chesapeake  lock,  195  111.  162,  62  N.  E.  831. 

&  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Gunter,  108  Ky.  365,  72  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Wangslin, 

56   S.   W.   527;    Texas  C.   R.   Co.   v.  152    111.    141,    38   N.    E.    760;    North 

Burnett,  80  Tex.  536,  16  S.  W.  320.  C.   St.    R.    Co.    v.    Eldridge,   151   111. 

TO  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Conlan,  101  550,  38  N.  E.  246;    Galveston,  H.  & 

111.    106;      North    C.     St.    R.    Co.    v.  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Michalke,  14  Tex.  Cv. 

Williams,    140    111.    281.    29    N.    E.  App.   495,   37   3.  W.   480. 

672;    Houston    &    T.    C.    R.    Co.    v.  ™  Sherrill   v.   Western   N.   T.   Co. 

Hubbard     (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    37    S.  116  N.  Car.  655,  21  S.  E.  429. 


165  NEGLIGENCE  A   FACT — ILLUSTRATIONS.  §    184 

sustained  while  thus  getting  on  the  car.  It  is  not  negligence 
per  se  for  a  person  to  get  on  or  off  a  street  car  under  the  circum- 
stance stated.74  Nor  can  the  court  instruct  that  the  omission 
or  commission  of  a  certain  act  would  be  a  want  of  care  or  due 
caution.75  But  where  negligence  is  made  an  issue,  if  the  act  or 
conduct  of  the  party  charged  with  negligence,  or  whose  duty 
it  is  to  use  due  and  ordinary  care,  is  so  clearly  and  palpably 
negligent  that  all  reasonable  minds  would  pronounce  it  so  with- 
out hesitation  or  dissent,  then  the  court  may  state  to  the  jury 
by  instruction  that  such  act  constitutes  negligence.76  Also,  where 
the  admitted  facts  are  such  that  no  other  conclusion  could  be 
reached  than  that  of  negligence  it  then  becomes  a  question  of 
law.77 

§  184.  Instructions  improper — Illustrations. — Charging  the 
jury  that  if  the  defendant's  employes  negligently  backed  a 
freight  train  against  the  plaintiff  while  he  was  waiting  to  board 
a  passenger  train,  and  that  such  negligence  was  the  proximate 
cause  of  the  accident,  or  if  such  employes  negligently  failed  to 
ring  a  bell  or  blow  a  whistle,  and  such  negligence  was  the 
proximate  cause  of  the  injury,  or  if  such  employes  negligently 
backed  said  train  towards  a  crowd  of  people,  one  of  whom  was 
the  plaintiff,  without  a  lookout  on  it  to  give  notice  of  its  ap- 
proach, and  such  negligence  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the 
injury  to  the  plaintiff,  they  should  find  for  the  plaintiff,  unless 
he  was  guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  is  improper,  in  that  it 
invades  the  province  of  the  jury  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.78 

An  instruction  stating  that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  person  approach- 
ing a  railroad  crossing  to  exercise  ordinary  care,  and  if,  in  the 
exercise  of  such  care,  it  was  the  plaintiff's  duty  to  stop  before 

74  North    C.    St.    R.    Co.    v.   Will-          ™  Hoehn  v.  Chicago  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
iams,    140    111.    281,    29    N.    B.    672;  152  111.  229,  38  N.  E.  549;   Lake  S. 
McDonough  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  135  111. 
137  Mass.  210;  Eppendorff  v.  Brook-  647,    26   N.    E.    510;    Chicago,    B.    & 
lyn   City  &  N.   R.   Co.   69  N.   Y.   S.  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Pollock,  195  111.  162,  62 
195;    Briggs    v.    Union'  St.    R.    Co.  N.    E.    831;    Cleveland,    C.    &   C.    R. 
148  Mass.  72,  19  N.  E.  19;  German-  Co.  v.  Crawford,  24  Ohio  St.  636. 
town   Pass.   R.   Co.   v.   Walling,   97          77  Exchange    Bank    v.     Trumble, 
Pa.  St.  55;  Lubsenz  v.  Metropolitan  108  Ky.  234,  56  S.  W.  156. 

St.  R.  Co.  76  N.  Y.  S.  411,  72  App.  78  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Cas- 

Div.   181.  edy   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  40  S.  W.  198. 

75  Kirby    v.    Southern    R.    Co.    63  See  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones, 
S.   Car.   494,   41   S.   E.   765.  16  Tex.  Cv.  App.  179,  40  S.  W.  745. 


§  185  JURY  DETERMINE  THE  FACTS.  166 

t 

driving  up  on  the  railway  and  he  failed  to  do  so,  the  jury  should 
find  for  the  defendant;  and  so,  if  in  the  exercise  of  such  care, 
it  was  his  duty  to  look  and  listen  for  a  train  and  he  failed  to  do 
so,  they  should  find  for  the  defendant,  is  improper;  it  invades 
the  province  of  the  jury  in  determining  the  facts  and  the  weight 
of  the  evidence.79 

An  instruction  in  a  suit  for  personal  injury  which  charges 
the  jury  that  it  became  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  when  going 
upon  the  defendant's  cars  to  exercise  due  care  and  caution,  use 
her  eyes,  and  act  with  reasonable  care  and  judgment  for  her 
own  safety,  more  especially  if  she  found  the  car  unusually 
overcrowded  with  passengers,  is  erroneous ;  and  in  'lieu  of  it 
the  court  should  have  told  the  jury  that  it  was  incumbent  on 
the  plaintiff  while  on  the  car  to  exercise  such  care  and  cau- 
tion as  might  be  reasonably  expected  of  a  person  of  ordinary 
prudence  situated  as  she  was.80 

§  185.  Remarks  and  conduct  of  court  influencing-  jury.. — ' '  The 
influence  of  the  trial  judge  upon  the  jury  is  necessarily  great 
because  of  his  authoritative  position,  and  by  words  or  actions 
he  may  materially  prejudice  the  rights  of  a  party.  By  word 
or  conduct  he  may,  on  the  one  hand,  support  the  character  or 
testimony  of  a  witness,  or,  on  the  other,  may  destroy  the 
same,  in  the  estimation  of  the  jury,  and  thus  his  personal  in- 
fluence is  exerted  to  the  unfair  advantage  of  one  of  the  parties, 
with  a  corresponding  detriment  to  the  cause  of  the  others."81 

Where  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  says:  "When  you 
want  to  give  somebody  something  as  a  gift  you  take  it  out 
of  your  own  pocket,  and  not  out  of  the  pocket  of  some  one  else; 
in  other  words,  let  us  have  fair  play,"  it  invades  the  province 
of  the  jury.  Such  remark  amounts  to  telling  the  jury  that  a 
verdict  for  the  plaintiff  would  be  a  gift  from  the  defendant  to 
the  plaintiff.82  For  the  judge  to  state  to  the  jury  that  "it 
seems  to  me  that  the  plaintiff  has  made  out  the  better  case" 

79  Missouri,    K.    &    T.    R.    Co.    v.  en,  27  Cal.  320;  S.  v.  Harkin,  7  Nev. 

Rogers    (Tex.   Cv.   App.),   40  S.  W.  377;    Farhman    v.    City    of    Hunts- 

849.  ville,     54     Ala.     263;     Andreas     v. 

so  Davis  v.  Paducah  R.  &  L.  Co.  Ketcham,   77  111.  377. 

24  Ky.   135,  68  S.  W.  140.  82  Varner    v.    Western    &    A.    R. 

si  Blashfield    Instructions,    &c.    §  Co.  108  Ga.  813,  34  S.  E.  166. 
50,  p.  125.    Citing  McMinn  v.  Whal- 


1G7  COURT  URGING  JURY  TO  AGREE.  §  187 

is  error  where  the  evidence  is  such  as  would  warrant  a  verdict 
for  either  party.83  A  remark  by  the  court  that  ''it  is  some 
times  said  that  parties  cannot  conscientiously  agree  to  a  verdict, 
there  is  no  conscience  in  the  case,  it  is  simply  a  question  of 
judgment,"  was  held  erroneous  as  directing  the  jury  to  eliminate 
conscience.84  The  court  not  being  satisfied  with  the  amount 
of  damages  arrived  at  by  the  jury  for  the  plaintiff  on  a  charge 
of  fraud  asked  them  to  further  consider  the  question ;  and  shortly 
afterwards  they  returned  another  verdict  with  more  than  double 
the  amount  of  the  former  verdict.  This  was  held  error,  in 
view  of  the  fact  of  there  being  material  evidence  tending  to 
reduce  the  amount  of  damages  claimed.85 

§  186.  Instructions  urging  jury  to  agree. — It  is  not  error  for 
the  court  in  charging  the  jury  to  instruct  them  that  it  is  their 
duty  to  try  to  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  their  verdict.86  And 
so  the  court  may  properly  instruct  the  jury  to  revolve  the 
subject  matter  of  the  suit  in  their  minds,  and  discuss  it  among 
themselves  in  the  jury  room.87  But  it  is  improper  for  the  court 
to  state  to  the  jury,  where  they  have  failed  to  agree,  that  if 
there  is  a  large  majority  of  the  jury  on  one  side,  perhaps  the 
minority  would  yield  to  the  majority  by  further  considering 
the  case.88  Any  statement  by  the  court  in  charging  the  jury, 
suggesting  that  they  are  authorized  to  reach  a  verdict  by  com- 
promising their  differences,  is  highly  improper.  Thus,  for  in- 
stance, for  the  court  to  say  that  "the  law,  which  requires  una- 
nimity on  the  part  of  the  jury  to  render  a  verdict,  expects  and 
will  tolerate  reasonable  compromise  and  fair  concessions",  is 
erroneous.89 

§  187.    Instructions  attempting  to  coerce  jury. — The  court  in 

ss  Samuel  v.  Knight,  9  Pa.  Super.  ST  Hand  v.  Agen,  96  Wis.  493,  71 

Ct.  352.  N.  W.  899. 

s*  Miller  v.  Miller,  187  Pa.  St.  ss  Sargent  v.  Lawrence  (Tex.  Cr. 

572,  41  Atl.  277.  App.),  40  S.  W.  1075. 

ss  Schoefield  v.  Gear  Pulley  Co.  SQ  Richardson  v.  Coleman,  131 

71  Conn.  1,  40  Atl.  1064.  Ind.  210,  29  N.  E.  909;  Clem  v.  S. 

se  Wheeler  v.  Thomas,  69  Conn.  42  Ind.  420;  Southern  Ins.  Co.  v. 

577,  35  Atl.  499,  39  L.  R.  A.  794,  White,  58  Ark.  277,  24  S.  W.  425. 

Instructions  tending  to  encourage  See,  also,  Goodsell  v.  Seeley,  46 

a  disagreement  are  improper,  Chi-  Mich.  623,  10  N.  W.  44;  Cranston  v. 

cago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Rains,  203  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  Co.  103  N. 

111.  423,  67  N.  E.  840.  Y.  614,  9  N.  E.  500;  Edens  v.  Han- 
nibal &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  72  Mo.  212. 


§    188  JURY    DETERMINE   THE   FACTS.  168 

charging  the  jury  should  guard  against  making  any  statement 
having  a  tendency  to  coerce  them  int-j  reaching  a  verdict.90 
For  the  court  to  impress  upon  the  jury  the  importance  of  the 
case  and  urge  them  to  come  to  an  agreement,  and  for 
that  purpose  to  direct  them  to  retire  again  for  fur- 
ther deliberation,  is  error.91  Any  statement  by  the  court 
having  a  tendency  to  impress  the  jury  with  the  idea  that  the 
court  will  be  obliged  to  keep  them  together  until  they  reach 
a  verdict  is  improper  as  tending  to  coerce  the  jury  to  come  to 
an  agreement.  Thus,  for  instance,  it  is  error  for  the  court 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  jury  to  the  costs  to  the  county 
for  each  day  the  court  remains  in  session,  and  urge  them  to 
struggle  together  until  they  reach  a  verdict.92 

So,  after  the  jury  have  spent  several  hours  in  their  efforts 
to  reach  a  verdict,  and  report  their  failure  to  agree  because 
of  one  of  the  jurors  holding  out  against  all  the  others,  it  is 
error  for  the  court  to  speak  to  them  concerning  the  expense 
incurred  in  trying  the  case;  that  the  court  trusts  that  every 
juror  is  acting  rationally  in  the  matter,  and  that  nobody  is 
acting  from  a  dogmatic  spirit  merely  for  the  purpose  of  assert- 
ing his  opinion.93  It  is  also  error  for  the  court  to  say  that 
it  is  no  credit  to  a  man  merely  because  he  has  an  opinion  to 
stubbornly  stick  to  it.94 

§  188.  Instructions  not  attempting  to  coerce  jury. — But  there 
are  cases  holding  that  a  court  by  instructions  may  insist  on  an 
agreement,  and  may  otherwise,  to  a  certain  extent,  attempt  to 
coerce  the  jury  into  an  agreement.  Thus  it  has  been  held  not 
to  be  error  for  the  court  to  say  to  the  jury  on  their  announc- 

90  Hodges    v.    O'Brien,    113    Wis.  Sigsbee   v.    S.    43    Fla.    524,    30    So. 
97,  88  N.  W.  97.  816;  Niles  v.  Sprague,  13  Iowa,  198. 

91  S.   v.   DudO'US&at,   47   La.   Ann.  93  McPeak  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
977,  17  So.  685.     See  Cox  v.  Peltier,  128  Mo.   617,  30  S.  W.   170;    Stondt 
159  Ind    355,  65  N.  B.  6.  v.    Shepherd,    73    Mich.    58;    Odette 

92  Hodges    v.    O'Brien,    113    Wis.  v.    S.    90   Wis.   258,   62   N.   W.    1054. 
97,  88  N.  W.  97;   Chesapeake,  O.  &  See,    also,    Mahoney   v.    San    Fran- 
S.   W.   R.   Co.   v.   Barlow,   86   Tenn.  cisco  &  S.  M.  R.  Co.  110  Cal.  471, 
537,   8   S.   W.   147;    Terre   Haute   &  42  Pac.  968.    Contra.    S.  v.  Gorham, 
I.    R.    Co.   v.    Jackson,   81    Ind.    19;  67   Vt.   365,   31  Atl.   845;    Jordan  v. 
Richardson    v.    Coleman,    131    Ind.  S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),   30   S.   W.   445; 
210,  29  N.  E.  909;  S.  v.  Hill,  91  Mo.  Johnson  v.  S.  60  Ark.  45,  24  S.  W. 
423,   4   S.   W.   121.     See,   also,   Per-  792. 

kins    v.    S.    50    Ala.    154.      Contra:          94  Randalp    v.    Lampkin,    90    Ky. 

551,   14   S.   W.   538,   10   L.   R.   A. '87. 


169  COURT    COERCING    JURY — COMMENTS    ON    EVIDENCE.  §    188 

ing  that  they  could  not  agree,  that  "this  case  is  submitted  to 
you  for  decision,  and  not  for  disagreement.  I  think  I  will  let 
you  give  it  a  further  trial."95  Nor  is  it  error  for  the  court 
to  direct  the  jury  that  if  they  should  not  agree  within  a  certain 
time  they  should,  on  reaching  a  verdict,  seal  it  and  then  sepa- 
rate, and  return  to  court  on  a  day  named,  to  which  the  court 
would  stand  adjourned.96  Or  where  the  jury  have  been  con- 
sidering a  case  two  or  three  days  it  is  not  improper  for  the  court 
to  express  to  them  its  regrets  that  they  have  not  reached  an 
agreement;  that  the  case  must  eventually  be  determined  by  a 
jury ;  that  if  they  do  not  agree  the  jury  system  that  far  is  a  failure. 
The  court  therefore  directs  the  jury  to  return  to  their  room 
and  make  another  effort  to  come  to  an  agreement.97 

The  court,  in  the  exercise  of  a  proper  discretion,  may  direct 
the  jury  to  retire  for  further  deliberation,  even  after  a  second 
announcement  that  they  could  not  agree.98  It  is  not  improper 
for  the  court  to  state  to  the  jury  that  they  should  reason  to- 
gether and  arrive  at  some  kind  of  a  verdict,  and  to  continue  their 
deliberations  until  they  reach  an  agreement.  Such  a  charge 
is  not  a  threat  to  keep  the  jury  out  until  they  agree.99  It  has 
also  been  held  not  to  be  error  for  the  court  to  say  to  the  jury 
on  their  return  into  court  for  additional  instructions,  that  it 
is  your  duty  to  decide  the  case  if  you  can  conscientiously  do 
so;  that  you  should  listen  to  the  arguments  of  each  other  with 
a  disposition  to  be  convinced ;  that  if  much  the  larger  number 
favor  a  conviction,  a  dissenting  juror  should  consider  whether 
his  doubt  is  a  reasonable  one,  and  that  if  a  majority  favor  an 
acquittal  the  minority  should  consider  whether  they  may  not 
reasonably  be  mistaken  in  their  judgment.100 

95  German  Sav.  Bank  v.  Citizens'  N.  W.  1054;   Jackson  v.  S.  91  Wis. 

Nat.    Bank,    101    Iowa,    530,    70    N.  267,     64    N.    W.     838;     Warlick    v. 

W.    769.  Plonk,  103  N.  Car.  81,  9  S.  E.  190; 

se  Darlington     v.     City     of     Alle-  S.  v.  Gorham,  67  Vt.  371,  31  Atl   845; 

gheny,  189  Pa.  St.  202,  42  Atl.  112.  Wheeler  v.    Thomas,   67   Conn.   577, 

See    Burgess    v.    Singer    Mfg.    Co.  35  Atl.  499;   S.  v.  Hawkins,  18  Ore. 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  30  S.  W.  1110.  476,   23   Pac.   475;    Cowan  v.  Umba- 

97  S.   v.  Pierce,  136  Mo.  34,  37  S.  gog  Pulp  Co.  91  Me.  26,  39  Atl.  340; 

W.    815;  "Com.    v.    Kelly,    165   Mass.  Krack  v.  Wolf,  39  Ind.  88. 
.175,    42    N.    B.    573.      See    Ter.    v.          100  Allen   v.   U.   S.   164   U.   S.   492, 

Griego,  8  N.  Mex.  133,  42  Pac.  81.  17  Sup.  Ct.  154.    See  Ter.  v.  Griego, 

»»  Lambright   v.    S.    34    Fla.    564,  8  N.  Mex.  133,  42  Pac.   81;    Odette 

16  So.  582.  v.    S.   90  Wis.   258,   62   N.   W.    1054. 

9»  Odette    v.    S.    90    Wis.    258,    62 


§  189  JURY  DETERMINE  THE  FACTS.  170 

§  189.  When  court  may  comment  on  evidence  and  express 
opinion. — But  in  the  federal  courts  the  rule  is  well  settled  that 
the  court  in  charging  the  jury  may  comment  upon  the  evidence 
and  express  an  opinion  as  to  its  weight,  what  it  proves  or  tends 
to  prove  or  does  not  prove,  provided  the  jury  are  ultimately 
left  at  liberty  to  determine  the  facts  in  issue.101  And  the  same 
rule  prevails  in  some  of  the  state  courts.102  The  constitutional 
and  statutory  provisions  of  the  states  which  prohibit  the  courts 
from  commenting  on  or  expressing  an  opinion  as  to  the  weight 
of  the  evidence  have  no  application  to  the  practice  in  the  federal 
courts  and  some  of  the  state  courts.103  "That  the  judge  may 
properly  state  to  the  jury  his  opinion  as  to  what  facts  are  proved 
or  not  proved  by  the  evidence  ...  if  he  also  instructs  them  that 
they  are  not  bound  by  his  opinions  on  such  matters,  but  that 
it  is  their  duty  as  jurors  to  consider  the  evidence,  and  find  the 
facts  therefrom,  has  been  the  uniform  holding  of  the  federal 
courts."104  The  instructions  shall  control  as  to  the  law  of  the 
case,  and  while  the  court  may  express  an  opinion  on  the  weight 
of  the  evidence,  as  well  as  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses,  yet 
the  jury  should  be  left  free  to  exercise  an  independent  .judg- 
ment in  determining  the  facts.105  It  is  proper  for  the  court  to 
comment  fairly  and  impartially  on  the  testimony  for  the  pur- 

101  Aerheart  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  102  Foley  v.  Longhran,  60  N.  J. 
R.  Co.  90  Fed.  907;  Hart  v.  U.  S.  L.  468,  39  Atl.  358,  38  Atl.  960;  Mc- 
84  Fed.  799,  28  C.  C.  A.  612.  See  Cormick  v.  McCormick,  194  Pa.  St. 
Herrick  v.  Quigley,  101  Fed.  187,  107,  45  Atl.  88;  Cook  v.  Steinert 
41  C.  C.  A.  294;  Martin  v.  Hughes,  &  Sons  Co.  69  Conn.  91,  36  Atl. 
98  Fed.  556;  Allis  v.  U.  S.  155  U.  S.  1008;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Holan,  63 
117,  15  Sup.  Ct.  36;  U.  S.  v.  Schnei-  Minn.  525,  65  N.  W.  952;  Pool  v. 
der,  21  D.  C.  381;  U.  S.  v.  Connelly,  White,  175  Pa.  St.  459,  34  Atl.  801, 
1  Fed.  779  9  Biss.  338;  Com.  v.  Ber-  (transaction  complicated) ;  Rose- 
chine,  168'  Pa.  St.  603,  32  Atl.  109;  v«ar  v.  Borough,  etc.  Ib9  Pa.  St.  565, 
Walls  v.  Southern  B.  T.  T.  Co.  66  32  Atl.  548;  Price  v.  Hamsoher,  174 
Fed.  453;  Lesser  Cotton  Co.  v.  St.  Pa.  St.  73,  34  Atl.  546. 
L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  114  Fed.  133;  103  Nudd  v.  Burrows,  91  U.  S. 
Freese  v.  Kemplay,  118  Fed.  428;  441;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 
Chimg  v.  U.  S.  118  Fed.  538;  First  v.  Vickers,  122  U.  S.  360,  7  Sup.  Ct. 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Holan,  63  Minn.  525,  1216. 

65  N.  W.  952;  Wiborg  v.  U.  S.  163  U.  104  Kerr     v.     Modern     Woodman, 

S.  632,  16  Sup.  Ct.  1127;   Treece  v.  117  Fed.  593. 

American  Asso.  (C.  C.  A.),  122  Fed.  105  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  .v.  Wilson, 

598;    Nome   Beach    L.    &   T.    Co.    v.  76  Fed.   122,  34  L.  R.  A.  477. 
Munich  Assur.   Co.   123   Fed.   820. 


171  COURT  REVIEWING  EVIDENCE.  §  191 

pose  of  more  clearly  defining  the  issues  and  to  assist  the  jury 
in    reaching    a   just    conclusion.100 

§  190.  Illustrations  of  the  rule. — Thus,  in  the  federal  courts, 
for  the  court,  in  charging  the  jury,  to  state  that,  under  the 
circumstances,  a  certain  act  amounts  to  negligence,  is  not  error 
where  the  charge  left  it  to  the  jury  to  determine  the  question  of 
negligence.107  A  charge  that  "it  cannot  be  doubted  under  the 
evidence  that  the  place  where  the  plaintiff  received  his  injury 
was  a  most  dangerous  one,"  is  not  error,  if  the  jury  are  also 
instructed  that  they  are  the  exclusive  judges  of  the  weight  of 
the  evidence.108  Under  this  rule  it  has  been  held  that  a  federal 
judge,  in  commenting  upon  the  evidence,  by  saying  that  he 
could  not  see  "how  the  defendant  can  be  acquitted,"  is  not 
cause  for  reversal  where  it  appears  that  the  court  correctly 
stated  the  law  and  expressly  left  the  jury  free  to  determine 
the  facts.109 

§  191.  Instructions  reviewing  the  evidence. — Under  the  above 
rule  the  judge  of  the  court  should,  in  charging  the  jury,  call 
their  attention  to  the  important  matters  of  evidence  bearing 
on  the  issues,  and  may  express  an  opinion  as  to  its  weight  and 
relevancy.110  But  instructions  designed  to  review  the  evidence 
are  not  required  to  refer  to  every  item  in  detail;  it  is  sufficient 
to  give  a  general  review  of  the  evidence,  fairly  showing  the 
contentions  of  the  parties.111 

It  is  not  necessary  to  state  the  testimony  of  each  witness 
separately  in  reviewing  the  evidence.  The  witnesses  may  be 

loe  Sommers  v.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  N.   E.   436;    Fineburg  v.   Second   & 

Co.    91   Fed.   337;    S.   v.   Means,   95  Third    St.    P.    R.    Co.    182    Pa.    St. 

Me.    364,   50  Atl.   30.  97,    37    Atl.    925. 

107  Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    R.    Co.         in  Taylor  v.  Burrell,  7  Pa.  Super, 
v.   Stahley,  62   Fed.   363.  Ct.  461;  Bank  of  Asheville  v.  Sum- 

108  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  David-  mer,  119  N.  Car.  591,  26  S.  E.  129; 
son,    76    Fed.    517.  Allis  v.  U.  S.  155  U.  S.  117,  15  Sup. 

109  Endleraan    v.    U.    S.    86    Fed.  Ct.   36;    Borham   v.   Davis,   146   Pa. 
456.      See    Bank    of    Commerce    v.  St.   72,   23   Atl.   160.     See   Halfman 
Bright,  77  Fed.   946.  v.  Pennsylvania  Boiler  Ins.  Co.  160 

no  Appeal      of      Sturdevant,      71  Pa.   St.   202,  28  Atl.   837;    S.   v.  Us- 

Conn.    392,    42    Atl.    70;    Schoetield,  sery,  118  N.  Car.  1177,  24  S.  E.  414; 

Gear  &  Pulley  Co.  v.  Schoefield,  71  Com.  v.  Warner,  13  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

Conn.  11,  40  Atl.  1046;  S.  v.  Means,  461,  the  summary  must  be  accurate 

9    Me.    364,    50    Atl.    30.      But    see  as  far  as  attempted. 
Com.    v.    Walsh,    162   Mass.    242,   38 


§    191  JURY    DETERMINE    THE    FACTS.  172 

grouped  and  the  substance  of  their  testimony  stated.112  Nor 
is  it  necessary  for  the  court  to  review  the  evidence  on  the  one 
side  or  the  other,  or  comment  upon  the  particular  corroborating 
circumstances,  where  a  case  turns  upon  some  single  matter 
of  fact  which  the  court  plainly  submits  to  the  jury.113  And 
where  the  court  states  to  the  jury  that  there  is  one  question  for 
them  to  determine,  a  failure  to  instruct  them  to  disregard  a 
certain  other  issue  is  not  error.114 

The  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  express  an  opinion  on  the 
weight  of  the  evidence,  but  it  is  not  bound  to  do  so.115  Es- 
pecially where  the  evidence  is  conflicting,  it  is  not  error  if  the 
court  fails  to  express  an  opinion  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.116 
And  in  the  absence  of  a  request  the  court  is  not  required  even 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  jury  to  a  conflict  between  the 
testimony  of  the  witnesses  of  the  parties  to  the  suit.117  It  is 
not  improper,  however,  to  instruct  on  the  effect  of  conflicting 
evidence.118  And  if  the  court  in  stating  the  evidence  makes  a 
mistake  in  quoting  the  testimony  it  is  the  duty  of  the  party 
affected  to  call  the  attention  of  the  court  to  such  mistake  im- 
mediately after  the  charge  is  finished.119  And  if  the  party  so 

112  Maynard  v.  Tyler,  168  Mass.  Wis.  236,  46  N.  W.  123;  S.  v.  Davis, 

107,  46  N.  E.  413;  Krepps  v.  Car-  27  S.  Car.  609,  4  S.  E.  567.  The 

lise,  157  Pa.  St.  358,  27  Atl.  741;  P.  judge  of  the  court  should  not  state 

v.  Doyell,  48  Cal.  85.  to  the  jury  his  recollection  of  what 

us  Laner  v.  Yetzer,  3  Pa.  Super,  a  witness  may  have  testified  to  in 

Ct.  461.  a  former  trial,  P.  v.  Corey,  157 

114  Davis  v.  Alas  Assur.  Co.  16  N.  Y.  332,  51  N.  E.  1024.  Held  to 

Wash.  232,  47  Pac.  885.  be  improper  comment  on  the  facts 

us  S.  v.  Main,  75  Conn.  55,  52  or  weight  of  the  evidence:  Yoaoh- 

Atl.  257;  Cohen  v.  Pemberton,  53  am  v.  McCurdy,  27  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

Conn.  235,  2  Atl.  315,  5  Atl.  682;  183,  65  S.  W.  213;  Berry  v.  S. 

Doon  v.  Ravey,  49  Vt.  293;  Shank  v.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.)  38  S.  W.  812;  Kib- 

S.  25  Ind.  208.  See,  also,  Breese  ier  v.  Com.  94  Va.  804,  26  S.  E. 

v.  United  States,  106  Fed.  680;  858;  Braun  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

George  v.  Stubbs,  26  Me.  242;  Bruoh  39  S.  W.  940;  Santee  v.  S.  (Tex. 

v.  Carter,  32  N.  J.  L.  565.  Cr.  App.),  37  S.  W.  436;  Alexander 

us  Ide  v.  Lake  Tp.  (Pa.  Com.  v.  Bank  of  Lebenon  (Tex.  Cv. 
PI.),  9  Kulp,  192.  See  Balph  v.  App.),  47  S.  W.  840;  S.  v.  Col- 
Liberty  Nat.  Bank,  179  Pa.  St.  430,  iins,  47  La.  Ann.  578,  17  So.  128;  Van 
36  Atl.  337.  Camp  Hardware  Co.  v.  O'Brien  (Ind. 

117  Balph  v.  Liberty  Nat.  Bank,  App.)  62  N.  E.  464;  S.  v.  Hyde,  20 

179  Pa.  St.  430,  36  Atl.  337.  Wash.  234,  55  Pac.  49;  Western  U. 

us  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  York,  Tel.  Co.  v.  Burgess  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 

128  Ala.  305,  30  S.  E.  676.  56  S.  W.  237;  Lincoln  v.  City  of  De- 

ii»  Mann  v.  Cowan,  8  Pa.  Super,  troit,  101  Mich.  245,  59  N.  W.  617; 

Ct.  30;  Grows  v.  Maine  C.  R.  Co.  Hensel  v.  Haas,  101  Mich.  443,  59  N. 

69  Me.  412;  Muetze  v.  Tuteur,  77  W.  808;  Meadows  v.  Truesdell  (Tex. 


173 


COURT  REVIEWING  EVIDENCE. 


affected  shall  fail  to  do  so,  by  such  failure  he  waives  the  right  to 
appeal  on  the  ground  of  the  court's  mistake. 

Cv.   App.),   56  S.   W.  932;    Herring- 
ton   v.    Guernsey,    177   Pa.    St.    175, 

35  Atl.  603;   Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mortenson,  27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  806, 
66    S.    W.    99;    Smith    v.    Gulf,    W. 
T.    &    P.    R.    Co.    (Te<x.    Cv.    App.), 
65    S.    W.    88;    Sullivan    v.    Market 
St.  R.  Co.  136  Gal.  479,  69  Pac.  143; 
Earle  v.  Poat,  63  S.  Car.  439,  41  S. 
E.  525;   St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  ,v.  Sib- 
ley,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App.  396,  68  S.  W. 
516;  Johnson  v.  Stone,  69  Miss.  826, 
13  So.  858;  Clifford  v.  Lee  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),    23    S.    W.    843;    Blumeno    v. 
Grand   Rapids   &    I.    B.   R.   Co.    101 
Mich,  325,  59  N.  W.  594;  P.  v.  Tot- 
man,    135    Cal.    133,    67   Pac.    bl;    S. 
v.    McDowell,    129    N.    Car.    523,    39 
S.    E.    840;    Hickory    v.    U.    S.    160 
U.    S.    408,    16   Sup.    Ct.    327;    Hud- 
son v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  420,  66  S. 
W.  668;  Parker  v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
526,  67  S.  W.  121;   Remner  v.  S.  43 
Tex.    Cr.   App.   347,   65   S.   W.   1102; 
Wallace  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  66  S. 
W.  1102;  Harris  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 
65  S.  W.  921;   Winter  v.  S.  133  Ala. 
176,   32   So.   125;    Reese  v.   S.    (Tex. 
Cr.   App.),   68  S.   W.   283;    Coffin  v. 
Brown,   94     Md.     190,     50  Atl.   567; 
Moore  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.   App.),  68  S. 
W.   279;    Faulkner  v.   King,   130  N. 
Car.  494,  41  S.  E.  885;   Crawford  v. 
S.   117   Ga.   247,   43   S.   E.   762;    Mc- 
Dommell  v.  De  Los  Fuentes,  7  Tex. 
Cv.  App.  136,  26  S.  W.  792.  Held  not 
improper  comment  on  the  weight  ot 
the   evidence:    Moore  v.   Dickinson, 
39  S.  Car.  441,  17  S.  E.  998;    Miles 
v.  Plant,  18  Pa.   Super.  Ct.  80;   St. 
Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Spivey  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.)  73  S.  W.  973;  Half  man  v. 
Pennsylvania  Boiler  Co.  160  Pa.  St. 
202,    28    Atl.    837;    Wills    v.    Lance, 
28  Ore.  371,  43  Pac.  487;  Files  v.  S. 

36  Tex.    Cr.    App.    206,    36    S.    W. 
93.     Held   not  intimating  an  opin- 
ion on  the  evidence,  in  the  following 
cases:    P.    v.    Grotty,    47    N.    Y.    S. 
845,    22   App.   Div.    77;    S.    v.    Shaw, 
102  Ga.  660,  29  S.  E.  477;  Collins  v. 
S.   39   Tex.   Cr.   App.   441,  46   S.   W. 
933;    Morris  v.   S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
371,  46  S.  W.  253;   P.  v.  Slater,  119 
Cal.    620,    51    Pac.    957;    Reynols    v. 
S.  147  Ind.  3,  46  N.  E.  31;  Smith  v. 


Dawley,  92  Iowa,  312,  60  N.  W.  625; 
S.  v.  Derrick,  44  S.  Car.  344,  22  S.  E. 
337;  Newport  v.  S.  140  Ind.  299,  39 
N.  E.  926;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
v.  Magee  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  49  S.  W. 
928;  Anderson  v.  McDonald,  31 
Wash.  274,  71  Pac.  1037.;  Bell  v.1 
City  of  Spokane,  30  Wash.  508,  71 
Pac.  31;  Drumheller  v.  American 
Surety  Co.  30  Wash.  530,  71  Pac. 
25;  Harris  v.  S.  97  Ga.  350,  23  S.  E. 
993;  Graham  v.  Frazier,  49  Neb.  90, 
68  N.  W.  367;  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co. 
v.  Echols,  17  Tex.  Cv.  App.  677, 
41  S.  W.  488;  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Jones  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  39  S.  W.  124; 
Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Gran- 
berry,  16  Tex.  Cv.  App.  391,  40  S. 
W.  1062;  Selling  v.  Clark,  41  N. 
Y.  S.  982,  18  Misc.  464;  Cook  v. 
Bartlett,  179  Mass.  576,  61  N.  E. 
266;  Wylie  v.  Commercial  &  F. 
Bank,  63  S.  Car.  406,  41  S.  E.  504; 
Cooper  v.  Ford  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  69 
S.  W.  487;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
v.  Johnson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  67  S. 
W.  769;  Davis  v.  Atlanta  &  C.  A.  L. 
R.  Co.  63  S.  Car.  370,  41  S.  E.  468. 
Held  invading  the  province  of  the 
jury:  Clewis  v.  Malome,  131  Ala.  465, 
31  So.  596;  Berez  v.  San  Antonio  & 
A.  P.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  67  S. 
W.  137;  Lamphere  v.  S.  114  Wis.  193, 
89  N.  W.  128;  Watkins  v.  S.  133  Alia. 
8S,  32  So.  627;  Nelson  v.  S.  43  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  553,  67  S.  W.  320.  Held 
not  invading  the  province  of  the 
jury  in  the  following  cases:  P.  v. 
Spiegel,  143  N.  Y.  107,  38  N.  E. 
284;  P.  v.  Johnson,  104  Cal.  418,  38 
Pac.  91;  S.  v.  Dill,  48  S.  Car.  249, 
26  S.  E.  567;  S.  v.  Atkins,  49  S.  Car. 
481,  27  S.  E.  484;  P.  v.  Howard, 
135  Cal.  266,  67  Pac.  148;  P.  v.  Tot- 
man,  135  Cal.  133,  67  Pac.  51;  Jar- 
man  v.  Rea,  137  Cal.  339,  70  Pac. 
216;  Carstens  v.  Earles,  26  Wash. 
676,  67  Pac.  404;  French  v.  Seattle 
Tr.  Co.  26  Wash.  264,  66  Pac.  404; 
Galveston,  H.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  New- 
port, 26  Tex.  Cv.  App.  583,  65  S. 
W.  657;  Brashington  v.  South  B.  R. 
Co.  62  S.  Car.  325,  40  S.  E.  665; 
American  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Kersh,  27 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  127,  66  S.  W.  74. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


FACTS   ASSUMED. 


Sec. 

192.  Instructions     assuming     facts 

— Generally. 

193.  Instructions     assuming     facts 

— Illustrations. 

194.  Instructions      not      assuming 

facts — Illustrations. 

195.  Assuming  facts  when  evidence 

is   close   or   conflicting. 


Sec. 

196.  Instructions      may      assume 

facts— When. 

197.  Facts  admitted  by  both   par- 

ties. 

198.  Assuming    facts — In    criminal 

cases. 


§  192.  Instructions  assuming  facts  generally. — Any  assump- 
tion of  facts  in  dispute  which  must  be  determined  by  the  jury 
is  an  infringement  of  their  province,  and  if  the  rights  of  a 
party  are  thereby  affected,  such  assumption  is  error.1  Instruc- 
tions which  assume  the  existence  of  material  facts  are,  as  a 
general  rule,  erroneous,  especially  if  unsupported  by  evidence.2 

i  P.   v.   Matthai,  135  Cal.   442,  67      Rombold    (Neb.),    97    N.    W.    1030; 


Pac.  694;  Cline  v.  S.  43  Ohio  St. 
332,  1  N.  E.  22;  Momence  Stone 
Co.  v.  Turrell,  205  111.  524,  68  N.  E. 
1078;  S.  v.  Bonner  (Mo.),  77  S.  W. 
463;  Smith  v.  Sovereign,  &c.  (Mo.), 
77  S.  W.  867;  Dobson  v.  Southern 
R.  Co.  132  N.  Car.  900,  44  S.  E. 
593;  Wilson  v.  Huguenin,  117  Ga. 
546,  43  S.  E.  857;  Birmingham,  &c. 
Co.  v.  Mullen  (Ala.),  35  So.  701; 
Choctaw,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Deperade 
(Okl.),  71  Pac.  629;  Rogers  v.  Man- 
hattan, &c.  Ins.  Co.  138  Cal.  285,  71 
Pac.  348;  Selensky  v.  Chicago,  &c. 
R  Co.  120  Iowa,  113,  94  N.  W.  272; 
Lydick  v.  Gill  (Neb.),  94  N.  W. 
109;  New  Omaha  T.  H.  &c.  Co.  v. 


Kahn  v.  Triest-R.  &c.  Co.  139  Cal. 
340,  73  Pac.  164;  Lawrence  v.  West- 
lake  (Mont),  73  Pac.  119;  North- 
ern Ohio  R.  Co.  v.  Rigby,  69  Ohio, 
184,  68  N.  E.  1046;  McHenry  v. 
Bulifant  (Pa.),  56  Atl.  226;  Karl  v. 
Juniata  Co.  206  Pa.  633,  56  Atl.  78; 
Riser  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  (S.  Car.), 
46  S.  E.  47;  Dodd  v.  Guiseffl,  100 
Mo.  App.  311,  73  S.  W.  304;  Na- 
bours  v.  McCord  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
75  S.  W.  827;  Bumgardner  v.  South- 
ern R.  Co.  132  N".  Car.  438,  43  S.  E. 
948;  Hock  Island,  &c.  Co.  v.  Pohl- 
man,  210  111.  139. 

2  See  Newman   v.   Schmilker,  181 
111.  406;   Langdon  v.  P.  133  111.  404, 


174 


175 


ASSUMING  FACTS GENERALLY. 


192 


Instructions  which  assume  that  there  is  evidence  before  the 
jury  tending  to  prove  material  facts,  when  in  fact  there  is  no 
such  evidence,  are  improper  and  generally  erroneous.3  An  in- 
struction which  states  that  there  is  no  evidence  to  prove  a 
material  fact  in  issue  when  there  is  such  evidence,  though  slight 
or  equivocal,  is  erroneous.* 

The  giving  of  an  instruction  intimating  or  implying  that  there 
is  no  evidence  touching  a  certain  phase  of  a  case  is  improper, 


24  N.  E.  874;  Callaghan  v.  Myers, 
89  111.  566;  Walcot  v.  Heath,  78  111. 
433;  Sugar  Creek  Min.  Co.  v.  Peter- 
son, 177  111.  329,  52  N.  E.  475;  Dina 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  78  S.  W.  230; 
Gaines  v.  S.  99  Ga.  703,  26  S.  E. 
760;  Wilcox  v.  Kinzie,  4  111.  (3 
Scam.),  218;  East  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Waldrop,  114  Ga.  289,  40  S.  E.  268; 
McCullough  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P. 
&  S.  S.  Co.  101  Mich.  234,  59  N.  W. 
618;  Weybright  v.  Fleming,  40  Ohio 
St.  55;  Schweinfurth  v.  Cleveland, 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  60  Ohio  St. 
223,  54  N.  E.  89;  Birmingham  R. 
L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Mullen  (Ala.),  35  So. 
204;  Dunseath  v.  Pittsburg  A.  &  M. 
Tr.  Co.  161,  Pa.  St.  124,  28  Atl. 
1021;  O'Flaherty  v.  Mann,  196  111. 
304,  63  N.  E.  727;  Bell  v.  Washing- 
ton Cedar-Shingle  Co.  8  Wash.  27, 
35  Pac.  405;  O'Neill  v.  Blase,  94 
Mo.  App.  648,  68  S.  W.  764;  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  38 
Neb.  112,  56  N.  W.  794;  Dixon  v.  S. 
113  Ga.  1039,  39  S.  E.  846  (confes- 
sion);  Rettig  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Tr.  Co. 
26  N.  Y.  S.  896,  6  Misc.  328;  Wil- 
liams v.  S.  46  Neb.  704,  65  N.  W. 
783;  Haupt  v.  Haupt,  157  Pa.  St. 
469,  27  Atl.  768;  Dady  v.  Condit, 
188  111.  234,  58  N.  E.  900;  Overall 
v.  Armstrong  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  25 
S.  W.  440;  Cox  v.  S.  68  Ark.  462, 
60  S.  W.  27;  McDonald  v.  Beall, 
55  Ga.  288;  French  v.  Sale,  63  Miss. 
386;  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  63  S.  W. 
1064;  Houston  v.  Com.  87  Va.  257, 
12  S.  E.  385;  Willis  v.  Hudson,  72 
Tex.  598,  10  S.  W.  713;  St.  Louis, 
K.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  U. 
S.  Y.  Co.  120  Mo.  541,  25  S.  W. 
399;  Com.  v.  Light,  195  Pa.  St. 
220,  45  Atl.  933;  Weybright  v.  Flem- 


ing, 40  Ohio  St.  52;  P.  v.  Williams, 
17  Cal.  142  (direct  or  indirect); 
Hill  v.  Spear,  50  N.  H.  253;  Brower 
v.  Edson,  47  Mich.  91,  10  N.  W.  121; 
Chicago  W.  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Mills,  91 
111.  39;  Hood  v.  Olin,  68  Mich.  165, 
36  N.  W.  177;  Kidd  v.  S.  83  Ala. 
58,  3  So.  442;  Kelly  v.  Eby,  141 
Pa.  176,  21  Atl.  512;  Bowie  v.  Spaids, 
26  Neb.  635,  42  N.  W.  700;  Chase 
v.  Horton,  143  Mass.  118,  9  N.  E. 
31;  P.  v.  Gotta,  49  Cal.  116; 
King  v.  S.  (Miss.),  23  So.  166;  Saf- 
fold  v.  S.  76  Miss.  258,  24  So.  314; 
Com.  v.  Light,  195  Pa.  St.  220  (as 
to  receiving  stolen  property),  45 
Atl.  933.  ' 

s  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
wood,  90  111.  429;  City  of  Chicago 
v.  Bixby,  84  111.  83;  Michigan,  S. 
&  N.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Shelton,  66  111. 
425;  McCormick  v.  McGaffray,  55 
N.  Y.  S.  574,  25  Misc.  786;  Chiches- 
ter  v.  Whitehead,  51  111.  259;  Ter. 
v.  Turner  (Ariz.),  31  Pac.  368;  Ad- 
ams v.  Smith,  58  111.  421;  Roche  v. 
Baldwin,  135  Cal.  522,  69  Pac.  903; 
Waters  v.  Kansas  City,  94  Mo.  App. 
413,  68  S.  W.  366;  Hall  v.  S.  130 
Ala.  45,  30  So.  422;  Hall  v.  S.  134 
Ala.  90,  32  So.  750;  Thomas  v.  S. 
133  Ala.  139,  32  So.  250;  Crittenden 
v.  S.  134  Ala.  145,  32  So.  273;  Barker 
v.  S.  48  Ind.  163;  Perkins  v.  Atta- 
way,  14  Ga.  27. 

4  Prairie  State  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Doig, 
70  111.  52;  Avery  &  Son  v.  Meek, 
16  Ky.  L.  R.  384,  28  S.  W.  337;  Geor- 
gia H.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen,  128  Ala. 
451,  30  So.  537;  Zibbell  v.  City  of 
Grand  Rapids,  129  Mich.  659,  89 
N.  W.  563;  Sander  v.  S.  134  Ala. 
74,  32  So.  654  (conspiracy);  Cupps 
v.  S.  (Wis.),  97  N.  W.  218. 


§    193  FACTS   ASSUMED.  176 

unless  there  actually  is  no  evidence  on  the  point  or  question 
to  which  it  relates.5  So  to  assume  or  state  in  an  instruction 
that  a  fact  has  been  established  when  •  there  is  no  evidence 
to  prove  such  fact  is  error.0  Also  the  giving  of  an  instruction 
which  assumes  the  existence  of  a  fact  when  there  is  evidence 
tending  to  prove  the  contrary  is  error.7 

§  193.  Instructions  assuming  facts — Illustrations. — An  in- 
struction reciting  that  the  state  has  introduced  evidence  tend- 
ing to  prove  the  theft  of  property  other  than  that  alleged  in 
the  indictment,  at  the  same  time  and  place,  when  there  is  no 
evidence  tending  to  show  such  theft,  is  prejudicial;  and  al- 
though no  exception  was  taken  to  the  charge,  it  affords  ground 
for  reversal.8  In  a  will  contest  an  instruction  which  suggests 
that  the  will  in  question  was  made  under  the  influence  of  par- 
tial insanity,  where  there  was  no  evidence  of  any  delusions  or 
mania,  is  improper  and  erroneous.9  And  an  instruction  which 
assumes  that  other  witnesses  were  present,  who  had  better  op- 
portunities of  observing  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  a  will 
than  the  subscribing  witnesses,  is  erroneous  when  there  is  no 
evidence  tending  to  prove  such  fact.10 

To  tell  the  jury  by  instruction  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  recover  all  damages  proved  to  have  been  sustained  by  him 
on  account  of  the  trespass  committed  by  the  defendant  on  the 
plaintiff's  premises,  as  alleged  in  the  declaration,  is  error,  in 
assuming  that  the  defendant  committed  the  trespass.11  So  an 

s  Barker  v.  S.  40  Fla.  178,  24  So.  Millon,  129  Mich.  86,  88  N.  W.  206; 

69;  Kildow  v.  Irick  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  Stern  v.  P.  102  111.  555.  See  Mathis 

33   S.  W.   315.  v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  605,  28  S.  W. 

6  Camden  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  817. 

61  N.  J.  L.  646,  40  Atl.  634;  Dough-          »  Wilson  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  34 

erty  v.  King,  48  N  Y.  S.  110;    Ameri-  S.  W   284;   Hayes  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr. 

can  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  89  111.  65;  App.  146,  35  S.  W.  983. 
Fullam  v.  Rose,  181  Pa.  St.  138,  37          »  Neiman    v.    Schmitker,    181    111. 

Atl.  197;   Kildow  v.  Irick  (Tex.  Cv.  406,   55   N.   E.    151;    Langdon  v.    P. 

App.),    33    S.    W.    315;    Wilson    v.  133  111.  404,  24  N.  E.  874;   Webster 

Crosby,    109    Mich.    449,    67    N.    W.  v.    Yorty,    194    111.    408,    62    N.    E. 

693;  Bentley  v.  Standard  F.  Ins.  Co.  707,  62  N.  E.  907. 
40  W.  Va.  729,  23  S.  E.  584;   Lewis          10  Neiman   v.   Schmitker,   181    111. 

v.  Rice,  61  Mich.  97,  27  N.  W.  867;  404,   55  N.  E.   151;    Owens  v.   S.   39 

Cropper  v.   Pittman,   13   Md.   190.  Tex.  Cr.  App.  391,  46  S.  W.  240. 

*  Walters  v.  American  Jewelry  &  "  Small  v.  Brainard,  44  111.  355; 
M.  Co.  114  Ga.  564,  40  S.  E.  803;  Hawk  v.  Ridgway,  33  111.  473;  Steele 
Leslie  v.  Smith,  32  Mich.  64;  Bow-  v.  Davis,  75  Ind.  197;  Mohr  v.  Kin- 
man  v.  Roberts,  58  Miss.  126;  Moffitt  nane,  85  111.  App.  447  (assault  and 
v.  Colkin,  35  Mo.  453;  Jones  v.  Me-  battery). 


177  ASSUMING  FACTS ILLUSTRATIONS.  §    194 

instruction  stating  that  "if  you  find  the  plaintiff's  action  is 
not  barred  you  will,  from  the  evidence,  estimate  the  amount  of 
his  damages  caused  by  delay  in  receiving  and  transporting  his 
cattle,  if  you  find  there  was  any  unreasonable  delay,"  is  erro- 
neous, in  that  it  assumes  that  the  cattle  had  been  damaged  by 
delay.12  In  an  action  for  assault  and  battery  a  charge  that 
"if  the  jury  find  for  the  plaintiff  they  have  the  right  to  take 
into  consideration,  in  estimating  the  damages,  the  pecuniary 
condition  of  the  defendant,"  is  erroneous  where  the  testimony 
as  to  malice  is  conflicting.13  An  instruction  stating  that  "the 
false,  improbable  and  contradictory  statements  of  the  accused, 
if  made,  in  explaining  suspicious  circumstance  against  him  are 
evidences  to  be  considered  by  the  jury,"  is  erroneous,  in  that 
it  assumes  that  the  statements  were  false,  improbable  and  con- 
tradictory, or  that  there  were  suspicious  circumstances  against 
him.14 

§  194.  Instructions  not  assuming  facts — Illustrations. — In  an 
action  for  personal  injury  an  instruction  which  states  that  if 
the  defendants  negligently  left  the  ditch  without  barriers,  and 
that  the  plaintiff,  without  fault,  fell  into  it,  the  jury  should  find 
for  the  plaintiff,  is  not  objectionable  as  assuming  the  fact  of- 
negligenee.15  An  instruction  which  states  that  the  "plaintiff 
has  sued  for  injuries  alleged  to  have  been  received  by  the 
negligent  act  of  the  railroad  company's  servants  in  placing 
obstructions  across  a  public  highway,  -and  without  ordinary  care,, 
and  that  the  obstructions  were  a  handcar  and  tools,"  merely 
states  the  allegations  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  to  have  been 
negligence  and  does  not  assume  negligence.16 

12  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  White  E.    409;    Jarman    v.    Rea,    137    Cal. 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  32  S.  W.  322.  See  339,    70    Pac.    216;    Chicago,    &c.    R. 

St.    Louis   S.   W.    R.   Co.   v.   McCul-  Co.   v.   Gore,   202   111.   188,   66  N.   E. 

lough    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    32    S.    W.  1063;  San  Antonio  Trac.  Co.  v.  Wel- 

285;    Dady   v.    Condit,    188    111.    234,  ter   (Tex.   Cv.  App.),  77  S.  W.  414; 

58   N.   E.   900.  Western    U.    Tel.    Co.    v.    Chambers 

is  Lopez     v.     Jackson,     80     Miss.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  77  S.  W.  273;  Blake 

684,   32   So.   117.    .  v.  Austin  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  75  S.  W. 

i*  Jones  v.   S.  59  Ark.   417,  27  S.  571;   St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Parks 

W.  601.     See  Hellyer  v.  P.  186  111.  (Tex.   Cv.  App.),  73  S.  W.  439. 
550,    58   N.    E.    245.  «  International    &    G.    N.    R.    Co. 

is  Britton    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,  v.  Locke  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  67  S.  W. 

120  Mo.  437,  25  S.  W.  366.     See  gen-  1082.     See  Elledge  v.  National  City 

erally:     Richmond   Traction   Co.    v.  &   O.    R.   Co.   100   Cal.   282,   34   Pac. 

Wilkinson  (Va.),  42  S.  E.  622;  Mai-  720-852. 
len  v.  Waldowiski,  203  111.  87,  67  N. 


§  195 


FACTS   ASSUMED. 


178 


On  a  charge  of  keeping  a  saloon  open  on  Sunday  in  violation 
of  law  an  instruction  stating  that  it  makes  no  difference  whether 
the  defendant  sold  any  liquor  or  not,  he  has  no  right  to  let 
persons  into  the  saloon,  does  not  assume  that  the  defendant 
allowed  persons  to  enter  the  saloon  on  Sunday.17  An  instruc- 
tion charging  that  if  the  defendant  wilfully  assaulted  the  plain- 
tiff the  jury  may  assess  vindictive  damages  is  not  subject  to 
the  criticism  that  it  assumes  that  an  assault  was  made.18 

§  195.    Assuming  facts  when  evidence  is  close  or  conflicting. 

Where  the  evidence  is  close19  or  conflicting,  instructions  which 
assume  the  existence  of  controverted  facts  are  improper  and 
erroneous;20  especially  are  such  instructions  erroneous  where 
the  evidence  is  conflicting  on  a  vital  point  in  the  case.21  Thus, 
where  an  injury  to  the  person  becomes  a  material  fact  in  issue, 


"  P.  v.  Bowkus,  109  Mich.  360,  67 
N.  W.  319. 

is  Bailey  v.  McCance  (Va.),  32  S. 
E.  43.  See  Bond  v.  P.  39  111.  26. 

10  Mohr  v.  Kinnane,  85  111.  App. 
447;  Myer  v.  Myer,  86  111.  App. 
417;  Conners  v.  Chingren,  111  Iowa, 
437,  82  N.  W.  934;  Steinmeyer  v.  P. 
95  111.  388;  Holloway  v.  Johnson, 
129  111.  369,  21  N.  B.  798. 

20  Means   v.   Gridley,   164   Pa.   St. 
387,  30  Atl.  390;   Hutton  v.  Doxsee, 
116  Iowa,  13,  89  N.  W.  79;   Goss  v. 
Colkins,    162    Mass.    492,    39    N.    E. 
469;   Wilber  v.  Wilber,  129  111.  396, 
21  N.  E.  1076;  Mahaffey  v.  Ferguson, 
156  Pa.  St.  156,  27  Atl.  21;   Lyle  v. 
Mclnnis    (Miss.),    17    So.    510.      See 
Commercial   F.   Ins.   Co.   v.   Morris, 
105    Ala.    498,    18    So.    34;    Bradley 
v.   Ohio  River  &  C.   R.   Co.   126  N. 
Car.    735,   36   S.   E.    181;    Baltimore 
Consol.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  91  Md.  506,  40 
Atl.  1000;  Luckie  v.  Schneider  (Tex. 
Cv.   App.),   57  S.  W.   690;    Richard- 
son  v.    Dybedall    (S.    Dak.),    98   N. 
W.    164. 

21  Chicago   &   A.   R.   Co.   v.   Ray- 
burn,    153    111.    290,    33    N.    E.    558, 
Eller   v.    P.    153    111.    347,    38   N.    E. 
660;    Cannon   v.   P.    141   111.   283,   30 
N.    E.    1027;    Coleman   v.    Adair,    75 
Miss.  660,  23  So.  369;  Owen  v.  Long, 
97  Wis.  78,  72  N.  W.  364;    Scott  v. 
P.  141  111.  211,  30  N.  E.  329;  Griffin 


v.  White,  52  N.  Y.  S.  807;  Gaines  v. 
McAlister,  122  N.  Car.  340,  29  S.  E. 
844;  S.  v.  Johnson,  6  Kas.  App. 
119,  50  Pac.  907;  Germania  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Klewer,  129  111.  611,  22 
N.  E.  489;  Brown  v.  S.  72  Miss.  997, 
17  So.  278;  P.  v.  Long,  104  Cal.  363, 
37  Pac.  1031;  S.  v.  Buralli  (Nev.), 
71  Pac.  532;  Bumgardner  v.  South- 
ern R.  Co.  132  N.  Car.  438,  43  S.  E. 
948;  Willis  v.  S.  134  Ala.  429,  33 
So.  226;  Bohlraan  v.  S.  135  Ala.  45, 
33  So.  44;  Finch  v.  Bergins,  89  Ind. 
360  (assuming  that  a  party  made 
admissions) ;  Densmore  v.  S.  67 
Ind.  306;  Jackson  v.  S.  71  Ind.  149 
(assuming  that  a  crime  was  com- 
mitted) ;  Huffman  v.  Cauble,  86  Ind. 
591;  Moore  v.  S.  65  Ind.  382;  Barker 
v.  S.  48  Ind.  163;  Matthews  v.  Story, 
54  Ind.  417;  Wood  v.  Steinau,  9  S. 
Dak.  110,  68  N.  W.  160;  Blue  V.  L. 
Co.  v.  Smith,  48  Neb.  293,  67  N. 
W.  159;  Worswick  v.  Hunt,  106  Ala. 
559,  18  So.  74;  S.  v.  Lewis,  56  Kas. 
374,  43  Pac.  265;  Wall  v.  Good- 
enough,  16  111.  415;  Bradley  v. 
Coobaugh,  91  111.  148,  151;  Chicago, 
W.  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Mills,  91  111.  39; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin, 
68  111.  499,  507;  Cusick  v.  Campbell, 
68  111.  508;  Ward  v.  Odell  Mfg.  Co. 
123  N.  Car.  248,  31  S.  E.  495;  Morton 
v.  Harvey,  57  Neb.  304,  77  N.  W. 
808;  Bates  v.  Harte,  124  Ala.  427, 


179 


ASSUMING,  WHEN   EVIDENCE   CLOSE. 


§  195 


an  instruction  which  assumes  that  the  person's  spine  was  injured, 
when  the  evidence  as  to  such  fact  is  conflicting,  is  erroneous.22 
A  charge  that  if  the  jury  find  for  the  plaintiff  they  should 
give  damages  in  such  an  amount  as  they  believe  will  com- 
pensate the  plaintiff  for  permanent  injury,  is  improper  when  the 
question  of  permanent  injury  is  in  dispute,  in  that  it  assumes 


26  So.  898;    Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Anderson,  184  111.  294,  56  N.  E.  331; 
Wellman    v.    Jones,    124    Ala.    580, 

27  So.   416;    Pacific  M.   L.   Ins.   Co. 
v.    Walker,   67   Ark.    147,    53    S.   W. 
675;  Duffield  v.  Delaney,  36  111.  258, 
261;    Conkwright   v.    P.   35   111.   204, 
207;   Dean  v.  Ross,  105  Cal.  227,  38 
Pac.    912;    Fleming   v.   Wilmington 
&   W.    R.    Co.    115    N.    Car.    676,   20 
S.   E.   714;    Nashville,   C.    &   St.   L. 
R.   Co.  v.   Hammond,   104  Ala.   191, 
15  So.  935;  Terry  v.  Beatrice  Starch 
Co.  43  Neb.  866,  62  N.  W.  255;  White 
v.  Van  Horn,  159  U.  S.  1,  15  Sup.  Ct. 
1027;    Schultz  v.  Schultz,  113  Mich. 
502,  71  N.  W.  854;  Metropolitan  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  McClure,  58  Kas.  109,  48 
Pac.  566;  Maddox  v.  Newport  News 
&  M.  V.  Co.  18  Ky.  L.  R.  635,  37  S. 
W.  494;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    39    S.   W. 
326;    McCallon  v.   Cohen    (Tex.   Cv. 
App.),    39    S.    W.    973;     Griffith    v. 
Bergeson,  115   Iowa,  279,  88  N.  W. 
451;    Cleveland,   C.   C.   &  St.   L.   R. 
Co.    v.    Best,    169    111.    301,    310,    48 
N.  E.  684;  City  of  Chicago  v.  Moore, 
139  111.  201,  208,  28  N.  E.  1071;  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Boderner, 
139  111.  596,  603,  29  N.  E.  692;   Illi- 
nois   Steel    Co.    v.    Schymanowski, 
162  111.  447,  461,  44  N.  E.  876;  West 
C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Estep,  162  111.  131, 
44    N.    E.    404;    Peoria   &   P.    N.    R. 
Co.    v.    Tamplin,    156    111.    285,    300, 
40  N.  E.  960;   Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
v.   Sanders,  154   111.   531,  537,  39  N. 
E.  481;   Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co. 
v.  Parker,  131  111.  557,  566,  23  N.  E. 
237;   Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hutchinson,  120  111.  587,  592,  11  N. 
E.  855;   Doyle  v.  S.  39  Fla.  155,  22 
So>   272;    Williamson  v.   Tyson,  105 
Ala.    644,    17    So.    336;    Louisville   & 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  York,  128  Ala.  305,  30 


S.  E.  676;  New  York,  P.  &  N.  R.  Co. 
v.  Jones,  94  Md.  24,  50  Atl.  423; 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sanchez  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  65  S.  W. 
893;  Braden  v.  Cook,  18  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  156;  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Am- 
mons  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  26  S.  W.  135; 
St.  Louis,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis  U.  Stock  Yards  (Mo.),  29  S. 
W.  399;  Sample  v.  Rand,  112  Iowa, 
616,  84  N.  W.  683;  Wadsworth  v. 
Dunnam,  98  Ala.  610,  13  So.  597; 
Freeman  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 
95  Mo.  App.  314,  68  S.  W.  1057;  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  24  S.  W.  918;  Stead- 
man  v.  Keets,  129  Mich.  669,  89  N. 
W.  555;  Duff  v.  Com.  24  Ky.  L.  R. 
201,  68  S.  W.  370  (selling  liquor); 
Rogers  v.  Manhattan  Life  Ins.  Co. 
138  Cal.  285,  71  Pac.  348;  Smith  v. 
Dukes,  5  Minn.  373.  See  generally: 
Eller  v.  P.  153  111.  347,  38  N.  E. 
660;  Hellyer  v.  P.  186  111.  550,  58 
N.  E.  245:  Cannon  v.  P.  141  111. 
282,  30  N.  E.  1027;  Hoge  v.  P.  117 
111.  46,  6  N.  E.  796;  Barr  v.  P.  113 
111.  473;  Chambers  v.  P.  105  111. 
417;  Com.  v.  McMahon,  145  Pa.  St. 
413,  22  Atl.  971;  S.  v.  Mackey,  12 
Ore.  154,  6  Pac.  648,  5  Am.  Cr.  R. 
536,  Metz  v.  S.  46  Neb.  547,  65  N.  W. 
190;  P.  v.  Bowkus,  109  Mich.  360, 
67  N.  W.  319;  Newton  v.  S.  (Miss.), 
12  So.  560:  P.  v.  Hertz,  105  Cal. 
660,  39  Pac.  32;  S.  v.  Wheeler,  79 
Mo.  366;  Underhill  Cr.  Ev.  §  279. 
An  instruction  which  assumes  dis- 
puted facts  as  illustrations  of  the 
la/w,  which  does  not  state  the  facts 
hypothetically,  is  improper  as  be- 
ing a  charge  on  the  evidence,  Jones 
v.  Charleston  &  W.  C.  R.  Co.  61  S. 
Car.  556,  .39  S.  E.  758. 

22  Fullerton   v.    Fordyce,   121   Mo. 
1,   25   S.   W.  587. 


§  196 


FACTS   ASSUMED. 


180 


that  such  injury  has  been  established.23  Also,  the  giving  of 
an  instruction  which  assumes  that  certain  machinery  is  a  part 
of  the  real  estate  on  which  it  is  located  is  improper,  where  the 
fact  as  to  whether  the  machinery  was  or  was  not  a  fixture  was 
in  dispute.24  Also,  where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  defendant 
denies  being  indebted  to  the  plaintiff  it  is  error  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  the  defendant  admits  such  indebtedness.25 

§  196.  Instructions  may  assume  facts — When. — But  where  a 
material  fact  is  conclusively  shown  by  undisputed  evidence,  or 
is  admitted  to  be  true,  then  the  giving  of  an  instruction  which 
assumes  that  such  fact  has  been  established  is  not  error,  and 
affords  no  ground  for  complaint  on  the  giving  of  instructions.26 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  48  S.  W. 
542;  Ellis  v.  Stewart  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  24  S.  W.  585;  San  Antonio  & 
A  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  20  Tex. 
136,  49  S.  W.  147;  Truxton  v.  Dait 
Stayle  Co.  (Del.),  42  Atl.  431;  Lit- 
tle v.  Town  of  Iron  River,  102  Wis. 
250,  78  N.  W.  416;  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  v.  Warren,  19  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  463,  49  S.  W.  254;  Spigner  v. 
S.  103  Ala.  30,  15  So.  892;  Brown 
v.  Emerson,  66  Mo.  App.  63;  Burt 
v.  Long,  106  Mich.  210,  64  N.  W. 
60.  But  see  Byers  v.  Wallace,  88 
Texas,  503,  28  So.  1056  (facts  not 
conclusive) ;  S.  v.  Drumm,  156  Mo. 
216,  56  S.  W.  1086;  Whitney  v.  S. 
154  Ind.  573,  57  N.  E.  398;  Tyler  v. 
Tyler,  78  Mo.  App.  240;  Wilkerson 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  57  S.  W. 
956;  Torres  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
55  S.  W.  828;  Barkley  v.  Barkley 
Cemetery  Asso.  15>3  Mo.  300,  54  S. 
W.  482;  Bertram  v.  Peoples  R.  Co. 
154  Mo.  639,  55  S.  W.  1040;  Keener 
v.  S.  98  Ind.  13;  Marshall  v.  Morris, 
16  Ga.  368.  376;  Roberts  v.  Mans- 
field, 32  Ga.  228;  Jeffries  v.  S.  61 
Ark.  308,  32  S.  W.  108,0;  S.  v. 
Bone,  114  Iowa,  537,  87  N.  W.  507; 
Board  v.  Legg,  110  Ind.  480,  11  N. 
E.  612;  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  William- 
son, 104  Ind.  157,  3  N.  E.  814;  Smith 
v.  S.  28  Ind.  321;  Stephenson  v. 
Wright,  111  Ala.  579,  20  So.  622; 
Wiborg  v.  U.  S.  163  U.  S.  632,  16 
Sup.  Ct.  1127;  Louisville,  E.  &  St. 
L.  C.  R.  v.  Utz,  133  Ind.  265,  32 
N.  E.  881;  Holliday  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr. 


23  Houston    City    St.    R.    Co.    v. 
Artusey   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  31  S.  W. 
319. 

24  Mundine  v.  Pauls,  28  Tex.  Cv. 
App.   46,   66   S.   W.   254. 

25  Aliunde  Consul  Min.  Co.  v.  Ar- 
nold   (Colo.    App.),    67   Pac.    28. 

26  Illinois  Cent.   R.    Co.   v.    King, 
179  111.  96,  53  N.  E.  552;    Gerke  v. 
Fancher,  158  111.  385,  41  N.  E.  982; 
Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  206  111. 
318,  68  N.  E.  1087;   North  C.  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Honsinger,  175  111.  318,  51  N. 
E.  613;   Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Al- 
len, 169  111.  287,  48  N.  E.  414;  Wil- 
liams v.  P.  164  111.  482,  45  N.  E.  987; 
Quinn  v.   P.   123   111.   343,   15   N.   E. 
46;    Wallace   v.   De   Young,   98    111. 
638;    Chicago   Screw   Co.   v.   Weiss, 
203   111.   539,   68  M.   E.   54;    Citizens' 
Ins.    Co.   v.    Stoddard,   197   111.    331, 
64   N.   E.   355;    Cupps  v.   S.    (Wis.). 
97  N.   W.   216;    First  Nat.   Bank  v. 
Bower    (Neb.),   98   N.   W.    836;    Lee 
v.    O'Quinn,    103    Ga.    355,    30    S.   E. 
356;    S.   v.    Gorham,   67   Vt.   365,   31 
Atl.  845;  Terrell  v.  Russell,  .16  Tex. 
Cv.  App.  573,  42  S.  W.  129;  County 
of  Cook  v.  Harms,  108  111.  151,  163: 
Hill   v.    S.    42    Neb.    503,    60   N.    W. 
916;    St.   Louis,   J.   &   S.   R.   Co.   v. 
Kirby,  104  111.  345,  349;   Morgan  v. 
S.  51  Neb.  672,  71  N.  W.  788;   Cen- 
tral   Georgia    R.    Co.    v.    Johnston, 
106   Ga.   130,  32   S.  E.   78;    Drennen 
v.   Smith,  115  Ala.  396,  22  So.  442; 
North   C.   St.   R.   Co. '  v.   Honsinger, 
175  111.  318,  51  N.  E.  613;  San  Anto- 
nio   &    A.    P.    R.    Co.    v.    Griffin 


181 


FACTS  PROPERLY  ASSUMED. 


196 


Thus  an  instruction  which  assumes  that  the  plaintiff's  leg  was 
injured,  is  not  material  error  where  the  fact  of  such  injury 
was  not  disputed  on  the  trial.27  Or,  in  other  words,  where  a 
fact  is  so  conclusively  proved  by  undisputed  testimony  that 
but  one  conclusion  can  be  reached  from  the  evidence  the  court 
may  assume  such  fact  as  having  been  established.28  And  al- 
though a  material  fact  may  be  disputed,  yet  if  all  the  evidence 
can  lead  to  no  other  conclusion  than  the  truth  of  the  fact,  the 
court  may,  in  giving  instructions,  assume  such  fact  to  be  true.29 
Where  a  fact  is  so  clearly  established  by  the  evidence  that 
the  court  would  be  warranted  in  giving  a  peremptory  instruc- 
tion on  the  subject,  an  instruction  assuming  such  fact  is  not 
for  that  reason  erroneous.30 


App.  133,  32  S.  W.  538.  See  also 
McGee  v.  Smitherman,  69  Ark.  632, 
65  S.  W.  461;  Hall  v.  Incorporated 
Town,  &c.  90  Iowa,  585,  58  N.  W. 
881,  McLane  v.  Maurer,  28  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  75,  66  S.  W.  693;  Gulf,  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Pierce,  7  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
597,  25  S.  W.  1052;  Mattingly  v. 
Lewisohn,  13  Mont.  508,  35  Pac. 
Ill;  Byers  v.  Wallace  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  25  S.  W.  1043;  Reliance  T.  & 
D.  Works  v.  Martin.  23  Ky.  L.  R. 
1625,  65  S.  W.  809;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F. 
R.  Co.  v.  Wilbanks,  7  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
489,  27  S.  W.  302;  Welden  v.  Omaha, 
K.  C.  &  E.  R.  Co.  93  Mo.  App.  668, 
67  S.  W.  698;  Citizens'  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Stoddard,  197  111.  330,  64  N.  E.  355; 
International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Locke  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  67  S.  W. 
1082;  S.  v.  Nickels,  65  S.  Car.  169, 
43  S.  E.  521;  Parks  v.  St.  Louis  & 
S.  R.  Co.  (Mo.),  77  S.  W.  70;  Mc- 
Ayeal  v.  Gullett,  202  111.  214;  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrod,  25  Ky. 
L.  R.  250,  75  S.  W.  233. 

27  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  McDon- 
nell, 194  111.  82,  62  N.  E.  308.  See 
Gran  v.  Houston,  45  Neb.  813,  64 
N.  W.  245;  Taylor  v.  Scherpe  &  K. 
A.  I.  Co.  133  Mo.  349,  34  S.  W. 
581;  Black  v.  Rocky  Mountain  B.  T. 
Co.  (Utah),  73  Pac.  514;  McCullough 
v.  Armstrong  (Ga.),  45  S.  E.  379; 
Thayer  County  Bank  v.  Huddleson 


(Neb.),   95   N.   W.   471;    Vogeler   v. 
Devries   (Md.),  56  Atl.  782. 

28  Wright   v.    Hardie,     (Tex.    Cv. 
App.),    30    S.    W.    675;    Rollings    v. 
Bankers'  Union,  63  S.  Car.  192,  41  S. 
E.  90;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 
v.    Jenkins,    29    Tex.    Cv.    App.    440, 
69    S.    W.    233;    Gavigan   v.    Evans, 
45  Mich.  597,  8  N.  W.  545;  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Sargent   (Neb.),  91  N.  W. 
595;   Morgan  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
67  S.  W.  420;  Northwestern  Fuel  Co. 
v.    Danielson,    57    Fed.    915;    Texas 
&c.    R,    Co.    v.    Gentry,    163    U.  S. 
353,  16  Sup.  Ct.  1104;  Muir  v.  Miller, 
82   Iowa,  700,   47  N.  W.   1011,  48  N. 
W.  1032;  Douglass  v.  Geiler,  32  Kas. 
499,  5  Pac.  178;  McLellon  v.  Wheel- 
er, 70  Me.  285;  P.  v.  Lee  Sare  Bo,  72 
Cal.  623,  14  Pac.  310;  Hogan  v.  Shu- 
art,  11  Mont.  498,  28  Pac.  736;  Val- 
entine v.  Sweatt  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  78 
S.  W.  385;   Dallas  R.  Tr.  R.  Co.  v. 
Payne    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    78   S.    W. 
1085. 

29  Toole   v.    Bearce,    91    Me.    209, 
39  Atl.  558;  Ragan  v.  Kansas  City, 
S.   &  E.   R.   Co.   144  Mo.   623,   46   S. 
W.    602;    Half  man   v.   Pennsylvania 
Boiler  Ins.   Co.   160  Pa.   St.   202,  28 
Atl.    837;    Cook   County   v.   Harms, 
108   111.   151;    Chicago,   St.   L.   &  P. 
R.   Co.  v.  Spilker,  134  Ind.   380,  33 
N.   E.   280. 

so  Thompson  v.   Brannin,   19   Ky. 
L.  R.  454,  40  S.  W.  914. 


§    .197  FACTS   ASSUMED.  182 

But  the  fact  that  the  evidence  on  a  material  issue  is  all  on  one 
side  does  not  authorize  the  court  to  direct  the  jury  that  it  proves 
a  controverted  fact.  Thus  in  an  action  against  a  railroad  com- 
pany for  the  value  of  stock  killed  by  it,  where  the  plaintiff  was 
the  only  witness  who  testified  as  to  the  value  of  the  stock  killed, 
it  was  held  improper  for  the  court  to  direct  the  jury  to  find  the 
value  to  be  the  amount  testified  to  by  the  plaintiff.  In  such 
state  of  the  case  the  jury  are  not  bound  to  believe  the  plaintiff, 
though  no  evidence  was  introduced  to  contradict  him.31 

§  197.  Facts  admitted  by  both  parties. — Where  a  fact  is  ad- 
mitted by  both  of  the  parties  to  the  suit  the  court  in  charg- 
ing the  jury  may  in  direct  terms  state  that  such  fact  is 
admitted.32  But,  of  course,  it  is  error  to  instruct  that  a  material 
fact  is  admitted  if  there  is  no  evidence  of  such  admission.33 
Facts  which  are  admitted  by  the  pleadings  or  parties  should 
not  be  submitted  to  the  jury  for  determination  as  though  in 
dispute.34  And  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  fact  is  affirmed 
by  one  party  in  his  pleadings  and  not  denied  by  the  other,  the 
court  may,  in  giving  instructions,  assume  such  fact  to  be  true.35 

§  198.  Assuming-  facts  in  criminal  cases. — While  it  is  the 
better  practice  for  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  in  a  criminal 
case  to  avoid  assuming  any  material  fact  as  having  been  proved, 
however  clear  to  the  mind  of  the  court  such  fact  may  seem 
to  be  established,36  yet  facts  about  which  there  is  no  dispute  and 

si  Choctaw,  O.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  istence'of  facts  of  common  knowl- 
Deperade  (Okl.),  71  Pac.  629.  See  edge  about  which  there  is  no  con- 
Foster  v  Franklin  L.  Ins.  Co.  (Tex.  troversy  is  not  error,  Harris  v. 
Cv.  App.),  72  S.  W.  91;  P.  v.  Web-  Shebeck,  151  111.  287,  37  N.  E.  1015. 
ster,  111  Cal.  381,  43  Pac.  1114.  34  Miles  v.  Walker  (Neb.),  92  N. 

32  Cooper  v.   Denver  &  R.   G.  R.  W.      1014;      Trager     v.      Shepherd 

Co.   11  Utah,   46,  39  Pac.   478;    Ste-  (Miss.),  18  So.  122;   Orth  v.  Clutz's 

phens  v.   Porter,  29  Tex.   Cv.   App.  Adm'r,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.),  223;  Wiley 

556,  69  S.  W.  423;    S.  v.  Angel,  29  v.  Man-a-to-wah,  6  Kas.  Ill;  Stew- 

N.    Car.    27;    Driver   v.   Board,   &c.  art  v.  Nelson,  79  Mo.  522;   Com.  v. 

70  Ark.  358,  68  S.  W.  26;    Blaul  v.  Ruddle,  142  Pa.  St.  144,  21  Atl.  814; 

Tharp,  83  Iowa,  665,  49  N.  W.  1044;  Bellefontaine  R.   Co.  v.   Snyaer,  24 

S.   v.   Pritchard,   16   Nev.   101;    San  Ohio   St.    670;    Wintz   v.    Morrison, 

Antonio  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  lies   (Tex.  17  Tex.  387;   Druse  v.  Wheeler.  26 

Cv.  App.),  59  S.  W.  564;  Galveston,  Mich.    189. 

H.  &  S.  A.  R.   Co.  v.   Lynes   (Tex.  35  Bussey  v.  Charleston  &  W.  C. 

Cv.  App.),  65  S.  W.  1119.  R.  Co.  52  S.  Car.  438,  30  S.  E.  477; 

ss  C/ocoran  v.  Lehigh  Coal  Co.  138  Riser  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  (S.  Car.), 

111.   399,  28  N.   E.  759.     The  giving  46  S.  E.   51. 

of  an  instruction  assuming  the  ex-  se  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3250,  citing: 


183 


ASSUMING   IN    CRIMINAL    CASES. 


198 


concerning  which  no  issue  is  made,  may  properly  be  called  to 
the  attention  of  the  jury  in  the  giving  of  instructions.37  Thus 
in  a  homicide  case,  where  the  fact  that  the  defendant,  and  no 
one  else,  fired  the  fatal  shot  is  admitted,  an  instruction  assuming 
that  the  shooting  took  place  is  not  objectionable;38  or  an  in- 
struction assuming  the  fact  of  the  killing  is  not  prejudicial  error 
where  there  is  no  dispute  that  the  killing  was  done  by  the 
defendant.39  But  where  the  fact  of  the  killing  is  controverted 
then  an  instruction  assuming  such  fact  is  prejudicial  error.40 


P.  v.  Dick,  32  Cal.  216;  S.  v.  Whit- 
ney, 7  Ore.  386;  S.  v.  Mackey,  12 
Ore.  154,  6  Pac.  648,  5  Am.  Cr.  R. 
536. 

37  S.  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153,  17  Atl. 
483,  8  Am.  Cr.  R.  219;  Davis  v.  P. 
114  111.  86,  29  N.  E.  192;  Williams  v. 
P.  164  111.  483,  45  N.  E.  987;  Hol- 
liday  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  133,  32  S. 
W.  538;  S.  v.  Gorham,  67  Vt.  365,  31 
Atl.  845,  10  Am.  Cr.  R.  28;  S.  v. 
Day,  79  Me.  120,  8  Atl.  544;  P. 
v.  Sternberg,  111  Cal.  3,  43  Pac.  198; 
S.  v.  Home,  9  Kas.  119,  1  Green 
Cr.  R.  722;  S.  v.  Aughtry,  49  S. 
Car.  285,  26  S.  E.  619,  27  S.  E.  199; 
Hawkins  v.  S.  136  Ind.  630,  36  N.  E. 
419;  Underbill  Cr.  Ev.  §  277;  Ber- 
tram v.  Peoples  R.  Co.  154  Mo. 
639,  55  S.  W.  1040. 

ss  Whitney  v.  S.  154  Ind.  573,  57 
N.  E.  398;  S.  v.  Holloway,  156  Mo. 
222,  56  S.  W.  734;  Hanrohan  v.  P. 
91  111.  142;  Genz  v.  S.  58  N.  J.  L. 
482,  34  Atl.  816.  The  court  may 
charge  that  the  killing  is  conceded. 

39  P.    v.    Pullman,    129    Cal.    258, 
61  Pac.  961;  S.  v.  Holloway,  156  Mo. 
222,  56  S.  W.  734;    Davis  v.  P.  114 
111.   97,  29   N.  E.   192;    Weller  v.   S. 
19   Ohio  C.   C.   166.   See  S.  v.   Med- 
lin,  126  N.  Car.  1127,  36  S.  E.  344. 

40  Cannon  v.   P.   141  111.  270,  282, 
30  N.  E.  1027;  Weller  v.  S.  19  Ohio 
C.   C.   166;    Reins  v.  P.   30  111.  256, 
274;    S.    v.   Marsh,   171   Mo.    523,   71 
S.  W.  1003  (defendant  denied  being 
present);   Gee  v.  S.  80  Miss.  285,  31 
So.  792.    Instructions  held  assuming 
facts:     Barr  v.  P.  113  111.  471,  473; 
S.  v.  Reed,  50  La.  Ann.  990,  24  So. 
131;   Hayes  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co. 
195  Pa.  St.  184,  45  Atl.  925;  Dart  v. 
Horn,  20  111.  213;  P.  v.  Dom  Pedro, 


43  N.  Y.  S.  44,  19  Misc.  300;  S.  v. 
Bowker,  26  Ore.  309,  38  Pac.  124; 
Frank  v.  Tatum  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
26  S.  W.  900;  Dallas  &  O.  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Harvey  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  27  S.  W. 
423;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Green- 
wood, 99  Ala.  501,  14  So.  495;  Land- 
man  v.  Glover  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  25 
S.  W.  994;  Ohlweiler  v.  Lohman, 
88  Wis.  75,  59  N.  W.  678;  La  Salle 
County  C.  Coal  Co.  v.  Eastman,  99 
111.  App.  495;  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
Healy,  100  111.  App.  586;  Bonaparte 
v.  Thayer,  95  Md.  548,  52  Atl.  496; 
St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Silbey 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  68  S.  W.  516;  Hall 
v.  S.  130  Ala.  45,  30  So.  422;  Lee  v. 
Hammond,  114  Wis.  550,  90  N.  W. 
1073;  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  123  111.  184,  14  N.  E.  197; 
City  of  Elgin  v.  Beckwith,  119  111. 
367,  10  N.  E.  558;  Commercial  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Proctor,  98  111.  562.  In- 
structions held  not  assuming  facts 
in  the  following  cases:  Bartlett  v. 
Board  of  Education,  59  111.  364,  373; 
Western  M.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Boughton, 
136  111.  317,  320,  26  N.  E.  591;  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson, 
135  111.  641,  652,  26  N.  E.  510;  Chi- 
cago &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Goebel, 
119  111.  515,  521,  10  N.  E.  369;  Chica- 
go, St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Welsh, 
118  111.  572,  575,  9  N.  E.  197;  Roark 
v.  S.  105  Ga.  736,  32  S.  E.  125; 
Bird  v.  Forceman,  62  111.  212,  215; 
Nugent  v.  Brenchard,  157  N.  Y.  687, 
51  N.  E.  1092;  Freeman  v.  Gates, 
22  Tex.  Cv.  App.  623,  55  S.  W.  524; 
Dammann  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  152 
Mo.  186,  53  S.  W.  932;  Triolo  v. 
Foster  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  57  S.  W. 
698;  International  G.  &  N.  R.  Co. 
v.  Martineg  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  57  S. 


198 


FACTS   ASSUMED. 


184 


And  this  is  true  in  all  jurisdictions,  and  is  a  well  settled  prin- 
ciple. 


W.  689;  Sherman,  S.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bell  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  58  S.  W.  147; 
Ryder  v.  Jacobs,  196  Pa.  St.  386,  46 
Atl.  667;  Jackson  v.  Burnham,  20 
Colo.  532,  39  Pac.  577;  Robinson 
v.  S.  (Miss.),  16  So.  201;  P.  v.  Mal- 
lon,  103  Cal.  513,  37  Pac.  512;  Hans 
v.  S.  50  Neb.  150,  69  N.  W.  838; 
S.  v.  Straub,  16  Wash.  Ill,  47  Pac. 
227;  Welsh  v.  S.  60  Neb.  101,  82 
N.  W.  368;  Conners  v.  S.  95  Wis. 
77,  69  N.  W.  981;  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Buch,  27  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  283,  65  S.  W.  681;  Throck- 
morten  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
14  Tex.  Cv.  App.  222,  39  S.  W.  174; 
Texas  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Echols,  17 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  677,  41  S.  W.  488; 
Geary  v.  Kansas  City,  O.  &  S.  R. 
Co.  138  Mo.  257,  39  S.  W.  774; 
Sonnefield  v.  Mayton  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  39  S.  W.  166;  Missouri,  K. 
&  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Mines  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  40  S.  W.  152;  Texas  &  N.  O. 


R.  Co.  v.  Echols,  17  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
677,  41  S.  W.  488;  Rapid  Tr.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lusk  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  66  S.  W. 
799;  Wreggitt  v.  Barnett,  99  Mich. 
477,  58  N.  W.  467;  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.  v.  Turner,  194  111.  575,  62  N.  E. 
798;  Crockett  v.  Miller,  112  Fed. 
729;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Poole's 
Adm'r,  100  Va.  148,  40  S.  E.  627; 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward, 
61  Fed.  927;  Moore  v.  S.  114  Ga.  256, 
40  S.  E.  295;  Williams  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr 
App.),  65  S.  W.  1059;  Tunnicliffe 
v.  Fox  (Neb.),  94  N.  W.  1032;  P. 
v.  Lapique  (Cal.),  67  Pac.  14;  Lyon 
v.  Watson,  109  Mich.  390,  67  N.  W. 
512;  Fitzgerald  v.  Clark,  17  Mont. 
100,  42  Pac.  273>;  Nugent  v.  Breu- 
chard,  36  N.  Y.  S.  102,  91  Hun,  12; 
Comey  v.  Philadelphia  Tr.  Co.  175 
Pa.  St.  133,  34  Atl.  621;  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Waldo  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  32  S.  W.  783;  Richmond 
v.  Traction  Co.  (Va.),  43  S.  E.  622. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF. 


Sec. 

199.     Instructions  that  burden  is  on 
affirmant. 


Sec. 

202.    Instructions     when     evidence 
is   equally   balanced. 


200.    Degree    of    proof    by    prepon-      203.     Preponderance  —  How  deter- 


derance. 

201.    Burden    and    degree   of   proof 
in  criminal  cases. 


mined  —  Witnesses. 


§  199.  Instruction  that  burden  is  on  affirmant — The  party 
who,  by  his  pleading,  alleges  a  fact  or  state  of  facts  is  required 
to  prove  the  same  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  and  the 
court,  on  proper  request,  should  so  instruct  the  jury.  Thus 
the  plaintiff  is  on  the  affirmative  as  to  the  facts  alleged 
in  his  complaint  or  declaration,  and  the  court  should  instruct  the 
jury  that  the  burden  is  on  him  to  make  out  his  case  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence.1  And  in  some  cases  at  least  it  is 
not  improper  to  instruct  that  the  plaintiff  must  prove  all  the 
material  facts  of  his  complaint  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evi- 
dence.2 But  where  the  plaintiff's  petition  or  declaration  alleges 


i  Mitchell  v.  Hindman,  150  111. 
538,  37  N.  E.  916;  Central  R.  Co. 
v.  Bannister,  195  111.  50,  62  N.  E. 
864;  De  Hart  v.  Bond,  143  Ind.  363, 
41  N.  E.  825;  Williams  v.  Hoehle,  95 
Wis.  510,  70  N.  W.  556;  Flores  v. 
Maverick  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  26  S. 
W.  316;  Meyer  v.  Blackmore,  54 
Miss.  575;  Fowler  v.  Harrison,  64  S. 
Car.  311,  42  S.  E.  159;  Guimard  v. 
Knapp,  Stout  &  Co.  95  Wis.  482, 
70  N.  W.  671.  See  Jesse  French 
Piano  &  Organ  Co.  v.  Forbes,  134 


Ala.  302,  32  So.  678  (excluding  un- 
certainty). 

2  Salem  Stone,  &c.  Co.  v.  Griffin, 
139  Ind.  141,  38  N.  E.  411;  De 
Hart  v.  Board,  143  Ind.  363,  41  N. 
E.  825.  In  a  personal  injury  case 
the  burden  of  proof  does  not  shift 
to  the  defendant  on  proof  of  the 
injury.  The  plaintiff  must  prove, 
not  only  the  injury,  but  also  that 
it  was  caused  by  the  negligence  ot 
the  defendant,  Peck  v.  St.  Louis 
Tr.  Co.  (Mo.),  77  S.  W.  736. 


185 


§  199  BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  186 

several  material  facts,  the  proof  of  any  one  of  which  would 
make  out  his  case  (for  instance,  several  different  grounds  of 
negligence),  then  such  an  instruction  would  be  improper.  Only 
so  many  of  the  material  facts  as  are  necessary  to  constitute  a 
cause  of  action  need  be  established.3 

Where  the  pleadings  put  several  facts  in  issue,  the  proof  of 
any  one  of  which  would  entitle  a  party  to  a  verdict,  an  instruc- 
tion calling  for  proof  of  all  of  such  facts  conjunctively  is  er- 
roneous.4 But  submitting  several  matters  conjunctively,  in- 
stead of  disjunctively  and  severally,  cannot  be  complained  of 
as  error  in  the  absence  of  a.  request  for  a  proper  instruction.5 
So  where  the  defendant,  by  his  pleading,  sets  up  affirmative  mat- 
ter in  his  plea  or  answer,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  have  the 
jury  instructed  that  the  burden  is  on  the  defendant  to  establish 
the  facts  thus  alleged,  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.6 
And  although  there  may  be  no  conflict  of  testimony  as  to  a 
material  fact,  it  is  not  error  to  charge  the  jury  that  the  party 
alleging  such  fact  must  prove  it  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
evidence.7 

But  the  party  upon  whom  rests  the  burden  of  proving  a 
material  fact  in  issue  is  not  confined  to  evidence  introduced  on 
his  side  of  the  case.  He  may  rely  upon  any  evidence  of  his 
opponent  to  aid  him.  It  matters  not  whether  the  evidence  is 
given  by  the  one  party  or  the  other;  it  is  sufficient  if  the  fact  is 
proved  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.8  Hence,  to  instruct 
the  jury  that  the  burden  of  proving  contributory  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  rests  on  the  defendant,  is  improper.9 
The  court  may,  however,  properly  refuse  instructions  on  the 
burden  of  proof  where  the  evidence  introduced  by  a  party  is 

s  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co  v.  Pat-  v.  Laumeister,  102  Cal.  658,  36  Pac. 

terson    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),    57    S.    W.  925;    Kepler  v.  Jessup,  11  Ind.  241. 

675.  *  Blotcky  v.  Caplan,  91  Iowa,  352, 

4  Bell  v.  Beazley,  18  Tex.  Cv.  App.  59  N.  W.  204.    See  Chittim  v.  Marti- 

639,  45  S.  W.  401;   Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  nez,  94  Tex.  141,  58  S.  W.  948.     See 

R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  95  Tex.  629,  69  S.  W.  Indianapolis    &    G.    R.    Tr.    Co.    v. 

136;    Wilson   v.    Huguenin,   117   Ga.  Haines   (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  188. 

546,  43  S.  E.  857;  Herbert  v.  Drew,  »  Indianapolis  &  G.  R.   T.  Co.  v. 

32  Ind.  366.  Haines  (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  188;  Chicago 

s  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Stephenson  (Ind.), 

95    Tex.    629,    69    S.    W.    136.  69  N.  E.  273. 

e  Whipple  v.  Preece,  18  Utah,  454,  a  Indianapolis  &  G.   R.   T.   Co.  v. 

56  Pac.  296;  Kuenster  v.  Woodhouse,  Haines  (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  188. 
101  Wis.  216,  77  N.  W.  165;   Nicbol 


187  BURDEN  ON  AFFIRMANT.  §    199 

uncontradicted.10  Or  where  a  fact  is  conclusively  established 
by  the  evidence  the  court  may  properly  refuse  to  instruct  on 
the  burden  of  proof.11  Also  the  refusal  to  charge  the  jury  on 
which  party  the  burden  of  proof  originally  rested  is  not  error 
where  the  evidence  conclusively  establishes  the  fact  in  issue.12 

But  when  a  party  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed  on 
the  law  as  to  the  burden  of  proof,  and  makes  proper  request 
therefor,  it  is  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  such  instructions.13 
However,  a  party  will  not  be  heard  to  complain  of  the  failure 
of  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  burden  of  proof  in  the 
absence  of  a  proper  request  in  that  respect.14  It  is  also  error 
for  the  court  -in  charging  the  jury  to  place  the  burden  of  proof 
on  the  wrong  party.15  But  if  a  party  assumes  the  burden  of 
an  issue,  which,  by  the  pleadings,  is  on  the  other  party,  he 
cannot  complain  of  error  in  that  respect.16 

Where  the  court  errs  in  charging  that  the  burden  of  proof 
is  on  the  defendant,  and  it  appears  that  the  plaintiff  success- 
fully carried  the  burden  by  his  proof,  the  error  is  not  material.17 
While  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  court,  in  charging  the  jury 
on  the  burden  of  proof,  should  define  preponderance  of^  evi- 
dence,18 yet  when  the  court  undertakes  to  do  so  the  instruc- 
tion defining  the  term  should  be  proper  and  applicable  to  the 

10  Milmo   Nat.   Bank   v.    Convery      113  Mich.  53,  71  N.  W.  523;  Martin 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  49  S.  W.  926;  Davis      v.    Davis,    76    Iowa,    762,    40   N.    W. 
v.   Davis,  20  Tex.   Cv.   App.  310,  49      712. 

S.  W.  726.  is  Wildey  v.   Crane,   69  Mich.   17, 

11  Yetter  v.  Zurick,  55  Minn.  452,      36  N.  W.  734;  S.  v.  Crossley,  69  Ind. 
57  N.  W.  147.  203;  S.  v.  Grinstead,  62  Kas.  593,  64 

is  Black   v.    S.   1   Tex.    App.   369;  Pac.  49;   McNutt  &  R.  v.  Kaufman, 

Stevens  v.  Pendleton,  94  Mich.  405,  26  Ohio  St.   130.     In  such  case  the 

53  N.  W.  1108.  court  will  not  look  to  the  evidence 

14  Miles  v.   Strong,  68  Conn.  273,  to  see  whether  it  sustains  the  ver- 

36  Atl.  55;  Donavan  v.  Bromley,  113  diet  returned,  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 

Mich.   53,  71  N.  W-  523;    Anderson  v.    Murphy,    198   111.    470,    64    N.    E. 

v.  Baird,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  444,  40  S.  W.  1011. 

923;    Lamina  v.  S.  46  Neb.  236,  64  ie  Armstrong    v.    Penn,    105    Ga. 

N.  W.  956.     The  court  is  not  bound  229,  31  S.  E.  158.     See  Freemont,  E. 

to  instruct  on  its  own  motion:  May-  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Harlin,  50  Neb. 

nard  v.  Fellows,  43  N.  H.  255;  Gulf,  698,  70  N.  W.  263,  36  L.  R.  A.  417. 

C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  McCarty,  82  Tex.  i"  Moore   v.    Brewer,   94   Ga.    260, 

608,    18    S.    W.    716;    McKinney    v.  21    S.   E.    460. 

Guhman,     38    Mo.     App.  344;    Dun-  is  Jones  v.   Durham,  94  Mo.   App. 

combe  v.   Powers,   75  Iowa,  185,  39  51,  67  S.  W.  976;  Endowment  Rank 

N.  W.  261;  Conway  v.  Jefferson,  46  K.    P.    v.    Steele,    108    Tenn.    624, 

N.  H.  521;   In  re  Bromley's  Estate,  69  S.  W.  336. 


200 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF. 


188 


evidence  before  the  jury.  It  is  improper  to  say  that  prepon- 
derance means  the  greater  weight  of  evidence,  to  be  determined 
from  a  careful  examination  of  all  the  evidence  "tendered"  where 
there  was  testimony  offered  but.  not  admitted.19 

§  200.  Degree  of  proof  by  preponderance. — As  stated  in  the 
preceding  section,  the  party  upon  whom  the  burden  rests  is 
required  to  establish  his  facts  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evi- 
dence. Hence  an  instruction  in  a  civil  case,  which  calls  for 
proof  by  a  greater  weight  of  evidence  than  by  a  preponder- 
ance, is  erroneous.20  Thus  an  instruction  exacting  proof  by  a 
"clear  preponderance,"21  or  by  a  "fair  preponderance,"22  or 
by  "more  and  better  evidence"  than  that  of  the  opposing  party, 
is  improper,  in  that  it  calls  for  a  higher  degree  of  proof  than  a 
preponderance  of  the  evidence.23  Also  a  charge  telling  the  jury 
that  the  evidence  should  "satisfy"  their  minds  to  warrant  a 
verdict,24  or  an  instruction  requiring  proof  to  the  "satisfac- 
tion" of  the  jury,25  or  that  the  evidence  must  "conclusively" 


isHurlbut  v.  Bagley,  99  Iowa, 
127,  68  N.  W.  585;  Western  U. 
Tel.  Co.  v.  James  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
73  S.  W.  79. 

20  White  v.  Ferris,  124  Ala.  461,  27 
So.  259;   Roe  v.  Bachelder,  41  Wis. 
360;    McCord-Brady   Co.   v.    Money- 
ban,    59    Neb.    593,    81    N.    W.    608; 
Long  v.  Martin,  152  Mo.  668,  54  S. 
W.  473;  Lundon  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
83    111.    App.    208;    Coffin    v.    U.    1. 
156     U.     S.     432,    15     Sup.    Ct.    394. 
Contra:  S.  v.  Linhoff  (Iowa),  97  N. 
W.  77.    See  Kirchner  v.  Collins,  152 
Mo.  394,  53  S.  W.  1081;    Herrick  v. 
Gary,   83   111.   85;    Guardian   Mutual 
Life   Ins.   Co.  v.  Hogan,  80  111.   35, 
41. 

21  Douley    v.    Dougherty,    75    111. 
App.  379;   Bitter  v.  Saathoff,  98  111. 
266;    Prather    v.    Wilkins,    68    Tex. 
187,  4  S.  W.  252;   Hall  v.  Wolff,  61 
Iowa,    559,   16  N.   710    (clearly   and 
fairly) ;      Meyer     v.      Hafemeister, 
(Wis.),  97  N.  W.   166. 

22  Atkinson     v.     Reed    (Tex.    Cv. 
App.),  49  S.  W.  260;  Houston  &  T. 
C.    R.    Co.    v.    Dotson,    15    Tex.    Cv. 
App.  73,  38  S.  W.  642;    Ashbome  v. 
Town  of  W.   69  Conn.   217,   37  Atl. 
498;  Effinger  v.  S.  9  Ohio  C.  C.  376; 


B.  Langtry  Sons  v.  Lowrie  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  58  S.  W.  835;  Carstens 
v.  Earles,  26  Wash.  676,  67  Pac. 
404;  Hart  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins.  Co. 
9  Wash.  620,  38  Pac.  213;  Altschuler 
v.  Coburn,  38  Neb.  881,  57  N.  W. 
836. 

Contra:     Meyer     v.     Hafemeister 
(Wis.),  97  N.  W.  166. 

23  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Pol- 
lock, 195  111.  163,  62  N.  E.  831;  Rolfe 
v.   Rich,   149   111.   436,   35   N.   E.   352 
(satisfactory    evidence) ;    Graves    v. 
Cadwell,   90  111.   612,  615. 

24  Moor  v.  Heineke,  119  Ala.  627, 
24    So.    374;     Town    of    Havana    v. 
Biggs,    58    111.    483,    486;    Willis    v. 
Chowning,    90    Tex.    617,    40    S.    W. 
395;    Texas,   &c.   R.    Co.   v.   Ballin- 
ger   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  40  S.  W.  822; 
Wollf  v.   Van  Housen,  55  111.   App. 
295;   Finks  v.  Cox   (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
30    S.    W.    512;    Frick   v.    Kabaker, 
116  Iowa,  494,  90  N.  W.  498;  Brown 
v.  Master,  104  Ala.  451,  16  So.  443. 
See   Sams  A.   C.   Co.   v.   League,   25 
Colo.   129,   54  Pac.   642. 

25  Wolf    v.    Van    Housen,    55    111. 
App.  295;   Mitchell  v.  Hindman,  150 
111.   538,   37   N.    E.   916;    McBride  v. 
Banguss,    65    Tex.    174,    467;    Gregg 


189  DEGREE  OF  PROOF PREPONDERANCE.  §  200 

prove  a  fact  or  case,  calls  for  too  high  a  degree  of  proof.26  So 
also  it  is  improper  to  instruct  that  a  party  must  prove  his 
claim  with  "clearness  and  certainty."27  But  it  has  been  held 
that  an  instruction  stating  that  "the  minds  of  the  jury  should 
be  satisfied  to  a  reasonable  degree  of  certainty"  is  not  material 
error.28 

In  South  Carolina  it  has  been  held  that  a  charge  that  the 
jury  "must  be  sure"  that  the  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  contributory 
negligence  before  they  can  find  for  the  defendant  is  not  erroneous 
and  does  not  call  for  too  high  a  degree  of  proof.29 

But  where  fraud  is  alleged  and  made  an  issue,  especially  where 
the  charge  is  such  as,  if  true,  it  indicates  criminal  conduct,  the 
evidence  must  establish  the  charge  by  a  clear  preponderance.30 

The  refusal  of  an  instruction  calling  for  the  "clearest  and 
most  satisfactory  evidence"  of  the  existence  of  the  relation 
of  debtor  and  creditor  between  husband  and  wife  at  the  time 
of  the  transfer  of  property  from  one  to  the  other  has  been  held 
not  to  be  error  in  the  absence  of  an  explanation  of  what  is 
meant  by  the  expression  "clearest  and  most  satisfactory  evi- 
dence."31 

In  a  will  contest  a  charge  which  states  that  "undue  influence 
need  not  be  proved  by  direct  evidence,  but  may  be  shown  by  facts 
and  circumstances  which  lead  the  mind  to  the  conviction  that 

v.  Jones  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  26  S.  B.  212;  Palm  v.  Chernowsky,  28  Tex. 
132;  Feist  v.  Boothe  (Tex.  Cv.  Cv.  App.  405,  67  S.  W.  165. 
App.),  27  S.  W.  33;  Lowery  v.  28  Liverpool  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co. 
Rowland,  104  Ala.  420,  16  So.  88;  v.  Farnsworth  Lumber  Co.  72  Miss. 
Miller  v.  Barber,  66  N.  Y.  558;  555,  17  So.  445;  Peltier  v.  Chicago, 
Monaghan  v.  Agriculture  F.  Ins.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.  88  Wis. 
Co.  53  Mich.  238;  Pierpont  Mfg.  521,  60  N.  W.  250.  Contra:  Low- 
Co,  v.  Goodman  Produce  Co.  (Tex.  ery  v.  Rowland,  104  Ala.  420,  16 
Cv.  App.),  60  S.  W.  347.  Contra:  So.  88;  O'Neil  v.  Blase,  94  Mo. 
Surber  v.  Mayfield,  156  Ind.  375,  App.  648,  68  S.  W.  764. 
60  N.  E.  7;  Carstens  v.  Earles,  26  20  Bodie  v.  Charleston,  N.  C.  R. 
Wash.  676,  67  Pac.  404.  Co.  61  S.  Car.  468,  39  S.  E.  715. 

26  Greathouse  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Cv.  so  Klipstein      v.      Raschein,      117 

App.)  23  S.  W.  226;  Gage  v.  Louis-  Wis.  248,  94  N.  W.  63;   Poertner  v. 

ville,   N.   O.   &  T.   R.   Co.   88  Tenn.  Poertner,    66    Wis.    644,    29    N.    W. 

724,  14  S.  W.  73.  386.      See   Wallace    v.    Maltice,    118 

27Maxon     v.     Farris     (Tex.     Cv.  Ind.    59,   20   N.   E.   706;    Stevens   v. 

App.),    48    S.    W.    741;    F.    Dohmen  Stevens,  127  Ind.  560,  26  N.  E.  1078. 

Co.  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins.  Co.  96  Wis.  Palm   v.    Chernowsky,   28   Tex.    Cv. 

38,  71  N.  W.  69;   McLeod  v.  Sharp,  App.   405,  67   S.   W.   165;    Stocks  v. 

53  111.   App.  406;    Brown  v.  Master,  Scott,  188  111.  266,  58  N.  E.  990. 

104    Ala.    451,    16    So.    443;     U.    S.  si  Hartman  &  F.  B.  Co.  v.  Clark, 

Fidelity    &    G.    Co.    v.    Charles,    131  94  Md.  520,  51  Atl.  291. 
Ala.    657,    31    So.    558,    57    L.    R.    A. 


§  201  BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  190 

it  has  been  exercised,"  is  not  rendered  obnoxious  by  the  use 
of  the  word  "conviction,"  where  other  instructions  in  the  charge 
state  that  the  burden  is  on  the  contestants  to  establish  want  of 
mental  capacity  and  undue  influence  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
credible  testimony,  which  means  by  the  greater  weight  of  the 
testimony.32 

§  201.    Burden  and  degree  of  proof  in  criminal  cases. — As 

stated  in  another  chapter,  the  burden  is  on  the  prosecution  to 
prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  as 
charged  in  the  indictment;  and  each  of  the  essential  elements 
necessary  to  constitute  the  offense  charged  must  be  established 
to  the  same  degree  of  certainty  before  a  conviction  is  warranted, 
and  a  refusal  to  so  instruct  the  jury  is  error.33  In  some  juris- 
dictions the  burden  is  on  the  accused,  in  a  criminal  case,  to 
establish  his  affirmative  defense,  such  as  insanity  and  self-de- 
fense by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  and  in  others  he  is 
only  required  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his  guilt  from  all 
of  the  evidence  on  both  sides  considered  together.  In  either 
case  an  instruction  requiring  him  to  establish  his  defense  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  calls  for  too 
high  a  degree  of  proof;34  but,  of  course,  such  instruction  is 
proper  in  those  states  where  the  law  requires  the  accused  to 
establish  his  defense  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.35 

In  those  states  where  the  burden  is  on  the  defendant  to  raise 
only  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his  guilt  the  giving  of  an  instruction 
stating  that  the  defendant  is  required  to  make  "satisfactory" 

32  Goldthorp     v.     Goldthorp,     115      in  that  it  requires  too  high  a  de- 
Iowa,   430,    88  N.   W.   944.  gree  of  proof,   S.   v.  Courtright,  66 

The   improper  use   of  the   words  Ohio  St.  37,  63  N.  E.  590. 

"burden  of  proof"  for  "preponder-  34  Hamilton    v.    S.    97    Tenn.    452, 

ance   of   evidence"   is   not   material  37  s.  W.   194;    McKnight  v.   U.   S. 

error     where     the     court    properly  115   Fed.   972    (intent);    German   v. 

states   that    the   burden    is   on   the  U.  S.  120  Fed.  666  (insanity  by  pre- 

plaintiff   to   make   out  his   case   by  ponderance  is  error) ;  Landers  v.  S. 

a   preponderance   of   the   evidence:  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  63  S.  W.  557;  S.  v. 

Williams    v.    Hoehle,    95    Wis.    510,  Porter,  64  Iowa,  237,  20  N.  W.  168 

70  N.   W.   556;    Flores  v.   Maverick  (preponderance);    Clark   v.    S.    150 

(Tex.    Cv.    App.),    26    S.    W.    316;  Ind.  60,  64  N.  E.  589  (self-defense). 

Doran  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &  M.  C.  R.  35  Com.  v.  Kilpatrick,  204  Pa.  St. 

Co.    117    Iowa,    442,    90    N.    W.    815  218,    53    Atl.    774;    S.    v.    Lewis,    20 

("testimony"  for  "evidence").  Nev.    333.   22   Pac.   241,   8   Am.    Cr. 

33  See  "Reasonable  Doubt,"  §  150.  R.  592;    S.  v.   Scott,  49  La.  R.   253, 
On   a   charge    of   perjury    an    in-  21    So.    271,    10    Am.    Cr.    R.    591; 

struction   calling  for  proof  equiva-      Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  2434. 
lent  to  two  witnesses  is  erroneous, 


191  DEGREE  OF  PROOF  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.  §  202 

proof  of  his  defense  or  mitigation,  unless  such  proof  "satis- 
factorily" arises  out  of  the  evidence  for  the  prosecution  is  error 
in  exacting  a  higher  degree  of  proof  than  the  law  requires.36 
Thus  an  instruction  in  a  homicide  case  requiring  the  accused 
to  prove  self-defense  to  the  "satisfaction"  of  the  jury  is  er- 
roneous, in  that  it  calls  for  too  high  a  degree  of  proof.  The 
accused  is  only  required  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  by  his 
defense.37  And  it  is  also  error,  where  the  plea  is  self-defense, 
to  charge  that  before  the  jury  can  acquit  they  must  be  rea- 
sonably satisfied  that  the  defendant  killed  the  deceased  under 
an  immediate  sense  of  great  danger  of  losing  his  life  or  suffer- 
ing serious  bodily  harm,  in  that  it  takes  from  the  state  the 
burden  of  proof.38  So  in  a  larceny  case  an  instruction  requir- 
ing the  defendant  to  satisfactorily  explain  his  possession  of 
property  alleged  to  have  been  stolen,  for  the  same  reason,  is 
erroneous.39  It  is  error  for  the  court  to  charge  that  the  threat- 
ened danger  to  the  person  must  be  so  great  as  to  create  a  rea- 
sonable belief  in  the  mind  of  the  person  assaulted,  of  imminent 
peril  to  life  or  "the  most  serious  bodily  harm."  The  words  of 
the  statute  being  "great  bodily  harm"  fall  far  short  of  "most 
serious  bodily  harm;"  the  one  may  endanger  life,  the  other 
not.40 

§  202.    Instructions  when  evidence  is  equally  balanced. — If  the 

evidence  is  equally  balanced,  or  so  close  as  to  make  it 
doubtful  which  party  has  presented  the  greater  weight  of  evi- 
dence, then  the  verdict  should  be  against  the  party  on  whom 
rests  the  burden  of  proof,  and  the  refusal  to  give  an  instruc- 
tion to  that  effect  when  properly  requested  is  error.41  But  the 
giving  of  such  an  instruction  under  some  state  of  facts  may  be 

se  Smith  v.  P.  142  111.  122,  31  N.  App.    Div.    386,    the    burden    never 

E.  599;   Clark  v.  S.  159  Ind.  65,  64  shifts   in   a   criminal   case. 

N.    E.    589;    Boykin   v.    P.    22    Colo.  sag.    v.   McKea,   120   N.    Car.    608, 

496,   45  Pac.   419;    S.   v.  McKea,  120  27  S.   E.   78.     See  S.  v.   Garvin    (S. 

N.  Car.  608,  27  S.  E.  78.  Car.),  26  S.  E.  570. 

37Wacaser  v.  P.  134  111.  438,  442;  *o  Reins  v.  P.  30  111.  256,  275. 

Alexander  v.  P.  96  111.  102.  See  Dor-  *i  City   of  Streeter   v.   Leibendor- 

sey  v.  S.  110  Ga.  331,  35  S.  E.  651;  fer,    71   111.    App.    625;    City   Banks 

Jackson  v.   P.   18  111.   270;    Hoge  v.  Appeal  from  Com'rs,  54  Conn.   273, 

P.    117    111.    44,    6    N.    E.    796.      See  7  Atl.  548;   Bridenthal  v.  Davidson, 

"Homicide,"  "Reasonable  Doubt."  61  111.  461;  Jones  v.  Angell,  95  Ind. 

as  Dent   v.    S.    (Ala.),    17   So.    94:  376.    See  Harper  v.  S.  101  Ind.  109; 

P.   v.   Caasata,   39   N.   Y.   S.    641,   6  Jarrell   v.   Lillie,   40   Ala.   271. 


§  203  BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  192 

improper.  Thus,  where  the  defendant,  by  his  pleading,  raises 
affirmative  issues,  such,  for  instance,  as  accord  and  satisfac- 
tion, of  fraudulent  representations  and  of  failure  of  considera- 
tion, the  burden  is  upon  him,  and  not  upon  the  plaintiff,  to  prove 
such  issues.  An  instruction,  therefore,  which,  in  substance,  tells 
the  jury  that  the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  make  out  his  case  by  a 
preponderance  of  the  evidence  upon  every  material  point,  and 
in  weighing  the  evidence  if  the  jury  think  that  it  is  evenly  bal- 
anced upon  any  point  necessary  to  a  recovery  by  the  plain- 
tiff, or  preponderates  ever  so  slightly  in  favor  of  the  defendant, 
they  should  find  for  the  defendant,  is  improper,  in  that  it  throws 
on  the  plaintiff  the  burden  of  proving  all  the  issues,  including 
those  raised  by  the  defendant.42 

.  §  203.  Preponderance  —  How  determined — Witnesses,  —  The 
court  is  authorized  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  mode  of  determin- 
ing the  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  and  should  not  refuse  to 
do  so,  especially  where  the  testimony  is  conflicting.43  By  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence  is  meant  the  greater  weight  of  the 
evidence.44  The  preponderance  of  the  evidence  is  not  necessarily 
determined  by  the  number  of  witnesses  who  may  testify  for  or 
against  a  party,  or  on  any  point  or  issue  involved.45  The  quality 
of  the  testimony,  as  well  as  the  number  of  witnesses,  must  be 
considered  by  the  jury  in  determining  the  preponderance.46 

It  is  for  the  jury  to  say  from  all  the  evidence  before  them 
whether  the  testimony  of  the  greater  number  of  witnesses  tes- 
tifying shall  be  more  or  less  controlling  than  the  better  quality 
of  the  testimony  of  the  fewer  number  of  witnesses.47  It  is  im- 
proper therefore  for  the  court  to  charge  that  the  preponder- 
ance of  the  evidence  is  determined  by  the  number  of  witnesses 

42  Richelieu    Hotel    Co.    v.    Inter-  313;  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Liesero- 
national   M.   E.   Co.   140  111.   267,  29  witz,    197    111.    612,    64    N.    E.    718; 
N.    E.    1044.  Georgia    N.     R.     Co.    v.    Hutchins 

43  Louisville     &     M.     R.     Co.     v.'  (Ga.),  46  S.  E.  662. 

Ward,    67    Fed.    927.     See   Buck   v.  46  Diver    v.    Hall,    46    N.    Y.    S. 

Hogeboom    (Neb.),    90   N.   W.   635;  533,  20  Misc.   677;    S.  v.  Bohan,  19 

Miller  v.  John,  208  111.  180.  Kas.  35.  See,  also,  Hardy  v.  Mil- 

44Ewen  v.  Wilbor,  208  111.  500.  waukee  St.  R.  Co.  89  Wis.  183,  61 

45Wastl  v.  Montana  N.  R.  Co.  N.  W.  771;  Gilmore  v.  Seattle  & 

17  Mont.  216,  42  Pac.  772;  Bierbach  R.    R.    Co.    29    Wash.    150,    69    Pac. 

v.    Goodyear    R.    Co.    54    Wis.    213,  743;    Dallas    Cotton    Mills    v.    Ash- 

11  N.  W.  514;   Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  ley  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  63  S.  W.  160. 

v.  Zang,  10  111.  App.  594;  Howlett  v.  47  Gilmore   v.   Seattle   &c.   R.   Co. 

Dilts,   4    Ind.    App.     23,    30    N.     E.  29  Wash.  150,  69  Pac.  743. 


193  PREPONDERANCE,    HOW    DETERMINED.  §    203 

on  each  side  where  the  opposing  witnesses  are  equally  credible 
and  equally  well  corroborated  and  have  no  greater  interest  in 
the  result  of  the  trial.48  And  for  the  same  reason  it  is  improper 
for  the  court  to  say  to  the  jury  that  if  they  should  find  that 
three  witnesses  are  of  equal  credibility  and  weight,  and  that 
the  testimony  of  two  of  them  conflict  with  the  other,  they  may 
disregard  the  testimony  of  the  latter;  such  instruction  invades 
the  province  of  the  jury.49  But  to  state  that  other  things  being 
equal  the  greater  number  of  witnesses  would  carry  the  greater 
weight  has  been  held  to  be  proper.50  So,  a  charge  stating  that 
"a  case  might  arise  in  which  a  jury  would  be  justified  in  finding 
a  verdict  for  the  defendant  on  the  testimony  of  one  witness 
against  the  testimony  of  any  greater  number  of  witnesses"  is 
not  improper.51  Also  a  charge  stating  that  the  preponderance  of 
the  evidence  is  not  alone  to  be  determined  by  the  entire  number 
of  witnesses,  but  also  by  their  means  of  knowledge,  conduct  and 
demeanor  in  testifying,  their  interest  or  lack  of  interest,  if  any, 
in  the  suit,  the  probability  or  improbability  of  their  statements, 
and  the  facts  and  circumstances  shown  on  the  trial  which  might 
go  to  determine  the  weight  of  their  testimony,  is  proper.52  An. 
instruction  which  charges  that  the  plaintiff  must  prove  his  case 
by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  and  that  the  jury  should 
dispassionately  weigh  all  the  evidence,  giving  weight  to  the  several 
witnesses  as  their  character,  intelligence,  manner  and  testimony 
warrant,  and  to  try  to  reconcile  all  statements  so  that  all  may 
appear  to  have  told  the  truth,  is  equivalent  to  stating  that 
preponderance  does  not  consist  in  the  greater  numerical  array 
of  witnesses.53 

48  Christmam  v.  Ray,  42  111.  App.  ^  P.  v.  Chun  Heong,  86  Cal.  329, 

111.  24  Pac.  1021. 

49Childs  v.  S.  76  Ala.  93;  Amis  52  Buck  v.  Hogeboom  (Neb.),  90 

v.  Cameron,  55  Ga.  449;  Johnson  N.  W.  635;  Pfaffenback  v.  Lake  S. 

v.  P.  140  111.  350,  29  N.  E.  895;  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  142  Ind.  246.  41  N. 

Armstrong  v.  S.  83  Ala.  49,  3  So.  E.  530;  Meyer  v.  Mead,  83  111.  App. 

431;  Kelley  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  19;  Hays  v.  Johnson,  92  111.  App. 

Co.  49  111.  App  304;  Kuehn  v.  Wil-  80;  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Liesero- 

son,  13  Wis.  117.  witz,  197  111.  612,  64  N.  E.  718. 

50  Spensley  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  ™  Wilcox  v.  Mines,  100  Tenn. 

Co.  62  Wis.  453,  22  N.  W.  740.  See  524,  45  S.  W.  781;  see  Ragsdale  v. 

Bisewski  v.  Booth,  100  Wis.  383,  76  Ezell,  18  Ky.  L.  R.  146,  35  S.  W.  629. 
N.  W.  349. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

AFFIRMATIVE  AND  NEGATIVE    EVIDENCE. 


204.    Instructions  on  relative  weight     205.    Instructions  on  relative  weight 
improper.  proper. 

§  204.  Instructions  on  relative  weight  improper.  —  Whether 
the  affirmative  testimony  of  a  witness  may  be  regarded  as 
stronger  than  the  negative  testimony  of  another  witness  is  a 
question  for  the  jury  to  determine.  The  court  cannot  instruct 
them,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  the  former  is  stronger  than 
the  latter  without  invading  the  province  of  the  jury.1  Accord- 
ing to  this  principle,  a  charge  stating  that  the  fact  that  a 
person  who  is  in  a  position  to  hear  a  bell  ring,  does  not  hear 
it,  is  no  evidence  that  the  bell  did  not  ring,  is  improper 
(though  relating  to  negative  testimony),  as  touching  on  the 
weight  of  the  evidence.2  So  to  instruct  that  positive  testimony 
of  witnesses  that  a  whistle  was  blown  and  bell  rung  is  entitled 
to  more  weight  than  testimony  of  others  that  they  did  not  hear 
the  one  or  the  other  is  improper,  in  the  absence  of  an  instruc- 
tion on  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses.3  Also  a  charge  "that 
affirmative  evidence  of  the  ringing  of  the  bell  and  blowing  of 
the  whistle  is  generally  entitled  to  more  weight  than  evidence 

i  Rockwood     v.     Poundstone,     38  Co.  v.  Buck,  130  Ind.  300,  30  N.  E. 

111.  200;    Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.   R.  19. 

Co.     v.     Shires,   108    111.    617,   632;  2  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  York, 

Sparks  v.  Dawson,  47  Tex.  138.  See  128  Ala,  305,  30  So.  676. 

Chicago  &  A.   R.   Co.  v.  Robinson,  s  Delaware,    L.    &   W.    R.    Co.    v. 

106   111.   142;    Chicago  &  A.  R.   Co.  Devore,   114  Fed.  155;   Southern  R. 

v.     Pelligreen,     65     111.     App.  333;  Co.  v.  Bryan,  115  Ga.  659,  42  S.  E. 

Keith  v.  S.  49  Kas.  439;  Sumpter  v.  43. 
S.  (Fla.),  3*3  So.  981;  Ohio  &  M.  R. 

194 


195  RELATIVE   WEIGHT   OF   EVIDENCE.  §    205 

that  it  was  not  heard  or  noticed"  is  improper  as  on  the  weight 
of  the  evidence.4 

§  205.  Instructions  on  relative  weight  proper. — But  in  some 
jurisdictions  the  court  should  instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  relative 
weight  of  positive  and  negative  evidence  when  requested  to 
do  so,  if  there  is  evidence  on  which  to  base  the  instruction.5 
Hence,  according  to  this  rule,  a  charge  that  it  is  for  the  jury  to 
consider  how  much  testimony  of  a  negative  character  is  worth, 
compared  with  positive  testimony,  and  that  ordinarily  the  evi- 
dence of  a  witness  who  swears  positively  that  he  saw  a  certain 
thing,  is  more  valuable  than  that  of  witnesses  who  say  they 
did  not  see  it,  is  proper.6  •  The  giving  of  an  instruction  that 
positive  testimony  is  generally  to  be  believed  in  preference  to 
negative  testimony,  other  things  being  equal,  and  the  witnesses 
being  of  equal  credibility,  is  not  improper.7  So  it  is  also  proper 
for  the  court  to  charge  that  a  witness  who  states  to  the  best 
of  his  recollection  that  a  certain  fact  is  true,  testifies  less  posi- 
tively than  one  who  positively  states  that  such  fact  is  true.8 

An  instruction  stating  that  where  witnesses  testify  that  cer- 
tain facts  took  place  and  other  witnesses  of  equal  credibility, 
having  equal  means  of  knowledge,  testify  that  such  facts  did 
not  take  place,  the  testimony  of  the  latter  is  not  negative,  but 
should  be  regarded  by  the  jury  as  affirmative  testimony,  in 
which  case  the  jury  should  weigh  all  the  testimony  and  give  a 
verdict  as  the  weight  preponderates,  is  not  erroneous,  though 
argumentative.9  In  a  case  in  which  witnesses  have  testified 
as  positively  on  one  side  that  a  fact  is  not  true  as  on  the  other 
side  that  such  fact  is  true,  the  court  may  properly  refuse  to 
instruct  that  positive  testimony  is  entitled  to  more  weight  than 

4  McLean  v.  Erie  R.  Co.   (N.  J.),  it,  Humphries  v.  S.  100  Ga.  260,  28 

54   Atl.  238.  S.   E.   25. 

s  Hildman  v.  City  of  Phillips,  106  e  Rhodes    v.    U.    S.    79    Fed.    740. 

Wis.   611,   82   N.   W.   566;    Selensky  See  Hess  v.  Williamsport  &  N.  B. 

v.  Chicago  G.  W.  R.  Co.  120  Iowa,  R.  Co.  181  Pa.  St.  492,  37  Atl.  568. 

113,  94  N.  W.  272;  Olsen  v.  Oregon  "  Southern     R.     Co.     v.     O'Bryan 

S.  L.  &  U.  N.  R.  Co.  9  Utah,  129,  (Ga.),  45  S.  E.  1001. 

33  Pac.  623.    .  s  Gable  v.   Ranch,   50  S.   Car.   95, 

A    charge    explaining   the    differ-  27  S.  E.  555. 

ence    between    the   probative   value  9  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Muel- 

of  positive  and  negative  testimony  ler,  165  111.  499,  46  N.  E.  373;    see 

is  erroneous  of  course  where  there  Kelley  v.  Schupp,  60  Wis.  86,  18  N. 

is  no  evidence  upon  which  to  base  W.  725. 


§   205  AFFIRMATIVE  AND  NEGATIVE  EVIDENCE.  196 

negative,  since  it  is  largely  within  the  discretion  of  the  court  to 
give  such  an  instruction.10 

10  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Lorentzen,  79  Fed.  291. 


CHAPTER  X. 


RELATING    TO    WITNESSES. 


Sec. 

206.  Jury  judges  of  credibility  of 
witnesses. 

207.  Instructions    violating    rule — 

Illustrations. 

208.  Intimating     opinion     by     in- 
structions. 

209.  Interested    witnesses    corrob- 
orated. 

210.  Praising    or    denouncing    wit- 
nesses. 

211.  Expert    and    non-expert    wit- 
nesses. 

212.  Witnesses   contradicting   each 
other. 

213.  Reconciling    conflicting    testi- 
mony. 

214.  Interest  of  witness  to  be  con- 
sidered. 

215.  Probability,  1  m  p  r  o  b  a  bility, 
manner,  conduct,  bias. 

216.  Instructing  that   jury   "must" 
or    "should"    consider. 

217.  On    disregarding   evidence. 


Sec. 

218.  On  swearing  wilfully  false. 

219.  On  swearing  falsely — Improp- 
er. 

220.  Impeachment   —    Instructions 
based   on   evidence. 

221.  Believing  or  disbelieving  wit- 
ness. 

222.  Failure  to  produce  witnesses 
or  evidence. 

223.  Singling     out     witnesses — Im- 
proper. 

224.  On   detectives    and   informers 
as  witnesses. 

225.  Relatives   as  witnesses. 

226.  On     competency     and     testi- 
mony of  the  defendant. 

227.  Defendant's       interest — Other 
considerations. 

228.  On  defendant's  unsworn  state- 

ments. 

229.  On  defendant's  failure  to  tes- 
tify. 


§  206.  Jury  judges  of  credibility  of  witnesses. — The  jury  are 
the  sole  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses  and  of  the 
weight  to  be  given  to  their  testimony,  and  the  court,  if  re- 
quested, should  instruct  the  jury  accordingly,  and  the  refusal 
to  so  instruct  is  error.1  Especially  where  the  witnesses  on  each 

i  Lensing  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  39  N.  E.  926;  Jones  v.  Oasler,  139 
45  S.  W.  572;  S.  v.  Washington,  Ind.  382,  38  N.  E.  812,  47  Am.  bt. 
107  La.  298,  31  So.  638;  Parkins  274;  Lefler  v.  S.  122  Ind.  206,  23 
V.Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  (Neb.),  93  N.  N.  E.  154;  Durham  v.  S.  120  Ind. 
W.  197;  Newport  v.  S.  140  Ind.  299,  467,  22  N.  E.  333;  Finch  v.  Bergins, 

197 


§    207  RELATING  TO  WITNESSES.  198 

side  are  about  equal  in  number  and  credibility,  and  the  testi- 
mony of  those  on  the  one  side  is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  tes- 
timony of  those  on  the  other  side,  should  the  question  of  the 
credibility  of  the  witnesses  be  exclusively  for  the  jury.2  The 
court  can  scarcely  err  in  refusing  to  give  instructions  which 
seem  to  have  a  tendency  to  influence  the  jury  as  to  the  credit 
to  be  given  particular  witnesses.3  It  is  within  the  discretion 
of  the  court  to  give  or  refuse  instructions  as  to  whether  any 
occurrences  or  scenes  taking  place  during  the  progress  of  the 
trial,  such,  for  instance,  as  where  a  party  or  witness  becomes 
hysterical,  should  be  considered  by  the  jury  or  not  in  weigh- 
ing the  evidence.* 

§  207.    Instructions    violating    the    rule — Illustrations. — The 

following  cases  serve  as  illustrations  showing  violations  of  the 
foregoing  rule  in  the  giving  of  instructions :  Where  the  testimony 
of  several  disinterested  witnesses  is  not  contradicted  and  is  not 
inherently  improbable  it  is  error  to  instruct  the  jury  that  they 
"are  not  bound  to  believe  the  testimony  of  any  of  the  wit- 
nesses-"5 as  it  is  to  instruct  that  the  jury  have  the  right  to  dis- 
regard the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  for  the  defendant  if 

89  Ind.  360;  S.  v.  Dickey,  48  W.  Va.  a  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 

325,  37  S.  E.  695;  Bowers  v.  P.  74  111.  Feehan,   149   111.   202,  212,  36  N.   E. 

418;  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3017,  citing,  1036;    Faulkner  v.  Paterson  R.   Co. 

Bean   v.    P.    124    111.    580,    16    N.    E.  65  N.  J.  L.  181,  46  Atl.  765. 

656;    Spahn   v.    P.    137    111.    543,    27  *  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Meech, 

N.  E.  688;    Shotz  v.  P.  121  111.  562.  163  111.  305,  45  N.  E.  291. 

13  N.  E.  524;  Peoples  v.  McKee,  92  The   question   of  the  competency 

111.  397;   Jordan  v.  S.  81  Ala.  20,  1  of  a  witness  is  primarily  one  to  be 

So.  577;  Dixon  v.  S.  46  Neb.  298,  64  decided  by  the  court.     If  the  ques- 

N.   W.   961;    S.   v.   Todd,   110   Iowa,  tion   of   competency    depends   upon 

631,  82   N.  W.   322;    Gott  v.  P.   187  the    existence    of    facts    which    are 

111.    249,    58    N.    E.    293;    Southern  disputed,  the  proper  practice  is  for. 

M.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Hudson,    113    Ga.  the  court  by  preliminary  examina- 

434,  38  S.  E.   964;   Howell  v.  S.  61  tion    to    determine    whether    such 

Neb.  391,  85  N.  W.  289;   Tarbell  v.  facts  exist.   If,  however,  the  deter- 

Forbes,  177  Mass.  238,  58  N.  E.  873;  mination   of   the    question   depends 

S.   v.   Tate,   156  Mo.   119,   56  S.   W.  upon  the  decision  of  intricate  ques- 

1099;     Chavarria    v.     S.   (Tex.     Cr.  tions    of    fact,    the    court    has    the 

App.)    62   S.   W.   312;    Strong  v.    S.  power  in  its  discretion  to  take  the 

61  Neb.  35,  84  N.  W.  410;   Stewart  opinion  of  the  jury  thereon, 

v.    Anderson,   111   Iowa,    329,   82   N.  Dowdy  v.  Watson,  115  Ga.  42,  41 

W.   770;    S.   v.   Adair,   160  Mo.   391,  S.    E.    266,    citing   1    Greenleaf   Ev. 

61   S.   W.   187;    S.   v.   Taylor,   57   S,  (16th  ed.),  §  81e. 

Car.   483,   35   S.   E.   729,  76  Am.   St.  5  Tyler   v.    Third   Ave.   R.    Co.    41 

575.  N.   Y.   S.  523,  18  Misc.  165. 

2  Mitchell    v.    S.    43    Fla.    188,    30 
So.  803. 


199  COURT  INTIMATING  OPINION.  §    208 

they  consider  them  interested,  even  though  they  are  not  contra- 
dicted or  impeached.6 

So  an  instruction  stating  that  the  jury  are  not  at  liberty 
to  reject  the  testimony  of  any  witness  because  his  statements 
may  be  in  conflict  with  that  of  other  witnesses  is  improper,  as 
invading  the  province  of  the  jury.7  For  the  court  to  charge 
the  jury  to  scan  with  caution  the  testimony  of  abandoned  women, 
for  the  same  reason,  is  error.8  Or  to  instruct  the  jury  to  give 
the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  for  the  state  the  same  weight 
as  is  given  to  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  for  the  defense 
is  likewise  improper.9 

§  208.  Intimating  opinion  by  instruction. — The  jury  being 
the  sole  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses,  the  court,  in 
giving  instructions,  should  guard  against  the  expression  or  in- 
timation of  any  opinion  as  to  their  credibility  or  the  weight  of 
their  testimony.10  Error  committed  by  the  court  in  thus  ex- 
pressing or  intimating  an  opinion  on  the  weight  or  sufficiency 
of  the  evidence  is  not  cured  by  the  giving  of  other  instructions, 
that  the  jury  are  the  sole  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  wit- 
nesses and  the  weight  of  the  evidence.11  It  matters  not  that 
the  testimony  of  a  witness  may  appear  to  be  false  and  not 
worthy  of  belief,  the  court  should  refrain  from  intimating  any 
opinion  as  to  what  credit  should  be  attached  to  it.12  The  court 
therefore  cannot  tell  the  jury  that  one  part  of  the  testimony 
of  a  witness  is  to  be  given  more  weight  than  another  part.13 

e  Berzevizy  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  P.  v.  Lyons,  49  Mich.  78,  13  N.  W. 

Co.    46    N.    Y.    S.    27,    19    App.    Div.  365;    Letts   v.    Letts,    91   Mich.    596, 

309.  52.  N.   W.   54;    Leise  v.   Meyer,   143 

7  F.  Dohman  Co.  v.  Niagara  Fire  Mo.   547,  45  S.  W.  282 ;   P.  v.   Gor- 

Ins.   Co.   96  Wis.   38,   71   N.    W.   69.  man,  83  Hun,  605,  31  N.  Y.  S.  1064; 

See    Chisholm    v.    Preferred    Bank-  Ter.    v.    O'Hare,   1   N.    Dak,   30,   44 

ers'  Life  Ass'n,  112  Mich.  50,  70  N.  N.   W.   1003;    Mawich   v.    Elsey,   47 

W.  415.  Mich.  10,  8  N.  W.  587,  10  N.  W.  57; 

s  S.  v.  Tuttle,  67  Ohio  St.  440,  66  S.  v.  Kelly,  73  Mo.  608. 

N.  E.  524,  93  Am.  St.  689.  "  P.    v.    Kindleberg-er,    100    Cal. 

» Evans  v.  S.  95  Ga.  468,  22  S.  E.  367,  34  Pac.   852;    Shorb  v.   Kinzie, 

298.  100  Ind.  429.     See  P.  v.  Carey.  125 

10  Crutchfield  v.   Richmond   &  R.  Mich.    535,    84    N.    W.    1087;    S.    v. 

Co.  76  N.  Car.  320;   Com.  v.  Barry,  Dick,   60   N.   Car.   440;    P.   v.   Chew 

91  Mass.  (9  Allen),  276;  McMinn  v.  Sing  Wing,  88  Cal.  288. 

Whalen,    27    Cal.    319;    Ross    v.    S.  12  Thompson  v.  S.  106  Ala.  67,  17 

59  Ga.  249;   S.  v.  White,  15  S.  Car.  So.    512;    Bell   v.   Ober  &   Sons   Co. 

293;   Berliner  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  96  Ga.  214,  23  S.  E.  7. 

121   Cal.   451,   53  Pac.    922;    Hudson  13  Owen  v.   Palmour,  111  Ga.  885, 

v.  Best,  104  Ga.  131,  30  S.  E.   688;  36  S.  E.  969. 


§    209  RELATIVE   TO    WITNESSES.  200 

While  courts  may,  in  a  general  way,  state  what  facts  may  be 
taken  into  consideration  in  determining  the  credit  to  be  given 
the  testimony  of  a  witness,  yet  where  the  evidence  is  conflict- 
ing or  nearly  evenly  balanced,  care  should  be  exercised  to  pre- 
vent the  expression  or  intimation  of  an  opinion  on  the  weight 
of  the  evidence.14  For  the  court  in  charging  the  jury,  to  state 
(that  "my  observation  is  that  pretty  good  persons  sometimes 
lie,  and  that  pretty  bad  persons  sometimes  tell  the  truth;  you 
should  consider  the  character  of  the  witness  so  far  as  you  know 
it  as  bearing  upon  the  question  whether  a  witness  would  be 
truthful  and  reliable  or  not,"  is  error,  and  is  not  cured  by  an- 
other instruction  which  states  that  the  verdict  must  be  based 
upon  the  evidence;  that  nothing  is  to  be  found  by  conjecture.15 

§  209.  Interested  witness  corroborated. — The  court  is  not 
authorized  to  state  to  the  jury,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  one 
witness  is  entitled  to  more  credit  than  another;16  or  that  the 
testimony  of  the  one  is  entitled  to  more  weight  than  that  of 
the  other,  whether  the  one  may  be  disinterested  and  the  other 
interested  or  not.17  Nor  is  it  proper  to  instruct  that  "as  a 
general  rule  a  witness  who  is  interested  in  the  result  of  a  suit 
will  not  be  as  honest,  candid  and  fair  in  his  testimony  as  one 
who  is  not  so  interested."18  But  a  charge  that  the  testimony 
of  an  interested  witness  should  be  examined  with  greater  care 
than  that  of  a  disinterested  witness  has  been  held  proper.10 

It  is  improper  for  the  court  to  instruct  that  but  little  or  no 
credence  should  be  given  to  the  testimony  of  a  witness  because 
of  his  ill  will,  although  such  bias  is  always  proper  to  be  con- 
sidered by  the  jury  in  weighing  the  testimony  of  such  witness.20 
On  the  same  principle  it  is  improper  to  charge  the  jury  that 
the  testimony  of  a  witness  who  is  corroborated,  is  entitled  to 

"Smith   v.   Chicago  &   W.   I.   R.  184;    Grier  v.   S.   53   Ind.   420.     See 

Co.    105    111.    511,    521;    Wabash    R.  Johnson  v.  P.  140  111.  352.  29  N.  E. 

Co.  v.  Biddle,  27  Ind.  App.  161,  59  895;  Lee  v.  S.  74  Wis.  45,  41  N.  W. 

N.   E.   284.  960:   Nelson  v.   Vorce,  55  Ind.   455; 

is  Johnson  v.  Superior  R.  Tr.  R.  Pratt  v.   S.  56  Ind.  179. 

Co.  91  Wis.  233,  64  N.  W.  753.  i»  Hinton   v.    Cream   City   R.    Co. 

16  Omaha    B.    R.    Co.    v.    McDer-  65  Wis.  335,  27  N,  W.  147. 

mott,  25  Neb.  714,  41  N.  W.  648.  20  Norwood    v.    S.    (Ala.),    24    So. 

IT  Platz   v.    McKean    Tp.    178   Pa.  53.       See,    also,    Stanley    v.    Mont- 

St.   601,   36   Atl.    136.  gomery,  102  Ind.  102,  26  N.  E.  213; 

isBoyce  v.   Palmer,   55   Neb.   389,  Unruh  v.   S.   105  Ind.  117,  4  N.  E. 

75  N.  W.  848;   Veatch  v.  S,  56  Ind.  453. 


201  INTERESTED  WITNESS — PRAISING,  DENOUNCING.  §   210 

greater  weight  than  the  testimony  of  one  uncorroborated.21  Or 
that  a  witness  may  have  a  better  opportunity  of  knowing  the 
facts  in  issue  than  others,  will  not  warrant  the  court  in  instruct- 
ing the  jury  that  such  witness  is  entitled  to  greater  credit  than 
such  other  witnesses.  Where  two  witnesses  are  equally  intel- 
ligent, equally  truthful,  fair  and  unprejudiced,  the  proposition 
may  be  true.  But  a  person  may  have  every  means  of  being 
fully  and  accurately  informed,  and  yet  for  various  reasons 
might  be  utterly  unworthy  of  belief.22 

So  it  is  likewise  improper  for  the  court  to  state  to  the  jury 
that  the  oral  testimony  of  witnesses  is  entitled  to  greater  weight 
than  the  depositions  of  absent  witnesses.23  For  the  same 
reason  it  is  improper  for  the  court  to  charge  the  jury  that 
"where  the  testimony  of  witnesses  is  irreconcilably  conflicting 
they  should  give  great  weight  to  the  surrounding  circumstances 
in  determining  which  witness  is  entitled  to  credit."24 

§  210.  Praising  or  denouncing  witnesses. — The  credibility  of 
the  witnesses  and  the  weight  of  the  evidence  being  questions  for 
the  jury  to  determine,  it  is  improper  to  call  attention  to  the 
testimony  of  a  witness  in  words  of  praise  as  impressing  one 
with  its  truthfulness,  or  to  speak  of  the  witness  in  terms  of 
denunciation.25  Nothing  should  be  said  by  the  court  intimat- 
ing a  disbelief  of  a  witness.26  Accordingly  an  instruction 
calling  the  attention  of  the  jury  to  a  certain  witness  who 
had  given  testimony  to  the  bad  character  of  another  witness, 
stating  that  "he  comes  to  blacken  the  character  of  his  half- 
sister  instead  of  defending  her,"  is  improper  and  erroneous.27 

21  Chittenden    v.    Evans,    41    111.         24  Skow   v.    Locks    (Neb.),    91    N. 
251.  W.  204. 

22  Milliken   v.   Marlin,   66   111.   22.          25  Little    v.    Superior    Rapid     Tr. 

23  Miller  v.  Eglin,  64  Ind.  197,  31      Co.  88  Wis.  462,  60  N.  W.  705;  Hick- 
Am.  R.  121.  ory  v.  United  States,  160  U.  S.  408, 

Where  in  order  to  prevent  a  con-  16  Sup.  Ct.  327. 

tinuance     the     prosecution     admits  20  Williams  v.  City  of  West  Bay, 

that    the    facts    stated    in    the    de-  119  Mich.  395,  78  N.  W.  328;   P.  v. 

fendant's    affidavit    for    a    continu-  Brow,  35  N.  Y.  S.  1009,  90  Hun  (N. 

ance    may    be    given    in    evidence,  Y.)   509. 

then    the    defendant    is   entitled   to  27  Spicer  v.  S.  105  Ala.  123,  16  So. 

have   the   jury  instructed   that  the  706.    See  Hickory  v.  United  States, 

facts    so    admitted    shall    be    given  160  U.  S.  408,  16  Sup.  Ct.  327.     See 

the  same  weight   as   if  the  absent  Smith   v.   Undted   States,   161  U.   S. 

witness     were     personally     present  85,  16  Sup.  Ct.  483;  Hicks  v.  United 

testifying,   and  a  refusal  to  so  in-  States,   150   U.   S.   442,   16   Sup.   Ct, 

struct  is  error,  Lee  v.  S.  75  Miss.  144. 
625,  23  So.  628. 


§  211  RELATING  TO  WITNESSES.  202 

While  it  may  not  be  improper  for  the  court,  in  charging  the 
jury,  to  repeat  the  uncontradicted  testimony  of  witnesses  and 
point  out  the  inquiries  suggested  by  such  testimony,28  yet  it 
is  improper  for  the  court  to  state  what  a  witness  may  have 
said  on  any  particular  matter.29 

.  §  211.  Expert  and  non-expert  witnesses. — According  to  the 
foregoing  rule  it  is  improper  for  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury, 
as  a  matter  of  law,  that  the  testimony  of  one  class  of  witnesses — 
experts  or  non-experts — is  entitled  to  greater  weight  than  that 
of  the  other.30  So  it  is  improper  for  the  court  to  say  to  the 
jury  that  the  testimony  of  a  certain  witness  should  be  received 
with  caution,  as  the  opinions  of  such  witnesses,  however  honestly 
entertained,  may  be  erroneous,  whether  the  witness  is  an  expert 
or  not.31 

The  weight  and  credibility  of  the  testimony  of  expert  wit- 
nesses are  to  be  determined  by  the  same  rules  that  apply  to  any 
other  witness,  and  such  testimony  should  be  considered  by  the 
jury  in  connection  with  all  the  other  evidence.32  The  weight 
of  the  opinions  of  expert  witnesses  is  exclusively  for  the  jury.33 
Hence  an  instruction  that  the  testimony  of  expert  witnesses 
is  usually  "of  little  value"  or  "of  great  value,"  is  improper, 
in  that  it  invades  the  province  of  the  jury.  The  court  should 

as  S.  v.   Glover,  27  S.   Car.  602,  4  bama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  93   Ala. 

S.  E.  564.  514,  9  So.  722;   Bpps  v.  S.  102  Ind. 

20  Killain   v.   Eigenmann,   57   Ind.  539,  1  N.  E.  491;  Langford  v.  Jones, 

488;   Cunningham  v.  S.  65  Ind.  380,  18  Ore.  307,  22  Pac.  1064;  Thornton 

the  court  should  not  in  any  man-  v.  Thornton,  39  Vt.  122;  Williams  v. 

ner  suggest  or  intimate  an  opinion  S.  50  Ark.  511,  9  S.  W.  5;   Wagner 

as  to  the  value  or  weight  of  the  tes-  v.  S.  116  Ind.  181,  17  N.  E.  833;   S. 

timony  of  witnesses.  v.  McCullough   (Iowa),  55  L.  R.  A. 

so  Taylor  v.   Cox,   153   111.   230,  33  378. 

N.  E.  656;   Ryder  v.  S.  100  Ga.  528,  ss  White  v.  S.  133  Ala.  122,  32  So. 

28  S.  E.  246,  X8  L.  R.  A.  721,  62  Am.  139;  Rivard  v.  Rivard,  109  Mich.  98, 

St.    334;    Nelson    v.    McLennan,    31  66  N.  W.  681,  63  Am.  St.  566;  Sever 

Wash.  208,  71  Par.  747.     See,  also,  v.  Spangler,  93  Iowa,  576,  61  N.  W. 

Durham  v.   Smith    120  Ind.  468,  22  1072;    Taylor   v.    Cox,   153   111.    220, 

N.  E.  333;  Bradley  v.  S.  31  Ind.  492.  38  N.   E.   656;   Louisville,   N.   O.   & 

31  Louisville,   N.   O.   &  T.   R.   Co.  T.   R.   Co.   v.   Whitehead,   71   Miss, 
v.  Whitehead,  71  Miss.  451,  15  So.  451,  15  So.  890;   Stevens  v.  City  of 
890,    42    Am.    St.    472;     Tarbell    v.  Minneapolis,  42  Minn.  136,  43  N.  W. 
Forbes,  177  Pa.  St.  238;   P.  v.  Sea-  842;    Mewes  v.   Crescent  P.   L.   Co. 
man,  107  Mich.  348,  65  N.  W.  203;  170  Pa.  St.  369,  32  Atl.  1082;  Tatum 
Weston  v.  Brown,  30  Neb.   609,  46  v.   Mohr,   21   Ark.   349;    Johnson  v. 
N.  W.  826.    Contra:  Haight  v.  Val-  Thompson,  72  Ind.  167;  Roberts  v. 
let,  89  Cal.  245,  26  Pac.  897.  Johnson,  58  N.  Y.  613;  .Etna  L.  Ins. 

32  Goodwin  v.  S.  96  Ind.  550;  Eg-  Co.  v.  Ward,  140  U.  S.  76,  11  Sup. 
gers   v.   Eggers,   57    Ind.   461;    Ala-  Ct.   720. 


203  EXPERT  AND  NON-EXPERT  WITNESSES.  §    212 

make  no  comments  intimating  its  opinion  as  to  the  weight  of 
such  testimony  either  favorable  or  unfavorable.3*  But  where 
the  opinion  of  an  expert  witness  is  based  upon  an  hypothetical 
state  of  facts,  and  the  supposed  facts  are  not  sustained  by  the 
evidence,  then  it  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  such  opinion 
is  of  little  or  no  weight.35 

The  facts  upon  which  the  question  to  the  expert  is  based 
must  be  substantially  proved  to  entitle  his  opinion  to  be  of  any 
value.30  And  it  has  been  held  that  an  instruction  stating  that 
"if 'one  fact  supposed  to  be  true,  included  in  the  hypothetical 
question,  is  untrue — not  supported  by  the  evidence,  then  the 
opinion  of  the  expert  would  be  valueless,"  is  proper.37  Also 
to  state  that  the  testimony  of  an  expert  should  be  weighed  and 
considered  by  the  jury  with  caution,  is  improper,  in  that  it 
singles  out  the  witness  and  discredits  his  testimony.38  Or  an  in- 
struction which  assumes  or  conveys  the  impression  that  an  exam- 
ination made  by  an  expert  may  not  have  been  impartial  is  erro- 
neous.39 

§  212.  Witnesses  contradicting  each  other. — The  fact  that  two 
witnesses  directly  contradict  each  other  does  not  warrant  the 
giving  of  an  instruction  that  the  evidence  is  balanced  unless 
there  is  some  other  circumstance  corroborating  the  one  or  the 
other,40  or  that  where  two  witnesses  have  contradicted  each 

3*Eggers  v.  Eggers,  57  Ind.  461;  Laflin  v.  Chicago,  W.  &  N.  R.  Co. 

P.  v.  Webster,  59  Hun  (N.  Y.),  398;  33  Fed.  422;   S.  v.  Owen,  72  N.  Car 

Persons  v.  S.  90  Tenn.  291,  16  S.  W.  605. 

726;  Pannell  v.  Com.  86  Pa.  St.  260;  35  Goodwin  v.  S.  96  Ind.  550;  Hall 

Reichenbach    v.    Ruddach,    127    Pa.  v.  Rankin,  87  Iowa,  261,  57  N.  W. 

564,  18  Atl.  432;  Kansas  City,  W.  &  217. 

N,  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  49  Kas.  1,  30  ™  Hovey  v.  Chase,  52  Me.  304,  83 

Pac.  108;  Williams  v.  S.  50  Ark.  511,  Am.   Dec.   514;    Treat   v.   Bates,   27 

9  S.  W.   598;    Brush  v. "  Smith,  111  Mich.  390. 

Iowa,   217,   82   N.   W.   467;    Long  v.  ^  P.    v.    Foley,    64    Mich.    148,    31 

Travellers'  Ins.  Co.  113  Iowa,  259,  85  N.  W.  94.     But  see  Epps  v.  S.  102 

N.    W.    24;    Bever   v.    Spangler,    93  Ind.  539,  1  N.  E.  491. 

Iowa  576,  61  N.  W.  1072;  P.  v.  Van-  38  Gustafson  v.  Seattle  Tr.  Co.  28 

derhoof,  71  Mich.  158,  39  N.  W.  28;  Wash.  227,  68  Pac.  721.  In  re  Blake's 

Wall  v.  S.  112  Ga.  336,  37  S.  E.  371;  Estate,    136    Cal.    306,    68    Pac.    827. 

Maynard   v.    Vinton,   59   Mich.    139,  See  S.  v.  McCullough,  114  Iowa,  532, 

26  N.  W.  401;    Melvin  v.  Easly,  46  87  N.  W.  503,  55  L.  R.  A.  378;  P.  v. 

N.   Car.  386.  Seaman,    107    Mich.    348,    65    N.    W. 

Contra,  holding  entitled  to  great  203;  Coleman  v.  Adair,  75  Miss.  660, 

Weight:       Tinney    v.    New    Jersey  23  So.  369. 

Steamboat  Co.  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.),  39  s.  v.  Rathbun,  74  Conn.  524,  51 

3;    St.   Louis,   I.   M.  &  S.  R.   Co.  v.  Atl.  540. 

Phillips,  66  Fed.  35;  S.  v.  Reidell,  «>  Sickle  v.  Wolf,  91  Wis.  396, 
9  Houst.  (Del.),  479,  14  Atl.  550; 


§    213  RELATING  TO   WITNESSES.  204 

other  that  one  of  them  has  told  a  falsehood.41  An  instruction 
that  the  jury  may  disregard  the  testimony  of  certain  witnesses 
for  the  reason  that  they  had  contradicted  each  other  is  errone- 
ous; the  jury  may,  in  their  judgment,  give  credit  to  some  of 
them  and  disregard  the  others,  notwithstanding  such  contradic- 
tion.42 

So  a  charge  that  if  the  state  has  but  one  witness  who  swears 
to  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  and  the  accused  contradicts  the 
testimony  of  such  witness  and  swears  to  his  innocence,  then 
the  facts  are  uncertain  and  leaves  the  question  of  the  guilt 
of  the  accused  in  doubt,  is  erroneous.43  But  it  has  been  held 
that  an  instruction  which  in  substance  charges  that  if  the  plain- 
tiff and  the  defendant  as  witnesses  are  equally  credible,  and  con- 
tradict each  other  on  material  facts,  then  there  is  no  preponder- 
ance in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  and  that  the  fact  that  they  disagree 
in  their  testimony,  if  each  honestly  has  stated  the  facts  as  he 
understood  them  to  be,  would  not  of  itself  warrant  them  in 
discrediting  either  of  them,  is  not  objectionable  as  invading  the 
province  of  the  jury.44  An  instruction  that  if  the  jury  believe 
a  certain  witness  and  that  the  facts  as  testified  to  by  him  are 
true,  they  shall  find  for  the  plaintiff;  but  that  if  they  do  not 
believe  him,  and  believe  the  facts  are  as  testified  to  by  other  wit- 
nesses, they  shall  find  for  the  defendant,  is  proper.45 

§  213.  Reconciling  conflicting  testimony. — Where  the  testi- 
mony of  the  witnesses  is  conflicting  it  is  proper  for  the  court  to 
charge  that  the  jury  should  reconcile  any  conflicts,  if  they  can 
do  so,  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  testimony  of  all  the  wit- 
nesses.46 But  the  contrary  seems  to  be  the  rule  in  Texas.  Thus 
it  has  been  held  to  be  improper  for  the  court  to  charge  the 
jury  that  "you  will  reconcile  any  conflicts  in  the  evidence 
if  you  can,  so  as  to  give  effect  to  all  the  testimony;  but  if  you 

64   N.   W.   1028.     Compare  Chicago  «  Cottrell  v.  Piatt,  101  Iowa,  231, 

&   E.    T.    R.    Co.   v.   Rains,   203   111.  70  N.   W.   177. 

422,   67   N.   E.   840.  45  Harris  v.  Murphy,   119   N    Car. 

41  P.    v.   Brow,   35   N.   Y.   S.    1009,  34,  25  S.  E.  708,  56  Am.  St.  656. 

90  Hun,  509.  *e  Price  v.  S.  114  Ga.  855,  40  S.  E. 

42  s.  v.  Bazile,  50  La.  Ann.  21,  23  1015;  Steen  v.  Sanders,  116  Ala.  155, 
So.  8.  See  Goodhue  v.  Farmers' 'w.  22  So.  498;  Walters  v.  Philadelphia 
Co.  v.  Davis,  81  Minn.  210,  83  N.  W.  Tr.  Co.   161  Pa.  St.  36,  28  Atl.  941; 
531.  Ter.  v.  Gonzales  (N.  Mex.),  68  Pac. 

43  S.  v.  Johnson,  48  La.  Ann.  87,      925;  Oliver  v.  Columbia  N.  &  L.  R. 
19  So.  213.    See  McLean  v.  Clark,  47      Co.  65  S.  Car.  1,  43  S.  E.  307. 

Ga.  24. 


205  RECONCILING   TESTIMONY — INTEREST    OF    WITNESS.  §    214 

cannot,  you  will  decide  which  of  the  witnesses  is  entitled  to 
the  greater  credibility  and  weight,  and  in  so  determining,  you 
may  consider  the  intelligence,  interest,  bias,  or  prejudice,  if  any. 
of  said  witnesses  as  well  as  their  manner  of  testifying, ' '  the  court 
holding  it  to  be  a  comment  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.47 

§  214.  Interest  of  witness  to  be  considered. — In  determining 
the  weight  to  be  given  to  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses,  in  either 
a  civil  or  criminal  case,  the  court,  in  charging  the  jury,  may 
state  that  they  have  the  right  to  take  into  consideration  the 
interest,  if  any,  a  witness  may  have  in  the  result  of  the  suit, 
together  with  all  the  other  evidence  in  the  case.48  Especially 
where  the  plaintiff  or  defendant,  when  a  witness  in  his  own 
behalf,  is  contradicted  on  material  matters  by  other  credible 
evidence,  is  it  the  duty  of  the  court,  if  so  requested,  to  instruct 
the  jury  as  to  his  interest,  if  any,  in  the  result  of  the  suit.49 

Accordingly  an  instruction  stating  that  while  the  defendant 
is  a  competent  witness,  yet  the  jury  have  a  right  to  take  into  con- 
sideration his  interest  in  the  result  of  the  trial,  and  all  the  facts 
and  circumstances  in  the  case,  and  give  his  testimony  only  such 
weight  as  they,  in  their  judgment,  think  it  entitled  to,  is  proper.50 

It  is  not  error  to  instruct  that  the  presumption  that  a  witness 
will  speak  the  truth  may  be  repelled  by  proof  of  his  interest 
or  bias.  This  amounts  to  telling  them  that  interest  and  bias 

47  Kellog    v.    McCabe    (Tex.    Cv.  139,  18  So.  306;  S.  v.  Ryan,  113  Iowa, 
App.),  38  S.  W.  542;  Houston,  E.  &  536,  85  N.  W.  812;   P.  v.  O'Neil,  67 
W.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Richards  (Tex.  Cv.  Gal.  378,  7  Pac.  790;  P.  v.  Calvin,  60 
App.),  49  S.  W.  687.     See  Crane  v.  Mich.  114,  26  N.  W.  851;  Hellyer  v. 
S.  Ill  Ala.  45,  20  So.  590.  P.  186  111.  550,  58  N.  E.  245;   Ham- 

48  Ammerman    v.    Teeter,    49    111.  ilton   v.   S.   62   Ark.   543,   36   S.   W. 
402;  Evans  v.  Lipscomb,  31  Ga.  71;  1065;   S.  v.  McCann,  16  Wash.   249, 
Lampe  v.  Kennedy,  60  Wis.  100,  18  47  Pac.  443;   S.  v.  Carey,  15  Wash. 
N.  W.  730;  Hellyer  v.  P.  186  111.  550,  549,   46  Pac.   1050;    S.   v.   Fiske,   63 
58  N.  E.  245;   Chezem  v.  S.  56  Neb.  Conn.  392,  28  Atl.  572;  S.  v.  Turner, 
496,  76  N.  W.  1056;  Lynch  v.  Bates,  110  Mo.  196,  19  S.  W.  645;  Emery  v. 
139  Ind.  206,  38  N.  E.  806;  Smith  v.  S.    101  Wis.   627,  78  N.  W.   145;    P. 
S.  142  Ind.  288,  41  N.  E.  595.  v.  Hertz,   105  Cal.   660,   39  Pac.   32; 

40  Becker  v.  Woarms,  76  N.  Y.  S.  Ter.  v.  Gatliff  (Okla.),  37  Pac.  809; 

438,    72    App.    Div.    196.      See    Lan-  P.    v.    Hitchcock,    104    Cal.    482,    38 

cashire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stanley,  70  Ark.  Pac.  198;  P.  v.  Jones,  24  Mich.  216. 

1,  62  S.  W.  66;   Kavanaugh  v.  City  See,  also,  S.  v.  McGinnis,  76  Mo. 

of  Wausau    (Wis.),   98   N.   W.   553.  326;    S.  v.  Zorn,  71  Mo.  415;    S.  v. 

BO  Barmby  v.   Wolfe,   44   Neb.   77.  Bohan,  19  Kas.  35. 
62  N.  W.  318;   Smith  v.  S.  107  Ala. 


215 


RELATING  TO  WITNESSES. 


206 


may  be  considered  by  them  in  weighing  the  testimony  of  the 
witness.01 

§  215.  Probability,  improbability,  manner,  conduct,  bias. — 
The  court  may  instruct  that  the  jury  may  consider  the  inherent 
probability  or  improbability  of  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses;52 
that  they  may  also  consider  any  feeling,  bias  or  partiality  shown 
|by  the  witnesses,  if  any.53  And  it  is  also  proper  to  instruct 
that  the  jury  may  take  into  consideration  the  manner,  conduct 
and  appearance  of  a  witness  while  on  the  witness  stand;54  and 
the  jury  may  also  consider  the  intelligence  or  want  of  intelli- 
gence of  a  witness  in  weighing  his  testimony.55 

But  to  instruct  that  the  jury  may  consider  the  demeanor  and 
conduct  of  the  accused  as  a  witness,  "during  the  trial,"  is 
error.56  But  in  Texas  the  courts  hold  that  an  instruction  which 
directs  the  jury  that  in  determining  the  truth  of  the  testimony 
they  may  consider  the  inelligence,  interest,  and  apparent  bias 
or  prejudice  of  the  witnesses  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  invades  the 
province  of  the  jury.57  And  in  the  same  state,  charging  the  jury 
that  "in  passing  on  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses,  you  may 


6i  P.   v.   Amaya,   134   Cal.   531,   66 
Pac.  794. 

52  McNeile    v.     Cridland,     6     Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  428;  Hale  Elevator  Co.  v. 
Hall,  201  111.  131,  66  N.  E.  249;  As- 
py  v.  Botkins,   160  Ind.  170,  66  N. 
E.  462. 

53  Blashfield    Instructions,    §    260, 
citing:    S.   v.   Nat,   51   N.    Car.   114 
(feeling);   Telker  v.  S.  54  Ark.  489, 
16  S.  W.  663;   S.  v.  Bohan,  19  Kas. 
35;  P.  v.  Cronin,  34  Cal.  192;   P.  v. 
Wheeler,  65  Cal.  77,  2  Pac.  892;  S.  v. 
Streeter,  20  Nev.  403,  22  Pac.  758;  S. 
v.  Fiske,  63  Conn.  392,  28  Atl.  572; 
S.  v.   Adair,  160  Mo.   392,  61  S.  W. 
187.     Contra:  Oliver  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),    42    S.    W.    554;    Isham   v.    S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  41  S.  W.  622. 

s*  S.  v.  Adair,  160  Mo.  391,  61  S. 

W.  187;    Georgia  Home  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Campbell,  102  Ga.  106,  29  S.  E.  148; 

S.  v.  Hoshor,  26  Wash.  643,  67  Pac. 

,.386;   S.  v.  Burton,  27  Wash.  528,  67 

Pac.   1097;   Brown  v.  Stacy,  5  Ark. 

403;    Ter.   v.   Leyba    (N.   Mex.),   47 

Pac.  718.    But  see  P.  v.  Newcomer, 

118  Cal.  263,  50  Pac.  405. 

•"  North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wellner, 


206  111.  277,  69  N.  E.  6.  See  Penn- 
sylvania Co.  v.  Hunsley,  23  Ind. 
App.  37,  54  N.  E.  1071. 

An  instruction  that  the  jury,  in 
weighing  the  testimony  of  wit- 
nessses  may  consider  the  fact  that 
they  were  called  by  the  court  is 
improper.  The  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses called  by  the  court  must  be 
subjected  to  the  same  tests  as  that 
of  other  witnesses,  Smith  v.  City 
of  Seattle  (Wash.),  74  Pac.  676. 

56  Purdy  v.  P.  140  111.  46,  29  N.  E. 
700;  Vale  v.  P.  161  111.  310,  43  N.  E. 
1091. 

The  jury  may  be  directed  that 
they  have  a  right  to  consider  their 
knowledge  of  men  which  they  have 
acquired  in  their  experience,  Cin- 
cinnati, H.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Cregor, 
150  Ind.  625,  50  N.  E.  760. 

57  Doggett  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
5,    44    S.    W.    842-    Williams    v.    S. 
(Tex.    Cr.    App.),    40    S.    W.    801; 
Isham  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  41  S. 
W.   622;    Harrell  v.   S.   37  Tex.   Cr. 
App.   612,   40  S.  W.'  799.     See  Lan- 
caster v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  16,  35 
S.  W.   165. 


207  WEIGHING  TESTIMONY — CONSIDERATIONS.  §    217 

consider  the  age,  intelligence,  interest  in  the  case,  apparent 
prejudice,  if  any,  and  all  the  other  circumstances  in  evidence 
before  you,"  is  held  to  be  improper  as  bearing  upon  the  weight 
of  the  evidence.58  And  this  same  rule  prevails  in  other  states 
besides  Texas.ou 

§216.    Instructions  that  jury  "must"  or  "should"  consider. 

A  charge  that  in  determining  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses 
and  of  the  weight  of  their  testimony  the  jury  must  take  into 
consideration  the  interest,  the  appearance  upon  the  witness  stand, 
the  intelligence,  the  opportunities  for  learning  the  truth  con- 
cerning the  things  testified  about,  the  apparent  candor  and  cor- 
rectness of  the  statements  as  compared  with  the  usual  and  ordi- 
nary nature  of  things,  is  not  objectionable  in  the  use  of  the 
word  "must."  It  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  consider  these 
things  in  weighing  the  testimony.  "Must"  implies  no  more 
than  the  idea  of  duty.60  It  has  been  held  that  a  charge  directing 
the  jury  that  they  "should"  take  into  consideration  the  intelli- 
gence of  a  witness  is  improper.  The  jury  may,  or  are  at  liberty 
to  take  into  consideration  the  intelligence  of  a  witness,  but  they 
are  not  bound  to  do  so.61 

§  217.  On  disregarding  testimony. — While  the  jury  cannot 
arbitrarily  disregard  the  testimony  of  a  credible  witness,02  yet 
they  are  not  bound  to  believe  the  testimony  of  a  witness  merely 
because  he  has  sworn  positively  to  a  material  fact  or  state  of 
facts,  and  it  is  proper  for  the  court  so  to  instruct  them.  Thus, 

cs  Oliver  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  42  Ind.  368,  39  N.  B.  390.     The  follow- 

S.    W.    554;    Peny   v.    S.    (Tex.    Or.  ing  cases  in  Indiana  are  no  longer 

App.),   42  S.  W.  297;    Shields  v.  S.  authority      on      this      proposition: 

39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  13,  44  S.  W.  844;  Woolen   v.   Whitacre,   91    Ind.    502; 

Houston,  B.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Run-  Unruh  v.   S.   105   Ind.   118,  4  N.   E. 

nels   (Tex.),  47  S.  W.  971.  453;  Duval  v.  Kenton,  127  Ind.  178. 

BO  Buckley  v.  S.  62  Miss.  705   (de-  ei  Smith  v.  S.  142  Ind.  288,  41  N. 

fendant);    Wright  v.   Com.    85   Ky.  E.  595;   Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Huns- 

123,  2  S.  W.  904.  ley,  23  Ind.  App.  37,  54  N.  E.  1071. 

eo  Fifer  v.  Hitter,  159  Ind.  11,  64  See   S.   v.   Bryant    (Mo.),   35   S.   W. 

N.   E.   463;    Keesier  v.   S.   154   Ind.  597   ("should"  or  "may");   Wabash 

242,  56  N.  E.  232;    S.  v.  Dotson,  26  R.  Co.  v.  Biddle,  27  Ind.  App.  161,  59 

Mont.  305,  67  Pac.   938;    Stanley  v.  N.  E.  284.     See  also  Bird  v.  S.  107 

Cedar  Rapids  &  M.   C.  R.  Co.   119  Ind.   154,  8  N.   E.   14;   Unruh  v.   S. 

Iowa,    526,    93    N.    W.    489;    City   of  105  Ind.  118,  4  N.  E.  453. 

Harvard  v.  Crouch,  47  Neb.  133,  66  02  Hall   v.   S.   134   Ala.   90,   32   So. 

N.  W.  276  (interest) ;  S.  v.  Hilsabeck  750;    McMahon   v.    P.    120   111.    584, 

(Mo.),  34  S.  W.  38;   Deal  v.  S.  140  11  N.  E.  883. 


§    218  RELATING  TO   WITNESSES.  208 

an  instruction  that  the  jury  are  not  necessarily  bound  to  believe 
anything  to  be  a  fact  because  a  witness  has  stated  it  to  be  so, 
provided  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  such  witness 
is  mistaken  or  has  sworn  wilfully  falsely  as  to  such  fact,  is 
proper.'53 

And  where  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  appears  to  be  wholly 
irreconcilable  and  the  credibility  of  some  of  them  is  questioned, 
it  is  proper  for  the  court  to  instruct  that  the  jury  may  entirely 
or  in  part  disregard  the  testimony  of  any  witness  they  believe 
to  have  testified  wilfully  falsely.64  But  to  instruct  that  the 
jury  may  disregard  the  testimony  of  any  witness  interested  in 
the  result  of  the  trial,  "if  in  their  judgment  it  is  right  to  do 
so,"  is  improper.65  So  to  instruct  that  the  jury  may,  if  they 
think  proper,  disregard  the  testimony  of  any  witness,  if  for  any 
reason  they  believe  it  to  be  untrue,  is  error.66  Or  to  instruct 
that  the  jury  are  not  at  liberty  to  disregard  the  testimony 
of  a  witness  who  has  been  corroborated  by  other  credible  evi- 
dence, is  error  if  the  word  "disregard"  may  be  considered  as 
synonymous  with  the  words  "refuse  to  consider,"  as  implying 
that  the  testimony  of  an  uncorroborated  witness  need  not  be  con- 
sidered by  them.67 

§  218.  On  swearing  wilfully  falsely. — The  jury  may  disregard 
the  entire  testimony  of  a  witness  where  the  evidence  shows 
that  he  has  wilfully  or  knowingly  sworn  falsely  to  a  material 
matter  unless  his  testimony  is  corroborated  by  other  credible 
evidence,  and  it  is  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  so  instruct.68 
Especially  should  such  an  instruction  be  given  for  the  defendant, 

es  Goss  Printing  Pr.  v.  Lempke,  mer  v.  S.  Ill  Ga.  839,  36  S.  E.  233; 

191  111.  201,  60  N.  E.  968.  See  also  Churchwell  v.  S.  117  Ala.  124,  23 

Davis  v.  Northern  E.  R.  Co.  170  So.  72;  Osborn  v.  S.  125  Ala.  106,  27 

111.  602,  48  N.  E.  1058;  S.  v.  Small-  So.  758;  Yundt  v.  Hartrunft.  41 

•wood,  75  N.  Car.  104.  111.  16:  P.  v.  Wilder,  134  Cal.  182,  66 

e*  Gerdes  v.  Christopher  &  S.  A.  Pac.  228;  S.  v.  Perry,  41  W.  Va. 

I.  &  F.  Co.  (Mo.),  27  S.  W.  615.  641,  24  S.  E.  634;  Bunce  v.  Mc- 

65  Rucker  v.  S.  (Miss.),  18  So.  Mahon,  6  Wyo.  24,  42  Pac.  23,  (held 

121.  not  singling  out  witness);  P.  v. 

«6  Rylee  v.  S.  75  Miss.  352,  22  So.  Petmecky,  99  N.  Y.  415  (defendant), 

890;  Jackson  v.  Com.  17  Ky.  L.  R.  2  N.  E.  145;  Mead  v.  McGraw, 

1350,  34  S.  W.  901.  Compare,  Hun-  19  Ohio  St.  61;  Seligman  v.  Rogers, 

ter  v.  S.  29  Fla.  486,  10  So.  730.  113  Mo.  642,  21  S.  W.  94;  Bevelot  v. 

67  p.  v.   Compton    (Cal.),   56   Pac.  Lestrade,  153  111.  625,  38  N.  E.  1056; 
44.  Lyts    v.    Keevey,    5    Wash.    606,    32 

68  Rider  v.  P.  110  111.  11;   Plum-  Pac.  534. 


209  WITNESS  SWEARING  FALSELY.  §    219 

in  a  criminal  case,  where  one  of  like  nature  has  been  given  for 
the  prosecution.69  And  it  is  proper  to  instruct  that  if  the  jury 
conclude  that  any  witness  has  sworn  wilfully  falsely  as  to  any 
material  matter  they  may  reject  or  treat  as  untrue  the  whole  or 
any  part  of  his  testimony.70  But  the  jury  are  not  bound  to 
reject  the  whole  of  the  testimony  of  such  witness  and  they  may 
be  so  instructed  by  the  court.71 

It  is  the  privilege  of  the  jury  in  such  case  to  disregard  the 
testimony  of  such  a  witness,  but  the  court  cannot,  as  a  matter 
of  law,  direct  that  they  "should"  disbelieve  it.72  But  it  has 
been  held  that  the  giving  of  such  an  instruction  is  within  the 
sound  discretion  of  the  court,  and  the  refusal  to  give  it  is  not 
to  be  regarded  as  of  sufficient  error  upon  which  to  reverse, 
especially  where  other  instructions  given  relating  to  the  credi- 
bility of  the  witnesses  cover  the  omission.73  An  error  com- 
mitted by  using  the  word  "intentionally"  in  an  instruction 
instead  of  "knowingly  and  wilfully,"  as  to  the  credibility  of  a 
witness  is  harmless,  when  the  instruction  is  read  in  connection 
.with  another,  charging  that  in  determining  the  weight  to  be 
given  to  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  the  jury  may  consider  their 
appearance  and  manner  and  interest  in  the  suit.74 

§219.  On  swearing  falsely — Improper. — An  instruction  advis- 
ing the  jury  that  they  are  at  liberty  to  disregard  the  testimony 
of  a  witness  if  he  has  intentionally  misstated  or  concealed 
material  facts  which  does  not  contain  the  qualifying  clause, 
to  wit,  "unless  his  testimony  is  corroborated  by  other  credible 

69  Gorgo  v.   P.   100   111.   App.   130.  351.     Contra:    S.   v.    Hale,   156   Mo. 

TO  S.    v.    Martin,    124   Mo.    514,    28  102,  56  S.  W.  881;   S.  v.  Kellerman, 

8.  W.  12;   First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Min-  14   Kas.   135;    Dunlop  v.   Patterson, 

neapolis  &  N.  E.  Co.  11  N.  Dak.  280.  5   Cow.    (N.   Y.),   243;    Stoffer  v.   S. 

91    N.   W.   436    (omitting  the  words  15    Ohio    St.    47;     S.    v.    Musgrave, 

"material   matter"  does  not  render  43  W.  Va.  672,  28  S.  E.  813;    S.  v. 

the    instruction    bad).  Burton  (Ala.),  22  So.  585;  McClellan 

71  S.    v.    Thompson,    21    W.    Va.  v.    S.    117    Ala.    140,    23    So.    653; 

746.  Wastl  v.  Montana  N.  R.  Co.  17  Mont. 

72Higbee    v.     McMillan,    18   Kas.  213,  42  Pac.  772. 

133;   Reynold  v.  -Greenbaum,  80  111.          73  Cicero  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  193 

416;   P.  v.  Oldham,  111  Cal.  648,  44  111.  279,  61  N.  E.   1093;   S.  v.  Hick- 

Pac.    312;    Callanan   v.    S.    24   Iowa,  man,   95   Mo.   322,    8   S.   W.    252;    S. 

441;  Lowe  v.  S.  88  Ala.  8,  7  So.  97;  v.  Banks,  40  La.  Ann.  736,  5  So.  18. 
Litton  v.  Young,  2  Mete.  (Ky.),  74  Noyes  v.  Tootle,  48  S.  W.  1031; 

565;   P.  v.  O'Neil,  109  N.  Y.  251,  16  McClure    v.    Williams,    65    111.    390 

N.  E.  68;    Senter  v.  Carr,  15  N.  H.  (wilfully   or   knowingly). 


220 


RELATING  TO   WITNESSES. 


210 


evidence,"  is  erroneous.75  And  the  words  "unless  his  testi- 
mony is  corroborated  by  the  statements  of  other  credible  wit- 
nesses," will  not  alone  answer,  as  the  corroboration  may  be 
by  any  credible  evidence  or  by  facts  inferable  therefrom.76  Also 
such  an  instruction  must  embody  the  idea  that  the  testimony 
was  wilfully,  corruptly  or  intentionally  given  by  the  witness.77 
The  mere  fact  that  a  witness  has  sworn  falsely  on  some  mate- 
rial point  will  not  authorize  the  jury  to  disregard  his  testimony. 
The  testimony  of  the  witness  must  not  only  be  false,  but  know- 
ingly or  corruptly  false  before  the  jury  are  at  liberty  to  disre- 
gard it;  a  witness  might  even  swear  corruptly  falsely  on  a 
material  matter  and  if  portions  of  his  testimony  are  corrob- 
orated by  other  credible  evidence,  it  would  not  necessarily  follow 
that  all  his  testimony  should  be  disregarded.78  And  the  instruc- 
tion must  confine  the  false  swearing  to  a  material  matter  in 
issue.79  And  it  should  be  so  drawn  as  to  apply  to  all  the  wit- 
nesses and  not  single  out  a  particular  witness.80 

§  220.    Impeachment — Instructions    based    on    evidence. — The 


75  Miller   v.    S.    106   Wis.    156,    81 
N.  W.  1020;  S.  v.  De  Wolfe  (Mont.), 
77    Pac.    1087;     Bratt    v.    Swift,    99 
Wis.    579,    75    N.    W.    411;    Chitten- 
den  v.  Evans,  41  111.  251;  Maxwell  v. 
Williamson,  35  111.  529;  F.  Dohman 
Co.    v.    Niagara    Fire    Ins.    Co.    96 
Wis.  38,  71  N.  W.  69.     See  Wilson 
v.  Coulter,  51  N.  Y.  S.  804;   Moran 
v.  P.  163  111.  372,  45  N.  E.  23;  Miller 
v.  Madison  Car  Co.  130  Mo.  517,  31 
S.  W.   574;    Peak  v.   P.   76  111.  289; 
Jeffries   v.    S.    77   Miss.    757,   28    So. 
948;    McDonald    v.    S.    (Miss.),    28 
So.  750.     Contra:     S.  v.  Sexton,  10 
S.  Dak.  127,  72  N.  W.  84. 

76  Dohman   v.    Niagara   Fire   Ins. 
Co.  96  Wis.  38,  71  N.  W.  69.    Contra: 
Brown    v.    Hannibal    &    St.    J.    R. 
Co.  66  Mo.  599;    S.  v.  Musgrave,  43 
W.    Va.    672,   28  S.   E.    813,   holding 
that  the  addition  of  the  words  "un- 
less corroborated,"  renders  the  in- 
struction erroneous. 

77  Ward    v.    Ward,    25    Colo.    33, 
52  Pac.  1105;   Jennings  v.  Kosmak, 
46  N.  Y.  S.  802,  20  Misc.  300;  Yundt 
v.   Hartrunft,   41    111.    10,   14;    Gehl 
v.  Milwaukee  Produce  Co.  116  Wis. 


263,  93  N.  W.  26;  Prater  v.  S.  107 
Ala.  26,  18  So.  238;  S.  v.  Kyle,  14 
Wash.  550,  45  Pac.  147  (holding  that 
"wilfully"  is  implied  in  "falsely") ; 
Gottlieb  v.  Hartman,  3  Colo.  53; 
S.  v.  Brown,  64  Mo.  367. 

78  Chittenden  v.  Evans,  41  111.  251, 
254;  Cahn  v.  Ladd,  94  Wis.  134, 

68  N.  W.   652;    Shenk  v.   Hager,  24 
Minn.  339;   Childs  v.  S.  76  Ala.  93; 
Fisher  v.   P.  20  Mich.   135;    Mercer 
v.    Wright,    3    Wis.    645.      See    also 
White  v.   S.   52  Miss.  216;    Cahn  v. 
Ladd,  94  Wis.  134;  S.  v.  Sexton,  10 
S.  Dak.  127,  72  N.  W.  84;  Skipper  v. 
S.  59  Ga.  63;  S.  v.  Lett,  85  Mo.  52. 

7»  P.  v.  Plyer,  121  Cal.  160,  53 
Pac.  553;  Ter.  v.  Lucero,  8  N.  Mex. 
543,  46  Pac.  18;  Cobb  v.  S.  115  Ala. 
18,  22  So.  506;  Peak  v.  P.  76  111. 
289;  Pierce  v.  S.  53  Ga.  365;  White 
v.  S.  52  Miss.  216.  Contra:  P.  v. 
Ah  Sing,  95  Cal.  65-4,  30  Pac.  796. 

so  City  of  Spring  Valley  v.  Gavin, 
182  111.  232,  54  N.  E.  1035;  P.  v. 
Arlington,  131  Cal.  231,  63  Pac. 
347;  Argabrigat  v.  S.  49  Neb.  760, 

69  N.  W.  102. 


IMPEACHMENT   OF    WITNESSES.  §    220 

court  is  authorized  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  law  as  to  the 
impeachment  of  witnesses  when  there  is  evidence  upon  which 
to  base  the  instructions,  whether  requested  to  do  so  or  not;81 
and  it  may  be  added  that  under  some  circumstances  the  refusal 
to  give  such  instructions  would  be  error  where  there  is  evidence 
upon  which  to  base  them.82  The  failure  of  the  court  to  instruct 
on  the  law  as  to  the  impeachment  of  witnesses  cannot  be  com- 
plained of  as  error  in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  such  instruc- 
tions.83 And,  of  course,  if  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  im- 
peach or  sustain  a  witness  the  court  is  not  bound  to  give  instruc- 
tions in  that  respect.84 

In  the  giving  of  instructions  -relating  to  the  impeachment 
of  witnesses,  the  court  cannot  say,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  a 
witness  has  been  impeached.  Whether  a  witness  has  or  has  not 
been  impeached,  and  to  what  extent,  is  a  question  for  the  jury 
to  determine.85  If  the  jury  believe  a  witness,  it  is  their  duty 
to  consider  his  testimony,  notwithstanding  an  attempt  to  impeach 
him.86  The  court  may,  however,  state  that  there  is  evidence 
tending  to  impeach  a  witness,87  or  that  there  is  evidence  tending 
to  sustain  him,  when  such  is  the  case — without  invading  the  prov- 
ince of  the  jury.88  It  is  not  improper,  therefore,  for  the  court 
to  state  that  a  witness  may  be  sustained  by  proof  of  good  char- 
acter or  by  other  facts  and  circumstances  shown  by  the  evi- 
dence.89 

si  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Crancher,  S.  E.  39.  See  also,  relating  to  "false 

132    Ind.    275,   31   N.   E.   941;    Ford  in  one  thing  false  in,  all  things,"  S. 

v.  S.  92  Ga.  459,  17  S.  E.  667.     See  v.  Hale,  156  Mo.  102,  56  S.  W.  881; 

Freeman  v.  S.  112  Ga.  48,  37  S.  E.  Ingalls  v.  S.  48  Wis.  647,  4  N.  W. 

172.     See  Smith  v.  S.   142  Ind.  288,  785;    S.   v.    McDevitt,    69   Iowa,   549, 

41    N.   E.   595.  29  N.  W.  459;   S.  v.  Palmer,  88  Mo. 

82  Wolfe     v.     S.     25     Tex.     App.  568. 

698,   9   S.   W.    44;    Rose   v.   Otis,   18  S5  Harris  v.  S.  96  Ala.  27,  11  So. 

Colo.   59,   31  Pac,  493.  255;  Powell  v.  S.  101  Ga.  20,  29  S.  E. 

83  Boynton  v.   S.   115  Ga.   587,   41  309;.  McConkey  v.  Com.  101  Pa.  St. 
S.    E.    995;    American    T.    &   T.    Co.  420. 

v.  Kersh,  27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  127,  66  se  McCasland    v.    Kimberlim,    100 

S.  W.  74;   Levan  v.  S.  114  Ga.  258,  Ind.    121;    Harris   v.    S.   96    Ala.    27, 

40    S.    E.    252;    Downing    v.    S.    114  11    So.    255;    Smith    v.    Grimes,    43 

Ga.  30,  39  S.  E.  927;   Hatcher  v.  S.  Iowa,    365. 

116  Ga.  617,  42  S.  E.  1018;  Anderson  «T  Smith  v.  S.  142  Ind.  288,  41  N. 

v.    S.    117    Ga.    255,    43    S.    E.    835;  E.    595;    Ford  v.   S.   92   Ga.   459,   17 

Thomas  v.  S.  95  Ga.  484,  22  S.  E.  S.  E.  1006;  Harris  v.  S.  96  Ala.  24, 

315;    S.    v.    Kirkpatrick,    63    Iowa,  11  So.  255. 

554,  19  N.  W.  660.  ™  Smith    v.    S.    142    Ind.    288,    41 

s*  Freeman  v.  S.  112  Ga.  48,  37  S.  N.  E.  595. 

E.    172;    Hart  v.   S.   93   Ga.    160,   20  so  Powell   v.    S.   101  Ga.   9,   29   S. 


§    221  RELATING  TO  WITNESSES.  212 

§  221.  Believing  or  disbelieving  witness. — It  is  not  improper 
to  instruct  that  "where  it  is  shown  that  the  reputation  of  a 
witness  for  truth  is  bad,  his  evidence  is  not  necessarily  destroyed, 
but  it  is  to  be  considered  under  all  the  circumstances  described 
in  the  evidence,  and  given  such  weight  as  the  jury  believe  it 
entitled  to,  and  to  be  disregarded  if  they  believe  it  entitled 
to  no  weight."00  An  instruction  that  the  jury  "are  at  liberty 
to  disregard  the  statements  of  such  witnesses,  if  any  there  be, 
who  have  been  sucessfully  impeached  either  by  direct  contradic- 
tion or  by  proof  of  general  bad  character,  unless  the  statements 
of  such  witnesses  have  been  corroborated  by  other  evidence 
which  has  not  been  impeached/'  is  not  improper.91 

A  charge  that  the  jury  "should  consider  the  impeaching  evi- 
dence introduced,  in  estimating  the  weight  which  ought  to  be 
given  to  the  testimony  of  the  witness,  and  should  also,  for  the 
same  purpose,  take  into  consideration  the  fact,  if  they  should  so 
find,  that  the  moral  character  of  any  witness  has  been  success- 
fully impeached, '  '92  is  proper.  A  charge  that  a  witness  has  either 
told  the  truth  or  that  he  has  perjured  himself  is  erroneous,  in 
that  the  jury  are  compelled  to  find  the  one  way  or  the  other 
without  giving  the  witness  the  credit  of  being  mistaken.93  The 
failure  of  the  court  to  charge  the  jury  as  to  the  purpose  and  effect 
of  impeaching  testimony  can  not  be  urged  as  error,  where  the  tes- 
timony of  the  prosecution,  which  tends  to  impeach  a  witness, 
is  met  by  rebuttal  testimony  sustaining  him,  especially  in  view  of 
the  general  charge  given  on  the  weight  of  the  testimony  and 
the  credit  to  be  given  to  the  witnesses.94 

To  instruct  that  the  effect  of  impeaching  evidence  is  not  to 
exclude  the  testimony  of  the  witness  from  the  consideration  of 
the  jury  is  improper,  as  tending  to  lead  the  jury  to  believe 
that  they  cannot  entirely  discredit  the  testimony  of  the  wit- 
ness.95 A  charge  that  "against  the  credibility  of  any  witness, 
it  is  a  strong  circumstance,  weighing  heavily,  that  he  is  shown 
to  have  sworn  falsely  in  regard  to  some  material  fact,"  is  im- 

E.  309,  65  Am.  St.  277;  See  Hart  v.         »s  Smith  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  170 
S.  93  Ga.  160.  20  S.  E.  39.  N.  Y.  394,  63  N.  E.  338. 

oo  S.  v.  Miller,  53  Iowa,  210,  4  N.          »*  Givens  v.   S.   35  Tex.   Cr.   App. 
W.  838,  900.  563,  34  S.  W.  636. 

91  Miller   v.    P.    39    111.    463.  ss  Crockett  v.  S.  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

92  Smith    v.    S.    142    Ind.    288,  41      173,  49  S.  W.  392. 
N.  E.  361. 


213  BELIEVING  OR   DISBELIEVING — FAILURE  TO   PRODUCE  §    222 

proper.90  To  instruct  that  "while  it  is  the  province  of  the  jury 
to  pass  upon  the  credibility  of  a  witness,  nevertheless  the  law 
furnishes  to  the  jury  certain  rules  to  guide  them  in  determining 
whether  or  not  a  witness  has  spoken  the  truth,  and  the  law 
authorizes  the  jury  to  discard  altogether  the  testimony  of  a 
witness  who  has  been  impeached,"  is  improper,  in  that  it  tends 
to  lead  the  jury  to  believe  that  the  credibility  of  the  witness 
depends  alone  upon  the  impeaching  evidence  irrespective  of 
other  evidence  in  the  case.97 

§222.    Failure  to  produce  witnesses  or  evidence. — It  may  be 

stated  as  a  general  rule,  in  either  a  civil  or  criminal  case,  that 
where  a  party  makes  no  effort  to  procure  certain  material  evi- 
dence which  is  peculiarly  or  exclusively  within  his  knowledge 
and  control,  and  which,  if  true,  would  rebut  or  meet  material 
evidence  introduced  against  him,  the  court  may,  in  charging  the 
jury,  comment  on  the  failure  to  produce  such  evidence  and  direct 
the  jury  to  consider  such  fact  in  determining  the  issues.98  But 
this  rule  can  have  no  application  to  the  failure  of  the  defendant 
in  a  criminal  case  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  or  his  failure  to 
call  his  wife  when  she  is  a  competent  witness  and  may  have 
knowledge  of  material  facts  in  issue  in  the  case.99  So  an  instruc- 
tion stating  that  "when  all  the  circumstances  proved  raise  a 
strong  presumption  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  his  failure  to  offer 
any  explanation,  where  in  his  power  to  do  so,  tends  to  confirm 
the  presumption  of  his  guilt,"  is  clearly  erroneous.100 

as  Paul  v.  S.  100  Ala.  136,  14  So.  Ave.   R.   Co.   8  Misc.    (N.   Y.)(   449; 

634.  Com.  v.  Costley,  118  Mass.  1;  Flynn 

97  Osborn   v.    S.    125   Ala.   106,   27  v.   New   York  E.   R.   Co.   50   N.   Y. 
So.    758.     Instructions   on   impeach-  S.  375.     See  Nicol  v.  Crittendon,  55 
ment   of  witnessed  held  erroneous:  Ga.   497.     See  S.   v.   Smallwood,   75 
Plummer  v.  S.  Ill  Ga.  839,  36  S.  E.  N.    Car.    104.     See   Momence   Stone 
233;    Strong   v.    S.    61    Neb.    35,    84  Co.  v.  Groves,  197  111.  93,  64  N.  E. 
N.    W.    410;    Osborn   v.    S.    125   Ala.  335;    Hinshaw    v.    S.    147    Ind.    334, 
106,  27  So.  758;   Paul  v.  S.  100  Ala.  47  N.  E.  157. 

136,  14  So.  634;  Jarnigan  v.  Fleming,  99  Stutsman  v.   Ter.   7  Okla.   490, 

43  Miss.  710;  Tarbell  v.  Forbes,  177  54  Pac.  707;  Doan  v.  S.  26  Ind.  498; 

Mass.   238,   58   N.   E.    873;    Dean  v.  S.   v.   Grebe,   17  Kas.   458;    Com.  v. 

S.  130  Ind.  237,  29  N.  E.  911;    Hig-  Harlow,  110  Mass.  411. 

gins  v.  Wren,  79  Minn.  462,  82  N.  100  Clem  v.  S.  42  Ind.  420,  2  Green 

W.    859;    Gilyard   v.    S.    98   Ala.    59,  C.  R.  696,  13  Am.  R.  369;    Com.  v. 

13  So.  391;  Spicer  v.  S.  105  Ala.  123,  Hardiman,     9     Gray    (Mass.),    136; 

16  So.  706.  Gordon  v.  P.  33  N.  Y.  501;  Com.  v. 

98  S.  v.  Grebe,  17  Kas.  458;  Stover  Pease,  110  Mass.  412. 
v.  P.  56  N.  Y.  320;  Ripley  v.  Second 


§  222  RELATING  TO  WITNESSES.  214 

In  civil  cases,  however,  the  parties  to  a  cause  are  included 
within  the  rule  mentioned.  Thus,  an  instruction  that  if  the  jury 
find  there  are  material  and  important  circumstances  appearing 
in  evidence  against  the  defendant,  and  they  further  find  that  the 
defendant  has  not  satisfactorily  explained  said  circumstances 
by  other  evidence,  then  the  fact  that  he  did  not  testify  in  his 
own  behalf  may  be  considered  in  evidence  against  him,  and  that 
they  should  give  such  fact  such  weight  as  it  is  entitled  to  when 
considered  with  the  other  evidence  in  the  case,  is  proper.101 
But  such  an  instruction  is  not  proper  unless  it  appears  that  the 
party  thus  failing  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf  has  knowledge  of 
and  could  give  material  evidence  as  a  witness.102  So  it  is  im- 
proper to  charge  that  it  is  fair  to  infer  that  the  testimony  of  a 
witness  is  untrue,  from  the  failure  to  call  another  person  as  a 
witness  who  has  knowledge  of  the  same  facts  and  who  was  acces- 
sible and  able  to  appear.103 

The  omission  of  a  party  to  call  a  witness  who  might  have  been 
called  by  the  other  party  is  no  ground  for  a  presumption  that 
the  testimony  of  the  witness  would  have  been  unfavorable.104 

Where  a  litigant  produces  and  examines  a  witness  on  his  side 
of  the  case,  the  fact  that  he  fails  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
witness  to  certain  material  facts  which  the  witness  perhaps 
knows  something  about,  will  not  warrant  the  inference  that 
the  testimony  of  the  witness  as  to  the  facts  omitted  would  have 
been  unfavorable,  nor  authorize  the  giving  of  instructions  sub- 
mitting any  such  inference  to  the  jury.105  The  fact  that  a  par- 
ticular person  who  is  equally  within  the  control  of  both  parties, 
is  not  called  as  a  witness,  is  no  ground  for  any  presumption 
against  either  party,  and  the  jury  have  no  right  to  presume 
anything  in  respect  to  his  knowledge  of  any  of 'the  facts  of  the 
case.106 

While  it  is  true  that  a  party  who  introduces  a  witness  vouches 
for  his  truthfulness  and  will  not  be  permitted  to  impeach  him, 
yet  he  does  not  warrant  the  witness  to  be  truthful;  hence  an 

101  Miller  v.  Dayton,  57  Iowa,  423,      39  N.  Y.  S.  279;  Cramer  v.  City  of 
10  N.  W.  814;  Blackwood  v.  Brown,      Burlington,  49  Iowa,  215. 

29  Mich.  483;  Union  Bank  v.  Stone,  IOB  Millman   v.   Rochester  R.    Co. 

50  Me.  5%.  39    N.    Y.    S.    274. 

102  Emery  v.  Smith,  54  Ga.  273.  ios  Scovill    v.    Baldwin,    27    Conn. 

103  Brown    v.   Town   of   Swanton,  316.    See  Flynn  v.  New  York  E.  R. 
69  Vt.  53,  37  Atl.  280.  Co.   50  N.   Y.   S.  375. 

104  Millman   v.    Rochester   R.    Co. 


215 


SINGLING  OUT  WITNESSES. 


instruction  that  when  a  party  introduces  a  witness  he  thereby 
indorses  his  credibility  is  erroneous.107 

§  223.  Singling  out  witnesses — Improper. — It  is  improper  in 
the  giving  of  instructions  to  single  out  a  particular  witness,  by 
name  or  otherwise,  and  submit  his  testimony  to  the  jury  and 
thereby  give  it  prominence.108  Instructions  relating  to  witnesses 
should  apply  equally  to  all  of  them  and  not  single  out  and  give 
prominence  to  the  testimony  of  any  particular  witness.109  It  is 
also  quite  as  improper  to  single  out  and  give  prominence  to  a 
certain  class  of  witnesses,  such  as  experts,  and  make  comments  on 
the  testimony,  either  favorable  or  unfavorable.  Such  practice  is 
an  invasion  of  the  province  of  the  jury.110 

An  instruction  as  to  the  testimony  of  non-expert  witnesses 
where  the  defense  is  insanity,  stating  that  their  opinions  are  to 
be  received  and  weighed  only  in  the  light  of  the  facts  related  by 
them;  that  the  jury  should  judge  of  the  reasonableness  of  their 
opinions  from  such  facts,  and  give  them  such  weight  as  they 
might  deem  proper,  and  that  both  the  expert  and  non-expert 


107  Jarnigan  v.  Fleming,  43  Miss. 
710;   S.  v.  Brown,  76  N.  Car.  225. 

108  S.    v.    Chick    (Mo.),    48    S.    W. 
829;    P.  v.  Clark,  105  Mich.   169,  62 
N.   W.   1117:    Davidson  v.   Walling- 
ford,    88    Tex.    619,    32    S.    W.    1030; 
King  v.  S.  120  Ala.  329,  25  So.  178; 
Smith    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    49 
S.  W.  583;  Thompson  v.  S.  106  Ala. 
67,   17   So.   512;    Donahue   v.   Egan, 
85  111.  App.  20;   Southern  R.  Co.  v. 
Reaves    (Ala.),   29    So.    594;    Grand 
Rapids   &   I.   R.   Co.   v.   Judson,   34 
Mich.  507. 

109  Wells    v.    S.    131    Ala.    48,    31 
So.  572;   Winter  v:  S.  133  Ala.  176, 
31  So.  717;  P.  v.  Weissenberger,  77 
N.  Y.  S.  71,  73  App.  Div.  428  (accom- 
plice);     Graff    v.    P.    208    111.    326; 
Arnold  v.  Pucher,  83  111.  App.  182; 
Doyle  v.    P.    147   111.   398,   35   N.    B. 
372;    Argabright  v.   S.   49  Neb.   760, 
€9  N.  W.  102;   Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
v.   Winters,   175    111.   299,   51   N.   E. 
SOI  (held  not  singling  out  witnesses 
of    one    party) ;    Rafferty   v.    P.    72 
111.  37,  46;   Orendorff  v.  Pinfronch, 
65  111.  App.  174;  Cogwell  v.  Southern 
P    R.  Co.  129  N.  Car.  398,  40  S.  E. 
202;    Mathews    v.    Granger,    96    111. 


App.  536,  63  N.  E.  658;  S.  v.  Smith, 
8  S.  Dak.  547,  67  N.  W.  619.  See  al- 
so Frost  v.  S.  124  Ala.  71,  27  So. 
550;  Clausen  v.  Jones,  18  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  376,  45  S.  W.  183;  S.  v.  Mc- 
Clellan,  23  Mont.  532,  59  Pac.  924; 
Heddle  v.  City  Elec.  R.  Co.  112 
Mich.  547,  70  N.  W.  1096;  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan,  114  Ala. 
449,  22  So.  20.  It  has  been  held 
that  where  only  one  witness .  was 
impeached  by  showing  that  he  had 
committed  the  crime  of  perjury,  it 
was  proper  for  the  court  in  giving 
instructions  to  refer  to  such  wit- 
ness by  name.  Shaw  v.  S.  102  Ga. 
660,  29  S.  E.  477.  See  S.  v.  Jackson, 
103  Iowa,  702,  73  N.  W.  467. 

no  Hayden  v.  Frederickson,  59 
Neb.  141,  80  N.  W.  494;  Coleman  v. 
Adair,  75  Miss.  660,  23  So.  369; 
Blough  v.  Parry,  144  Ind.  463,  40 
N.  E.  70;  Jamison  v.  Weld,  93  Me. 
345,  45  Atl.  299;  Thomas  v.  Gates, 
126  Cal.  1,  58  Pac.  315;  Smith  v. 
Chicago  &  W.  I.  R.  Co.  105  111. 
511,  522;  Brush  v.  Smith,  111  Iowa. 
217,  82  N.  W.  467.  See  Bever  v. 
Spangler,  93.  Iowa,  576,  61  N.  W. 
1072. 


§    224  .        RELATING  TO  WITNESSES.  216 

testimony  should  be  subjected  to  a  careful  and  painstaking  inves- 
tigation, properly  states  the  law.111  Where  the  evidence  tends 
to  prove  that  other  witnesses  besides  the  plaintiff  who  gave  tes- 
timony, were  interested  in  the  result  of  the  suit,  an  instruction 
singling  out  the  plaintiff  and  applying  to  him  alone  the  test 
of  credibility  because  of  his  interest  is  improper.112  So  it  is 
improper  to  instruct  that  if  the  jury  believe  a  certain  witness 
they  should  find  for  the  defendant,  when  there  is  other  evidence 
tending  to  contradict  the  testimony  of  such  witness.113  Where 
the  testimony  of  a  witness  has  been  greatly  weakened  by  his  con- 
tradictory statements  on  former  trials  and  by  his  apparently 
imperfect  memory,  it  is  improper  for  the  court  to  charge  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  reconcile  his  testimony,  if  possible ; 
that  it  is  better  to  assume  that  a  witness  has  made  mistakes 
rather  than  that  he  has  testified  falsely.  Such  a  charge  invades 
the  province  of  the  jury.114 

§  224.  Detectives  and  informers  as  witnesses. — The  testi- 
mony of  detectives  and  informers,  whose  business  it  is  to  secure 
evidence,  should  be  examined  and  weighed  with  greater  care 
than  that  of  witnesses  wholly  disinterested,  and  it  is  proper  to 
so  instruct  the  jury.115  That  a  reward  has  been  offered  for  the 
apprehension  of  a  person  accused  of  the  commission  of  a  crime, 
is  a  fact  proper  to  be  shown  in  evidence  as  affecting  the  credi- 
bility of  a  witness  who  may  have  been  instrumental  in  causing 
the  arrest  of  the  accused;  hence  it  is  improper  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  "the  mere  fact  that  a  reward  had  been  offered  is 
not  evidence  against  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses;  that  there 
must  be  something  in  connection  therewith  to  show  that  the 

in  Wilcox  v.  S.  94  Tenn.  106,  28  5fi   N.   E.   796.     See  City  of  Spring 

S.    W.   312.       But    in    the    federal  Valley  v.  Gavin,  182  111.  232,  54  N. 

courts    it    has    been    held    not    im-  E.  1035. 

proper  for  the  court  to  state  that  us  Fox   v.    Manhattan   R.    Co.    73 

the    testimony    of    medical    experts  N.    Y.    S.    896,    67    App.    Div.    460; 

is    entitled    to    great    weight.      St.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.   Co.   v.  Jud- 

Louis,  Q.   M.   &   S.   R.   Co.  v.   Phil-  son,  34  Mich.  507. 

lips,  66  Fed.  35.  n*  Isely   v.   Illinois  Cent.   R.   Co. 

112  City    of    Dixon    v.    Scott,    181  88  Wis.  453,  60  N.  W.  794. 

111.  116,  54  N.  E.  897;  Pennsylvania  us  Sandage  v.  S.  61  Neb.  240,  85 

Co.    v.    Versten     140    111.    637,    642,  N.  W.   35;    Fidelity  M.   L.  Asso.  v. 

30  N.  E.  540;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Jeffords,  107  Fed.  402.  53  L.  R.  A. 

Co.   v.    Dudgeon,    83   111.   App.    528,  193  note. 


217  DETECTIVES,    INFORMERS,    RELATIVES.  §  225 

witness  testified  in  view  of  the  reward. '  '11G  But  calling  the  atten- 
tion of  the  jury  to  the  admitted  fact  that  the  witnesses  for 
the  state  had  been  paid  and  hired  to  arrest  the  defendant  is 
improper.117 

§  225.  Relatives  as  witnesses. — In  passing  upon  the  credibility 
of  the  witnesses  the  jury  may  take  into  consideration  the  rela- 
tionship of  any  of  them  to  the  defendant,  if  any  is  shown,  and 
it  is  proper  to  so  instruct  the  jury.118  Thus  an  instruction  that 
the  jury  should  scrutinize  the  testimony  of  the  defendant's 
father  and  mother  on  account  of  their  Relationship,  and  if  they 
believe  them  to  be  credible,  their  testimony  should  be  given  as 
full  weight  as  that  of  other  witnesses,  is  proper.119  An  instruc- 
tion that  "in  considering  the  weight  of  the  testimony  given  by 
both  the  defendant  and  his  wife,  you  will  take  into  considera- 
tion the  fact  that  he  is  the  defendant  testifying  in  his  own  be- 
half and  that  she  is  his  wife,  and  you  may  consider  their  interest 
in  the  case  and  the  marital  relation  in  passing  upon  the  cred- 
ibility of  their  testimony,"  is  proper.120 

A  charge  that:  "It  is  the  duty  of  the  jury,  in  passing  upon  the 
evidence  of  the  prisoner  himself,  and  of  his  near  relatives  who 
have  testified  for  him,  to  scrutinize  their  evidence  with  great 
caution,  considering  their  interest  in  the  result  of  the  verdict, 
and  after  so  considering,  the  jury  will  give  to  it  such  weight 
as  they  may  deem  proper,"  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  does  not  fur- 
ther charge  that  if  the  witnesses  were  found  to  be  credible 
their  testimony  should  be  given  full  credit.121  An  instruction 
directing  the  attention  to  the  testimony  of  the  wife  of  the 
accused,  stating  that  although  the  law  does  not  say  that  a 
wife  cannot  swear  to  the  truth,  it  does  cast  suspicion  upon  her 

us  Myers  v.   S.   97   Ga.   76,   25   S.  testimony,   Mitchell   v.   S.   133  Ala. 

E.  252.  65,  32  So.  132. 

117  Copeland  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr  App.  i"  S.   v.    Apple,   121   N.    Car.    584, 

575,  38  S.  W.  210.  28  S.  E.  469.     See  S.  v.  Byers,  100 

us  Van  Buren  v.  .S.  63  Neb.   453,  N.  Car.  512,  6  S.  E.  420. 

88  N.  W.  671.     But  see  P.  v.  Shat-  120  S.  v.   Napper,   141  Mo.  401,  42 

tuck,  100  Gal.  673,  42  Pac.  315,  22  L.  S.    W.    957. 

R.  A.  790.    In  a  homicide  case  it  has  121  S.    v.    McDowell,    129    N.    Car. 

been  held  improper  to  call  the  at-  523.   39   S.   E.    840.     See   also   S.   v. 

tention  of  the  jury  to  the  relation-  Collins,   118  N.   Car.   1203,  24  S.   E. 

ship    of   the    witnesses    to    the    de-  118;    S.    v.    Holloway,    117    N.    Car. 

ceased  as  tending  to  discredit  their  730,   23   S.   E.    168;    S.   v.   Nash,   30 

N.  Car.  35. 


§  226  RELATING  TO  WITNESSES.  218 

testimony  by  reason  of  the  close  relationship  between  husband 
and  wife,  and  that  the  jury  should,  therefore,  scan  it  closely,  is 
improper,  as  tending  to  lead  the  jury  to  believe  that  the  tes- 
timony of  the  wife  may  be  discredited,  although  they  may  be- 
lieve that  she  has  testified  truthfully.122  Also  a  charge  that 
the  jury  have  no  right  to  reject  the  testimony  of  the  wife  and 
daughter  of  the  accused  simply  because  it  comes  from  a  source 
in  which  there  would  be  strong  motives  to  give  the  most  favor- 
able coloring  possible  to  the  evidence  for  the  accused,  is  im- 
proper as  expressing  a,n  opinion  on  the  question  of  motives.123 
The  competency  of  children  as  witnesses  depends  upon 
their  intelligence,  judgment,  understanding  and  ability  to  com- 
prehend the  nature  and  effect  of  an  oath.124  The  jury  are  the 
judges  of  the  credibility  of  a  child  witness,  as  well  as  all  other 
witnesses,  but  it  has  been  held  not  improper  for  the  court 
to  call  their  attention  to  the  fact  of  the  tender  age  of  the 
witness  when  considering  any  contradictory  or  inconsistent, 
statements  in  his  testimony,  if  any,  and  advise  them  that 
they  are  not  required  to  consider  the  testimony  of  such  wit- 
ness as  they  would  that  of  a  mature  person.  Thus,  on  a 
charge  of  having  carnal  knowledge  of  a  female  child,  seven 
years  old,  an  instruction  that  "you  will  not  take  and 
consider  her  statements  if  they  are  contradictory  and  incon- 
sistent, as  you  would  those  of  a  mature  person,  but  you  must 
take  them  as  the  statements  of  a  little  girl,  given  under  such  cir- 
cumstances as  you  have  seen,  and  must  weigh  them  in  con- 
nection with  all  the  other  testimony,"  has  been  held  not  to  be 
improper.125  A  charge  that  the  jury  ' '  should  weigh  the  testimony 
of  an  immature  child  with  that  degree  of  their  own  common 
knowledge  and  understanding  of  children  in  the  narrative  of 
events  during  childhood,"  is  improper,  in  that  it  is  incomplete 
and  elliptical.126 

§  226.    On  competency  and  testimony  of  the  defendant. — By 

122  s.  v.  Lee,  121  N.  Car.  544,  28  10   Gal.    66;    S.    v.    Dennis,    19    La. 
S.   E.   552.  Ann.  119;  S.  v.  Richie,  28  La.  Ann. 

123  p.  v.  Pom/eroy,  30  Ore.  16,  46  327;  S.  v.  Whitier,  21  Me.  341. 
Pac.  797.  125  Barnard    v.    S.    88    Wis.    656, 

124  Rapalje  Witnesses  §  7,  citing  60   N.   W.   1058. 

Flanigan  v.  S.  25  Ark.  92;  Warner         ize  Walker  v.   S.   134  Ala.    86,   32 
v.    S.    25    Ark.    447;    P.    v.   Bernal,      So.  703. 


#19  COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES DEFENDANT.  §    227 

statutory  provision  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  case  is  made 
a  competent  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  at  his  election,  and  when 
he  does  testify  he  becomes  the  same  in  all  respects  as  any  other 
witness,  and  his  testimony  is  to  be  tested  by  the  same  rules  or 
tests  that  are  applied  to  other  witnesses.127  And,  of  course, 
under  such  statute  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury 
instructed  that  he  is  a  competent  witness  in  his  own  behalf.1-8 
But  the  court  may  call  special  attention  to  the  testimony  of 
the  defendant  and  tell  the  jury  that  they  are  authorized  to 
take  into  consideration  the  interest  he  may  have  in  the  result 
of  the  trial,  as  affecting  his  credibility — in  other  words,  the 
court  may  single  out  the  testimony  of  the  defendant  which  is 
improper  as  to  other  witnesses.129  The  court  may  instruct  as  to 
the  credit  to  be  given  to  the  testimony  of  the  accused,  although 
there  is  no  statute  expressly  authorizing  it.130  But  this  principle 
cannot  be  applied  to  any  other  witness  who  may  be  interested 
in  the  result  of  the  trial  or  related  to  the  defendant.131 

§227.  Defendant's  interest — Other  considerations. — As  pre- 
viously stated,  the  jury  in  weighing  the  testimony  of  the 
defendant  in  a  criminal  case  shall  be  governed  by  the  same 
rules  and  tests  that  are  applied  to  the  other  witnesses,  but 
the  court  may  direct  them  that  they  should  consider  his  in- 
terest in  the  result  of  the  trial.132  The  court  may  also  call  the 
attention  of  the  jury  to  the  fact,  if  it  be  a  fact,  that  the 
accused  has  been  previously  convicted  of  a  felony.133  Also  that 

127  Sullivan   v.   P.   114   111.  24,   27,         "i  p.   v.    Hertz,   105   Cal.   660,   39 
28  N.   E.   381;    Rider  v.   P.   110   111.  Pac.   32;    McEwen  v.   S.    (Miss.),  16 
13;  Creed  v.  P.  81  111.  569.  So.  242.    Contra:   as  to  wife  of  de- 

128  McVay    v.    S.    (Miss.),    26    So.  fendant,  S.  v.  Napper,  141  Mo.  401, 
947.     See  S.  v.  McClellan,  23  Mont.  42  S.  W.  957. 

532,  59  Pac.  924.  132  S.  v.  Summar,  143  Mo.  220,  45 

i29padfield   v.   P.   146   111.   663,   35  S.   W.   254;    S.  v.   Young,  104   Iowa, 

N.  E.  469;  Rhea  v.  U.  S.  6  Okla.  249,  730,   74  N.   W.   693;    S.   v.  Wiggins, 

50   Pac.   992;    Barmoy  v.   Wolfe,  44  50  La.  Ann.  330,  23  So.  334;  Kirkham 

Neb.  77,  62  N.  W.  318;   Keating  v.  v.  P.  170  111.  16,  48  N.  E.  465;  P.  v. 

S.    (Neb.),    93   N.    W.    980;    Ter.    v.  Petmecy,    99    N.    Y.    421,    2    N.    E. 

Gonzales    (N.    Mex.),    68    Pac.    925;  145.     See  also  Honsh  v.  S.  43  Neb. 

Bressler  v.  P.  117  111.  422,  8  N.  E.  163,    61   N.   W.   571;    Newport  v.    S. 

62;    Hirsehm-an   v.    P.    101    111.    568;  140    Ind.    299,    39   N.    E.    926;    S.    v. 

Doyle   v.    P.   147   111.   394,   35   N.    E.  Case,  96   Iowa,  264,   65   N.   W.   149; 

372;   Pryman  v.  S.  102  Ala.  130,  15  S.  v.  Metcalf,  17  Mont.  417,  43  Pac. 

So.  433;  Macintosh  v.  S.  151  Ind.  251.  998;    P.  v.   Calvin,  60  Mich.   114,  26 

See  Underbill  Cr.  Ev.  §  58.  N.  W.   851. 
iso  p.  v.   Hitchcock,   104  Cal.   482,          iss  p.    v.    Johnson,    104    Cal.    418. 

38  Pac.  198.  38  Pac.  91.     See  Conkey  v.  Carpen- 


§  227  RELATING  TO  WITNESSES.  220 

if  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  has  made 
any  false,  improbable  or  contradictory  statements  in  his  tes- 
timony these  matters  are  proper  to  be  considered  in  weighing 
his  testimony.134  And  it  is  also  proper  to  charge  that  the  de- 
fendant sustains  or  occupies  a  relation  to  the  case  different 
from  that  of  any  other  witness  where  the  instruction  clearly 
states  what  his  relation  to  the  case  is — that  he  is  the  defendant.135 
Although  it  is  proper  to  thus  caution  the  jury  in  weighing  the 
testimony  of  the  accused,  yet  the  court  should  not  cast  sus- 
picion upon  it  in  giving  instructions.136 

An  instruction  stating  that  the  jury  are  "to  consider  what 
he  has  at  stake ;  consider  the  temptations  brought  to  bear  on  a 
man  in  Jris  situation  to  tell  a  falsehood,"  is  improper.137  An 
instruction  which  states  that  the  jury,  in  weighing  the  tes- 
timony of  the  defendant,  may  consider  the  relationship  of  the 
witnesses  to  him,  their  interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit,  their 
temper  and  feeling  and  their  demeanor  while  testifying,  is  im- 
proper.138 On  the  other  hand,  if  the  testimony  of  the  accused 
is  corroborated  by  other  credible  evidence  the  jury  may  consider 
it  as  strengthened  to  the  extent  of  such  corroboration.139 

To  instruct  that  the  jury  are  not  bound  to  believe  the  tes^ 
timony  of  the  defendant,  nor  treat  it  the  same  as  the  testimony 
of  other  witnesses,  is  improper  and  prejudicial.140  But  an  in- 
struction that  "the  testimony  of  the  defendant  is  to  be  weighed 

ter,  106  Mich.  1,  63  N.  W.  990  (re-  of  the  defendant  they  must  acquit 

lating  to  any  witness  who  has  been  him,    is   improper,    where    there   is 

convicted  of  a  crime).  other  evidence  tending  to  prove  his 

"•I  Jones  v.   S.  61  Ark.  88,  32   S.  guilt,  Naugher  v.  S.  116  Ala.  463,  23 

W.  81;  Com.  v.  Devaney,  182  Mass.  So.  26.     An  instruction  relating  to 

33,  64  N.  E.  402;  Sater  v.  S.  58  Ind.  an  interview  between  the  state's  at- 

378  (relating  to  the  defendant  pro-  torney   and   the   defendant,   stating 

curing  false  testimony).  that  if  the  jury  have  any  doubt  as 

i»«  P.   v.   Curry,   103   Cal.   548,   37  to   what   was   said  .between    them, 

Pac.   503;    P.   v.   Ferry,   84   Cal.   31,  where   they,    as   witnesses,    contra- 

24  Pac.  33;  Mclntosh  v.  S.  151  Ind.  dieted    each    other,    then    the   jury 

251,  51  N.  E.  354.  should  adopt  the  version  of  the  de- 

ise  s.  v.  White,  10  Wash.  611,  39  fendant,  is  improper,  S.  v.  Warner. 

Pac.    160;    Alexander   v.    S.   114   Ga.  &9  Vt.  30,  37  Atl.  246. 

266,  40  S.  E.  231.  1*0  Sullivan   v.    P.    114    111.    27,    28 

137  p.  v.  Van  Ewan,  111  Cal.  144,  N.  E.  381;   Chambers  v,  P.  105  111. 

43  Pac.  520.  409,  412;   Reagan  v.  U.  S.  157  U.  S 

™«  Eller  v.   P.  153  111.  344,  38  N.  310,    15    Sup.    Ct.    610.      See    S.    v. 

E.  660.  Mecum,  95  Iowa,  433,  64  N.  W.  286; 

139  Johnson  v.  U.  S.  157  U.  S.  320  Gulliher  v.   P.   82   111.   146;    Hellyer 

15  Sup.  Ct.  164.'  An  Instruction  that  v.  P.  186  111.  550,  58  N.  E.  245.  See 

if  the  jury  have  a  reasonable  doubt  Allen  v.  S.  87  Ala.  107,  6  So.  370. 
as  to  the  truth  of  the  testimony 


221  DEFENDANT  A  WITNESS,  HIS   STATEMENTS.  §    228 

by  the  same  rules  that  govern  in  weighing  the  testimony  of 
other  witnesses,  but  in  passing  upon  its  weight  the  jury  may 
consider  the  interest  the  defendant  has  in  the  result  of  the  trial; 
but  that  they  should  not  reject  his  testimony  if  they  believe  it 
to  be  true,  simply  because  he  is  the  defendant,"  is  proper.141 
Or  a  charge  that  the  defendant  is  a  competent  witness,  but  that 
the  jury  are  the  judges  of  the  weight  to  be  given  to  his  tes- 
timony, and  that  they  should  take  into  consideration  all  the 
surrounding  facts  and  circumstances  and  give  his  testimony  such 
weight  only  as  they  believe  it  entitled  to,  in  view  of  all  the  facts, 
is  not  improper.142 

§  228.  On  defendant's  unsworn  statements. — By  statute  in 
some  of  the  states  the  accused  is  permitted  to  make  an  unsworn 
statement  in  his  defense.  Any  such  statement  thus  made  is 
proper  to  go  to  the  jury  and  to  be  allowed  such  weight  as  they 
may  see  fit  to  give  it.143  And  it  is  proper  for  the  court  to  call 
the  attention  of  the  jury  to  the  fact  that  the  statement  of  the 
accused  is  not  made  under  oath.144  It  is  also  proper  for  the 
court  to  advise  the  jury  to  be  extremely  cautious  in  believing 
the  unsworn  statement  of  the  accused.145  But  to  say  to  the  jury 
that  the  defendant's  statement  is  "not  binding  on  them"  is 
improper.146  And  in  charging  the  jury  as  to  the  statement 
of  the  accused,  the  better  practice  is  to  instruct  in  the  language 
of  the  statute,  although  the  court  is  authorized  to  instruct  on 
the  effect  of  such  statute.147  The  failure  of  the  court,  how- 
ever, to  make  any  reference  to  the  defendant's  statement  is  not 
prejudicial  error  where  the  instructions  in  all  other  respects 
fully  cover  the  questions  involved.148 

1*1  S.    v.    Summar,    143    Mo.    220,  us  Alexander   v.    S.    114    Ga.   266, 

45    S.    W.    254.     Set    P.    v.    Holmes,  40  S.  E.  231. 

126  Gal.  462,  58  Pac.  917;  S.  v.  Met-  "«  Knight  v.  S.  114  Ga.  48,  39  S. 

calf,    17    Mont.    417,    43    Pac.    182.  E.  928. 

142  Mclntosh    v.    S.    151    Ind.    251,  «T  Strickland    v.    S.    115    Ga.    222, 
51  N.  E.  354;   Smith  v.  S.  118  Ala.  41  S.  E.  713;  Pitts  v.  S.  114  Ga.  35, 
117,  24  So.  55;  Palmer  v.  S.  (Neb.),  39  S.  E.  873.     See  also  Hoxie  v.  S. 
97  N.  W.  235.  114   Ga.    19,    39   S.   E.   944;    Vaughn 

143  Olive  v.  S.  34  Fla.  203,  15  So.  v.  S.  88  Ga.  371,  16  S.  E.  64;  Tucker 
925;    Blackburn   v.    S.   71   Ala.   319;  v.    S.    114    Ga.    61,    39    S.    E.    926; 
P.  v.  Arnold,  40  Mich.  715;  Smith  v.  Lacewell  v.  S.  95  Ga.  346,  22  S.  E. 
S.  94  Ga.  591,  22  S.  E.  214;  Harrison  546. 

v.  S.  83  Ga.  129,  9  S.  E.  542;  Sledge  i«  Hayes  v.  S.  114  Ga.  25,  40 
v.  S.  99  Ga.  684,  26  S.  E.  756.  S.  E.  13. 

144  Poppell  v.  S.  71  Ga.  276. 


§    221)  RELATING  TO   WITNESSES.  222 

§229.  On  defendant's  failure  to  testify. — The  fact  that  the 
accused  does  not  testify  in  his  own  behalf  cannot  be  construed 
as  a  circumstance  against  him,  and  the  court  may  so  advise 
the  jury  by  proper  instructions.149  And  in  some  jurisdictions 
the  court  should  instruct,  if  requested,  that  the  fact  that  the 
defendant  does  not  testify  should  not  be  considered  or  con- 
strued against  him;  that  no  presumption  of  guilt  should  be  in- 
dulged against  him  because  he  has  not  testified  in  his  own  be- 
half. The  refusal  of  an  instruction  properly  embracing  this 
principle  is  reversible  error.150  But  in  the  absence  of  a  request 
for  such  an  instruction  there  can  be  no  ground  for  complaint. 
The  court  is  not  bound  to  give  an  instruction  on  its  own  mo- 
tion, that  the  failure  of  the  defendant  to  testify  in  his  own 
behalf  should  not  be  taken  as  a  circumstance  against  him.151 

"a  S.  v.  Johnson,  50  La.  Ann.  154,  IBO  Farrell  v.  P.  133  111.  247,  24 
23  So.  199;  P.  v.  Fitzgerald,  46  N.  J.  N.  B.  423;  S.  v.  Evans,  9  Kas.  App. 
L.  1020;  Guimo  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  889;  Shrawley  v.  S.  153  Ind.  375,, 
App.  257,  45  S.  W.  694;  Ferguson  55  N.  E.  95;  S.  v.  Goff,  62  Kas. 
v.  S.  52  Neb.  432,  72  N.  W.  590;  104,  61  Pac.  683;  S.  v.  Wines,  65 
P.  v.  Fitzgerald,  156  N.  Y.  253,  N.  J.  L.  31,  46  Atl.  702;  S.  v.  Car- 
50  N.  E.  846;  Com.  v.  Brown,  167  nagy,  106  Iowa,  483,  76  N.  W.  805; 
Mass.  144,  45  N.  E.  1;  Grant  v.  S.  S.  v.  Landry,  85  Me.  95,  26  Atl.  998; 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  70  S.  W.  954;  P.  v.  S.  v.  Carr,  25  La.  Ann.  408;  P.  v. 
Hoch,  150  N.  Y.  291,  44  N.  E.  976;  Rose,  5.2  Hun  (N.  Y.),  33. 
S.  v.  Hogan,  115  Iowa,  455,  88  N.  W.  isi  Metz  v.  S.  46  Neb.  547,  65  N. 
1074;  S.  v.  Weems,  96  Iowa,  426,  W.  190;  Matthews  v.  P.  6  Colo. 
65  N.  W.  387;  Sullivan  v.  S.  9  Ohio  App.  456,  41  Pac.  839;  Grubb  v.  S. 
C.  C.  652;  S.  v.  Krug,  12  Wash,  288,  117  Ind.  277,  20  N.  E.  257;  S.  v. 
41  Pac.  126;  S.  v.  Robinson,  117  Magers,  36  Ore.  38,  58  Pac.  892;  Fox- 
Mo.  649,  23  S.  W.  1066.  Contra:  well  v.  S.  63  Ind.  539;  P.  v.  Flym, 
Prewitt  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  262,  73  Cal.  511,  15  P.  102;  Felton  v.  S. 
53  S.  W.  879;  Torey  v.  S.  41  Tex.  139  Ind.  531,  39  N.  E.  228. 
Cr.  App.  543,  56  S.  W.  60. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

SPECIAL  FINDINGS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

230.  Questions  for  special  findings      232.     General  instructions  unneces- 

are   proper.  sary  and  improper. 

231.  Interrogatories    should    relate      233.     Interrogatories        illustrating 

to  ultimate  facts.  practice. 

234.    General   and   special   verdicts. 

§  230.  Questions  for  special  findings  are  proper. — The  sub- 
mission of  questions  of  fact  for  the  determination  of  the  jury 
by  special  finding  is  proper  as  a  preliminary  step  to  the  submis- 
sion of  the  entire  case  or  for  directing  a  verdict.1  Issues  are 
sometimes  presented  by  the  pleadings,  which  should  be  submit- 
ted to  the  jury  for  separate  finding,  as,  for  instance,  a  plea  of 
venue.-  But  whether  questions  of  fact  for  special  findings 
should  be  submitted  to  the  jury  is  a  matter  largely  within  the 
discretion  of  the  trial  court.3  The  practice  is  usually  regulated 
by  statute,  but  in  substance  it  is  merely  the  submission  to  the 
jury  of  special  interrogatories  for  answers.* 

§  231.  Interrogatories  should  relate  to  ultimate  facts. — When 
special  interrogatories  are  thus  submitted  they  should  relate 
to  the  ultimate  facts  in  issue;  that  is,  the  answers  to  the  inter- 

1  City  of  Elizabeth  v.  Fitzgerald,  (Neb.),    90    N.    W.    215;    Kane    v. 
114  Fed.  547.  Footh,  70  111.  590.     But  see  Gale  v. 

2  Merchants   &   Planters'   Oil   Co.  Priddy,   66   Ohio  St.   400,   64   N.   E. 
v.  Burrow  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  69  S.  W.  437;    Morrison    v.    Northern    P.    R. 
435.  Co.    (Wash.),    74   Pac.    1066,    action 

s  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.  of  the  trial  court  not  reviewable. 
v.  Lagerkrans  (Neb.).  91  N.  W.  •*  See  Woodmen,  &c.  v.  Locklin, 
358;  City  of  Crete  v.  Hendricks  28  Tex.  Cv.  App.  486,  67  S.  W.  331. 

223 


§   232  SPECIAL  FINDINGS.  224 

rogatories  must  be  conclusive  of  the  rights  of  the  parties.5  A 
question  for  special  finding  should  be  single  and  direct,  and 
relate  to  an  ultimate  and  controlling  fact  in  the  case,  and  not 
to  evidentiary  facts  from  which  the  ultimate  fact  may  be  de- 
duced by  reasoning  or  argument.0  Several  questions  should  not 
be  submitted  in  one  instruction  in  charging  as  to  special  verdict.7 

§  232.  General  instructions  unnecessary  and  improper. — In- 
structions submitting  to  the  jury  general  propositions  of  law 
are  unnecessary  and  improper  where  special  findings  are  re- 
quested.* After  the  jury  determine  the  facts  by  special  find- 
ings the  court  applies  the  law.9  Where  there  is  a  request  for 
a  special  verdict  the  court  should  instruct  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  action,  the  issue,  and  as  to  the  form  of  the  verdict,  but 
general  instructions  as  to  the  law  of  the  case  are  improper.10 

Under  the  procedure  of  North  Carolina  the  jury  do  not  render 
a  general  verdict,  but  merely  respond  to  the  issues  submitted 
for  determination.  An  instruction,  therefore,  which  charges  that, 
on  a  certain  showing  of  the  facts,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover, 
is  properly  refused.11  It  is  improper  for  the  court  to  state 
to  the  jury  the  legal  effect  of  their  answers  to  questions  pre- 

5  Taylor  v.   Felsing,   164   111.   331,  C.  Foster  Lumber  Co.  97  Wis.  641, 

339,    45    N.    E.    161.      See    Judy    v.  73  N.  W.  563;   Goesel  v.  Davis,  100 

Sterrett,    153    111.    94,    98,    38   N.    E.  Wis.   678,   76  N.  W.   768;    Manch  v. 

633;    Terre   Haute   &    I.    R.    Co.    v.  City   of   Hartford,    112   Wis.    40,    87 

Eggman,  159  111.  550,  42  N.  E.  970;  N.    W.    816;    Ward    v.    Cochran,    71 

Kletzing   v.    Armstrong,    119    Iowa,  Fed.  128.    See  Reed  v.  City  of  Mad- 

505,    93    N.    W.    500;     Gutzman    v.  ison,    85    Wis.    667,    56    N.    W.    182. 

Clancy,  114  Wis.  509,  90  N.  W.  1081;  »  Johnson  v.  Culver,  116  Ind.  278, 

Ward  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  19  N.  E.  129. 

102  Wis.   215,   78   N.   W.   442;    Gale  10  Stayner  v.   Joyce,   120   Ind.   99, 

v.  Priddy,  66  Ohio  St.  400,  64  N.  E.  22   N.   E.   89;    Woolen  v.  Wire,   100 

437;    Cullen    v.    Hanisch,    114   Wis.  Ind.   251;    Indianapolis,  P.   &  C.  R. 

24,  89  N.  W.  900;  Nix  v.  Reiss  Coal  Co.  v.  Bush,  101  Ind.  587;  Boyce  v. 

Co.    114    Wis.    493,    90    N.    W.    437;  Schreoder,    21    Ind.    App.    28,    51   N. 

Palnode  v.   Westenhaver,   114 'Wis.  E.    376;    Udell    v.    Citizens'    St.    R. 

460,  90  N.  W.  467.  Co.    152    Ind.    507,    52    N.    E.    799; 

«  Illinois   Steel   Co.   v.   Mann,  '197  Louisville,    N.    A.    &   C.    R.    Co.    v. 

111.    186,    64    N.    E.    328,    citing    L.  Buck,  116  Ind.  566,  19  N.  E.  453.    See 

Wolff  Mfg.   Co.   v.   Wilson,   152   111.  Louisville,    N.    A.    &    C.    R.    Co.    v. 

9,  38  N.  E.  694.  Lynch,   147  Ind.   165,   44  N.  E.   997, 

t  Cullen  v.  Hanisch,  114  Wis.  24,  34  L.  R.  A.  298;  Louisville,  N.  A.  & 

89  N.  W.  900.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Frawley,  110  Ind.  28,  9 

s  Rhyner  v.  City  of  Menasha,  107  N.   E.   594. 

Wis.  201,  83  N.  W.  303;   Kohler  v.  «  Witsell    v.    West    Asheville    & 

West    Side    R.    Co.    99    Wis.    33,    74  S.  S.  R.  Co.  120  N.  Car.  537,  27  S. 

N.  W.  568;   Seibrecht  v.   Hogan,  99  E.  125,  35  L.  R.  A.  808  note. 
Wis.  437,  75  N.  W.  71;   Klatt  v.  N. 


225  INTERROGATORIES    ILLUSTRATING    PRACTICE.  §    234 

sented  to  them.12  The  court  should  not  state  to  the  jury  that 
if  they  answer  "yes"  to  a  certain  interrogatory,  a  general  ver- 
dict for  the  plaintiff  could  not  be  sustained.13 

§  233.  Interrogatories  illustrating  practice. — The  following  in- 
terrogatories were  held  properly  submitted  to  the  jury  for 
answers  and  serve  to  illustrate  the  rule:  If  defendant's  ten- 
ancy did  not  expire  March  thirty-first,  when  did  it  expire  by  his 
agreement  with  the  plaintiff? 

If  the  plaintiff  agreed  to  let  the  defendant  have  the  prem- 
ises longer  than  the  end  of  March,  when  and  how  did  they 
make  the  agreement? 

These  questions  do  not  ask  for  the  statements  of  evidence, 
but  material  facts.14  In  an  action  for  causing  the  death  of 
a  person  by  negligence  the  following  interrogatory,  to  wit :  ' '  Was 
the  defendant  passing  over  the  crossing  in  the  usual  way  and 
going  directly  across  the  same?"  was  held  properly  refused, 
because  not  relating  to  an  ultimate  fact  in  issue.15 

In  another  case,  the  court  submitted  to  the  jury  this  question : 
Was  the  note  (of  five  thousand  dollars)  given  as  an  induce- 
ment to  procure  the  marriage  of  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant, 
or  not,  and  if  not,  for  what  was  it  given? 

Answer:  "It  was  not  given  as  an  inducement  to  procure  the 
marriage  of  the  plaintiff,  but  only  as  a  bridal  present,  and  had 
no  consideration,  and  was  null  and  void." 

It  was  not  necessary  for  the  jury  to  state  for  what  the  note 
was  given;  but  the  fact  that  they  found  for  what  it  was  given 
necessarily  means  that  they  found  it  was  not  given  in  con- 
sideration of  marriage.16  Interrogatories  submitted  for  the  pur- 
pose of  having  the  jury  state  upon  which  paragraph  or  par- 
agraphs- of  the  complaint  a  verdict  is  based  is  not  warranted 
under  the  statutes  of  Indiana,  as  not  asking  for  an  ultimate  fact.17 

§  234.     General  and  special  verdicts. — To  enable  a  party  to 

12  Gerrard  v.   La  Crosse  City  R.  ^  Terre    Haute    &    I.    R.    Co.    v. 

Co.  113  Wis.  258,  89  N.  W.  125.  Eggman,  159  111.  550,  42  N.  E.  970. 

is  Coats  v.   Town   of  Stanton,  90  16  Hatchett  v.    Hatchett,    28   Tex. 

Wis.  130.  62  N.  W.  619.  Cv.  App.  33,  67  S.  W.  163. 

"  Lantmann    v.    Miller,    158    Ind.  IT  Consolidated  Stone  Co.  v.  Mor- 

382,  63  N.  E.  761.     See  Wabash  R.  gan,  160  Ind.  241,  66  N.  E.  696. 
Co.  v.  Schultz,  30  Ind.  App.  495,  64 
N.    E.    481. 


§    234  SPECIAL  FINDINGS.  226 

successfully  interpose  the  special  findings  of  the  jury  upon  par- 
ticular questions  of  fact  as  a  reason  for  judgment  in  his  favor, 
he  must  at  least  have  special  findings  that  stand  in  such  clear 
antagonism  to  the  general  verdict  .that  the  two  cannot  coexist.18 
The  special  finding  must  control  where  there  is  an  irreconcilable 
conflict  between  it  and  the  general  verdict.19  Where  answers 
to  interrogatories  are  inconsistent,  contradictory  and  at  war  with 
each  other,  they  simply  work  destruction  among  themselves,  and 
do  not  impair  the  general  verdict.20 

An  instruction  that  the  answers  to  particular  questions  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury  must  be  consistent  with  'each  other  and 
with  the  general  verdict  is  improper.21  But  to  say  that  "it  is 
very  important  that  the  questions  you  are  asked  to  answer 
should  be  answered  so  that  they  will  correspond  with  your 
verdict"  is  not  improper,  and  is  not  a  direction  to  the  jury 
that  their  answers  to  the  special  questions  must  correspond  with 
their  general  verdict.22  In  passing  on  a  motion  for  judgment 
on  special  findings,  notwithstanding  the  general  verdict  to  the 
contrary,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  verdict  necessarily 
covers  the  whole  issue,  and  that  it  solves  every  material  fact 
against  the  party  against  whom  it  is  rendered.23 

is  McCoy  v.  Kokomo  R.  &  L.  Co.  merman,  61  Kas.  750,  60  Pac.  1064; 

158  Ind.  658,  64  N.  E.  92;  City  of  Kilpatrick  Koch  Dry  Goods  Co.  v. 

Mishawaka  v.  Kirby  (Ind.),  69  N.  Kahn,  53  Kas.  274,  36  Pac.  327; 

E.  482.  See  Union  Tr.  Co.  v.  Van-  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Barnes,  86  Mich, 

dercook  (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  487.  632,  49  N.  W.  475.  See  St.  Louis 

is  Bedford  Q.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  29  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Burrows,  62  Kas. 

Ind.  App.  85,  63  N.  E.  880;  Roe  v.  89,  61  Pac.  439.  But  see  Hoppe  v. 

Winston,  86  Minn.  77,  90  N.  W.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  61  Wis. 

122.  357,  21  N.  E.  227. 

20  McCoy  v.  Kokomo,  R.  &  L.  Co.  22  Germaine  v.  City  of  Muskegon, 
158   Ind.   658,  64  N.   E.   92;    Rice  v.  105    Mich.    213,    63    N.    W.    78.      See 
Manford,  110  Ind.  596,  11  N.  E.  283;  Redford    v.    Spokane    St.    R.    Co.    9 
Redelsheimer  v.  Miller,  107  Ind.  485,  Wash.  55. 

8   N.    E.    447.      See   Brems   v.    Sher-          23  McCoy  v.  Kokomo,  R.  &  L.  Co 
man,  158  Ind.  300,  63  N.  E.  571.  158    Ind.    658,    64    N.    E.    92    (citing 

21  Coffeyville   Brick    Co.    v.    Zim-      Indiana   case). 


CHAPTER  XII. 

ERRORS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

235.  Immaterial    error— Generally.       243.    Verdict  clearly  right  and  jus- 

236.  Verdict   showing   error   disre-  tice  done. 

garded.  244.    Erroneous   instructions  favor- 

237.  The  principles  illustrated.  able  is  harmless. 

238.  Imperfect  instruction  correct-      245.    Principle   or    element   refused 

ed  by  others.  or  omitted. 

239.  Error  cured  by  opponent's  in-      246.    How     a     correct     instruction 

structions.  cures   a   defective   one. 

240.  In  criminal  cases— Error  cur-      247.     Instructions  contradictory. 

ed  by  others.  248.     Instructions    differing    widely 

241.  Damages — Defective      instruc-  from  each  other. 

tions  cured.  249.     Instructions     self-contradicto- 

242.  Instruction     assuming     fact —  ry. 

Harmless.  250.    Evidence  close,   conflicting  or 

doubtful. 

§  235.  Immaterial  error — Generally. — It  is  the  duty  of  the 
court  to  harmonize  the  instructions  so  that  they  will  present 
to  the  jury  the  legal  questions  in  a  plain,  consistent  and  in- 
telligible manner;  but  the  giving  of  an  erroneous  instruction 
is  not  ground  for  reversal  where  it  appears  from  an  examination 
of  the  charge  as  a  whole  that  the  erroneous  instruction 
did  no  harm  to  the  party  complaining.1  The  mere  fact  that 
an  instruction  is  erroneous  will  not  of  itself  be  regarded  as 
reversible  error  where  it  is  apparent  that  it  could  not  have 
been  misleading  when  taken  in  connection  with  other  instruc- 
tions given.2 

i  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  2  Slingloff  v.  Bruner,  174  111.  570, 
Krapp,  173  111.  219,  50  N.  E.  663;  51  N.  E.  772;  Seigel,  Cooper  &  Co. 
City  of  Decatur  v.  Besten,  169  111.  v.  Connor,  171  111.  572,  49  N.  E. 
340,  48  N.  E.  186;  Copeland  v.  728;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashline, 
Hewett,  96  Me.  525  53  Atl.  36.  171  111.  320,  49  N.  E.  521;  Chicago 

227 


§  236 


ERRORS. 


228 


§  236.  Verdict  showing  error  disregarded. — The  giving  of  an 
improper  instruction  will  be  regarded  as  merely  harmless  error 
where  it  appears  from  the  verdict  to  have  been  disregarded 
by  the  jury.3  Or  an  error  committed  in  refusing  a  proper  in- 
struction is  harmless  where  it  appears  from  the  verdict  that 
it  would  have  had  no  effect  had  it  been  given.4  Thus,  where 
it  appears  from  answers  to  interrogatories,  that  the  jury  disre- 
garded an  error  in  the  charge,  the  error  is  not  prejudicial.5 
Although  an  instruction  may  properly  submit  a  material  fact 
for  determination,  yet  the  refusal  to  give  it  is  but  harmless 
error  where  the  jury,  in  answer  to  special  interrogatories,  have 
found  against  the  party  requesting  the  instruction  as  to  such 
fact.6  Also  where  the  special  findings  of  the  jury  show  the 
plaintiff  to  have  been  wholly  free  from  negligence,  an  error  com- 


&  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  166  111. 
572,  46  N.  E.  1125;  Keating  v.  P. 
160  111.  483,  43  N.  E.  724;  Porter  v. 
P.  158  111.  370,  41  N.  E.  886;  Pope 
v.  Pope,  95  Ga.  87,  22  S.  E.  245; 
Spies  v.  P.  122  111.  245,  12  N.  E.  865, 
17  N.  E.  898;  Liberty  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Ehrlich,  42  Neb.  553,  60  N.  W.  940; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Matthews, 
153  111.  268,  38  N.  E.  559;  Wenona 
Coal  Co.  v.  Holmquest,  152  111.  591, 
38  N.  E.  946;  Rich  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 152  111.  30,  38  N.  E.  255;  Lake 
E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Wills,  140  111. 
614,  31  N.  E.  122;  City  of  Roodhouse 
v.  Christian,  158  111.  137,  41  N.  E.* 
748;  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Bo- 
kamp,  181  111.  16,  54  N.  E.  567; 
Keeler  v.  Herr,  157  111.  57,  41  N.  E. 
750;  South  C.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Dufresne, 
200  111.  456,  65  N.  E.  1075;  Van 
Buskirk  v.  Day,  32  111.  266.  See 
generally:  Com'rs  v.  Ryckman,  91 
Md.  36,  46  Atl.  311;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co. 
v.  Stein,  140  Ind.  61,  39  N.  E.  246. 
3  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Baker,  67  Ark.  531,  55  S.  W.  941; 
Smith  v.  Rountree,  185  111.  219, 
56  N.  E.  1139;  Brush  v.  Smith,  111 
Iowa,  217,  82  N.  W.  467;  Gallimore 
v.  Brewer,  22  Ky.  L.  R.  296,  57  S.  W. 
253;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Condor,  23  Tex.  Cv.  App.,  488,  58 
S.  W.  58;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Cunifte  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  57 


S.  W.  692;  Murphy  v.  St.  Louis  Tr. 
Co.  96  Mo.  App.  272,  70  S.  W.  159 
(verdict  rendered  less  than  the  de- 
mand);  National  Horse  Importing 
Co.  v.  Novak,  95  Iowa,  596,  64  N. 
W.  616  (no  general  damages  award- 
ed);  White  v.  Bryan,  96  Iowa,  166, 
64  N.  W.  765;  Westbrook  v.  S.  97 
Ga.  189,  22  S.  E.  398;  S.  v.  Afray. 
124  Mo.  393,  27  S.  W.  1097.  See 
also  Ash  v.  Beck  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
68  S.  W.  53;  International  Soc. 
v.  Hildreth,  11  N.  Dak.  262,  91  N.  W. 
70;  Sunset  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Day,  70 
Fed.  364;  Clarkson  v.  Whitaker 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  33  S.  W.  1032; 
Vickers  v.  Kennedy  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
34  S.  W.  458;  Godfrey  v.  Phillips, 
209  111.  584,  594. 

*  Thompson  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
30  S.  W.  667;  Town  of  West  Cov- 
ington  v.  Sohultz,  16  Ky.  L.  R.  831, 
30  S.  W.  410. 

s Rouse  v.  Harry,  55  Kas.  589, 
40  Pac.  1007;  Pennsylvania  Coal 
Co.  v.  Kelly,  150  111.  9,  40  N.  E.  938; 
Mason  v.  Sieglitz  22  Colo.  320,  44 
Pac.  588. 

«  National  L.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
acre  (Ind.  App.),  43  N.  E.  905.  See 
East  St.  L.  C.  Co.  v.  O'Harra,  150 
111.  585,  37  N.  E.  917;  Indianapolis 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Hockett,  159  Ind.  682, 
66  N.  E.  39. 


229  IMPERFECTIONS — ILLUSTRATIONS.  §  238 

mitted  in  charging  the  jury  on  the  old  doctrine  of  comparative 
negligence  which  is  no  longer  in  force,  is  harmless.7 

§  237.  The  principles  illustrated. — A  charge  which  states  the 
amount  sued  for  to  be  too  high  and  the  verdict  returned  is  for 
the  proper  amount  claimed,  the  error  is  immaterial  and  harm- 
less.8 Where  the  verdict  of  the  jury  exempts  a  party  from 
liability,  the  giving  of  an  erroneous  instruction  limiting  his 
liability  is  harmless.9  So  where  the  jury  find  that  the  defendant 
was  not  guilty  of  negligence,  that  renders  the  question  of  con- 
tributory negligence  immaterial,  and  hence  the  giving  of  an 
erroneous  instruction  as  to  contributory  negligence  is  not  ground 
for  error.10  Where  the  verdict  is  for  the  defendant  in  an 
action  on  a  contract,  an  erroneous  instruction  as  to  the  measure 
of  damages  stating  that  the  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  some 
damages  if  the  contract  was  as  he  claimed  it  to  be,  is  but  harm- 
less error.11 

§  238.  Imperfect  instruction  corrected  by  others — An  in- 
struction, though  erroneous  when  standing  alone,  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  misleading  where  the  matter  upon  which  it  touches 
is  fully  and  properly  stated  in  another  instruction;12  or  if  an 
instruction  is  defective  in  any  particular,  yet  when  taken  to- 
gether with  others  given  relating  to  the  same  subject  such 
defect,  is  cured  the  error  is  harmless.13  An  imperfection  in  an 

7  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Kelly,  Rosenheimer  v.  Standard  Gaslight 

156  111.  9,  40  N.  E.  938.  Co.  53  N.  Y.  S.  192,  36  App.  Div. 

s  Doe  v.  United  States  (Neb.),  91  1;  Indianapolis  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Hock- 

N.  W.  519.  ett,  159  Ind.  679,  66  N.  E.  39;  Town 

»  Shaefer  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  R.  Co.  of  Vinegar  Hill  v.  Busson,  42  111. 

128  Mo.  64,  30  S.  W.  331.  See  Gue-  45;  P.  v.  Flannelly,  128  Cal.  83,  60 

rold  v.  Holtz,  103  Mich.  118,  61  N.  Pac.  670,  Crane  Co.  v.  Columbus  S. 

W.  278.  Bank  (Neb.),  91  N.  W.  532;  Pence  v. 

10  Scheel   v.    City   of  Detroit,    130  Wabash    R.    Co.    116    Iowa,    279,    90 
Mich.   51,  90  N.  W.  274.  N,  W.  59;   Choctaw,  O.  &  G.  R.  Co. 

11  Mobley  v.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  v.   Tennessee,  116  Fed.  23;    Barnes- 
Co.    42    S.    Car.    306,    20    S.    E.    83;  ville  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Love  (Del.),  52  Atl. 
Lomax  v.  Holbine  (Neb.),  90  N.  W.  267;   Oliver  v.  Sterling,  20  Ohio  St. 
1122.  400;   Jacoby  v.  Stark,  205  111.  34,  G8 

12  Boldenwick    v.    Cahill,    187    111.  N.   E.   557;    City  of  Macon  v.   Hol- 
218,    58    N.    E.    351;     McMahan    v.  comb,    205    111.    645,    69    N.    E.    79; 
Sankey,  133  111.  636,  24  N.  E.  1027;  Ready   v.    P.    (Colo.),   74   Pac.    895; 
Langdon  v.   P.   133  111.  282,  403,  24  Johnson  v.   Gebhauer,  159  Ind.  284, 
N.   E.   874;    City  of  Joliet  v.  John-  64  N.  E.  855. 

son,  177  111.  178,  52  N.  E.  498;  Bal-  13  Rock  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Leisy 
timore  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Spaul-  Brewing  Co.  174  111.  556,  51  N.  E. 
ding,  21  Ind.  App.  323,  52  N.  E.  410; 


238 


ERRORS. 


230 


instruction  is  harmless  when  the  instructions  taken  as  a  whole 
correctly  state  the  law.14  Although  an  instruction  may  be  in- 
correct or  misleading  when  severed  from  its  connection  with 
other  instructions,  by  omitting  some  needed  qualifications,  yet 


572;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Go.  v. 
Krapp,  173  111.  219,  50  N.  E.  663, 
Chicago  Trust  Co.  v.  Goldsmith,  173 
111.  326,  50  N.  E.  676;  Peoples'  C.  & 
A.  Co.  v.  Darrow,  172  111.  62,  49  N. 
E.  1005;  City  of  Lanark  v.  Dougher- 
ty, 153  111.  163,  38  N.  E.  892;  Central 
R.  Co.  v.  Serfass,  153  111.  379,  39  N. 
E.  119;  St.  Louis  B.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
138  111.  475,  28  N.  E.  1091;  City  of 
Chicago  v.  McDonough,  112  111.  85; 
Westra  v.  Westra  Estate,  101  Mich. 
526,  60  N.  W.  55;  Citizens'  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hamer,  29  Ind.  App.  426,  63 
N.  E.  778;  Donk  Bros.  Coal  &  C. 
Co.  v.  Stroff,  200  111.  483,  66  N.  E. 
29;  Redhing  v.  Central  R.  Co.  68 
N.  J.  L.  641,  54  Atl.  431  (error  cured 
by  context).  Error  cured  when  in- 
struction assumes  fact:  Texas  & 
N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  30  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  496,  71  S.  W.  26;  Gulf,  C.  & 
S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Carter  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  71  S.  W.  73  (assuming  plain- 
tiff was  a  passenger).  See  Keating 
v.  P.  160  111.  483,  43  N.  E.  724;  Hix 
v.  P.  157  111.  383,  41  N.  E.  862; 
Carlton  v.  S.  43  Neb.  373,  61 
N.  W.  699;  Omaha  Fair  &  E. 
A.  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  45 
Neb.  105,  60  N.  W.  330;  P.  v.  Neary, 
104  Cal.  373,  37  Pac.  943;  Chicago 
&  A.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Pontiac,  169 
111.  155,  171;  West  Ch.  St.  S.  R.  Co. 
v.  Scanlan,  168  111.  34,  48  N.  E.  149; 
Buck  v.  Maddock,  167  111.  219,  225, 
47  N.  E.  208;  Day  v.  Porter,  161  111. 
235,  43  N.  E.  1073;  City  of  Rood- 
house  v.  Christian,  158  111.  137,  41 
N.  E.  748;  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R. 
Co.  v.  Odurn,  156  111.  78,  40  N.  E. 
559;  Milling  v.  Hillenbrand,  156  111. 
310,  40  N.  E.  941;  North  C.  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Boyd,  156  111.  416,  40  N.  E. 
955;  Cannon  v.  Farmers'  Bank 
(Neb.),  91  N.  W.  585;  Cleve- 
land, C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Baddeley,  150  111.  328,  36  N.  E.  965; 
Johnson  v.  Johnson,  187  111.  97,  58 
N.  E.  237;  Dueber  Watch  C.  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Young,  155  111.  226,  40  N.  E. 


582;  Ide  v.  Fratcher,  194  111.  552,  62 
N.  E.  814;  Hardware  &  Iron  Co. 
v.  O'Brien  (Ind.  App.),  62  N.  W. 
464;  Mueller  v.  Pels,  192  111.  76,  61 
N.  E.  472;  Boyd  v.  Portland  Elec. 
Co.  40  Ore.  126,  66  Pac.  576;  Gal- 
veston,  H.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Newport, 
26  Tex.  Cv.  App.  583,  65  S.  W.  657; 
Whitney  &  S.  Co.  v.  O'Rourke,  172 
111.  183,  50  N.  E.  242;  Kenyon  v. 
City  of  Mondovi,  98  Wis.  50,  73  N. 
W.  314;  Lambeth  R.  Co.  v.  Brig- 
ham,  170  Mass.  518,  49  N.  E.  1022; 
Gilchrist  v.  Gilchrist,  76  111.  218; 
Zimmerman  v.  Brannon,  163  Iowa, 
144,  72  N.  W.  439;  Lamb  v.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.  147  Mo.  171,  48  S. 
W.  659;  Mclntosh  v.  S.  151  Ind. 
251,  51  N.  E.  354;  McVey  v.  S.  57 
Neb.  471,  77  N.  W.  1111;  S.  v.  Hea- 
cock,  106  Iowa,  191,  76  N.  W.  654; 
Hutchins  v.  S.  151  Ind.  667,  52  N. 
E.  403;  Yundt  v.  Hartrunft,  41  111. 
13;  Meyers  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App),  49 
S.  W.  600.  See  North  C.  St.  «,.  Co. 
v.  Peuser,  190  111.  73  (exception 
to  the  rule),  60  N.  E.  78;  Latham 
v.  Roache,  72  111.  182;  Chandler  v. 
Com.  19  Ky.  L.  R.  631,  41  S.  W.  437; 
De  Weese  v.  Merimee  I.  M.  Co. 
128  Mo.  423,  31  S.  W.  110;  S.  v.  Stef- 
fens,  116  Iowa,  227,  89  N.  W.  974; 
Clear  Creek  Stone  Co.  v.  Dearmin, 
160  Ind.  162,  66  N.  E.  609;  Aspy 
v.  Batkins,  160  Ind.  170,  66  N.  E. 
462;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Bowman  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  25  S. 
W.  140,  an  instruction  that  a  rail- 
road company  could  not  charge 
more  than  the  local  rate  for  freight, 
instead  of  agreed  rate,  is  not  error 
where  the  local  and  agreed  rate 
are  the  same. 

i*  Maynard  v.  Sigman  (Neb.),  91 
N.  W.  576;  Olson  v.  Oregon  S.  L. 
R.  Co.  24  Utah,  460,  68  Pac.  148; 
111.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hopkins,  200  111. 
122,  65  N.  E.  656;  Arbuckle  v.  S. 
80  Miss.  15,  31  So.  437;  Jinks  v.  S. 
114  Ga.  430,  40  S.  E.  320. 


231 


ERRORS   CURED  HOW. 


§    239 


when  read  in  connection  with  the  others  the  imperfection  may 
be  cured.  If  the  instructions  taken  as  a  whole  present  the  law 
with  substantial  accuracy  that  is  sufficient.15 

A  general  instruction  which  states  the  law  correctly  will  not 
cure  an  error  in  a  specific  instruction,  although  the  instruc- 
tions must  be  considered  together  and  as  a  whole.16  But  if  any 
material  element  or  fact  be  omitted  in  an  instruction,  the  error 
is  cured  where  such  element  or  fact  is  stated  in  another  instruc- 
tion.17 Thus,  for  instance,  an  instruction,  though  defective  in 
that  it  fails  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  question  whether  or  not 
the  plaintiff  was  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  when  injured, 
is  but  harmless  error  where  other  instructions  given  for  either 
or  both  parties  clearly  submit  the  question  thus  omitted.18 

§  239.  Error  cured  by  opponent's  instructions. — An  error  com- 
mitted in  the  giving  of  a  defective  instruction  for  one  of  the 
parties  may  be  cured  by  the  giving  of  a  proper  instruction  for 
the  other  party.  For  instance,  an  instruction  which  is  defective 
in  not  instructing  as  to  the  proper  measure  of  damages,  in  case 


is  Toluca  M.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Haws, 
194  111.  92,  62  N.  E.  312;  Kunst  v. 
Ringold,  116  Mich.  88,  74  N.  W.  294; 
Liese  v.  Meyer,  143  Mo.  547,  45  S. 
W.  282. 

™  Clark  v.  S.  159  Ind.  66,  64  N.  E. 
589. 

i?  Hacker  v.  Monroe  &  S.  176  111. 
590,  52  N.  E.  12;  Tomle  v.  Hamp- 
ton, 129  111.  384,  21  N.  E.  800; 
Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoerfner, 
175  111.  634,  51  N.  E.  884;  La  Plant 
v.  S.  152  Ind.  80,  52  N.  E.  1452; 
Hamilton  v.  Love,  152  Ind.  641,  53 
N.  E.  181;  Gordon  v.  Burris,  153 
Mo.  223,  54  S.  W.  546;  Johnson  v. 
Gebhauer,  159  Ind.  283,  64  N.  E. 
S55;  Harness  v.  Steele,  159  Ind.  293, 
64  N.  E.  875;  S.  v.  Martin  (Mont), 
74  Pac.  728;  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co. 
v.  Clapp,  201  111.  434,  66  N.  E.  223; 
Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Puntenney, 
200  111.  12;  65  N.  E.  442;  McMillen 
v.  Lee.  78  111.  443;  Orr  v.  Cedar  R. 
&  M.  R.  Co.  94  Iowa,  423,  62  N.  W. 
851;  P.  v.  Klee  (Cal.),  69  Pac.  696 
("wilfully"  supplied  by  "intention- 
ally"); Johnson  v.  Gehbauer,  159 
Ind.  271,  64  N.  E.  855;  Cnicago  C. 


R.  Co.  v.  Finnemore,  199  111.  1,  64 
N.  E.  985  (ordinary  care) ;  S.  v.  Cot- 
trill,  52  W.  Va.  363,  43  S.  E.  244;  S. 
v.  Prater,  52  W.  Va.  132,  43  S.  E. 
230;  Johnson  v.  Glidden,  11  S.  Dak. 
237,  76  N.  W.  933;  Graves  v.  Hillyer 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  48  S.  W.  889;  S. 
v.  Prater,  52  W.  Va.  132,  43  S.  E. 
230;  S.  v.  Cottrill,  52  W.  Va.  363, 
43  S.  E:  244. 

isWillard  v.  Swansen,  126  111.  384, 
18  N.  E.  548;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Johnson,  116  111.  210,  4  N.  E. 
381;  Cherokee  Packet  Co.  v.  Hilson, 
95  Tenn.  1,  31  S.  W.  737;  Waller  v. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  59  Mo. 
App.  410;  Hughes  v.  Chicago  &  A. 
R.  Co.  127  Mo.  447,  30  S.  W.  127; 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v. 
Odum,  156  111.  78,  40  N.  E.  559. 

An  improper  remark  inadvertent- 
ly made  by  the  court  in  charging 
the  jury  cannot  be  said  to  be  ma- 
terial error  if  it  is  retracted  by  the 
court  unless  it  appears  that  the 
jury  did  not  accept  the  retraction, 
Brooks  v.  Rochester,  31  N.  Y.  179, 
10  Misc.  88. 


§  239  ERRORS.  232 

the  jury  should  find  for  the  plaintiff,  is  harmless  error  where 
the  instructions  given  for  the  defendant  fully  and  fairly  state 
the  rule  for  estimating  damages.19  So  if  an  instruction  is  defec- 
tive in  that  it  fails  to  state  that  the  burden  is  on  the  plain- 
tiff to  make  out  his  case  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence, 
then  one  given  for  the  defendant,  correctly  stating  the  law  as 
to  the  burden  of  proof,  will  cure  the  error  in  the  plaintiff's 
instruction.20 

The  giving  of  an  instruction  which  may  perhaps  be  too  general 
on  the  question  of  negligence  is  only  harmless  error  where  other 
instructions  given  at  the  request  of  the  opposing  party  properly 
confine  the  jury  to  the  negligence  alleged.21  Also  where  an 
instruction  incorrectly  states  the  rule  as  to  contributory  negli- 
gence it  is  harmless  error,  where  another  instruction  given  at 
the  request  of  either  party  states  the  rule  correctly.22  Also  an 
instruction  which  improperly  states  the  law  as  to  the  safety  of 
the  machinery  or  appliances  furnished  by  the  master  to  his  ser- 
vant in  his  work  by  permitting  the  jury  to  consider  whether  there 
were  safer  means  at  hand  than  that  causing  the  injury,  is  not 
material  error  where  another  instruction  properly  announces  the 
rule  that  the  defendant  is  not  required  to  procure  the  most  im- 
proved appliances,  but  was  required  to  use  reasonably  safe  means 
only.23 

In  an  action  on  a  contract,  an  error  in  the  giving  of  an  in- 
struction which  in  substance  states  that  if  the  defendant  has 
shown  that  there  was  a  warranty  which  was  broken,  and  that 
the  machine  was  worthless,  the  money  paid  on  account  might 
be  recovered,  is  cured  where  another  instruction  charges  that 
the  correct  rule  is  the  difference  between  the  value  of  the  ma- 
chine, if  it  was  perfect  when  delivered,  and  its  present  value.24 
Also  in  a  suit  on  a  building  contract,  a  charge  that  if  the  jury 
believe  that  the  plaintiff  delivered  the  materials  called  for  in 

i»Behm  v.  Parker  (Md.),  32  Atl.  22  Cameron  v.  Union  Trunk  Line, 

199,  Springfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Punten-  10  Wash.  507,  39  Pac.  128;   Chock- 

ney,  200  111.  9,  65  N.  E.  442.  tow  O.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Tenn.  116  Fed. 

20  Mitchell    v.    Hindman,    150    111.  23. 

538,  37  N.  E.  916;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  23  Whaley  v.   Bartlett,  42  S.   Car. 

Barmister,  195  111.  50,  62  N.  E.  864.  454,  20  S.  E.  745. 

21  Johnson   v.    St.    Louis   &   S.   R.  24  j.    R.   Alsing  Co.   v.   New   Eng. 
Co.  173  Mo.  307,  73  S.  W.  173;  Buck-  Q.  &  S.  Co.  73  N.  Y.  S.  347,  66  App. 
man  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  100  Div.    473. 

Mo.  App.  30,  73,  S.  W.  270. 


233  ERROUS,  CURING CRIMINAL  CASES.  §  240 

the  detail  plans  last  approved  by  the  architect,  within  ninety 
days  from  the  said  approval,  and  erected  the  same  in  place  of 
the  said  building  within  ninety  days  after  the  delivery  thereof, 
and  had  "substantially"  completed  the  erection  of  all  the  struc- 
tural steel  and  iron  work  in  said  building  within  said  last 
mentioned  ninety  days  then  they  are  entitled  to  recover,  though 
erroneous,  the  error  was  cured  by  another  instruction  given  at 
the  request  of  the  defendant,  which  states  that  the  contract 
requires  that  the  plaintiffs  were  bound  "to  furnish  and  com- 
plete the  same  and  every  part  and  detail  thereof  within  ninety 
days"  before  they  could  recover.25 

§  240.  In  criminal  cases — Error  cured  by  others. — In  a  crim- 
inal case  the  omission  of  any  material  element,  such,  for  instance, 
as  the  element  of  reasonable  doubt,  the  error  will  be  regarded 
as  cured  when  another  instruction  given  clearly  defines  the 
term.26  Also  where  the  court  erroneously  charges  that  proof 
of  the  ownership  of  property  alleged  to. have  been  stolen,  must 
be  established  by  a  "preponderance  of  the  evidence,"  the  error 
is  cured  by  a  general  charge  that  the  defendant  must  be  ac- 
quitted, unless  proved  guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.27 

The  omission  of  the  words  "with  premeditated  malice"  is  not 
material  error  where  the  phrase  is  properly  stated  in  another 
instruction  which  was  given.28  The  omission  of  the  word  "felo- 
niously" in  a  charge  describing  murder  is  not  prejudicial  error 
where  the  evidence  for  the  prosecution  shows  that  the  defend- 
ant was  lying  in  wait  for  his  victim,  the  only  defense  being 
self-defense.29  And  if  an  instruction  for  the  prosecution  in  a 
criminal  case  is  calculated  to  mislead  when  standing  alone,  the 
error  will  be  cured  if  the  court  fully  instructs  the  jury  on  the 

25  Bailey  v.   Trustees,  200  Pa.  St.  333;    Bonner  v.   Com.    (Ky.),   38   S. 

406,  50  Atl.  160.  W.  '488;  P.  v.  Scott,  123  Cal.  434,  56 

aepoteet    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),  Pac.  102. 

43  S.  W.  339;  S.  v.  Wright,  141  Mo.  273.   v.   Goforth,   136   Mo.   Ill,   37 

333,  42  S.  W.  934;  S.  v.  Cochran,  147  S.  W.  801;  Shields  v.  S.  149  Ind.  395, 

Mo.  504,  49  S.  W.  558;    Skeen  v.  S.  49  N.  E.  351.     Contra:    S.  v.  Clark, 

(Miss.),    16   So.   495;    Barnard   v.    S.  102  Iowa,  685,  72  N.  W.  296. 

88  Wis.   656,   60  N.   W.   1058;    S.   v.  28  Whitney  v.  S.   154  Ind.   573,  57 

Hunt,    141    Mo.    626,    43   S.   W.    389;  N.  E.  398;   White  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr. 

P.  v.  Britton,  118  Cal.  409,  50  Pac.  App.    153,   29   S.   W.    1094. 

664.      See,    also,    Shields    v.    S.    104  29  Brooks    v.    Com.    16    Ky.    356, 

Ala.    35,    16   So.    85,    5    Am.    St.    17;  28  S.  W.  148. 
Jackson   v.    S.   106   Ala.   12,   17   So. 


§  241  ERRORS.  234 

same  subject,  in  the  instructions  given  for  the  defendant.30  Thus, 
under  an  indictment  for  embezzlement,  a  charge  that  "you 
are  instructed  that  the  defendant  being  the  cashier  of  the  bank, 
and  having  control  of  the  cash  and  other  assets  of  said  bank, 
is  responsible  therefor;  .and  the  fact  that  other  officers  of  the 
bank  have  access  to  the  funds  does  not  relieve  the  defendant 
from  accounting  for  the  same,"  though  erroneous,  is  cured 
where  the  court  also  charged  that  before  the  jury  could  con- 
vict they  must  find  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  he  actually 
converted  the  money  of  said  bank  to  his  own  use.31 

§  241.  Damages — Defective  instruction  cured. — An  instruction 
though  faulty  in  not  limiting  the  damages  claimed  to  the  amount 
complained  of  in  the  declaration,  will  be  regarded  as  cured  where 
other  instructions  given  for  the  defendant  properly  confine 
such  damages  to  the  declaration.32  Even  though  an  instruction 
improperly  allows  damages  for  prospective  suffering  and  loss 
of  health  in  a  personal  injury  case  where  the  declaration  fails 
to  make  claim  for  a  permanent  injury,  such  instruction,  though 
erroneous,  is  harmless  where  the  evidence  of  the  plaintiff's  inju- 
ries, up  to  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  suit,  seems  to 
justify  the  damages  awarded,  without  reference  to  any  pros- 
pective suffering  or  loss  of  health.33 

Where  it  appears  from  an  inspection  of  the  whole  case  that  the 
jury  in  assessing  damages  disregarded  instructions  which  were 
defective  in  not  confining  them  to  the  evidence,  there  can  be 
no  ground  for  error,  the  amount  allowed  being  reasonable  as 
appears  from  the  evidence.34  An  instruction,  though  defective 
in  directing  the  jury,  in  determining  the  value  of  property,  "to 
consider  the  evidence  of  all  the  witnesses"  is  cured  where 
another  instruction  expressly  directs  them  to  disregard  any  evi- 
dence which  has  been  stricken  out.35 

§  242.    Instructing  assuming  fact — Harmless. — If  an  instruc- 

30  Rogers  v.  S.  (Miss.),  21  So.  130.          »•*  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Ro- 

31  Ritter  v.  S.  70  Ark.   472,  69  S.      watt.  196  111.  156,  63  N.  E.  649. 

W.  262.  35  Tedens    v.    Sanitary    Dist.    149 

32  Calumet  &   C.    C.   &  D.   Co.   v.  111.   87,  96,   36  N.  E.   1033;    Consoli- 
Morawetz,    195    111.    406,    63    N.    E.  dated   Coal   Co.   v.   Haenni,   146   111. 
165.  614,  626,  35  N.  E.  162. 

33  Best  Brewing   Co.   v.   Dunlevy, 
157    111.    141,    41    N.    E.    611. 


235 


IMMATERIAL  ERRORS — VERDICT   RIGHT 


§    243 


tion,  though  erroneous  when  standing  alone,  in  that  it  assumes 
the  existence  of  a  disputed  material  fact,  yet  when  considered  in 
connection  with  all  the  other  instructions  given  on  both  sides 
clearly  appears  not  to  be  misleading  or  improper,  the  error  is 
harmless.36  But  a  bad  instruction  will  not  be  cured  by  others 
which  state  the  law  correctly  except  in  cases  that  are  plain  and 
entirely  free  from  doubt.37 

§  243.  Verdict  clearly  right  and  justice  done. — If  the  verdict 
is  clearly  right  under  the  evidence  it  should  not  be  disturbed 
although  the  instructions  may  be  erroneous.38  Or,  when  from  the 
nature  of  the  evidence  and  the  issues  presented  by  the  pleadings, 
the  verdict  could  not.have  been  reasonably  different,  the  error 
as  to  the  instructions  will  be  regarded  as  immaterial  and  harm- 
less.39 So  where  the  record  discloses  that  a  party  was  nut  enti- 

so  City  of  Elgin  v.  Joslyn,  136  111. 
529,  26  N.  E.  1090;  Chicago  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hastings,  136  111.  251,  26  N. 
E.  594;  East  St.  L.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Enright,  152  111.  246,  38  N.  E.  553; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Swearingen, 
47  111.  210;  Scutt  v.  Woolsey,  47  N. 
Y.  S.  320;  City  of  San  Antonio  v. 
Kreusel,  17  Tex.  Cv.  App.  594,  43 
S.  W.  615;  Everett  v.  Spencer,  122 
N.  Car.  1010,  30  S.  E.  334;  Wil- 
loughby  v.  North  Eastern  R.  Co.  52 
S.  Car.  166,  29  S.  E.  629;  Anderson 
v.  Daly  Mining  Co.  16  Utah,  28,  50 
Pac.  815;  Cicero  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Rol- 
lins, 195  111.  220,  63  N.  E.  98;  Neu- 
feld  v.  Roderninski,  144  111.  83,  89, 
32  N.  E.  913;  Scott,  v.  P.  141  111. 
195,  205,  30  N.  E.  329;  Citizens'  Gas 
Light  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  118  111.  182, 
8  N.  E.  310. 

37  Quirk  v.  St.  Louis  N.  E.  Co.  126 
Mo.  460,  28  S.  W.  1080. 

3«  Hartley  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co.  148  Mo.  124,  49  S.  W.  840;  Hall 
v.  Sroufe,  52  111.  421;  Perry  v. 
Makenson,  103  Ind.  302,  2  N.  E.  713; 
Wolfe  v.  Pugh,  101  Ind.  309;  La- 
fayette &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  26 
Ind.  76;  Ward  v.  Cochran,  71  Fed. 
127;  Evans  v.  Merritt,  62  Ark.  228, 
35  S.  W.  212;  Sullivan  v.  Jefferson 
Ave.  R.  Co.  133  Mo.  1,  34  S.  W.  566; 
South  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Du- 
freene,  200  111.  464,  65  N.  E.  1075; 
Vogg  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  138  Mo. 
172,  36  S.  W.  646;  Secor  v.  Oregon 


I.  Co.  15  Wash.  35,  45  Pac.  654; 
Davis  v.  Gilliam,  14  Wash.  206,  44 
Pac.  119;  Turner  v.  Ft.  Worth  &  D. 
C.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  30  S.  W. 
253;  Rose  v.  Bradley,  91  Wis.  619, 
65  N.  W.  509;  Mehurin  v.  Stone,  37 
Ohio  St.  49;  City  of  Beardstown  v. 
Clark,  204  111.  526,  68  N.  E.  378; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Murphy,  198 
111.  471,  64  N.  E.  1011. 

so  King  v.  King,  155  Mo.  406,  56 
S.  W.  534;  Wagoner  v.  Wabash  R. 
Co.  185  111.  154,  56  N.  E.  1056; 
Cooper  v.  Delk,  108  Ga.  550,  34  S. 
E.  145;  Hiner  v.  Jeanpert,  65  111. 
429;  Robinson  v.  Hyer,  35  Fla.  544, 
17  So.  745;  Gruber  v.  Decker,  115 
Ga.  779,  42  S.  E.  82;  Citizens'  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hamer,  29  Ind.  App.  426, 
63  N.  E.  778,  62  N.  E.  658;  Baxter 
v.  Lusher,  159  Ind.  381,  65  N.  E. 
211;  Thompson  v.  P.  125  111.  261,  17 
N.  E.  749;  Vinson  v.  Scott,  198  111. 
542,  65  N.  E.  78;  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
Lowrey,  32  Neb.  732,  49  N.  W.  707. 
See  Swearingen  v.  Inman,  198  111. 
255,  65  N.  E.  80;  S.  v.  Hill,  47  Neb. 
456,  66  N.  W.  541;  Blackman  v. 
Housels  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  31  S.  W. 
511;  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
Knieram,  152  111.  467,  39  N.  E.  324; 
Metropolitan  W.  &  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
Skola,  183  111.  455,  56  N.  E.  171,  75 
Am.  St.  120;  Gray  v.  Merriam,  148 
111.  188,  35  N.  E.  810/39  Am.  St. 
172;  Vanhousen  v.  Broehl,  59 
Neb.  48,  80  N.  W.  260;  Foster  v. 


§  243 


ERRORS. 


236 


tied  to  a  verdict  under  the  most  favorable  construction  of  the 
evidence,  he  cannot  complain  of  error  as  to  the  instructions.40 
Or  where  it  does  not  reasonably  appear  that  the  giving  of  an  in- 
struction on  a  matter  which  was  not  presented  by  the  pleadings 
nor  supported  by  evidence,  in  any  manner  affected  the  verdict, 
the  error  will  not  warrant  the  reversal  of  the  judgment.41 

So  where  the  evidence  standing  uncontradicted  is  sufficient  to 
sustain  the  verdict  rendered,  error  in  the  giving  of  instructions 
will  be  regarded  as  harmless.42  Thus,  where  the  plaintiff's  cause 
of  action  is  clearly  established  by  the  admissions  of  the  defend- 
ant, there  can  be  no  ground  for  complaint  in  the  giving  or  refus- 
ing instructions  even  though  they  are  erroneous.43  The  re- 
fusal of  the  court  to  give  a  proper  instruction  on  behalf  of  the 
defendant  is  harmless  error  where  the  undisputed  evidence  con- 
clusively shows  his  guilt.44  Or  if  it  appears  that  substantial 
justice  has  been  done,  and  the  jury  could  have  reached  no  other 
result  from  the  evidence,  the  refusal  of  instructions,  though  cor- 
rect, will  not  be  sufficient  ground  for  reversal.45 

A  judgment  will  not  be  reversed  for  error  in  the  instructions, 


Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  84  111.  164; 
Greer  v.  Lafayette  Co.  Bank,  128 
Mo.  559,  30  S.  W.  319;  Thompson 
v.  Force,  65  111.  370;  Strohm  v. 
Hayes,  70  111.  41,  45;  Cusick  v. 
Campoell,  68  111.  508;  Lawrence  v. 
Jarvis,  32  111.  304,  312;  Texas,  &c. 
R.  Co.  v.  Nolan,  62  Fed.  552;  Strat- 
ton  v.  Dale,  45  Neb.  472,  63  N.  W. 
875;  Glover  v.  Blakeslee,  115  Ga. 
696,  42  S.  E.  40;  Dodds  v.  McCor- 
mick  Harvesting  M.  Co.  62  Neb. 
759,  87  N.  W.  911;  Leftwich  v.  City 
of  Richmond,  4  Va.  Super.  Ct.  128, 
40  S.  E.  651. 

Where  the  verdict  is  warranted 
by  the  evidence  slight  inaccuracies 
in  the  charge  cannot  be  urged  as 
material  error:  Strong  v.  S.  95  Ga. 
499,  22  S.  E.  299;  Collier  v.  Jenks, 
19  R.  I.  493,  34  Atl.  998  (as  to  bur- 
den of  proof);  see  Texas  P.  &  R. 
Co.  v.  Reed  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  32  S. 
W.  118;  Bank  of  H.  v.  Napier,  41 
W.  Va.  481,  23  S.  E.  800. 

40  Elster  v.  Springfield,  49  Ohio 
St.  82,  30  N.  E.  274;  Frank  v.  Wil- 
liams, 36  Fla.  136,  18  So.  351. 


41  Boygero  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  64 
S.  Car.  104,  41  S.  E.  819. 

42  Dwelling     House     Ins.     Co.     v. 
Dowdall,  55   111.   App.   622. 

43  Shultz  v.  Babcock,  166  111.   398, 
46   N.   E.   892. 

44  Brown    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 
65   S.   W.   906. 

45  Ryan   v.   Donnelly,  71  111.   104; 
Pahlman     v.     King,     49     111.     269; 
Schwarz  v.   Schwarz,  26  111.  81,  85; 
Beseler    v.    Stephani,    71    111.    404; 
Jones  v.  Chicago  &  Iowa  R.  Co.  68 
111.  380,  384;   DeClerg  v.  Mungin,  46 
111.  112;  Elam  v.  Badger,  23  111.  445, 
450;   Mode  v.  Beasley,  143  Ind.  306, 
42   N.   E.   727;    Jordan   v.   James,   5 
Ohio,    88;    Thompson  v.   P.    125   111. 
261,  17  N.  E.  749.  See,  also,  for  crim- 
inal cases:  Dacey  v.  P.  116  111.  576, 
6    N.    E.    165;    Wilson   v.   P.    94    111. 
327;   Dunn  v.  P.  109  111.  646;   Ritz- 
man   v.    P.    110   111.    362;    Leach    v. 
P.    53    111.    311,    318;    Meyer    v.    S. 
(Tex.  Cr.),  49  S.  W.  600;   Mclntosh 
v.    S.    151    Ind.    251,    51    N.    E.    354; 
Berry  v.   S.  31  Ohio  St.  225;    Edel- 
hoff  v.  S.  5  Wyo.  19,  36  Pac.  627,  9 
Am.  Cr.  R.  262. 


237  VERDICT    RIGHT — ERRORS    HARMLESS.  §    244 

unless  it  appears  that  the  party  complaining  was  in  some  manner 
prejudiced.46  Where  the  charge  submits  to  the  jury  matters 
not  material  to  the  issue,  there  is  no  ground  for  reversal  unless 
prejudice  is  shown  by  so  doing,47  especially  if  such  immaterial 
matter  merely  imposes  a  burden  on  the  successful  party  with- 
out injury  or  prejudice  to  the  other.48 

But  the  giving  of  an  erroneous  charge  on  a  vital  point  or  con- 
trolling issue  involved  in  a  ease  will  be  presumed  prejudicial 
unless  the  record  clearly  shows  the  contrary.49  If  the  issues  are 
not  fairly  submitted  to  the  jury  the  court  will  not  be  authorized 
to  look  into  the  testimony  to  ascertain  whether  the  weight  of  the 
evidence  was  or  was  not  favorable  to  a  verdict.  A  party  is  en- 
titled to  have  the  issues  passed  upon  by  the  jury  under  proper 
instructions.50  Where  the  plaintiff's  own  testimony  shows  that 
the  defendant  agreed  to  pay  him  only  one  hundred  dollars  for 
certain  services,  an  instruction  that  the  defendant  agreed  to  pay 
him  two  hundred  dollars  is  material  error,  although  the  jury  ren- 
dered a  verdict  of  only  one  hundred  dollars  for  the  plaintiff,  the 
defendant  having  contested  and  denied  the  whole  of  the  plain- 
tiff's claim.51 

§  244.  Erroneous  instruction  favorable  is  harmless. — A  party 
has  no  cause  to  complain  of  an  erroneous  instruction  which  is 
favorable  to  him  rather  than  harmful.52  Thus,  for  instance, 
an  instruction  erroneously  requiring  the  plaintiff  to  prove  a 
matter  by  a  higher  degree  of  proof  than  by  a  preponderance, 
is  error  of  which  the  defendant  cannot  complain,  being  favorable 
to  him.53  Submitting  to  the  jury  an  issue  not  supported  by  any 

«  Easley   v.   Valley  M.   L.    Asso.  Pendleton  St.  R,  Co.  v.  Stellman,  22 

91   Va.   161,   21   S.   B.   235;    Stein  v.  Ohio  St.  1. 

Vamice,  44  Neb.  132,  62  N.  W.  464;  so  Globe   Ins.   Co.   v.   Sherlock,   25 

Wallace    v.    Cravens,    34    Ind.    534;  Ohio   St.   67. 

Beavers  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.  47  Neb.  ^  Pipkin     v.     Home     (Tex.     Cv. 

761,  66  N.  W.  821;   River  Boom  Co.  App.),  68  S.  W.  100. 

v.     Smith     (Wash.),     45     Pac.    750;  52  Kitchell    v.    Bratton,    2    111.    (1 

Chase  v.  Washburn,  1  Ohio  St.  244.  Scam.),  300;   Missouri,  K.  &  T.   R. 

47  White  v.  Ross,  35  Fla.  377,  17  Co.  v.   Cook,  12  Tex.  Cv.  App.  203, 

So.  640;    Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  33  S.  W.  669;    Kugler  v.  Wiseman, 

Duvall,  12  Tex.  Cv.  App.  348,  35  S.  20  Ohio,  361;   S.  v.  Hicks   (Mo.),  77 

W.  699  (issue  not  essential  to  plain-  S.  W.  542.     Lindell  v.  Deere-Wells 

tiff's  right  to  recover).  Co.    (Neb.),   92  N.  W.   164. 

<*  McCary   v.    Stull,    44    Neb.    175,  ™  Doran   v.    Cedar   Rapids   &    M. 

62   N.   W.   501.  C.   R.   Co.  117  Iowa,  442,  90  N.  W. 

J»  Baldwin  v.  Bank  of  Massillon,  815;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Coun- 

1  Ohio  St.  141;  Lowe  v.  Lehman,  15  tryman,  16  Ind.  App.  139,  44  N.  E. 

Ohio    St.    179;    Jones    v.    Bangs,    40  265. 
Ohio  St.   139    49  Am.  R.  664,  note; 


245 


ERRORS. 


238 


evidence  but  which  is  favorable  to  the  party,  is  not  error  of 
which  he  can  complain.54 

§  245.  Principle  or  element  refused  or  omitted. — The  refusal 
of  an  instruction  correctly  stating  a  principle  of  law  clearly  appli- 
cable to  the  evidence  and  pleadings  which  is  not  contained  in 
any  other  instruction  given  is  manifest  error,55  especially  if  the 


54  S.  v.  Brown,  145  Mo.  680,  47  S. 
W.  789;  S.  v.  Kindred,  148  Mo.  270, 
49  S.  W.  845;  Miller  v.  Root,  77 
Iowa,  545,  42  N.  W.  502. 

The  errors  complained  of  in  the 
giving  or  refusing  of  instructions 
in  the  following  cases  were  held 
to  be  harmless: 

Bowen  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  58  S. 
Oar.  222,  36  S.  E.  590;  Blair  v.  City 
of  Groton,  13  S.  Dak.  211,  82  N.  W. 
48;  Fox  v.  Boyd,  104  Tenn.  357,  58 
S.  W.  221;  Shannon  v.  Jefferson 
City,  125  Ala.  384,  27  So.  977;  Smit- 
son  v.  Southern  P.  Co.  37  Ore.  74,  60 
Pac.  907;  Bibb  County  v.  Ham,  110 
Ga.  340,  35  S.  E.  656;  Horgan  v. 
Brady,  156  Mo.  659,  56  S.  W.  294; 
Nelson  v.  Terry  (Ky.),  56  S.  W. 
672;  Ward  v.  Odell  Mfg.  Co.  126  N. 
Car.  946,  36  S.  E.  194;  Lassiter  v. 
Norfolk  &  C.  R.  Co.  126  N.  Car. 
509,  3-6  S.  E.  48;  Searcy  v.  Martin- 
Woods  Co.  93  Iowa,  420,  61  N.  W. 
934;  Neill  v.  Jordan,  15  Mont.  47, 
38  Pac.- 223;  Johnson  v.  Hirschberg, 
185  111.  445,  57  N.  E.  26;  Chicago 
&  A.  R.  Co.  v.'Keegan,  185  111.  70, 
56  N.  E.  1088;  Scrivani  v.  Dondero, 
128  Cal.  31,  60  Pac.  463;  Hamman 
v.  Central  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  156  Mo. 
232,  56  S.  W.  1091;  Glover  v.  Char- 
leston &  S.  R.  Co.  57  S.  Car.  228, 
35  S.  E.  510;  Ellis  v.  Stone  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  55  S.  W.  758;  Bussanicy 
v.  Myers,  22  Wash.  369,  60  Pac. 
1117;  Sears  Adm'r  v.  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co.  22  Ky.  152,  56  S.  W.  725; 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Mag- 
ness,  68  Ark.  289,  57  S.  W.  33; 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  White,  23 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  280,  56  S.  W.  204; 
Brunette  v.  Town  of  Gagen,  106 
Wis.  618,  82  N.  W.  564;  Grace  v. 
St.  Louis  R.  Co.  156  Mo.  295,  56  S. 
W.  1121;  Austin  R.  T.  Co.  v.  Grothe, 
88  Tex.  262,  31  S.  W.  196;  Traxler 


v.  Greenwich  Tp.  168  Pa.  St.  214,  31 
Atl.  1090;  Wells  v.  Houston,  29 
Tex.  Cv.  App.  619,  69  S.  W.  183; 
Heminway  v.  Miller,  87  Minn.  123, 
91  N.  W.  428;  Hoges  v.  Nalty,  113 
Wis.  567,  89  N.  W.  535;  Davidson  v. 
Jefferson  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  68  S. 
W.  822;  Logansport  &  W.  V.  Gas 
Co.  v.  Coate,  (Ind.  App.),  64  N.  E. 
638;  Clapp  v.  Royer,  28  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  29,  67  S.  W.  345;  City  Trans- 
fer Co.  v.  Draper,  115  Ga.  954,  42 
S.  E.  221;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Ru- 
zicka  (Neb.),  91  N.  W.  543;  Driver 
v.  Board,  &c.  70  Ark.  358,  68  S. 
W.  26;  McNeil  v.  Durham,  130  N. 
Car.  256,  41  S.  E.  383;  Charles 
Schatzlein  Paint  Co.  v.  Passiuore, 
26  Mont.  500,  68  Pac.  1113;  Stowers 
v.  Singer,  24  Ky.  395,  68  S.  W.  637, 
67  S.  W.  822;  Yale  v.  Newton,  130 
Mich.  434,  90  N.  W.  37;  In  re  Reed's 
Estate,  86  Minn.  163,  90  N.  W.  319; 
Westinghouse  Co.  v.  Gainor,  130 
Mich.  393,  90  N.  W.  52. 

Held  harmful  in  the  following 
cases: 

Frick  v.  Kabaker,  116  Iowa,  494, 
90  N.  W.  498;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Woodward,  70  Ark. 
441,  69  S.  W.  55;  Evans  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Crawford  (Neb.),  93  N.  W.  177; 
Stuck  v.  Yates,  30  Ind.  App.  441, 
66  N.  E.  177;  Ballow  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  609  S.  W.  513;  S.  v.  How- 
ard, 41  Ore.  49,  69  Pac.  50;  S.  v. 
Phillips,  119  Iowa,  642,  94  N.  W. 
229;  Barnesville  Man.  Co.  v.  Love 
(Del.)  52  Atl.  267;  S.  v.  Crawford, 
31  Wash.  260,  71  Pac.  1030;  Western 
U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Sorsby,  29  Tex.  Cv. 
App.  345,  69  S.  W.  122;  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Camper,  199  111. 
569,  65  N.  E.  448;  P.  v.  Goodrode 
(Mich.),  94  N.  W.  14. 

ss  Bennett  v.  Connelly,  103  111.  50, 
53;  Last  Chance  M.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Ames, 


239  IMPERFECTION  BY  OMISSIONS.  §    245 

refused  instruction  relates  to  disputed  questions  of  fact  which 
are  vital  in  determining  the  rights  of  the  party  requesting  the 
instruction.56  And  the  giving  of  an  instruction  which  omits  a 
material  fact  or  element  essential  to  a  correct  statement  of  the 
law,  which  is  not  contained  in  any  other  of  the  instructions,  is 
error.57  And  the  omission  of  a  material  element,  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  "due  care  and  caution"  on  the  part  of  the  person 
injured,  under  some  state  of  the  facts  is  error,  although  other 
instructions  contain  the  element  thus  omitted.58 

Thus,  in  an  action  for  personal  injury,  the  refusal  to  instruct 
that  if  the  plaintiff  was  riding  a  wheel  at  the  time  he  was  injured 
he  could  not  recover,  is  such  error  that  the  giving  of  a  general 
instruction  that  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  he  must  have 
been  in  the  exercise  of  due  care,  or  that  he  could  not  recover 
unless  he  received  the  injuries  in  the  manner  alleged  in  his  decla- 
ration,59 will  not  mend.  In  an  action  against  a  street  car  com- 
pany, a  charge  that  "if  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  could  have 
crossed  the  street  and  avoided  the  car  but  for  the  carelessness 
of  the  defendant's  driver  and  his  impetuous  driving,  you  must 
find  for  the  plaintiff,"  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  eliminates  con- 
tributory negligence;  and  the  giving  of  an  instruction  for  the 

23  Colo.  167,  47  Pac.  382;  Ginnard  v.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner,  22  Tex.  Cv.  App. 

Knapp,  95  Wis.  482,  70  N.  W.  671;  167,   54   S.   W.   1064;    Lewis   v.    S.   4 

Maxwell   v.    Chapman,   26   N.   Y.    S.  Ohio,   397;    Lytle  v.  Boyer,  33  Ohio 

361,   74   Hun,   111;    Selma  St.   &   S.  St.  506,  511;   Mallen  v.  Waldowski, 

R.  Co.  v.  Owen,  132  Ala.  420;  31  So.  203  111.   91,  67  N.   E.   409. 

598;   New  York,  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  But    the    refusal    to    instruct    on 

Thomas,   92  Va.   606,  24  S.  E.  264;  matters  not   material   to   the   issue 

McGee  v.  Wineholt,  23  Wash.   748,  is  not  error,  Mendenhall   v.  North 

63  Pac.  571;    Harvey  v.  S.  125  Ala.  Carolina  R.  Co.  123  N.  Car.  275,  31 

47,  27  So.  763;    Soney  v.  S.  13  Lea  S.  E.  480. 

(Tenn.),  472;   Kinkle  v.  P.  27  Colo.  57  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Peiinell, 

459,  62  Pac.  197;   Brainard  v.  Bur-  94  111.  448,   454;    Galveston  Land  & 

ton,  5  Vt.  97;   Sperry  v.  Spaulding,  I.  Co.  v.  Levy,  10  Tex.  Cv.  App.  104, 

45  Cal.   544;    Nichols  v.  S.   46  Miss.  30  S.  W.  504;    Pritchett  v.  Johnson 

284;    Keith  v.  Spencer,  19  Fla.  748;  (Neb.),  97  N.  W.  224. 

Lytle    v.    Boyer,    3'3    Ohio    St.    506;  .     ss  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 

Morris  v.  Platt,  32  Conn.  75;  Cooper  wood,    80    111.    88,    91;    Callahan    v. 

v.   Mulder,   74  Mich.   374,   41  N.  W.  City  of  Port  Huron,  128  Mich.  673, 

.1084;     Suttle    v.    Finnegan,    86    111.  87   N.   W.    880. 

App.  423;  Anderson  v.  City  of  Bath,  B»  Callahan  v.  City  of  Port  Huron, 

42  Me.  346.  128  Mich.  673,  87  N.  W.  880.     Cora- 

ssBinkley  v.  Dewell  (Kas.  App.).  pare:   Mallen  v.  Waldowski,  203  111. 

58  Pac.  1028.     See  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  91,  67  N.  E.  409. 


§  246  ERRORS.  240 

defendant  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover  if  he  was  negligent 
would  not  cure  the  error.60 

§  246.    How  a  correct  instruction  cures  defective   one — An 

instruction  which  assumes  or  undertakes  to  state  a  complete  case 
cannot  be  truly  regarded  as  but  one  of  a  series  of  instructions 
in  the  sense  that  it  may  be  supplemented  or  qualified  by  others 
in  the  same  series  in  such  manner  that  an  error  in  it  will  be 
cured.  In  other  words,  an  error  in  such  instruction  cannot  be 
cured  by  supplementary  or  qualifying  instructions.61  An  in- 
struction based  upon  only  a  portion  of  the  evidence  bearing  upon 
the  main  issue  is  •  erroneous,  and  the  giving  of  a  subsequent 
instruction  stating  the  law  correctly  will  not  cure  the  error.62 
On  the  subject  as  to  when  a  correct  instruction  does  or  does 
not  cure  a  defective  one,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  has 
used  the  following  language:  "Where  instructions  which  are 
defective  are  cured  by  others  unobjectionable,  the  latter  must 
either  directly  refer  to,  and  explain  and  qualify  the  former,  or 
be  supplementary  to  the  former  and  supply  what  was  omitted 
from  the  former;  but  obviously  where  the  latter  are  supple- 
mentary to  the  former  instructions  the  former  must  be  correct 
as  far  as  they  go,  and  defective  only  in  not  going  farther  and 
including  what  is  supplied  by  the  supplementary  instructions. 
But  where  one  instruction  says  the  law  is  one  thing  with  regard 
to  a  particular  matter  or  state  of  circumstances,  and  another 
instruction  that  the  law  is  another  and  materially  different  thing 
with  regard  to  precisely  the  same  matter  or  state  of  circum- 
stances, the  instructions  are  repugnant  and  no  repetition  of 
the  correct  instruction  can  cure  the  errors  of  those  that  are  in- 
correct ;  for  the  jury,  assuming  as  is  their  duty,  that  they  are  all 

so  Lifschitz  v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &      land,  C.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.   Crawford, 

B.  R.    Co.    73    N.    Y.    888,    67    App.       24  Ohio  St.  640,  15  Am.  R.  633. 
Div.    602.  62  Burlingim    v.    Bader,    45    Neb. 

An  instruction  assuming  to  state  673,  63  N.  W.  919. 

an  hypothetical  case  must  not  omit  A  remittitur  as  to  one  of  several 

any  material  fact,    Cleveland,    C.  &  items  of  damages  claimed  will  not 

C.  R.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  24  Ohio  St.  cure    an    error    in    an    instruction 
640,  15  Am.  R.  633.  which  applies  to  the  several  items 

si  Graff  v.  P.  134  111.  383,  25  N.  of  damages:  Hartford  Deposit  Co. 
B.  583.  See  Kurstelska  v.  Jackson,  v.  Oalkins,  186  111.  104,  57  N.  E. 
89  Minm.  96,  93  N.  W.  1054;  Cleve-  863. 


241  CORRECT  CHARGE  CURING  DEFECTIVE.  §    247 

correct,  may  as  readily  follow  those  that  are  incorrect  as  those 
that  are  correct."63 

In  Mississippi,  where  an  abstract  proposition  of  law  is  incor- 
rectly stated  and  the  same  or  similar  propositions  are  thereafter 
correctly  set  forth  in  other  instructions  given,  then  if,  taking 
the  instructions  on  both  sides  as  a  whole,  the  court  can  safely, 
affirm  that  no  harm  has  been  done  to  either  side  and  that  the! 
right  result  has  been  reached,  the  verdict  will  not  in  such  case 
be  disturbed.  But  where  the  court  undertakes  to  collate  certain 
facts,  and,  making  a  concrete  application  of  the  law  to  such 
facts,  instructs  the  jury  to  bring  in  a  verdict  if  they  believe  such 
facts  exist,  and  the  facts  therein  stated  will  not  legally  sustain 
the  verdict  directed,  such  error  cannot  be  cured  by  other  in- 
structions correctly  stating  the  law;  the  reason  for  the  differ- 
ence being  that  in  the  first  instance  it  is  simply  an  erroneous 
statement  of  a  legal  principle  which  may  or  may  not  mislead 
the  jury,  according  to  the  varying  circumstances  of  causes,  but 
in  the  latter  instance,  where  a  verdict  is  directed  to  be  based 
upon  the  facts  stated  in  the  instruction,  other  instructions  em- 
bodying other  and  different  statements  of  facts  and  authoriz- 
ing a  verdict  to  be  predicated  thereon,  do  not  modify  the  erro- 
neous instructions,  but  simply  conflict  therewith.  If  by  an  er- 
roneous instruction  the  jury  is  charged  to  convict  if  they  believe 
certain  facts  to  exist,  and  by  another  instruction  the  jury  is 
told  that  they  should  acquit  unless  they  believe  certain  other 
facts  also  exist,  these  instructions  do  not  modify,  but  contra- 
dict each  other.  The  one  is  not  explanatory  of  the  other,  but 
in  conflict  therewith.  In  such  a  state  of  the  case  the  jury  are 
left  without  any  sure  or  certain  guide  to  conduct  them  to  the 
proper  conclusion.64  The  cases  in  which  it  has  been  held  that 
a  bad  instruction  may  be  cured  by  another,  are  cases  where 
the  bad  and  good  instructions,  when  read  together,  clearly  state 
the  law  and  where  it  can  be  clearly  seen  that  the  bad  instruc- 
tion did  no  harm.86 

§  247.     Instructions   contradictory. — The   giving   of   a   correct 

es  Hoge  v.  P.  117  111.  48,  6  N.  B.  185  111.  80,  56  N.  E.  1088.     See  Gui- 

796.  nard    v.    Knapp    S.    &    Co.    90    Wis. 

™  Harper  v.  S.  (Miss.),  35  So.  575.  123,  62  N.  W.  625,  48  Am.   St.  901. 
65  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Keegan, 


§  247 


ERRORS. 


242 


instruction  will  not  obviate  an  error  in  an  instruction  on  the 
other  side  where  they  are  entirely  variant  with  each  other,  and 
there  is  nothing  to  show  the  jury  which  to  adopt  as  the  law. 
In  such  case  it  is  impossible  to  determine  whether  the  jury 
followed  the  correct  or  erroneous  instruction.68  Nor  will  the 
giving  of  a  correct  instruction  at  the  request  of  either  party 
correct  a  material  error  in  a  bad  instruction  where  the  instruc- 
tions are  contradictory.  The  correct  instruction  cannot  be  said 
to  modify  or  supplement  the  wrong  one  as  is  the  case  where' 
they  are  not  contradictory.67  A  charge  containing  positive  error 


ee  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Oo.  v.  Kee- 
gan,  185  111.  79,  56  N.  E.  1088; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunn, 
61  111.  385;  Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co. 
v.  Johnson,  106  Ga.  130,  32  S.  E. 
78;  City  of  Macon  v.  Holcomb,  205 
111.  640,  69  N.  E.  79;  Kerr  v.  Top- 
ping, 109  Iowa,  150,  80  N.  W.  321; 
McCole  v.  Loeher,  79  Ind.  430;  Har- 
rington v.  Priest,  104  Wis.  362,  80 
N.  W.  442;  American  Strawboard 
Co.  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  177  111. 
513,  53  N.  E.  97;  Crosby  v.  Ritchey, 
56  Neb.  336,  76  N.  W.  895;  S.  v. 
Utley,  132  N.  Car.  1022,  43  S.  E. 
820;  Edwards  v.  Atlantic'  C.  L.  R. 
Co.  132  N.  Car.  99,  43  S.  E.  585 
("Ring  the  bell  and  blow  the  whis- 
tle"— Ring  the  bell  or  blow  the 
whistle);  Meyer  v.  Hafmeister 
(Wis.),  97  N.  W.  166;  City  of  Boul- 
der v.  Niles,  9  Colo.  421;  Summer- 
lot  v.  Hamilton,  121  Ind.  91,  22  N. 
E.  973;  S.  v.  Button,  99  Ind.  307; 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Lafferty, 
2  W.  Va.  104;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Murphy,  198  111.  470,  64  N.  E. 
1011;  Cresler  v.  City  of  Ashville 
(N.  Car.),  46  S.  E.  739.  See,  also, 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Beecher,  65  Ark.  64,  44  S.  W.  715; 
Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
25  Mich.  274;  Brown  v.  McAllister, 
39  Cal.  573;  Deserant  v.  Cerrillos 
Coal  Co.  178  U.  S.  409;  Bluedom  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  108  Mo.  439, 
18  S.  W.  1103;  Mississippi  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Miller,  40  Miss.  45;  Haight  v. 
"Vallet,  89  Cal.  249,  26  Pac.  897; 
Hoben  v.  Burlington  &  -I.  R.  Co. 
20  Iowa,  562;  Blume  v.  S.  154  Ind. 
343,  56  N.  E.  771;  Hart  v.  Chicago, 


R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  56  Iowa,  166,  7  N. 
W.  9,  41  Am.  R.  93;  Kelly  v.  Cable 
Co.  7  Mont.  70,  14  Pac.  633. 

siEnright  v.  P.  155  111.  32,  39  N. 
E.  561;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Naperville,  166  111.  87,  94, 
47  N.  E.  734;  Partridge  v.  Cutter, 
168  111.  504,  512,  48  N.  E.  125;  S. 
v.  Shadwell,  26  Mont.  52,  66  Pac. 
508;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Cozby, 
174  111.  109,  119,  50  N.  E.  1011;  Ko- 
nold  v.  Rio  Grande  W.  R.  Co.  21 
Utah,  379,  60  Pac.  1021;  Chicago  C. 
R.  Co.  v.  Dinsmore,  162  111.  658,  44 
N.  E.  887;  Farmers'  T.  N.  Bank  v. 
Woodell  (Ore.),  61  Pac.  831;  Arnett 
v.  Huggins  (Colo.  App.),  70  Pac. 
765  (contradictory  as  to  damages) ; 
Werming  v.  Teeple,  144  Ind.  189,  41 
N.  E.  600;  Pendleton  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stallman,  22  Ohio  St.  1;  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  56  Neb.  746,  77 
N.  W.  130;  Shano  v.  Fifth  Ave.  &  H. 
St.  Bridge  Co.  189  Pa.  St.  245,  42  AtL 
128;  Green  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co. 
122  Cal.  563,  55  Pac.  577;  Griffin 
v.  City  of  Lewiston  (Idaho),  55 
Pac.  545;  S.  v.  Webb.  6  Idaho,  428, 
55  Pac.  892;  Illinois  Linen  Co.  v. 
Hough,  91  111.  67;  Baldwin  v.  Kil- 
lain,  63  111.  550;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
R.  Co.  v.  Payne,  49  111.  499;  Barr 
v.  S.  45  Neb.  458,  63  N.  W.  856; 
Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Shepherd,  107 
Tenn.  444,  64  S.  W.  710;  Kraus  v. 
Haas  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  25  S.  W. 
1025;  Holt  v.  Spokane  &  P.  R.  Co. 
3  Idaho.  703,  35  Pac.  39;  Wolf  v. 
Wolf,  158  Pa.  St.  621,  28  Atl.  164; 
Town  of  Denver  v.  Myers,  63  Neb, 
107,  88  N.  W.  191;  City  of  Winches- 
ter v.  Carroll,  97  Va.  727,  40  S.  E. 


243 


CONTRADICTORY WIDELY    DIFFERING. 


248 


cannot  be  cured  by  contradictory  instructions  stating  the  law 
correctly,  unless  the  latter  makes  direct  reference  to  and  with- 
draws or  qualifies  the  erroneous  charge.68  And  it  must  appear 
that  the  erroneous  instructions  are  plainly  withdrawn  before  the 
errors  will  be  regarded  as  cured.69 

§  248.  Instructions  differing  widely  from  each  other. — Also 
the  giving  of  two  instructions  widely  differing  from  each  other 
op.  the  same  vital  point  in  issue  in  a  case  is  such  error  that  a 


37;  Payne  v.  McCormick  H.  M.  Co. 
11  Okla.  318.  66  Pac.  287;  Denver  & 
R.  G.  R.  Go.  v.  Fatherington  (Colo. 
App.),  68  Pac.  978;  Eureka  Fire 
&  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Percell,  19  Ohio 
C.  C.  135;  Lindberg  v.  Chicago 
C.  R.  Co.  83  111.  App.  433;  Linn  v. 
Massilon  Bridge  Co.  78  Mo.  App. 
Ill;  Virginia  &  N.  C.  Wheel  Co. 
v.  Chalkley,  98  Va.  62,  34  S.  E. 
976;  S.  v.  Peel,  23  Mont.  358,  59 
Pac.  169,  75  Am.  St.  529;  P.  v.  Ben- 
nett 121  Mich.  241,  80  N.  W. 
9;  Criner  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
290,  53  S.  W.  873;  Henry  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  54  S.  W.  592; 
S.  v.  Evans,  12  S.  Dak.  473,  81  N. 
W.  893;  Palmer  v.  S.  8  Wyo.  40,  59 
Pac.  793;  S.  v.  McClellan,  23  Mont. 
532,  59  Pac.  924;  Swenie  v.  S.  59 
Neb.  269,  80  N.  W.  815;  Bleiler  v. 
Moore,  94  Wis.  385,  69  N.  W.  164. 
See,  also,  Gearing  v.  Lacher,  146 
Pa.  St.  397,  23  AtL  229;  Mississippi 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  40  Miss.  45; 
Howell  v.  S.  61  Neb.  391,  85  N.  W. 
289;  Hickman  v.  Griffin,  6  Mo.  37; 
Imhoff  v.  Chicago  &  M.  R.  Co.  20 
Wis.  344;  McDougal  v.  S.  88  Ind. 
24;  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.  v.  Noftsger,  148  Ind.  101,  47 
N.  E.  332;  Baker  v.  Ashe,  80  Tex. 
356,  16  S.  W.  36;  Henry  v.  S.  51 
Neb.  149,  70  N.  W.  924;  Burnett  v. 
S.  60  N.  J.  L.  255,  37  Atl.  622;  Bos- 
well  v.  District  of  Columbia,  21  D. 
C.  526;  Richardson  v.  Halstead,  44 
Neb.  606,  62  N.  W.  1077;  S.  v.  Tat- 
law,  136  Mo.  678,  38  S.  W.  552; 
Edwards  v.  Atlantic  Coast  L.  R.  Co. 
129  N.  Car.  78,  39  S.  E.  730;  Knight 
v.  Denman,  64  Neb.  814,  90  N.  W. 
863;  Spencer  v.  Terry's  Estate 
(Mich.),  94  N.  W.  372;  Harter  v. 
City  of  Marshall  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 


36  S.  W.  294;  Eureka  Fire  &  M. 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Percell  19  Ohio  C.  C.  135; 
Lindberg  v.  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  83 
111..  App.  433;  Linn  v.  Missillon 
Bridge  Co.  78  Mo.  App.  Ill;  Vir- 
ginia &  N.  C.  Wheel  Co.  v.  Chalk- 
ley,  98  Va.  62,  34  S.  E.  97;  S.  v. 
Peel,  23  Mont.  358,  59  Pac.  169; 
P.  v.  Bennett,  121  Mich.  241,  80  N. 
W.  9;  Criner  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
290,  53  S.  W.  873;  Henry  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  54  S.  W.  592;  S.  v.  Evans, 
12  S.  Dak.  473,  81  N.  W.  893;  Palmer 
v.  S.  9  Wyo.  40,  59  Pac.  793;  S. 
v.  McClellan,  23  Mont.  532,  59  Pac. 
924,  75  Am.  St.  558;  Sweenie  v.  S. 

59  Neb.  269,  80  N.  W.  815;   Bleiler 
v.    Moore,    94    Wis.    385,    69    N.    W. 
164;    S.   v.   Tatlaw,   136  Mo.   678,   38 
S.    W.    552;    Henry    v.    S.    51    Neb. 
149,    70   N.    W.    924;    Burnett   v.    S. 

60  N.    J.    255,    37    Atl.    622;     Bos- 
well  v.  District  of  C.  21  D.  C.  526; 
Richardson    v.    Halstead,    44    Neb. 
606,  62  N.  W.  1077. 

es  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  65  S.  W.  74; 
Baker  v.  Ashe,  80  Tex.  357,  16  S. 
W.  36;  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee, 
29  Ind.  App.  480,  64  N.  E.  675;  In- 
ternational &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  An- 
chond  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  68  S.  W. 
743;  S.  v.  Fitzgerald,  72  Vt.  142,  47 
Atl.  403;  Heyl  v.  S.  109  Ind.  589,  10 
N.  E.  916;  Imhoff  v.  Chicago  &  M. 
R.  Co.  20  Wis.  344;  Guetig  v.  S. 
63  Ind.  278,  3  Am.  Cr.  R.  233. 

es  McCrory  v.  Anderson,  103  Ind. 
16,  2  N.  E.  211;  Klugen  v.  S.  45 
Ind.  521;  Binns  v.  S.  66  Ind.  428; 
Toledo,  N.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Schuck- 
man,  50  Ind.  42;  Lower  v.  Franks, 
115  Ind.  340,  17  N.  E.  630;  Gulf 
C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  White  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  32  S.  W.  322. 


§  249  ERRORS.  244 

new  trial  will  be  given.70  An  absolute  misstatement  of  the  law 
in  giving  instructions  is  not  corrected  by  properly  stating  the 
law  in  other  instructions.71  But  where  two  instructions  are  in- 
consistent or  contradictory,  one  correct  and  the  other  incorrect, 
if  it  appears  that  tine  jury  followed  the  correct  one  in  reaching 
the  verdict  the  error  is  immaterial.72  And  if  a  party  was  not 
entitled  to  an  instruction  which  was  given  at  his  request  he 
cannot  claim  error  that  another  given  for  his  opponent  was  con- 
tradictory to  it.73 

§  249.  Instructions  self -contradictory — An  instruction  which 
is  itself  contradictory  in  its  own  terms,  is  eroneous.  'Thus  an 
instruction  directing  the  jury  that  if  the  defendant  was  mentally 
incompetent  to  protect  his  own  interests  in  making  a  contract, 
then,  although  they  may  believe  he  understood  the  same,  they 
should  find  he  was  not  mentally  competent,  and  that  the  con- 
tract was  invalid,  is  self-contradictory.74  An  ordinance  prohibit- 
ing driving  at  a  greater  rate  of  speed  than  six  miles  an  hour 
having  been  introduced  on  the  trial  of  a  homicide  case,  an  in- 
struction charging  the  jury  that  "if  t<he  defendant  was  engaged 
in  the  commission  of  an  unlawful  act  not  amounting  to  a  felony, 
and  while  so  engaged  ran  over  and  killed  the  deceased,  whether 
he  intended  to  do  so  or  not,  it  is  manslaughter,"  is  inconsistent 
with  a  charge  that  driving  at  a  greater  rate  of  speed  than  six 
miles  an  hour  does  not  of  itself  prove  guilt,  and  that  the  de- 
fendant cannot  be  convicted  unless  he  was  driving  in  a  dangerous 
manner.  The  charges  are  contradictory.75 

TO  Toledo,    W.    &    W.    R.    Co.    v.  Pac.  R.   Co.  114  Mo.  384,  21  S.   W. 

Larmon,  67   111.  71;   Pittsburg,  C.  C.  731. 

&  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Noftsger,  148  Ind.  74  Sands  v.  Potter,  165  111.  402,  46 

101,  47  N.  E.  332;  Beck  v.  S.  51  Neb.  N.   E.   282,   56  Am.   St.   253;    Blume 

106,    70    N.    W.    498;    Bibby    v.    S.  v.  S.  154  Ind.  343,  56  N.  E.  771.  See 

(Tex.   Cr.   App.),   65  S.  W.   193.  International    &    G.    N.    R.    Co.    v. 

71  S.  v.  Adrion,  49  La.  Ann.  1145,  Lehman   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  66  S.  W. 
22   So.   620.   62  Am.   St.  678;    Raker  214. 

v.    S.    50    Neb.    202,    69    N.    W.    749.          75  P.   v.   Pearae,   118  Cal.    154,   50 

See,  also.  Bruce  v.  Beall,  99  Tenn.  Pac.  376.     See  Lemasters  v.  South- 

303,  41  S.  W.  445;   Pittsburg,  C.  C.  era  Pac.  R.  Co.  131  Cal.  105.  63  Pac. 

&    St.    L.    R.    Co.    v.    Noftsger,    148  128;    Elk   Tanning  Co.   v.   Brennan, 

Ind.  101,  47  N.  E.  332.  203  Pa.  St.  232,  52  Atl.  246;   Hoover 

72  Hillebrant    v.    Green,   93    Iowa,  v.  Mercantile  T.  M.  Ins.  Co.  93  Mo. 
661,  62  N.  W.  32.  App.    Ill,    69    S.    W.    42;    Carter   v. 

73  Moore  v.   Graham,   29  Tex.   Cv.  Fulgham,   134   Ala.   238,   32   So.   684. 
App.   235.   69   S.   W.   200.     See  Wil-  Instructions      held      contradictory: 
liams  v.  Southern  Pac.   R.   Co.   110  Grim  v.  Murphy,  110  111.  271:  Pred- 
Cal.  457,  42  Pac.  974;  Reardon  v.  Mo.  erick  v.  Allgaier,  88  Mo.  598;   Mov- 


245 


CONTRADICTORY,  WHEN  EVIDENCE  CLOSE. 


250 


§  250.  Evidence  close,  conflicting  or  doubtful. — Where  the 
facts  of  a  case  are  close  or  conflicting  on  a  vital  point  all  of 
the  instructions  should  state  the  law  accurately.  In  such  state 
of  the  facts  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  jury  were  fully  instructed 
on  behalf  of  the  opposing  party  on  every  material  question  in- 
volved.76 Where  the  evidence  is  conflicting  and  contradictory, 
and  the  case  is  one  which  may  on  the  facts  be  decided  either 
way,  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  all  the  instructions 
should  be  accurate.77 

When  the  evidence  is  so  evenly  balanced  that  the  jury  might  be 
justified  in  finding  either  way,  it  is  highly  important  that  the  law 
should  be  stated  to  the  jury  accurately  in  the  giving  of  instruc- 
tions.77* In  such  state  of  the  evidence  the  slightest  intimation  of 
the  opinion  of  the  court  or  the  assumption  of  a  material  fact  in 
the  giving  of  instructions  is  error,  although  the  law  may  be  cor- 
rectly stated  in  others  given.78  Also,  if  the  evidence  is  close  or 


ar  v.  Harvey,  125  Mass.  574.  In- 
structions held  not  contradictory: 
Underwood  v.  Wolf,  131  111.  425,  434, 

23  N.   E.   842,   19   Am.   St.   40;    Mc- 
Mahon  v.  Sankey,  133  111.  637,  641, 

24  N.  E.   1027;   Waxahachie  Cotton 
Oil  Co.  v.  McLain,  27  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
334,  66  S.  W.  226;   S.  v.  Moore,  163 
Mo.    432,    68   S.   W.    358;    Larkin   v. 
Burlington,   C.   R.   &   N.   R.   Co.   91 
Iowa,  654.  60  N.  W.  195. 

70  Chicago  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Dim- 
ick,  96  111.  47;  Stratton  v.  Central 
City  H.  R.  Co.  95  111.  32;  Steinmeyer 
v.  P.  95  111.  390;  Ruff  v.  Jarrett,  94 
111.  480;  Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  Co. 
v.  Cline.  135  111.  48,  25  N.  E.  846; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Dough- 
erty, 110  111.  525;  Rumbold  v.  Roy- 
al League,  206  111.  517,  69  N.  E.  590; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Murray,  62 
111.  331;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilbert, 
157  111.  365,  41  N.  E.  724;  Eller  v. 
P.  153  111.  344,  38  N.  E.  660;  Swan 
v.  P.  98  111.  612;  Craig  v.  Miller,  133 
111.  307,  24  N.  E.  431;  Grand  Lodge 
v.  Orrell,  99  111.  App.  246;  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Patten,  64 
111.  514;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Moffitt, 
67  111.  431;  Finks  v.  Cox.  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  30  S.  W.  512;  Norfleet  v. 
Sigman,  41  Miss.  631;  Adams  v.  S. 
29  Ohio  St.  412;  Gilmore  v.  Mc- 
Neil, 45  Me.  599. 


77  Holloway    v.    Johnson,    129    111. 
367,  21  N.  E.  798;  Wilber  v.  Wilber, 
129  111.  396,  21  N.  E.  1076;    Kanka- 
kee  Stone  &  S.  Co.  v.  City  of  Kan- 
kakee,    128   111.    177,   20   N.    E.    670; 
Parmley  v.   Farrar,   169   111.  607,  48 
N.   E.    693;    Keanders   v.   Montague, 
180   111.    306,   54   N.   E.   321;    Gorrell 
v.  Payson,  170  111.  217,  48  N.  E.  433; 
Sinnet  v.   Bowman,   151  111.   156,  37 
N.  E.  885;    Cartier  v.  Troy  Lumber 
Co.  138  111.  538,  28  N.  E.  932;  Ameri- 
can Ins.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  89  111.  62; 
Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Hanks,  91  111.  407, 
414;    Cushman   v.    Cogswell,   86   111. 
62;   Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Gar- 
ver,   83   111.   App.   118;    Hughes'   Cr. 
Law,     §3255,     citing:     Smith    v.    P. 
142   111.   12-3,  31  N.  E.   599;    Kirland 
v.  S.  43  Ind.  146,  13  Am.  R.  386;   P. 
v.   Westlake,   124   Cal.   452,   57   Pac. 
465;    S.    v.    Peel,    23    Mont.    358,    59 
Pac.   169;    S.   v.   Evans,   12   S.   Dak. 
473,   81  N.  W.  893;    Hoge  v.   P.   117 
111.  46;   6  N.  E.  796;    Steinmeyer  v. 
P.    95    111.    388;    S.    v.    Pugsley,    75 
Iowa,  744,  38  N.  W.   498,  8  Am.   C. 
R.   108. 

77*  Shaw  v.  P.  81  111.  150;  Waters 
v.  P.  172  111.  371,  50  N.  E.  148;  Ad- 
ams v.  P.  179  111.  637,  54  N.  E.  296. 

78  Adams     v.     P.     179     111.     638, 
54   N.   E.   296. 


§  250  ERRORS.  246 

doubtful  the  law  should  be  accurately  stated  in  the  giving  of  in- 
structions.70 Where  the  facts  are  close  or  doubtful  it  is  error  to 
refuse  specific  instructions  applicable  to  the  evidence,  although 
the  court  may  have  given  general  instructions  on  all  the  issues.80 
Thus,  where  there  is  evidence  tending  to  show  accord  and  satis- 
faction, but  there  is  some  uncertainty  touching  the  question  of 
acceptance  and  room  for  controversy,  the  court,  in  such  state  of 
the  case,  should  clearly  and  accurately  state  what  constitutes  an 
acceptance.81 

7»  Waters  v.  P.  172  111.  375,  50  N.          so  Roberts   v.    S.    114    Ga.    450,    40 

E.  148;  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Dough-  S.  E.  297. 

erty,    170    111.'    379,    48    N.    E.    1000;          si  Troy    Min.    Co.    v.    Thotaas,    15 

Swift  &  Co.   v.   Rutkowski,  187  111.  S.  Dak.  238,  88  N.  W.  106. 
159,   47   N.   E.   362;    Volk  v.  Roche, 
70  111.  299. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

IN  CRIMINAL  CASES. 

Sec.  Sec. 

HOMICIDE.  259.    Defendant  first  in  the  wrong, 

but  abandons  the  conflict. 

251.  Degree  determined  by  jury.          *™-    TDutv  of  defendant  to  retreat. 

252.  Degree  -  Erroneous  instruc-      26L     Instructions   when  allegations 

tion-Harmless  error.  Tand  Proof  vary- 

253.  Instructions    when    degree    is      262-     Instructions    when    arrest    is 

doubtful.  unlawful. 

254.  "Cooling  time"— When  a  ques-      263-     Killing    mere    trespasser— In- 

tion  of  law.  structions. 

255.  Self-defense     —     Instructions      2^.    Motive-Instructions. 

proper  and  improper.  2&5-    Mutual    combat— Instructions. 

256.  Self    defense — Instructions    on 

belief  and  appearances.  BURGLARY  AND  LARCENY. 

257.  Instructions  on  threats  of  de-      265a.    Possession  of  stolen  property 

ceased.  — Instructions. 

258.  Provoking  difficulty — Freedom      266.    Presumption  as  to  possession 

from  fault.  is  one  of  fact. 

Homicide. 

§  251.  Degree  determined  by  jury. — Under  an  indictment  for 
murder,  the  defendant,  if  guilty  at  all,  may  be  convicted  of 
murder,  or  the  included  crime  of  manslaughter,  and  the  law 
makes  it  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  con- 
viction should  be  for  the  one  or  the  other.  In  such  case  the 
court  cannot  say  to  the  jury  by  instruction  that  if  certain  facts 
(enumerating  them)  are  true  they  should  find  the  defendant 
guilty  of  murder.  The  jury  should  be  left  free  to  determine 
the  degree  of  guilt.1  Hence  to  instruct  the  jury  that  if  they  find 

i  Panton  v.  P.  114  111.  509,  2  N.  E.  501;    S.    v.    Oakes,    95    Me.    369,    50 

411;    Lynn  v.  P.  170  111.   537,  48  N.  Atl.    28.     Contra:      Anderson    v.   U. 

E.  964;  McCoy  v.  P.  175  111.  224,  51  S.  18  U.  S.  689;  S.  v.  Nelson  (Minn.), 

N.   E.  777.     See  Schwabacher  v.   P.  97  N.  W.  655.     See  "Included  Crim- 

165    111.    624,    46    N.    E.    809;    P.    v.  inal  Offenses."     Chap  XIV. 
Holmes,    111    Mich.    364,    69    N.    W. 

247 


IN   CRIMINAL   CASES.  248 

from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  shot  and  killed  the  de- 
ceased after  the  latter  was  disarmed  he  is  guilty  of  murder, 
is  error  under  a  statute  requiring  the  jury  to  determine  the 
degree  of  guilt,  in  that  it  invades  the  province  of  the  jury  on 
that  question.2  But  an  instruction  which  properly  recites  all 
the  elements  of  the  crime  of  murder  may  direct  the  jury  to 
find  the  defendant  guilty  of  murder  if  all  the  elements  of  mur- 
der have  been  established  by  the  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt.8 

§  252.    Degree — Erroneous    instruction    harmless    error. — The 

giving  of  an  erroneous  instruction  applicable  only  to  the  charge 
of  murder  is  but  harmless  error  where  the  defendant  is  con- 
victed of  manslaughter,  the  jury,  in  legal  effect,  having  acquitted 
him  of  murder.4  Also  where  an  instruction  which  is  clearly 
erroneous  as  to  the  charge  of  murder  in  the  first  degree  is  ap- 
plicable to  that  degree  only,  the  error  committed  in  giving  it 
could  do  no  harm  in  case  the  verdict  rendered  is  for  a  lower 
degree,  unless  it  in  some  manner  contributed  in  producing  the 
verdict  thus  rendered.5  An  error  committed  in  the  giving  of 
instructions  on  the  law  as  to  the  punishment  for  manslaughter, 
if  the  jury  should  find  the  defendant  guilty  of  that  crime,  af- 
fords no  ground  to  complain  of  error  in  that  respect  where  the 

2  Gafford  v.   S.  125  Ala.  1,  28  So.  should    find    him    guilty    of    man- 

406.      See    Ragland"   v.    S.    Ill    Ga.  slaughter,    write    "guilty    of    man- 

211,   36  S.  E.   682;    Smith  v.   P.   142  slaughter,"  is  proper.     S.  v.  Owens, 

111.  123,  31   N.  E.  599;   Brown  v.  S.  44  S.   Car.   324,   22  S.  E.  244;    S.  v. 

109  Ala.  70,  20  So.  103;   S.  v.  Lock-  Faile,  43  S.  Car.  52,  20  S.  E.  798. 

lear,  118  N.  Car.  1154,  24  S.  E.  410;  *  Belt  v.   P.   97   111.   469    (malice) ; 

S.  v.  Gadberry,  117  N.  Car.  811,  23  Baxton  v.  S.  157  Ind.  213,  61  N.  E. 

S.   E.    477.     It  has   been   held   that  195.     See  S.  v.  Gates,  130  Mo.  351, 

where    the    accused    asked    an    in-  32  S.  W.  971,  holding  the  same  rule 

struction  which  precluded  the  jury  applicable    to    larceny,    having   the 

from    finding    him    guilty    of    mur-  included   offense  petit  larceny, 

der  in  the  second  degree  or  of  man-  5  McCoy  v.,  S.  40  Fla.  494,  24  So. 

slaughter  in  either  degree,  but  con-  485;   Rains  v.  S.  152  Ind.  69,  52  N. 

fined  them  to  a  conviction  of  mur-  E.  450  (malice) ;  S.  v.  Robertson,  54 

der  in  the  first  degree  or  not  guilty,  S.   Car.   147,  31  S.   E.   868   (malice), 

it  was  properly  refused,   Swope  v.  See,   also,   Blackwell   v.   S.    33   Tex. 

S.  115  Ala.  40,  22  So.  479.  Cr.    App.    278,    32    S.    W.    128;    Rut- 

s  Carle  v.  P.  200  111.  494,  66  N.  E.  ledge  v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    33   S. 

32,  93  Am.  St.  208.     On  a  trial  for  W.  347;    Tigerina  v.  S.  35  Tex.   Cr. 

murder  an  instruction  directing  tne  App.  302,  33  S.  W.  353;   Jackson  v. 

jury  that  if  they  find  the  defendant  S.  91  Wis.  253,  64  N.  W.  838  (rape 

guilty  of  murder  they  should  state  and  fornication), 
in  their  verdict  "guilty,"  and  if  they 


249  DEGREE  WHEN  DOUBTFUL.  §    253 

jury  have  found  the  defendant  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first 
degree  and  fixed  his  puninshment  at  death.6 

The  court  in  charging  the  jury  as  to  the  law  of  murder  in 
the  second  degree  does  not  err  by  defining  murder  in  the  first 
degree  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the  jury  a  better  understanding 
of  the  meaning  of  murder  in  the  second  degree,  where  the  charge 
also  advises  the  jury  that  the  defendant  is  not  on  trial  for 
murder  in  the  first  degree.7  Also  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment 
for  manslaughter  it  is  not  improper,  in  charging  the  jury,  to 
define  murder  in  its  various  degrees,  and  justifiable  homicide 
also,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the  jury  a  proper  understand- 
ing of  the  meaning  of  manslaughter.8  In  Missouri  it  has  been 
held  to  be  reversible  error  in  a  murder  case,  where  a  conviction 
was  had  for  manslaughter,  to  give  instructions  on  the  law  of 
manslaughter,  where  the  evidence  conclusively  showed  that  the 
defendant,  if  guilty  at  all,  was  guilty  of  nothing  but  murder 
in  the  first  degree.9  Also  where  there  is  no  evidence  tending 
to  prove  any  crime  except  murder  in  the  first  degree,  it  is  error 
for  the  court  to  give  an  instruction  defining  murder  in  the  sec- 
ond degree.10 

§  253.  Instructions  when  degree  is  doubtful. — If  there  be  a 
reasonable  doubt  whether  the  evidence  shows  the  defendant  to 
be  guilty  of  murder  or  manslaughter,  the  jury  should  give  him 
the  benefit  of  such  doubt  and  find  him  guilty  of  the  lesser  rather 
than  the  greater  crime,  and  an  instruction  so  directing  them  is 
proper  when  given  in  connection  with  other  instructions  to  ac- 
quit entirely  if  the  evidence  fails  to  establish  his  guilt  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt.11  But  the  failure  of  the  court  to  instruct 
that  if  the  jury  are  in  doubt  as  to  which  degree  the  defendant 

e  Smith  v.  Com.  17  Ky.  439,  31  S.  v.  Berchine,  168  Pa.  St.  603,  32  Atl. 

W.  724.  109.  Contra:  S.  v.  Meyer,  58  Vt. 

7  McQueen  v.  S.  103  Ala.  12,  15  457,  3  Atl.  195,  7  Am.  Cr.  R.  434. 

So.  824.  US.  v.  Mason,  54  S.  Car.  240,  32 

sWeightnovel  v.  S.  (Fla.),  35  So.  S.  E.  357;  Danghrill  v.  S.  113  Ala. 

862.  7,  21  So.  378.  See  Stone  King  v.  S. 

9  S.   v.    Punshon,  124   Mo.   448,   27      118   Ala.    68,   24   So.    47.     See,    also, 
S.  W.  1111.  Newport  v.  S.  140  Ind.  299,  39  N.  E. 

10  S.  v.  Mahley,  68  Mo.  315,  3  Am.  926;   Mullins  v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R. 
Cr.  R.  184;  Bugg  v.  Com.  18  Ky.  L.  2433,  67  S.  W.  824;   Payne  v.   Com. 
R.  844,  38  S.  W.  684.     Instructions  1  Mete.   (Ky.),  370;   S.  v.  Anderson, 
as  to  the  different  degrees  of  homi-  86  Mo.   309;    P.  v.   Chun  Heong,  86 
cide    held    sufficient:     Hamilton    v.  Cal.  329,  24  Pac.  1021;  Clark  v.  Com. 
S.  62  Ark.  543,  36  S.  W.  1054;  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1029,  63  S.  W.  740. 


§  254  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.  250 

is  guilty,  they  should  convict  him  of  the  lower  degree,  is  not 
material  error  where  the  evidence  shows  the  killing  to  have  been 
wilful  and  the  instructions  clearly  define  murder  and  man- 
slaughter in  their  several  degrees.12  A  charge  that  "if  upon 
the  whole  case  you  have  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  defendant 
having  been  proved  guilty,  or  if  you  find  him  guilty,  but  have 
a  reasonable  doubt  from  the  evidence  as  to  whether  he  has  been 
proved  guilty  of  murder  or  manslaughter,  then  you  will  find 
him  guilty  of  manslaughter,"  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  literally 
directs  the  jury  to  find  the  accused  guilty  of  manslaughter  if, 
upon  the  whole  case,  they  have  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his  guilt 
of  any  offense.13  But  the  doubt  as  to  the  degree  of  the  homicide 
should  be  a  reasonable  doubt,  not  a  "doubt."14 

§254.  "Cooling  time" — When  a  question  of  law. — The  court 
may,  as  a  matter  of  law,  instruct  that  the  defendant  had  suffi- 
cient cooling  time  after  being  provoked  to  a  heat  of  passion, 
where  the  evidence  clearly  warrants  the  instruction,  and  that 
in  such  case  an  unlawful  killing  would  not  be  reduced  to  man- 
slaughter.15 

§255..    Self-defense — Instructions  proper  and  improper. — The 

refusal  to  give  instructions  properly  requested,  embracing  the 
law  of  self-defense,  is  error  when  there  is  any  evidence,  though 
slight,  upon  which  to  base  them;16  or  the  giving  of  instruc- 
tions submitting  the  theory  of  the  prosecution  which  ignores 

12  S.  v.  Wells,  54  Kas.  161,  37  Pac.  S.  125  Ala.  40,  28  So.  78;  Enlow  v. 

1005.  S.  154  Ind.  664,  57  N.  E.  539;   P.  v. 

is  Smith   v.    Com.   108  Ky.   57,   55  Zigouras,   163   N.   Y.    250,   57   N.   E. 

S.  W.  718.  465;    Lofton   v.    S.    79   Miss.   723,   31 

i*  S.    v.   May,   172   Mo.    630,   72   S.  So.  420;   Blalock  v.  S.  79  Miss.  517, 

W.  918;  S.  v.  Anderson..  86  Mo.  309;  31    So.    105;    Teel    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr. 

Watson  v.  S.  83  Ala.  60,  3  So.  411.  App.),  67  S.  W.  531;  Trabue  v.  Com. 

IB  Ragland    v.     S.     125     Ala.    534,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  2135,  66  S.  W.  718;  Bar- 

27    So.    983.      See   Thomas   v.    S.    42  tay  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  67  S.  W. 

Tex.  Cr.  App.  386,  56  S.  W.  70.  See  416;  Ter.  v.  Baca  (N.  Mex.),  71  Pac. 

Smith  v.   S.  103  Ala.  4,  15  So.   843.  460.     See  McClurg  v.   Com.   17  Ky. 

ie  Kirk  v.  Ter.  10  Okla.  46,  60  Pac.  L.  R.  1339,  36  S.  W.  14  (instructions 

797;   Johnson  v.  S.  75  Miss.  635,  23  held  as  favorable  as  warranted  by 

So.  579;  Chapman  v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cr.  the  evidence);   Brown  v.  S.  9  Neb. 

App.   135,   57   S.   W.   965;    Lynch   v.  157,    2   N.   W.   378.     Held   improper 

S.   41   Tex.  Cr.   App.   510,   57  S.  W.  statement     of     the     law     of     self- 

1130;  Morris  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  402,  46  defense,   Mahaffey   v.   Ter.    (Okla.), 

S.   W.   491;    Polks   v.    S.    (Tex.   Cr.  69  Pac.  342. 
App.),  58  S.  W.  98;   Washington  v. 


251  ON    SELF    DEFENSE.  §    255 

the  evidence  tending  to  prove  self-defense,  is  error.17  Thus,  when 
the  testimony  of  the  defendant  shows  that  'the  deceased  raised 
his  gun  and  the  defendant  then  shot  him,  this  is  sufficient  to 
entitle  the  defendant  to  instructions  on  self-defense,  although 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  deceased  actually  pointed  the  gun 
towards  the  defendant.18 .  And  where  the  evidence  shows  that 
the  deceased  and  others  made  an  attack  on  the  defendant  with 
sticks  and  clubs,  he  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed  on 
the  law  of  self-defense.19 

But  applying  the  general  rule  that  instructions  are  improper 
unless  there  is  evidence  to  support  them,  if  there  is  no  evidence 
tending  to  prove  self-defense,  then  instructions  on  the  law  of 
such  defense  are  improper.20  And  where  the  evidence  clearly 
and  conclusively  shows  that  the  killing  was  not  done  in  self- 
defense,  it  is  not  improper  to  so  state  to  the  jury  by  instruc- 
tion.21 Thus,  where  the  evidence  for  the  prosecution  tends  to 
prove  murder,  and  the  defendant's  that  he  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  commission  of  the  crime,  instructions  on  self-defense 
are  not  applicable.22  The  refusal  of  the  court  to  instruct  on 
the  law  of  self-defense  affords  no  ground  to  complain  of  error 
where  the  defendant  and  his  father  both  testified  that  the  mortal 
blow  was  inflicted  by  the  latter,  although  the  evidence  for  the 

IT  Sullivan  v.   S.   80  Miss.   596,  32  Colo.   206,  60  Pac.   485;   Hays  v.   S. 

So.  2;   Eaverson  v.  S.  73  Miss.  810,  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  57  S.  W.  835;   Tu- 

19  So.  715.  dor  v.  Com.  19  Ky.  L.  R.  1039,  43  S. 

is  Bedford  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  W.    187;    Johnson   v.    S.    100    Tenn. 

477,  38  S.  W.  210.     See  Enright  v.  254,   45    S.   W.    436;    Lonkster  v.    S. 

P.    155    111.    32,    35,    39    N.    E.    561;  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  603,  56  S.  W.  65; 

Gables  v.  S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  68  S.  S.  v.  Byrd,  52  S.  Car.  480,  30  S.  E. 

W.  288.  482;    S.  v.   Craine,  120  N.   Car.   601, 

is  Allen  v.  U.  S.  157  U.  S.  675,  15  27   S.   E.   72;    Danforth   v.    S.    (Tex. 

Sup.  Ct.  720.  Cr.    App.),    69    S.   W.    159;    Ulun   v. 

20  Justice  v.   Com.    20  Ky.   L.   R.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),   32    S.   W.   699; 

386,  46  b.  W.  499;   S.  v.  Davis,  104  Walters  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App    388 

Tenn.  501,  58  S.  W.  122;  Cannon  v.  35   S.   W.    652. 

S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  56  S.  W.  351;  Na-  21  s.   v.    O'Neil,    58   Minn.    478,    59 

varro  v.   S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),   43   S.  N.  W.  1101. 

W.  105;  Leach  v.  S.  99  Tenn.  584,  42  22  Kidwell  v.  S.  35  Tex    Cr    App 

S.    W.    195;    S.   v.    Hyland,    144   Mo.  264,   33   S.   W.   342. 

302,  46  S.  W.  195;  Kairn  v.  S.  (Tex.  It  has   been   held   that   it  is   not 

Cr.  App.),  45  S.  W.  703;  P.  v.  How-  material    error    to    instruct   on    the 

ard,  112  Cal.  135,  44  Pac.  464;   Irby  doctrine    of    imperfect    self-defense, 

v.  S.  95  Ga.  467,  20  S.  E.  218;  Jack-  though  self-defense  was  not  raised 

son  v.  Com.  98  Va.  845,  36  S.  E.  487;  as  an  is-sue  on  the  trial,  Gonzales 

Harmanson   v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  v.    S.    (Tex.    Or.    App.),   29    S     W. 

42  S.  W.  995;    S.  v.  Black,  143  Mo.  1091. 
166,   44   S.  W.   340;    Nilan  v.   P.   27 


§  256  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.  252 

prosecution  tended  to  prove  that  the  defendant  committed  the 
homicide.23  So  where  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  the 
deceased  did  not  attempt  to  assault  or  harm  the  defendant  a 
charge  on  the  law  of  self-defense  is  properly  refused.24 

§  256.    Self-defense — Instructions  on  belief  and  appearances. 

When  a  person  is  assailed  or  assaulted  in  such  manner  as  to 
induce  in  him  a  reasonable  and  well-grounded  belief  (and  he 
honestly  believes)  that  he  is  actually  in  danger  of  losing  his 
life  or  suffering  great  bodily  harm,  he  may  then  act  in  defend- 
ing himself,  although  it  may  afterwards  turn  out  that  the  danger 
was  not  real,  but  only  apparent;  and  the  court  should  instruct 
the  jury  accordingly  where  the  evidence  tends  to  support  such 
belief.25  A  mere  belief,  however,  unsupported  by  evidence,  is 
not  sufficient  to  justify  one  in  acting  in  self-defense,  and  an  in- 
struction so  informing  the  jury  is  proper.  Such  an  instruction 
is  not  subject  to  the  criticism  that  it  withdraws  from  the  jury 
the  consideration  of  the  right  of  self-defense  where  the  law  on 
that  subject  is  properly  given  in  other  instructions.26  Accord- 
ingly it  is  not  error  to  instruct  that  if  the  circumstances  of 
the  killing  were  such  as  to  produce  in  the  mind  of  the  defendant, 
or  that  of  any  reasonably  prudent  person  situated  as  he  was,  the 
impression  that  he  could  save  his  own  life  or  escape  serious 
bodily  harm  only  by  killing  the  deceased,  such  killing  was  justi- 
fiable unless  the  defendant  provoked  the  difficulty  with  intent 
to  kill  the  deceased.27 

An  instruction  on  the  law  of  self-defense  which  deprives  the 
defendant  from  acting  on  such  appearance  of  danger  as  would 
cause  a  reasonable  man  to  act  under  like  circumstances  is  fatally 
defective  and  prejudicial.  The  defendant  is  not  required  to 

23  McDaniel  v.   S.   100  Ga.   67,  27  low    v.    S.    154    Ind.    664,    57   N.    B. 
S.   E.   158.  539;    Hollingsworth    v.    S.    156    Mo. 

24  Brown   v.    Com.    20   Ky.    L.    R.  178,    56   S.   W.    1087;    Steinmeyer   v. 
1552,  49  S.  W.  545;  S.  v.  Craine,  120  P.  95  111.  389;   Steiner  v.  P.  187  111. 
N.  Car.  601,  27  S.  E.  72.     Where  it  245,  58  N.  E.  383.     See  Hughes  Cr. 
appears  from  the  evidence  that  the  Law,   §  2442;    Presser  v.   S.   77  Ind. 
deceased  was  a  man  of  bad  reputa-  274;  Bryant  v.  S.  106  Ind.  509,  7  N. 
tion  the  court  may  properly  charge  E.  217. 

the  jury  that  the  unlawful  killing  20  s.  v.   Cochran,   147  Mo.  504,  49 

of  a  bad  man  is  a  crime,  the  same  S.  W.  558.     See  Com.  v.  McGowen, 

as  it  is  an   offense  to  kill   a  good  189  Pa.  St.  641,  42  Atl.  365. 

man,  S.   v.   Anderson,  126  Mo.   542,  27  Addington   v.    U.    S.    165    U.    S. 

29   S.   W.   576.  184,  17  Sup.  Ct.  288      See  Bell  v.  S. 

2r.  Campbell   v.   P.   16   111.   17;    En-  115  Ala.  25,  22  So.  526. 


253  ON  SELF-DEFENSE — BELIEF,  APPEARANCE.  §    257 

show  that  the  killing  was  "absolutely  necessary."  He  may  act 
from  appearances.28  So  an  instruction  which  states  that  it  must 
appear  that  the  danger  was  so  urgent  and  pressing  that  in  order 
to  save  life  or  prevent  great  bodily  harm  the  killing  was  abso- 
lutely necessary  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  holds  the  defendant  to 
actual  and  positive  danger  and  deprives  him  of  the  right  of 
acting  upon  appearances.29  A  charge  that  if  the  defendant  killed 
the  deceased,  honestly  believing  that  his  own  life  was  in  jeopardy, 
or  that  he  was  in  imminent  danger  of  receiving  serious  bodily 
injury,  and  that  he  used  no  more  force  than  was  reasonably 
necessary  to  protect  himself,  then  the  killing  was  justifiable, 
correctly  states  the  law  of  self-defense.30  Also  a  charge  that  if 
the  defendant  killed  the  deceased,  but  at  the  time  of  the  killing 
the  deceased  made  an  attack  on  him,  which  caused  the  defendant 
to  have  reasonable  expectation  or  fear  of  death  or  serious  bodily 
injury,  and  acting  under  the  influence  of  such  reasonable  ex- 
pectation or  fear,  he  killed  the  deceased,  the  jury  should  acquit 
him,  is  proper.31  But  it  must  appear  that  the  party  killing 
acted  under  the  influence  of  such  fear,  and  not  in  a  spirit  of 
revenge.32 

§  257.  Instructions  on  threats  of  deceased. — Evidence  that 
the  deceased  had  previously  threatened  the  defendant  is,  under 
some  circumstances,  very  material  in  determining  whether  the 
defendant  in  good  faith  acted  under  a  just  fear  of  danger  to 
his  life  :33  and  it  is  error  for  the  court,  in  charging  the  jury  in 
reference  to  such  threats,  to  ignore  the  evidence  relating  there- 
to.34 Thus  an  instruction  that  "a  mere  threat  is  not  sufficient, 
that  the  mere  drawing  of  a  weapon  or  show  of  a  weapon  is  not 
sufficient,"  is  erroneous  where  there  is  evidence  that  the  de- 
ceased actually  made  threats  and  drew  a  deadly  weapon  on 
the  defendant.35 

28  Enright    v.    P.    155    111.    35,    39          si  Price    v.    S.    36    Tex.    Cr.    App. 
N.    E.    561;    S.    v.    Rolla,    21    Mont.      403.    37    S.    W.    743. 

582,   55  Pac.  523.     See  S.  v.  Carter  32  Keaton  v.  S.  99  Ga.   197,  25  S. 

(Wash.),   45  Pac.   745;    S.   v.   Miller  E.  615. 

(Ore.),  74  Pac.  660;  S.  v.  Castle,  133  33  Powell  v.  S.  1.9  Ala.  581;  Lingo 

N.   Car.   769,  46  S.  E.  4.  v.  S.  29  Ga.  470;    S.  v.  Gushing,  17 

29  Roach    v.    P.    77    111.    30;    S.    v.  Wash.   544,  50  Pac.  512. 

Carter  (Wash.),  45  Pac.  745.  s*  Johnson   v.    S.    105   Ga.    665,   31 

sop.   v.    Piper,    112   Mich.   644,   71      S.    E.   399. 
N.  W.  174.  ss  Johnson   v.    S.    106    Ga.    665,   31 


§  258  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.  254 

Telling  the  jury  that  "a  fear  growing  out  of  and  only  sup- 
ported by  mere  words,  threats,  menaces  or  contemptuous  ges- 
tures is  not  the  fear  which  would  justify  or  excuse  another  for 
committing  a  homicide,"  is  improper  where  it  appears  from  the 
evidence  that  the  deceased  cut  him  with  a  knife.30  So  a  charge 
that  former  threats  made  by  the  deceased  to  kill  the  defendant 
cannot  excuse  the  defendant  for  killing  the  deceased  if  there  is 
nothing  indicating  a  deadly  design  against  the  defendant  at  the 
time  of  the  killing,  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  omits  all  reference 
to  the  conduct  of  the  deceased,  showing  an  intention  to  carry 
out  his  former  threat  at  the  time  of  the  killing.37  The  fact  that 
the  deceased  had  made  threats  against  the  defendant  (and  of 
which  the  defendant  had  been  informed)  does  not  warrant  the 
giving  of  an  instruction  that  such  threats  may  be  considered 
by  the  jury  as  tending  to  show  that  the  defendant  killed  the 
deceased  through  malice  or  ill  will.38 

§  258.  Provoking  difficulty — Freedom  from  fault. — The  accus- 
ed has  not  the  right  to  provoke  a  quarrel,  take  advantage  of  it  and 
slay  his  enemy  and  then  justify  the  killing  on  the  ground  of 
self-defense.  He  must  be  wholly  free  from  fault  in  bringing  on 
the  difficulty.39 

But  the  burden  is  not  on  the  defendant  to  show  that  he  was 
free  from  fault  in  bringing  on  the  difficulty;  and  an  instruction 
which  denies  the  defendant  the  right  of  self-defense  unless  he 
shows  himself  free  from  fault  is  therefore  erroneous.40 

If  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  defendant  was 
in  the  wrong  in  bringing  on  the  difficulty,  then  to  instruct  on  that 

S.  E.  399;  Gafford  v.  S.  (Miss.),  47  S.  W.  799;  Mitchell  v.  S.  (Tex. 
24  So.  314  (timidity  or  fear).  See  Cr.  App.),  41  S.  W.  816  (not  en- 
Bryant  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  47  titled  to  instructions  on  man- 
S.  W.  373.  slaughter). 

so  Gumming  v.   S.   99   Ga.   662,   27          4°  Lewis  v.  S.  120  Ala.  339,  25  So. 

S.  E.  177.  43.     An   instruction   that  to  entitle 

37  Thompson   v.   U.   S.   157   U.    S.  the    defendant   to    an    acquittal    he 

271,  15  Sup.  Ct.  73.  must  have  been  "entirely  free  from 

ss  Allison  v.  U.  S.  160  U.  S.  203,  fault  in  bringing  on  the  difficulty" 

16  Sup.  Ct.  252.  is  not  improper,  as  the  word  "en- 

39  Hughes  v.  P.  116  111.  330,  6  N.  tirely"  exacts  no  higher  degree  of 

E.  55;  Adams  v.  P.  47  111.  379;  Kin-  fault  than  free  from  fault:     Ellis 

ney  v.  P.  108  111.  527;   Crawford  v.  v.  S.  120  Ala.  333,  25  So.  1;  Bell  v. 

S.   112   Ala.   1,   21   So.   214;    Hughes  S.  115  Ala.  39,  22  So.  530;  Crawford 

v.  S.  117  Ala.  25,  23  So.  677;  Welch  v.   S.   112  Ala.  29,  21  So.   223.     See 

v.  S.  124  Ala.  41,  27  So.  306;  Jack-  Dennis   v.    S.    118   Ala.    72,    23    So. 

son   v.    Com.    98   Va.    845,    36    S.   E.  1002. 
487;   S.  v.  Pennington,  146  Mo.  27, 


255  PROVOKING  DIFFICULTY — FAULT.  §    259 

subject  is  error.41  But  on  the  other  hand,  where  there  is  evi- 
dence tending  to  show  that  the  defendant  was  at  fault,  the  court 
may,  by  proper  instructions,  submit  the  question  to  the  jury.42 

It  follows  that  where  the  evidence  is  clear  and  undisputed 
that  the  defendant  provoked  the  difficulty  which  resulted  in  the 
homicide,  he  is  not  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed  on  the 
law  of  self-defense.43 

Where  there  is  no  evidence  to  justify  the  killing  of  another, 
the  court  may  properly  refuse  to  instruct  on  the  law  of  justifica- 
tion, although  the  evidence  may  be  sufficient  to  reduce  the  charge 
from  murder  to  manslaughter.  For  example,  if  a  husband  kill 
his  wife  while  she  is  in  the  act  of  adultery,  the  law  regards  the 
provocation  sufficient  to  reduce  the  crime  from  murder  to  man- 
slaughter, but  not  sufficient  to  justify  the  homicide.44 

§  259.    Defendant  first  in  wrong,  but  abandons  the  conflict. 

If  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  though  orig- 
inally in  the  wrong  in  bringing  on  the  difficulty  with  the  de- 
ceased, in  good  faith  had  abandoned  the  conflict  and  declined 
any  further  struggle,  then  in  that  ease  he  would  have  the  right 
to  act  in  self-defense,  and  the  court,  on  proper  request,  should 
not  refuse  to  instruct  the  jury  accordingly.45  Thus  an  instruc- 

41  Cornelius  v.  Com.  23  Ky.  L.  R.      134  Ala.   1,   32   So.   704.     See  Long- 
771,  64  S.  W.  412;  McCandless  v.  S.      acre  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  41  S.  W. 
42  Tex.   Cr.  App.  58,  57  S.  W.   672;       621. 

Grayson   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),   57  44  S.    v.    Cancienne     50    La.    Ann. 

S.    W.    808;    Stell    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.  847.  24  So.   134.     But  see  Morrison 

App.),  58  S.  W.  75;   Williams  v.  S.  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  519,  47  S.  W. 

(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  69  S.  W.  415;  Com.  369  (statute  makes  the  killing  justi- 

v.  Hoskins.  18  Ky.  L.  R.  59,  S5  S.  W.  fiable) ;  Giles  v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

284.     See  Winters  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  561,  67   S.  W.   411.     Instructions  in 

App.   582,  40   S.  W.   303;    Cooper  v.  the   following   cases   were   held    er- 

S.  80  Miss.  175,  30  So.  579;   Pollard  roneous    in    not    properly    present- 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  73  S.  W.  953;  ing    the     question     of     "free    from 

Harris  v.  S.  36  Ark.  127.  fault"  or  who  was  at  fault  in  bring- 

42  Ter.  v.  Gonzales  (N.  Mex.),  68  ing  on  the  difficulty:    Gibson  v.  S. 
Pac.    928;    Tate   v.    S.    35    Tex.    Cr.  (Miss.),  17  So.  892;  Mosely  v.  S.  107 
App.  231,  33  S.  W.  121;   Carleton  v.  Ala.   74,   17   So.   932;    P.   v.   Palmer, 
S.   43  Neb.  373,  61  N.  W.  699    (cir-  105  Mich.  568,  63  N.  W.  656;    Line- 
cumstantial    evidence    will    support  han   v.   S.   113  Ala.   70,   21   So.   497; 
such    instruction).     See  Jackson   v.  Bell  v.   S.   115  Ala.   25,  22   So.   526; 
S.  106  Ala.  12,  17  So.  333   (defend-  S.  v.  Davis,  52  W.  Va.  224,  43  S.  E. 
ant   killed   a   third   person  by   mis-  99;    Hensen    v.    S.    114    Ala.    25,    22 
take).  So.   127. 

43  Kilgore   v.    S.    124    Ala.    24,    27  45  Young  v.  Com.  19  Ky.  L.  R.  929, 
So.   4.     See   Carleton  v.   S.   43  Neb.  42   S.  W.   1141;    Stevenson  v.   U.   S. 
373,  61  N.  W.  699.    See  Mann  v.  S.  86  Fed.   106;    P.   v.   Newcomer,   118 


§    2()0  IN    CRIMINAL    CASES.  25G 

tion  that  ''even  if  the  defendant  had  been  the  assailant,  if  he 
had  really  and  in  good  faith  endeavored  to  decline  any  further 
struggle  before  the  homicide  was  committed,  the  killing  might 
be  justifiable  in  self-defense/'  is  proper.40  An  instruction  un- 
supported by  any  evidence  given  on  the  assumption  or  theory 
that  the  defendant  was  originally  in  the  wrong,  and  sought 
the  deceased  for  the  purpose  of  provoking  a  quarrel,  and  which 
ignores  the  plea  of  self-defense,  is  erroneous.47 

§  260.  Duty  of  defendant  to  retreat — In  some  jurisdictions 
the  ancient  doctrine  prevails  that  the  accused  is  bound  to  re- 
treat and  in  good  faith  decline  the  combat,  if  he  can,  before 
he  will  be  permitted  to  invoke  the  law  of  self-defense  as  a 
justification  for  killing  another.48  And  where  this  doctrine  is 
recognized  as  the  law  it  is  proper,  in  charging  the  jury,  to 
instruct  that  the  defendant  must  avoid  the  danger  by  flight,  if 
he  can,  before  he  has  the  right  to  act  in  ^elf-defense.49 

But  it  is  error  to  give  such  an  instruction  applying  this  rule 
to  the  defendant,  if  he  was  a  peace  officer  at  the  time  of  the 
difficulty,  acting  in  his  official  capacity;50  and  by  the  very  latest 
expression  of  the  supreme  court  of  Illinois  it  has  no  application  to 
any  other  person  who  is  not  in  the  wrong  and  is  unlawfully 
attacked  in  a  place  where  he  has  a  right  to  be.51 

Cal.    263,    50   Pac.    405;    S.    v.    Hig-  (Del.),  487,  41  Atl.  190,  4  Blackstone 

gerson,  157  Mo.  395,  57  S.  W.  1014;  Comm.   185. 

Irvine  v.  S.  104  Tenn.  132,  56  S.  W.  49  Stevens  v.   Com.   20  Ky.    L.   R. 

845.     See  S.  v.  Medlin,  126  N.  Car.  544,  47  S.  W.  229.     Compare:     S.  v. 

1127,  36  S.  E.  344;  S.  v.  McCann,  16  Rolla,    21    Mont.    582,    55    Pac.    523. 

Wash.    249,    47    Pac.    443,    the    evi-  See,   also,   Scroggins  v.   S.   120  Ala. 

dence   was   that   the   defendant   did  369,  25  So.  180;   Bell  v.  S.  115  Ala. 

not   decline   further   struggle.  25,  22  So.  526.     See  Mann  v.  S.  134 

46  p.  v.  Simons,  60  Cal.  72;   P.  v.  Ala.  1,  32  So.  704;  S.  v.  McCann,  16 

Rush.  65  Cal.  129,  3  Pac.  590,  5  Am.  Wash.   249,  49  Pac.  216;    Gafford  v. 

Cr.  R.  463.  S.  122  Ala.  54,  25  So.  10  (assuming 

it  Bow  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  481,  could    not   retreat). 

31  S.  W.  170;    S.  v.  Smith,  125  Mo.  ™  Lynn   v.   P.   170   111.   536,   48  N. 

2.   28   S.   W.   181;    Cline  v.   S.    (Tex.  E.  964. 

Cr.  App.),  28  S.  W.  684.     See  Ham-  ^  Hammond    v.    P.    199    111.    173, 

mond    v.    P.    199    111.    173,   64   N.   E.  64  N.  E.  980;  Miller  v.  S.  74  Ind.  1; 

980.  Presser  v.   S.  77   Ind.  274;    Story  v. 

**  Davison  v.  P.  90  111.  231;   S.  v.  S.   99  Ind.   413;    Plummer  v.   S.   135 

Spears,  46  La.  Ann.  1524,  16  So.  467,  Ind.   308,  34  N.   E.   968;    Page  v.   S. 

9  Am.  Cr.  R.  624;   S.  v.  Rheams,  34  141  Ind.  236,  40  N.  E.  745.     In  the 

Minn.  18,  24  N.  W.  302,  6  Am.  Cr.  decision  referred  to  we  find  the  fol- 

R.    540;     S.    v.    Warren,    1    Marv.  lowing  language:  "The  ancient  doc- 


257          RETREAT — ALLEGATIONS  AND  PROOF  VARY.        §  261 

§  261.  Instructions  when  allegations  and  proof  vary. — So 
where  the  evidence  tends  to  show  that  the  deceased  may  have 
met  his  death  by  other  means  than  by  the  hands  of  the  accused, 
as  by  suicide,52  by  accident,53  at  the  hands  of  a  third  person 
without  the  aid  or  procurement  of  the  accused,54  or  by  a  blow 
instead  of  by  poisoning,55  or  that  death  was  the  result  of  a 
disease  instead  of  the  wound  alleged,  or  operation  on  such 
wound,56  the  refusal  of  instructions  properly  presenting  such  de- 
fense is  error.57 

Thus  where  the  evidence,  though  conflicting,  tends  to  show 
that  while  the  deceased  was  standing  at  the  bar  in  a  saloon, 
and  on  calling  attention  to  a  revolver  lying  on  the  back  of 
the  bar,  the  bar-keeper  picked  it  up  and,  pointing  it  at  the 
deceased,  shot  and  killed  him;  that  the  revolver  was  accidentally 
discharged  while  handing  it  across  the  bar  to  show  it  to  the 
deceased,  and  that  the  defendant  and  deceased  had  always  been 
good  friends,  the  giving  of  instructions  as  to  intentional  shoot- 
ing and  gross  carelessness,  and  refusing  to  instruct  as  to  whether 
or  not  the  killing  was  accidental,  is  material  error.58 

trine  of  the  common  law  that  the  52  s.  v.  Kerns,  47  W.  Va.  266,  34 

right  of  self-defense  does  not  arise  S.    E.    734;    Bennett   v.    S.    39    Tex. 

until  every  effort  to  escape  even  to  Cr.  App.  639,  48  S.  W.  61;  Garner  v. 

retreating  until  an  impassable  wall  S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),   77   S.   W.   798. 

or    something   of    that   nature   has  See   Com.   v.    Mudgett,    174   Pa.    St. 

been  reached,  has  been  supplanted  211,  34  Atl.  588. 

in    America    by    the    doctrine    that  53  Fitzgerald  v.  S.  112  Ala.  34,  20 

a   man   if   unlawfully    assaulted    in  So.  966;  Wooten  v.  S.  99  Tenn.  189, 

a  place  where  he  has  a  right  to  be,  41  S.  W.  813;   Allison  v.  U.  S.  160 

and  put  in  danger,  real  or  reason-  U.  S.  203,  16  Sup.  Ct.  252.    See  S.  v. 

ably  apparent  of  losing  his  life,  or  Carey,  15  Wash.  549,  46  Pac.  1050. 

receiving  great  bodily  harm,  is  not  ^  s.  v.   White,  10  Wash.   611,  39 

required     to     endeavor     to     escape  Pac.  160;   Sander  v.  S.  134  Ala.  74, 

from  his  assailant,  but  may  stand  32   So.   654. 

his    ground    and    repel    force    with  ^  Lewis   v.    Com.    19    Ky.    L.    R. 

force,    even    to    the   taking   of   the  1139,  42  S.  W.  1127. 

life   of   his<   assailant,    if   necessary  56  Garner   v.   S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 

for  the  preservation  of  his  own  life  77   S.   W.    798. 

or  to  protect  himself  from  receiv-  s?  P.  v.  Seaman,  107  Mich.  348, 
ing  great  bodily  harm,"  Hammond  65  N.  W.  203,  evidence  that  the  de- 
v.  P.  199  111.  173,  64  N.  E.  980.  But  ceased  aborted  from  natural  causes, 
where  both  parties  are  at  fault  ss  Fitzgerald  v.  S.  112  Ala.  34,  20 
neither  can  justify  the  taking  of  So.  906;  Wooten  v.  S.  99  Tenn.  189, 
life  without  retreating,  and  the  in-  41  S.  W.  813  (deceased  fell).  See 
struction  should  use  this  qualify-  Hayden  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R.  274, 
ing  statement  or  its  equivalent:  45  S.  W.  886  (no  evidence  of  reek- 
Deal  v.  S.  140  Ind.  354,  39  N.  E.  less  or  careless  use  of  weapon).  A 
930;  Deilks  v.  S.  141  Ind.  23.  40  N.  charge  that  "if  it  is  possible  to 
E.  120.  account  for  the  death  of  the  de- 


§  262  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.  258 

§  262.  Instructions  when  arrest  is  unlawful. — A  person  has 
a  right  to  resist  an  unlawful  arrest,  and  may  defend  himself 
against  assaults  made  upon  his  person  by  an  officer  or  other  per- 
son seeking  to  arrest  him  illegally  and  without  color  of  authority ; 
and  where  the  evidence  tends  to  prove  that  the  deceased  was 
killed  under  such  circumstances,  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  have 
the  jury  instructed  on  the  law  of  self-defense.59  Where  the  evi- 
.dence  tends  to  show  that  the  accused  did  not  know  that  his  arrest 
was  sought  for  a  lawful  purpose,  an  instruction  on  murder  al- 
leged to  have  been  committed  while  resisting  a  lawful  arrest  is 
erroneous  in  omitting  such  knowledge.00 

§  263.  Killing  mere  trespasser. — Instructions. — Mere  trespass 
will  not  justify  the  taking  of  human  life ;  such  extreme  measures 
cannot  be  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  removing  a  trespasser 
from  one's  premises.  The  giving  of  instructions,  therefore,  tend- 
ing to  lead  the  jury  to  believe  that  one  may  lawfully  kill  a  tres- 
passer is  improper.  Thus,  where  the  killing  was  the  result  of 
the  contentions  of  the  accused  and  deceased  as  to  the  ownership 
and  right  to  occupy  a  tract  of  land  it  is  error  for  the  court  to 
instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  rights  or  claims  of  the  contending 
parties  to  the  land.61  In  another  case  where  the  homicide  was 
the  result  of  a  dispute  between  the  defendant  and  deceased, 
arising  from  the  refusal  of  the  former  to  shut  a  gate  after 
passing  through  it,  on  a  road  extending  through  land  owned  by 
the  father  of  the  deceased,  it  was  held  error  to  instruct  on  the 
unlawfulness  of  passing  through  gates  and  leaving  them  open.62 

§  264.  Motive — Instructions. — While  it  is  always  proper  to 
show  motive  for  the  commission  of  the  crime  of  murder,  the 
prosecution  is  not  bound  to  do  so,  motive  not  being  an  indis- 

ceased  on  any  reasonable  hypothe-  v.    S.   41   Tex.   Cr.   App.   510,   57   S. 

Bis  other  than  that  of  the  guilt  of  W.  1130.     See  Murphy  v.  S.  36  Tex. 

the  defendant"  the  jury  should  do  Cr.  App.  24,  35  S.  W.  174. 

po,   renders   it  unnecessary  to  give  so  3.    v.    Phillips,    118    Iowa,    660, 

an  instruction  on  the  theory  as  to  92  N.  W.  876.     See,  also,  Plummer 

whether    the    deceased    may    have  v.  S.  135  Ind.  308,  34  N.  E.  968. 

met  his  death  by  a  fall,  S.  v.  Oarey,  ei  Utterback  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R. 

15  Wash.  549,  46  Pac.  1050.  1515,  49  S.  W.  479.  See  Hughes  Cr. 

5»  Hardin  v.   S.  40  Tex.   Cr.   App.  Law,  §  13. 

208,  49  S.  W.  607;  Hill  v.  S.  35  Tex.  62  s.  v.  Vaughan,  22  Nev.  285,  39 

Cr.  App.  371,  33  S.  W.  1075;  Lynch  Pac.  733. 


259  MOTIVE — BURGLARY  AND  LARCENY.  §    265 

pensable  element  of  the  crime;  and  the  court,  in  charging  the 
jury,  may  so  instruct  them.63  But  in  the  absence  of  an  instruc- 
tion having  been  given  for  the  prosecution  on  the  subject,  the 
defendant  is  not  entitled  to  instructions  based  on  the  absence 
of  motive.64  But  where  the  court  instructs  for  the  prosecution 
that  motive  of  the  accused  to  commit  the  crime  charged  is  not 
a  necessary  element  of  guilt,  then  the  refusal  to  instruct  for  the 
defendant  that  the  absence  of  a  probable  motive  is  a  circum- 
stance in  favor  of  the  accused,  is  error.65 

An  instruction  that  a  motive  is  difficult  to  prove ;  that  no  one 
can  lay  bare  the  secrets  of  the  mind;  that  there  may  have  been 
a  concealed  motive,  although  impossible  to  prove,  is  improper  as 
allowing  the  jury  to  imagine  a  motive.66 

§  265.  Mutual  combat — Instructions. — The  giving  of  instruc- 
tions on  the  law  of  mutual  combat  is  proper  where  the  evi- 
dence tends  to  prove  a  voluntary  agreement  to  fight.67  Thus, 
where  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  and 
prosecuting  witness  voluntarily  fought  with  each  other  for  the 
purpose  of  settling  their  disputes,  an  instruction  as  to  mutual 
combat  is  proper  in  the  trial  of  an  assault  with  intent  to  kill, 
and  it  matters  not  who  commenced  the  assault.68  Also  where 
the  evidence  shows  that  the  defendant  and  deceased  were  in 
an  altercation  threatening  to  kill  each  other,  and  that  each  went 
his  way  and  procured  a  weapon  and  they  again  met,  and  that 
the  defendant  then  shot  and  killed  the  deceased,  an  instruction 
on  the  theory  as  to  whether  the  defendant  voluntarily  engaged 
the  deceased  in  deadly  conflict  is  proper.69  On  the  other  hand, 
if  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  prove  mutual  combat,  instruc- 
tions on  that  theory  are  improper.  Thus,  where  the  evidence 

esHotema    v.    United    States    186  S.  105  Ga.  736,  32  S.  B.  125;   Kol- 

U.  S.  413,  22  Sup.  Ct.  895;  Wheeler  ler  v.   S.   36  Tex.   Or.   App.    496,   38 

v.    S.    158   Ind.    687,    63    N.   E.    975;  S.  W.  44.     See  Parks  v.   S.  105  Ga. 

S.  v.  Crabtree,  170  Mo.  642,  71  S.  W.  242,  31  S.  E.  580;  Red  v.  S.  39  Tex. 

127.  Cr.  App.  414,  46  S.  W.  408;  Davis  v. 

e*  S.  v.  Brown,  168  Mo.  449,  68  S.  114  Ga.  104,  39  S.  E.  906;  S.  v. 

S.  W.  568.  Turner,  63  S.  Car.  548,  41  S.  E.  778; 

es  S.  v.  Foley,  144  Mo.  600,  46  S.  Dorsey  v.  S.  110  Ga.  331,  35  S.  E. 

W.  733.  651  (proper  as  to  voluntary  man- 
es P.  v.  Enwright,  134  Cal.  527,  slaughter). 

66  Pac.  726.  es  Wallis  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  40 

67  Harmanson  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  S.  W.  794. 

App.),   42   S.   W.   995;    Glover  v.   S.         eg  Roller  v.   S.   36  Tex.    Cr.   App. 

105  Ga.  597,  31  S.  E.  584;  Roark  v.  496,  38  S.  W.  44. 


§  265a  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.  260 

shows  that  the  defendant  was  forced  into  a  fight  by  the  de- 
ceased against  defendant's  will,  and  that  defendant  was  com- 
pelled to  act  in  self-defense,  such  an  instruction  should  not  be 
given.70 

Burglary  and  Larceny. 

§265a.  Possession  of  stolen  property — Instructions. — In  some 
jurisdictions  where  burglary  and  larceny  have  been  committed 
at  the  same  time  by  one  and  the  same  act,  the  person  found 
in  possession  of  the  stolen  property  soon  after  the  burglary  with- 
out giving  any  reasonable  explanation  of  how  he  came  into  pos- 
session of  it,  then  such  possession  is  prima  facie  proof  that  he 
committed  the  burglary  as  well  as  the  larceny.71  According 
to  this  principle  it  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  "the 
possession  of  stolen  property  soon  after  the  commission  of  a  theft 
is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  guilt  of  the  person  in  whose  pos- 
session it  is  found,  and  is  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction,  un- 
less the  other  evidence  in  the  case  or  the  surrounding  circum- 
stances are  such  as  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  of  such  guilt."72 

A  charge  that  "where  property  has  been  stolen  and  recently 
thereafter  the  same  or  any  part  thereof  is  found  in  the  pos- 
session of  another,  such  person  is  presumed  to  be  the  thief, 
and  if  he  fails  to  account  for  his  possession  of  such  property 

70  Maines  v.   S.  35  Tex.  Cr.   App.      Porterfield  v.   Com.   91  Va.   801,   22 
109,  31  S.  W.  667;  Jordan  v.  S.  117      S.   E.    352.     See   S.   v.   Bryant,    134 
Ga.   405,   43   S.  E.   747;    Guerrero  v.      Mo.   246.  35  S.  W.  597. 

S.    39   Tex.   Cr.   App.   662,   47   S.   W.  "  Hughes   Grim.   Law,    §  451,   cit- 

655.  ing  Keating  v.  P.  160  111.  483,  43  N. 

71  S.   v.   La  Grange,  94  Iowa,   60,  E.  724;    Gunther  v.  P.   139  111.   526, 
62  N.  W.  664;   S.  v.  Ham,  98  Iowa,  28    N.    E.    1101;    Comfort    v.    P.    54 
60,  66  N.  W.  1038;  Magee  v.  P.  139  111.    404;    Campbell    v.    S.    150    Ind. 
111.    140,    28    N.    E.    1077;    Langford  74;   49  N.  E.  905;    Gablick  v.  P.  40 
v.    P.    134    111.    444,   25   N.    E.    1009;  Mich.  292,  3  Am.  Cr.  R.  244;    S.  v. 
Smith  v.  P.  115  111.  17,  3  N.  E.  733;  Kelley,  57  Iowa,  644,  11  N.  W.  635; 
S.  v.  Prahm,  73  Iowa,  355,  35  N.  E.  S.   v.   Brady    (Iowa),  97  N.  W.   64; 
451,  7  Am.  Cr.  R.  134;  S.  v.  Wilson,  Brooks   v.    S.   96   Ga.    353,   23   S.   E. 
137    Mo.    592,    39    S.    W.    80;    S.    v.  413,  10  Am.   Cr.   R.   136,  and  many 
Rivers,  68  Iowa,  611,  27  N.  W.  781;  other  cases.     See  Hix  v.  P.  157  111. 
Branson  v.  Com.  92  Ky.  330,  13  Ky.  382,   41   N.   E.   862.     Contra:    White 
L.  R.  614;  P.  v.  Wood,  99  Mich.  620,  v.    S.    21    Tex.    App.    339,    17    S.   W. 
58   N.   W.   638;    Mangham  v.   S.   87  727;  P.  v.  Chadwick,  7  Utah,  134,  25 
Ga.    549,    13    S.    E.    558;    Taylor   v.  Pac.  737;  Harper  v.  S.  71  Miss.  202, 
Ter.    (Ariz.),    64   Pac.    423.   Contra:  13  So.   882;   Galloway  v.  S.  Ill  Ga. 
Dobson    v.    S.    46    Neb.    250,    64    N.  832,  36  S.  E.  63,  and  other  cases. 
W.    956.     Contra,   as   to   burglary: 


261  POSSESSION  OF  STOLEN  PROPERTY.  §    266 

in   a   manner   consistent   with   his   innocence   this   presumption 
becomes  conclusive  against  him,"  is  proper.73 

The  refusal  to  give  the  following  instruction  for  the  defendant, 
was  held  to  be  error,  especially  where  an  instruction  on  the  same 
subject  was  given  for  the  prosecution:  "If  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant  bought  the  property  and  paid 
for  it,  and  his  purchase  was  open  and  public,  unconnected  with 
any  suspicious  circumstances  of  guilt,  that  is  a  satisfactory  ac- 
count of  his  possession  of  the  property,  and  removes  all  presump- 
tion of  guilt  growing  out  of  his  possesion  thereof."74 

§  266.    Presumption  as  to  possession  is  one  of  fact. — But  the 

•presumption  that  the  person  found  in  possession  of  recently 
stolen  property  is  the  thief,  is  not  a  presumption  of  law,  but 
one  of  fact.  There  is  no  legal  rule  on  the  subject;  but  much 
depends  on  the  nature  of  the  property  stolen  and  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case.  Such  presumption  establishes 
no  legal  rule,  ascertains  no  legal  test,  defines  no  legal  terms, 
measures  no  legal  standard,  bounds  no  legal  limits.75 

The  possession  of  stolen  property  by  the  defendant  soon  after 
the  burglary  is  a  circumstance  which  the  jury  may  consider,  to- 
gether with  all  the  other  evidence,  in  determining  whether  the 
defendant  committed  the  burglary.76  Hence  an  instruction  that 
possession  of  recently  stolen  property  is  a  strong  criminating 
circumstance  tending  to  show  guilt,  is  erroneous.  Such  posses- 
sion is  only  a  fact  to  be  considered  with  all  the  other  evidence.77 

73  S.  v.   Kelly,   73  Mo.   608;    S.  v.  76  Whitman  v.  S.  42  Neb.  841,  60 
Henry,    24    Kas.    460;    Shepperd    v.  N.  W.  1025;   Porterfield  v.  Com.  91 
S.   94  Ala.  104,  10  So.  663;   Com.  v.  Va.   801,   22   S.   E.   352;    S.   v.   Bliss, 
McGorty,   114   Mass.   299;    Campbell  27  Wash.  463,  68  Pac.  &7;   Johnson 
v.   S.   150  Ind.   74,  49  N.  E.  905.  v.    S.    148    Ind.    522,    47    N.    E.    926; 

74  Jones  v.  P.  12  111.  259.  Campbell   v.    S.    150   Ind.    74,   49   N. 

75  Hughes     Cr.    Law,    §    452,     cit-  E.   905. 

ing,  Smith  v.  S.  58  Ind.  340,  2  Am.  77  3.    v.    Bliss,    27    Wash.    463,    68 

Cr.   R.   375;    S.  v.  Hodge,  50  N.  H.  Pac.  87.    On  a  charge  of  larceny  an 

510,  3  Greenleaf  Ev.  §31;  S.  v.  Jen-  instruction  as  to  the  failure  of  the 

nett,   88   N.   Car.   665;    Stover  v.   P.  accused    to    explain    his    possession 

56    N.    Y.    317;    Bellamy    v.    S.    35  of    the    property    alleged    to    have 

Fla.   242,   17   So.   560;    Ingalls  v.   S.  been  stolen,  is  improper  in  the  ab- 

48  Wis.  647,  4  N.  W.  785;   Jones  v.  sence  of  any  demand  or  request  for 

S.    26   Miss.   247;    S.   v.   Walker,   41  such  explanation,  Moore  v.  S.  (Tex. 

Iowa,  217,  1  Am.  Cr.  R.  433;   P.  v.  Cr.    App.),    33   S.    W.    980. 
Pagan,  66  Cal.  534,  6  Pac.  394,  and 
other  cases. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


INCLUDED  CRIMINAL  OFFENSES. 


Sec.  Sec. 

267.  Included  offenses — I  n  s  t  r  u  c-      271. 

tions. 

268.  If    no    evidence — Instructions      272. 

properly  refused. 

269.  Homicide — No  evidence  of  in-      273. 

eluded   offenses. 

270.  Evidence   supporting  included      274. 

offense — Instructions. 


No  evidence  of  manslaughter 
— Instructions. 

Manslaughter  —  Instructions 
proper. 

Involuntary  manslaughter — 
Evidence  wanting. 

Instructions  must  be  request- 
ed. 


§267.  Included  offenses — Instructions. — Where  a  defendant 
is  charged  with  a  crime  which  includes  other  offenses  of  an 
inferior  degree,  the  law  of  each  degree  or  included  offense 
which  the  evidence  tends  to  prove  should  be  given  to  the  jury 
by  proper  instructions,  and  the  refusal  to  so  instruct  is  error.1 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  so  fully  instruct  the  jury  upon 
every  degree  and  kind  of  crime  of  which  the  accused  may  be 
convicted,  under  the  indictment,  as  to  give  him  the  benefit  of 
having  the  evidence  considered  by  the  jury  under  a  full  knowl- 
edge of  the  law  as  to  the  essential  characteristics  of  each  kind 
and  degree  of  crime  for  which  a  verdict  may  be  returned  against 
him.2 


i  Curtis  v.  S.  36  Ark.  284;  P.  v. 
Palmer,  96  Mich.  580,  55  N.  W.  994; 
Brookins  v.  S.  100  Ga.  331,  28  S. 
E.  77;  Guy  v.  S.  Ill  Ga.  648,  36  S. 
E.  857;  S.  v.  Mize,  36  Kas.  187;  S. 
v.  Cunningham,  111  Iowa,  233,  82  N. 
W.  775;  S.  v.  Rutherford,  152  Mo. 
124,  53  S.  W.  417;  Picken  v.  S.  115 
Ala.  42,  22  So.  551;  Shaeffer  v.  S.  61 
Ark.  241,  32  S.  W.  679  (petit  lar- 


ceny included  in  grand  larceny) ; 
Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3248,  citing  S. 
v.  Desmond,  109  Iowa,  72,  80  N. 
W.  214;  S.  v.  Lucas,  124  N.  Car.  825, 
32  S.  E.  962;  S.  v.  Estep,  44  Kas. 
572,  24  Pac.  986. 

2  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3243,  citing 
S.  v.  Meyer,  58  Vt.  457,  3  Atl.  195, 
7  Am.  Cr.  R.  435. 


262 


263  WHEN   NO  EVIDENCE  OF   INCLUDED  OFFENSE.  §    268 

Slight  evidence  is  sufficient  upon  which  to  base  instructions 
embracing  the  law  of  inferior  or  included  offenses,  and  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  court  to  instruct  thereon,  notwithstanding  the  weak- 
ness of  the  testimony.3  If  the  testimony  of  the  defendant  alone 
tends  to  prove  an  included  offense,  instructions  should  be  given 
accordingly,  although  his  testimony  is  at  variance  with  that  of 
all  the  other  witnesses.4 

Instructions  which  ignore  or  withdraw  from  the  consideration 
of  the  jury  an  included  offense  are  erroneous  where  the  evidence 
tends  to  prove  the  included  offense.5 

Thus  on  a  charge  of  robbery  there  being  evidence  tending 
to  prove  the  included  crime  of  larceny,  the  giving  of  instruc- 
tions eliminating  or  withdrawing  such  included  offense  is  er- 
ror.6 Also  on  a  charge  of  felonious  assault  which  includes 
simple  assault  or  assault  and  battery,  an  instruction  directing 
the  jury  to  acquit  if  they  are  not  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  defendant  is  guilty  of  felonious  assault  is  im- 
proper.7 

§  268.  If  no  evidence. — Instructions  properly  refused. — Of 
couse,  if  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  tending  to  prove  an  in- 
cluded offense  the  court  may  properly  refuse  to  instruct  thereon.8 
Thus,  on  a  charge  of  assault  with  intent  to  kill,  a  failure  to  in- 
struct on  the  law  of  the  lesser  or  included  offense  of  simple  assault 
is  not  error  where  the  evidence  conclusively  proves  only  the 
crime  of  assault  with  intent  to  kill  or  no  offense  at  all.9 

3S.   v.   Mize,   36   Kas.   187;    Madi-  Parker  v.   S.  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  119, 

son  v.  Com.  13  Ky.  L.  R.  313,  17  S.  49   S.   W.   80;    S.   v.   Fruge,   106   La. 

W.  164;  S.  v.  Elliott,  98  Mo.  150,  11  694,  31  So.  323. 

S.  W.  566.  9  s.    v.    Barton,    142    Mo.    450,    44 

4  S.    v.    Banks,    73    Mo.    592;     S.  .  S.    W.    239;    Barnes   v.    S.    39    Tex. 

v.    Palmer,    88    Mo.    568.      But    see  Cr.  App.  184,  45  S.  W.  495;    Harris 

S.    v.    Turlington,    102    Mo.    642,    15  v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    47    S.    W. 

S.  W.  141.  643;    Honeywell   v.    S.    40    Tex.    Cr. 

s  Uolan  v.   S.   44  Neb.   643,  62  N.  App.  199,  49  S.  W.  586   (aggravated 

W.  1090.  assault);   Ter.  v.  Gatliff  (Okla.),  37 

s  P.   v.    Church,   116   Cal.   300,   48  Pac.   899;    S.     v.     Alcom,    137    Mo. 

Pac.  125.  121,   38   S.   W.   548;    S.   v.   Johnson, 

T  Fleming    v.    S.    107    Ala.    11,    18  129    Mo.    26,    31    S.    W.    339;    S.    v. 

So.  263;  Jackson  v.  S.  (Ala.),  18  So.  Woods,  124  Mo.  412,  27  S.  W.  1114; 

728.  P.    v.    Lopez,    135    Cal.    23,    66    Pac. 

s  S.  v.  Lucas,  124  N.  Car.  825,  32  965;    Wilson  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  App.), 

S.  E.  962;   S.  v.  Sherman,  106  Iowa,  73  S.  W.  964   (aggravated  assault); 

684,   77   N.   W.    641;    S.    v.   Murphy,  Duval  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.),   70  S. 

109  Iowa,  116,  80  N.  W.  305;  Brook-  W.    543    (aggravated    assault), 
ins  v.  S.  100  Ga.  331,  28  S.   E.  77; 


§   269  INCLUDED  CRIMINAL  OFFENSES.  264 

Where  on  a  charge  of  malicious  assault  with  intent  to  kill, 
as  defined  by  statute,  the  defendant  may  be  convicted  of  assault 
wiih  intent  to  kill  without  malice,  as  defined  by  another  section 
of  the  statute,  an  instruction  is  not  defective  in  omitting  to 
state  the  law  on  malicious  or  felonious  intent.10  Also,  if  a  serious 
injury  be  inflicted  by  means  of  a  deadly  weapon  it  is  proper 
*to  refuse  an  instruction  on  simple  assault  which  is  included 
in  a  charge  of  malicious  assault  with  a  deadly  weapon.11  Like- 
wise where  the  evidence  clearly  establishes  the  guilt  of  the 
accused  on  a  charge  of  assault  with  intent  to  maim,  it  is  not 
error  to  refuse  to  instruct  on  assault  and  battery.12 

On  a  charge  of  robbery  if  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  crime 
may  have  been  larceny  instead  of  robbery,  a  failure  to  instruct 
as  to  larceny  is  not  error.13 

Also  under  an  indictment  for  rape  where  the  evidence  conclu- 
sively proves  that  crime,  the  court  may  properly  refuse  to  in- 
struct as  to  the  law  of  assault  with  intent  to  commit  rape.14  But 
under  a  statute  providing  that  the  court  shall  instruct  the  jury 
as  to  the  law  of  assault,  or  assault  and  battery,  on  a  charge  of 
assault  with  intent  to  kill,  it  is  error  to  refuse  to  so  instruct.15 

§269.    Homicide — No  evidence  of    included    offenses. — In    a 

homicide  case  where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  defendant  is 
guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree,  or  not  guilty  of  any  of- 
fense, instructions  requested  on  any  of  the  lower  degrees,  or 
on  manslaughter,  which  are  included  in  the  indictment,  are  prop- 
erly refused.16  The  evidence  having  no  tendency  to  prove  any 

10  S.  v.   Grant,  144  Mo.  56,  45  S.  Pac.  389;  Paynter  v.  Com.  21  Ky.  L. 
W.  1102.  R.  1562,  55  S.  W.  687;  P.  v.  Harris, 

11  S.   v.   Drumm,   156   Mo.   216,   56  103  Mich.  473,  61  N.  W.  871;  Bryant 
S.  W.  1086;   Brantley  v.  S.  9  Wyo.  v.  S.  114  Ga.  861,  40  S.  E.  995   (as- 
102,   61  Pac.   139;   Ford  v.  S.    (Tex.  sault  with  intent  to  rape).    See,  al- 
Cr.  App.),  56  S.  W.  338;  S.  v.  Hig-  so,  S.  v.  Courtemarsh,  11  Wash.  446, 
gerson,  157  Mo.  395,  57  S.  W.  1014;  39  Pac.  955;  Young  v.  Com.  16  Ky. 
Martinez  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  App.),   56  496.   29   S.  W.   439. 

S.   W.  580;   P.  v.  Stanton,  106  Gal.  is  S.   v.   Dolan,   17  Wash.   499,   50 

139,    39    Pac.    525.      Contra:      S.    v.  Pac.  472.     See  P.  v.  Demasters,  105 

Desmond,   109   Iowa,   72,   80   N.   W.  Cal.   669,   39   Pac.   35. 

214.  is  S.    v.    Kornstett,    62    Kas.    221, 

12  S    v.  Akin,  94  Iowa,  50,  62  N.  61  Pac.  805:   Ragland  v.  S.  125  Ala. 
W.  667;  Duval  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  12,  27  So.  983;   S.  v.  Vinso,  171  Mo. 
70  S.   W.  543  576,    71    S.    W.    1034;     Cook    v.    S. 

is  S.  v.  Reasby,  100  Iowa,  231,  69      (Fla.),   35   So.    671    (third    degree); 

N.  W.  451.  S.    v.    Meadows,    156    Mo.    110,    56 

14  P.   v.   Chavez,   103   Cal.   407,   37      S.  W.  878;  Reed  v.  Com.  98  Va.  817, 


265 


HOMICIDE,  WHEN  NO  INCLUDED  OFFENSE. 


269 


other   offense   than  murder   in   the   first   degree,   the   court,   in 
charging  the  jury,  may  restrict  them  to  that  crime.17 

In  Ohio  it  has  been  held  error  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  law 
of  murder  in  the  second  degree  and  on  manslaughter,  where  the 
evidence  has  a  tendency  to  prove  only  murder  in  the  first 
degree,  or  no  crime  at  all.18  Where  the  evidence  tends  to  prove 
murder  of  the  first  degree,  an  instruction  that  the  jury  could  not 
convict  of  that  degree  is  properly  refused.19  So  where  there 
is  no  evidence  tending  to  prove  murder  in  the  second  degree, 
instructions  as  to  that  crime  may  be  refused.20 


36  S.  E.  399;  Cannon  v.  S.  41  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  467,  56  S.  W.  351;  Henry 
y.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  30  S.  W.  802; 
Gafford  v.  S.  125  Ala.  1,  28  So.  406; 
McGrath  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  413, 
34  S.  W.  127;  Hays  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  57  S.  W.  835;  O'Brien  v. 
Com.  89  Ky.  354,  11  Ky.  L.  R.  534, 
12  S.  W.  471;  Baker  v.  S.  Ill  Ga. 
141,  36  S.  W.  607;  Robinson  v.  S.  84 
Ga.  674,  11  S.  E.  544;  Waller  v.  S. 
110  Ga.  250,  34  S.  E.  212;  S.  v.  Cal- 
der,  23  Mont.  504,  59  Pac.  903;  S.  v. 
Hicks,  125  N.  Car.  636,  34  S.  E.  247; 
Stoball  v.  S.  116  Ala.  452,  23  So. 
162;  Clarke  v.  S.  117  Ala.  1,  23  So. 
671;  S.  v.  Musick,  101  Mo.  260,  14 
S.  W.  212;  Wilkerson  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  7  S.  W.  956;  S.  v.  Van 
Tassel,  103  Iowa,  6,  72  N.  W.  497; 
S.  v.  Albright,  144  Mo.  638,  46  S. 
W.  620;  Hart  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
44  S.  W.  1105;  Navarro  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  43  S.  W.  105;  Dancy  v. 
S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  46  S.  W.  247; 
S.  v.  Smith,  102  Iowa,  656,  72  N.  W.' 
279;  Meyers  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
500.  46  S.  W.  817;  S.  v.  Tomasitz, 
144  Mo.  86,  45  S.  W.  1106;  Riddle 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  46  S.  W.  1058; 
Greer  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  45  S.  W. 
12;  P.  v.  Fellows,  122  Cal.  233,  54 
Pac.  830;  P.  v.  Chaves,  122  Cal.  134, 
54  Pac.  596;  P.  v.  Fuhrmann,  103 
Mich.  593,  61  N.  W.  865;  Prewett  v. 
S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  262,  53  S.  W. 
879;  P.  v.  Repke,  103  Mich.  459,  61 
N.  W.  801;  Davis  v.  United  States 
165  U.  S.  373',  17  Sup.  Ct.  360.  See 
Sparf  v.  United  States  156  U.  S.  51, 
15  Sup.  Ct.  273;  Johnson  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  58  S.  W.  105;  Ho-lloway  v. 
S.  156  Mo.  222,  56  S.  W.  734;  S.  v. 


Jackson,  103  Iowa,  702,  73  N.  W. 
467;  Sandoval  v.  Ter.  8  N.  Mex.  573, 
45  Pac.  1125;  Aguilar  v.  Ter.  8  N. 
Mex.  496,  46  Pac.  342;  S.  v.  Pun- 
shon,  124  Mo.  448,  27  S.  W.  1111; 
Jahnke  v.  S.  (Neb.),  94  N.  W.  158; 
S.  v.  Young,  67  N.  J.  L.  223,  57 
Atl.  939;  S.  v.  Dixon,  131  N.  Car. 
808,  42  S.  E.  944;  P.  v.  Beverly,  108 
Mich.  509,  66  N.  W.  379;  S.  v.  Har- 
lan,  130  Mo.  381,  32  S.  W.  997;  S. 
v.  Finley,  118  N.  Car.  1161,  24  S.  E. 
495;  S.  v.  Covington,  117  N.  Car. 
834,  23  S.  E.  337;  Hunt  v.  S.  135 
Ala.  1,  33  So.  329.  No  evidence 
tending  to  reduce  from  murder  to- 
manslaughter.  Sparf  v.  United 
States  156  U.  S.  51,  10  Am.  Cr.  R. 
215,  15  Sup.  Ct.  273;  P.  v.  McNut,, 
93  Cal.  658,  29  Pac.  243;  Clark  v. 
Com.  123  Pa.  St.  555,  16  Atl.  795; 
McClernan  v.  Com.  11  Ky.  L.  R.  301, 
12  S.  W.  148. 

IT  Cupps  v.  S.  (Wis.),  97  N.  W. 
217. 

is  Dresback  v.  S.  38  Ohio  St.  369. 
See  Adams  v.  S.  29  Ohio  St.  414. 

is  S.  v.  Barrett,  132  N.  Car.  1005, 
43  S.  E.  832.  In  this  connection  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  where 
the  jury  are  authorized  by  statute 
to  determine  the  degree  of  guilt, 
the  court  cannot  by  instruction  say 
to  the  jury  that  if  certain  enum- 
erated facts  are  established  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  the  defendant 
is  guilty  of  murder,  it  being  the 
province  of  the  jury  to  determine 
the  degree  of  guilt  if  the  accused  is 
guilty  of  any  offense.  See  cases 
cited  under  §  251. 

20  Beard  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
173,  53  S.  W.  348;  S.  v.  Baker,  14& 


INCLUDED  CRIMINAL  OFFENSES.  266 

The  court  is  not  bound  to  instruct  on  any  included  degree 
of  murder  where  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  prove  such 
included  crime;  especially  is  this  true  if  the  party  complaining 
makes  no  request  for  such  instructions.21  Thus,  for  example, 
where  the  evidence  shows  that  a  husband,  charging  his  wife 
in  the  grossest  terms  with  improper  conduct,  struck  her  and 
shot  her  to  death,  without  provocation,  while  she  was  pleading 
for  mercy,  and  then  seized  and  shot  his  child,  he  was  not  en- 
titled to  instructions  on  murder  in  the  second  degree.22  So  under 
an  indictment  charging  murder  while  in  the  act  of  committing 
rape,  an  instruction  charging  that  murder  in  the  second  degree 
and  manslaughter  are  not  included  in  such  charge,  and  that 
in  case  the  accused  is  convicted  the  verdict  should  be  for  murder 
in  the  first  degree,  is  proper.23 

The  killing  of  a  person  while  the  accused  is  attempting  to 
commit  the  crime  of  robbery  is  murder,  as  defined  by  statute 
in  some  of  the  states;  and  an  instruction  on  murder  in  the 
second  degree  in  such  case  may  be  refused.2*  In  charging  the 
jury  as  to  the  law  of  murder  under  such  circumstances  it  is  not 
necessary  to  define  robbery.25 

§270.  Evidence  supporting  included  offense — Instructions. 
If  the  evidence,  though  circumstantial,  tends  to  support  the  charge 
of  murder  in  the  second  as  well  as  the  first  degree,  it  is  error 
to  refuse  instructions  as  to  the  law  of  murder  in  the  second 
degree.26  Thus,  where  the  evidence  discloses  that  the  deceased 

Mo.  379,  48  S.  W.  475  (facts  stated) ;  23  Morgan   v.   S.   51   Neb.   672,   71 

Swan  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App;  531,  47  N.  W.  788. 

S.   W.   362;    Leslie   v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  24  s.    v.    Saxton,    147    Mo.    89,    48 

App.),  49  S.  W.  73;  S.  v.  Bronstine,  S.   W.   452;    Aiken  v.   Com.  24  Ky. 

147    Mo.    520,    49    S.    W.    512.      By  L.  R.  523,  68  S.  W.  849;  S.  v.  Young, 

statute     of     Louisiana     the     jury  67  N.  J.  L.  223,  51  Atl.  959  (killing 

should  be  instructed   that  there  is  while    committing    burglary).      See 

no  crime  known  as  "murder  in  the  Wilkins  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  525, 

second   degree,"   but  that  the   jury  34   S.   W.   627. 

may  find  the  accused  guilty  of  man-  25  Ransom  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

slaughter,  S.  v.  Jones,  46  La.  Ann.  70  S.  W.  960. 

1395,  16  So.  369.  2G  Fisher   v.    S.    23   Mont.    540,    59 

21  S.  v.  Meadows,  156  Mo.  110,  56  Pac.    919;    Guerrero   v.    S.    41    Tex. 
S.   W.   878;    Gafford  v.   S.   125   Ala.  Cr.  App.  161,  53  S.  W.  119;  Lancas- 
1.  28  So.  406.    See  P.  v.  Worden,  113  ter  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  31  S.  W. 
Cal.  569,  45  Pac.  844.  515;   S.  v.  O'Reilly,  126  Mo.  597,  29 

22  s.  v.  Duestrow,  137  Mo.  44,  38  S.  W.  577;  S.  v.  Bryant,  55  Mo.  75,  2 
S.   W.   554.  Green  Cr.  R.  612. 


267  EVIDENCE  SHOWING  INCLUDED  OFFENSE.  §  271 

was  found  dead  in  his  wagon,  his  face  cut  and  battered,  and  an 
ax  was  found  in  his  wagon  with  blood  on  it,  and  that  some  flour 
had  been  taken  out  of  the  wagon,  but  there  being  no  evidence 
as  to  how  or  under  what  circumstances  the  killing  was  done, 
it  was  held  error  to  instruct  only  on  murder  in  the  first  degree. 
The  court,  under  the  circumstances,  should  have  also  instructed 
on  the  lower  degrees.27  Also  where  it  appears  from  the  evidence 
that  the  defendant  and  the  deceased  had  had  trouble  in  their 
business  affairs ;  that  the  defendant  followed  the  deceased  with  a 
rifle,  who  had  gone  up  a  certain  trail;  that  soon  after  this  a 
shot  was  heard,  after  which  the  defendant  was  seen  returning 
and  that  the  deceased  was  found  dead  from  a  rifle  bullet,  a 
failure  to  instruct  as  to  the  lower  degree  of  murder  was  held 
error,  it  being  for  the  jury  to  determine  the  degree  of  the  homicide 
in  the  event  of  a  conviction.28  And  in  some  jurisdictions  the 
court  should  instruct  as  to  the  lower  degree,  whether  requested 
to  do  so  or  not,  where  the  evidence  warrants  the  giving  of  such 
instructions.-0  And  the  court  should  instruct  on  murder  in  the 
second  degree  where  the  evidence  is  entirely  circumstantial  no 
one  knowing  how  the  killing  was  done.30 

In  Kentucky  the  court  should  instruct  as  to  the  law  of  mur- 
der, manslaughter  and  justifiable  homicide  in  case  the  evidence 
is  wholly  circumstantial.31  In  Utah  it  has  been  held  proper  to 
instruct  as  to  all  the  degrees  of  murder,  no  matter  whatever 
may  be  the  evidence.33 

§  271.  No  evidence  of  manslaughter — Instructions. — Where 
there  is  no  evidence  whatever  tending  to  prove  manslaughter 
in  any  degree  as  defined  by  statute,  the  court  may  properly 
refuse  to  instruct  as  to  such  included  crimes.33  And  if  there 
is  no  evidence  whatever  tending  to  prove  manslaughter,  the 

27  Aguilar  v.  Ter.  8  N.  Mex.  496,          si  Ratchford  v.  Com.  16  Ky.  L.  R. 
46  Pac.  342.  411,  28  S.  W.  499. 

28  Ter  v.  Padilla,   8  N.  Mex.  510,          32  p.   v.   TMede,  11  Utah,  241,  39 
46  Pac.  346.  Pac.  837. 

29  Ter.  v.  Friday,  8  N.  Mex.  204,          33  s.    v.    Brown,    145    Mo.    680,   47 
42  Pac.  62;  Ter.  v.  Vialpando,  8  N.      S.    W.    789;    S.    v.    Baker,    146    Mo. 
Mex.  211,  42  Pac.  64.  379,  48  S.  W.  475  (facts) ;  S.  v.  Kin- 

so  Bennett  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  dred,    148    Mo.    270,    49    S.    W.    845; 

639,   48   S.   W.    61;    Lancaster    v.    S.  Mills  v.  S.  104  Ga.  502,  30  S.  E.  778; 

(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  31  S.  W.  515;  Aiken  Puller  v.   S.    (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  48  S. 

v.  Com.  24  Ky.  L.  R.  523,  68  S.  W.  W.   183;    Hatcher  v.   S.   43   Tex.   Cr. 

849.  App.   237,  65   S.  W.  97;    Howard  v. 


§   272  INCLUDED  CRIMINAL  OFFENSES.  268 

court  may  properly  instruct  the  jury  that  the  evidence  does 
not  warrant  a  verdict  of  that  crime.34  So  where  the  evidence 
tends  to  prove  murder  the  defendant  cannot  insist  on  limiting 
the  instructions  to  manslaughter.35 

If  the  evidence  shows  that  the  defendant  is  either  guilty  of 
murder,  or  that  he  is  entitled  to  be  acquitted  on  the  ground  of 
self-defense,  then  it  is  improper  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the 
law  of  manslaughter.36  Where  the  evidence  does  not  show  that 
the  homicide  was  the  result  of  a  sudden  quarrel,  or  that  there 
was.  any  reasonable  or  lawful  provocation  for  the  killing,  the 
accused  is  not  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed  on  any  of  the 
degrees  of  manslaughter.37  And  the  court  need  not  instruct 
on  manslaughter  where  the  evidence  proves  either  the  crime  of 
mur,der  while  in  the  act  of  committing  robbery,  or  where  the 
evidence  shows  self-defense.38  In  a  case  where  the  defense  was 
insanity,  the  court  having,  at  the  request  of  counsel  for  the 
accused,  instructed  on  the  law  of  that  defense,  and  the  court 
having  also  given  the  statutory  definitions  of  murder  and  man- 
slaughter, it  was  held  not  to  be  error  to  refuse  an  instruction 
on  manslaughter,  though  correct  as  an  abstract  proposition  of 
law.39  Or  the  defense  being  insanity,  and  the  accused  was  either 
absolutely  insane  or  not  at  all,  instructions  as  to  the  law  of 
murder  of  the  second  degree  may  be  refused.40 

§  272.  Manslaughter — Instructions  proper. — But  if  there  is 
any  evidence  having  a  tendency  to  support  the  included  crime 
of  manslaughter  it  is  error  to  refuse  to  instruct  the  jury  as  to 
the  law  of  manslaughter.41  If  a  person,  while  resisting  an  il- 

S.  115  Ga.  244,  41  S.  E.  654;   S.  v.  39  Reighard  v.   S.   22   Ohio  C.   C. 

Diller,   170  Mo.  1,  70  S.  W.  139;    S.  340. 

v.    Gurley,   170   Mo.    429,   70   S.   W.  40  Jarvis  v.  S.  70  Ark.  613,  67  S. 

875;    S.    v.    Hall,    168    Mo.    475,    68  W.  76. 

S.  W.  344.  41  Horton  v.  S.  110  Ga.  739,  35  S. 

34  Genz  v.  S.   58  N.  J.  L.  482,  34  B.  659;  Dorsey  v.  S.  110  Ga.  331,  35 

Atl.  816.  S.   E.    651    (mutual   combat);    S.   v. 

ss  S.    v.    Tighe,   27   Mont.    327,    71  Lucey,   24   Mont.    295,   61   Pac.   994; 

Pac.  3.  Folks  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  58  S.  W. 

36  Franklin  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  98;   Sumner  v.  S.  109  Ga.  142,  34  S. 
625,  31  S.  W.  643;  May  v.  S.  94  Ga.  E.  293;  Hollingsworth  v.  S.  156  Mo. 
76;  20  S.  E.  251.  178,    56    S.    W.    1087;    Beckharn    v. 

37  S.   v.    May,   172   Mo.   630,   72   S.  S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),   69   S.   W.   534; 
W.  918.  Stevenson  v.  U.  S.  162  U.  S.  313,  16 

ss  Little  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  Sup.  Ct.  839;  Compton  v.  S.  110 
654,  47  S.  W.  984.  Ala.  24,  20  So.  119;  S.  v.  Weak- 


269  HOMICIDE — MANSLAUGHTER  INCLUDED.  §    273 

legal  arrest,  kill  the  officer  who  thus  seeks  to  arrest  him,  the 
crime  is  usually  manslaughter,  and  not  murder.  In  such  case 
the  accused  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  fully  instructed  on  the 
law  of  manslaughter.42 

Where  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  while  the  deceased 
and  the  defendant  were  having  an  altercation,  the  deceased  struck 
the  defendant  in  the  mouth;  that  they  were  then  separated, 
and  that  soon  afterwards  the  deceased  approached  the  defend- 
ant apparently  intending  to  assault  him;  and  that  the  evidence 
was  conflicting  as  to  whether  he  did  assault  or  strike  the  de- 
fendant, an  instruction  on  manslaughter  under  such  state  of  facts 
is  proper.43  So  under  an  indictment  charging  murder  by  the 
administration  of  poison,  evidence  of  the  general  reputation  of 
the  defendant  for  peace  and  good  order  which  tends  to  raise 
a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  criminal  intent,  is  sufficient  foun- 
dation for  the  giving  of  instructions  as  to  the  included  crime  of 
manslaughter.44  So,  also,  if  the  evidence  tends  in  any  manner 
to  establish  the  crime  of  voluntary  manslaughter,  then  an  in- 
struction as  to  that  offense  is  proper.45 

§  273.  Involuntary  manslaughter — Evidence  wanting. — Where 
the  evidence  shows  that  the  homicide  was  either  murder 
in  the  first  degree  or  the  second  degree,  or  that  the  killing  was 
done  in  self-defense,  the  court  niay  properly  refuse  instructions 
as  to  the  crime  of  voluntary  manslaughter.47  But  where  no  one 

ly    (Mo.),    77    S.    W.    527     (fourth  42  Lynch   v.    S.   41   Tex.    Cr.   App. 

degree);    Pollard    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.  510.-57   S.   W.   1130;    Mooney  v.   S. 

App.),  73  S.  W.  953;   Gardner  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  65  S.  W.  926.     See 

(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  73  S.  W.  13;  Riptoe  Manger    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    69 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  42  S.  W.  381;  S.  W.  145.     Contra:   S.  v.  Edwards, 

Brande    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    45  126  N.  Car.  1051,  35  S.  B.  540;  Com. 

S.  W.  17;  Hudson  v.  S.  101  Ga.  520,  v.  Grether,  204  Pa.  203,  53  Atl.  753. 

28  S.  E.  1010;  Horton  v.  S.  110  Ga.  43  Castra   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.). 

739,    35    S.    E.    659;    Fendrick   v.    S.  40  S.  W.  985. 

39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  147,  45  S.  W.  589;  44  3.  v.  Ellsworth,  30  Ore.  145,  47 

Reddick  v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),   47  Pac.  199. 

S.  W.  993;  Franklin  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  45  Horton    v.    S.    110   Ga.    739,    35 

App.),   48   S.   W.   178    (facts);    S.   v.  s.  E.  659;  Hatcher  v.  S.  116  Ga.  617, 

Grugin,  147  Mo.  39,  47  S.  W.  1058.  42  S.  E.  1018. 

42  L.  R.  A.  774;   Garrison  v.  S.  147  47  Gafford  v.  S.  125  Ala.  1,  28  So. 

Mo.  548,  49  S.  W.  508;    S.  v.  Dyer,  406;   Baker  v.  S.  Ill  Ga.  141,  36  S. 

139    Mo.    199,    40    S.    W.    768;    S.    v.  E.  607;   Parks  v.  S.  105  Ga.  242,  31 

Shadwell,  26  Mont.  52,  66  Pac.  508;  S.   E.   580;    Pugh  v.    S.    114   Ga.    16, 

Hooper  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  69  S.  39  S.  E.  875.     See  Hollingsworth  v. 

W.   149.  S.   156  Mo.  178,  56  S.  W.   1087. 


§    274  INCLUDED   CRIMINAL   OFFENSES.  270 

saw  the  homicide,  instructions  should  be  given  on  all  the  de- 
grees; also  on  manslaughter.48  Likewise  where  the  evidence 
tends  to  support  manslaughter  of  the  first  degree  only,  or  no 
offense,  the  instructions  may  be  confined  accordingly.49 

The  accused  is  not  entitled  to  instructions  as  to  the  law  of 
involuntary  manslaughter  where  the  evidence  shows  an  inten- 
tional killing  without  provocation  or  justification,  although  he 
in  his  own  behalf  may  state  that  the  killing  was  accidental.50 
And  where  the  evidence  shows  the  case  to  be  either  murder  or 
voluntary  manslaughter,  and  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  tend- 
ing to  establish  involuntary  manslaughter,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
give  instructions  defining  the  latter  crime,  for  to  do  so  would 
be  directing  the  attention  of  the  jury  to  a  principle  of  law  not 
applicable  to  the  facts  of  the  case,  having  a  tendency  to  confuse 
rather  than  to  enlighten  the  jury  on  the  issues.51  And  on  the 
same  principle  where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  accused  is 
guilty  of  either  murder  or  manslaughter,  he  cannot  insist  on 
instructions  as  to  any  included  offense  lower  in  degree  than 
manslaughter.52 

§  274.  Instructions  must  be  requested — The  failure  of  the 
court  to  instruct  on  the  lesser  or  included  offense  is  not  error  in 
the  absence  of  a  request  for  such  instructions.53  So  if  instruc- 
tions on  manslaughter  are  not  requested  there  can  be  no  ground 
for  complaint  that  the  court  did  not  instruct  as  to  that  crime.54 
In  the  absence  of  a  request  for  more  specific  instructions  as  to 
the  included  crime  of  manslaughter  there  is  no  ground  for  com- 
plaint in  that  respect,  the  court  having  charged  the  jury  in 
the  language  of  the  statute  relating  to  manslaughter.55  Or  under 
an  indictment  for  an  attempt  to  commit  rape  the  defendant  must 

48  Aiken  v.  Com,  24  Ky.  L.  R.  523,  Pac.  41;   Reynolds  v.  S.  147  Ind.  3, 
68  S.  W.  849.  46  N.   E.   31;    Miller  v.   P.   23   Colo. 

49  P.   v.   De   Garmo,   76  N.   Y.   S.  95,    46    Pac.    Ill;    Odette    v.    S.    90 
477,   73  App.   Div.   46.  Wis.  258,  62  N.  W.  1054:  Barr  v.  S. 

so  Ewatt  v.  S.  100  Ga.  80,  25  S.  E.  45   Neb.    458,    63   N.   W.    856;    P.    v. 

846.  Arnold,  116  Cal.  682,  48  Pac.  803. 

si  Davis   v.   P.   114   111.   86,   97,   29  54  Allen  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  70 

,N.  E.   192;    S.   v.   Dettmer,   124  Mo.  S.  W.  85;    Tillery  v.  S.  99  Ga.  209, 

426,  27  S.  W.  1117;   Ragsdale  v.  S.  25  S.  E.   170,  the  court  is  not  re- 

134  Ala.  24,  32  So.  674.  quired  to  instruct  on  its  own  mo- 

1     52  s.   v.   Tippet,   94   Iowa,   646,   63  tion. 

N.    W.   445.  ss  Hanye  v.   S.   99  Ga.   212,   25  S. 

53  p.   v.   Barney,   114   Cal.   554,   47  E.  307. 


271 


FAILURE  TO  ASK  REQUESTS. 


274 


request  instructions  on  the  included  offense  of  simple  assault  if 
he  wishes  the  jury  to  consider  that  offense.56  Likewise  on  a 
charge  of  robbery,  if  the  accused  fails  to  ask  instructions  on  the 
included  crime  of  larceny  he  cannot  complain  of  error  that 
the  court  failed  to  instruct  on  larceny.57  That  the  court  failed 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  jury  to  the  fact  that  the  defendant 
surrendered  himself  after  killing  the  deceased  cannot  be  com- 
plained of  as  error,  no  instruction  having  been  requested  on  that 
point.58  And  there  is  no  error  for  a  failure  to  charge  as  to  the 
punishment  for  murder,  whether  by  death  or  by  punishment 
in  the  penitentiary,  in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  such  an  in- 
struction.59 


se  p.   v.  Barney,  114  Cal.   554,  47 
Pac.   41. 

57  Miller  v.  P.  23  Colo.  95,  46  Pac. 
111. 

58  Boston  v.  S.  94  Ga.  590,  21  S. 
E.  603. 

59  S.  v.  Cobbs,  40  W.  Va.  718,  22 
S.    E.    310.      An    instruction    which 
states     the     punishment    for     each 
grade   of   the    different   offenses    is 
sufficient  if  it  describes  or  defines 
each    grade    in    such    manner    that 
the    jury    may    clearly    understand 
which  particular  offense  is  referred 
to  in  the  instructions,  Clark  v.  Com. 
18  Ky.  L.  R.  758,  38  S.  W.  489.  The 
giving  of  instructions  on  murder  in 
the  first  degree   is   harmless  error 


where  under  a  fair  charge  to  the 
jury  the  defendant  is  convicted  of 
murder  in  the  first  degree,  S. 
v.  Alfray,  124  Mo.  393,  27  S.  W. 
1097.  See  Gonzales  v.  S.  35  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  33,  29  S.  W.  1091.  And 
the  giving  of  instructions  as  to  the 
law  of  murder  in  the  second  degree 
where  the  evidence  shows  murder 
only  in  the  first  degree,  is  not  er- 
ror, Johnson  v.  S,  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
4  S.  W.  901.  Nor  is  it  error  to  in- 
struct on  the  law  of  manslaughter 
when  there  is  no  evidence  tending 
to  prove  that  crime,  Goodwin  v. 
S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  46  S.  W.  226, 
See  S.  v.  Cunningham,  111  Iowa, 
233,  82  N.  W.  775. 


CHAPTER  XV. 
DEFINITION  OF  OFFENSES. 

Sec.  Sec. 

275.  Statutory     offenses  —  Instruc-      277.    Enumerating   elements   of  of- 

tions  denning.  fense. 

276.  Elements  omitted.  278.     Deadly  weapon  defined. 

§  275.  Statutory  offenses — Instructions  defining. — The  court,  in 
charging  the  jury,  may  give  the  statutory  definition  of  the  offense 
with  which  the  accused  is  charged,  in  the  exact  words  of  the 
statute;1  but  the  court  is  not  bound  to  do  so.2  If  the  instruc- 
tions embody  all  the  essential  elements  of  the  crime  charged 
that  is  sufficient  without  an  instruction  giving  the  statutory 
definition.3  But  a  departure  from  the  statutory  words  in  de- 
fining a  criminal  offense  or  some  element  thereof  in  giving  in- 
structions, is  error,  unless  the  words  used  are  equivalent  in 
meaning  to  the  statutory  words  defining  the  offense.  Thus,  "or- 
dinary temper  and  courage"  are  not  of  the  same  meaning  as 
the  statutory  words  "ordinary  temper."4  And  instructions  in 
the  language  of  the  statute  defining  a  crime  are  proper,  although 
some  of  the  modes  of  committing  the  offense  as  defined  may 
not  be  involved  in  the  case.5 

1  Duncan  v.  P.  134  111.  110,  24  N.  Tex.    Cr.    App.    400,    37    S.    W.    434; 
E.  765;   Shaw  v.  S.  102  Ga.  660,  29  Currier   v.    S.    157    Ind.    114,    60    N. 
S.   E.   477;    Long  v.   S.   23  Neb.   33,  E.     1023,    wh«ere    the    jury    is   not 
36  N.  W.  310.  charged  with  determining  what  pen- 

2  Carroll    v.    S.    53    Neb.    431,    73  alty  shall  be  imposed   in  case  the 
N.  W.  939.  defendant  is   found   guilty   the    in- 

s  Adkins   v.   S.   41   Tex.   Cr.   App.  structions  .need  not  state  the  penal- 

577,    56   S.    W.    63;    Williams   v.    S.  ty. 

38    Tex.    Cr.'   App.    144,    41    S.    W.  5  p.   v.    Chaves,    122   Cal.    134,    54 

626;    Long  v.   S.  23  Neb.  33,  36  N.  Pac.   596;    Sparks  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr. 

W.   310.  App.   86,  29  S.  W.  264;   P.  v.  Mills, 

*  Gardner  v.  S.  40  Tex.  Cr.   App.  143  N.   Y.  383,  38  N.  E.   456;    P.  v. 

19,   48   S.   W.    170;    Hardy   v.    S.    36  Hughson,   154   N.   Y.   153,   47   N.   E. 

272 


273  OMITTING  ELEMENT  IN  DEFINING.  §    276 

§276.  Elements  omitted. — The  omission  of  a  material  element 
of  an  offense  in  charging  the  jury  on  the  definition  thereof  is 
error.  For  example,  in  defining  perjury  the  omission  from  the 
instruction  of  the  words  ''wilfully  and  corruptly"  renders  the 
instruction  erroneous.6  Or  in  a  larceny  case  omitting  from  an 
instruction  the  element  of  the  value  of  the  property  alleged  to 
have  been  stolen  renders  the  instruction  defective,  the  value 
being  an  essential  element  of  the  offense  charged.7  An  instruc- 
tion intended  as  a  definition  of  larceny  is  fatally  defective  if  it 
omits  the  word  "stealing."8  Also  an  instruction  defining  lar- 
ceny is  fatally  defective  if  it  omits  the  element  of  criminal  in- 
tent.9 

So  an  instruction  which  attempts  to  state  facts  and  circum- 
stances constituting  the  crime  of  assault  with  intent  to  kill,  is 
erroneous  if  it  omits  the  element  of  criminal  intent.10  Or  an  in- 
struction on  receiving  stolen  property,  which  omits  the  intent 
and  purpose  with  which  the  property  was  received  is  erroneous.11 
Or  on  a  trial  for  forgery  an  instruction  stating  that  if  the  de- 
fendant wrote  the  order  introduced  in  evidence,  or  procured  it 
to  be  written,  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  omits  the  element,  "with 
intent  to  defraud."12  Or  in  an  instruction  intended  to  state  the 
essential  elements  of  murder  in  the  first  degree  if  the  words 
•''with  malice  aforethought"  be  omitted  it  is  erroneous.13  So 
where  one  portion  of  a  charge  does  not  properly  or  sufficiently 
state  the  essential  elements  of  the  crime,  the  error  will  not  be 
corrected  although  a  full  or  correct  statement  of  the  law  may  be 
given  in  other  portions  of  the  charge.14 

1002.     Contra:    Whitcomb   v.   S.   30  312,  43  L.  R.  A.  423.     See  Henry  v. 

Tex.    Cr.    App.    269,    17    S.   W.    258;  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  49  S.  W.  96. 

Simons  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  34  S.          "  Goldsberry  v.  S.   (Neb.),  92  N. 

W.  619.  W.    906. 
s  S.    v.    Higgins,    124   Mo.    640,   28          12  Agee  v.   S.   113   Ala.   52,  21  So. 

S.   W.   178;    Hix  v.  P.   157  111.   382,  207;   Sledge  v.  S.  99  Ga.  684    26  S. 

41   N.   E.   862.  E.  756. 

7  Collins  v.  P.  39  111.  233,  239.  is  s.    v.    Shafer,    22    Mont.    17,    55 

s  Hix  v.  P.  157  111.  383,  41  N.  E.  pac.  526;  Tutt  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R. 

862.  492,    46    S.    W.    675;    Bennett    v.    S. 

9  S.   v.    Lockland,   136   Mo.    26,   37  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  639,  48  S.  W.  61; 
S.   W.   812;    S.  v.  Coy,  119  N.   Car.  Burton   v.    S.    107   Ala.   108    18   So. 
901,  26  S.  E.  120;   P.  v.  Hendrick-  284.     See  Bunnell   v.   Com.   17   Ky. 
son,  46  N.  Y.   S.  402,  18  App.   Div.  L.  R.  106,  30  S.  W.  604,  omitting  the 

404.  See    Key    v.    S.    37    Tex.    Cr.      word  "feloniously"  in  defining  mur- 
App.  511,  40  S.  W.  296;  Beabont  v.      der  is  not  material  error. 

S.   37   Tex.   Cr.  App.   515.   40   S.   W.          u  Mells  v.  U.  S.  164  U.  S.  644    17 

405.  Sup.  Ct.  210. 

10  Reed  v.  S.  76  Miss.  211,  24  So. 


§    277  DEFINITIONS  OF  OFFENSES.  274 

§  277.  Enumerating  elements  of  offense. — An  instruction 
which  recites  all  the  essential  elements  or  facts  necessary  to  con- 
stitute the  crime  of  assault  with  intent  to  commit  murder,  and 
which  states  that  if  the  jury  believe  that  such  facts  have  been 
proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  the  defendant  is  guilty  of  as- 
sault with  intent  to  commit  murder,  is  proper.15  An  instruction 
designed  as  a  definition  of  voluntary  manslaughter  stating  that, 
if  the  defendant  took  the  life  of  the  deceased  as  charged  in  the 
indictment,  he  is  guilty,  is  not  objectionable  in  omitting  the  word 
"unlawfully"  before  the  word  "took"  where  the  indictment 
properly  charges  the  unlawful  and  felonious  killing.18 

In  a  homicide  case  an  instruction  stating  that  if  the  defendant 
administered  poison  to  his  wife  and  she  partook  of  it  and  died 
from  its  effects,  that  is  sufficient  to  establish  all  the  elements  of 
the  crime,  is  not  erroneous  where  it  does  not  appear  from  the 
evidence  that  he  gave  her  the  drug  as  a  medicine  to  benefit  her.17 
Also  charging  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  defendant  drew  his  pistol,  and  went  to  the  deceased  and 
struck  him  with  his  fist  and  then  shot  and  killed  him,  they 
might  from  these  facts  infer  that  the  defendant  killed  the  de- 
ceased wilfully  and  with  malice  aforethought,  properly  states 
the  law.18 

And  under  the  statute  of  New  York  an  instruction  which 
properly  defines  murder  in  the  first  degree,  is  not  rendered  erro- 
neous by  embodying  in  it  other  provisions  of  the  statute  relating 
to  homicide  having  no  bearing  on  the  case,  if  the  jury  are  prop- 
erly instructed  that  a  premeditated  design  to  kill  must  be  shown 
in  order  to  warrant  a  conviction.19  Under  the  statute  of  Mis- 
souri an  instruction  stating  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  wilfully, 
premeditatedly  and  of  his  malice  aforethought,  shot  and  killed 
the  deceased,  but  without  deliberation,  they  should  convict  him 
of  murder  of  the  second  degree,  correctly  states  the  law.20 

is  Crowell  v.  P.  190  111.  508,  514,  i»  P.   v.   Hughson,  154  N.   Y.   153, 

60  N.  E.  872.  47  N.  E.  1092.  See  S.  v.  Anderson, 

IB  Shields  v.  S.  149  Ind.  395,  49  10  Ore.  448.  See  Simons  v.  S.  (Tex. 

N.  E.  357.  Cr.  App.),  34  S.  W.  619.  See,  "Stat- 
ic S.  v.  Van  Tassel,  103  Iowa,  6,  utory  Instructions." 

72  N.  W.  497.  20  S.  v.  Bauerle,  145  Mo.  1,  46  S. 

is  Allen  v.  United  States  164  U.  "S.  W.  609.  See  Sullivan  v.  S.  100  Wis. 

492,  17  Sup.  Ct.  164.  283,  75  N.  W.  956. 


275  ENUMERATING   ELEMENTS — DEADLY   WEAPON.  §    278 

§  278.  Deadly  weapon  defined. — Any  instrument  which  is  likely 
to  produce  death  or  serious  bodily  injury  from  the  manner  in 
which  it  is  used  is  a  proper  definition  of  a  deadly  weapon.21  A 
charge  which  defines  a  deadly  weapon  to  be  "  anything  with 
which  death  may  be  easily  and  readily  produced,"  regardless 
of  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  made,  or  whether  it  was  made  or 
not,  is  not  improper.22  An  instruction  stating  that  a  certain  in- 
strument is  a  dangerous  weapon  is  improper  as  invading  the 
province  of  the  jury.23  The  definition  of  "deadly  weapon"  need 
not  be  repeated  in  different  instructions  when  once  given.24 

21  Hardy  v.   S.   36   Tex.   Cr.   App.  22  Acers  v.  U.  S.  164  U.  S.  388,  17 

400,   37   S.   W.   434;    Acers  v.   U.   S.  Sup.  Ct.  91. 

164  U.S.  388,  17  Sup.  Ct.  91;   Mikel  23  Doering  v.  S.  49  Ind.  56. 

v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  68  S.  W.  512;  2*  s.  v.  Smith,  164  Mo.  567,  65  S. 

Toilet  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  55  S.  W.  270  (billiard  cue). 
W.  335. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


CRIMINAL  INTENT. 


Sec. 

279.  Intent  inferred  from  acts  and 

words. 

280.  On  evidence  disproving  intent. 

281.  Drunkenness     disproving     in- 

tent. 


Sec. 

282.  Malice     and      malice     afore- 

thought. 

283.  On   inferring  malice — Improp- 

er. 


§  279.  Intent  inferred  from  acts  and  words. — Every  sane  man 
is  presumed  to  intend  the  natural  and  probable  consequences  of 
his  acts,  and  it  has  been  uniformly  held,  therefore,  that  the 
intent  to  commit  a  criminal  offense  may  be  inferred  from  the 
acts,  words  or  declarations  of  the  person  accused,  as  well  as  from 
the  manner  and  circumstances  of  the  act  committed,1  and  the 
court  in  charging  the  jury  may  instruct  them  accordingly.2  Thus 
an  instruction  that  the  defendant  is  presumed  to  intend  all  the 
natural,  probable  and  usual  consequences  of  his  acts  is  proper, 
especially  when  the  act  is  committed  voluntarily  and  wilfully.3 


i  Crosby  v.  P.  137  111  336,  27  N. 
E.  49;  Fitzpatrick  v.  P.  98  111.  269; 
S.  v.  Kortgaard,  62  Minn.  7,  64  N. 
W.  51;  Weaver  v.  P.  132  111.  536, 
24  N.  E.  571;  Hanrahan  v.  P.  91 
111.  147;  Conn  v.  P.  116  111.  464, 
6  N.  E.  463;  Donaway  v.  P. 
110  111.  333;  Perry  v.  P.  14  111.  496; 
P.  v.  Langton,  67  Cal.  427,  7  Pac. 
.843;  7  Am.  Cr.  R.  439;  S.  v.  Milhol- 
land,  89  Iowa  5,  56  N.  E.  403;  Rosin 
v.  U.  S.  161  U.  S.  29,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
43;  S.  v.  Patterson,  116  Mo.  505, 
22  S.  W.  696;  S.  v.  Barbee,  92  N. 
Oar.  820,  6  Am.  Cr.  R.  180,  3  Green- 


leaf  Ev.  §§  13,  14.  See  S.  v.  Shep- 
pard,  49  W  Va.  582,  39  S.  E.  676, 
instructions  held  erroneous. 

^Krehnavy  v.  S.  43  Neb.  337,  61 
N.  W.  628;  P.  v.  Langton,  67  Cal. 
427,  7  Pac.  843. 

s  Jackson  v.  P.  18  111.  270;  P.  v. 
Langton,  67  Cal.  427,  7  Pac.  843, 
7  Am.  Cr.  R.  439;  Krehnavy  v.  S. 
43  Neb.  337,  61  N.  W.  628;  Achey 
v.  S.  64  Ind.  59  (form);  S.  v.  Wis- 
dom, 84  Mo.  177.  Contra:  Black  v. 
S.  18  Tex.  App.  124;  Rogers  v.  Com. 
16  Ky.  L.  R.  199,  27  S.  W.  813;  P.  v. 
Willett,  36  Hun  (N.  Y.),  500. 


276 


277  INTENT  INFERRED.  §   281 

Also  a  charge  which  in  substance  states  that  if  the  jury  believe 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  wrongful  act  had  been  inten- 
tionally committed,  that  is  prima  facie,  but  not  conclusive  proof, 
of  criminal  intent,  is  proper.*  So  it  is  proper  to  instruct  that 
where  an  assault  is  made  with  a  deadly  weapon  used  in  such  man- 
ner as  to  be  reasonably  calculated  to  destroy  life,  the  criminal 
intent  may  be  inferred.5 

An  instruction  that  "if  the  instrument  used  be  a  deadly 
v  weapon,  the  use  of  it  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  from  a 
felonious  and  malicious  intent,  and  the  defendant  must  excuse  the 
intent  by  proof  or  he  will  be  held  guilty,"  is  inconsistent  and 
contradictory.6  A  charge  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the*  evi- 
dence beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  shot  the 
deceased  in  a  vital  part  and  ^killed  him,  then,  there  being  no  evi- 
dence tending  to  disprove  malicious  intent,  they  should  find  that 
he  intended  to  kill  is  proper.7  But  if  the  evidence  fails  to 
show  any  act  or  statement  tending  to  support  the  inference 
of  criminal  intent  then  an  instruction  as  to  inferring  such  intent 
is  improper  and  erroneous.8 

§  280.  On  evidence  disproving  intent. — Where  there  is  any 
evidence  tending  to  disprove  malicious  or  criminal  intent  it  is 
error  to  refuse  to  submit  to  the  jury  by  proper  instructions 
whether  or  not  such  intent  existed,  especially  where  a  specific 
intent  is  an  element  of  the  crime  charged.9 

§  281.  Drunkenness  disproving  intent. — It  is  not  improper  to 
instruct  on  the  law  as  to  drunkenness  where  it  appears  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant  was  intoxicated  at  the  time  of 
the  alleged  criminal  act.10  At  common  law  voluntary  intoxication, 

4  U.  S.  v.  Folson,  7  N.  Mex.  532,  v.  P.  27  Colo.  206,  60  Pac.  485;  Dor- 

38  Pac.  70.  sey  v.  S.  110  Ga.  351,  35  S.  E.  651. 

s  Voght  v.  S.  145  Ind.  12,  43  N.  E.  s  S.  v.  Kelly   (Vt),  51  Atl.  434. 

1049;    Godwin    v.    S.    73    Miss.    873,  9  Smith  v.  S.  75  Miss.  542,  23  So. 

19  So.  712.  260;    Pena  v.    S.   38   Tex.    Cr.    App. 

a  Armstrong  v.  P.  38  111.  513;  S.  v.  333,  42   S.  W.   991;    Darity  v.   S.  38 

Painter,  67  Mo.  84  (meaningless  and  Tex.    Cr.    App.    546,    43    S.   W.    982, 

absurd).  (specific    intent);    Bailus   v.    S.    16 

7  S.    v.    Silk,    145    Mo.    240,    44    S.  Ohio  C.  C.  227. 

W.  764.     See  S.  v.  Dolan,  17  Wash.  10  Upchurch  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

499,  50  Pac.   472-    Dennis  v.  S.   118  39   S.  W.   371.     See  Maynard  v.   S. 

Ala.  72,  23  So.  1002.    Contra:  Nilan  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  39  S.  W.  667;  P.  v. 

Fish,  125  N.  Y.  136,  26  N.  E.  319. 


§   281  CRIMINAL  INTENT.  278 

as  distinct  from  mania  a  potu,  furnishes  no  excuse,  justifica- 
tion or  extenuation  for  a  crime  committed  under  its  influence.11 
While  drunkenness  is  no  excuse  for  the  commission  of  a  criminal 
offense,  yet  where  a  specific  intent  is  necessary  to  be  proved 
before  a  conviction  can  be  had,  it  is  competent  to  show  that 
the  accused  was  at  the  time  wholly  incapable  of  forming  such 
intent  whether  from  intoxication  or  otherwise.  In  other  words, 
it  is  a  proper  defense  to  show  that  the  accused  was  intoxicated 
to  such  degree  as  rendered  him  incapable  of  entertaining  the' 
specific  intent  essential  to  the  commission  of  the  crime  charged ; 
and  any  instruction  given  to  the  jury  which  deprives  the  accused 
pf  that  defense  is  therefore  improper  and  erroneous.12 

Thus,  an  instruction  stating  that  drunkenness  is  no  excuse 
for  the  commission  of  any  crime  or  misdemeanor,  unless  such 
drunkenness  was  occasioned  by  fraud,  contrivance  or  force  of 
some  other  person  for  the  purpose  of  causing  the  perpetration  of 
an  offense,  and  that  where  the  act  of  the  defendant  would  be 
criminal  if  committed  when  he  was  sober,  the  fact  that  he  com- 
mitted such  act  while  intoxicated  will  constitute  no  defense, 
unless  his  intoxication  was  caused  by  some  other  person  for  the 
purpose  above  stated, — and  this  is  the  rule  even  where  such 
intoxication  is  so  extreme  as  to  make  the  defendant  uncon- 
scious of  what  he  was  doing,  is  erroneous.13  And  where  there 
is  evidence  tending  to  support  such  defense  the  defendant,  on 
making  proper  request,  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed  on 
intoxication.14  On  the  trial  of  a  case  in  which  a  specific  intent 
is  an  essential  element  of  the  crime  charged,  it  is  error  to  refuse 
to  charge  the  jury  that  if  they  entertain  a  reasonable  doubt 
whether  the  defendant  was  sufficiently  sober  to  form  such  intent, 

11  Underbill  Cr.  Ev.  §  164,  citing:  derhill   Cr.   Ev.    §    166,    citing:      S. 
4  Blackstone  Comm.  25,  26;  1  Hale,  v.   Zarn,   22   Ore.   591,   30  Pac.   317; 
P.  C.  32;   Bacon's  Maxims,  Rule  5;  Com.  v.  Hagenlock,  140  Mass.   125, 
Garner  v.  S.  28  Fla.  113,  153,  9  So.  3  N.  E.  36;  Cline  v.  S.  43  Ohio  St. 
835;    Colee  v.   S.  75  Ind.   515;   Hopt  332,  1  N.  E.  22;    Aszman  v.   S.   123 
v.   P.   104  U.   S.   633;    Godwin  v.   S.  Tnd.  347,  24  N.  E.  123;  Chrisman  v. 
96  Ind.  550;  Wagner  v.  S.  116  Ind.  S.  54  Ark.  288,  15  S.  W.  889;  Booher 
186,  18  N.  E.  833;  S.  v.  Murphy,  118  v.  S.  156  Ind.  435,  60  N.  E.  156. 
Mo.   7,   25   S.   W.   95;    P.   v.   Miller,         is  Schwabacher  v.  P.  165  111.  629, 
114  Cal.  10,  45  Pac.  986.  46  N.  E.   809.     See  Mclntyre  v.  P. 

12  Schwabacher  v.  P.  165  111.  619,  38  111.  520. 

46  N.  E.  809;  Crosby  v.  P.  137  111.  1*  P.  v.  Hill,  123  Cal.  47,  55  Pac. 
340,  27  N.  E.  49.  See  R'eed  v.  692;  S.  v.  Pasnau,  118  Iowa,  501, 
Com.  98  Va.  817,  36  S.  E.  399;  Un-  92  N.  W.  682. 


279  MALICE — MALICE  AFORETHOUGHT.  §    282 

they  could,  not  find  him  guilty.15  So  the  giving  of  an  instruction 
that  drunkenness  is  no  excuse  for  the  commission  of  a  crime  is 
improper  where  the  drunkenness  is  shown  in  evidence,  not  as 
an  excuse,  but  as  the  contributing  cause  of  death  by  accident.16 

§  282.  Malice  and  malice  aforethought. — Malice,  when  an  es- 
sential element  of  a  case,  is  a  fact  to  be  determined  by  the  jury 
from  the  evidence;17  but  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  may 
define  the  term.18  The  law  implies  malice  from  the  unlawful 
killing  with  a  deadly  weapon  and  thus  imposes  upon  the  accused 
the  burden  of  showing  a  want  of  malice  ;19  and  an  instruction  to 
the  jury  to  that  effect  is  proper.20 

In  a  homicide  case  the  mere  fact  that  the  accused  may  have 
killed  another  is  not  sufficient  to  warrant  the  giving  of  an  instruc- 
tion on  a  charge  of  murder.21  It  must  appear  that  the  killing 
was  done  with  malice  aforethought  to  constitute  the  crime.22 
Hence  an  instruction  which  undertakes  to  enumerate  and  sub- 
mit to  the  jury  for  their  determination  what  facts  must  be 
established  to  warrant  a  conviction  of  murder,  but  which  omits 
the  element  of  malice  aforethought,  is  fatally  defective.23 

is  Whitten   v.   S.   115   Ala.   72,   22  Iowa.  686,  92  N.  W.  872.     See  S.  v. 

So.  483.     See  Booher  v.  S.  156  Ind.  Dolan,   17  Wash.   499,   50  Pac.   472; 

435,  60  N.  E.  156.  S.  v.  Moody,  18  Wash.  165,  51  Pac. 

is  S.  v.   Cross,  42  W.  Va.  253,  24  356. 

S.  E.  996.    An  instruction  that  "the  19  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  136,  citing: 

jury  must  bear  in  mind  that  it  is  Bankhead  v.  S.  124  Ala.  14,  26  So. 

only  the  effect  of  intoxication,  had  ,979;    S.    v.    McDonnell,   32   Vt.    491; 

upon  the  prisoner's  mind  in  regard  McQueen  v.   S.   103  Ala.  12,  15  So, 

to  his  ability  to  design,  deliberate  824;   S.  v.  Decklotts,  19  Iowa,  447; 

and   meditate  upon  and  fully  com-  Kent  v.  P.  8  Colo.  563,  9  Pac.  852; 

prehend  the  act  he  did  previous  to  S.   v.  Earnest,   56  Kas.   31,  42  Pac. 

its  performance,  which  is  material,"  359;    Holderman  v.  Ter.   (Ariz.),  60 

has  been  held  to  be  a  proper  state-  Pac.    876. 

ment    of    the    law,    Com.    v.    Me-  20  g.  v.  Zeibert,  40  Iowa,  173;  Jen- 

Gowen,  189  Pa.  St.  641,  41  Atl.  365.  kins  v.  S.  82  Ala.  25,  2  So.  150. 

See    Com.    v.    Van    Horn,    188    Pa.  21  Hunter  v.   S.   74   Miss.   515,   21 

St.  143,  41  Atl.  469.  So.  305. 

17  Harpham    v.    Whitney,    77    111.  22  Tutt  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R.  492, 

38;    Frankfurter   v.    Bryan,    12    111.  46  S.  W.  675;  S.  v.  Shafer      (Mont.), 

App.  549;   Harrell  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  55   Pac.  526;   Bennett  v.   S.  39  Tex. 

App.    204,    45    S.    W.    581;    Hidy    v.  Cr.    App.   639,  48   S.   W.   61. 

Murray,  101  Iowa,  65,  69  N.  W.  1138;  23  Tutt.    v.    Com.    Ky.   L.    R.    492, 

Hirsch  v.  Feeney,  83  111.  548;   Rit-  46  S.  W.  675;  S.  v.  Sch'afer    (Mont.), 

ter  v.  Swing,  174  Pa.  St.  341,  34  Atl.  55  Pac.  526;   Bennett  v.  S.  39  Tex. 

584;    McClafferty  v.   Philp,   151   Pa.  Cr.   App.   639,   48  S.   W.   61;    Coffey 

St.    86,   24   Atl.    1042;    Ellis  v.   Sim-  v.  S.  (Miss.),  24  So.  315;  S.  v.  Smith, 

onds,  168  Mass.  316,  47  N.  E.  116.  102   Iowa,   656,   72   N.   W.   279.     See 

is  Harrell  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  Leslie   v.    S.    42    Tex.    Cr.   App.   65, 

204,  45  S.  W.  581;  S.  v.  Hunter,  118  57  S.  W.  659. 


§    283  CRIMINAL  INTENT.  280 

An  instruction,  therefore,  which  submits  that  if  the  defendant 
"wilfully,  feloniously  and  maliciously"  killed  the  deceased  he 
would  be  guilty  of  murder  is  erroneous  in  omitting  the  phrase 
"with  malice  aforethought."24  Or  an  instruction  that  if  the 
defendant  "with  a  sedate  and  deliberate  mind  and  formed  design 
to  kill,  did  unlawfully  shoot  and  kill"  the  deceased,  they  should 
find  him  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree,  is  erroneous  in 
omitting  the  element  of  malice  aforethought,  although  that  ele- 
ment be  clearly  defined  in  another  part  of  the  charge.25 

§  283.  Instructions  on  inferring  malice — Improper. — A  person 
may  intentionally  kill  another  and  the  act  will  be  neither  murder 
nor  manslaughter.  The  intentional  killing  of  an  assailant  in 
necessary,  self-defense  is  no  crime  whatever.  An  instruction, 
therefore,  which  states  that  if  the  defendant  intended  to  kill 
the  deceased  the  law  will  hold  him  responsible  criminally,  is  erro- 
neous.26 So  an  instruction  that  "if  one  person  attacks  another 
without  justifiable  cause,  and  from  the  violence  used  death  ensues, 
the  question  which  arises  is  whether  the  killing  be  murder  or 
manslaughter ;  that  if  the  weapon  used  was  a  deadly  weapon  it  is 
reasonable  to  infer  that  the  person  making  the  attack  intended 
death  and  death  was  the  consequence  of  his  act,  it  is  murder," 
for  the  same  reason  is  fatally  defective.27  Where  the  court 
instructs  that  if  the  evidence  shows  that  the  health  of  the  de- 
ceased was  such  that  at  the  time  he  was  struck  by  the 
defendant  it  was  reasonably  probable  that  death  might  ensue 
or  that  death  might  be  hastened  by  the  blow,  then  the  defendant 
would  be  guilty,  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  fails  to  state  that  the 
act  was  unlawfully  committed  by  the  defendant.28 

24  Tutt  v.  Com.  20  Ky.  L.  R.  492,      50   Pac.    405;    Smith   v.    P.    142    111. 
46  S.  W.  675;  S.  v.  Schafer    (Mont.),      120,   31   N.   E.   599. 

55  Pac.  526.  27  Smith  v.  P.  142   111.  123,  31  N. 

25  Bennett  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.      E.  599, 

639,    48    S.    W.    61.      Contra:    S.    v.          28  Wooten  v.  S.  99  Tenn.  189,  41 
Hunt,    141    Mo.    626,    43    S.    W.    389.      S.  W.   813. 
28  p.   v.   Newcomer,   118  Cal.   263, 


CHAPTER  XVII. 


STATUTORY   INSTRUCTIONS. 


Sec. 

284.    Instructions  in  words  of  stat- 
ute. 


Sec. 
285. 

286. 


Instructions  in  words  of  stat- 
ute— Improper,  when. 
Copying   extracts   from   cases. 


§  284.  Instructions  in  words  of  statute. — As  a  general  rule 
the  giving  of  instructions  in  the  words  of  the  statute  is  proper, 
although  some  of  its  terms,  perhaps,  ought  to  be  explained;1 
or  an  instruction  substantially  in  the  language  of  the  statute 
is  not  objectionable.2  If  any  of  the  terms  of  a  statute  be  ambig- 
uous a  party  will  not  be  heard  to  complain  of  the  court  stating 
the  law  to  the  jury  in  the  language  of  the  statute  without  explain- 
ing such  terms,  in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  such  explana- 
tion.3 

Thus,  under  the  statute  of  Florida,  it  is  proper  in  charging  the 
jury  to  give  the  definition  of  manslaughter  and  justifiable  homi- 
cide in  the  exact  words  of  the  statute  ;4  also  of  murder  as  defined 
by  the  statute  of  Mississippi.5 


1  Town  of  Fox  v.  Town  of  Ken- 
dall, 97  111.  80;  Mt.  Olive  &  S.  Coal 
Co.    v.    Rademacher,    190    111.    543, 
60  N.  E.  888;   P.  v.  Mills,  143  N.  Y. 
383,    38    N.    E.    456;    Rogers    v.    S. 
(Miss.),  21  So.  130;   Dunn  v.  P.  109 
111.  642. 

2  Petefish  v.  Becker,  176  111.  455, 
52   N.   E.   71;    Neiders   v.   Bell,   174 
111.   325,  51  N.   E.   855,   refusing  in- 
structions   reciting    statutory     pro- 
visions, not  error.     Referring  to  a 
statute   by   name,   as   for   instance, 
the  "statute  of  frauds,"   in   giving 


instructions  without  explaining  its 
meaning  is  error;  it  is  calculated 
to  confuse  and  mislead  the  jury. 
Moshier  v.  Kitchell  &  Arnold,  87 
111.  18.  22.  Reference  need  not  be 
made  to  the  common  law  in  charg- 
ing the  jury  where  offense  is  based 
upon  a  statute.  Com.  v.  O'Brien, 
172  Mass.  248,  52  N.  E.  77. 

3  Bailey  v.  Campbell,  2  111.  (1 
Scam.),  110. 

*  Driggers  v.  S.  38  Fla.  1,  20  So. 
758. 

s  Rogers  v.  S.   (Miss.),  21  So.  130. 


281 


§  285  STATUTORY  INSTRUCTIONS.  282 

The  court  is  not  required  to  give  instructions  defining  words 
or  phrases  of  the  statute  which  are  used  in  their  ordinary  sense 
and  are  easily  understood.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  words  "serious 
bodily  injury"  used  in  defining  an  aggravated  assault  and  bat- 
tery, need  not  be  defined  in  the  instructions.0  The  giving  of 
an  instruction  in  the  language  of  the  statute  containing  provisions 
not  relevant  to  the  issues  in  the  case  is  not  error  unless  prejudi- 
cial to  the  rights  of  the  party  complaining.7  Where  the  court 
has  charged  the  jury  in  the  language  of  the  statute  in  one  part 
of  the  charge  which  defines  an  offense,  it  is  not  error  if  some  mate- 
rial word  should  be  omitted  in  a  subsequent  part  of  the  charge 
which  refers  to  the  same  statute.8 

§285.    In  words  of  statute — Improper,  when. — But  it  is  not 

always  proper  to  give  instructions  in  the  language  of  the  statute 
without  qualification.  In  Illinois  the  giving  of  an  instruction  on 
the  law  of  self-defense  on  homicide,  in  the  words  of  the  statute, 
is  error.9  The  statute  mentioned  is  as  follows :  "  If  a  person  kill 
another  in  self-defense,  it  must  appear  that  the  danger  was  so 
urgent  and  pressing  that  in  order  to  save  his  own  life,  or  to  pre- 
vent his  receiving  great  bodily  harm,  the  killing  of  the  other 
was  absolutely  necessary;  and  it  must  appear  also,  that  the  per- 
son killed  was  the  assailant,  or  that  the  slayer  had  really, 
and  in  good  faith,  endeavored  to  decline  any  further  struggle 
before  the  mortal  blow  was  given."10  The  giving  of  an  instruc- 
tion in  the  language  of  this  statute  without  qualification,  limits 
the  right  of  self-defense  to  actual  danger,  no  matter  how  threat- 
ening may  be  the  appearances,  and  deprives  the  defendant  of 

6  De  Los   Santos  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  jury   may   read   the   statutes   defin- 
App.),  31  S.  W.  395;  Humphreys  v.  ing  the  offense  including  the  law, 
S.   34  Tex.   Cr.   App.  434,  30  S.  W.  as  to  the  penalty,  with  which  th& 
1066.  defendant  is  charged.    Com.  v.  Har- 

7  P.  v.  Burns,  63  Cal.   614;    S.  v.  ris  168  Pa.  St.  619,  32  All.  92;  Miller 
Anderson,  10  Ore.  448;  Needham  v.  v.   Com.   (Va.),  21  S.  E.  499;   P.   v. 
P.   98   111.   275;    P.  v.   Hughson,  154  Henderson,  28  Cal.  465;    Simons  v 
N.   Y.   153,  47  N.  E.  1092.     Contra:  S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),   34   S.   W.   619; 
Whitcomb  v.   S.   30  Tex.   App.   269,  Ter.   v.   Mahaffey,  3   Mont.   116. 

17    S.    W.    258.      See    Simons   v.    S.         »  Gainey  v.  P.  97  111.  277;  McCoy 

(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  34  S.  W.  619.     See  v.    P.    175    111.    230,    51    N.    E.    777; 

"Definition   of  Offenses."  Enright  v.  P.  155  111.  35,  39  N.  E. 

8  Winkles   v.    S.    114    Ga.    449,   40  561;  S.  v.  Laurie,  1  Mo.  App.  371. 
S.    E.    259,    intentionally    omitted;          10  Kurd's    111.    Stat.    §    149,    Chap. 
Under  the  practice  in  some  of  the  38  Cr.  Code. 

states    the    court    in    charging    the 


283  COPYING  FROM  REPORTS.  §  286 

the  right  to  act  in  self-defense  unless  the  killing  was  "abso- 
lutely necessary."11 

§  286.  Copying  extracts  from  cases — In  framing  instructions 
it  is  not  a  wise  practice  to  copy  extracts  or  expressions  from 
reported  cases  and  formulate  them  into  instructions.  Such  ex- 
tracts may  properly  state  the  law  applicable  to  the  case  from 
which  they  are  copied,  but  not  applicable  to  some  other  case 
of  a  different  state  of  facts.12  Such  practice  is  held  to  be  proper, 
however,  if  the  instructions  thus  framed  correctly  state  the  law 
applicable  to  facts  in  issue.13  So  upon  the  same  principle  instruc- 
tions may  be  framed  by  copying  extracts  from  text-books  (or 
read  by  the  court  according  to  the  practice),  providing  such 
instructions  properly  state  the  law  applicable  to  the  facts  of  the 
case.14  The  court,  however,  is  not  bound  to  give  such  instruc- 
tions, but  may  frame  the  charge  in  its  own  language.15 

11  Enright  v.  P.  155  111.  35,  39  N.  ia  P.  v.  Minnaugh,  131  N.  Y.  563, 
E.  561;  McCoy  v.  P.  175  111.  230,  51  29  N.  E.  750;  Estate  of  Spencer,  96 
N.  E.  777;   Gainey  v.  P.  97  111.  277.  Cal.  448,  31  Pac.  453;  Power  v.  Har- 
See  Kinney  v.  P.  108  111.  524.  low,    57    Mich.    107,    23   N.    W.    606; 

12  Smoke      &c.      Co.     v.      Lyford  Kirby  v.  Wilson,  98  111.  240;  Henry 
123   111.   300,  13  N.   E,   844;    Centra-  v.  Klopfer,  147  Pa.  St.  178,  23  Atl. 
lia  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Rixman,  121  111.  338. 

214,    12   N.   E.    685.     See   Merrietta  i*  P.  v.  Wayman,  128  N.   Y.   585, 

&   C.   R.    Co.   v.   Picksley,   24   Ohio  27  N.  E.  1070;  Bronnenburg  v.  Char- 

St.  668.     See  generally:     Etchepare  man,  80  Ind.  475. 

v.  Aguirre,  91  Cal.  288,  27  Pac.  668;  is  P.  v.  Wayman,  128  N.  Y    585, 

Laidlaw  v.   Sage,   80   Hun    (N.   Y.),  27  N.  E.  1070;  P.  v.  Niles,  44  Mich. 

550;    Freeman   v.   Weeks,    48   Mich.  606,   7   N.   W.   192. 
255,  12  N.  W.  215;  Power  v.  Harlow. 
57  Mich.   107,  23  N.  W.  606. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

ACCOMPLICE  AS  WITNESS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

287.  Accomplice  defined.  291.     Instructions  assuming  witness 

288.  Testimony      of      accomplice —  is   an   accomplice. 

How  considered.  292.     Duty    to    instruct    on    accom- 

289.  Testimony      of      accomplice —  plioes  without  request. 

When  corroboration  is  neces-      293.    Principal    and    accessory — In- 
sary.  structions. 

290.  Is  witness  an  accomplice — In- 

structions. 

§  287.  Accomplice  defined. — An  accomplice  is  one  who  is  in 
some  way  concerned  in  the  commission  of  a  crime,  though  not  as 
principal ;  and  this  includes  all  persons  who  have  been  concerned 
in  its  commission,  whether  they  are  considered  in  strict  legal  pro- 
priety as  principals  in  the  first  or  second  degree,  or  merely  as 
accessories  before  or  after  the  fact.1  Another  definition  of  an 
accomplice  is  one  of  many  equally  concerned  in  a  felony,  the 
term  being  generally  applied  to  those  who  are  admitted  to  give 
evidence  against  their  fellow  criminals  for  the  furtherance  of 
justice  which  might  otherwise  be  excluded.2 

§  288.  Testimony  of  accomplice — How  considered. — In  the  ab- 
sence of  statutory  provision,  the  jury  may,  if  they  see  fit,  convict 
on  the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  accomplices  alone,  but  such 
testimony  should  be  acted  upon  with  great  care  and  caution; 
and  it  is  the  practice  for  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  accord- 
ingly.3 The  refusal  to  direct  the  jury  to  weigh  the  testimony 

1  Cross    v.  P.  47  111.  58,  4  Black-  s  Hoyt  v.  P.  140  111.  596,  30  N.  E. 
stone   Comm.   331;    1   Bouvier  Law  315,  16   L.   R.   A.   239;    S.   v.   Dana, 
Diet.  46.  .  59  Vt.  614,  10  Atl.  727;  S.  v.  Wool- 

2  Cross  v.  P.  47  111.  58.  ard,  111  Mo.   248,  20  S.  W.  27.   See 

284 


285 


TESTIMONY  OF  ACCOMPLICE  CONSIDERED. 


§  288 


of  accomplices  with  great  care  and  caution  may  under  some 
circumstances  be  prejudicial  error.4  Especially  should  the  jury 
be  directed  to  act  upon  such  testimony  with  great  caution  where 
they  are  cautioned  as  to  the  testimony  of  the  defendant.5 

The  court  should  instruct  the  jury  to  consider  the  induce- 
ments and  influences  for  hope  or  promises  under  which  an  accom- 
plice gives  his  testimony,  as  affecting  his  credibility  as  a  witness, 
and  a  refusal  to  so  instruct  is  error.6  The  giving  of  such 
cautionary  instruction  is  not  improper  in  not  defining  the  phrase 
"with  great  caution."7  An  instruction  that  the  jury  should 
weight  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  "with  great  caution,"  and 
that  they  may  disregard  it  if  they  believe  it  to  be  untrue,  is 
proper.8  Also  a  charge  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  such  witness  has  wilfully  sworn  falsely  to  any  mate- 


Tuberson  v.  S.  26  Fla.  472,  7  So. 
858;  P.  v.  Sternberg,  111  Cal.  11, 
43  Pac.  201;  Shiver  v.  S.  41  Fla. 
631,  27  So.  36;  S.  v.  Kennedy,  154 
Mo.  268,  55  S.  W.  293;  Wisdom  v. 
P.  11  Colo.  170,  17  Pac.  519;  Allen 
v.  S.  10  Ohio  St.  288;  Waters  v. 
P.  172  111.  371,  50  N.  E.  148;  Under- 
bill Cr.  Ev.  §  71.  See  also  Cox 
v.  Com.  125  Pa.  St.  94  17  Atl.  227; 
Flanagin  v.  S.  25  Ark.  96;  Com.  v. 
Bosworth,  22  Pick.  (Mass.),  398; 
S.  v.  Barber,  113  N.  Car.  711,  18 
S.  E.  515;  Ulmer  v.  S.  14  Ind.  52; 
S.  v.  Prudhomme,  25  La.  Ann.  525; 
Rex  v.  Wilkes,  7  C.  &  P.  272;  S.  v. 
Hardin,  19  N.  Car.  407;  Collins  v.  P. 
98  111.  589;  S.  v.  Betsall,  11  W.  Va. 
704;  Fitzcox  v.  S.  52  Miss.  923; 
Ingall  v.  S.  48  Wis.  647,  4  N.  W. 
785;  U.  S.  v.  Neverson,  1  Mackey 
(D.  C.),  154. 

4  Hoyt  v.  P.  140  111.  596,  30  N.  E. 
315,  16  L.  R.  A.  239;  P.  v.  Stern- 
burg,  111  Cal.  11,  43  Pac.  201;  S.  v. 
Woolard,  111  Mo.  248,  20  S.  W.  27. 
See  also  Cheatham  v.  S.  67  Miss. 
335,  7  So.  204;  S.  v.  Jones,  64  Mo. 
391;  S.  v.  Potter,  42  Vt.  495  (not 
error  to  refuse). 

s  S.  v.  Meyesenburg,  171  Mo.  1, 
71  S.  W.  239. 

e  Ter.  v.  Chavez,  8  N.  Mex.  528, 
45  Pac.  1107.  Where  on  a  plea  of 


guilty  to  a  charge  of  murder,  the 
testimony  of  an  accomplice  is  the 
only  evidence  as  to  the  degree  of 
the  crime,  the  defendant  is  entitled 
to  have  the  jury  instructed  on  the 
testimony  of  an  accomplice,  Mar- 
tin v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  38  S.  W. 
194. 

T  Home  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Decker, 
55  Neb.  346,  75  N.  W.  841.  An 
instruction  on  accomplices  is  suffi- 
cient if  it  refers  to  the  testimony  of 
an  accomplice  without  adding  "or 
accomplices,"  Yontz  v.  Com.  23  Ky. 
L.  R.  1850,  66  S.  W.  383. 

s  Wilson  v.  S.  71  Miss.  880,  16 
So.  304;  P.  v.  Sternberg,  111  Cal. 
11,  43  Pac.  201;  Brown  v.  S.  72 
Miss.  990,  18  So.  431  (modified  by 
adding:  if  the  Jury  have  a  reason- 
able doubt  of  its  truth);  Wisdom 
v.  P.  11  Colo.  170,  11  Pac.  519;  S.  v. 
Coates,  22  Wash.  601,  61  Pac.  726; 
P.  v.  Bonney,  98  Cal.  278,  33  Pac. 
98;  S.  v.  Kellerman,  14  Kas.  135; 
U.  S.  v.  Sykes,  58  Fed.  1004;  P.  v. 
Costello,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  87;  Ar- 
nold v.  S.  5  Wyo.  439,  40  Pac.  967; 
S.  v.  Dana,  59  Vt.  614,  10  Atl.  727; 
Fan-all  v.  Broadway,  95  N.  Car. 
551;  S.  v.  Donnelly,  130  Mo.  642,  32 
S.  W.  1124;  S.  v.  Dawson,  124  Mo. 
418,  27  S.  W.  1104. 


§    289  ACCOMPLICES  AS  WITNESSES.  286 

rial  matter  they  may  disregard  his  entire  testimony,  is  proper 
and  its  refusal  is  error.9 

The  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  advise  the  jury  that  they 
ought  not  to  convict  on  the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  an  ac- 
complice, but  it  is  not  bound  to  do  so.10  An  instruction  that 
it  would  not  be  safe  to  convict  upon  the  testimony  of  an  accom- 
plice unless  corroborated  on  some  material  point,  and  that  such 
testimony  should  be  carefully  scrutinized,  has  been  held  to  be 
improper.11  Where  the  court  charges  that  the  accomplice  has 
turned  state's  evidence  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  his  part 
in  the  affair,  and  that  the  jury  should  take  the  circumstances 
into  consideration  in  weighing  his  testimony,  the  refusal  of 
an  instruction  that  it  is  generally  unsafe  to  convict  on  the  testi- 
mony of  an  accomplice  is  not  prejudicial  error.12 

§  289.  Testimony  of  accomplice — When  corroboration  is  nec- 
essary.— Statutes  exist  in  some  of  the  states  prohibiting  a  convic- 
tion on  the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  accomplices,  and  the  de- 
fendant, on  making  proper  request,  is  entitled  to  instructions  to 
that  effect  when  warranted  by  the  evidence;  and  it  is  error  for 
the  court  to  refuse.13  And  the  nature  and  character  of  the  corrob- 
orative testimony  should  be  described  or  defined  by  proper  in- 
structions.14 The  defendant  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed 
as  to  the  meaning  of  corroborative  evidence.15  And  the  instruc- 
tion must  relate  to  the  commission  of  the  specific  crime  charged 
in  the  indictment  and  not  to  other  offenses.16  If  there  is  evidence 
independent  of  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  tending  to  con- 
nect the  accused  with  the  commission  of  the  crime  charged, 

9  Owens  v.  S.  80  Miss.  499,  32  So.         12  Com.  v.  Bishop,  165  Mass.  148, 
152.     It  has  been  held  improper  to      42  N.  E.560,  the  accomplice  was  cor- 
instruct  that  the  testimony  of  the      roborated. 

wife    of    an    accomplice    should    be  is  Martin   v.   S.   36   Tex.   Cr.    632, 

considered   by   the   jury   with   cau-  36  S.  W.  587,  38  S.   W.   194;    S.   v. 

tion,  Crittenden  v.  S.  134  Ala.  145,  Reavis,   71   Mo.   419;    Stewart  v.   S. 

32   So.   273.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  174,  32  S.  W.  766; 

10  Reg  v.   Farler,   8  C.  &  P.  106;  S.  v.  Patterson,  52  Kas   335,  34  Pac. 
Collins   v.   P.   98   111.    589;    Com.   v.  784;  Bernhard  v.  S.  76  Ga.  613. 
Bishop,    165    Mass.    148,    42    N.    E.  « Mitchell  v.  S.  38  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
560;    S.   v.   Haney,  19  N.   Car.   390;  325,  42   S.  W.  989;    S.  v.  Pratt,  98 
Black  v.   S.   59  Wis.   471,  18  N.  W.  Mo.  482,  11  S.  W.  977. 

457;  Allen  v.  S.  10  Ohio  St.  288;  S.  IB  P.  v.  Sternberg,  111  Cal.  11,  43 

v.    Potter,    45    Vt.     495;     Com.     v.  Pac.  201;   Crawford  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr. 

Holmes,  127  Mass.  424.  App.),  34  S.  W.  927. 

11  Com.  v.  Glume,  162  Mass.  206,  ie  P.    v.   Ward,    134   Cal.    301,    66 
38  N.  E.  435.  Pac.   372. 


287  CORROBORATION  REQUIRED  WHEN.  §    290 

then  an  instruction  directing  the  jury  to  acquit  if  they  believe 
the  witnesses  were  accomplices  is  properly  refused.17  And  the 
court  must  determine,  as  a  question  of  law,  whether  there  is 
any  evidence  other  than  the  testimony  of  accomplices  tending 
to  connect  the  defendant  with  the  crime  charged.18 

Where  a  statute  requires  corroboration  of  an  accomplice,  such 
requirement  should  be  substantially  observed  without  the  omis- 
sion of  any  material  thing  mentioned  in  the  statute.  Thus,  where 
a  statute  provides  that  such  corroboration  is  not  sufficient  "if  it 
merely  shows  the  commission  of  the  offense  or  the  circumstances 
thereof/'  an  instruction  based  on  such  statute  which  omits  the 
element  "or  the  circumstances  thereof"  is  defective.19  The  refusal 
of  an  instruction  as  to  the  corroboration  of  an  accomplice,  al- 
though in  the  language  of  the  statute,  is  not  error  where  others 
in  the  charge  in  substance  state  that  the  testimony  of  an  accom- 
plice must  be  corroborated  by  other  evidence  tending  to  connect 
the  defendant  with  the  commission  of  the  crime  charged.20 

One  accomplice  cannot  corroborate  another  accomplice,  and 
an  instruction  which  in  substance  informs  the  jury,  in  so  many 
words,  is  sufficient,  though  not  stated  in  distinct  terms.21  A 
charge  that  one  accomplice  cannot  corroborate  another  accom- 
plice is  properly  refused  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  tending 
to  show  that  the  corroborating  witness  was  an. accomplice.22 

§  290.  Is  witness  an  accomplice — Instructions — The  evidence, 
of  course,  must  show  that  the  witness  testifying  was  in  fact 
an  accomplice  before  the  court  is  required  to  give  instructions 
on  the  law  relating  to  the  testimony  of  accomplices;23  and  it 
must  also  appear  that  he  in  his  testimony  stated  material  facts 

IT  Henry   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),  W.  -849;    S.   v.   McDonald,   57    Kas. 

43   S.   W.   340.  537,  46  Pac.   966. 

is  Kent  v.    S.   64  Ark.   247,   41   S.  21  Stevens  v.   S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

W.   849.     The  court  should   specifl-  49  S.   W.   105. 

cally    instruct    the    jury    that    the  22  Pace  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  31 

corpus  delicti  of  an  offense  can  not  S.  W.  173. 

be  proved  by  the  testimony  of  ac-  23  Robinson  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

complice     alone.      Truelove     v.     S.  54,  43  S.  W.  526;  Brann  v.  S.  (Tex. 

(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  71  S.  W.  601.  Cr.  -App.),  39  S.  W.  940;  Parr  v.  S. 

19  S.   v.   Smith,   102   Iowa,   656,   72  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  493,  38  S.  W.  180; 
N.  W.  279;  S.  v.  Jackson,  103  Iowa,  P.    v.    Chadwick,    7    Utah,    134,    25 
702,  73  N.  W.  467.     See  S.  v.  Smith,  Pac.  737.     See  Prendergast  v.  S.  41 
106  Iowa,  701,  77  N.  W.  499   (hold-  Tex.  Cr.  App.  358,  57  S.  W.  850;   S. 
ing  instruction  proper).  v.  Burns  (Nev.),  74  Pac.  984. 

20  Kent   v.    S.    64    Ark.   247,   41   S. 


§    291  ACCOMPLICE  AS  WITNESS.  288 

connecting  or  tending  to  connect  the  accused  with  the  commis- 
sion of  the  crime  charged  to  entitle  the  defendant  to  such  instruc- 
tions.24 If  there  is  any  evidence  from  which  the  jury  might 
fairly  infer  that  a  witness  was  an  accomplice,  it  is  sufficient 
to  warrant  the  giving  of  such  instruction;  and  such  inference 
may  be  drawn  from  the  testimony  of  the  witness  himself.25  And 
where  it  is  suspected  that  a  witness  is  or  was  an  accomplice, 
the  fact  as  to  whether  he  was  or  was  not  may  be  submitted 
by  instruction  for  the  jury  to  determine,  together  with  the  effect 
of  complicity  on  his  testimony,20  but  it  is  error  to  submit  the 
determination  of  the  question  to  the  jury  without  telling  them 
what  an  accomplice  is.27  And  in  explaining  the  meaning  of 
accomplice  it  is  sufficient  to  give  the  statutory  definition.28  Mere 
suspicion,  however,  against  a  witness  is  not  sufficient  to  warrant 
the  conclusion  that  he  was  an  accomplice ;  so  an  instruction  stat- 
ing that  a  witness  is  an  accomplice  is  properly  refused  if  there 
is  no  evidence  to  that  effect.29 

In  a  larceny  case  one  who  receives  the  stolen  goods  knowing  the 
same  to  have  been  stolen  is,  on  his  becoming  a  witness  for  the 
prosecution,  an  accomplice,  and  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  have 
the  jury  instructed  on  the  law  of  accomplices.30  Also  on  a 
charge  of  incest,  where  there  is  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
the  woman  consented  to  sexual  intercourse  with  the  defendant, 
the  court  should  charge  the  jury  that  if  they  believe  she  was  an 
accomplice  they  must  find  that  she  has  been  corroborated  before 
they  could  convict  the  defendant.31 

§  291.  Instructions  assuming  witness  is  an  accomplice. — Where 
the  evidence  conclusively  shows  that  a  witness  is  an  accomplice, 

24  Moseley  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.          as  Grinsinger     v.     S.     (Tex.     Cr. 
578,  37  S.  W.  736;   Waggoner  v.  S.      App.),   69   S.   W.   583. 

35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  199,  32  S.  W.  896  29  s.  v.  Haynes,  7  N.  Dak.  352,  75 

(accomplices  refuse  to  testify).  N.  W.  267;   Smith  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr. 

25  Arnold  v.  S.  5  Wyo.  439,  40  Pac.  App.  442,  37  S.  W.  743;   Smith  v.  S. 
967;    Conde  v.   S.  33  Tex.  Cr.   App.  10   Wyo.    157,   67   Pac.   977;    O'Con- 
10,  24  S.  W.  415.  nor  v.    S.    28   Tex.    App.    288,    13   S. 

26  s.    v.    Haynes,   7   N.   Dak.    352,  W.  14. 

75  N.  W.  267;  Martin  v.  S.  (Tex.'Cr.  so  Kelly   v.    S.    34   Tex.    Cr.    App. 

App.),   43    S.   W.   352;    White   v.    S.  412,  31  S.  W.  174. 

42  Tex.  Cr.  App.  567,  62  S.  W.  575.  "  Stewart  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

27  Thomas  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  174,  32  S.  W.  766;   Coburn  v.  S.  36 
73  S.  W.  1045;  Carroll  v.  S.  45  Ark.  Tex.  Cr.  App.  257,  36  S.  W.  442. 
539;   Suddeth  v.  S.  112  Ga.  407,  37 

S.   E.    747. 


289  PRINCIPAL  AND  ACCESSORY.  §    293 

the  court  may,  as  a  matter  of  law,  properly  state  the  fact  in 
charging  the  jury.32  And  where  the  evidence  warrants  the  court 
in  instructing  that  a  witness  is  an  accomplice,  the  giving  of 
such  instructions  is  not  objectionable  as  assuming  the  defendant's 
guilt.33  But  to  charge  the  jury  that  a  witness  is  an  accomplice 
according  to  his  own  testimony  assumes  that  his  testimony  is 
true  and  is  therefore  erroneous.34  An  instruction  which  in  sub- 
stance states  that  if  the  jury  believe  the  testimony  of  the  accom- 
plice has  been  corroborated  they  could  convict  the  defendant 
is  erroneous,  in  that  it  assumes  the  truth  of  the  accomplice's 
testimony.35  Also  an  instruction  which  assumes  that  a  witness 
who  is  jointly  indicted  with  the  accused  is  an  accomplice  is 
erroneous.36 

§  292.    Duty  to  instruct  on  accomplices  without  request. — In 

some  of  the  states  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  give  instructions 
on  the  law  relating  to  the  testimony  of  accomplices,  whether 
requested  to  do  so  or  not.37  But  the  refusal  of  special  requests 
cannot  be  urged  as  error  where  the  court  on  its  own  motion  fully 
instructs  on  the  law  relating  to  the  testimony  of  accomplices.38 

§  293.  Principal  and  accessory — Instructions. — If  there  is  any 
evidence  tending  to  connect  the  accused  with  others  in  the  com- 
mission of  an  offense  it  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  law 
of  principal  and  accessory.39  Thus,  on  a  trial  for  an  assault  with 
intent  to  kill  where  the  evidence  shows  that  two  persons  shot 
at  the  prosecuting  witness  at  the  same  time,  the  court  may  charge 
the  jury  on  the  law  of  principal  and  accessory.40  But  unless  there 
is  evidence  upon  which  to  base  the  instruction  it  is  error  to 
give  it.41 

32  Winfield  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  Brace  v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  48,  62 

72  S.  W.  182.  S.   W.    1067;    Coburn   v.    S.   36    Tex. 

ss  Hatcher  v.  S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  Cr.   App.   257,   36  S.  W.   442. 

237,  65  S.  W.  97;  Torres  v.  S.  (Tex.  as  Powell   v.   S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 

Cr.  App.),  55  S.  W.  828.  44    S.   W.    504. 

s*  Bell  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  677,  39  Houston  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

47  S.  W.  1010.     See  P.  v.  Reilly,  53  47  S.  W.  468;   Tidwell  v.  S.  40  Tex. 

N.    Y.   S.    1005.  Cr.  App.  38,  48  S.  W.  184.    See  Han- 

ss  Jones  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  72  kins  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  261,  45 

S.  W.  845.  S.   W.   807. 

se  S.  v.  Spotted  Hawk  (Mont.),  33  40  Granger  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

Pac.    1026;    Heivner   v.    P.    (Colo.),  31  S.  W.  671. 

43   Pac.  1047.  41  p.    v.    Smith,    105   Cal.    676,    39 

37  Williams    v.    S.    42    Tex.    392;  Pac.   38. 


§    293  ACCOMPLICE  AS  WITNESS.  290 

The  court  is  not  required  to  instruct  on  the  law  of  accessory 
after  the  fact  in  a  homicide  case  where  the  evidence  strongly 
tends  to  prove  the  defendant  actually  did  the  shooting,  and  there 
is  no  evidence  tending  to  support  the  offense  of  accessory  after 
the  fact.42  In  defining  accessory  the  instructions  should  follow 
the  words  of  the  statute,  stating  that  an  accessory  is  "one  who 
advises  and  encourages,  and  not  one  who  advises  or  encourages. '  '43 
Where  the  evidence  tending  to  connect  the  accused  with  the 
commission  of  an  offense  by  conspiracy  with  others  is  circum- 
stantial, he  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed  that  he  cannot 
be  held  responsible  for  what  others  may  have  done,  unless  he 
advised,  aided  or  abetted  in  the  commission  of  the  offense.44r 

42  McQuinn   v.   Com.   17   Ky.   500,         44  Howser    v.    S.     (Ala.),    23    So. 
31  S.  W.  872.  681. 

43  S.    v.    Geddes,   22   Mont.    68,   55 
Pac.  919. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


ON  REASONABLE   DOUBT. 


Sec. 

294.  Definition  and  elements. 

295.  Definition     and     elements— Il- 

lustrations. 

296.  Instructions     on      degree     of 

proof. 


Sec. 

299.  Doubt  arises  from  whole  ev- 

idence. 

300.  Modification  of  instruction  on 

reasonable  doubt. 

301.  Instruction   as   to  each   juror. 


297.     Instructions     on     probability,      302.     Instruction    that    jurors    "be- 


possibility. 

298.    Instruction     on     hunting     up 
doubt. 


lieve  as  men." 


§294.  Definition  and  elements. — It  is  difficult  to  define  what 
is  a  reasonable  doubt,  but  all  the  authorities  agree  that  such 
a  doubt  must  be  actual  and  substantial  as  contra-distinguished 
from  a  mere  vague  apprehension  and  must  arise  out  of  the  evi- 
dence1, or  from  a  want  of  evidence.2  The  doubt  must  be  sup- 
ported by  reason  and  not  by  mere  conjecture  and  idle  supposition 
irrespective  of  evidence.3 

A  reasonable  doubt  is  not  a  mere  whim,  but  is  such  a  doubt  as 
reasonable  men  may  entertain  after  a  careful  and  honest  con- 
sideration of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case.4  A  reasonable  doubt 


1  Hughes  Cr.  Law  §  2488,  citing: 
3  Greenleaf  Ev.   (Re-df.  Ed.).  §  29; 
Earll   v.   P.   73   111.   329;    Carlton  v. 
P.   150   111.   181,  192,   37  N.   E.   244; 
Hopt  v.  Utah,  120  U.  S.  430,  439,  7 
Sup.   Ct.   614;    Underbill   Cr.   Ev.   § 
10. 

2  S.  v.  Blue,  136  Mo.  41,  37  S.  W. 
796;  Brown  v.  S.  105  Ind.  390,  5  N. 
E.   900;    Tomlinson  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr. 
App.),   43   S.   W.   332;    Emery  v.   S. 
101  Wis.  627,  78  N.  W.  145;  Wright 
v.    S.    69  Ind.   165,   35   Am.   R.   212; 
Densmore  v.   S.   67   Ind.   307.     The 


omission  of  the  words  "want  of 
evidence,"  in  such  an  instruction, 
is  not  prejudicial  error,  however, 
where  the  evidence  is  exceedingly 
strong  and  overwhelming  against 
the  accused,  Mathis  v.  S.  80  Miss. 
491,  32  So.  6. 

»  P.  v.  Ross,  115  Cal.  233,  46  Pac. 
1056;  S.  v.  Patton,  66  Kas.  486,  71 
Pac.  840;  Carpenter  v.  S.  62  Ark. 
286,  36  S.  W.  900. 

4  P.  v.  Baker,  153  N.  Y.  Ill,  47 
N.  E.  31.  The  rule  of .  reasonable 
doubt  has  no  application  to  the 


291 


§  295  ON  REASONABLE  DOUBT.  292 

is  "that  state  of  the  case  which,  after  considering  and  compar- 
ing all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  leaves  the  minds  of  the  jury  in 
that  condition  that  they  cannot  say  they  feel  an  abiding  con- 
viction of  the  truth  of  the  charge."5  A  reasonable  doubt  is 
also  defined  to  be  a  doubt  arising  from  a  candid  and  impartial 
investigation  of  all  the  evidence,  and  such  as,  in  the  graver 
transactions  of  life,  would  cause  a  reasonable  and  prudent  man 
to  hesitate  and  pause.6 

The  giving  of  several  instructions  on  reasonable  doubt,  defining 
that  term  in  different  forms,  is  not  objectionable,  although  all 
the  definitions  or  elements  might  be  embodied  in  one  instruc- 
tion.7 A  charge  defining  a  reasonable  doubt  to  be  "a  doubt 
which  a  reasonable  man  of  sound  judgment,  without  bias,  preju- 
dice or  interest,  after  calmly,  consciously  and  deliberately  weigh- 
ing all  the  testimony,  would  entertain  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  ac- 
cused,"  cannot  be  complained  of  as  error  in  the  absence  of  a 
request  for  more  adequate  instructions  on  the  subject.8 

§295.  Definition  and  elements — Illustrations. — An  instruc- 
tion which  states  that  evidence  is  sufficient  to  remove  a  reason- 
able doubt  when  it  convinces  the  judgment  of  ordinarily  prudent 
men  of  the  truth  of  a  proposition  with  such  force  that  they 

law  of  a  case,  but  to  the  facts  only,  Frank  v.  S.  94  Wis.  211,  68  N.  W. 

although  the  jury  may  be  the  judges  657  (in  their  own  important  affairs) ; 

of  the  law.     Hence  instructions  in  S.  v.  Case,  96  Iowa,  264,  65  N.  W. 

this    respect    are    improper,    S.    v.  149;    Allen   T.    S.    Ill    Ala.    80,    20 

Meyer,  58  Vt.  457,  3  Atl.  195;  O'Neil  So.  490;   S.  v.  Harris,  97  Iowa,  407, 

v.  S.   48  Ga.   66.     The   definition  of  66  N.  W.  728;   S.  v.  David,  131  Mo. 

reasonable  doubt,  according  to  the  380,  33   S.   W.   28;    S.   v.   Gleim,   17 

views   of   some   courts,   is   of   little  Mont.  17,  41  Pac.  998  ("highest  con- 

or  no  practical  benefit  to  the  jury,  cerns  of  his  own  interests") ;     Law- 

S.  v.  Sauer,  38  Minn.  439,  38  N.  W.  head   v.    S.   46   Neb.    607,   65   N.   W. 

355;  Hamilton  v.  P.  29  Mich.  195.  779  ("most  important  affairs  or  con- 

s  Dunn  v.  P.  109  111.  645.  cerns  of  life");  S.  v.  Serenson,  7 

e  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  2488,  citing:  s.  Dak.  277,  64  N.  W.  130;  S.  v. 

Dunn   v.    P.    109    111.    635;    May   v.  Crockett,    39    Ore.    76,    65    Pac.    447. 

P.    60    111.    119;    Connaghan    v.    P.  See  Emery  v.  S.  92  Wis.  146,  65  N. 

88  111.  462;   Little  v.  P.  157  111.  158,  W.    848;    S.   v.   Pierce,  65   Iowa,   89, 

42   N.   E.    389;    Com.   v.   Miller,    137  21    N.    W.    195. 

Pa.   St.   77,   21   Atl.   138,   8  Am.   Cr.          i  Johnson  v.  P.  202  111.  53,  66  N. 

R.  623.     See  P.  v.  Ah  Sing,  51  Cal.  E.   877. 

372,  2  Am.  Cr.  R.  482;  P.  v.  Cneong         s  S.    v.    Reed,   62   Me.   129;    S.    v. 

Toon   Ark,    61    Cal.    527.     See   also  Smith,  65  Conn.  283,  31  Atl.  206;  S. 

McArthur  v.  S.  60  Neb.  390,  83  N.  v.   Johnson,  19  Wash.   410,   53   Pac. 

W.  196;  S.  v.  Cushanberry,  157  Mo.  667;    P.    v.    Ahern,   93   Cal.    518,   29 

168,  56  S.  W.  737;    S.  v.   Holloway,  Pac.  250;  P.  v.  Waller,  70  Mich.  237, 

150    Mo.    222,    56    S.    W.    734;    S.    v.  38  N.  W.  261. 

Baker,    136    Mo.    74,   37   S.    W.    810; 


293  DEFINITION  AND  ELEMENTS.  §    295 

would  act  upon  the  conviction  without  hesitation  in  their  own 
most  important  affairs  or  in  matters  of  highest  importance  to 
themselves  where  there  is  no  compulsion  to  act  at  all,  is  proper.9 
Also  an  instruction  which  states  that  proof  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  means  "such  proof  as  satisfies  the  judgment  and  con- 
science of  the  jury  as  reasonable  men  applying  their  reason  to  the 
evidence  before  them  that  the  crime  charged  has  been  com- 
mitted by  the  defendant,  and  so  satisfies  them  as  to  leave  no  other 
reasonable  conclusion  possible,"  is  correct.10 

A  charge  defining  reasonable  doubt  to  be  "an  actual,  substan- 
tial doubt  arising  from  the  evidence  or  from  a  want  of  evi- 
dence in  the  case,"  is  proper.11  An  instruction  on  reasonable 
doubt  is  not  defective  in  failing  to  embody  the  phrase  "to 
a  moral  certainty"  in  connection  therewith.12  Proof  "beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt"  and  proof  "to  a  moral  certainty"  are  synony- 
mous and  equivalent.13  Hence,  an  instruction  stating  that  "a  juror 
is  understood  to  entertain  a  reasonable  doubt  when  he  has  not 
an  abiding  conviction,  to  a  moral  certainty,  that  the  person  ac- 
cused is  guilty,"  properly  states  the  law.14 

A  charge  that  a  reasonable  doubt  is  a  doubt  for  which  a  reason 
may  be  given  is  erroneous.15  Also  an  instruction  charging  that 

9  Garfield  v.   S.   74  Ind.  60;    Key-  974,  2  App.  Div.  332  (absence  of  evi- 
nolds  v.  S.  147  Ind.  3,  46  N.  E.  31;  dence) ;  Earll  v.  P.  73  111.  329.     See 
Harris  v.  S.  155  Ind.  265,  58  N.  E.  Tomlinson  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  43 
75;   Jarrell  v.  S.  58  Ind.  293;   Frank  S.  W.  332. 

v.    S.    94   Wis.    211,    68   N.    W.    657;  12  s.  v.  Van  Tassel,  103  Iowa,   6, 

S.    v.    Kearley,    26    Kas.    77;    Law-  72  N.  W.  497. 

head   v.    S.   46   Neb.    607,   65   N.   W.  1 3  Carl  ton  .v.    P.    150    111.    192,    37 

779;    S.    v.    Gleim,    17    Mont.    17,    41  N.   E.   244;    Com.     v.     Castley,     118 

Pac.    998;    S.   v.    Schoffer,   74   Iowa,  Mass.  1;   Bailey  v.  S.  133  Ala.  155, 

704,  39  N.  W.  89;  U.  S.  v.  Jackson,  32  So.  57. 

29   Fed.   503.     Contra:      Bray  v.   S.  1*  S.  v.  Vansant,  80  Mo.  67;   Sul- 

41  Tex.  560;   Jane  v.  Com.  2  Mete,  livan   v.   S.   52   Ind.   309;    McKleroy 

(Ky.),   30;    P.   v.   Brannon,   47   Cal. '  v.  S.  77  Ala.  95;   P.  v.  Phidillia,  42 

96;    P.    v.    Bemmerly,    87    Cal.    121,  Cal.  536;   Carlton  v.  P.  150  111.  192, 

25    Pac.    266.      See    also    Com.    v.  37   N.   E.   244;    Dunn  v.   P.   109   111. 

Miller,  139  Pa.   St.  77,  21  Atl.  138,  645  (to  a  reasonable  and  moral  cer- 

23  Am.   St.   170;    S.  v.   Settleworth,  tainty) ;    Com.   v.  Webster,   5   Gush. 

18  Minn.  208.  (Mass.).   320. 

10  P.    v.    Ezzo,   104    Mich.    341,    62  is  Thompson  v.  S.  131  Ala.  18,  31 
N.  W.  407.  So.  725   (confusing);   Jimmerson  v. 

11  Ferguson  v.  S.  52  Neb.  432,  72  S.   133  Ala.   18,   32  So.   141;    Cawlev 
N.    W.    590,    66   Am.    St.   512;    S.    v.  v.  S.  133  Ala.  128,  32  So.  227;   Mor- 
Duncan,  142  Mo.  456,  44  S.  W.  263;  gan  v.  S.  48  Ohio  St.  376,  27  N.  E. 
Emery  v.  S.  101  Wis.  627,  78  N.  W.  710;  Avery  v.  S.  124  Ala.  20,  27  So. 
145;    Powell  v.  S.  95  Ga.  502,  20  S.  505.    Contra:  Ellis  v.  S.  120  Ala.  333, 
E.  483;  P.  v.  Freidland,  37  N.  Y.  S.  25  So.  1;   Dennis  v.  S.  118  Ala.  72, 


§  296  ON  REASONABLE  DOUBT.  294 

a  reasonable  doubt  must  be  a  very  reasonable  doubt  is  erro- 
neous.16 When  the  jury  are  satisfied  "to  a  moral  certainty  and 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,"  they  are  entirely  satisfied,  and  an 
instruction  which  contains  the  proposition  that  the  jury  need 
not  be  "entirely  satisfied"  is  erroneous.17 

§  296.  Instructions  on  degree  of  proof. — To  warrant  a  convic- 
tion the  evidence  must  establish  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  and  to  a  moral  certainty ;  and  the  defendant 
on  making  proper  request  is  entitled  to  have  the  term  properly 
defined.18  And  all  of  the  essential  elements  necessary  to  con- 
stitute the  crime  charged  must  be  established  to  the  same  degree 
of  certainty;  and  the  court  should  so  instruct  the  jury  if  re- 
quested.39 But  every  incidental  fact  need  not  be  established 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  An  instruction  so  requiring  is  too 
broad.20 

The  court  in  charging  the  jury  on  the  law  as  to  the  meaning 
of  reasonable  doubt  should  not  refuse  the  usual  well  known 
instruction  defining  the  term,  and  substitute  another  instead,  as, 
for  instance,  that  such  doubt  must  be  based  on  common  sense. 
To  do  so  is  error.21  That  the  jury  may  conscientiously  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  is  guilty,  does  not  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  law.  "Conscientious  belief"  does  not  mean 

23    So.    1002;    P.    v.    Stubenvoll,    62  572;  Jones  v.  S.  107  Ala.  93,  18  So. 

Mich.   329,   28  N.   W.   883;    Vann  v.  237,  error  to  refuse  instruction. 

S.  83  Ga.  44,  9  S.  E.  945;  P.  v.  Gui-  is  S.  v.  Martin,  124  Mo.  514,  28  S. 

dici,  100  N.  Y.  503,  3  N.  E.  493.  W.    12;    Snyder  v.    S.    51    Ind.    Ill; 

ic  Nelson    v.    S.    (N.    J.),    35    Atl.  S.  v.  Fannon,  158  Mo.  149,  59  S.  W. 

785.  75;   Crane  v.  S.  Ill  Ala.  45,  20  So. 

17  P.   v.   Kerrick,   52  Cal.   446;    P.  590.      Where    the    evidence    clearly 

v.  Phipps,  39  Cal.  326.  Contra:  S.  establishes  guilt  and  is  so  convinc- 
v.  Nelson,  11  Nev.  334.  .  ing  as  not  to  suggest  a  doubt,  error 

i«  Rogers  v.  S.  117  Ala.  9,  22  So.  in    refusing   to   instruct   as   to   the 

666;    Walker  v.   S.   117  Ala.   42,   23  law  of  reasonable  doubt  will  be  re- 

So.   149;    Bones  v.   S.   117  Ala.   138,  garded    as    harmless,    Suiter    v.    S. 

23   So.   138;    Godwin  v.   S.   73  Miss.  76    Ga.    105;    Van    Brown    v.    S.    34 

873,  19  So.  712.     See  also  Webb  v.  Tex.   186. 

S.  73  Miss.  456,  19  So.  238;  Wacaser  20  s.  v.  Watkins,  106  La.  380,  31 

v.  P.  134  111.  438,  25  N.  E.  564,  23  So.    10;     Wade    v.    S.    71    Ind.    541 

Am.  St.  683;  Tensing  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  (subsidiary  matters,  item   by  item. 

App.),  45  S.  W.  572;  Battle  v.  S.  103  not     to      be      established      beyond 

Ga.  53,  29  S.  E.  491;   Ison  v.  Com.  reasonable  doubt). 

23   Ky.   L.    R.    1805,   66   S.   W.    184;  21  p.    v.    Paulsill,    115    Cal.    6,    45 

Line  v.  S.  51  Ind.  172;    Lovejoy  v.  Pac.    734. 
S.  62  Ark.  478,  36  S.  W.  575;   Lens- 
ing  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  45  S.   W. 


295 


DEGREE  OF  PROOF  REQUIRED. 


§  297 


beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,2-  nor  does  "full  satisfaction  of  guilt" 
satisfy  the  law.23  A  charge  that  "if  the  facts  and  circumstances 
proved  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  are  such  as  to  satisfy 
the  jury  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,"  such  evidence  should  have 
the  same  weight  as  direct  evidence,  is  improper  in  not  requiring 
that  the  facts  themselves  must  be  established  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt.24 

§  297.  Instructions  on  probability,  possibility. — A  probability 
of  the  innocence  of  the  accused  is  equivalent  to  reasonable  doubt ; 
hence,  the  refusal  to  charge  the  jury  that  "if  there  is  a  probabil- 
ity of  the  defendant's  innocence  he  should  be  acquitted"  is 
error.25  The  evidence  is  not  required  to  exclude  the  possibility 
of  innocence.  Accordingly  an  instruction  defining  a  reasonable 
doubt  to  be  a  serious-,  substantial  and  well  founded  doubt  and 
not  the  mere  possibility  of  a  doubt,  is  proper.26  And  an  instruc- 
tion calling  for  proof  strong  enough  to  exclude  the  possibility 
of  the  innocence  of  the  accused  is,  therefore,  properly  refused.27 


22  Orr   v.   S.    (Miss.),   18   So.   118; 
Johnson   v.   S.    (Miss.),   16   So.   494; 
Hemphill  v.  S.  71  Miss.  877,  16  So. 
261;  Brown  v.  S.  72  Miss.  95,  16  So. 
202;    Brown  v.   S.   72   Miss.   997,   17 
So.    278. 

23  Williams    v.    S.    73    Miss.    820, 
19  So.  826.     See  also  Burton  v.   S. 
107  Ala.  108,  18  So.  284;   Rucker  v. 
S.   (Miss.),  18  So.  121;   Compton  v. 
S.  110  Ala.  24,  20  So.  119. 

24  Gill  v.  S.  59  Ark.  422,  27  S.  W. 
598.     An  instruction  conveying  the 
impression   that   the   jury    are   au- 
thorized to  convict  of  a  misdemean- 
or on  lighter  evidence  than  is  re- 
quired  to   warrant  a   conviction   of 
other  offenses  of  a  graver  nature, 
is  erroneous,  P.  v.  Chartoff,  75  N. 
Y.   S.   1088,   75  App.   Div.  555. 

25  Whitaker  v.  S.  106  Ala.  30,  17 
So.  456;   Shaw  v.  S.  125  Ala.  80,  28 
So.   390;    Bones  v.   S.   117  Ala.   138, 
23  So.  138;   Croft  v.  S.  95  Ala.  3,  10 
So.    517;     Spraggins    v.    S.     (Ala.), 
35   So.    1002.     Instructing   the   jury 
that  even  after  the  evidence  has  re- 
moved   all    probability    of    the    de- 
fendant's   innocence    the    law    says 
the   jury   may   entertain   a   reason- 
able doubt  of  his  guilt  and  find  him 


not  guilty,  is  improper  in  that  it  is 
misleading.  Bell  v.  S.  115  Ala.  25, 
22  So.  526.  See  Pickens  v.  S.  115 
Ala.  42,  22  So.  551;  Adams  v.  S. 
115  Ala.  90,  22  So.  612,  67  Am.  St. 
17. 

26  Earll   v.   P.   73   111.   329;    Smith 
v.   P.  74  111.  146;    S.  v.  McCune,  16 
Utah,  170,  51  Pac.  818;   Little  v.  S. 
89  Ala.   99,   8  So.   82;    S.  v.   David, 
131    Mo.    380,    33    S.    W.    28;    S.    v. 
Dickey,  48  W.  Va.  325,  37  S.  E.  695; 
S.   v.   Cushenberry,  157  Mo.   168,  56 
S.  W.  737;   McArthur  v.  S.  60  Neb. 
390     ("fanciful     suppositions") ;     S. 
v.  Krug,  12  Wash.  288,  41  Pac.  126 
("imaginary") ;    Densmore  v.   S.   67 
Ind.  306  (conjecture). 

27  Morris  v.  S.  124  Ala.  44,  27  So. 
336;    P.   v.    Smith,    105   Cal.    676,   39 
Pac.  38;  S.  v.  Garrison,  147  Mo.  548, 
49  S.  W.  508;  Karr  v.  S.  106  Ala.  1, 
17   So.    328;    Le   Cointe   v.    U.    S.    7 
App.  Gas.   (D.  C.)  16;   Powell  v.  S. 
95  Ga.  502,  20  S.  E.  483;  S.  v.  Edie, 
147   Mo.    535,    49    S.   W.    563;    P.    v. 
Benham,    160   N.    Y.    402,    55   N.    E. 
11    (absolute   and    positive   proof); 
Emery  v.  S.  101  Wis.  627,  78  N.  W. 
145;   S.  v.  Ostrander.  18  Iowa,  437. 
See  also  Bodine  v.  S.  129  Ala.  106, 


298 


ON    REASONABLE   DOUBT. 


296 


But  it  is  error  to  instruct  that  the  rule  requiring  the  guilt  of 
the  defendant  to  be  established  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  does 
not  mean  that  it  shall  be  "conclusively  established."28 

The  law  does  not  require  proof  of  guilt  to  a  mathematical 
certainty;29  nor  does  it  require  proof  to  an  absolute  certainty.30 
A  charge  that  absolute  certainty  is  not  required  and  it  is  rarely, 
if  ever,  possible  in  any  case;  but  to  justify  a  conviction,  the  evi- 
'dence  when  taken  as  a  whole  and  fairly  considered  must  so  satisfy 
your  judgments  and  consciences  as  to  exclude  every  other 
reasonable  conclusion,  has  been  held  proper.31  But  in  Alabama 
it  has  been  held  that  an  instruction  charging  that  unless  the  evi- 
dence excludes  to  a  moral  certainty  every  reasonable  hypothesis 
but  that  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  the  jury  must  acquit,  is  erro- 
neous as  requiring  too  high  a  degree  of  proof.32 

§  298.  Instruction  on  hunting  up  doubts. — The  jury  must  con- 
fine themselves  to  the  evidence  before  them;  they  cannot  go 

jury,  after  having  heard  all  the 
evidence,  feel  a  desire  for  more  evi- 
dence showing  the  defendant's 
guilt,  they  have  a  reasonable  doubt, 
Newell  v.  S.  115  Ala.  54,  22  So. 
572. 

Misleading:  "The  court  instructs 
the  jury  that  a  reasonable  doubt 
to  warrant  an  acquital  in  a  crim- 
inal case  is  not  a  mere  possible 
doubt,  but  is  such  a  doubt  as, 
after  mature  comparison  and 
consideration  of  all  the  evidence, 
leaves  the  minds  of  the  jurors  in 
such  a  condition  that  they  cannot 
say  they  feel  an  abiding  conviction 
to  a  moral  certainty  of  the  truth 
of  the  charge,  or  for  which  a  reason 
can  be  given."  This  instruction 
was  held  bad  because  it  is  uncertain 
whether  the  last  clause,  "or  for 
which  a  reason  can  be  given,"  qual- 
ifies the  word  "doubt"  or  the  word 
"conviction,"  thereby  making  the 
instruction  misleading.  S.  v.  Shep- 
pard,  49  W.  Va.  582,  39  S.  E.  676. 
See  Cleavenger  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  65  S.  W.  89  (held  bad  also). 
See  also  Patzwald  v.  U.  S.  7  Okla. 
232,  54  Pac.  458;  P.  v.  Swartz,  118 
Mich.  292,  76  N.  W.  491  (not  mis- 
leading); Brown  v.  S.  128  Ala.  12, 
29  So.  200  (misleading). 


29  So.  926;  Griffith  v.  S.  90  Ala.  583 
("clear  and  distinct  proof"),  8  So. 
812;  Whatley  v.  S.  91  Ala.  108 
(absolute  belief),  9  So.  236;  White 
v.  S.  133  Ala.  122,  32  So.  139;  P.  v. 
Davis,  135  Cal.  162,  67  Pac.  59; 
Com.  v.  Devine,  18  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
431;  S.  v.  Good,  132  Mo.  114,  33 
S.  W.  790;  Abram  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  44,  35  S.  W.  389,  instruction 
as  to  possibility  of  innocence  held 
erroneous. 

ss  p.  v.  Stephenson,  32  N.  Y.  S. 
1112,  11  Misc.  141. 

29  Davis  v.  S.  114  Ga.  104,  33  S. 
E.  906;  P.  v.  Hecker,  109  Cal.  451, 

42  Pac.    307,    "absolute   moral    cer- 
tainty" not  required;   Jeffries  v.  S. 
77   Miss.    757,   28   So.    948;    Mose   v. 
S.   36  Ala.   211   (circumstantial  evi- 
dence). 

so  S.  v.  Marshall,  105  Iowa,  38, 
74  N.  W.  763.  See  Carleton  v.  S. 

43  Neb.    373,   61   N.   W.   699. 

si  S.  v.  Marshall,  105  Iowa,  38. 
74  N,  W.  763.  See  Carleton  v.  S. 
43  Neb.  373.  61  N.  W.  699. 

32  Barnes  v.  S.  Ill  Ala.  56,  20 
So.  565;  Gafford  v.  S.  122  Ala.  54, 
25  So.  10.  See  Yarbrough  v.  S. 
115  Ala.  92,  22  So.  534.  See  Dermis 
v.  S.  118  Ala.  72,  23  So.  1002.  It  is 
improper  to  instruct  that  if  the 


297  '   HUNTING  DOUBTS ARISING   FROM   EVIDENCE.  §    299 

beyond  the  evidence  to  seek  for  or  to  hunt  up  doubts,  nor  must 
they  entertain  such  doubts  as  are  merely  chimerical  or  conjectural. 
An  instruction  so  charging  is  proper.33  Especially  is  such  an 
instruction  proper  where  the  law  as  to  the  presumption  of  inno- 
cence has  been  fully  and  accurately  stated  in  other  instructions 
of  the  charge.34 

§  299.  Doubt  arises  from  whole  evidence — And  a  reasonable 
doubt  which  will  authorize  an  acquittal  is  one  as  to  the  guilt 
of  the  accused  on  the  whole  of  the  evidence  and  not  as  to  any  par- 
ticular fact.35  Thus  an  instruction  that  "the  reasonable  doubt 
the  jury  are  permitted  to  entertain  must  be  as  to  the  guilt  of  the 
accused  on  the  whole  of  the  evidence  and  not  as  to  any  particular 
fact  in  the  case"  is  proper.36  Also  an  instruction  "that  the 
rule  requiring  the  jury  to  be  satisfied  of  the  defendant's  guilt 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  in  order  to  warrant  a  conviction  does 
not  require  that  the  jury  should  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  of  each  link  in  the  chain  of  circumstances  relied  upon  to 
establish  the  defendant's  guilt;  it  is  sufficient  if,  taking  the 
testimony  altogether,  the  jury  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  state  Has  proved  each  material  fact  charged  and 
that  the  defendant  is  guilty,"  properly  states  the  law.37  It  is_ 
therefore,  proper  to  refuse  an  instruction  which  directs  the  atten- 
tion of  the  jury  to  some  particular  fact  or  facts  in  the  case  requir 
ing  proof  of  such  facts  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.38 

33  Miller    v.    P.    39    111.    457,    463;  111.     86,     29     N.     E.     192;     Leigh 

Voght  v.   S.   145   Ind.   12,  43  N.   E.  v.    P.    113    111.    372;    Bressler   v.    P. 

1049;    S.   v.   Elsham,   70   Iowa,   531,  117  111.  422,  8  N.  E.  62;  Miller  v.  P, 

31   N.   W.   66.  39   111.   457;    May  v.   P.   60  111.   119; 

3*  S.  v.  Nichols,  50  La.  Ann.  699,  Hoge  v.  P.  117  111.  35,  6  N.  E.  796. 

23  So.  980.  Contra:     S.  v.  Gleim,  17  Mont.  17, 

35  Mullins  v.  P.  110  111.  47;  Crews  41  Pac.  998,  10  Am.  Cr.  R.  52, 
v.    P.    120    111.    321,    11    N.    E.    404;          ?.-  Bradshaw  v.  S.  17  Neb.  147,  22 

Williams  v.  P.  166  111.  136,  46  N.  E.  N.  W.  361,  5  Am.  Cr.  R.  499;   Gott 

749;  Weaver  v.  P.  132  111.  536,  24  N.  v.    P.    187    111.    249,    58    N.    E.    293; 

E.    571;    Acker    v.    S.    52    N.    J.    L.  Allen  v.  S.  60  Ala.  19;  Morgan  v.  S. 

259;    S.   v.    Stewart,    52    Iowa,   284;  51  Neb.  672,  71  N.  W.  788;  Sumner 

Nix  v.  S.  97  Ga.  211;   Carr  v.  S.  84  v.  S.  5  Blackf.   (Ind.),  579,  36  Am. 

Ga.   250;    Barker  v.   S.   126  Ala.  69,  Dec.  561;  S.  v.  Hayden,  45  Iowa,  11; 

28    So.    685:    McCullough    v.    S.    23  Rudy  v.  Com.  128  Pa.  St.  500,  18  Atl. 

Tex.  App.  626;  Gordon  v.  S.  129  Ala.  344. 
113,  30  So.  30.  ss  Qchs  v.  P.  124  111.  399,  429,  16 

so  Hughes  Cr.  Law  §  3263,  citing:  N.   E.    662;    Bressler  v.   P.   117   111. 

Carl  ton  v.  P.  150  111.  181,  37  N.  E.  439,  8  N.  E.  62;  Davis  v.  P.  114  111. 

244,  41  Am.   St.  346;   Mullins  v.   P.  86,    98,   29   N.   E.    192;    Leigh    v.   P. 

110     111.     42;      Davis     v.     P.     114  113  111.   379;   Mullins  v.  P.   110  111. 


§  300  ON  REASONABLE  DOUBT.  298 

So  an  instruction  that  a  reasonable  doubt  need  not  arise  from 
the  whole  evidence  but  may  arise  from  a  part  of  it,  is  properly 
refused.  The  reasonable  doubt  to  justify  an  acquittal  must  arise, 
if  at  all,  from  the  whole  of  the  evidence  taken  together.39  As 
previously  stated,  a  reasonable  doubt  must  arise  out  of  the  evi- 
dence or  from  a  want  of  evidence.  Hence  an  instruction  stating 
that  "if  a  reasonable  doubt  is  raised  by  the  ingenuity  of  counsel 
upon  any  hypothesis  reasonably  consistent  with  the  evidence" 
the  jury  should  acquit  the  defendant,  is  improper.40  So  a  charge 
that  the  impeachment  of  one  or  more  of  the  witnesses  for  the  state 
might  generate  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant 
is  improper.41 

§300.    Modification  of  instruction  on  reasonable  doubt. — The 

modification  of  an  instruction  by  changing  the  phrase  "from  all 
reasonable  doubt"  to  "a  reasonable  doubt"  is  not  error  and  af- 
fords no  ground  for  complaint.42  An  instruction  on  reasonable 
doubt,  requested  in  behalf  of  the  defendant,  which  correctly  states 
the  law,  may  be  modified  without  committing  error,  so  as  to  pre- 
sent the  theory  of  the  prosecution  on  the  same  doctrine;  as,  for 
instance,  after  correctly  stating  the  rule  for  the  defendant  it  is 
proper  to  add:  "But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  you  are  satisfied  of  the 
guilt  of  the  accused  to  a  reasonable  and  moral  certainty,  then  it 
would  be  your  duty  to  find  him  guilty."43  So  a  charge  that  the 
law  presumes  that  the  defendant  is  innocent  of  the  crime  with 
which  he  is  charged  until  he  is  proved  guilty  by  competent  evi- 
dence beyond  a  reasonable  doubt ;  and  if  the  evidence  leaves  in  the 
minds  of  the  jury  any  reasonable  doubt  of  the  defendant's  guilt 
the  law  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  acquit  him,  is  properly 
modified  by  striking  out  the  phrase  "beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt."44 

42;   Mann  v.   S.   134  Ala.   1,  32  So.  Com.  99  Va.  848,  38  S.  E.  184.    See 

704;   Winter  v.   S.  133  Ala.   176,  32  P.  v.   Kaiser,  119  Gal.  456,  51  Pac. 

So.  125;   Liner  v.  S.  124  Ala.  1,  27  702;    Walker   v.    S.    (Ala.),    35    So. 

So.   438;    Barker  v.   S.   126  Ala.   69,  1011. 

28  So.  685;   S.  v.  Dunn,  18  Mo.  419.  «  Crawford   v.   S.   112   Ala.   1,   21 

Contra:     Com.  v.  Leonard,  40  Mass.  So.  214;  Cobb  v.  S.  115,  Ala.  18,  22 

473.  So.    506. 

so  Bryant  v.  S.  34  Fla.  291,  16  So.  42  p.    v.   Burns,   121   Cal.    529,   53 

177;    S.   v.   Myers,  12  Wash.   77,  40  Pac.    1096. 

Pac.   626.  43  Bone  v.  S.  102  Ga.  387,  30  S.  B. 

•to  P.   v.  Wells,   112  Mich.   648,   71  845;  Mclntosh  v.  S.  151  Ind.  251,  51 

N.   W.   176;    P.   v.   Ammerman.   118  N.  E.  354. 

Cal.   23,   50  Pac.   15;    United   States  44  Schintz   v.   P.   178    111.    320,    52 

v.   Harper,   33  Fed.   471;    Horton  v.  N.  E.  903. 


299  DOUBT  AS  TO  EACH  JUROR.  §  301 

§  301.  Instruction  as  to  each  juror. — Each  juror  must  be  sat- 
isfied beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  is  guilty  as 
charged,  before  he  can,  under  his  oath,  consent  to  a  verdict 
of  conviction.  So  an  instruction  that  if  any  one  of  the  jurors, 
after  having  duly  considered  all  the  evidence,  and  after  having 
consulted  with  his  fellow-jurymen,  entertains  such  reasonable 
doubt,  the  jury  cannot,  in  such  case,  find  the  defendant  guilty, 
is  correct  in  point  of  law.45  Also  a  charge  that  ''if  after  con- 
sideration of  the  whole  case,  any  juror  should  entertain  a  reason- 
able doubt  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant,  it  is  the  duty  of  such 
juror  so  entertaining  such  doubt  not  to  vote  for  a  verdict  of 
guilty,  nor  to  be  influenced  in  so  voting  for  the  single  reason  that 
a  majority  of  the  jury  should  be  in  favor  of  a  verdict  of  guilty," 
has  been  approved.46 

A  charge  that  "if  any  one  of  the  jurors  has  a  reasonable  doubt 
of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant,  they  are  not,  for  that  reason, 
required  to  acquit,"  is  not  improper,  for  the  reason  that  a  lack 
of  unanimity  does  not  necessarily  require  an  acquittal.  A  mistrial 
may  be  proper.47  But  a  charge  that  "if  there  be  one  juryman  who 
believes  the  state  has  not  proved  the  defendant  guilty  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  and  to  a  moral  certainty,  then  such  juryman 
should  not  consent  to  a  verdict"  has  been  held  bad,  in  that  it  is 
calculated  to  impress  the  mind  of  a  juror  with  the  idea  that 
his  verdict  must  be  reached  and  adhered  to  without  the  aid  of 
that  consideration  and  deliberation  with  his  fellow-jurors  which 
the  law  requires.48  Also  an  instruction  that  if  any  juror  is  not 

45  Meehan  v.  S.   (Wis.),  97  N.  W.  35  So.  221;   Davis  v.  S.  63  Ohio  St. 

174;   Castle  v.  S.  75  Ind.  146;   Stitz  173,  57  N.  E.  1099;  Cook  v.  S.  (Fla.), 

v.    S.    104    Ind.    359;     S.    V.    Ryno  35   So.   669. 

(Kas.),  74  Pac.  1111;   Parker  v.   S.  46  P.    v.    Dole,    122    Cal.    486,    55 

136  Ind.   284,  35  N.  B.   1105;    Shen-  Pac.  581.  68  Am.  St.  50. 

kenberger    v.    S.    154    Ind.    643,    57  47  Neville  v.  S.  133  Ala.  29,  32  So. 

N.    E.    519;    Fassinon  v.    S.    89    Ind.  596;    Andrews  v.   S.  134  Ala.  47,  32 

235;    Fletcher  v.  S.  132  Ala.  10,  31  So.    665.     See   S.   T.    Rorbacher,    19 

So.   561;    S.  v.   Howell,  26  Mont.   3,  Iowa,  155. 

66  Pac.  293;    Grimes  v.  S.   105  Ala.  48  Cunningham  v.  S.  117  Ala.   59, 

86,  17  So.  184;  S.  v.  Rodgers,  56  Kas.  23  So.  693;  Goldsmith  v.  S.  105  Ala. 

362,   43   Pac.   256.     See   Little   v.    S.  8,    16    So.    933;    Pickens    v.    S.    115 

157  111.  157,  42  N.  E.  389.     Contra:  Ala.    42,   22   So.   551;    P.   v.   Rodley, 

Hodge  v.  Ter.  (Okla.),  69  Pac.  1080;  131  Cal.  240,  63  Pac.  251;  S.  v.  Rath- 

S.  v.  Garth,   164  Mo.  553,  65  S.  W.  bun,  74  Conn.  524,  51  Atl.  540;   Da- 

275;    S.   v.   Young,   105  Mo.    640,   16  vis  v.  S.  63  Ohio  St.  173  (held  mis- 

S.  W.  408;  Fogarty  v.  S.  80  Ga.  450,  leading).      See,    also,    S.    v.    Robin- 

5  S.  E.  782;   Baldwin  v.  S.    (Fla.),  son,  12  Wash.  491,  41  Pac.   884. 


§  302  ON  REASONABLE  DOUBT.  300 

satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant,, 
his  duty  requires  that  he  should  refuse  to  agree  to  a  verdict 
of  guilty,  that  a  juror  is  not  expected  to  surrender  his  individual 
judgment  in  order  to  reach  an  agreement,  has  been  held  improper 
as  being  an  invitation  to  the  jury  to  disagree.40 

§  302.  Instruction  that  jurors  "believe  as  men." — In  charging 
the  jury  on  the  subject  of  reasonable  doubt  it  is  not  improper  to 
state  that  "a  juror  is  not  at  liberty  to  disbelieve  as  a  juror  what 
he  believes  as  a  man;"50  or  to  instruct  that  their  oaths  impose 
upon  them  no  obligation  to  doubt  where  no  doubt  would  have 
existed  if  no  oath  had  been  administered,  is  not  objectionable.51 
Also  an  instruction,  "you  should  be  convinced  as  jurors  where 
you  would  be  convinced  as  citizens,  and  you  should  doubt  as 
jurors  only  where  you  would  doubt  as  men"  from  the  evidence, 
is  proper.52 

49  S.  v.  Rue,  72  Minn.  296,  75  N.  S.  46  Neb.  607,  65  N.  W.  779;  P.  v. 

W.    235;    P.    v.    Hill,    116    Cal.    562,  Wayman,    128  N.   Y.   587,   27   N.   E. 

48   Pac.    711;    Little   v.    P.    157    111.  1070;    S.  v.  Pierce,   65  Iowa,  85,  21 

153,  42  N.  E.  389;   S.  v.  Taylor,  134  N.    W.    195;    Fan  ton   v.    S.    50   Neb. 

Mo.    109,    35    S.    W.    92;    S.    v.    Fry,  351,  69  N.  W.  953;   S.  v.  Bridges,  29 

67   Iowa,   475,   25   N.   W.   738.  Kas.    138;     Adams    v.    S.    135    Ind. 

so  p.  v.  Worden,  113  Cal.  569,  45  571,  34  N.  E.  956. 

Pac.  844;   Leisenberg  v.  S.  60  Neb.  si  Barney   v.    S.    49   Neb.    515,   68 

628,   84   N.   W.   6;    Bartley   v.    S.   53  N.    W.    636;    Fanton   v.    S.    50    Neb. 

Neb.   310,  73  N.  W.  744.     See  S.  v.  351,  69  N.  W.  953,  36  L.  R.  A.  158; 

Elsham,  70  Iowa,  531,  31  N.  W.  66.  Bartley  v.  S.  53  Neb.  310,  73  N.  W. 

Contra:    P.   v.   Johnson,   140   N.    Y.  744. 

350,  35  N.  E.  604;    Cross  v.   S.  132  52  McMeen    v.    Com.    114    Pa.    St. 

Ind.  65,  31  N.  E.  473;    Lawhead  v.  300,   9   Atl.    878. 


CHAPTER     XX. 

ON  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

303.  When     evidence     is     circum-      310.    Circumstances    mu&t   be   con- 

stantial.  sistent  with   guilt. 

304.  When   evidence   is   direct  and      311.    Essential   facts   need   only   be 

circumstantial.  consistent. 

305.  Instructing     on     comparative      312.    Essential      facts — Degree      of 

weight   improper.  proof. 

306.  Instructions    improper — Illus-      313.    Omission    of   words   from    in- 

trations.  struction — Effect. 

307.  Instructions    not    improper —      314.    Omission  of  words  not  fatal — 

Illustrations.  Illustrations. 

308.  Drawing     inferences — Instruc-      315.     Illustrations  of  the  rules. 

tions. 

309.  Instructing     to      convict     on 

proof    of    certain    facts — Ef- 
fect. 

§  303.  When  evidence  is  circumstantial. — ' '  Circumstantial  evi- 
dence is  legal  and  competent  evidence  in  criminal  cases ;  and  if  it 
is  of  such  character  as  to  exclude  every  reasonable  hypothesis 
other  than  that  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant,  it  is  sufficient  to 
authorize  a  conviction."  In  other  words,  circumstantial  evi- 
dence alone  is  sufficient  to  authorize  a  conviction  when  it  con- 
vinces the  jury  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt.1  And  in  charging  the  jury  the  court  may  properly  cau- 

i  Cunningham  v.   S.   56  Neb.  691,  280;    S.  v.  Hunter,  50  Kas.  302,  32 

77    N.    W.    60;    Hughes    Cr.    Law,  Pac.  37;   S.  v.  Elsham,  7  Iowa,  531, 

§  3204,  citing,  Carlton  v.  P.  150  111.  31  N.  W.  66.  Facts  may  be  proved 

187,  37  N.  E.  244,  41  Am.  St.  346;  P.  in  civil  as  well  as  criminal  cases  by 

v.  Daniels  (Cal.)  34  Pac.  233;  S.  v.  circumstantial    evidence,     Jones   v. 

Avery,  113  Mo.  475,  21  S.  W.  193;  S.  Hess   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  48  S.  W.  46. 
v.   Slingerland,  19  Neb.  141,  7  Pac. 

301 


§  304 


ON   CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE. 


302 


tion  them  that  it  is  wrong  to  have  a  prejudice  against  convicting 
on  circumstantial  evidence. - 

Where  the  evidence  against  the  accused  is  entirely  circum- 
stantial, the  court  should,  when  properly  requested,  charge  the 
jury  on  the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence,  and  a  refusal  to  do 
so  is  usually  reversible  error.3  The  fact,  however,  that  the 
.court  did  not  fully  and  sufficiently  instruct  on  the  law  of  cir- 
cumstantial evidence  affords  no  ground  to  complain  of  error  in 
the  absence  of  a  request  for  a  more  specific  charge.4  But  accord- 
ing to  the  practice  in  some  jurisdictions  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  instruct  on  the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence  whether  re- 
quested to  do  so  or  not.5 

§  304.    When  evidence  is  direct  and  circumstantial. — But  if  the 

evidence  is  both  direct  and  -circumstantial  a  party  cannot  insist 
on  having  the  jury  charged  on  the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence. 
The  rule  governs  only  where  a  conviction  depends  entirely  upon 
such  evidence.6  It  is  not  improper,  however,  to  instruct  on 


2  S.  v.  Aughtry,  49  S.  Car.  285, 
26  S.  E.  619. 

s  Hank  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  56 
S.  W.  922;  Davis  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  54  S.  W.  583;  Arismendis  v. 
S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  374,  54  S.  W. 
599;  Rountree  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
58  S.  W.  106;  Jones  v.  S.  105  Ga. 
649,  31  S.  E.  574;  Ter.  v.  Lermo,  8 
N.  Mex.  566,  46  Pac.  10;  Lopez  v.  S. 
37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  649,  40  S.  W.  972; 
Polanka  v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  634, 
28  S.  W.  541;  Adams  v.  S.  34  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  470,  31  S.  W.  372;  Left- 
wich  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  489,  31 
S.  W.  385  (facts  stated).  Contra: 
Richards  v.  S.  (Ga.),  27  S.  E.  726. 
See  Crews  v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
533,  31  S.  W.  373;  S.  v.  Austin,  129 
N.  Car.  534,  40  S.  E.  4;  Season  v. 
S.  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  442,  67  S.  W. 
96;  Hart  v.  S.  (Ga.),  23  S.  E.  831; 
Green  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  34  S. 
W.  283;  Childers  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  392,'  35  S.  W.  654  (owner  of 
property  involved  circumstantial) ; 
Ter.  v.  Lermo,  8  N.  Mex.  566,  46 
,Pac.  16;  P.  v.  Scott,  10  Utah,  217, 
37  Pac.  335;  S.  v.  Moxley,  102.  Mo. 
374,  14  S.  W.  969,  15  S.  W.  556;  Bo^d 
v.  S.  24  Tex.  App.  570;  U.  S.  Express 


Co.  v.  Jenkins,  64  Wis.  542,  25  N. 
W.  549;  S.  v.  Donnelly,  130  Mo.  642, 
32  S.  W.  1124. 

*  Barnett  v.  Farmers'  M.  F.  Ins. 
Co.  115  Mich.  247,  73  N.  W.  372; 
Ponder  v.  S.  115  Ga.  831,  42  S.  E. 
224. 

s  Jones  v.  S.  105  Ga.  649,  31  S.  E. 
574.  See,  also,  P.  v.  Scott,  10  Utah, 
217,  37  Pac.  335;  S.  v.  Donnelly,  130 
Mo.  642,  32  S.  W.  1124;  Martin  v. 
S.  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  441,  24  S.  W.  512; 
Childers  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  35 
S.  W.  654. 

s  Grover  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  46 
S  W.  824;  Williams  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  45  S.  W.  494;  Taylor  v.  S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  42  S.  W.  285;  Hous- 
ton v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  47  S.  W. 
468;  Rios  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
675,  47  S.  W.  987;  Colter  v.  S. 

37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  284,  39  S.  W.  576; 
Rodgers  v.  S.  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  563, 

38  S.   W.    184;    Moore   v.   S.   97   Ga. 
759,    25    S.   E.    362;    Upchurch   v.    S. 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  39  S.  W.  371;  Evans 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  31  S.  W.  648; 
Carmarillo   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 
68  S.  W.  795;  Roberts  v.  Port  Blake- 
ly  Mill  Co.  30  Wash.  25,  70  Pac.  Ill; 
S.   v.   Donnelly,   130   Mo.   642,   32   S. 


303  WHEN  EVIDENCE  DIRECT  AND  CIRCUMSTANTIAL.  §    304 

circumstantial  evidence  where  the  evidence  is  largely  circum- 
stantial; but  the  court  is  not  bound  to  do  so.7  So  where  the 
whole  of  the  evidence  is  given  by  eye  witnesses  to  the  transaction 
in  question  an  instruction  as  to  the  weight  of  circumstantial  evi- 
dence is  improper.8  And  if  the  evidence  is  composed  of  both  di- 
rect and  circumstantial  the  refusal  to  charge  the  jury  that  the  bur- 
den is  on  the  prosecution  to  establish  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
the  existence  of  each  link  in  the  chain  of  circumstances  is  not 
ground  for  error.9  So  if  there  is  any  direct  evidence  fairly 
tending  to  connect  the  defendant  with  the  commission  of  the 
crime  charged  he  is  not  entitled  to  have  the  jury  instructed  on 
the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence.10 

The  failure  of  the  court  to  charge  on  circumstantial  evidence 
where  there  is  positive  evidence  of  the  commission  of  the  offense 
charged,  though  given  by  an  accomplice  only,  is  not  error.11 
Also,  if  the  accused  admits  that  he  committed  the  crime  charged, 
the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence  need  not  be  given  to  the 
jury.12  And  if  the  defendant  confesses  his  guilt  as  charged, 
he  cannot  insist  upon  instructions  on  circumstantial  evidence, 
where  the  corpus  delicti  is  clearly  established  by  other  competent 

W.  1124;  Granado  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  Pac.  903;  Nite  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

App.  426,  35  S.  W.  1069;   P.  v.  Lena  340,    54   S.   W.    763;    Hodge   v.    Ter. 

Deo,    132    Cal.    199,    64    Pac.    265;  (Okla.),  69  Pac.  1077. 

Rains  v.  S.  88  Ala.  91,  70  So.  315.  10  Alexander    v.    S.    40    Tex.    Cr. 

7  Rountree  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  App.   395,   49   S.   W.   229;    Givens  v. 

58  S.  W.  106.                                '  S.   34   Tex.   Cr.   App.   563,  34   S.  W. 

s  Welch  v.  S.  124  Ala.  41,  27  So.  626. 

307;   Red  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  53  11  Wampler    v.    S.    28    Tex.    App. 

S.    W.    618;    Wolf    v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.  352;    Rios  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  48 

App.),    53    S.    W.    108;    Leftwick    v.  S.  W.   505:    Vaughan  v.   S.   57   Ark. 

S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  55  S.  W.  571;  P.  1,   20   S.   W.   588;    Kidwell   v.    S.   35 

v.  Burns,  121  Cal.  529,  53  Pac.  1096;  Tex.    Cr.    App.    264,    33    S.    W.    342; 

Campbell  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  160,  S.   v.   Donnelly,   130  Mo.   642,   32   S. 

38  S.  W.  171;   Purvis  v.  S.  71  Miss.  W.    1124;    Thompson  v.    S.    33   Tex. 

706,  14  So.  268;    Thompson  v.  S.  33  Cr.  App.  217,  26  S.  W.  198. 

Tex.    Cr.    App.    217,    26   S.    W.    198;  12  Franks   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.), 

Vaughan    v.    S.    37    Ark.    1;    S.    v.  45  S.  W.  1013;   Jackson  v.  S.   (Tex. 

Fairlamb,  121  Mo.  137,  25  S.  W.  895;  Cr.  App.),  62  S.  W.  914;   Paul  v.  S. 

Moore   v.    S.    97    Ga.    759,    25    S.    E.  (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    45    S.    W.    725; 

362;    Purvis   v.   S.   71   Miss.   706,   14  Smith   v.   S.   24   Tex.   Cr.   App.   265, 

So.  268;    Granado  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  30  S.   W.   236;    S.   v.   Robinson,   117 

App.  426,  35  S.  W.  1069;  Gann  v.  S.  Mo.  649,  23  S.  W.  1066;  Albritton  v. 

(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  59  S.  W.  896;  Evans  S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),   26   S.   W.    398; 

v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    31    S.    W.  White  v.  S.  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  625,  25 

648,    that    the    eye   witness    is    the  S.  W.  784;  Perry  v.  S.  110  Ga.  234, 

prosecuting  witness  is  sufficient  to  36    S.    E.    781;    Langdon   v.   P.    133 

take  the  case  out  of  the  rule.  111.  408,  24  N.  E.  874. 

a  S.   v.   Calder,  23   Mont.   504,   59 


§    305  ON   CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE. 

evidence.13  So,  also,  where  the  only  issue  or  defense  is  insanity 
on  which  the  evidence  is  direct,  the  court  may  properly  refuse  to 
instruct  on  circumstantial  evidence.14  And  in  a  larceny  case 
if  the  taking  of  the  property  be  admitted,  but  claimed  to  have 
been  lawfully  taken,  it  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  charge  on  cir- 
cumstantial evidence  even  for  the  purpose  of  proving  criminal 
intent.15  But  where  only  possession  of  stolen  property  is  relied  on 
to  connect  the  accused  with  the  commission  of  the  offense  charged, 
the  court  cannot  properly  refuse  to  instruct  on  circumstan- 
tial evidence.16 

§  305.  Instructing  on  comparative  weight  improper. — Where 
an  instruction  contains  any  comment  as  to  the  comparative 
weight  of  direct  and  circumstantial  evidence,  or  upon  the  relia- 
bility of  the  one  kind  as  compared  with  the  other,  it  is  improper 
as  a  comment  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence  and  may  be  refused. 
Thus  a  charge  stating  that  "the  law  makes  no  distinction  between 
circumstantial  and  positive  evidence"  is  improper  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  qualification  as  to  the  care  to  be  used  in  considering 
circumstantial  evidence.17  Or  to  charge  that  circumstantial  evi- 
dence is  often  more  reliable  than  direct  testimony  of  eye  witnesses, 
and  a  verdict  of  guilty  in  such  cases  may  rest  on  a  surer  basis 
than  when  rendered  upon  the  testimony  of  eye  witnesses  whose 
memory  must  be  relied  upon  and  whose  passions  or  prejudices 
may  have  influenced  them,  is  error.18*  So,  also,  to  charge  the 
jury  that  "circumstantial  evidence  is  just  as  good  and  convincing 
and  just  as  reliable  as  direct  and  positive  evidence  when  properly 

"  Dennis  v.  S.  118  Ala.  72,  23  So.  66  S.  W.   1102;   Poston  v.   S.    (Tex. 

1002;  Carmona  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  Cr.  App.),  35  S.  W.  656;   Stewart  v. 

«5   S.   W.    928;    Hannigan  v.   S.   131  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  77  S.  W.  791. 

Ala.  29,  31  So.  89;  S.  v.  Armstrong,  "  Burt  v.  S.  72  Miss.  408,  16  So. 

167  Mo.  257,  66  S.  W.  961;  Roberts  v.  342,  48  Am.  St.  563,  note;  S.  v.  Dot- 

S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  70  S.  W.  423;  S.  son,  26  Mont.  ?05,  67  Pac.   938.     A 

v.   Gartrell,   171  Mo.   489,   71  S.   W.  charge  that  all  the  evidence  relied 

1045;    Wampler   v.    S.    28   Tex.    Cr.  upon  to  connect  the  defendant  with 

App.   352    (direct   proof  by   accom-  the     commission     of     the      crim/e 

plice) ;    Green   v.   S.   97  Ala.   59,   12  charged  is  circumstantial,  has  been 

So.    416,   15   So.    242.  held  to  be  improper  as  a  comment 

14  S.  v.  Soper,  148  Mo.  217,  49  S.  upon   the   evidence,   S.   v.   Aughtry, 

W.   1007.  49  S.  Car.  285,  26  S.  B.  619. 

is  Houston  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  is  S.  v.  Musgrave,  43  W.  Va.  676. 

47  S.  W.  468;   Gann  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  28    S.  '  E.    813;    P.    v.    O'Brien,    130 

App.),  59  S.  W.  896  (ownership  the  Cal.  1,  62  Pac.  297.  See  Gibson  v.  S. 

only  question  contested).  76  Miss.  136,  23  So.  582. 

ie  Wallace  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 


305  COMPARATIVE  WEIGHT ILLUSTRATIONS.  §    307 

linked  together"  is  improper,  in  that  it  invades  the  province  of  the 
jury.19  The  court  may,  however,  properly  state  to  the  jury  that 
the  evidence  before  them  consists  of  both  direct  and  circum- 
stantial;20 and  it  is  proper  to  explain  the  difference  between 
them.21  The  difference  between  the  two  kinds  may  be  shown 
by  denning  each  in  charging  the  jury.22  And  if  the  court  errs 
in  charging  as  to  the  distinction  between  the  two  kinds  of  evi- 
dence, the  error  will  be  rendered  harmless  where  the  court  cor- 
rectly instructs  on  the  legal  definition  of  both  classes  of  evi- 
dence.23 

§  306.  Instructions  improper — Illustrations. — According  to  the 
principle  stated  in  the  preceding  section,  it  is  proper  to  refuse 
an  instruction  that  "the  strength  of  circumstantial  evidence 
must  be  equal  to  the  strength  of  the  testimony  of  one  credible 
eyewitness" — where  the  case  is  one  depending  upon  circum- 
stantial evidence  alone.2*  Or  to  charge  that  "before  the  jury 
can  convict  the  defendant  they  must  be  as  well  satisfied  from 
the  combination  of  circumstances  that  the  defendant  did  the 
killing  as  though  an  eyewitness  had  testified  before  them  that 
the  defendant  did  the  killing",  is  improper.25  Or  a  charge  that 
the  "humane  provision  of  the  law"  is  that  circumstantial  evi- 
dence, to  justify  a  conviction,  must  exclude  to  a  moral  certainty 
every  reasonable  hypothesis  but  that  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused, 
is  properly  refused.26 

§  307.  Instructions  not  improper — Illustrations. — But  a  charge 
that  there  is  no  practical  difference  between  direct  and  circum- 
stantial evidence,  that  the  sole  question  is  whether  the  jury 
are  satisfied  from  the  evidence,  of  the  defendant's  guilt,  beyond 

19  Hudson   v.    Best,    104   Ga.    131,  20  So.  384;  Buchman  v.  S.  109  Ala. 
30  S.  E.  688;  Armstrong  v.  Penn,  105  7,  19  So.  410:   P.  v.  Daniels   (Cal.), 
Ga.    229,    31    S.   E.    158.     See    Gant-  34  Pac.  233;  Thornton  v.  S.  113  Ala. 
ling  v.   S.   40  Fla.   237,   23  So.   857;  43,  21  So.  356;   Banks  v.  S.  72  Ala. 
Horton   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    19  522;   S.  v.  Slingerland,  19  Nev.  135, 
S.  W.   899.  7  Pac.  280.    See  Brown  v.  S.  23  Tex. 

20  Davis  v.  S.  51  Neb.  301,  70  N.  195.     See,   also,   S.   v.   Norwood,   74 
W.   984.  N.    Car.    248;    Mickle   v.    S.    27   Ala. 

21  Joiner  v.  S.  105  Ga.  646,  31  S.  20;   Rea  v.   S.   8  Lea   (Tenn.),   363; 
E.   556.  Jane    v.    Com.    2    Mete.    (Ky.),    30; 

22  Robinson  v.   S.   114  Ga.   56,   39  Cicely  v.  S.  13  S.  &  M.  (Miss.),  202. 
S.  E.  862.  25  Banks  v.  S.  72  Ala.  522. 

23  Roberts  v.   S.   83  Ga.   369,  9  S.  20  Dennis  v.  S.  112  Ala.  64,  20  So. 
E.  675.  925;    Crawford  v.  S.  112  Ala.  1,  21 

24  S.  v.   Carson,   115  N.   Car.   743,  So.  214. 


§    308  ON  CIIICUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  306 

a  reasonable  doubt,  has  been  sustained  as  a  proper  instruction.27 
Or  that  "there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  circumstantial  evi- 
dence that  renders  is  less  reliable  than  other  classes  of  evidence" 
is  not  improper.28 

A  charge  that  "circumstantial  evidence,  if  complete,  may  be 
as  conclusive  or  convincing  as  direct  or  positive  evidence  of 
eyewitnesses.  When  it  is  strong  and  satisfactory,  the  jury 
should  consider  it  fairly,  neither  enlarging  nor  belittling  its 
force,"  is  not  so  far  erroneous  as  to  warrant  a  reversal  of  a 
judgment.29  Nor  is  it  prejudicial  error  in  charging  the  jury, 
to  tell  them  that  those  who  declare  it  to  be  cruel  or  criminal 
to  convict  on  circumstantial  evidence  are  knaves  or  fools.30  And 
it  has  been  hejd  not  improper  to  charge  that  in  order  to  con- 
vict, "the  circumstantial  evidence  should  be  such  as  to  produce 
nearly  the  same  degree  of  certainty  as  that  which  arises  from 
direct  testimony,  and  to  exclude  a  rational  probability  of  in- 
nocence."31 Also  a  charge  that  if  circumstantial  evidence  is  of 
such  a  character  as  to  exclude  every  reasonable  hypothesis  other 
than  that  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant,  it  is  entitled  to  the 
same  weight  as  direct  evidence,  is  not  improper.32  - 

§  308.  Drawing  inferences — Instructions. — It  is  for  the 
jury  to  determine  from  the  entire  evidence  what  inference  may 
be  drawn,  if  any,  from  a  state  of  facts  and  circumstances  with- 
out being  instructed  as  to  what  weight  they  are  to  attach  to 
any  portion  of  the  evidence.  When  the  court  says  that  a  cer- 
tain inference  may  be  drawn  from  certain  facts,  if  proved,  a 
jury  would  understand  the  instruction  as  meaning  that  it  is- 
t"b°ir  duty  to  draw  such  inference;  at  least  it  would  indicate 
that  the  court  thought  it  proper  that  the  inference  should  be 
drawn.33  Facts  may  be  inferred  by  the  jury  from  circumstances 

27  S.   v.    Rome,   64   Conn.   329,   30      A'pp.    121,    9    S.    W.    735.      Contra: 
Atl.  57.  S.  v.  Dotson,  26  Mont.  305,  67  Pac. 

28  p.   v.   Uquidas,   96   Cal.   239,   31      938. 

Pac.  52.  32  Reynolds   v.   S.    147   Ind.   3,   46 

29  Union  C.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Skip-  N.  E.  31;   Gill  v.  S.  59  Ark.  422,  27 
per,  115  Fed.  69,  75;   Smith  v.  S.  61  S.  W.  598;   Longley  v.  Com.  99  Va. 
Neb.  296.  85  N.  W.  49.  807,  37  S.  E.  337;  Davis  v.  S.  51  Neb. 

3"  Hickory   v.   United   States,   151  301,  70  N.  W.  984;    Smith  v.  S.  35 

U.  S.  303,  14  Sup.  Ct.  334.  Tex.  Cr.  App.  618,  34  S.  W.  960;   P. 

si  P.  v.  Cronin,  34  Cal.  191.     See,  v.  Neufeld,  165  N.  Y.  43,  58  N.  E. 

also,  P.  v.  Stewart,  75  Mich.  21,  42  786. 
N.  W.   662;   Brookin  v.  S.  26  Tex.         33  Hackelrath  v.   Stookey,  63  111- 


307  INFERENCES SUFFICIENCY  OF  FACTS.  §  309 

proved.04  But  the  court  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  facts,  and 
cannot  instruct  the  jury  as  to  what  inferences  may  or  may  not  be 
drawn  from  the  proof  of  other  facts.35  But  a  charge  telling 
the  jury  that  it  is  for  them  to  say  whether  or  not  they  will 
draw  a  certain  inference,  if  it  should  seem  proper  for  them 
to  do  so,  is  not  error.36 

§  309.  Instructing  to  convict  on  proof  of  certain  facts — Effect. 
The  court  cannot,  as  a  matter  of  law,  direct  the  jury  to  con- 
vict the  accused  if  they  believe  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
the  facts  and  circumstances  pointing  toward  his  guilt  are  true. 
The  jury  may  believe  that  such  facts  have  been  conclusively 
established  as  required,  yet  they  may  not  regard  the  facts  and 
circumstances  so  proved  sufficient  to  satisfy  their  judgment  and 
conscience  of  the  defendant's  guilt.  The  facts  and  circumstances 
might  be  true,  but  not  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction.37  Hence 
an  instruction  which  directs  the  jury  to  convict  the  accused, 
if  they  believe  the  facts  and  circumstances  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  pointing  toward  his  guilt,  is  erroneous;38  such  an  in- 
struction is  an  invasion  of  the  province  of  the  jury.39 

Also  a  charge  directing  the  jury  to  convict  the  defendant  if  the 
facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence  cannot  reasonably  be  account- 
ed for  by  any  other  reasonable  hypothesis  than  that  of  guilt,  is 
erroneous.40  Also  the  giving  of  an  instruction  that  the  jury 
may  infer  the  main  fact  in  issue  from  facts  and  circumstances 

486,  488;    Ashlock  v.  Linder,  50  111.  35  Pittsburg,  Ft.  W.   &  C.   R.   Co. 

169;    Barnes    v.    Blackhart,    12    111.  v.  Callaghan,  157  111.  406,  41  N.  E. 

195,  198;   Izler  v.  Manchester  &  A.  909;    Continental    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 

R.  Co.  57  S.  Car.  332,  35  S.  B.  583;  Yung,  113  Ind.  159,  15  N.  E.  220,  3 

Omaha  Fair  &  E.  Asso.  v.  Missouri  Am.  St.  630,  note;  P.  v.  Walden,  51 

Pac.  R.  Co.  42  Neb.  105.  60  N.  W.  Cal.  588;   Newman  v.  McComas,  43 

330;    Cook   v.   Brown,   39   Me.   443;  Ind.  70;   Mayer  v.  Wilkins,  37  Fla. 

Union  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Buchanan,  244,   19   So.  632;    Augusta  Mfg.   Co. 

100   Ind.   63;    City   of  Columbus   v.  v.  Vertrees,  4  Lea   (Tenn.),  75. 

Strassner,  138  Ind.  301,  34  N.  E.  5;  36  Com.  v.  Walsh,  162  Mass.  242, 

Graves  v.  Colwell,  90  111.  612;  Stan-  38  N.  E.  436. 

ley  v.  Montgomery,  102  Ind.  102,  26  37  Otmer  v.   P.   76   111.   149.     See, 

N.  E.  213.  also,    P.    v.    Chartoof,    75    N.    Y.    S. 

3-1  Tyler,  Ullman  &  Co.  v.  West-  1088,  72  App.  Div.   555. 

ern  U.  Tel.  Co.  60  111.  421,  434,  14  ss  Otmer  v.  P.  76  111.  149;  Sims  v. 

Am.    R.    38;    Robbins    v.    P.    95    111.  S.  43  Ala.  33. 

178;   Graves  v.  Colwell,  90  111.  612;  39  Sims  v.  S.  43  Ala.  33. 

Hamilton  v.  P.  29  Mich.  195.     See  *o  Webb  v.  S.  73  Miss.  456,  19  So. 

Carlton  v.  P.  150  111.  181,  37  N.  E.  238. 
244. 


§    310  ON  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  308 

in  evidence  is  error  where  a  case  is  closely  contested  on  a  ma- 
terial and  vital  point  in  issue.41 

§  310.  Circumstances  must  be  consistent  with  guilt. — Where  a 
conviction  depends  upon  circumstantial  evidence  alone,  the  facts 
and  circumstances  relied  upon  ought  not -only  to  be  consistent 
with  the  defendant's  guilt,  but  inconsistent  with  every  other 
rational  conclusion  before  a  conviction  is  warranted;  and  an 
instruction  which  fails  to  so  state  to  the  jury  is  fatally  defec- 
tive.42 The  facts  and  circumstances  proved  must  also  exclude 
every  other  reasonable  hypothesis  except  the  guilt  of  the  de- 
fendant before  a  conviction  can  be  had.  Hence  an  instruc- 
tion based  upon  such  evidence  which  fails  to  require  proof 
to  that  degree  of  certainty  is  erroneous.43  But  the  refusal  to  give 
such  an  instruction  may  not  be  error  if  the  instructions,  given 
on  reasonable  doubt,  burden  of  proof,  presumption  of  innocence 
and  the  like,  are  full,  clear  and  comprehensive.44  And  although 
an  instruction  as  to  circumstantial  evidence  may  be  erroneous, 
yet,  as  a  general  rule,  if  others  given  correctly  state  the  law, 
the  error  will  be  regarded  as  harmless.45 

§311.  Essential  facts  need  only  be  consistent. — But  the  rule 
thus  requiring  that  the  facts  and  circumstances  shown  in  evi- 
dence must  be  consistent  with  the  defendant's  guilt  and  incon- 
sistent with  every  other  rational  conclusion,  relates  to  the  essen- 
tial, indispensable  facts  or  circumstances,  and  not  to  facts  or  cir- 
cumstances which  might  be  eliminated  from  the  case,  and  there 
would  still  remain  sufficient  material  facts  to  warrant  a  con- 

41  Snowden  v.  Waterman,  105  Ga.      vis  v.  S.  51  Neb.  301,  70  N.  W.  984. 
384,  31  S.  E.  110.  Contra:   Jones  v.   S.  61  Ark.  88,  32 

42  Harris  v.   S.   34   Tex.   Cr.   App.      S.  W.  81. 

494,   31   S.   W.   388;    Hamilton  v.   S.  43  Jones    v.    S.    34    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

96  Ga.  301,  22  S.  E.  528;   Brown  v.  490,  30  S.  W.  1059;   Wantland  v.  S. 

S.  108  Ala.  18,  18  So.  811;  Cavender  145  Ind.  38,  43  N.  E.  931;   Smith  v. 

v.    S.    126    Ind.    48,    25    N.    E.    875;  S.   35   Tex.   Cr.   App.   618,   33   S.   W. 

Smith  v.   S.   35  Tex.   Cr.   App.  618;  339.     See,  also,  Reynolds  v.  S.   147 

Wantland  v.  S.  145  Ind.  38,  43  N.  E.  Ind.  3,  46  N.  E.  31. 

931;    Kollock  v.  S.   88  Wis.  663,   60  44  s.  v.  Seymour,  94  Iowa,  699,  63 

N.  W.  817;   S.  v.  Andrews,  62  Kas.  N.  W.  661;  Tatum  v.  S.  61  Neb.  229, 

207,    61    Pac.    808;    Gonzales    v.    S.  85   N.   W.   40.     See  Jones   v.   S.   61 

(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  57  S.  W.  667;  P.  v.  Ark.    88,    32    S.    W.    81;    Hamilton 

Dick,   32   Cal.   216;    S.   v.   Asbell,   57  v.  S.  96  Ga.  301,  22  S.  E.  528;   Bar- 

Kas.  398,  46  Pac.  770;   Gill  v.  S.  59  row  v.  S.  80  Ga.  191,  5  S.  E.  64. 

Ark.  422,   27  S.  W.   598;    Longly  v.  45  p.  v.  Dole,  122  Cal.  486,  55  Pac. 

Com.  99  Va.  807,  37  S.  E.  339;   Da-  581,  68  Am.  St.  50. 


309  ESSENTIAL  FACTS — DEGREE  OF  PROOF.  §  312 

vietion  if  established  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  It  is  therefore 
proper  to  refuse  to  instruct  that  if  a  single  circumstance  proved 
is  inconsistent  with  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  the  jury  should 
acquit  him;  they  should  be  restricted  to  the  material,  essential 
facts  or  circumstances.40  There  may  be  facts  or  circumstances 
proved  in  a  case  not  at  all  essential  to  a  conviction.  Such 
facts  need  not  be  established  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  The 
instruction  should  relate  to  the  material  fact's  or  circumstances.47 
Or  an  instruction  that  each  of  the  several  circumstances  must 
be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  must  not  only  point 
with  moral  certainty  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendant,  but  must 
exclude  to  a  moral  certainty  every  other  reasonable  hypothesis, 
is  likewise  improper.48  Only  each  essential  element  constituting 
the  crime  charged  need  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
and  not  each  circumstance,  though  important  in  determining 
the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused.49 

§  312.  Essential  facts— Degree  of  proof.— It  is  a  fundamental 
principle  of  the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence  that  each  in- 
dependent essential  fact  must  be  proved  in  the  same  satisfactory 
manner  as  if  the  whole  issue  rested  upon  the  proof  of  that  fact.50 
In  other  words,  each  of  such  essential  facts  must  be  established 
to  the  same  degree  of  certainty  as  if  it  were  the  main  fact.51 
According  to  this  rule  it  is  proper  to  instruct  that  ''when  the 
evidence  against  the  defendant  is  made  up  wholly  of  a  chain  of 
circumstances,  and  there  is  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  ex- 
istence of  one  of  the  facts  essential  to  establish  guilt,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  jury  to  acquit."52 

«  P.  v.  Willett,  105  Mich.  110,  62  48  Kollock  v.   S.   88  Wis.   663,   60 

N.  W.  1115.     See  S.  v.  Seymore,  94  N.  W.  817. 

Iowa,   699,   63  N.  W.  661;    Price   v.  49  s.  v.  Gallivan,  75  Conn.  326,  53 

S.  114  Ga.B855,  40  S.  B.  1015;  Leon-  All.  731,  96  Am.  St.  203. 

ard    v.    Ter.    2    Wash.    Ter.    397,    7  so  s.  v.  Crabtree,  170  Mo.  642,  71 

Pac.  872;   S.  v.  Gleim,  17  Mont.  17,  S.  W.  130;   P.  v.  Stewart,  75  Mich. 

41  Pac.  998,  52  Am.  St.  655;   Claire  21,   42   N.   W.   662;    Harrison   v.    S. 

v.      P.      9      Colo.      122,      10     Pac.  6  Tex.  App.  42.     But  see  Smith  v. 

799       (condemning      the      use      of  S.  61  Neb.  296,  85  N.  W.  49;   S.  v. 

the    word    "chain,"    preferring    the  Young,    9    N.    Dak.    165,    82    N.    W. 

"cable"    metaphor    in    referring    to  420;    Graves  v.   P.  18  Colo.   181,   32 

the    facts);    Rayburn   v.    S.    (Ark.),  Pac.  63. 

63  S.  W.  356  (condemning  "links  in  si  Johnson  v.  S.  18  Tex.  App.  385. 

a    chain,"    preferring    "threads    or  52  p.  v.   Anthony,  56  Cal.   397. 

strands  making  a  rope  or  cord"  of  The   decisions   which   do   not  ap- 

evidence).  prove    of   this   form   of   instruction 

47  Chilesler  v.  S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  condemn  it  principally  for  the  use 

635,  28  S.  W.  683.  of    the    words    "chain    of    circum- 


§    313  ON  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  310 

Where  circumstantial  evidence  alone  is  relied  upon  for  a  con- 
viction, each  necessary  link  and  each  and  every  material  fact 
upon  which  a  conviction  depends,  must  be  proved  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt,  and,  of  course,  the  jury  should  be  instructed 
accordingly,  and  a  refusal  to  so  instruct  is  error.53 

So  a  charge  based  upon  circumstantial  evidence  alone,  that 
"each  fact  necessary  to  establish  the  guilt  of  the  accused  must  be 
proved  by  competent  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  the 
facts  and  circumstances  proved  should  not  only  be  consistent  with 
the  guilt  of  the  accused,  but  inconsistent  with  any  other  reason- 
able hypothesis  than  that  of  his  guilt,"  and  producing  a  reason- 
able certainty  that  the  accused  committed  the  crime  charged,  is 
not  objectionable.54  Hence  an  instruction  that  the  law  does 
not  require  the  jury  to  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
of  each  link  in  the  chain  of  circumstances  relied  upon  to  estab- 
lish the  defendant's  guilt;  that  it  is  sufficient  if  taking  all  of 
the  testimony  together,  the  jury  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reason 
able  doubt  of  the  defendant's  guilt,  is  improper.55 

§  313.  Omission  of  words  from  instruction — Effect. — The  omis- 
sion of  the  word  "reasonable"  or  "rational"  in  its  proper  con- 
nection in  the  giving  of  an  instruction  on  circumstantial  evi- 
dence renders  the  instruction  defective.50  Thus  an  instruction 

stances"  or  "links  in  the  chain  of  5  Cush.   (Mass.),  295;   P.  v.  Phipps, 

facts,"  as  tending  to  mislead;   also  39   Cal.   333;   Bressler  v.   P.  117  111. 

because  of  the   confusion  of  minor  438,  8  N.  E.  62;  Burrill  Cr.  Ev.  773, 

or    dispensable    facts    with    the    es-  736,  2  Thomp.  Trials,  §  2511,  1  Ros- 

sential  indispensable  facts:   Graves  coe  Cr.  Ev.  27;   S.  v.  Young,  9  N. 

v.  P.  18  Colo.  181,  32  Pac.  63;   Ray-  Dak.    165,    82    N.    W.    420.      Contra: 

burn   v.    S.   69   Ark.   177,    63   S.   W.  If  the  evidence  is  not  entirely  cir- 

356;  Clare  v.  P.  9  Colo.  122,  10  Pac.  cumstantial:    Harvey  v.  S.  125  Ala. 

799.     See  Bressler  v.  P.  117  111.  422,  47,  27  So.  763;  Morris  v.  S.  124  Ala. 

8  N.  E.  62.  44,   27    So.    336;    Bressler   v.   P.   117 

ss  p.  v.  Aiken,  66  Mich.  460,  33  N.  111.   438,  8  N.  E.   62;    S.   v.   Moxley, 

W.  821,  7  Am.   Cr.  R.   363,  11  Am.  102  Mo.  374,  14  S.  W.  969,  15  S.  W. 

St.  512;  S.  v.  Kruger,  7  Idaho,  178,  556;    Davis  v.   S.  74  Ga.   869;    Aris- 

61    Pac.    463;    P.    v.    Fairchild,    48  mendis  v.   S.   41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  374, 

Mich.    37,    11    N.    E.    773;     Graves  54  S.  W.  599;  S.  v.  Cohen,  108  Iowa, 

v.     P.      18     Colo.      170,     32     Pac.  208,  78  N.  W.   857;   P.  v.  McArron, 

63;     Marion    v.    S.    16    Neb.    349,  121  Mich.  I,  79  N.  W.  944. 

20   N.   W.    289;    P.    v.    Anthony,   56  54  Baldez   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 

Cal.  397;    S.  v.  Gleim,  17  Mont.  17,  35   S.   W.   664;    Crow  v.    S.    33   Tex. 

41    Pac.    998,    10    Am.    Cr.    R.    52,  Cr.  App.  264,  26  S.  W.  209. 

52    Am.    St.    655;     S.    v.     Furney,  ss  s.  v.  Gleim,  17  Mont.  17,  41  Pac. 

41    Kas.    115,    21    Pac.    213,    8    Am.  998,  52  Am.  St.  655. 

Cr.   R.   137;    Kollock  v.   S.    88  Wis.  se  Crawford   v.    S.    112   Ala.   1,   21 

663,  60  N.  W.  817;  Com.  v.  Webster,  So.  214.    See  S.  v.  Glass,  5  Ore.  81. 


WORDS  OMITTED.  §    314 

charging  that  if  the  facts  in  evidence  can  be  explained  upon 
any  other  hypothesis  than  that  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant,  he 
should  be  acquitted,  is  defective,  in  that  it  omits  the  word 
reasonable  in  connection  with  the  word  "hypothesis."57 

An  instruction  on  circumstantial  evidence  which  omits  to  state 
that  the  guilt  of  the  accused  must  be  established  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt  before  a  conviction  can  be  had  is  erroneous.58  But 
an  error  in  the  giving  of  an  instruction  on  circumstantial  evi- 
dence, caused  by  omitting  the  element  of  reasonable  doubt,  is 
harmless  where  other  instructions  in  various  forms  call  for  proof 
of  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.59  So  the  omission  to  charge 
as  to  reasonable  doubt  is  not  material  error  where  the  court,  in 
charging  on  circumstantial  evidence,  states  that  the  facts  estab- 
lished must  not  only  be  consistent  with  the  defendant's  guilt, 
but  must  also  exclude  every  other  reasonable  hypothesis  before 
a  conviction  can  be  had.60 

§  314.  Omission  of  words  not  fatal — Illustrations. — A  charge 
that  "a  few  facts  or  multitude  of  facts  proved,  all  consistent 
with  the  supposition  of  guilt  are  not  enough  to  warrant  a  verdict 
of  guilty.  In  order  to  convict  on  circumstantial  evidence,  not  only 
the  circumstances  must  all  concur  to  show  that  the  defendant 
committed  the  crime,  but  they  must  be  inconsistent  with  any 
other  rational  conclusion,"  is  a  proper  statement  of  the  law,  and 
the  refusal  to  give  it  is  error.61  An  instruction  on  circumstantial 
evidence  charging  that  the  facts  shown  in  evidence  and  relied 
upon  for  a  conviction  must  be  consistent  with  each  other  and 
with  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  and  taken  together,  must  be  of  a 
conclusive  nature,  producing  a  reasonable  and  moral  certainty 
that  the  defendant,  and  no  other  person,  committed  the  crime 
charged,  properly  states  the  law.62 

57  Johnson   v.   S.   53  Neb.   103,   73  Jenkins  v.  S.  62  Wis.  49,  21  N.  W. 

N.   W.    463;    Walker  v.   S.   117.   Ala.  232. 

42,  23  So.  149;  McClelland  v.  S.  117  si  s.  v.  Andrews,  62  Kas.  207,  61 

Ala.  140,  23  So.  653.  Pac.  808.    See  Roberts  v.  S.  110  Ga. 

ss  Lipscomb  v.  S.  75  Miss.  559,  23  253,  34  S.  E.  203.     See  S.  v.  David, 

So.  210.  131  Mo.  380,  33  S.  W.  28.     See  Vil- 

59  Bird  v.   S.   43   Fla.   541,   30   So.  lereal  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.  App.),   61  S. 

655.  W.  715  (giving  a  complete  charge  on 

so  Young  v.   S.   95  Ga.   456,  20  S.  circumstantial   evidence  in  one   in- 

".5.    270.       Instructions    on    circum-  struction). 

stantial  evidence  held  not  erroneous  02  Crow   v.    S.    37   Tex.    Cr.    App. 

when  considered  with  others  given:  295,  39  S.  W.  574;  Hill  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Wells  v.  S.  99  Ga.  206,  24  S.  E.  853; 


§    315  ON  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  312 

A  charge  that  "when  a  conviction  is  sought  alone  upon  cir- 
cumstantial evidence,  the  circumstances  relied  upon,  taken  to- 
gether, must  be  incapable  of  explanation  upon  any  other  ra- 
tional hypothesis  but  that  of  the  defendant's  guilt"  properly 
states  the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence.63  So  an  instruction  on 
circumstantial  evidence  is  sufficient  if  it  states  that  the  jury 
must  exhaust  every  reasonable  hypothesis  or  conclusion  other 
than  that  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant  before  they  can  con- 
vict, although  it  does  not  state  that  the  evidence  must  show 
that  the  defendant,  and  "no  other  person,"  committed  the  of- 
fense charged.6* 

§  315.  Illustrations  of  the  rules. — A  charge  that  if  one  set 
or  chain  of  circumstances  leads  to  two  opposing  conclusions, 
one  or  the  other  of  such  conclusions  must  be  wrong,  and  there- 
fore, in  such  a  case,  if  the  jury  have  a  reasonable  doubt  as 
to  which  of  said  conclusions  the  chain  of  circumstances  leads, 
a  reasonable  doubt  would  thereby  be  created,  and  they  should 
give  the  defendant  the  benefit  of  such  doubt  and  acquit  him,  is 
improper,  for  the  reason  that  both  these  "opposing  conclusions" 
might  lead  to  the  defendant's  guilt.65  An  instruction  charging 
that  "to  justify  the  inference  of  legal  guilt  from  circumstantial 
evidence,  the  existence  of  the  inculpatory  facts  must  be  estab- 
lished absolutely  and  to  a  demonstration  incompatible  with  the 
innocence  of  the  accused,"  is  improper,  in  that  it  calls  for  a 
greater  degree  of  certainty  than  the  law  requires.60  Absolute 
moral  certainty  excludes  not  only  reasonable  doubt,  but  all 
doubt.67  Also  an  instruction  on  circumstantial  evidence  direct- 

Cr.  App.),  35  S.  W.  660;   S.  v.  Dav-  Mose  v.  S.  36  Ala.  211;  P.  v.  Davis, 

enport,  38  S.  Car.  348,  17  S.  B.  37.  64  Cal.  440;  P.  v.  Anthony,  56  Cal. 

ea  Crutchfield    v.    S.    7    Tex.    Cr.  397. 

App.  65;  Hunt  v.  S.  7  Tex.  Cr.  App.  or  S.  v.  Glass,  5  Ore.  82.     "Abso- 

212.  lute  moral  certainty  is  not  attain- 

64  Bennett  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  able   by   the   human    mind     It    de- 
639,  48  S.  W.  61;  Ramirez  v.  S.  43  scribes   a  fixed    and   uncomipromis- 
Tex.   Cr.   App.   455,   66   S.   W.   1101;  ing  attitude  of  the  mind  of  which 
S.  v.  David,  131  Mo.  380,  33  S.  W.  men  are  not  capable  in  any  of  the 
28.  situations   of  life.     It   means   such 

65  P.   v.   Clarke,   130   Cal.   642,   63  a  degree  of   certainty  as  precludes 
Pac.  138.  the  possibility  of  error  or  mistake, 

ee  p.  v.  Bellamy,  109  Cal.  610,  42  and  as  presupposes  the  infallibility 
Pac.  236;  Carlton  v.  P.  150  111.  181,  of  witnesses  and  jurors.  It  im- 
37  N.  E.  244,  41  Am.  St.  346.  See  poses  such  conditions  upon  the  ad- 
Jenkins  v.  S.  35  Fla.  737,  18  So.  182;  ministration  of  justice  as  would 


313 


ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  THE  RULES. 


§    315 


ing  the  jury  to  acquit  where  the  criminating  circumstances  are 
either  denied  by  the  accused  or  are  explained  in  such  a  way 
as  to  render  his  guilt  doubtful  is  erroneous,  in  that  his  mere 
denial  without  reference  to  its  credibility  calls  for  an  acquittal.68 


make  the  punishment  of  crime  im- 
possible, and  the  existence  of  crim- 
inal courts  useless." 

as  Long  v.  S.  42  Fla.  509,  28  So. 
775.  An  instruction  that  "each  fact 
necessary  to  the  conclusion  sought 
to  be  established  must  be  proved 
by  competent  evidence  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt,  and  all  the  facts 
necessary  to  such  conclusion  must 
be  consistent  with  each  other,  and 
the  main  fact  sought  to  be  proved; 
and  the  circumstances  taken  to- 
gether must  be  of  a  conclusive  na- 


ture leading  on  the  whole  to  a  sat- 
isfactory conclusion  and  producing 
in  effect  a  reasonable  and  moral 
certainty  of  the  guilt  of  the  defend- 
ant and  excluding  every  reason- 
able hypothesis,  except  the  guilt  of 
the  defendant,"  is  properly  modi- 
fied by  adding  thereto  that  circum- 
stantial evidence,  to  warrant  a  con- 
viction need  not  demonstrate  the 
guilt  of  the  defendant  beyond  the 
possibility  of  his  innocence,  Ham- 
lin  v.  S.  39  Tex.  Or.  App.  579,  47  S. 
W.  656. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

ON  CONFESSIONS— ADMISSIONS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

316.  Weight    of    confession    is    for  319.  Voluntary    confessions — C  a  u- 
the   jury.  tionary   instructions. 

317.  Weight     o  f     confession — Im-  320.  Confessions — Corroboration. 

proper  comnient.  321.     Instructions     when     no     evi- 

318.  Voluntary     confessions — Com-  dence — When  evidence. 

petency. 

§  316.  Weight  of  confession  is  for  the  jury. — When  admissions 
or  confessions  of  a  person  charged  with  crime  are  properly  ad- 
mitted in  evidence,  the  weight  and  credibility  thereof  are  to 
be  treated  and  considered  by  the  jury  precisely  the  same  as  any 
other  evidence.  It  is  the  province  of  the  jury  to  determine 
whether  a  confession  is  true;  and  hence,  if  they  believe  the 
whole  confession  to  be  true,  they  will  act  upon  the  whole  as  the 
truth.  But  if  warranted  by  the  evidence,  the  jury  may  believe 
that  part  of  the  confession  which  makes  against  the  accused  and 
reject  that  part  which  is  in  his  favor.  An  instruction  in  proper 
form  embracing  this  principle  has  been  approved.1 

The  weight  of  the  evidence  of  a  confession  is  a  question  for 
the  jury,  and  should  be  the  subject  of  appropriate  instructions.2 
And  in  determining  what  credit  should  be  given  to  a  confes- 
sion, the  jury  are  entitled  to  know  the  circumstances  under 
which  it  was  given,3  and  the  evidence  thereof  should  be  con- 

i  Jackson  v.  P.  18  111.  271;  S.  v.  2  Williams  v.  S.  63  Ark.  527,  39 
Gunter,  30  La.  Ann.  537.  See  Keith  v.  S.  W.  709. 

S.  157  Ind.  376,  61  N.  E.  716;   S.  v.         s  s.  v.   Brennan,  164  Mo.   487,  65 
Derrick,  44  S.  Car.  344,  22  S.  E.  337;       S.  W.   325. 
S.  v.  Peck,  85  Mo.  190;    S.  v.  Cur- 
tis. 70  Mo.  594. 

314 


315  WEIGHT  OF   CONFESSIONS — COMMENT  ON.  §    317 

sidered,  together  with  all  the  other  evidence  introduced.1  Thus 
if  the  accused  believed  he  was  about  to  die  at  the  time  of  mak- 
ing an  alleged  confession,  the  jury  have  the  right  to  consider 
whether,  when  in  such  condition,  he  would  have  been  likely 
to  make  a  truthful  or  false  statement  as  to  his  connection 
with  the  offense  charged.4* 

§  317.  Weight  of  confession — Improper  comment. — It  being 
the  duty  of  the  jury  to  determine  the  weight  and  credit 
that  shall  be  given  to  a  confession  as  evidence  of  guilt,  the 
court,  in  the  giving  of  instructions,  should  guard  against  intimat- 
ing anything  as  to  the  value  of  such  evidence.  The  court  can- 
not state  that  a  confession  freely  and  voluntarily  made  is  en- 
titled to  great  weight.5  Thus  an  instruction  stating  that  "a 
confession  freely  and  voluntarily  made  is  among  the  best  evi- 
dence known  to  the  law,  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  the  defendant  did  make  such  a  confession  they  are 
authorized  to  consider  this  in  connection  with  the  other  evi- 
dence" is  improper  as  bearing  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.6 
Or  an  instruction  advising  the  jury  that  the  voluntary  con- 
fessions of  the  accused  are,  in  law,  to  be  regarded  as  the  strongest 
proof  against  him,  for  the  same  reason,  is  erroneous.7 

To  charge  the  jury  that  any  verbal  confession  made  by  the 
defendant,  and  written  down  by  another,  is  subject  to  mistake, 
which  may  arise  from  a  misunderstanding  of  the  meaning  of 
the  defendant's  words,  or  by  using  words  not  used  by  him,  or 
by  substituting  the  language  of  the  person  writing  the  state- 
ment, is  improper  as  invading  the  province  of  the  jury.8  So 
an  instruction  that  the  fact  that  the  person  who  is  charged 
with  the  commission  of  a  crime  says  nothing,  but  remains  silent, 
is  a  circumstance  to  which  the  jury  may  look  as  a  confession 
of  guilt,  is  likewise  improper.9 

*  Holland  v.  S.  39  Fla.  178,  22  So.  Ct.  223   (stating  that  flight  is  a  si- 

298;    S.   v.   Tobie,   141   Mo.    547,   42  lent    admission    from    which    guilt 

S.  W.  1076.  may  be  inferred). 

4*  S.    v.    Gorham,    67   Vt.    365,    31  o  Thompson    v.    S.    73    Miss.    584, 

Atl.  845.  19    So.    204;    Brown   v.    S.    32    Miss. 

5  S.    v.    Gleim,    17    Mont.    17,    41  433;  Morrison  v.  S.  41  Tex.  520. 

Pac.  998,  52  Am.  R.  655.    See  Powell  ?  Morrison  v.   S.   41  Tex.   520. 

v.  S.    (Miss.),  20  So.   4;    Hogsett  v.  s  Hauk  v.   S.   148  Ind.   238,   46  N. 

S.  40  Miss.  522;    Ledbetter  v.  S.  21  E.   127. 

Tex.   App.  344,  17  S.  W.  427.     See  £>  Campbell  v.  S.  55  Ala.  80. 
Starr  v.  U.  S.  164  U.  S.  627,  17  Sup. 


§    318  CONFESSIONS — ADMISSIONS.  316 

§  318.  Voluntary  confessions — Competency. — Confessions  or 
admissions  are  not  competent  evidence  unless  they  were  made 
freely  and  voluntarily  by  the  accused.10  If  any  degree  of  influ- 
ence has  been  exerted  to  induce  the  accused  to  make  a  confes- 
sion, it  is  incompetent.11  • 

Confessions  induced  by  the  appliances  of  hope  or  fear  are  not 
regarded  as  voluntarily  made,  and  are,  therefore,  not  to  be  relied 
on  as  true.  A  confession  can  never  be  received  in  evidence  when 
the  accused  has  been  influenced  to  make  it  by  any  threat  or  prom- 
ise.12 "And  the  slightest  menace  or  threat,  or  any  hope  engendered 
or  encouraged  that  the  prisoner's  case  will  be  lightened,  meliora- 
ted or  more  favorably  dealt  with,  if  he  will  confess — either  of 
these  is  enough  to  exclude  the  confession  thereby  superinduced."13 

The  competency  of  a  confession,  that  is,  whether  it  was  freely 
and  voluntarily  made,  is  a  question  for  the  court,  and  not  for 
the  jury,  to  determine.14  Hence  the  giving  of  an  instruction 
submitting  its  competency  to  the  jury  for  them  to  determine 
is  improper.15  Thus  for  the  court  to  charge  that  if  the  jury 
believe  from  all  the  evidence  that  the  defendant's  confession 
was  procured  by  means  of  fear  or  terror,  or  by  hope  of  reward, 
they  should  disregard  it,  is  improper.16  Or  an  instruction  that 
the  jury  should  disregard  a  confession  unless  they  believe  that 
it  was  voluntarily  made  by  the  defendant  is  likewise  improper.17 
But  if  the  testimony  as  to  whether  a  confession  was  or  was 

10  Robinson  v.  P.  159  111.  119,  42         is  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3099,  citing 
N.  E.  375;  Com.  v.  Preece,  140  Mass.      Owen  v.  S.  78  Ala.  425,  6  Am.  Cr. 
276,  5  N.  E.  494,  5  Am.  Cr.  R.  107;       R.  206,  56  Am.  R.  40. 

S    v.  Day,  55  Vt.  570,  4  Am.  Cr.  R.          1*  Johnson  v.  S.  59  Ala.  37,  3  Am. 
105;  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §§  3094,  3096.      Cr.  R.  258;   P.  v.  Barker,  60  Mich. 

11  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3096,  citing-     277,  27  N.  W.   539. 

Robinson  v.  P.  159  111.  119,  42  N.  E.  «  Brown  v.  S.  124  Ala.  76,  27  So. 

375.  250;    Dugan  v.   Com.   19   Ky.   L.   R. 

12  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3098,  citing  1273,  43  S.  W.  418;  Holland  v.  S.  39 
Gates  v.  P.  14  111.  436,  1  Greenleaf  Fla.  178,  22  So.  298;  Hunter  v.  S.  74 
Ev    §219    (Redf.   Ed.);    Johnson  v.  Miss.   515,   21   So.   305;    Williams  v. 
S.    59   Ala.    37,    3    Am.    Cr.    R.    258;  S.    37   Tex.   Cr.   App.   147,   38   S.   W. 
Newman  v.  S.  49  Ala.  9,  1  Am.  Cr.  999;   Stone  v.  S.  105  Ala.  60,  17  So. 
R.  173;   P.  v.  Barrie,  49  Cal.  342,  1  114;    McKinney  v.   S.   134   Ala.    134, 
Am.  Cr.  R.  181;   Gillett  Indirect  &  32  So.  726. 

Col.  Ev.   §  110.  16  Holland   v.    S.    39   Fla.    178,    22 

By  statute   in   Indiana  a   confes-  So.  298. 

sion    made   under   any   inducement  17  Hunter   v.   S.   74   Miss.   515,   21 

except    fear    produced    by    threats  So.  305;  Williams  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr. 

may  be  given  in  evidence  with  all  App.   147,   38  S.   W.  999;    Bailey   v. 

the    circumstances,    Benson    v.    a.  S.   42  Tex.   Cr.   App.   289,   59   S.   W. 

119  Ind.  488,  21  N.  E.  1109.  900. 


317  VOLUNTARY  CONFESSIONS.  §    319 

uot  voluntarily  made  is  conflicting,  then  the  issue  may  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury  for  them  to  determine,  and  the  jury  may  re- 
gard or  disregard  the  confession  as  they  may  determine.18  And 
where  the  evidence  is  conflicting  as  to  whether  the  confession 
was  voluntarily  made,  it  is  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  sub- 
mit the  matter  to  the  jury  by  proper  instruction.19 

But  the  failure  to  instruct  that  the  jury  should  be  satisfied 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  confession  was  made  vol- 
untarily is  not  material  where  the  court  instructs  generally  on 
reasonable  doubt.20  But  if  the  legality  of  the  confession  is  not 
challenged  or  contested,  then  the  court  may  properly  refuse  to 
charge  that  before  the  jury  can  consider  confessions  made  by 
the  accused  they  must  believe  he  made  the  same  voluntarily, 
and  not  through  promise  or  improper  influence.21  It  has  been 
held  that  if,  after  evidence  of  a  confession  has  been  admitted, 
it  appears  by  evidence  subsequently  admitted  that  such  con- 
fession was  not  freely  and  voluntarily  made,  then  the  court 
should  withdraw  the  evidence  of  such  confession.22 

§  319.  Voluntary  confessions — Cautionary  instructions. — While 
it  is  usually  very  necessary  that  some  degree  of  care  should  be 
used  in  receiving  the  confession  of  one  charged  with  the  com 
mission  of  crime,  and  much  caution  be  employed  by  the  jury 
in  ascertaining  its  weight  and  sufficiency,23  yet  the  court  can- 
not properly  state  to  the  jury,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  con- 
fessions or  admissions  should,  for  certain  reasons  stated,  be  re- 
ceived with  great  caution,  unless  voluntarily  made.  The  weight 
and  credibility  of  confessions  are  to  be  determined  by  the  jury 
as  facts.  Some  confessions  or  admissions  may  be  entitled  to 
little  credit,  considering  the  circumstances  under  which  they 
were  made;  others,  if  made  deliberately,  freely  and  voluntarily, 
may  be  among  the  most  effective  proofs  in  law,  but  the  court- 
cannot  say,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  the  confession  in  evidence 

is  Morris   v.    S.   39   Tex.   Cr.   App.  21  Bailey    v.    S.   42   Tex    Cr.    App. 

371,   46  S.  W.  253;    Sparks  v.   S.   34  289,  59  S.  W.  900. 

Tex.    Cr.    App.    86,    29    S.    W.    264;  22  Holland  v.  S   39  Fla.  178,  22  So. 

Paris  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  82,  31  298. 

S.   W.    855.  23  Underbills    Cr.    Ev.    §  146,    cit- 

19  Sparks  v.   S.   34  Tex.   Cr.   App.  ing  Nobles  v.  S.  98  Ga.  73,  26  S.  E. 
86,  29  S.  W.  264.  64. 

20  Nix  v.  S.  97  Ga.  211,  22   S.   E. 
975. 


§    320  CONFESSIONS — ADMISSIONS.  318 

belongs  to  the  one  class  or  the  other.24     The  contrary  view  is 
held  to  be  the  law  in  other  states.25 

Where  the  confessions  or  admissions  were  voluntarily  and  de- 
liberately made  it  is  not  necessary  to  instruct  the  jury  to  re- 
ceive them  with  caution.26  In  California  such  an  instruction 
has  been  held  as  properly  modified  by  striking  out  the  word 
"great,"'  it  not  being  one  of  the  statutory  words  relating  to 
such  admissions.27  Hence  an  instruction  that  as  a  general  rule 
the  statements  of  witnesses  as  to  verbal  admission  of  a  person 
charged  with  the  commission  of  a  criminal  offense  should  be 
received  by  the  jury  with  great  caution,  as  that  kind  of  evi- 
dence is  subject  to  much  imperfection  and  mistake  unless  vol- 
untarily made,  is  erroneous,  in  that  it  invades  the  province  of 
the  jury.28  Also  a  charge  that  oral  admissions  of  a  party 
should  be  received  with  great  caution,  because  a  witness  may 
not  have  correctly  understood  them,  or  may  not  have  correctly 
recollected  them,  is  likewise  erroneous.29 

§  320.  Confessions — Corroboration. — The  corpus  delicti  can- 
not be  established  by  confessions  alone.  It  must  be  shown  by 
other  evidence,  independent  of  confessions  or  admissions  of  the 
accused.30  When  the  court  undertakes  to  state  this  principle 
in  the  giving  of  instructions  the  jury  should  be  left  free  to  pass 
upon  and  determine  whether  the  evidence  of  the  confession, 
together  with  the  evidence  of  the  corpus  delicti,  is  sufficient 
to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. 
An  instruction  leading  the  jury  to  believe  that  they  would  be 

24  Keith  v.  S.  157  Ind.  376,  61  N.  Maier,    94    Cal.    269,    29    Pac.    481: 
E.    716.     See   Collins  v.    S.   20   Tex.  Knowles  v.  Nixon,  17  Mont.  473,  43 
Cr.  App.  400.  Pac.  628;    Keith  v.  S.  157  Ind.  376, 

25  Marzen  v.  P.  173  111.  60,  50  N.  61  N.  E.  716;   Morris  v.  S.  101  Ind. 
E.    249;    S.    v.    Hardee,    83   N.    Car.  560;  Zenor  v.  Johnson,  107  Ind.  69, 
619  (discretionary).    See  S.  v.  Jack-  7    N.   E.    751;    Runnill   v.    Art,    169 
son,    103   Iowa,    702,   73   N.   W.    467.  Mass.  341,  47  N.  E.  1017;   White  v. 
See   Nobles   v.   S.   98  Ga.   73,   26   S.  Ter.  3  Wash.  Ter.  397,  19  Pac.  37. 
E.  64.  29  Zenor  v.  Johnson,  107  Ind.  70, 

26  S.    v.    Jackson,    103    Iowa,    702,  7  N.  E.  751,  36  Am.  R.  166;  Morris 
73  N.  W.  467.  v.  S.  101  Ind.  562;    Keith  v.  S.  157 

27  p.   v.  Van  Horn,   119   Cal.   323,  Ind.  386.  61  N.  E.  716. 

51   Pac.    538.     See   P.    v.    Sternberg,          so  Gore   v.   P.    162   111.   265,   44   N. 

Ill  Cal.  11,  43  Pac.  201.  E.  500;  South  v.  P.  98  111.  263;  P.  v. 

28Wastl.  v.    Montana   N.    R.    Co.  Tarbox,    115   Cal.   57,   46   Pac.    896; 

17  Mont.  213,  42  Pac.  772;  Collins  v.  McCulloch  v.   S.  48  Ind.  109,  citing 

S.    20    Tex.    App.    400;    Bobo    v.    S.  many    cases.       Hughes     Cr.     Law, 

(Miss.),    16    So.    755;    Kaufman    v.  §  3093. 


319  CORROBOEATION  OF  CONFESSIONS.  §  321 

authorized  to  convict  if  the  evidence  of  the  confession  is  cor- 
roborated by  proof  of  the  corpus  delicti,  is  erroneous.  The  jury 
must  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  from  all  the  evi- 
dence that  the  accused  is  guilty  before  they  can  convict  him.31 
An  instruction  that  the  defendant  cannot  be  convicted  on  his 
own  confession  if  not  corroborated  by  other  evidence  tending 
to  establish  the  corpus  delicti,  is  properly  refused  where  it  ap- 
pears that  the  evidence,  outside  of  the  confession,  is  sufficient 
to  establish  the  corpus  delicti.32 

§  321.    Instructions   when   no   evidence — When   evidence. — If 

there  is  no  evidence  whatever  tending  to  prove  a  confession, 
then  instructions  on  that  subject  are  improper,  and  they  may  be 
prejudicial.33  To  instruct  the  jury  that  the  accused  has  made 
admissions  when  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  had,  is  error.34 
It  is  error  to  refuse  instructions  on  the  subject  of  confessions 
where  the  admissibility  of  the  confessions  is  an  important  or 
controlling  fact  in  the  decision  of  the  case.35  But  the  omission 
to  instruct  on  this  subject  is  not  material  error  where  the  other 
evidence  in  the  case,  alone,  without  the  evidence  of  the  con- 
fession, clearly  establishes  the  guilt  of  the  defendant.36 

31  Wimberly  v.  S.   (Ga.),  31  S.  E.  E.   178.   The   same  rules   as   to  ad- 
162.     See  Davis  v.   S.   105   Ga.   808,  missions    or    statements    apply    to 
32  S.  E.  158.  both  civil  and  criminal  cases  alike. 

32  Tidwell  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cv.  App.),  See  generally  the  following  cases: 
48  S.  W.  184;   Com.  v.  Tarr,  4  Al-  Phoenix   Ins.   Co.   v.   Gray,   113   Ga. 
len   (Mass.),  315.  424,  38  S.  E.  992;  Lewis  v.  Christie, 

ss  Knight  v.   S.  114  Ga.   48,  39  S.  99   Ind.   377;    Tozer  v.    Hershey,   15 

E.  928,  88  Am.  St.  17;    Davis  v.  S.  Minn.  257;  Shinn  v.  Tucker,  37  Ark. 

114  Ga.  104,  39  S.  E.  906;   Goodwin  580;    Allen    v.    Kirk,    81    Iowa,    658, 

v.    S.   114  Wis.   318,   90   N.   W.   120;  47  N.  W.  906;  Knowles  v.  Nixon,  17 

Suddeth  v.  S.  112  Ga.  407,  37  S.  E.  Mont.  473,  43  Pac.  628;    Stewart  v. 

747;    Gentry  v.  S.  24  Tex.  App.  80.  De  Loach,  86  Ga.  729,  12  S.  E.  1067; 

34  Andrews  v.  S.  21  Fla.  595.  Newman  v.  Hazelrigg,  96  Ind.   377; 

35  s.  v.  Moore,  160  Mass.  443.  Haven  v.   Markstrum,   67  Wis.   493, 

36  Sellers  v.   S.  99  Ga.  212,  25  S.  30  N.  W.  720. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

RELATING  TO   ALIBI. 

Sec.  Sec. 

322.  Alibi  as  a  defense — Burden  on      326.    Instructions  on  issue — Proper 

defendant.  and  improper. 

323.  Burden — Degree  of  proof.  327.     Instructions  proper. 

324.  Burden  —  By    preponderance,      328.     Instructions  improper. 

when. 

325.  Instructions  discrediting  alibi. 

§  322.  Alibi  as  a  defense — Burden  on  defendant. — The  de- 
fense of  an  alibi  is  not  a  substantive  defense,  but  it  is  a  fact 
proper  to  be  shown  in  evidence  in  rebuttal  to  the  evidence  of 
the  prosecution.  The  state  must  prove  that  the  accused  was 
present  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  crime  charged, 
that  is,  where  his  presence  is  essential  to  connect  him  with  its 
commission.1  In  some  jurisdictions  the  burden  is  on  the  de- 
fendant to  establish  in  support  of  an  alibi  such  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances, as  when  considered  in  connection  with  the  other 
evidence,  create  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  a  reasonable  doubt 
of  the  truth  of  the  charge.2  The  evidence  in  support  of  an 

1  S.  v.  Ardoin,  49  La.  Ann.  1145,  596,  11  N.  W.  5;    S.  v.  Beasley,  81 
22    So.    620,    62   Am.    St.    678;    S.   v.  Iowa,  83,  50  N.  W.  570.     See,  also, 
Lowry,  42  W.  Va.  205,  24  S.  E.  561;  Town  v.  S.  Ill  Ala.  1,  20  So.   598; 
Gawn   v.   S.    13   Ohio   C.    C.   116,   7  Beavers  v.  S.  103  \la.  36,  15  So.  616; 
Ohio  Dec.  19.  P.  v.  Piohette,  111  Mich.  461,  69  N. 

2  Hughes   Cr.    Law,    §  2414,   citing  W.  739;  Henson  v.  S.  112  Ala.  41,  21 
Carlton  v.  P.  150  111.  181,  37  N.  E.  So.  79;    S.  v.  Pry,  67  Iowa,  475,  25 
244,  41  Am.  St.  346;   Garrity  v.  P.  N.    W.    738;     S.    v.    Mcdellan,    23 
107     111.     162;     Mullins    v.     P.     110  Mont.  532,  59  Pac.  924,  75  Am.  St. 
111.    46;     Ackerson    v.    P.    124    111.  558;     P.    v.    Resh,    107    Mich.    251, 
563,    16    N.    E.    847;     Hoge    v.    P.  65    N.    W.    99;    Thompson    v.    Com. 
117    111.    44,    6    N.    E.    796;     Shee-  88  Va.   45,  13  S.  E.  304;    Underbill 
ban  v.  P.  131  111.  22,  22  N.  E.  818;  Cr.  Ev.  §  152;   Gutirrez  v.  S.   (Tex. 
S.    v.    McGarry,    111    Iowa,    709,    83  Cr.   App.),   59    S.  W.   274.     Contra: 
N.  W.  718;  S.  v.  Hamilton,  57  Iowa,  S.  v.  Harvey,  131  Mo.  339,  32  S.  W. 

320 


321  BURDEN — DEGREE  OF  PROOF.  §  323 

alibi  should  be  considered  in  connection  with  all  the  other 
evidence  in  the  case,  and  if  on  the  whole  evidence  there  is  a 
reasonable  doubt  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  he  should  be  ac- 
quitted. And  an  instruction  stating  the  law  in  this  form  is 
proper.3 

§  323.  Burden — Degree  of  proof. — The  burden  of  proof  does 
not  change  when  the  defendant  undertakes  to  prove  an  alibi ; 
and  if  by  reason  of  the  evidence  in  support  of  this  defense  the 
jury  should  have  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  guilt  of  the  de- 
fendant he  would  be  entitled  to  an  acquittal,  although  the  jury 
might  not  be  able  to  say  that  the  alibi  was  fully  proved.*  The 
prosecution  is  not  relieved  from  the  necessity  of  proving  the 
actual  presence  of  the  accused  at  the  time  and  place  of  the 
commission  of  the  alleged  crime  when  personal  presence  is  es- 
sential.5 So  where  the  jury  are  instructed  that  if  they  •  enter- 
tain a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  whether  the  defendant  was  present 
at  the  time  and  place  of  the  commission  of  the  alleged  offense 
they  should  acquit  him,  sufficiently  states  the  law  without  fur- 
ther instruction  on  alibi;6  or  that  if  the  defendant  was  at  an- 
other place  before  and  during  the  commission  of  the  crime 
charged,  he  should  be  acquitted,  is  proper.7 

1110;    Shoemaker    v.    Ter.    4    Okla.  Caldw.   (Term.),  92;   S.  v.  Ward,  61 

118,  43  Pac.  1059;  S.  v.  Taylor,  118  Vt.  153,  192.,  17  Atl.  483;  Beavers  v. 

Mo.   153,  24   S.  W.  449;    S.  v.   Ghee  S.  103  Ala.  36,  15  So.  616;    Bennett 

Gong,    16    Ore.    534,    19    Pac.    607;  v.  S.  30  Tex.  Cr.  App.  341,  17  S.  W. 

Fleming  v.  S.  136  Ind.  149,  36  N.  E,  545;    S.  v.   Ohee  Gong,  16  Ore.  538, 

154.  19  Pac.   607;    Howard  v.   S.  50  Ind. 

s  S.  v.  Ardoin,  49  La.  Ann.  1145,  22  190;    Landis  v.   S.   70  Ga.  651;    Mc- 

So.  620,  62  Am.  R.  678;   Barr  v.  P.  Lain   v.    S.    18  Neb.   154,   24   N.   W. 

30  Colo.  522,  71  Pac.  392.     See  S.  v.  720;   S.  v.  Hardin,  46  Iowa,  623,  26 

Taylor,   118  Mo.   167,  3;5  S.  W.   92;  Am.  R.  174;   Pate  v.  S.  94  Ala.  14, 

S.  v.  Bryant,  134  Mo.  246,  35  S.  W.  18,  10  So.  665. 

597;  Walker  v.  S.  42  Tex.  360;  Shee-  4  Hughes   Cr.   Law,   §  2415,   citing 

han  v.  P.  131  111.  22,  22  N.  E.  818;  Walters  v.  S.  39  Ohio  St.  215,  4  Am. 

Underbills  Cr.  Ev.   §   148,  citing  S.  Cr.  R.  35,  1  Bish.  Cr.  Proc.  §  1061. 

v.  Conway,  56  Kas.  682,  44  Pac.  627;  5  S.  v.   Lowry,  42  W.  Va.  205,  24 

S.  v.  Harvey,  131  Mo.  339,  32  S.  W.  S.  E.  561. 

1110;    S.  v.   Lowry,  42  W.  Va.  205,  6  Punk  v.  S.    (Tex.   Cr.  App.),  48 

24    S.    E.    561;    P.    v.    Pichette,    111  S.  W.  171;    S.  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153, 

Mich.    461,   69   N.   W.   739;    Borrego  17  Atl.  483,  8  Am.  Cr.  R.  224;   Long 

v.  Ter.  8  N.  Mex.  446,  46  Pac.  349;  v.   S.  42  Fla.  509,  28  So.  775;    S.  v. 

Carlton  v.  P.  150  111.  181,  37  N.  E.  Spotted  Hawk,  22  Mont.  33,  55  Pac. 

244,  41  Am.  St.  346;  Ackerson  v.  P.  1026.    See  S..v.  Button,  70  Iowa,  268, 

124  111.  571,  16  N.  E.  847;  Watson  v.  30  N.  W.  567. 

Com.  95  Pa.  St.  422;  Ware  v.  S.  59  7  P.    v.    Pichette,    111    Mich.    461, 

Ark.  379,  27  S.  W.  485;  Harrison  v.  69  N.  W.  739;  S.  v.  Taylor,  118  Mo. 

S.  83  Ga.  134,  9  S.  E.  542;  Walters  v.  167,  24  S.  W.  449. 
S.  39  Ohio  St.  217;  Chappel  v.  S.  7 


§    324  RELATING   TO   ALIBI.  322 

A  charge  directing  the  jury  to  acquit  the  defendant  if  his 
evidence  raises  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his  guilt,  correctly  and 
sufficiently  states  the  law  as  to  the  defense  of  an  alibi.8  To 
instruct  that  when  the  defendant  undertakes  to  establish  an 
alibi  the  evidence  he  introduces  must,  when  considered  with  all 
the  other  evidence  in  the  case,  account  for  his  whereabouts 
during  the  whole  period  of  time  is  not  improper  where  the  jury 
are  also  properly  instructed  on  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  where- 
abouts of  the  defendant  during  the  time  in  question.9 

§324.  Burden — By  preponderance,  when. — In  some  jurisdic- 
tions, however,  the  burden  is  on  the  accused  to  establish  the 
defense  of  an  alibi  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.10  Under 
this  rule  an  instruction  that  "it  is  the  duty  of  the  defendant, 
in  proving  an  alibi,  to  reasonably  satisfy  the  jury  that  he  was 
elsewhere  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  offense,"  prop- 
erly states  the  law.11  But  an  instruction  that  an  alibi  can  only 
be  satisfactorily  sustained  by  proof  which  renders  it  impos- 
sible for  the  accused  to  have  committed  the  crime  charged 
against  him  is  improper.12  So  an  instruction  requiring  the  de- 
fendant to  establish  the  defense  of  alibi  by  a  preponderance 
of  the  evidence,  which  fails  to  take  into  consideration  the  prin- 
ciple of  reasonable  doubt,  is  erroneous.13 

s  S.  v.  Miller,  156  Mo.  76,  56  S.  W.  13  S.  E.  304;  S.  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153, 

907;   S.  v.  Jones.  153  Mo.  457,  55  S.  17  All.  483,  8  Am.  Cr.  R.  222;  P.  v. 

W.  80;    S.  v.  Hale,  156  Mo.  112,  56  Kessler,    13    Utah,    69,    44    Pac.    97. 

S.  W.  881.     Compare  Shaw  v.  S.  102  Contra:    McNamara   v.    P.    24    Colo. 

Ga.    660,   29    S.   E.    477;    Bone  v.    S.  61,   48   Pac.    541;    S.   v.    Conway,    55 

102  Ga.  387,  30  S.  E.  845.    See  Towns  Kas.  323,  40  Pac.  661. 

v.  S.  Ill  Ala.  1,  20  So.  598;  Toler  v.  n  Pellum  v.   S.   89  Ala.   28,  8  So. 

S.   16   Ohio  St.   585;    P.  v.   Pearsall,  83;    S.  v.   Henry,  48  Iowa,  403.  But 

50  Mich.  233,  15  N.  W.  98;  Gallagher  see  Beaver  v.  S.  103  Ala.  36,  15  So. 

v.  S.  28  Tex.  App.  247,  12  S.  W.  1087;  616;    Briceland   v.    Com.   74   Pa.    St. 

French    v.    S.    12    Ind.    670;     S.    v.  469;    Miller  v.   P.   39   111.   464;    Wis- 

Starnes,  94  N.  Car.  973.  dom  v.  P.  11  Colo.  175,  17  Pac.  519. 

9  P.   v.   Worden,   113   Cal.   569,   45  12  Gawn  v.  S.  13  Ohio  C.  C.  116,  7 
Pac.    844;    West   v.    S.    48    Ind.    483  Ohio  Dec.  19;   McCormick  v.  S.  133 
(whole    time);    Albritton    v.    S.    94  Ala.   202,   32   So.   268;    Pollard   v.   S. 
Ala.    76    (whole   time),    10    So.    426.  53  Miss.  421;  Kaufman  v.  S.  49  Ind. 

10  S.  v.  Rowland,  72  Iowa,  327,  33  248;   Stuart  v.  P.  42  Mich.  260,  3  N. 
N.    W.    137;    S.    v.    McCracken,    66  W.  863;  Beavers  v.  S.  103  Ala.  36,  15 
Iowa,  569,  24  N.  W.  43;  S.  v.  Ham-  So.  616;  Wisdom  v.  P.  11  Colo,  170, 
ilton,    57    Iowa,    596,    11    N.    W.    5;  17  Pac.  519;  Snell  v.  S.  50  Ind.  516. 
S.  v.  Kline,  54  Iowa,  185,  6  N.  W.         is  s.  v.  Hogan   (Iowa),  88  N.  W. 
184;  Lucas  v.  S.  110  Ga.  756,  36  S.  E.  1074. 

87;    Thompson  v.   Com.   88  Va.   45, 


323 


BURDEN    BY    PREPONDERANCE. 


§    326 


§  325.  Instructions  discrediting  alibi. — The  defense  of  an  alibi 
is  as  legitimate  as  any  other  defense,  and  the  court  should  not, 
by  instruction  or  otherwise,  cast  suspicion  upon  it.1*  It  is  a 
well  established  rule  that  an  instruction  containing  language 
which  casts  suspicion  upon,  discredits  or  disparages  any  class  of 
evidence,  is  erroneous.15  It  is  not  improper,  however,  for  the 
court,  in  charging  the-  jury,  to  state  that  evidence  introduced 
to  prove  an  alibi  should  be  subjected  to  rigid  scrutiny.16 

§326.  Instructions  on  issue — Proper  and  improper. — Where 
the  defense  to  a  criminal  charge  is  an  alibi,  and  the  defendant  in- 
troduces affirmative  evidence  tending  to  support  it,  he  is  entitled 
to  an  affirmative  charge  on  the  issue  of  alibi,  and  it  is  error  for 
the  court  to  refuse  to  so  instruct.17  It  is  also  error  to  refuse 
to  charge  the  jury  that  a  reasonable  doubt  may  arise  from  the 
evidence  tending  to  prove  an  alibi.18  The  court  is  not  required, 
however,  to  instruct  on  the  law  of  alibi  on  its  own  motion.  The 
desired  instructions  must  be  properly  requested.19 


i*  Miller  v.  P.  39  111.  465;  Albin 
v.  S.  63  Ind.  598,  3  Am.  Cr.  R.  295; 
P.  v.  Kelley,  35  Hun  (N.  Y.),  295; 
Line  v.  S.  51  Ind.  172;  Simmons  v. 
S.  61  Miss.  243;  Sater  v.  S.  56  Ind. 
378;  S.  v.  Ghee  Gong,  16  Ore.  534,  19 
Pac.  607;  S.  v.  Crowell,  149  Mo.  3U1, 
50  S.  W.  893;  S.  v.  Jaynes,  78  N. 
Car.  504;  S.  v  Lewis,  69  Mo.  92; 
P.  v.  Lattimore,  86  Cal.  403,  24  Pac. 
1091;  Spencer  v.  S.  50  Ala.  124; 
Dawson  v.  S.  62  Miss.  241.  Contra: 
Provo  v.  S.  55  Ala.  222;  S.  v.  Blunt, 
59  Iowa,  468,  13  N.  W.  427;  S.  v. 
.Wright,  141  Mo.  333,  42  S.  W.  934; 
P.  v.  Wong  Ah  Foo,  69  Cal.  180,  10 
Pac.  375. 

is  Shenkenberger  v.  S.  154  Ind. 
630,  640,  57  N.  E.  519;  Lewis  v. 
Christie,  99  Ind.  377;  S.  v.  Lewis, 
.69  Mo.  92;  Spencer  v.  S.  50  Ala.  124. 

is  S.  v.  Rowland,  72  Iowa,  329,  33 
N.  W.  137;  Albritton  v.  S.  94  Ala. 
76,  10  So.  426;  S.  v.  Blunt,  59  Iowa, 
468,  13  N.  W.  427. 

IT  Rountree  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
55  S.  W.  827;  Arismendis  v.  S.  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  60  S.  W.  47;  Padron  v. 
S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  548,  55  S.  W. 
827;  Tittle  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  96, 
31  S.  W.  677;  Smith  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 


App.),  50  S.  W.  362;  Garcia  v.  S. 
34  Fla.  311,  16  So.  223;  S.  v.  Con- 
way,  55  Kas.  333,  40  Pac.  661;  An- 
derson v.  S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App  546, 
31  S.  W.  673;  P.  v.  Dick,  32  Cal. 
216;  S.  v.  Mackey,  12  Ore.  1&4,  6  Pac. 
648,  5  Am.  Cr.  R.  536;  S.  v.  Whit- 
ny,  7  Ore.  386;  S.  v.  Kaplan,  167  Mo. 
298,  66  S.  W.  967;  Burton  v.  S.  107 
Ala.  108,  18  So.  284;  S.  v.  Porter, 
74  Iowa,  623,  38  N.  W.  514;  Wiley  v. 
S.  5  Baxt.  (Tenn.),  662;  Conway  v. 
S.  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  327,  26  S.  W. 
401;  Long  v.  S.  42  Fla.  509,  28  So. 
775;  S.  v.  Bryant,  134  Mo.  246,  35 
S.  W.  597;  Fletcher  v.  S.  85  Ga. 
666,  11  S.  E.  872;  Joy  v.  S.  41  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  46,  51  S.  W.  935;  Aris- 
mendis v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  60 
S.  W.  47  (alibi  sole  defense);  Deggs 
v.  S.  7  Tex.  App.  359  (alibi  the 
sole  defense).  Contra:  Conrad  v. 
S.  132  Ind.  258,  31  N.  E.  805;  S.  v. 
Ward,  61  Vt.  194,  17  Atl.  483,  8  Am. 
Cr.  R.  224;  S.  v.  Button,  70  Iowa, 
268,  30  N.  W.  567. 

is  Fleming  v.  S.  136  Ind.  149,  36 
N.  E.  154. 

19  Marshall  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
450,  36  S.  W.  86;  Goldsby  v.  U. 
S.  160  U.  S.  70,  16  Sup.  Ct.  216; 


§  32?  RELATING  TO  ALIBI.  324 

Where  there  is  abundant  evidence  of  a  conspiracy  connecting 
the  accused  with  the  commission  of  a  murder,  .it  could  make  no 
difference  whether  he  was  or  was  not  present  when  the  homicide 
was  committed;  hence  an  instruction  on  alibi  in  such  case  may 
be  properly  refused.-0  An  instruction  that  "if  you  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant  was  not  present  at  the  time 
it  is  alleged  that  the  crime  was  committed  you  must  acquit 
him,"  is  properly  refused  where  the  defendant  may  have  aided 
and  abetted  the  crime  without  being  personally  present.21 

But,  of  course,  if  there  is  no  evidence  introduced  tending  to 
prove  the  defense  of  alibi,  an  instruction  as  to  that  defense  is  prop- 
erly refused.22  Thus,  where,  in  a  trial  for  murder,  the  evidence 
shows  that  the  killing  occurred  about  eight  o'clock,  and  the 
defendant  introduced  no  evidence  to  show  his  whereabouts  from 
seven-thirty  to  eight-fifteen,  and  it  appearing  that  he  could  have 
committed  the  crime  during  that  time,  he  cannot  complain  that 
the  court  failed  to  instruct  on  the  defense  of  alibi.23 

§  327.  Instructions  proper — A  charge  that  evidence  to  es- 
tablish an  alibi,  like  any  other  evidence,  may  be  open  to  special 
observation;  that  persons  may  perhaps  fabricate  it  with  greater 
hopes  of  success  or  less  fear  of  punishment  than  most  other 
kinds  of  evidence,  and  honest  witnesses  often  mistake  dates 
and  periods  of  time  and  identity  of  people  and  other  things 
about  which  they  may  testify,  is  proper.24  In  a  case  where  the 
defense  was  an  alibi,  for  the  court  to  charge  the  jury  that  "I -ap- 
prehend you  will  have  little  trouble  in  coming  to  a  conclusion 
whether  it  is  a  case  of  murder.  I  believe  it  is  conceded  by 
counsel  who  addressed  you  that  the  killing  was  a  felonious  one," 
was  held  not  to  be  an  improper  charge  on  the  facts  of  the 

Lyon  v.  S.  (Tex.  Or.  App.),  34  S.  W.  57  S.  W.  805;  Glover  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 

947;    Com.   v.   Boschim,  176   Pa.   St.  App.),   46   S.   W.    824;    Morris  v.    S. 

103,  34  Atl.  964;    S.  v.  Peterson,  38  124  Ala.   44,  27  So.  336;   Jackson  v. 

Kas.  205,  16  Pac.  263;    Anderson  v.  S.    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),   67   S.   W.    497; 

S.  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  546,  31  S.  W.  673.  S.  v.  Jackson,  95  Mo.  623,  8  S.  W. 

Contra:     Fletcher  v.  S.  85  G-a.  666,  749;    S.   v.   Seymour,   94   Iowa,   699, 

11  S.  E.  872.  63   N.   W.   661. 

20  s.  v.  Gatlin,  170  Mo.  354,  70  S.  23  S.  v.  Seymour,  94  Iowa,  699,  63 
W.  885;  S.  v.  Johnson,  40  Kas.  266,  N.  W.  661;  S.  v.  Murray,  91  Mo.  95, 
19  Pac.  749.  3  S.  W/397. 

21  P.  v.  Feliz,  136  Cal.  19,  69  Pac.  24  p.  v.  Wong  Ah  Foo,  69  Cal.  189, 
220.  10  Pac.  375. 

22  Johnson  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 


325  PROPER  AND  IMPROPER   REQUESTS.  §    328 

case.25  To  charge  the  jury  that  an  alibi  is  a  good  defense,  if 
proved,  is  not  error  where  in  the  same  connection  the  jury 
are  instructed  that  if  they  have  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the 
presence  of  the  defendant  they  should  acquit  him.26  An  in- 
struction in  substance  charging  that  if  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  testimony  to  sustain  the  defense  of  alibi 
is  false  and  fraudulent,  then  this  is  a  discrediting  circumstance 
to  which  the  jury  may  look,  in  connection  with  all  the  other 
evidence,  in  determining  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendant, 
is  proper.27  But  an  instruction  which  thus  states  that  if  the 
jury  believe  the  alibi  to  be  false,  that  is  positive  evidence  of 
guilt,  is  erroneous.28 

An  instruction  that  "the  defense  of  an  alibi  is  one  easily 
manufactured,  and  jurors  are  generally  and  properly  advised 
by  the  courts  to  scan  the  testimony  of  an  alibi  with  care  and 
caution,"  is  proper.29  A  charge  that  "if  the  defendant  was  at 
the  time  of  the  killing  at  another  and  different  place  from  that 
at  which  such  killing  was  done,  and  therefore  was  not  and 
could  not  have  been  the  person  who  killed  the  deceased,  if  he 
was  killed;  that  if  the  evidence  raises  in  your  minds  a  reason- 
able doubt  as  to  the  presence  of  the  defendant  at  the  place 
where  the  deceased  was  killed,  if  he  was  killed,  at  the  time  of 
such  killing,  you  will  find  him  not  guilty,"  is  correct.30 

§  328.  Instructions  improper. — To  instruct  the  jury  that,  as 
a  rule,  the  defense  of  an  alibi  is  open  to  great  and  manifest 
abuse,  because  of  the  comparative  ease  with  which  testimony  to 
support  it  may  be  fabricated,  or  that  this  defense  is  often  re- 
sorted to  by  those  who  are  guilty,  or  that  perjury,  mistake, 
contrivance  and  deception  are  frequently  employed  and  involved 
in  supporting  it,  is  error,  as  invading  the  province  of  the  jury.31 
Stating  to  the  jury  that  an  alibi  is  a  defense  "easily  fabricated, 

25  S.  v.  Aughtry,  49  S.  Car.  285,  26  as  s.    v.    Manning    (Vt )     52    Atl. 

S.    E.    619.  1033. 

«»  S.    v.    Price,    55    Kas.    610,    40  29  s.    v.    Blunt,    59    Iowa,    468,    13 

Pac.  1001;  P.  v.  Resh,  107  Mich.  251,  N.   427. 

65  N.  W.  99;   P.  v.  Chun  Heong,  86  ™  Walker  v.   S.   6  Tex.   App.   576. 

Cal.  330,  24  Pac.   1021.  31  Underbill    Cr.    Ev.    §    153.    cit- 

27  Tattim  v.  S.  131  Ala.  32,  31  So.  ing  S.  v.  Chee  Gong,  16  Ore.  538.  19 

369;    Albritton  v.   S.   94  Ala.   76,   10  Pac.  607;  Murphy  v.  S.  31  Fla.  166. 12 

So.  426;  Crittenden  v.  S.  134  Ala.  So.  453;  Dawson  v.  S.  62  Miss.  241. 
145,  32  So.  273. 


§  328  RELATING  TO  ALIBI.  326 

that  it  has  occasionally  been  successfully  fabricated,  and  that 
the  temptation  to  resort  to  it  as  a  spurious  defense  is  very  great, 
especially  in  cases  of  importance,"  is  highly  improper  as  in- 
vading the  province  of  the  jury  in  determining  the  weight  of 
the  evidence.32 

An  instruction  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  defendant  "has  attempted  to  prove  an  alibi  and  failed,  it  is 
a  circumstance  of  great  weight  against  him  and  proper  to  be 
considered  by  the  jury  in  determining  his  guilt  or  innocence," 
is  improper.  Failing  to  prove  an  alibi  should  have  no  greater 
weight  to  convince  a  jury  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  than  the 
failure  to  prove  any  other  important  fact  of  defense.33  It  is 
also  improper  to  charge  that  a  failure  to  prove  an  alibi  may 
be  considered  in  connection  with  any  other  evidence  in  the  case 
tending  to  prove  guilt.34 

It  is  error  to  charge  that  if  the  jury  do  not  believe  that  the 
testimony  of  the  defense  as  to  an  alibi  outweighs  the  testimony 
of  the  state,  which  connects  the  defendant  with  the  offense 
charged,  they  should  not  believe  the  alibi.35  An  instruction 
that  the  defendant  is  not  required  to  establish  the  defense  of 
an  alibi  to  the  reasonable  satisfaction  of  the  jury  is  properly 
refused.36  Also  a  charge  that  the  burden  of  proving  an  alibi 
is  not  on  the  defendant  is  properly  refused  where  'other  in- 
structions state  that  it  is  sufficient  if,  from  the  whole  evidence 
on  both  sides,  including  the  evidence  relating  to  the  alibi,  there 
is  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  defendant's  guilt,  and  where  the 
charge  contains  further  instructions  as  to  the  presumption  of 
innocence ;  and  that  unless  such  presumption  is  overcome  by 
evidence,  the  defendant  should  be  acquitted.37  It  is  error  to 

32  Henry   v.    S.    51   Neb.    149.    70          34  Parker   v.    S.    136   Ind.    284,   35 
N.   W.    924;    Nehms  v.    S.    58   Miss.  N.   E.   1105.     See,   also,   Kimbrough 
362;   Sawyers  v.  S.  15  Lea  (Tenn.),  v.  S.  101  Ga.  583,  29  S.  B.  39;   S.  v. 
695.     Compare  P.  v.  Wong  Ah  Foo,  Byers,  80  N.  Car.  426. 

69  Cal.   180,  10  Pac.  375.  35  Duncan  v.  S.  95  Ga.  477,  22  S. 

33  Miller  v.  P.  39  111.  465;  Prince      E.   324. 

v.    S.    100   Ala.   144,    14  So.   409;    P.          se  Holley  v.  S.  104  Ala.  100,  17  So. 

v.    Malaspina,    57    Cal.    628;    S.    v.      102;    Pate  v.   S.   94  Ala.   18,   10   So. 

Jaynes,  78  N.  Car.  504.    See  Sawyers      665. 

v.    S.    15    Lea    (Tenn.),    695;     S.    v.          ST  Emery  v.  S.  101  Wis.  627,  78  N. 

Collins,  20  Iowa,  85;  Turner  v.  Com.      W.   145. 

86  Pa.  St.  54;  Parker  v.  S.  136  Ind. 

293,  35  N.  E.  1105.    Contra:  Kilgore 

v.  S.  74  Ala.  5. 


327  PROPER  AND  IMPROPER  REQUESTS.  §    328 

charge  the  jury  that  if  it  was  possible  that  the  defendant  could 
have  been  at  both  places — that  is,  at  the  place  of  the  alleged 
crime  and  where  he  claimed  he  was  at  the  time — the  proof  of 
the  alibi  is  of  no  value  whatever.38  Also  a  charge  that  "proof 
to  establish  an  alibi,  though  not  clear,  may  nevertheless,  with 
other  facts  of  the  case,  raise  doubt  enough  to  produce  an  ac- 
quittal ;  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  defendant 's  presence  at  the 
time  and  place  necessary  for  the  commission  of  the  crime  would 
necessarily  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  of  guilt,"  is  improper  as 
being  misleading  and  argumentative.39 

ss  Ford  v.  S.  101  Term.  454,  47  S.         ™  James  v.  S.  115  Ala.  83,  22  So. 
W.  703.  565. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


INSANITY  AS  A  DEFENSE. 


Sec. 

329.  Insanity  defined. 

330.  Sanity     presumed  —  Insanity 

presumed    to   continue. 

331.  Insanity — Burden    on    defend- 

ant. 

332.  Insanity — Instructions      may 

define. 


Sec. 

333.  Insanity     feigned — Cautionary 

instructions. 

334.  Insanity  —  Instructions  prop- 

er— Illustrations. 

335.  Insanity  —  Instructions     im- 

proper— Illustrations. 


§  329.  Insanity  defined.— Where  insanity  is  the  defense  to 
a  criminal  charge,  the  inquiry  is  always  to  be  reduced  to  the 
single  question  of  the  capacity  of  the  accused  to  discriminate 
between  right  and  wrong  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  criminal 
act.1  The  insanity  must  be  of  such  a  degree  as  to  create  an 
uncontrollable  impulse  to  do  the  act  charged,  by  overriding -the 
reason  and  judgment,  and  obliterating  the  sense  of  right  as  to 
the  particular  act  done,  and  depriving  the  accused  of  the  power 
of  choosing  between  them1.2 


i  S.  v.  Harrison,  36  W.  Va.  729, 
15  S.  E.  982,  18  L.  R.  A.  224  note, 
9  Am.  Cr.  R.  638;  Carr  v.  S.  96 
Ga.  284,  22  S.  E.  570,  10  Am.  Cr. 
R.  331;  S.  v.  Morwy,  37  Kas.  369, 
15  Pac.  282;  P.  v.  Carpenter,  102 
N.  Y.  238,  6  N.  E.  584;  S.  v.  Pagels, 
92  Mo.  300,  4  S.  W.  391;  P.  v.  Hoin, 
62  Cal.  120;  S.  v.  Lawrence,  57  Me. 
577.  See  Mangum  v.  Com.  19  Ky.  L. 
R.  94,  39  S.  W.  703;  Com.  v.  Gerade, 
145  Pa.  St.  289,  22  Atl.  464;  S.  v. 
Hockett,  70  Iowa,  442,  30  N.  W.  742. 
See  Eckert  v.  S.  114  Wis.  160,  89 
N.  W.  826.  Contra:  Parsons  v.  S. 
81  Ala.  577,  2  So.  854,  7  Am.  Cr.  R. 
266. 


2  Ho  ps  v.  P.  31  111.  391;  Lilly 
v.  P.  148  111.  473,  36  N.  E.  95; 
Dacey  v.  P.  116  111.  572,  6  N.  E.  165; 
Meyer  v.  P.  156  111.  129,  40  N.  E. 
490;  United  States  v.  Faulkner,  35 
Fed.  731.  See,  also,  S.  v.  Nixon,  32 
Kas.  212,  4  Pac.  159;  Plake  v.  S.  121 
Ind.  435,  23  N.  E.  273;  Goodwin  v.  S. 
96  Ind.  550;  Howard  v.  9.  50  Ind. 
190;  Wagner  v.  S.  116  Ind.  187, 18  N. 
E.  833;  Conway  v.  S.  118  ind.  482,  21 
N.  E.  285;  S.  v.  Felter,  32  Iowa,  49; 
P.  v.  Riordan:,  117  N.  Y.  71,  22  N.  E. 
455;  Tiffiany  v.  Com.  121  Pa.  St.  180, 
15  Atl.  462;  Mackin  v.  S.  59  N.  J.  L. 
495,  36  Atl.  1040;  Genz  v.  S.  59  N. 
J.  L.  488,  37  Atl.  69;  P.  v.  Carpen- 


328 


329  ,   BURDEN   ON   DEFENDANT.  §  331 

§  330.    Sanity  presumed — Insanity  presumed  to   continue. — 

The  law  presumes  every  man  to  be  sane  until  the  contrary  is 
shown.  But  this  legal  presumption  may  be  overcome  by  evi- 
dence from  either  side  tending  to  prove  insanity  of  the  accused.3 
According  to  this  principle  it  is  proper,  in  charging  the  jury,  to 
instruct  them  that  every  man  is  presumed  to  be  sane,  and  to 
intend  the  natural  and  usual  consequences  of  his  own  acts.4 

When  insanity  of  a  permanent  type  is  proved  to  exist,  it  will 
be  presumed  to  continue  to  exist  until  the  presumption  is  over- 
come by  competent  evidence.  But  this  rule  does  not  apply  to 
cases  of  occasional  or  intermittent  insanity,  but  it  does  apply 
to  all  cases  of  habitual  or  apparently  confirmed  insanity  of  what- 
ever nature.5  And  the  refusal  to  give  an  instruction  embrac- 
ing this  principle  is  error  where  the  evidence  tends  to  prove  in- 
sanity of  a  permanent  nature.6  But  a  charge  that  if  the  de- 
fendant was  insane  a  short  time  before  the  commission  of  the 
alleged  criminal  act,  the  presumption  is  that  he  was  insane  when 
he  comitted  the  act,  is  properly  refused.7 

§  331.  Insanity — Burden  on  defendant. — And  the  burden  of 
proof  is  on  the  defendant  to  overcome  such  presumption.  The 
adjudged  cases  in  this  country  present  a  vast  weight  of  authority 
favorable  to  the  doctrine  that  insanity  as  a  defense  must  be  es- 
tablished to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  by  a  preponderance  of 
the  evidence;  that  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  defendant's  sanity, 
raised  by  all  the  evidence,  does  not  authorize  an  acquittal.8 
But  there  are  numerous  decisions  by  courts  of  high  authority 

ter,  102  N.  Y.  250,  6  N.  E.  584;   P.  inick  v.  Randolph,  124  Ala.  557,  27 

v.   Taylor,  138  N.   Y.  406,  34  N.   E.  So.   481. 

275;    S.   v.    Plye,   26  Me.   312;    S.   v.  &  S.  v.  Wilner,  40  Wis.  306,  citing 

Lawrence,  57  Me.  577,  581;  Parsons  1    Greenleaf   Ev.    §§    42,    371,    689; 

v.  S.  81  Ala.  577,  2  So.  854.  Jackson  v.  Van  Dusen,  5  Johns.  (N. 

s  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  2437,  citing,  Y.),  144;  Grouse  v.  Holman,  19  Ind. 

Dacey   v.    P.    116    111.    572,    6    N.    E.  30;  Wry  v.  Wry,  33  Ala.  187;  Under- 

165;  Montag  v.  P.  141  111.  80,  30  N.  hill's  Cr.  Ev.   §  156;   Branstrator  v. 

E.  337;  P.  v.  McCarthy,  115  Cal.  255,  Crow    (Ind.),   69   N.   E.   668. 

46  Pac.  1073;  Davis  v.  United  States  «  S.  v.  Wilner,  40  Wis.  306.     See 

160  U.  S.  469,  16  Sup.  Ct.  353,  and  Grubb  v.  S.  117  Ind.  277,  20  N.  E. 

many  other  cases;  Sanders  v.  S.  94  257. 

Ind.   147;    Com.   v.   Gerade,  145  Pa.  T  p.   v.   Smith,  57  Cal.   130. 

St.  297,  22  Atl.  464.  s  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  2435,  citing, 

4  S.    v.    Pagels,    92    Mo.    300,    4    S.  S.  v.  Scott,  47  La.  Ann.  251,  21  So. 

W.  931;    Sanders  v.  S.  94  Ind.  147;  271,  10  Am.  Cr.  R.  585;   Parsons  v. 

S.  v.  Bruce,  48  Iowa,  533.    See  Dom-  S.  81  Ala.  577,  2  So.  854,  7  Am.  Cr. 

R.  266;  Com.  v.  Gerade,  145  Pa.  St. 


§  331 


INSANITY   AS   A   DEFENSE. 


330 


holding  that  where  a  prima  facie  case  is  made  out  against  the 
defendant,  he  is  never  bound  to  overcome  it  by  a  preponderance 
of  the  evidence  where  insanity  is  the  defense ;  that  the  burden 
of  proof  is  always  on  the  state  and  never  shifts  to  the  defend- 
ant;9 that  the  presumption  of  sanity  may  be  overcome  by  evi- 
dence which  is  sufficient  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  san- 
ity of  the  accused  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  alleged 
criminal  act,  and  an  instruction  so  stating  is  proper.10 

It  is  proper,  therefore,  to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  law 
presumes  a  man  to  be  sane  until  the  contrary  is  shown,  and 
imposes  on  the  accused  the  burden  of  proving  insanity  when 
set  up  as  a  defense  to  a  criminal  charge.11  If  the  state  shall 
prove,  even  prima  facie,  that  the  accused  committed  the  act 
alleged  to  be  criminal,  and  no  other  evidence  is  given,  his  sanity 
will  be  presumed,  and  if  he,  in  his  defense,  offers  no  evidence 
as  to  his  mental  condition,  his  sanity  will  be  regarded  as  proved.12 


289,  22  Atl.  464;  Coyle  v.  Com.  100 
Pa.  St.  573,  4  Cr.  L.  Mag.  76;  Car- 
lisle v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  56  S.  W. 
365;  P.  v.  Nino,  149  N.  Y.  317,  43 
N.  E.  853;  King  v.  S.  74  Miss.  576, 
21  So.  235;  S.  v.  Larkins,  5  Idaho, 
200.  47  Pac.  945;  S.  v.  Cole,  2  Pen. 
(Del.),  344,  45  Atl.  391;  Graves  v. 
S.  45  N.  J.  L.  203.  4  Am.  Cr.  R.  387; 
Coates  v.  S.  50  Ark.  330,  7  S.  W. 
304.  7  Am.  Cr.  R.  585;  S.  v.  Smith, 
53  Mo.  267,  2  Green.  Cr.  R.  599;  P. 
v.  Wilson,  49  Gal.  13,  1  Am.  Cr.  R. 
358;  Ortwein  v.  Com.  76  Pa.  St. 
414,  1  Am.  Cr.  R.  298;  S.  v.  Cleven- 
ger,  156  Mo.  190,  56  S.  W.  1078; 
Underbill  Cr.  Bv.  §  158. 

»  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  2436,  cit- 
ing S.  v.  Crawford,  11  Kas.  32,  2 
Green.  Cr.  R.  642;  P.  v.  McCann,  16 
N.  Y.  58;  Chase  v.  P.  40  111.  353;  P. 
v.  Hellick,  126  Cal.  425,  58  Pac.  918. 
See,  also,  Kelch  v.  S.  55  Ohio  St, 
152,  45  N.  E.  6;  P.  v.  McCarthy,  115 
Cal.  255,  46  Pac.  1073;  S.  v.  Shaef- 
fer,  116  Mo.  96,  22  S.  W.  447;  Ford 
v.  S.  73  Miss.  734,  19  So.  665;  Walk- 
er v.  P.  88  N.  Y.  81,  88;  Smith  v. 
Com.  1  Duv.  (Ky.),  224,  228;  P. 
v.  Holmes,  111  Mich.  364,  69  N.  W. 
501;  Armstrong  v.  S.  30  Fla.  170, 
204,  11  So.  618;  S.  v.  Davis,  109  N. 
Car.  780,  14  S.  E.  55;  Underbill  Cr. 


Ev.  §  157;  Guetig  v.  S.  66  Ind.  94; 
Plake-  v.  S.  121  Ind.  433,  23  N.  E. 
273;  McDougal  v.  S.  88  Ind.  24. 

10  Dacey  v.   P.   116   111.   571,   6   N. 
E.  165;   Montag  v.  P.  141  111.  80,  30 
N.    E.    337;    Cunningham    v.    S.    56 
Miss.  269;  Maas  v.  Ter.  10  Okla.  714, 
63  Pac.  960;  Dunn  v.  P.  109  111.  635; 
Langdon  v.  P.  133  111.  406,  24  N.  E. 
874;     P.    v.    Garbutt,    17    Mich.    9; 
O'Connell  v.  P.  87  N.  Y.  377;    S.  v. 
Bart.lett,  43  N.  H.  224;   Myers  v.  P. 
156  111.  129,  40  N.  E.  490;   Brother- 
ton  v.  P.  75  N.  Y.  159,  3  Am.  Cr.  R. 
219;    Com.    v.    Pomeroy,    117    Mass. 
143;   Plake  v.  S.  121  Ind.  433,  23  N. 
E.  273;   S.  v.  Nixon,  32  Kas.  205,  4 
Pac.  159;  Ballard  v.  S.  19  Neb.  609, 
28  N.  W.  271;  Davis  v.  United  States 
160  U.  S.  469,  16  Sup.  Ct.  363;  P.  v. 
Taylor,  138  N.  Y.  398,  34  N.  E..  275; 
Keener  v.   S.   97  Ga.  3881,  24  S.  E. 
28;    S.    v.   Wright,   134   Mo.    404,   35 
S.  W.  1145;  S.  v.  Stickley,  41  Iowa, 
232,  234,  Underbill  Cr.  Ev.  §  157. 

11  S.   v.   Pagels,   92   Mo.   300,   4   S. 
W.    931;    S.    v.    Clevenger,    156   Mo. 
190,  56  S.  W.  1078. 

12  Underbill    Cr.    Ev.    §    157,    cit- 
ing    Boiling     v.     S.    54    Kas.    602; 
O'Brien  v.  P.  48  Barb.  (N.  Y.),  280; 
Armstrong  v.  S.  30  Fla.  197,  11  So. 
618;    O'Connell  v.   P.   87  N.  Y.   384; 


331  DEFINITION  ON  DEGREE FEIGNING  INSANITY.  §    333 

The  burden  being  on  tlie  defendant  to  overcome  the  presump- 
tion of  sanity,  an  instruction  that  the  prosecution  must  affirma- 
tively establish,  as  part  of  their  case,  that  the  defendant  was 
sane,  is  improper.13 

§  332.  Insanity — Instructions  may  define. — The  court,  in 
charging  the  jury,  may  define  what  in  law  constitutes  such  a 
degree  of  insanity  as  excuses  an  act,  which,  but  for  the  mental 
condition  of  the  accused,  would  be  a  crime;  but  in  doing  so 
the  court  should  avoid  expressing  its  views  of  the  case.1*  But 
the  court  is  not  authorized  to  state  to  the  jury  that  certain  facts 
do  or  do  not  prove  insanity.15  And  the  court  may  instruct  the 
jury  that  insanity,  in  all  its  forms,  is  liable  to  become  worse, 
until  it  ends  in  complete  dementia — without  expressing  an  opin- 
ion on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.16 

§  333.  Insanity  feigned — Cautionary  instructions. — Where  the 
evidence  warrants  it,  the  court  may  caution  the  jury  to  examine 
into  the  defense  of  insanity  that  the  accused  shall  not  impose 
upon  the  court  with  an  ingenious  counterfeit  of  the  malady. 
Thus  it  is  not  improper  to  instruct  that  tlie  plea  of  insanity  is 
"sometimes  resorted  to  in  cases  where  aggravated  crimes  have 
been  committed  under  circumstances  which  afford  full  proof  of 
the  overt  acts,  and  render  hopeless  all  other  means  of  evading 
punishment.  While,  therefore,  it  ought  to  be  viewed  as  a  not 
less  full  and  complete,  than  it  is  a  humane  defense  when  sat- 
isfactorily established,  yet  it  should  be  satisfactorily  examined 
into,  with  care,  lest  an  ingenious  counterfeit  of  the  malady 
furnish  protection  to  guilt."17 

So  also  an  instruction  that  "if  you  find  the  accused  at  the  time 
the  doctor  was  observing  him  through  the  hole  in  the  wall,  as 
described  by  the  witness,  was  watching  to  see  whether  he  was 

Com.  v.  Gerade,  145  Pa.  St.  296,  22  Geier,  111  Towa,  706,  83  N.  W.  718; 

Atl.     464;     Dove     v.     S.     3     Heisk.  S.  v.  Jones,  126  N.  Car.  1099,  36  S.  B. 

(Tenn.),    371.  38;    P.   v.   Hubert,   119   Cal.   216,   51 

is  P.    v.    Garbutt,    17   Mich.    9,    97  Pac.  329. 

Am.    Dec.    162;    Reg.    v.    Layton,    4  ie  Carr  v.  S.  96  Ga.  284,  22  S.  E. 

Cox  Cr.  Gas.  155;   S.  v.  Spencer,  1  570. 

Zab.  (N.  J.)  202.  IT  p.   v.   McCarthy,   115   Cal.    255. 

i*  P.  v.  Holmes,  111  Mich.  364,  69  46   Pac.   1073;    P.   v.   Larrabee,   115 

N.  W.  501.  Cal.  158,  46  Pac.  922;  P.  v.  Allender, 

is  Guetig  v.   S.  63  Ind.  278;    Rob-  117    Cal.    81,    48    Pac.    1014;     P.    v. 

inson  v.  Walton,  58  Mo.  380;   S.  v.  Kloss,  115  Cal.  567,  47  Pac    459. 


§  334  INSANITY  AS  A  DEFENSE.  332 

observed,  and  was  regulating  his  conduct  accordingly,  it  would 
raise  a  very  strong  presumption  that  he  was  feigning  insanity, 
and  indeed  such  evidence  of  design  and  calculation  on  his  part 
as  to  be  in  my  opinion  entirely  fatal  to  his  defense  of  insanity," 
has  been  held  not  to  be  an  improper  comment  on  the  defense 
of  insanity  where  the  evidence  strongly  tends  to  show  that  the 
defense  was  not  founded  in  fact,  but  feigned.18 

§  334.  Insanity — Instructions  proper — Illustrations — Where 
the  defendant  neither  admits  nor  denies  killing  the  deceased, 
but  claims  that  she  was  unconscious,  an  instruction  charging 
the  jury  that  if  they  believe  and  find  from  the  evidence  that 
the  defendant  killed  the  deceased,  but  at  the  time  of  the  killing 
was  from  any  cause  rendered  so  unconscious  of  her  acts  as  not 
to  know  what  she  was  doing,  they  should  acquit  her,  properly 
states  the  law.19  A  charge  that  evidence  of  insanity  can  have 
no  effect  in  reducing  the  degree  of  the  crime  is  not  improper 
where  other  instructions  are  given  that  if  the  accused  is  insane 
he  should  be  acquitted.20 

On  a  plea  of  insanity  an  instruction  stating  that  "we  hear 
everything  he  says,  consider  everything  he  does;  we  observe 
his  conduct  on  the  witness  stand;  we  don't  check  him  in  stat- 
ing his  testimony,  because  one  of  the  purposes  is  to  see  whether 
he  is  a  sane  man  or  not,"  is  not  improper  as  authorizing  the 
jury  to  infer  that  the  issue  on  the  question  of  insanity  shall 
be  confined  to  the  time  of  the  trial  instead  of  at  the  time  of 
the  crime  charged,  where  other  instructions  in  various  forms 
confine  the  inquiry  as  to  insanity  to  the  time  of  the  alleged 
offense.21  "The  law  is  that  where  the  killing  is  admitted,  and 
insanity  or  want  of  legal  responsibility  is  alleged  as  an  excuse, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  satisfy  the  jury  that  insanity 
actually  existed  at  the  time  of  the  act,  and  a  doubt  as  to  such 
insanity  will  not  justify  the  jury  in  acquitting  upon  that 
ground."  Held  proper.22  Another  form  held  proper:  "Was 
the  defendant  a  free  agent  in  forming  the  purpose  to  kill  the 
deceased?  Was  he  at  the  time  the  act  was  committed  capable 

is  McKee  v.  P.  36  N.  Y.  118.  21  p.  v.  Burgle  (Cal.),  53  Pac.  9&». 

is  S.  v.  Lewjs,  136  Mo.  84,  37  S.  W.  22  Ortwein  v.  Com.  76  Pa.  St.  414, 

806.  1  Am.  Cr.  R.  297,  Hughes  Cr.  Law, 

20  Com.  v.  Hollinger,  190  Pa.  St.  §  3269. 
155,  42  Atl.  548. 


333  PROPER  AND  IMPROPER  REQUESTS.  §    335 

of  judging  whether  that  act  was  right  or  wrong?  And  did  he 
at  the  time  know  it  was  an  offense  against  the  laws  of  God  and 
man?"23 

§  335.  Insanity — Instructions  improper — Illustrations. — Where 
insanity  is  the  defense  to  a  charge  of  murder,  and  evidence  of 
the  insanity  of  relatives  of  the  defendant  is  introduced,  it  isl^ 
improper  to  instruct  that  the  evidence  of  the  insanity  of  such 
relatives  should  be  considered  only  in  case  the  jury  entertain 
a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  defendant's  sanity  at  the  time  of 
the  commission  of  the  act.  All  of  the  evidence  should  be  con- 
sidered in  determining  the  mental  condition  of  the  defendant.24 
A  charge  stating,  among  other  things,  that  "the  defense  of 
insanity  has  been  so  abused  as  to  be  brought  into  great  dis- 
credit; that  it  has  been  the  last  resort  to  cases  of  unquestion- 
able guilt,  and  has  been  an  excuse  to  juries  for  acquittal,"  is 
highly  prejudicial  to  the  rights  of  the  accused.25 

An  instruction  which  charges  that  no  state  of  mind  resulting 
from  drunkenness,  short  of  actual  insanity  or  loss  of  reason,  is  any 
excuse  for  committing  a  crime,  is  erroneous  where  the  evidence 
shows  that  the  accused  was  intoxicated,  but  where  there  was  no 
evidence  that  he  had  premeditated  committing  the  crime.26 

A  charge  that  an  attempt  to  commit  suicide  is  evidence  of 
insanity  is  properly  refused ;  such  act  is  not  evidence  of  in- 
sanity, but  only  one  phase  of  the  evidence  to  be  considered, 
together  with  all  the  other  evidence  in  the  case.27  An  instruc- 
tion that  although  the  defendant  at  the  time  of  the  commission 
of  the  crime  charged  was  able  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong, 
yet  if  he  "did  not  possess  the  power  to  avoid  the  wrong  and 
do  the  right,  he  is  irresponsible  and  you  must  acquit"  is  errone- 
ous and  properly  refused.28  It  is  improper  and  erroneous  to 
charge  that  the  presumption  of  innocence  is  of  so  much  greater 
strength  than  that  of  sanity  that  when  evidence  appears  tending 
to  prove  insanity  it  compels  the  prosecution  to  establish,  from 

23  Blackburn  v.  S.  23  Ohio  St.  146,         26  Latimer  v.   S.   55   Neb.   609,   76 
2  Green.  Cr.  R.  540;  Clark  v.  S.  12      N.  W.  207. 

Ohio,  494.  27  p.   v.    Owens,    123   Cal.    482,   56 

24  Jones  v.  P.  23  Colo.  276,  47  Pac.      Pac.    251. 

275.  28  p.    v.    Bartheman,    120    Cal.    7, 

25  S.    v.    Barry,    11    N.    Dak.    428,      52  Pac.  112.  ' 
92  N.  W.  809. 


335 


INSANITY   AS  A  DEFENSE. 


334 


all  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  the  mental  sound- 
ness of  the  accused.29  An  instruction  telling  the  jury  that  if 
there  is  a  single  fact  essential  to  constitute  the  guilt  of  the  de- 
fendant which  has  not  been  established  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  that  is  sufficient  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt,  is  properly 
.refused  where  insanity  is  the  defense  and  the  only  issue  in  the 
•  case.30 


28  Guetig  v.  S.  66  Ind.  94. 

so  S.  v.  Soper,  148  Mo.  217,  49 
S.  W.  1007.  The  refusal  to  instruct 
on  the  law  as  to  insanity  cannot  be 
urged  as  error  if  there  is  no  evi- 
dence tending  to  show  insanity  of 
the  defendant  at  or  near  the  time 


of  killing,  S.  v.  Hartley,  22  Nev. 
342,  40  Pac.  372,  28  L.  R.  A.  33  note. 
Instructions  on  insanity  are  prop- 
erly refused  where  insanity  is  not 
interposed  as  a  defense,  Johnson  v. 
S.  100  Tenn.  254,  45  S.  W.  436. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 


PRESUMPTIONS  OP  INNOCENCE. 


Sec. 

336.  Defendant  presumed  to  be  in- 

nocent. 

337.  Instructions     refused — W  hen 

error   and   when   not. 


Sec. 

33S.  Presumption  of  innocence  is 
evidence. 

339.  Presumption  is  evidence — Il- 
lustrations. 


§  336.  Defendant  presumed  to  be  innocent. — In  criminal  cases 
the  defendant  is  always  presumed  to  be  innocent  of  the  crime 
charged  until  his  guilt  has  been  established  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt;1  and  this  presumption  continues  in  his  favor  throughout 
every  stage  of  the  trial  down  to  and  until  the  jury  shall  have 
reached  a  verdict,2  and  does  not  cease  upon  the  submission  of 
the  case  to  the  jury.3  This  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  crim- 
inal law,  and  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  have  the  jury  properly 
instructed  on  the  law  of  such  presumption,  and  the  refusal  to  so 


i  Rogers  v.  S.  117  Ala.  192,  23  So. 
82;  Salm  v.  S.  89  Ala.  56,  8  So.  66; 
Foster  v.  S.  89  Wis.  482,  62  N.  W. 
185;  P.  v.  Willett,  105  Mich.  110, 
62  N.  W.  1115;  P.  v.  Pallister,  138 
N.  Y.  605,  33  N.  E.  741;  Aszman 
v.  S.  123  Ind.  361,  24  N.  E.  123; 
Gardner  v.  S.  55  N.  J.  L.  17,  26 
Atl.  30;  P.  v.  Resh,  107  Mich.  251. 
65  N.  W.  99;  P.  v.  Coughlin,  65 
Mich.  704,  32  N.  W.  905;  Farley  v. 
S.  127  Ind.  421,  26  N.  E.  766;  Reeves 
v.  S.  29  Fla.  527,  10  So.  901;  Long  v. 
S.  23  Neb.  33,  36  N.  W.  310;  Hutts  v. 
S.  7  Tex.  App.  44;  Reid  v.  S.  50  Ga. 
556;  Underbill  Cr.  Ev.  §  17.  See, 
also,  P.  v.  Bowers  (Cal.),  18  Pac. 
660;  Line  v.  S.  51  Ind.  172;  P.  v. 
Arlington,  131  Cal.  231,  631  Pac.  347; 
Garrison  v.  S.  6  Neb.  285;  Murphy 


v.  S.  108  Wis.  HI,  83  N.  W.  1112; 
Ter.  v.  Burgess,  8  Mont.  57,  19  Pac. 
58;  S.  v.  Stubblefield,  157  Mo.  360. 
58  S.  W.  337. 

2  S.  v.  Krug,  12  Wash.  288,  41 
Pac.  126;  Bartley  v.  S.  53  Neb.  310, 
73  N.  W.  744;  S.  v.  Stubblefield,  157 
Mo.  360,  58  S.  W.  337;  S.  v.  Howell, 
26  Mont.  3,  66  Pac.  291;  P.  v.  McNa- 
mara,  94  Cal.  515,  29  Pac.  953;  P.  v. 
Macard,  73  Mich.  26,  40  N.  W.  784. 
See  P.  v.  Arlington,  131  Cal.  231, 
63  Pac.  347,  (relating  to  every 
stage  of  the  trial) ;  Underbill  Cr. 
Ev.  §  18.  Contra:  Emery  v.  S.  101 
Wis.  627,  78  N.  W.  145;  Baker  v. 
Com.  90  Va.  820,  20  S.  E.  776. 

s  P.  v.  O'Brien,  106  Cal.  104,  39 
Pac.  325. 


335 


§    337  PRESUMPTION    OF    INNOCENCE.  336 

instruct  when  properly  requested  is  reversible  error;4  but  the 
failure  to  so  instruct  cannot  be  urged  as  error  where  the  omission 
was  not  called  to  the  attention  of  the  court.5 

§  337.    Instructions  refused — When  error  and  when  not. — The 

refusal  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  law  as  to  the  presumption  of 
the  innocence  of  the  accused  when  properly  requested  is  error, 
although  the  court  may  fully  instruct  on  the  doctrine  of  reason- 
able doubt.6  It  is  not  error,  however,  to  refuse  an  instruction 
on  the  presumption  of  innocence  if  the  refused  instruction  is 
substantially  covered  by  others  given.7  Thus  where  the  court 
has  stated  to  the  jury  that  nothing  can  be  presumed  against  the 
defendant,  it  is  not  prejudicial  error  to  omit  to  charge  that  the 
defendant  is  presumed  to  be  innocent,  if  the  instructions  in  other 
respects  fully  and  properly  state  the  law  applicable  to  the  case.8 
So  the  refusal  of  a  specific  instruction  which  may  perhaps  more 
definitely  state  the  principle  of  such  presumption  is  not  ground 
for  error  where  the  general  charge  on  the  same  subject  can  be 
readily  understood  by  the  jury.9  And  the  giving  of  an  instruc- 
tion on  the  presumption  of  innocence  may  render  it  unnecessary 
to  give  instructions  on  other  questions,  such,  for  instance,  as  "the 
burden  is  upon  the  state  to  establish  every  element  of  the  of- 

*  Rogers    v.    S.    117    Ala.    192,    23  Vaughan  v.  Com.  85  Va.  671;  Mur- 

So.    82;    S.    v.    Gonce,    79    Mo.    602;  ray  v.  S.  26  Ind.  141  (exception  must 

Foster  v.  S.  89  Wis.  482,  62  N.  W.  be  taken  to  the  refusal),  Contra:  S. 

185;  P.  v.  Willett,  105  Mich.  110,  62  v.   Heinze,   2   Mo.   App.   1314;    P.   v. 

N.    W.    1115;    Castle   v.    S.    75    Ind.  Ostrander,   110  Mich.   60,   67  N.   W. 

146;  Reeves  v.  S.  29  Fla.  527,  10  So.  1079. 

905;    Coffee  v.   S.   5   Tex.   App.  545;  *  Faqua  v.  Com.    (Ky.),  73  S.  W. 

P.  v.  Potter,  89  Mich.  354,  50  N.  W.  782;  Smith  v.  S.  63  Ga.  170;  Murphy 

994;    Farley   v.   S.    127   Ind.    419,   26  v.   S.   108  Wis.   Ill,   83  N.  W.   1112. 

N.   E.   898.  8  P.  v.  Parsons,- 105  Mich.  177,  63 

s  P.   v.   Graney,   91  Mich.   646,  52  N.   W.    69.      See   P.    v.    Harper,    83 

N.  W.  66;  P.  v.  Ostrander,  110  Mich.  Mich.  273,  47  N.  W.  221. 

60,  67  N.  W.  1079;   P.  v.  Smith,  92  8  Murphy   v.    S.    108   Wis.    Ill,    83 

Mich.  10.  52  N.  W.  67;   Williams  v.  Wis.  1112.     On  the  trial  of  a  charge 

P.   164  111.   481,  45  N.   B.   987.     See  of  murder  in  the  first  degree  an  in- 

Murray  v.  S.  26  Ind.  141.     Contra:  struction  as  to  the  presumption  of 

P.  v.  Macard,  73  Mich.  15,  40  N.  W.  innocence  which  states  among  other 

784;   P.  v.  Potter,  89  Mich.  353,  50  things   that   the   defendant   is   pre- 

N.  W.  994.  sumed  to  be  innocent  "of  the  crime 

«  Stokes  v.  P.  53  N.  Y.  183;  Coffin  charged"  relates  as  well  to  the  in- 
v.  United  States,  156  L.  S.  432,  15  eluded  offenses  as  to  the  specific 
Sup.  Ct.  394;  P.  v.  Van  Houter,  38  charge  of  murder  in  the  first  de- 
Hun  (N.  Y.),173;  Cochran. v.  United  gree,  S.  v.  Smith,  164  Mo.  567,  65  S. 
States,  157  U.  S.  286,  15  Sup.  Ot.  628;  W.  270. 


337  PRESUMPTION    OF    INNOCENCE    AS    EVIDENCE.  §    339 

fense  and  never  shifts  to  the  defendant."10  So  the  refusal  to 
charge  that  if  there  is  a  probability  of  innocence  there  is  a  reason- 
able doubt  of  guilt,  is  not  error  where  other  instructions  given 
properly  state  the  law  of  the  presumption  of  innocence.11 

§  338.  Presumption  of  innocence  is  evidence. — The  legal  pre- 
sumption of  innocence  shall  be  regarded  as  a  matter  of  evidence 
to  the  benefit  of  which  the  defendant  is  entitled  until  his  guilt 
is  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  a  refusal  to  so  instruct 
the  jury  when  a  proper  instruction  is  requested  is  error.12  A 
charge  that  the  presumption  of  innocence  "partakes  of  the 
nature  of  evidence,  and  if  no  evidence  was  introduced,  then  under 
this  presumption  of  innocence  the  jury  should  acquit  the  defend- 
ant;" and  that  such  presumption  continues  until  the  defendant 
is  proved  guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  is  proper  although 
evidence  had  in  fact  been  introduced.13  But  the  refusal  of  such 
an  instruction  is  not  error  where  the  court  instructs  that  the 
presumption  of  innocence  continues  until  guilt  is  established 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.14 

§  339.  Presumption  is  evidence — Illustrations. — An  instruc- 
tion stating  that  every  person  is  presumed  to  be  innocent  until 
his  guilt  has  been  established  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  is  not 
erroneous  in  that  it  does  not  state  that  the  guilt  must  be  proved 
by  competent  evidence  where  it  appears  that  all  the  evidence  is 
competent.15  A  charge  stating  in  substance  that  the  law  pre- 
sumes the  innocence  of  a  person  accused  of  crime  and  that  this 
presumption  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  form,  to  be  disregarded  by 

10  Huggins  v.  S.  42  Tex.  Cr.  App.  76  N.  W.  438;   Gordon  v.  Com.  100 
364,  60  S.  W.  52;   Lewis  v.  S.  (Tex.  Va.   825,   41  S.  E.   746,  57  L.  R.   A. 
Cr.  App.),  59  S.  W.  886.  744.     Contra:  S.  v.  Martin,  (Mont), 

11  Allen  v.  United  States,  164  U.  74   Pac.    727. 

S.  492,  17  Sup.  Ct.  154.  In  Virginia  it  is  McVey  v.  S.  55  Neb.  777,  76  N. 

has  been  held  that  a  charge  that  the  W.  438. 

accused  comes  to  trial  presumed  to  i*  McVey  v.  S.  55  Neb.  777,  76  N. 

be   innocent,   and  this  presumption  W.    438.     See   Gordon   v.    Com.    100 

extends  to  the  end  of  the  trial,  and  Va.   825,  41   S.   E.  746,   57  L.  R.  A. 

the    jury    in    considering    the    evi-  744;    S.    v.    Hudspeth,    159    Mo.    178, 

dence  should  endeavor  to  reconcile  60  S.  W.  136. 

it    with    this    presumption,    is    im-  is  Dalzell    v.    S.    7    Wyo.    450,    53 

proper  as  tending  to  mislead.    Bar-  Pax:.  297;   S.  v.  Duck,  35  La.   Ann. 

ker  v.  Com.  90  \a.  820,  20  S.  E.  776.  764;  Williams  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

12  Bryant   v.    S.    116    Ala.    44b,   23  606.  34  S.  W.  943;    P.  v.  Resh,  107 
So.  40;  Bartley  v.  S.  53  Neb.  310,  73  Mich.   251,   65  N.  W.  99;    Gallagher 
N.  W.  744;  McVey  v.  S.  55  Neb.  777,  v.  S.  28  Tex.  App.  247. 


§   339  PRESUMPTION   OF   INNOCENCE.  338 

the  jury  at  their  pleasure ;  that  such  presumption  continues  with 
the  defendant  throughout  all  the  stages  of  the  trial,  properly 
states  the  law.16  An  instruction  that  "the  law  raises  no  pre- 
sumption against  the  accused,  but  every  presumption  of  the 
law  is  in  favor  of  his  innocence,"  is  proper.17  An  instruction  that 
the  defendant,  though  indicted  for  perjury,  is  just  as  innocent  of 
the  crime  as  though  not  indicted,  is  erroneous.18 

"  S.    v.    Krug,    12    Wash.    288,    41  19   Pac.   558,   1   L.   R.   A.   808.     See, 

Pac.  126.     Contra:    Barker  v.   Com.  also,  Line  v.  S.  51  Ind.  172. 

90  Va.  820,  20  S.  E.  776.  is  Sanders   v.    P.    124    111.    21fc,    16 

IT  Ter.    v.    Burgess,    8    Mont.    57,  N.  E.  81. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 


CHARACTER    OP    DEFENDANT. 


Sec. 

340.  Proof  of  good  character  prop- 

er. 

341.  Good    character    considered — 

Instructions. 

342.  Instructions     o  n     character — 

Refusal — When  proper. 

343.  Good    character   creating   rea- 

sonable     doubt — Instruction. 

344.  Good    character    unavailing — 

When. 


Sec. 

345.    Good     character — Instructions 

improper. 
(1.)     Considered    as    generating 

doubt. 

(2.)    Persons  not  Mkely  to  com- 
mit crime. 

(30  Sufflciervt  to  raise  doubt. 
(4.)  Invading  province  of  jury. 
(5.)  Ignoring  evidence  of. 


§  340.  Proof  of  good  character  proper. — In  every  criminal 
prosecution  the  accused  is  entitled  to  prove  his  good  character, 
and  when  proved  it  is  itself  a  fact  in  the  case — a  circumstance 
tending  in  greater  or  less  degree  to  establish  his  innocence ;  and 
the  accused  has  a  right  to  have  it  considered  by  the  jury  the 
same  as  any  other  fact  in  evidence.1  Evidence  of  the  good  char- 
acter of  the  accused  is  admissible  whether  the  case  as  to  his  guilt 
or  innocence  is  doubtful  or  not.2  Therefore,  to  say  by  instruc- 


1  S.  v.  Van  Kuran,  25  Utah,  8,  69 
Pac.  60. 

2  Jupitz    v.    P.    34    111.    521;    Mc- 
Queen v.  S.  82  Ind.  74;  Steele  v.  P. 
45  111.   157;    S.  v.  Lindley,  51  Iowa, 
344,  1  N.  W.  484;   Aneals  v.  P.  134 
111.    401,    25    N.    E.    1022;    Com.    v. 
Leonard,   140  Mass.  473,  7  Am.   Cr. 
R.   598,  4  N.  E.  96,  54  Am.  R.  485; 
P.    v.    De    La    Cour    Soto,    63    Cal. 
165;     Hall     v.     S.     132     Ind.     317, 
31     N.     E.     536;     S.    v.    Schleagel, 
50    Kas.    325,    31    Par.    1105;    Edg- 
ington    v.      U.     S.     164    U.     S.   361, 


17  Sup.  Ct.  72;  Com.  v.  Wilson, 
152  Mass.  12,  25  N.  E.  16;  Pate  v.  S. 
94  Ala.  14,  10  So.  665;  S.  v.  Mc- 
Murphy,  52  Mo.  251,  1  Green.  Cr.  R. 
640;  S.  v.  Anslinger,  171  Mo.  600, 
71  S.  W.  1041;  Stewart  v.  S.  22  Ohio 
St.  478;  S.  v.  Honing,  49  Iowa,  158; 
S.  v.  Porter,  32  Ore.  135,  49  Pac.  964; 
P.  v.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228,  15  N.  W.  95; 
S.  v.  Henry,  50  N.  Car.  65;  Remsen 
v.  P.  57  Barb.  (N.  Y.),  324,  43  N.  Y. 
6;  Holland  v.  S.  131  Ind.  572,  31 
N.  E.  359;  Hammond  v.  S.  74  Miss. 
214,  21  So.  149. 


339 


§    341  CHARACTER  OF  DEFENDANT.  340 

tion  that  evidence  of  the  good  character  of  the  defendant  can 
be  considered  by  the  jury  only  in  cases  where  the  other  evidence 
leaves  it  doubtful  whether  the  defendant  is  guilty  or  not,  is  error.3 
So  a  charge  that  "evidence  of  good  character  is  entitled  to 
great  weight  when  the  evidence  against  the  accused  is  weak  or 
doubtful,  but  is  entitled  to  very  little  weight  when  the  proof 
is  strong,"  is  erroneous  in  that  it  invades  the  province  of  the 
jury.4  Also  an  instruction  charging  that  "evidence  of  previous 
good  character  may  be  considered  by  you  in  connection  with  all 
the  other  evidence  given  in  the  cause  in  determining  whether  the 
defendant  would  likely  commit  the  crime  with  which  he  is 
charged;  and  if  you  find  from  all  the  evidence  in  the  cause,  in- 
dependent of  the  evidence  of  his  good  character,  that  there  is 
a  reasonable  doubt,  then  you  should  give  him  the  benefit  of  good 
character  and  acquit  him ;  but  if  you  should  find  from  all  the 
evidence  given  in  the  cause  independent  of  the  evidence  of 
previous  good  character  that  the  defendant  did  commit  the 
crime  or  was  present  aiding  or  abetting,  encouraging,  counseling, 
directing  and  assisting  in  the  same,  evidence  of  previous  good 
character  would  not  avail  him  anything,  and  you  should  find  him 
guilty,"  is  erroneous  in  that  it  deprives  the  defendant  of  the 
benefit  of  his  evidence  of  good  character.5  The  weight  that  ought 
to  be  given  to  evidence  of  good  character  does  not  depend  upon 
the  grade  of  the  crime,  and  an  instruction  that  it  does  is  er- 
roneous.6 

§341.    Good    character    considered — Instructions. — It    is    the 

duty  of  the  jury  to  consider  the  evidence  of  the  previous  good 
character  of  the  accused  together  with  all  the  other  evidence  in 
the  case  in  determining  his  guilt  or  innocence.  They  must  con- 

s  Rowe    v.    U.    S.    97    Fed.    779;  C.  C.  613;  Hammond  v.  S.  74  Miss. 

Jupitz    v.    P.    34    111.    516,    521;    P.  214,  21  So.  149;  Com.  v.  Cleary,  135 

v.    Hancock,    7   Utah,   170,    25    Pac.  Pa.  St.  64,  19  Atl.  1017;  Felix  v.  S. 

1093;    Edgington    v.    U.    S.    164    U.  18  Ala.  725;    Stewart  v.  S.  22  Ohio 

S.   361,   17   Sup.   Ct.   72;    Powers  v.  St.  478;  S.  v.  Kinley,  43  Iowa,  296; 

S.     74    Miss.     777,     21    So.    65;     P.  S.  v.  Daley,  53  Vt.  442. 
v.   Don   Pedro,   43    N.    Y.    S.    44,   19          *  Vincent    v.    S.    37    Neb.    672,    56 

Misc.    300.      See   P.    v.    Dippold,    51  N.  W.  320. 

N.    Y.    S.    859,    30   App.   Div.   62;    S.          5  Holland    v.    S.    131    Ind.    568,    31 

v.    Holmes,    65    Minn.    230,    68    N.  N.   E.   359. 

W.  11;  Com.  v.  Leonard,  140  Mass.          »  Harrington    v.    S.    19    Ohio    St. 

473',    4   N.    E.    96;    8.    v.    Henry,    50  268;  Cancerni  v.  P.  16  N.  Y.  501. 
N.  Oar.  65;  Donaldson  v.  S.  10  Ohio 


341  GOOD  CHARACTER,  EFFECT.  §  343 

sider  whether  the  evidence  of  such  good  character,  when  weighed 
and  considered  with  all  the  other  evidence,  raises  a  reasonable 
doubt  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  accused.7  Such  evidence  should  be 
submitted  to  the  jury  as  any  other  evidence  without  any  inti- 
mation as  to  its  value  or  without  any  disparagement.8  The  evi- 
dence of  the  good  character  of  the  accused  should  be  mentioned 
in  connection  with  the  other  evidence  in  the  case  in  charging 
the  jury,  and  not  disconnected  from  it.9 

§342.    Instructions  on  character — Refusal — When  proper. — If 

there  is  no  evidence  as  to  the  good  character  of  the  defendant  the 
court  may  properly  refuse  to  instruct  in  that  respect.10  Thus 
an  instruction  that  the  defendant's  character  cannot  be  assailed 
unless  he  himself  puts  it  in  issue  by  introducing  evidence  in 
its  support,  is  improper  where  the  defendant  has  offered  no 
evidence  as  to  his  character;  it  suggests  the  inference  that  the 
prosecution  might  have  shown  the  bad  character  of  the  defend- 
ant had  it  been  permitted  to  do  so.11  It  is  not  error  to  refuse  an 
instruction  as  to  the  good  character  of  the  accused  if  it  is  sub- 
stantially embodied  in  others  given.12 

§  343    Good  character  creating  reasonable  doubt — Instruction. 

The  accused  is  entitled  to  an  instruction  that  good  character  may 
of  itself  create  a  reasonable  doubt  where  otherwise  no  such  doubt 
would  exist.13  So  an  instruction  that  if  in  the  judgment  of  the  jury 

7  S.  v.  Keefe,  54  Kas.  197,  38  Pac.  ra,  100  Mo.  100  (holdiu    that  the  re- 

302;    Olds   v.    S.    (Fla.),   33   So.    296.  fusal    of    a    proper    instruction    is 

See  Crump  v.  Com.   (Va.),  23  S.  E.  not    error),    13    S.    W.    938;    P.    v. 

700.  Spriggs,  58  Hun  (N.  Y.),  603,  11  N. 

s  Powers    v.    S.    74    Miss.    777,    21  Y.  S.  433. 

So.  657;   Latimer  v.  S.  55  Neb.  609,          is  P.  v.   Elliott,   163  N.  Y.  11,  57 

76  N.  W.  207;   Moran  v.  S.  11  Ohio  N.  E.  103;  Lowenberg  v.  P.  5  Park. 

C.  C.  464;   P.  v.  Casey,  53  Cal.  392.  Cr.    (N.   Y.),  414;    Bryant  v.   S.  116 

o  Crawford    v.    S.    112    Ala.    1,    21  Ala.  445,  23  So.  40;  S.  v.  Vankuran, 

So.   214;    P.   v.   Hoagland,   137   Cal.  25  Utah,  8,  69  Pac.  60  (good  char- 

218,  69  Pac.  1063.  acter   may   satisfy   the  jury   of   the 

10  Williams  v.  P.   166  111.  136,  46  innocence  of  the  defendant) ;  Bank- 
N.    E.    749;    S.   v.   Gartrell,   171  Mo.  head  v.   S.  124  Ala.  14,  26  So.  979; 
489,  71  S.  W.  1045.     See  S.  v.  Fur-  Aneals  v.  P.  134   111.  415,  25  N.   E. 
geson,    162   Mo.    668,   63    S.   W.    101.  1022;    P.  v.  Bell,  49   Cal.   489.     See, 

11  P.  v.  Gleason,  122  Cal.   370,  55  also,  S.  v.  Porter,  32  Ore.  135,  49  Pac. 
Pac.  123.  964;    Heine  v.  Com.  91  Pa.  St.  145; 

12  White  v.   U.   S.   164  U.   S.   100,  P.    v.    Bell,    49    Cal.    485.      Contra: 
17    Sup.    Ct.    38;    Com.    v.    Wilson.  Scott  v.  S.  105  Ala.  57,  16  So.  925; 
152    Mass.    12,    25    N.    E.    16;    P.    v.  Briggs  v.  Conr.  82  Va.  554;   Powers 
Johnson,  61  Cal.  142;  S.  v.  McNama-  v.    S.   74   Miss.    777,   21   So.   657. 


§    344  CHARACTER  OF  DEFENDANT.  342 

the  evidence  of  good  character  raises  a  reasonable  doubt  against 
positive  evidence,  they  have  the  right  to  entertain  such  doubt, 
and  the  defendant  should  have  the  benefit  of  it,  properly  states 
the  law.14  It  is  not  proper,  however,  to  instruct  that  evidence  of 
good  character  is  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  reason- 
able doubt.15  Also  that  good  character  is  of  importance  to  a 
person  charged  with  the  commission  of  a  criminal  offense,  and 
that  the  jury  have  the  right  to  consider  whether  a  person  of 
good  character  would  be  less  liable  to  be  guilty  of  the  commis- 
sion of  crime  than  a  person  of  bad  character,  is  proper.16 

§  344.  Good  character  unavailing — When. — If,  however,  the 
evidence  clearly  and  conclusively  establishes  the  guilt  of  the 
accused  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  the  jury  should  find  him 
guilty,  notwithstanding  his  former  good  character.  Hence,  an 
instruction  charging  that  if  from  the  evidence  the  jury  believe 
the  defendant  is  guilty,  then  his  previous  good  character  neither 
justifies,  mitigates,  nor  excuses  the  offense,  is  proper.17  Also  an 
instruction  that  if  after  full  consideration  of  all  the  evidence 
adduced  (including  the  evidence  of  good  character),  the  jury 
believe  the  defendant  to  be  guilty  of  any  degree  of  the  crime 
charged,  they  should  so  find,  notwithstanding  proof  of  good 
character,  correctly  states  the  law.18 

§345.  Good  character — Instructions  improper. — (1)  Consider- 
ed as  generating  doubt:  A  charge  which  states  that  "the  good 
character  of  the  defendant  if  proved,  is  not  only  evidence  of  inno- 
cence, but  it  may  be  considered  by  the  jury  for  the  purpose  of 
generating  doubt,"  is  improper,  in  that  it  tends  to  mislead  the 
jury  on  the  question  of  reasonable  doubt.19  Also  charging  that 
good  character,  if  proved,  may  sometimes  have  the  effect  of 
generating  such  doubt  as  would  authorize  an  acquittal,  even 

i*  P.   v.   Hughson,   154  N.   Y.   153,  Mo.  70;   S.  v.  Spooner,  41  La.  Ann. 

47  N.  B.  1092.  780,   6   So.   879;    Creed  v.   P.   81  111. 

i"  S.    v.    Gushing,    17    Wash.    544,  565;    S.   v.    Porter,    32    Ore.    135,    49 

50  Pac.  512.  Pac.  964;  P.  v.  Brooks,  61  Hun  (N. 

IB  P.  v.  Harrison,  93  Mich.  597,  53  Y.)  619,  15  N.  Y.  S.  362;  S.  v.  Dar- 

N.   W.    725.  rah,  152  Mo.  522,  54  S.  W.  226. 

IT  S.   v.   Jones,   78  Mo.   282;    S.  v.  is  P.  v.  Smith,  59  Cal.  601. 

Leppere,  66  Wis.  355,  28  N.  W.  376;  i»  Johnson    v.    S.    102    Ala.    1,    16 

Com.  v.  Eckerd,  174  Pa.  St.  137,  34  So.  99;   Eggleston  v.  S.  129  Ala.  80, 

Atl.  305;  P.  v.  Samsels,  66  Cal.  99,  4  30  So.  582;  Miller  v.  S.  107  Ala.  40, 

Pac.   1061;    P.  v.   Mitchell,  129   Cal.  19  So.  37;   Webb  v.  S.  106  Ala.  52, 

584,  62  Pac.  187;   S.  v.  Vansant,  80  18  So.  491. 


343  IMPROPER  REQUESTS  ON  CHARACTER.  §  345 

when  the  jury  would  otherwise  have  entertained  no  doubt,  and 
that  the  defendant  may  introduce  evidence  of  his  previous  good 
character  for  the  purpose  of  generating  a  doubt  of  his  guilt,  has 
been  declared  to  be  improper,  as  giving  undue  prominence  to 
the  evidence  of  good  character.20 

(2.)  Person  not  likely  to  commit  crime''.  So  a  charge  that  "if  you 
find  good  character  established  by  the  evidence  you  should  con- 
sider it  and  allow  it  such  weight  as  you  believe  it  fairly  entitled  to, 
as  tending  to  show  that  men  of  such  character  would  not  be  likely 
to  commit  the  crime  charged, ' '  is  erroneous  in  that  it  does  not  ex- 
pressly refer  to  the  good  character  of  the  accused,  and  is  somewhat 
argumentative.21 

(3)  Sufficient  to  raise  the  doubt:  Also  a  charge  that  the  good 
character  of  the  defendant,  if  shown,  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  raise 
a  reasonable  doubt,  is  improper22 

(4.)  Invading  province  of  jury :  A  charge  that  if  from  all  the  evi- 
dence the  jury  have  any  reasonable  doubt  of  the  guilt  of  the  de- 
fendant, and  if  they  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
defendant  has  for  a  long  time  possessed  and  now  possesses  a  good 
moral  character  for  peace,  sobriety,  and  honesty,  then  such  fact 
of  good  character,  coupled  with  the  presumption  of  innocence 
which  the  law  invokes  is  sufficient  upon  which  to  find  a  verdict  of 
not  guilty,  is  improper  as  invading  the  province  of  the  jury.23 

(5.)  Ignoring  evidence  of:  The  defense  in  rebuttal  having  intro- 
duced evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  reputation  of  the 
accused  for  truth,  honesty  and  integrity  was  good,  the  court 
erred  in  charging  the  jury  that  they  should  draw  no  unfavor- 
able inference  of  the  defendant  from  the  fact  that  she  had 
offered  no  evidence  as  to  her  general  good  character.24 

20  Goldsmith  v.  S.  105  Ala.   8,  16  other     witnesses     has    been    intro- 
So.  933;   Crawford  v.  S.  112  Ala.  1,  duced  on  both  sides,  a  general  in- 
21  So.  214.  struction  that  such  evidence  should 

21  Dorsey  v.  S.  110  Ala.  38,  20  So.  be  considered  on  the  credibility  of 
450.  the  witnesses  is  not  erroneous  and 

22  Hammond  v.  S.  74  Miss.  214,  21  does   not   limit   the   effect   of    it   to 
So.  149.  the  defendant's  credibility,  nor  de- 

23  s.  v.  McNamara,  100  Mo.  100,  13  prive  him   of  the  right  to  have  it 
S.  W.  938.  considered  on  the  issue  of  his  guilt 

21  S.   v.   Marks,   16   Utah,   204,   51      or  innocence.     S.  v.  Olds,  106  Iowa, 
Pac.   1089.     Where  evidence   of  the      110,    76   N.   W.    644. 
character    of    the     defendant     and 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

OBJECTIONS    AND   EXCEPTIONS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

346.  Method    and    manner   of   tak-      356.    Error  presented  on  motion  for 

ing  exceptions.  new  trial. 

347.  Time  of  taking  exceptions.  357.    Making    instructions    part    of 

348.  Specific    exceptions    generally  record. 

necessary.  358.    By   bill   of   exceptions. 

349.  General    exceptions    sufficient.      369.    AIL    instructions    must    be    in 

350.  Exceptions   when   instructions  record. 

are  numbered.  360.     Presumption  in  absence  of  all 

351.  Exceptions — General,     specific  instructions. 

and  joint.  361.    When    considered    in    absence 

352.  Failure  to  except — Effect.  of  evidence. 

353.  Assignment    of    error    on    in-      362.    Presumptions    in.    absence    of 

structions  in  group.  evidence. 

354.  Exceptions  limited  to  grounds      363.    Errors    caused    at    one's    own 

stated.  request. 

355.  Objections  and  exceptions  not      364.    After  cause  is  remanded. 

waived. 

§  346.  Method  and  manner  of  taking  exceptions. — As  a  general 
rule  exceptions  to  the  giving  or  refusing  of  instructions  must  be 
properly  taken  in  the  trial  court  before  the  assignment  of  errors 
thereon  will  be  considered  by  a  court  of  review.1  Under  stat- 
utory provisions  in  some  jurisdictions  the  exceptions  to  instruc- 
tions must  be  signed  by  the  judge  presiding,  and  if  not  signed 
they  will  not  be  the  subject  of  review  on  appeal  or  writ  of 
error.2  And  the  exceptions  must  be  signed  by  the  judge  pre- 

i  West  C.   St.   R.   Co.   v.   Martin,  658,  68  N.  E.  1117;  Bruen  v.  P.  206 

154    111.    523,    39   N.    E.    140;    Buck-  111.  425,  69  N.  E.  24;  First  Nat.  Bank 

master  v.  Cool,  12  111.  74;  Burnette  v.   Tolerton    (Neb.),   97   N.   W.   248. 

v.    Town   of  Guyers,   106   Wis.   618,  2  Central   R.    Co.   v.    Coleman,    80 

82  N.  W.  564;   Barker  v.   Lawrence  Md.  328,  30  Atl.  918;  Ayres  v.  Blev- 

Mfg.    Co.    176    Mass.    203,    76    N.    E.  ins,  28  Ind.  App.  101,  62  N.  E.  305; 

366;    Gracie   v.   Stevens,   171   N.   Y.  Hutchinson    v.    Lerncke,    107    Ind. 

344 


345  TAKING   EXCEPTIONS,    HOW,    WHEN.  §    347 

siding,  although  the  instructions  were  given  on  the  court's  own 
motion.3 

The  taking  of  exceptions,  to  be  of  any  avail  on  review,  must 
extend  to  all  the  instructions  on  the  same  subject  considered  to- 
gether. An  exception  to  detached  portions  of  instructions  will 
not  be  considered.4  The  indorsement  on  instructions  of  the 
words  "given  and  excepted  to  at  the  time  by  the  defendant," 
and  signed  by  the  court,  is  not  sufficient  under  a  statute  which 
provides  that  "it  shall  be  sufficient  to  write  on  the  margin  or 
at  the  close  of  each  instruction,  'refused  and  excepted  to,  or  given 
and  excepted  to,'  "  which  memorandum  shall  be  signed  by  the 
judge,  in  that  it  omits  the  date  which  is  quite  as  material  as 
the  signature.5 

§  347.  Time  of  taking  exceptions. — Objections  to  instructions 
cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time  in  the  reviewing  court  on  ap- 
peal or  writ  of  error.6.  Thus,  an  objection  that  the  court  in- 
structed the  jury  orally  instead  of  in  writing,  comes  too  late 
when  raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal.7  The  record  must  show 
that  exceptions  were  taken  at  the  time  the  instructions  were 
given  or  refused,  to  be  of  any  avail.8  Where  an  exception  appears 

121,  8  N.  E.  71;  Board  v.  Legg,  110  171  N.  Y.  635,  63  N.  E.  1117;  Fruchey 

Ind.  486,  11  N.  E.  612;  McKinsey  v.  v.    Eagleson,    15    Ind.    App.    88,    43 

McKee,   109   Ind.   209,   9   N.   E.  771;  N.  E.  146;    Keens  v.  Robertson,  46 

Mason   v.   Seiglitz,  22   Colo.   320,  44  Neb.    837,   65   N.   W.   897;    Romberg 

Pac.  588.    See  Moore  v.  Brown  (Tex.  v.   Hediger,   47  Neb.  201,  66   N.  W. 

Cv.  App.),  64  S.  W.  946.  283;   Hall  v.  Incorporated  Town,  90 

s  Silver  v.   Parr,  115  Ind.   113,   17  Iowa,   585,   58   N.   W.   881;    Price   v. 

N.    E.    114.      An    exception    to    the  Hallett,  138  Mo.  561,  38  S.  W.  451; 

ruling  of  the  court  need  not  be  in  Turner    v.    Goldsboro    Lumber    Co. 

a    technical    term,    such    as    "I    ex-  119  N.  Car.  387,  26  S.  E.  23;   Daw- 

cept."     Woolsey   v.    Lasher,    54    N.  son    v.    Coston,    18,    Colo.    493,    33 

Y.  S.  737.  Pac.    189;    Peck   v.    Boggess,   2    111. 

*  Bell  v.  City  of  Spokane,  30  (1  Scam.),  285;  Tomlinson  v.  Wai- 
Wash.  508,  71  Pac.  31;  Gray  v.  lace,  16  Wis.  234;  Carter  v.  Missouri 
Washington  Water  P.  Co.  30  Wash.  M.  &  L.  Co.  6  Okla.  11,  41  Pac.  356; 
665,  71  Pac.  206.  •  P.  v.  Caldwell,  107  Mich.  374,  65 

s  Malott  v.  Hawkins,  159  Ind.  137,  N.   W.   213;    Franklin  v.   Claflin,  49 

63  N.  E.  308;  Behymer  v.  S.  95  Ind.  Md.  24;  S.  v.  Probasco,  46  Kas.  310, 

140;    Roose  v.   Roose,   145  Ind.  162,  26   Pac.   749;    Lawrence  v.  Bucklen, 

44  N.   E.  1;   Williams  v.   Chapman,  45    Minn.    195,    47    N.    W.   655;    Mc- 

160  Ind.  130,  66  N.  E.  460.  Daneld  v.  Logi,  143  111.  487,  32  N.  E. 

o  Cathey   v.   Bowen,    70   Ark.    348,  423.     Contra:  Gonzales  v.  S.  35  Tex. 

68  S.  W.   31;    Jenkins  v.  Mammoth  Cr.  App.  339,  33  S.  W.  363. 

Min.  Co.  24  Utah,  513,  68  Pac.  845;  ?  Bowling    v.     Floyd     (Kas.),     48 

Thompson  v.  Security  T.  &  L.  Ins.  Pac.   875. 

Co.    63    S.    Car.    290,    41    S.    E.    464;  s  Washington    County   Water   Co. 

Gumby  v.   Metropolitan   St.   R.   Co.  v.  Garver,  91  Md.  398,  46  Atl.  979; 


347 


OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS. 


346 


in  regular  order  upon  the  record,  immediately  following  the  in- 
struction to  which  exception  was  taken,  it  will  be  presumed  by 
the  reviewing  court  that  the  exception  was  taken  at  the  time  the 
instructions  were  given.9 

In  some  jurisdictions  the  exceptions  relating  to  instructions 
must  be  taken  before  the  jury  retire  to  consider  the  case.10  But 
in  some  of  the  states  exceptions  may  be  taken  at  any  time  before 
the  verdict  of  the  jury.11  It  follows  from  what  has  been  said 
that  the  taking  of  exceptions  after  the  verdict  is  too  late  to  be 
considered  on  appeal.12  And  of  course  it  is  too  late  to  object  to 


Loewenstein  v.  Bennett,  19  Ohio 
C.  C.  b!6;  Taylor  v.  Pullen,  152 
Mo.  434,  53  S.  W.  1086;  Zingrebe 
v.  Union  R.  Co.  60  N.  Y.  S.  913; 
Frenkmann  v.  Schneider,  64  N.  Y. 
S.  Ill;  Snowden  v.  Town  of  Som- 
erset, 64  N.  Y.  S.  1088;  Willard  v. 
Petitt,  153  111.  663,  667,  39  N.  E. 
991  (Illinois  cases  reviewed);  East 
St.  Louis  Elec.  R.  Co.  v.  Stout,  150 
111.  9,  36  N.  E.  963;  S.  v.  Dewitt,  152 
Mo.  76,  53  S.  W.  429  (oral  instruc- 
tions) ;  Vaughn  v.  Ferrall,  57  Ind. 
182;  S.  v.  Sacre,  141  Mo.  64,  41  S. 
W.  905;  Barr  v.  City  of  Omaha,  42 
Neb.  341,  60  N.  W.  591;  S.  v.  Hath- 
away, 100  Iowa,  225,  69  N.  W. 
443;  U.  S.  Sugar  Refiner  v.  Provi- 
dence Steam  &  G.  P.  Co.  62  Fed. 
375;  Bradford  Glycerine  Co.  v. 
Kizer,  113  Fed.  894;  Bluff  City  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Floyd,  70  Ark.  418,  68 
S.  W.  484;  S.  v.  -Harris,  107  La.  Ann. 
325,  31  So.  782;  Aden  v.  Road  Dist. 
&c.  197  111.  220,  64  N.  E.  274;  Shep- 
herd v.  S.  36  Fla.  374,  18  So.  773; 
Hubbard  v.  S.  37  Fla.  156,  20  So.  235; 
Bush  v.  S.  47  Neb.  642,  66  N.  W. 
638;  Crump  v.  Com.  (Va.),  23  S. 
E.  760. 

9  Strickfadden  v.  Zipprick,  49  111. 
288. 

10  Pitman    v.    Mauran,    69    N.    H. 
230,    40    Atl.    392;    Yates    v.    U.    S. 
90  Fed.   57;    Commercial   Travelers' 
M.     A.     Asso.     v.    Fulton,     79    Fed. 
423;     McKown    v.    Powers,    86    Me. 
291,  29  Atl.  1079;  Hindman  v.  First 
Nat.    Bank,   112    Fed.    931;    Murray 
v.    S.   26   Ind.   141;    S.   v.   Westlake, 
159    Mo.    669;    Buel    v.    New    York 
Steamer,  17  La.  Ann.  541;  Reynolds 


v.  S.  68  Ala.  507;  Schroeder  v.  Rin- 
hard,  25  Neb.  75,  40  N.  W.  593; 
S.  v.  Clark,  37  Vt.  471;  Little 
Miami  R.  Co.  22  Ohio  St.  324; 
Garton  v.  Union  City  Nat.  Bank, 
34  Mich.  279;  Garoutte  v.  William- 
son, 108  Cal.  135,  41  Pac.  35,  413; 
O'Conner  v.  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  Co.  27  Minn.  166,  6  N.  W.  481; 
Gibson  v.  S.  26  Fla.  109,  7  So. 
376. 

11  Polykrans  v.   Kransz,  77   N.    ¥. 
S.  46,  73  App.  Div.  583;  Gehl  v.  Mil- 
waukee  Pro.    Co.    116   Wis.    263,    93 
N.  W.  26;  S.  v.  Pirlot,  19  R.  I.  695; 
Vaughn    v.    Ferrall,    57    Ind.    182; 
Hawley    v.    S.    69    Ind.    98,    38    Atl. 
656.      If    the   court    while    charging 
the  jury   should    misstate  the   evi- 
dence, counsel  should  at  once  call 
the   court's    attention    to    the    mis- 
take that  it  may   be   corrected   be- 
fore    the    jury    retires,      although 
specific     exceptions     may     not     be 
required,     J&meson     v.     Weld,     93 
Me.     345,     45     Atl.     299;     Wood    v. 
Wells,  103  Mich.  320,  61  N.  W.  503. 
See    Henry  v.    Henry,   122   Mich.    6, 
80  N.  W.  800. 

12  McDonald  v.  U.  S.  63  Fed.  426; 
S.    v.    O'Donald     (Idaho),    39    Pac. 
556;    S.    v.    Hart,    116    N.    Car.    976, 
20  S.  E.  1014;  P.  v.  Thiede,  11  Utah, 
241,  39  Pac.  837;  Vaughn  v.  Ferrall, 
57  Ind.  182;  Jaqua  v.  Cordesman,  106 
Ind.   141,  5   N.   E.   907    (too  late  on 
motion   for  new   trial);    Murray   v. 
S.  26  Ind.   141   (must  be  taken  be- 
fore jury  retire) ;    Garoutte  v.  Wil- 
liamson,   108   Cal.    135,   41   Pac.    35; 
Le  Bean  v.  Telephone  &  T.  C.  Co. 
109  Mich.  302,  67  N.  W.  339;    S.   v. 


347 


SPECIFIC    EXCEPTIONS    NECESSARY. 


§  348 


instructions  for  the  first  time  on  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  unless 
permitted  by  statute.13  By  statutory  provision  of  Iowa  excep- 
tions may  be  taken  to  the  giving  or  refusing  of  instructions  on 
a  motion  for  a  new  trial.14 

§  348.  Specific  exceptions  generally  necessary. — According  to 
the  practice  in  some  of  the  states  the  exceptions  should  specific- 
ally point  out  the  errors  complained  of  as  to  each  of  the  instruc- 
tions.15 The  mere  exception  to  the  giving  of  an  instruction  is 
not  sufficient ;  the  attention  of  the  court  should  be  called  to  the 
particular  point  of  objection,  and  a  request  made  to  correct  the 
imperfection.16  And  the  exception  should  be  made  to  each  in- 


Hart,  116  N.  Car.  976,  20  S.  E.  1014; 
Bynum  v.  Southern  Pump  Co.  63 
Ala.  462;  Thiede  v.  Utah.  159  U. 
S.  510,  16  Sup.  Ct.  62;  Barker  v. 
Todd,  37  Minn.  370,  34  N.  W.  895; 
Collins  v.  George  (Va.),  46  S.  E. 
684. 

is  Tobias  v.  Triest,  103  Ala.  664, 
15  So.  914;  S.  v.  Vickers,  47  La. 
Ann.  1574,  18  So.  639;  Boon  v.  Mur- 
phy, 108  N.  Car.  187,  12  S.  E.  1032; 
Lary  v.  Young  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  27  S. 
W.  908;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Modglin,  85  111.  481;  Harrison  v. 
Chappell,  84  N.  Car.  258;  Louisville, 
N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart,  119  Ind. 

273,  21  N.  E.  753;  Boss  v.  Northern 
P.  R.  Co.  2  N.  Dak.  128,  49  N.  W. 
655;     Snyder    v.    Nelson,    31    Iowa, 
238;    S.    v.    Meyers,   99   Mo.    107,    12 
S.  W.   516;    Shepherd  v.   S.  36  Fla. 
374,  18  So.   773;    S.   v.   Halford,  104 
N.   Car.   874,   10   S.   E.   524.   But  see 
Collins  Ice  Cream  Co.  v.  Stephens, 
189  111.  200,  59  N.  E.  524. 

i*  Shoemaker  v.  Turner,  117 
Iowa,  340,  90  N.  W.  709.  The  same 
rule  governs  as  to  the  modification 
of  requested  instructions.  Excep- 
tion must  be  taken  to  the  refusal 
to  give  the  instruction  as  requested, 
and  also  the  action  of  the  court  in 
giving  it  as  modified.  Brozek  v. 
Steinway  R.  Co.  161  N.  Y.  63,  55  N. 
E.  395;  Muller  v.  Powers,  174  Mass. 
555,  55  N.  E.  395;  Elkhorn  Valley 
Lodge  v.  Hudson,  58  Neb.  672,  81  N. 
W.  859;  Lewis  v.  Topman,  90  Md. 

274,  45  Atl.  450;  Davis  v.  Bailey,  21 
Ky.  L.  R.  839,  53  S.  W.  31;  Missouri 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  75  Tex.  4,  12 


S.  W.  835;  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hudson,  113  Fed.  449;  Helms  v. 
Wayne  A.  Co.  73  Ind.  332.  See  Pat- 
terson v.  Indianapolis  &  B.  R.  R. 
Co.  56  Ind.  20;  Burns  v.  P.  126  111. 
285,  18  N.  E.  550;  Ballance  v.  Leon- 
ard, 37  111.  43;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hecht,  38  Ark.  357. 

is  Walters  v.  Laurens  Cotton 
Mills,  53  S.  Car.  155,  31  S.  E.  1; 
Henderson  v.  Bartlett,  53  N.  Y.  S. 
149,  32  App.  Div.  435;  Owen  v. 
Brown,  70  Vt.  521,  41  Atl.  1025; 
Thomas  v.  Union  R.  Co.  45  N.  Y. 
S.  920,  18  App.  Div.  185;  Lichty  v. 
Tarmatt,  11  Wash.  37,  39  Pac.  260; 
Hedrick  v.  Straus,  42  Neb.  485,  60 
N.  W.  928;  Emery  v.  Boston  &  M. 
R.  67  N.  H.  434,  36  Atl.  367;  Hamp- 
ton v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  120  N. 
Car.  534,  27  S.  E.  96,  35  L.  R.  A. 
808;  Fitzpatrick  v.  Union  Tr.  Co. 
(Pa.),  55  Atl.  1050;  S.  v.  Webster, 
107  La.  45.  31  So.  383;  Gallman  v. 
Union  H.  Mfg.  Co.  65  S.  Car.  192, 
43  S.  E.  524;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
McCartney,  121  Ind.  385,  23  N.  B. 
258;  Kendrick  v.  Dillinger,  117  N. 
Car.  491,  23  S.  E.  438;  S.  v.  Tibbs, 
48  La.  Ann.  1278,  20  So.  735.  Contra: 
Farmers'  S.  B.  v.  Wilka  (Iowa),  17 
N.  W.  210;  Williams  v.  Com.  80  Ky. 
315;  Williams  v.  Barrett,  52  Iowa, 
638,  3  N.  W.  690;  Van  Pelt  v.  City 
of  Davenport,  42  Iowa,  314;  Woods 
v.  Berry,  7  Mont.  201,  14  Pac.  758. 

16  Thomas  v.  Union  R.  Co.  45  N. 
Y.  S.  920,  18  App.  Div.  185;  Bailey 
v.  Mill  Creek  Coal  Co.  20  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  186:  Jacksonville  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.  v.  Wilhite,  209  111.  84,  87. 


§  349  OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS.  348 

struction  severally  and  distinctly  ;17  and  it  should  disclose  to  what 
particular  legal  proposition  it  applies  before  it  will  be  considered 
on  review.18  An  exception  which  fails  to  state  either  the  words  . 
or  the  substance  of  an  instruction  of  which  complaint  is  made  is 
too  indefinite.19  If  an  instruction  is  vague,  indefinite  and  cal- 
culated to  leave  the  jury  in  doubt,  the  court's  attention  should 
be  called  to  the  imperfection  at  the  time,  to  be  of  any  avail  on 
appeal  or  writ  of  error.20  An  exception  that  the  charge  "does 
not  properly  state  the  measure  of  plaintiff's  damages  or  recovery 
under  the  allegations  of  the  complaint,"  is  too  indefinite.21  An 
exception  "to  that  part  of  the  charge  stating  the  effect  of  good 
character^  taken  to  a  certain  portion  of  the  charge  to  the  jury 
which  treats  only  of  the  proper  effect  of  evidence  of  good  char- 
acter is  sufficiently  specific  under  the  practice  in  the  federal 
courts.22 

§  349.  General  exceptions  sufficient. — In  other  states  a  general 
exception  is  sufficient.  Thus,  in  Kentucky  the  law  makes  no 
distinction  between  a  general  and  particular  or  specific  exception, 
as  either  is  sufficient  to  authorize  the  reviewing  court  to  consider 
and  examine  alleged  errors  in  the  giving  or  refusing  of  instruc- 
tions.23 Under  the  code  of  Iowa,  where  the  exceptions  are  taken 
to  instructions  at  the  time  they  are  given,  the  ground  of  excep- 
tion need  not  be  stated;24  but  exceptions  taken  after  the  verdict 
must  specifically  point  out  the  ground  of  objection  as  to  each 
instruction.25  In  Indiana  by  statute  an  entry  in  general  terms 
that  the  party  excepts  to  the  giving  or  refusing  of  a  designated 
instruction  is  sufficient.25* 

In  Maryland  it  has  been  held  that  where  several  instructions 
are  presented  at  the  same  time,  forming  a  series  of  consecutive 

IT  Newport  News  &  M.  V.  Co.  v.  22  Edington  v.  U.  S.  164  U.  S.  361, 

Pace,  158  U.  S.  36,  15  Sup.  Ct.  743;  17  Sup.  Ct.  72;   Brown  v.  U.  S.  164 

American    Fire    Ins.    Co.    v.    Land-  U.  S.  221,  17  Sup.  Ct.  33. 

fare,    56   Neb.    482,    76    N.    W.    1068.  23  Williams   v.    Com.    80   Ky.    315. 

is  Field   v.    Long,    89   Me.   454,   36  24  Williams    v.    Barrett,    52    Iowa, 

Atl.  984;  Faivre  v.  Manderschild,  117  638,  3  N.  W.  690;  Van  Pelt  v.  City 

Iowa,  724,  90  N.  W.  76.  of  Davenport,   42  Iowa,  314. 

is  Atkins  v.  Field,  89  Me.  281,  36  25  Byford     v.     Girton,     90     Iowa, 

Atl.    375.  661,  57  N.  W.  588;   Benson  v.  Lun- 

20  Fowler  v.  Harrison,  64  S.  Car.  dy,   52    Iowa,   265,   3   N.   W.   149. 
311,    42    S.   E.    159;    City   of   South  25*  Childress     v.     Callender,     108 
Omaha  v.  Meyers   (Neb.),  92  N.  W.  Ind.    394,    9    N.    B.    292;    Acts    Ind. 
743.  1903,  p.  338;  See  post,.  §  357. 

21  McDonough     v.     Great     N.     R. 
Co.  15  Wash.  244,  46  Pac.  334. 


349  GENERAL  EXCEPTIONS REQUESTS   NUMBERED.  §    351 

legal  propositions,  it  is  but  a  single  act,  and  the  whole  will  be 
embraced  in  one  exception.26  The  taking  of  an  exception  ' '  to  the 
refusal  of  the  court  to  charge  specifically  as  requested"  is  an 
exception  to  the  refusal  of  each  instruction  requested  under  the 
practice  in  New  Jersey.27  In  one  jurisdiction  it  has  been  held 
that  where  a  party  requests  the  court  to  give  an  instruction 
and  it  is  refused,  an  exception  need  not  be  taken  to  one  given 
by  the  court  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  one  requested.28 
Where  exception  is  taken  to  any  matter  in  the  record  it  is  not 
necessary  to  take  other  exceptions  if  the  exception  first  taken 
covers  the  matter  in  issue.29 

§  350.  Exceptions  when  instructions  are  numbered. — Where 
the  instructions  are  numbered  and  separately  given,  an  exception 
at  the  conclusion  "to  the  giving  of  each  and  every  and  all  of 
said  instructions  separately,"  is  sufficient  under  the  practice  in 
some  of  the  states.29  So,  also,  the  taking  of  an  exception  "to 
the  giving  of  instructions  three,  four,  five  and  six,  contained  in 
the  general  charge  of  the  court,  and  to  the  giving  of  each  of 
said  instructions,"  is  sufficient,  being  separate  and  specific  as  to 
each  instruction.30  Or  an  exception  to  the  giving  or  refusing  of 
instructions  numbered  from  "one  to  nine  inclusive  and  to  each 
of  them"  is  sufficient.31  But  an  exception  that  the  court  erred 
in  giving  instructions  "three  and  four"  is  not  sufficient  if  one 
of  them  properly  states  the  law.32 

26  McCosker    v!.    Banks,    84    Md.         ai  Rice  v.  Williams  (Colo.  App.), 
292,   25   All.   935.  71  Pac.  433;  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co. 

27  Consolidated   Tr.   Co.   v.   Chen-  v.    Young,    30    Colo.    349,    70    Pac. 
owith,  61  N.  J.  L.  554,  35  Atl.  1067.  688;    Witsell   v.   West  Asheville   R. 

28  Evans  v.    Clark,   1   Indian   Ter.  Co.    120   N.   Car.   557,   27   S.   E.   125. 
216,  40  S.  W.   771.  32  Cincinnati,    H.    &    I.    R.    Co.    v. 

29  Ellis     v.     Leonard,     107    Iowa,  Cregor,  150  Ind.  625,  50  N.  E.  760; 
487,    78    N.    W.    246;    McClellan    v.  Aitkens   v.    Rawlings,    52    Neb.    539, 
Hein,    56    Neb.    600,   77   N.   W.    120;  72  N.  W.  858;    Kloke  v.  Martin,  55 
Geary    v.    Parker,    65    Ark.    521,    47  Neb.    554,    76    N.    W.    168;    Hall    v. 
S.  W.   238;    Rhea  v.   U.   S.   6   Okla.  Needles,  1  Indian  Ter.  146,  38  S.  W. 
249,   50  Pac.   992;    Ritchey  v.  P.  23  671;   Voelckel  v.  Banner  Brew.  Co. 
Colo.    314,   47   Pac.   272,   384;    Ludg-  9  Ohio  C.  C.  318;  Baltimore  &  P.  R. 
wig    v.    Blackshere    (Iowa),    77    N.  Co.  v.  Mackey,  157  U.  S.  72,  15  Sup. 
W.    356;    Terre   Haute   &   I.    R.    Co.  Ct.   491;   Jones  v.  Ellis,  68  Vt.  544, 
v.  McCorkle,  140  Ind.  613,  40  N.  E.  35  Atl.  488.     See  Whipple  v.  Preece, 
62;    Bower  v.   Bower,   146   tnd.   393,  24  Utah,  364,  67  Pac.  1071,  holding 
45  N.  E.  595.     See  Dunham  v.  Hoi-  not    sufficient    to    refer    to    the    in- 
loway,  3  Okla.  244,  41  Pac.  140.  struction  by  number  only;  the  par- 

*o  Brooks  v.  Dutcher,  22  Neb.  644,      ticular  point  of  objection   must  be 
36   N.   W.    128;    City   of   Omaha   v.      indicated. 
Richards,    49    Neb.    249,    68    N.    W. 
528. 


§  351 


OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS. 


350 


§  351.  Exceptions — General,  specific  and  joint. — A  general  ex- 
ception to  the  entire  charge,  consisting  of  detached  propositions 
of  law,  some  of  which  are  correct  and  some  erroneous,  will  be 
of  no  avail  in  a  court  of  review.  The  erroneous  instructions 
must  be  specifically  pointed  out.33  Thus,  an  exception  to  the 
charge  "as  given,"  without  pointing  out  in  what  particular  the 
charge  is  erroneous,  is  too  general.34  Also  an  exception  "to  the 
giving  of  each  and  every  one ' '  of  the  instructions  is  too  general.35 


as  Postal  T.  C.  Co.  v.  Hulsey,  115 
Ala.  193,  22  So.  854;  S.  v.  Webster, 
121  N.  Car.  586,  28  S.  E.  254;  Hamp- 
ton v.  Ray,  52  S.  Car.  74,  29  S.  E. 
537;  Ruby  C.  M.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Pren- 
tice, 25  Colo.  4,  52  Pac.  210;  Pear- 
son v.  Spartenberg  Co.  51  S.  Car. 
480,  29  S.  E.  193;  Powers  v.  Hazel- 
ton  &  L.  R.  Co.  33  Ohiio  St.  438; 
Standard  L.  &  A.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
59  Kas.  521,  53  Pac.  856;  Shaffer  v. 
Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  Co.  14  Ohio 
C.  C.  488;  Haas  v.  Brown,  47  N.  Y. 
S.  606,  21  Misc.  434;  Hart  v.  Bowen, 
86  Fed.  877;  Gilroy  v.  Loftus,  48 
N.  Y.  S.  532,  22  Misc.  105;  Bennett 
v.  McDonald,  52  Neb.  278,  72  N.  W. 
268;  Drenning  v.  Wesley,  189  Pa. 
St.  160,  44  Atl.  13;  Craig  v.  Bor- 
ough, 11  Pa.  Super.  Ct  490;  Gregg 
v.  Willis,  71  Vt.  313,  45  Atl.  229; 
Phoenix  A.  Co.  v.  Lucker,  77  Fed. 
243;  -Newman  v.  Virginia  T.  &  C. 
S.  &  I.  Co.  80  Fed.  228;  City  of  So. 
Omaha  v.  Powell,  50  Neb.  798,  70 
N.  W.  391;  Adams  v.  S.  25  Ohio 
St.  584;  Rosenfield  v.  Rosenthal 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  39  S.  W.  193; 
Pickham  v.  Wheeter  B.  Mfg.  Co.  77 
Fed.  663;  Wills  v.  Hardcastle,  19 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  525;  Thompson  v.  Se- 
curity T.  &  L.  Ins.  Co.  63  S.  Car. 
290,  41  S.  E.  464;  Harris  v.  Smith, 
71  N.  H.  330,  52  Atl.  854;  Gutz- 
man  v.  Clancy,  114  Wis.  589,  90  N. 
W.  1081;  Lee  v.  Hammond,  114  Wis. 
550,  90  N.  W.  1073;  Jones  v.  S. 
160  Ind.  539,  67  N.  E.  264;  Ras- 
tetter  v.  Reynolds,  160  Ind.  141,  66 
N.  E.  612. 

s*  S.  v.  Moore,  120  N.  Car.  570, 
26  S.  E.  697;  Winbish  v.  Hamilton, 
47  La.  Ann.  246, 16  So.  856;  Antietam 
Paper  Co.  v.  Chronicle  Pub.  Co. 
15  N.  Car.  147,  20  So.  367;  Barrett 


v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  69  S.  W. 
144;  Finance  Co.  v.  Old  Pittsburg 
C.  Co.  65  Minn.  442,  68  N.  W.  70; 
P.  v.  Thiede,  11  Utah,  241,  39  Pac. 
839;  S.  v.  Varner,  115  N.  Car.  744, 
20  S.  E.  518;  Jones  v.  S.  160  Ind. 
539,  67  N.  E.  264;  Magoon  v.  Be- 
fore, 73  Vt.  231,  50  Atl.  1070;  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Norton 
(Ark.),  73  S.  W.  1095;  Hamilton 
v.  Great  F.  St.  R.  Co.  17  Mont. 
334,  42  Pac.  860;  S.  v.  Varner,  115 
N.  Car.  744,  20  S.  E.  518;  P.  Ft.  W. 
&  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Probst,  30  Ohio  St. 
106;  Western  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tobin,  32 
Ohio  St.  88. 

35  Crawford  v.  Athletic  Asso.  Ill 
Iowa,  736,  82  N.  W.  944;  Colum- 
bus C.  Co.  v.  Crane  Co.  101  Fed. 
55,  98  Fed.  946;  Allend  v.  Spokane 
Falls  &  N.  R.  Co.  21  Wash.  324, 
58  Pac.  244;  New  Orleans  &  N.  E. 
R.  Co.  v.  Clements,  100  Fed.  415; 
Cook  v.  Kilgo,  111  Ga.  817,  35  S. 
E.  673;  La  Manna  v.  Munroe,  62 
N.  Y.  S.  984;  Appeal  of  Turner,  72 
Conn.  305,  44  Atl.  310;  Cavallora 
v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  110  Cal.  348, 
42  Pac.  918  (instructions  given  on 
court's  own  motion) ;  Holloway  v. 
Dunham,  170  U.  S.  615,  18  Sup. 
Ct.  784;  Consolidation  C.  &  M.  Co. 
v.  Clay,  51  Ohio  St.  542,  38  N.  E. 
610;  Ryan  v.  Washington  &  G.  R. 
Co.  8  App.  Gas.  (D.  C.)  542;  Car- 
penter v.  Eastern  R.  Co.  67  Minn. 
188,  69  N.  W.  720;  Willoughby  v. 
Northeastern  R.  Co.  52  S.  Car.  166, 
29  S.  E.  629;  Pittsburg  &  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Thompson,  82  Fed.  720;  Spears 
v.  U.  S.  81  Fed.  694,  26  C.  C.  A. 
570;  Harless  v.  U.  S.  1  Indian  Ter. 
447,  45  S.  W.  133;  Ludwig  v. 
Blackshere,  102  Iowa,  366,  71  N 
W.  356;  Rheimfeldt  v.  Dahlman, 


351 


EXCEPTIONS   GENERAL,    SPECIFIC   AND   JOINT. 


§    351 


An  exception  taken  thus:  "To  which  said  charge  and  the  whole 
thereof  the  defendant  then  and  there  duly  excepted, ' '  is  not  suffi- 
ciently specific  upon  which  to  assign  error.30 

An  assignment  of  error  that  the  instructions  "improperly  state 
the  law,  are  confusing,  conflicting,  misleading  and  present  false 
issues,"  is  too  general.37  So,  an  exception  taken  "to  the  portions 
of  the  charge  wherein  it  is  stated  that  certain  parts  of  the  pub 
lication  are  libelous  per  se, "  is  too  broad.38  The  taking  of  an 
exception  "severally  and  separately  to  each  and  every  section 
and  each  and  every  paragraph  of  the  charge"  is  not  sufficient 
unless  the  entire  charge  is  erroneous.39  So,  also,  an  exception  to 
a  number  of  instructions  as  an  entirety  is  of  no  avail  unless 
they  are  all  erroneous.40  But  where  the  error  complained  of 
affects  the  entire  charge,  then  such  general  exception  is  suffi- 


43  N.  Y.  S.  28,  19  Misc.  162;  Mil- 
ler v.  P.  23  Colo.  95,  46  Pac. 
Ill;  Jones  v.  East  Term.  V.  &  G. 
R.  Co.  157  U.  S.  682,  15  Sup.  Ct. 
719;  Luedtke  v.  Jeffrey,  89  Wis. 
136,  61  N.  W.  292;  Goodman  v. 
Sampliner,  23  Ind.  App.  72,  54  N. 
E.  823;  World  M.  B.  Asso.  v. 
Worthing,  59  Neb.  587,  81  N.  W. 
620;  Waples  P.  Co.  v.  Turner,  82 
Fed.  64;  Globe  Oil  Co.  v.  Powell, 
56  Neb.  463,  76  N.  W.  1081;  McAlis- 
ter  v.  Long,  33  Ore.  368,  54  Pac. 
124;  Andrews  v.  Postal  Tel.  Co. 
119  N.  Car.  403,  25  S.  E.  955;  Bar- 
ker v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.  157  U.  S. 
693,  51  N.  E.  1089;  S.  v.  Melton,  120 
N.  Car.  591,  26  S.  E.  933;  Burnett 
v.  Wilmington,  N.  &  N.  R.  Co.  120 
N.  Car.  517,  26  S.  E.  819.  See  Wil- 
liams v.  Casebeer,  126  Cal.  86,  58 
Pac.  380. 

se  Love  v.  Anchor  Raisin  Vin.  Co. 
(Cal.),  45  Pac.  1044;  Gable  v. 
Rauch,  50  S.  Car.  95,  27  S.  E. 
555;  Hayes  v.  S.  112  Wis.  304,  87 
N.  W.  1076;  Bernstein  v.  Downs, 
112  Cal.  197,  44  Pac.  557. 

3?  Shoemaker  v.  Bryant  Lumber 
&  S.  M.  Co.  27  Wash.  637,  68  Pac. 
380.  See  Butler  v.  Holmes  (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  68  S.  W.  52. 

ss  Cunningham  v.  Underwood, 
116  Fed.  803. 

39  Syndicate  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cutch- 
ings,  104  Ala.  176,  16  So.  46;  Leach 


v.  Hill,  97  Iowa,  81,  66  N.  W.  69; 
Jones  v.  Ellis  Estate,  68  Vt.  544, 
35  Atl.  488;  Ragsdale  v.  S.  134  Ala. 
24,  32  So.  674;  Merrill  v.  Palmer,  68 
Vt.  475,  33  Atl.  829;  Thiede  v.  P. 
159  U.  S.  510,  16  Sup.  Ct.  62.  See, 
also,  Pease  Piano  Co.  v.  Cameron, 
56  Neb.  561,  76  N.  W.  1053;  Thorn 
v.  Pittard,  62  Fed.  232;  Green  v. 
Hansen,  89  Wis.  597,  62  N.  W.  408; 
Dunnington  v.  Frick  Co.  60  Ark. 
250,  30  S.  W.  212;  Vider  v.  O'Brien, 
62  Fed.  326;  Carpenter  v.  American 
A.  Co.  46  S.  Car.  541,  24  S.  E.  500; 
Scoville  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  11  Utah, 
60,  39  Pac.  481;  Omaha  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Deirks,  43  Neb.  473,  61  N. 
W.  740;  Postal  Tel.  C.  Co.  v.  Hul- 
sey,  132  Ala.  444,  31  So.  527;  Hal- 
lenbeck  v.  Garst,  96  Iowa,  509,  65 
N.  W.  417;  Schollay  v.  Moffitt  W. 
Drug  Co.  (Colo.  App.),  67  Pac.  182. 
40  S.  v.  Ray,  14&  Ind.  500s  45 
N.  E.  693;  Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Phelps,  51  Neb.  623,  71  N.  W.  303; 
Lane  v.  Minnesota  S.  Agr.  Soc.  67 
Minn.  65;  69  N.  W.  463;  Culter  v. 
Skeels,  69  Vt.  154,  37  Atl.  228;  Ras- 
tetter  v.  S.  160  Ina.  133,  66  N.  E. 
612;  Milliken  v.  Maund,  110  Ala. 
332,  20  So.  310;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Callaghan,  161  U.  S.  91,  16  Sup. 
Ct.  493;  McNamara  v.  Pengilly,  64 
Minn.  543,  67  N.  W.  661;  Barker 
v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.  36  N.  Y.  S.  256, 
91  Hun  (N.  Y.),  495;  Dickerson  v. 


§  352  OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS.  352 

cient.41  Or  where  the  whole  charge  or  the  portion  to  which 
exception  is  taken  amounts  merely  to  a  single  proposition  a 
general  exception  is  sufficient.42 

The  taking  of  an  exception  to  the  instructions  on  the  ground 
that  the  charge  is  too  general  is  of  no  avail  on  review  in  the 
absence  of  a  request  for  more  specific  instructions.43  So,  an 
exception  taken  to  instructions  by  two  parties  jointly  is  of  no 
avail  if  they  are  erroneous  as  to  one  only.44  The  rules  deduced 
from  the  authorities  cited  are  to  the  effect  that  if  exceptions 
are  taken  jointly  by  two  or  more  parties,  they  are  unavailing 
unless  the  instructions  are  erroneous  as  to  all  who  join;  and  if 
the  exceptions  are  in  gross  to  a  series  of  instructions,  they  will 
likewise  be  unavailing  if  any  one  of  the  instructions  is  correct. 

§  352.  Failure  to  except — Effect. — The  general  rule  is  that  ex- 
ceptions to  instructions  given,  or  the  refusal  to  give,  must  be 
taken  in  the  trial  court;  objections  to  instructions  cannot  be 
made  for  the  first  time  on  appeal.45  But  according  to  statutory 
provisions,  or  the  practice,  in  some  states,  errors  may  be  assigned 
on  appeal  or  writ  of  error  as  to  the  giving  or  refusing  of  instruc- 
tions, although  no  exceptions  whatever  were  taken  in  the  trial 
court.47  This  rule  governs  in  criminal  as  well  as  civil  causes ;  espe- 

Quincy  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  67  Vt.  609,  32  92  N.  W.  782;    Copeland   v.   Ferris, 

Atl.  489;  Lowe  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  13  118  Iowa,  554,  92  N.  W.  699. 
Utah,   91,    44   Pac.    1050;    Bonner   v.          44  Marshall    v.    Lewark,    117    Ind. 

S.  107  Ala.  97,  18  So.  226;   Hodge  v.  377,   20   N.   E.   253. 
Chicago  &  A.   R.   Co.   121   Fed.   52;  45  s.    v.    Probasco,    46    Kas.    310, 

Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Clay,  51  Ohio  26  Pac.   749;    Kansas   Farmers'   etc. 

St.  550,  38  N.  E.  610;  Western  Ins.  Ins.    Co. .  v.    Hawley,    46    Kas.    746, 

Co.  v.  Tobin,  32  Ohio  St.  88;  Glaser  27  Pac.   176;    Ritzenger  v.   Hart,  43 

v.  Glaser  (Okla.),  74  Pac.  945.  Mo.  App.  183;   Fleming  v.  Fleming, 

41  Hindman    v.    First   Nat.    Bank,  33  S.  Car.  505;   12  S.  E.  257;    Price 

112  Fed.  931,  57  L.  R.  A.  108.  v.  Vanstone,  40  Mo.  App.  207;  Con- 

42Nickum  v.  Gaston,  24  Ore.  380,  nelly  v.  Shamrock  Ben.  Soc.  43  Mo. 

33    Pac.    671,    35    Pac.    31;    Haun    v.  App.   283;    East   St.    Louis   Elec.    R. 

Rio    Grande    W.    R.    Co.    22    Utah,  Co.    v.    Stout,    150    111.    9,    36    N.    E. 

346,  62  Pac.  908;   Boyce  v.  Wabash  963;    West    Chicago    St.    R.    Co.    v. 

R.    Co.    63   Iowa,  70,   18  N.   W.   673.  Martin,   154   111.   523,   39   N.  E.   140; 

«  Queen    Ins.    Co.    v.    Leonard,    9  McKinnon  v.   Atkins,   60  Mich.   418, 

Ohio  C.  C.  46;   Burnham  v.  Logan,  88  27   N.   W.    564;    P.    v.    Buddensieck, 

Tex.    1,   29    S.   W.    1067;    Producers'  103   N.   Y.   487,   9   N.   E.   44;    Coffee 

Marble    Co.    v.    Bergen    (Tex.    Cv.  v.  McCord,  83  Ind.  593. 
App.),  31  S.  W.  89.    See,  also,  Lind-         4-  National  Bank  v.   Sumner,  119 

heim  v.   Buys,  31   N.   Y.   S.   870,   11  N.  Car.  591,  26  S.  E.  129;  Grugan  v. 

Misc.    16;    Baltimore    &    P.    R.    Co.  City   of    Philadelphia,    158    Pa.    St 

v.    Mackey,    157    U.    S.    72,    15    Sup.  337,    27    Atl.    1000;    Janny   v.    How- 

Ct.  49;  Crossette  v.  Jordan  (Mich.),  ard,    150   Pa.    St.    342,   24 .  Atl.    740; 


353        FAILURE  TO  EXCEPT — EXCEPTING  IN  GROUP.        §  354 

dally  in  capital  cases,  in  a  few  states,  will  errors  as  to  instruc- 
tions be  considered  on  review,  although  in  the  trial  court  no  ex- 
ceptions were  taken  as  is  generally  required.48 

§  353.    Assignment  of  error  on  instructions  in  group. — The 

assignment  of  error  in  a  group  or  en  masse  as  to  the  giving  or 
refusing  of  instructions,  will  not  be  considered  on  appeal  or  writ 
of  error  if  any  one  of  the  group  of  instructions  was  properly 
given  or  refused,  as  the  case  may  be.49  Where  error  is  assigned 
in  the  giving  and  refusing  of  a  group  of  instructions,  and  one 
of  them  is  proper,  the  whole  assignment  of  error  fails.  Assigning 
error  in  this  manner  without  pointing  out  the  reasons  to  enable 
the  court  to  determine  the  questions  involved  will  not  be  con- 
sidered on  appeal.50  So,  where  a  party  prepares  a  series  of 
instructions  and  requests  the  court  to  give  them  as  a  whole, 
and  excepts  to  the  refusal  to  give  the  request  as  a  whole,  the 
assignment  of  error  in  refusing  to  give  a  portion  will  not  be 
considered  by  the  reviewing  court.51  In  Nebraska  the  assign- 
ment of  error  must  be  separate  on  each  instruction  complained 
of  on  the  motion  for  a  new  trial,  as  well  as  in  the  petition  in 
error.52 

§  354.    Exceptions  limited  to  grounds  stated. — Instructions  will 
be  reviewed  only  as  to  the  particular  grounds  for  which  error 

Whitaker  v.  S.   106  Ala.  30,  17  So.  Neb.  304;   69  N.  W.  835;   Stough  v. 

456;    Hill    v.    S.    35    Tex.    Or.    App.  Ogden,  49  Neb.  291,  68  N.  W.  516; 

371,  33  S.  W.  1075;    McMillan  v.  S.  Axthelm    v.    Chicago    R.    I.    &    P. 

35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  370,  33  S.  W.  970  R.  Co.   (Neb.),  89  N.  W.  313;   Green 

(misdemeanors     require     exception  v.   Tierney,  62  Neb.   561,   87  N.   W. 

by  statute).  331;  Runquist  v.  Anderson,  64  Neb. 

48  Falk   v.   P.   42    111.    335;    P.   v.  755,  90  N.  W.  760;  Redman  v.  Voss, 
Barberi,  149  N.  Y.  256,  43  N.  E.  635;  46    Neb.    512,    64    N.    W.    1094;     P. 
Hill  v.  S.  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  371,  33  v.  Berlin,  10  Utah,  39,  36  Pac.  190; 
S.   W.  1075.  Rowen   v.    Sommers    (Iowa),   66   N. 

49  Lewis    v.    S.    42    Pla.    253,    28  W.  897. 

So.    397;    Frenzer    v.    Richards,    60  so  Albion     Milling     Co.     v.     First 

Neb.  131,  82  N.  W.  317;    Brozek  v.  Nat.  Bank,   64   Neb.   116,   89   N.  W. 

Steinway   R.    Co.    161    N.    Y.   63,   55  638.     See  King  v.  S.  43  Fla.  211,  31 

N.    E.    395;    New   Dunderberg   Min.  So.  254. 

Co.   v.   Old,   97   Fed.   150;    Lineham  si  Murry   v.   Board   of  Comrs.   58 

R.   Tr.   Co.  v.  Morris,   87  Fed.   127;  Kas.  1.  48  Pac.  554. 

Illinois  Cent.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Linstroth  r>2  Karnes     v.     Dovey,     53     Neb. 

Wagon  Co.  112  Fed.  737;  New  Eng.  725,    74    N.    W.    311;    Langshort    v. 

T.  &  C.  Co.   v.  Catholican,  79  Fed.  Coon,   53   Neb.    765,   74   N.   W.    257; 

294;  Dempster  M.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  First  Kloke   v.    Martin-,    55   Neb.    554     76 

Nat.   Bank,   49  Neb.   321,   68  N.   W.  N.  W.  168. 
477;     Behrends     v.     Beyschlag,     50 


§  355  OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS.  354 

is  assigned.53  The  filing  of  exceptions  with  the  clerk  of  the 
court,  as  provided  by  statute,  to  the  ruling  of  the  court  in  the 
giving  or  refusing  of  instructions,  limits  the  party  to  the  ex- 
ceptions thus  filed.54 

§355.  Objections  and  exceptions  not  waived. — The  fact  that 
instructions  are  not  requested  at  all  by  a  party  on  a  particular 
point  or  issue  will  not  bar  him  from  assigning  error  and  urging 
objections  to  erroneous  instructions  given  for  his  opponent  on 
the  same  subject.55  The  giving  of  erroneous  instructions  which 
are  prejudicial  to  the  rights  of  a  litigant  is  ground  for  the  assign- 
ment of  error,  although  no  instructions  were  requested  by  the 
complaining  party.5"  So,  if  it  appears  that  the  jury  took  the 
wrong  view  of  the  law,  error  may  be  assigned,  whether  the  com- 
plaining party  requested  instructions  or  not.57 

An  instruction  assuming  to  cover  an  entire  question,  such,  for 
instance,  as  the  question  of  liability,  but  which  omits  a  material 
element,  is  erroneous;  and  in  such  case  the  other  party  is  not 
precluded  from  assigning  error  thereon,  though  he  did  not 
request  an  instruction  on  the  same  subject.58  And  in  some  juris- 
dictions, although  an  instruction  is  defective  and  for  that  reason 
properly  refused,  yet  if  it  is  sufficient  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
court  to  the  question  upon  which  it  is  requested  to  be  given,  the 
failure  of  the  court  to  give  a  proper  instruction  on  that  particular 
matter  is  error.59 

ss  Mixon  v.  Mills,  92  Tex.  318,  47  Missouri,   K.    &  T.   R.   Co.   v.   Kir- 

S.   W.   966;    Edmunds   v.    Black,    15  schoffer    (Tex.   Cv.  App.),  24  S.  W. 

Wash.   73;    45  Pac.  639.     See,   also,  577;    Pierson    v.    Duncan,    162    Pa. 

Cole  v.  Curtis,  16  Minn.  182;   Ryall  St.    239,    29    Atl.    733;    Whelchel    v. 

v.  CentraJ  Pac.  R.  Co.  76  Cal.  474,  Gainesville  &  D.  E.  R.  Co.  116  Ga. 

18    Pac.    430;    Phipps   v.    Pierce,    94  431,  42  S.  E.  776;    Gowdey  v.  Rob- 

N.    Car.    514;    Price    v.    Burlington  bins,  38  N.  Y.   S.   280,  3  App.   Div. 

C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co.  42  Iowa,  16.  353;    Carter   v.    Columbia    &   G.   R. 

s*  S.   v.   Campbell,   7   N.   Dak.   58,  Co.  19  S.  Car.  26;  Bynum  v.  Bynum, 

77  N.  W.  935.  33   N.    Car.    632;    S.   v.    Pennell,   56 

55  Ford  v.   Chicago  &  R.   I.   &  P.  Iowa,  29,  8  N.  W.  686. 

Co.    106    Iowa,    85,    75    N.    W.    650;  "  York     Park     Bldg.     Asso.      v. 

Wills  v.  Tanner,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  795,  Barns,   39   Neb.   834,   58  N.  W.   440. 

39  S.  W.  422;  International  &  G.  N.  ™  City  of  South  Omaha  v.  Hager 

R.  Co.  v.  Kuehn,  11  Tex.  Cv.  App.  (Neb.),  92  N.   W.  1017. 

21,  31  S.  W.  322;   Johnson  v:  John-  so  Cleveland  v.   Empire  Mills   Co. 

son   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  67  S.  W.  123.  6  Tex.  Cv.  App.  479,  25  S.  W.  1055; 

so  Seffel   v.   Western   U.   Tel.   Co.  Carpenter  v.  Dowe  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  67  S.  W.   897;    In-  26  S.   W.   1002;    Kinyon  v.   Chicago 

ternational     G.     &     N.     R.     Co.     v.  &  N.  W.  R.   Co.   118  Iowa,   349,  92 

Welch,  86  Tex.  203,  24  S.  W.  395;  N.  W.  40;   Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 


355  WAIVING PRESERVING  INSTRUCTIONS   IN   RECORD.  §    357 

§  356.  Errors  presented  on  motion  for  new  trial. — It  must 
appear  that  any  errors  complained  of  in  giving  instructions  were 
called  to  the  attention  of  the  court  on  a  motion  for  a  new  trial, 
that  the  court  may  have  an  opportunity  to  correct  the  errors 
before  they  will  be  considered  by  a  court  of  review.60  And  the 
errors  complained  of  should  be  specifically  pointed  out  in  the 
motion  for  a  new  trial.61  In  some  of  the  states  the  practice  re- 
quires that  the  errors  must  be  separately  assigned  as  to  each  in- 
struction complained  of,  in  the  motion,  for  a  new  trial.62  But 
in  Illinois  a  court  of  review  on  appeal  or  writ  of  error  will  pass 
upon  the  correctness  in  giving  instructions,  although  no  motion 
for  a  new  trial  appears  in  the  bill  of  exceptions.63 

§  357.  Making  instructions  part  of  the  record. — In  some  of  the 
states  the  instructions  are  made  a  part  of  the  record  by  statute, 
thus  dispensing  with  the  necessity  of  embodying  them  in  a  bill 
of  exceptions.64  By  statute  in  Indiana,  when  requested  in  writing 
by  either  party,  the  judge  must  reduce  all  instructions  to  writing 
and  number  and  sign  them.  Exceptions  may  be  taken  by  writing 
on  the  margin  or  at  the  end  of  each  instruction  "given  and 
excepted  to,"  or  "refused  and  excepted  to;"  this  memorandum 
must  be  dated  and  signed  by  the  judge.  But  instructions  thus 
excepted  to  must  be  filed  and  the  record  must  affirmatively  show 
that  fact  before  they  will  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  record.65 

v.  Manghan,  29  Tex.  Cv.  App.  486,  160;    Schenck    v.    Butsch,    32    Ind. 

69    S.    W.    80;    Neville    v.    Mitchell  344. 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  66  S.  W.  579;  City  ei  Central    of    Georgia    R.    Co.    v. 

of   Sherman  v.   Greening    (Tex.   Cv.  Bond,  111  Ga.  13,  36  S.  E.  299;  New- 

App.),  73  S.  W.  424;   Leeds  v.  Reed  man  v.  Day,   108  Ga.   813,  34  S.  B. 

(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  36  S.  W.  347.  167. 

oo  Brown  v.  Mayo,  80  Mo.  App.  62  Palmer  v.  First  Bank  of  Ulyses 
81;  Izlar  v.  Manchester  &  A.  R.  (Neb.),  81  N.  W.  303;  Stons  &  Har- 
Co.  57  S.  Car.  332,  35  S.  E.  583;  rison  v.  Fesselman,  23  Ind.  App. 
Hintz  v.  Graupner,  138  111.  158,  165,  293,  55  N.  E.  245. 
27  N.  E.  935;  Schmidt  &  Bro.  Co.  es  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Keefe, 
v.  Mahoney,  60  Neb.  20,  82  N.  W.  154  111.  508,  514,  39  N.  E.  606.  See 
99;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Tolerton  North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wrixon,  150 
(Neb.),  97  N.  W.  248;  Davis  v.  111.  532,  37  N.  E.  895. 
Hall  (Neb.),  97  N.  W.  1023;  Even-  64  Utah  Optical  Co.  v.  Keith,  18 
ing  Post  Co.  v.  Canfield,  23  Ky.  L.  Utah,  477,  56  Pac.  155;  S.  v.  Bart- 
R.  2028,  68  S.  W.  502;  Jones  v.  Lay-  ly,  56  Neb.  810,  77  N.  W.  438; 
man,  123  Ind.  573,  24  N.  E.  363;  Clanin  v.  Fagan,  124  Ind.  304,  24 
Grant  v.  Westfall,  57  Ind.  121.  See  N.  E.  1044;  Blumer  v.  Bennett,  44 
Irwin  v.  Smith,  72  Ind.  488.  See  Neb.  873,  63  N.  W.  14. 
Dawson  v.  Coffman,  28  Ind.  220;  es  Dix  v.  Akers,  30  Ind.  433;  Wai- 
Douglass  v.  Blankenship,  50  Ind.  lace  v.  Goff,  71  Ind.  294;  Louis- 


§    358  OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS.  356 

The  instructions  may  be  brought  into  the  record  by  bill  of  ex- 
ceptions, but  there  must  be  some  showing  that  the  instructions 
given  or  refused  were  properly  excepted  to.06  It  has  recently 
been  held  in  this  state,  apparently  in  the  teeth  of  the  statute,  that 
the  marginal  exceptions  provided  by  statute  are  not  sufficient  to 
raise  any  question  on  appeal,  unless  it  is  otherwise  shown  which 
party  took  the  exceptions.67  But  in  criminal  cases  instructions  can 
only  be  made  a  part  of  the  record  by  a  bill  of  exceptions.68  There 
are  four  methods  in  Indiana  by  which  instructions  may  be 
brought  into  record:  (1)  By  marginal  exceptions;  (2)  By 
order  of  court ;  (3  )  By  bill  of  exceptions ;  (4  )  By  general  excep- 
tions under  the  recent  statute.  But  the  only  safe  way  is  by  a  gen- 
eral bill  of  exceptions,  as  the  record  must  affirmatively  show  that 
the  instructions  set  out  in  the  record  were  all  the  instructions  giv- 
en. Copying  the  instructions  in  the  motion  for  a  new  trial  does  not 
make  them  a  part  of  the  record,  and  in  such  form  will  not  be 
considered  on  review.69 

§  358.  By  bill  of  exceptions. — Errors  assigned  in  the  giving 
or  refusing  of  instructions  will  not  be  considered  by  a  court  of 
review  unless  the  instructions  given  and  refused  are  properly 
preserved  in  a  bill  of  exceptions  or  other  proper  mode,  showing 
that  exceptions  were  properly  taken  in  the  trial  court.70  Accord- 

ville,  N.  A.  and  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  106  Wis.  618,  82  N.  W.  564;  Piano 

115  Ind.  378,  16  N.  E.  145,  17  N.  B.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  McCord  (Iowa),  80  N. 

584;  Riley  v.  Allen,  154  Ind.  176,  W.  659;  Barker  v.  Lawrence  Mfg. 

56  N.  E.  240.  Co.  176  Mass.  203,  57  N.  E.  366; 

e«  Eslinger  v.  East,  100  Ind.  434.  Ryder   v.    Jacobs,    196   Pa.    St.    386, 

6T  Indiana,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bundy,  46  Atl.  667;  Commissioners  v. 

152  Ind.  590,  53  N.  E.  175.  Ryckman,  91  Md.  36,  46  Atl.  317; 

es  Leverich  v.  S.  105  Ind.  277,  4  Westberg  v.  Simmons,  57  S.  Car. 

N.  E.  852;  Delhaney  v.  115  Ind.  499,  467,  35  S.  E.  764;  Bowen  v.  South- 

18  N.  E.  49;  Utterback  v.  S.  153  ern  R.  Co.  58  S.  Car.  222,  36  S.  E. 

Ind.  545,  55  N.  E.  420.  590;  Hogan  v.  Peterson,  8  Wyo. 

By  recent  statute  in  Indiana  in-  549;  59  Pac.  162;  Gulliver  v.  Adams 

structions  may  be  excepted  to  by  Ex.  Co.  38  111.  509;  Dombrook  v. 

numbers,  either  in  writing  or  or-  Rumely  Co.  (Wis.),  97  N.  W.  493; 

ally,  and  such  exceptions  noted  on  Berkett  v.  Bond,  12  111.  86;  Buck- 

the  court's  minutes  and  the  in-  master  v.  Cool,  12  111.  74;  Lindsay 

structions  filed,  and  they,  with  the  v.  Turner,  156  U.  S.  208,  15  Sup. 

exceptions,  become  a  part  of  the  Ct.  355;  Leifheit  v.  Jos.  Schlitz 

record.  Acts  of  1903,  p.  338.  Brewing  Co.  106  Iowa,  451,  76  N. 

6»  Archibald  v.  S.  122  Ind.  122.  W.  730;  Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co. 

23  N.  E.  758;  Claflin  v.  Cottman,  v.  Siefke,  144  N.  Y.  354.  39  N.  E. 

77  Ind.  58;  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  358;  Burnett  v.  Cavanaugh,  56  Neb. 

v.  Holland,  162  Ind.  406,  69  N.  E.  142.  190;  76  N.  W.  576;  Evans  v.  Clark 

TO  Burnette    v.    Town    of    Guyers,  (Miss.),  24  So.  532;   Abbott  v.  City 


357 


BILL  OF  EXCEPTIONS — PRESERVING  ALL. 


§  359 


ing  to  the  practice  in  Indiana,  if  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  is  passed 
upon  at  a  term  subsequent  to  the  return  of  the  verdict,  the  court 
may  then  grant  time  within  which  to  file  a  bill  of  exceptions  em- 
bracing the  evidence  and  the  rulings  upon  the  motion;  but  such 
bill  will  not  preserve  any  ruling  made  during  the  trial,  nor  will 
such  bill  bring  the  instructions  into  the  record.71 

§  359.  All  instructions  must  be  in  record. — A  court  of  review 
will  not  consider  the  assignment  of  errors  as  to  instructions  unless 
the  entire  charge  or  all  of  the  instructions  given  and  refused  are 
made  part  of  the  record  by  a  bill  of  exceptions  or  other  proper 
manner.72  All  the  instructions  should  be  preserved  in  the  record 


of  Mobile,  119  Ala.  595,  24  So.  565; 
Sams  Automatic  C.  Co.  v.  League, 
25  Colo.  129,  54  Pac.  642;  Colby 
v.  McDermont  (N.  Dak.),  71  N.  W. 
772;  Castle  v.  Boys,  19  Ky.  L.  Jl.  345, 
40  S.  W.  242;  Merrill  v.  Equitable 
F.  &  S.  I.  Co.  v.  49  Neb.  198,  68  N. 
W.  365;  Costello  v.  Kottas,  52  Neb. 
15,  71  N.  W.  950;  Prichard  v.  Budd, 
76  Fed.  710;  Schaff  v.  Miles,  31  N. 
Y.  S.  134,  10  Misc.  395;  Schwabel- 
and  v.  Buchler,  31  N.  Y.  S.  143,  10 
Misc.  773;  Ward  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  29  S.  W.  274;  Werner  v. 
Jewett,  54  Kas.  530,  38  Pac.  793; 
Keokuk  Stove  Works  v.  Hammond, 
94  Iowa,  694,  63  N.  W.  563;  Pike 
v.  Sutton,  21  Colo.  84,  39  Pac.  1084; 
Ryan  v.  Conroy,  33  N.  Y.  S.  330, 
85  Hun,  (N.  Y.)  544;  Dunbar  v.  S.  34 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  596,  31  S.  W.  401;  Phil- 
lips v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  30  S.  W. 
1063;  Sigler  v.  McConnell,  45  Neb. 
598,  63  N.  W.  870;  Partin  v.  Com.  17 
Ky.  L.  R.  499,  31  S.  W.  874;  Moore 
v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  28  S.  W.  686; 
Patterson  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  29 
S.  W.  272:  Hardeman  v.  S.  (Miss.), 
16  So.  876;  S.  v.  Owens,  44  S.  Car. 
324,  22  S.  E.  244;  S.  v.  Knutson, 
91  Iowa,  549,  60  N.  W.  129;  S.  v. 
Paxton,  126  Mo.  500,  29  S.  W.  705; 
Bragger  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  R.  Co.  24 
Utah,  391,  68  Pac.  140;  American 
Cotton  Co.  v.  Beasley,  116  Fed.  256; 
Mount  v.  Brooklyn  Union  Gas  Co. 
76  N.  Y.  S.  533;  Andrysick  v.  Stak- 
owski,  159  Ind.  428,  63  N.  E.  854; 
Engel  v.  Dado  (Neb.),  92  N.  W. 
629;  Challis  v.  Lake,  71  N.  H.  90, 


57  Atl.  260;  Delhaney  v.  S.  115  Ind. 
502,  18  N.  E.  49;  Minor  v.  Parker, 
72  N.  Y.  S.  549,  65  App.  Div.  120; 
Leverich  v.  S.  105  Ind.  277,  4  N. 
E.  852;  Livingston  v.  Moore  (Neb.), 
89  N.  W.  289;  Trogden  v.  Deckard, 
47  Ind.  572;  Marshal  ton  L.  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Doll,  80  Ind.  113;  Suther- 
land v.  Venard,  34  Ind.  390  (oral 
instructions  must  be  preserved  by 
bill  of  exceptions  to  be  of  any 
avail  on  review) ;  Casey  v.  Ballou 
Banking  Co.  98  Iowa,  107,  67  N.  W. 
98;  Hall  v.  Incorporated  Town,  90 
Iowa,  585,  58  N.  W.  881;  Robbins  v. 
Brockton  St.  R.  Co.  180  Mass.  51, 
61  N.  E.  265;  Krack  v.  Wolf,  39 
Ind.  88;  Eddy  v.  Lafayette,  163  U. 
S.  456,  16  Sup.  Ct.  1082;  Runnells 
v.  Village  of  P.  109  Mich.  512,  67 
N.  W.  558;  Longyear  v.  Gregory, 
110  Mich.  277,  68  N.  W.  116;  Vil- 
lage of  Monroeville  v.  Root,  54 
Ohio  St.  523,  44  N.  E.  237;  Ranson 
v.  Weston,  110  Mich.  240,  68  N.  W. 
152;  Thirkfield  v.  Mountain  V.  C. 
Asso.  12  Utah,  76,  41  Pac.  564;  Sim- 
onds  v.  City  of  B.  93  Wis.  40,  67 
N.  W.  40;  S.  v.  Nelson,  132  Mo. 
184,  33  S.  W.  809;  S.  v.  Hilsabeck, 
132  Mo.  348,  34  S.  W.  38;  S.  v. 
Jones,  134  Mo.  254,  35  S.  W.  607. 

71  Indianapolis,  D.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Pugh,    85    Ind.    279.      See   Leach    v. 
Hill,  97  Iowa,  81,  66  N.  W.  69. 

72  Long  v.  Shull,  7  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
476;  Dubois  v.  Decker,  114  Fed/ 267; 
Sargent  v.  Chapman,  12  Colo.  App. 
529,    56    Pac.    194;    S.    v.    Rover.    11 
Nev.    343;    Warren   v.   Nash    (Ky.), 


§  360  OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS.  358 

to  enable  the  court  to  determine  whether  the  errors  complained 
of  were  cured  or  not  by  considering  the  instructions  together  as 
a  whole.73  It  must  appear  from  the  bill  of  exceptions  that  it 
contains  all  the  instructions  given  and  refused,  otherwise  the 
assignment  of  errors  as  to  the  instructions  will  not  be  considered 
on  appeal  or  error  by  the  reviewing  court.74 

The  record  should  affirmatively  show  that  the  instructions 
contained  therein  were  the  only  instructions  given  and  refused.75 
By  a  rule  of  long  standing  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  only  such  parts  of  the  charge  to  which  exceptions  were 
taken  need  be  embodied  in  the  record  by  the  bill  of  exceptions 
for  the  purpose  of  review  by  that  court.76 

But  the  more  recent  authorities  seem  to  hold  that  a  positive  or 
direct  recital  in  a  bill  of  exceptions  that  it  contains  all  the  evi- 
dence or  all  the  instructions  given  and  refused,  is  not  essential  to 
make  it  complete ;  that  it  will  be  regarded  as  complete  unless  it 
affirmatively  appears  from  the  record  that  other  instructions  were 
given  or  refused.77 

§  360.  Presumption  in  absence  of  all  instructions. — It  will  be 
presumed  that  the  trial  court  fully  and  correctly  stated  the  law 
applicable  to  the  issues,  or  contentions  of  the  parties  if  the 
entire  charge  is  not  embodied  in  the  record.78  Where  the  in- 
structions are  not  contained  in  the  record  showing  that  ex- 
ceptions were  properly  taken  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  court 

67  S.  W.  274;  Whitney  E.  I.  Co.  v.  ton,  54  111.  158;  Kleinschmidt  v. 
Anderson,  172  Mass.  1,  51  N.  E.  McDermott,  12  Mont.  309,  30  Pac. 
182;  Craggs  v.  Bohart  (Indian  Ter.)..  393;  Keeling  v.  Kuhn,  19  Kas.  441; 
69  S.  W.  931;  Collins  v.  Breen,  Pierson  v.  S.  12  Ala.  149;  Michigan 
75  Wis.  606,  44  N.  W.  769;  City  v.  Phillips  (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  701. 
Freeborn  v.  Norcross,  49  Cal.  313;  75  Barton  v.  S.  154  Ind.  670,  57 
Greenabaum  v.  Millsaps,  77  Mo.  N.  E.  515;  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
474;  Cheaney  v.  S.  36  Ark.  74;  Holland  (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  141.  Con- 
Montgomery  v.  Harker,  81  Mo.  63;  tra:  Cox  v.  'P.  109  111.  459. 
Kelleher  v.  City  of  Keokuk,  60  76  Crane  v.  Crane,  5  Pet.  (U.  S.), 
Iowa,  473,  15  N.  W.  280;  Berren-  356;  Phoenix  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rad- 
berg  v.  City  of  Boston,  137  Mass.  din,  120  U.  S.  183,  7  Sup.  Ct.  500. 
231;  Bean  v.  Green,  33  Ohio  St.  77  Warren  v.  Nash,  24  Ky.  L.  R. 
452.  479,  68  S.  W.  658,  citing  Garrott  v. 

73  Marshall    v.    Lewark,    117    Ind.  Ratliff,  83  Ky.  386;   Louisville  &  N. 

377,  20  N.  E.  253;   Oregon  R.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Finley,  86  Ky.  L.  R.  294,  5 

Co.  v.  Galliber,  2  Wash.  Ter.  70,  3  S.  W.  753. 

Pac.  615.  78  Hawkins  v.  Collier,  106  Ga.  18, 

™  Board,  &c.  v.   Gibson,  158  Ind.  31    S.    E.    755;    Myer    v.    Suburban 

471,  63  N.  E.  982.     See,  also,  as  to  Home   Co.    55    N.    Y.    S.    566,    Misc. 

refused    instructions,    Gill    v.    Skel-  686. 


359  PRESUMPTION  IN  ABSENCE  OF  INSTRUCTIONS.  §    360 

properly  instructed  the  jury  on  its  own  motion.79  In  the  absence 
of  some  of  the  instructions  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  court 
properly  instructed  the  jury  though  the  portion  of  the  charge 
appearing  in  the  record  is  susceptible  of  two  meanings.80  Also 
if  erroneous  instructions  were  given  it  will  be  presumed,  in  the 
absence  of  the  full  charge,  that  the  errors  were  cured  by  others 
given  which  are  not  in  the  record.81 

But  where  the  instructions  given  contain  errors  that  could  not 
be  cured  by  others,  then  it  may  be  proper  to  reverse  on  account 
of  erroneous  instructions  although  all  that  were  given  do  not 
appear  in  the  record.82  And  where  all  of  the  instructions  are 
not  in  the  record  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  ones  refused  are 
covered  by  those  given.83  In  passing  upon  alleged  errors  it  will 
be  presumed  that  the  trial  court  properly  instructed  the  jury  in 
the  absence  of  a  showing  to  the  contrary,  or  where  the  instruc- 
tions are  not  set  out  in  the  abstract  as  required  by  the  rules  of 
the  court.84  But  it  has  been  held  that  the  reviewing  court  will 
not  presume  that  a  refused  instruction  was  given  in  the  general 
charge  merely  because  such  general  charge  is  not  embodied  in 
the  record.85  That  the  instructions  were  given  or  refused  or 
modified  in  the  form  they  appear  in  the  record  will  be  presumed 

79  Richardson  v.  City  of  Eureka,  82  Meyer  v.  Temme,  72  111.  577. 

96   Gal.    443;    Gross   Lumber   Co.    v.  ss  Clore  v.  Mclntire,  120  Ind.  266, 

Goody,    99    Ga.    775,    27    S.    B.    169;  22  N.  E.  128;  Puett  v.  Beard,  86  Ind. 

Marshall    v.    Lewark,    117   Ind.    377,  108;    Vancleave   v.    Clark,    118    Ind. 

20    N.    E.    253;    Ford    v.    Ford,    110  61,  20  N.  E.  527;  Lehman  v.  Hawks, 

Ind.    89,   10   N.   E.   648;    Becknell  v.  121    Ind.    541,    23    N.    E.    670;    Gar- 

Becknell,  110  Ind.  42,  10  N.  E.  414;  rett  v.  S.  109  Ind.  527,  10  N.  E.  570; 

Lehman  v.  Hawks,  121  Ind.  546,  23  Chicago,    M.    &    St.    P.    R.    Co.    v. 

N.    E.    670;    Hancock   v.    Shockman  Yando,    127    111.    214,    20    N.    E.    70; 

(Ind.  Ter.),  69  S.  W.  826;    Cobb  v.  Pace  v.  Payne,  73  Ga.  675;    Gill  v. 

Makme,  87  Ala.  514,  6  So.  299;   Me-  Skelton,  54  111.  158;   Bolen  v.   S.   26 

Phee  v.  McDermott,  77  Wis.  33,  45  Ohio   St.    371;    Hearn    v.    Shaw,    72 

N.    W.    808;    Huff    v.    Aultman,    69  Me.    187;    Stearnes   v.    Johnson,    17 

Iowa,    71,    28    N.    W.    440;    McFad-  Minn.   142. 

yen  v.  Masters,  11  Okla.  16,  66  Pac.  «*  Guerin   v.    New   Eng.    T.    &   T. 

284;    Hewey  v.  Nourse,  54  Me.  256;  Co.  70  N.  H.  133,  46  Atl.  185;   Mc- 

P.  v.  Niles,  44  Mich.  606,  7  N.  W.  Graw  v.  Chicago,  R.  &  I.  P.  R.  Co. 

192;    Bean    v.    Green,    33    Ohio    St.  (Neb.),    81    N.    W.    306;     Nighbert 

444;     Linton    v.    Allen,    154    Mass.  v.  Hornsby,  100  Tenn.  82;  42  S.  W. 

432,   28  N.   E;   780;    Klink  v.   P.   16  1060;    Milwaukee   Harvester   Co.    v. 

Colo.  467,  27  Pac.  1062.  Tymich,  68  Ark.  225,  58  S.  W.  252; 

so  Davis  v.  S.  25  Ohio  St.  369.  Scott  v.  Smith,  70  Ind.  298. 

si  Bell    v.    S.    69    Ga.    752;    Fern-  ^  Alabama    M.    R.    Co.    v.    Guil- 

bach  v.  City  of  Waterloo,  76  Iowa,  ford,  114  Ga.  627,  40  S.  E.  794. 
598,   41   N.   W.    370;    P.   v.    Von.   78 
Cal.    1,   20   Pac.   35. 


361 


OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS. 


360 


on  review,  notwithstanding  contentions  to  the  contrary.88  And 
where  it  appears  that  the  trial  court  instructed  the  jury  to  find 
on  special  issues,  it  will  be  presumed  on  review  that  one  of  the 
parties  to  the  'cause  requested  such  instructions,  in  the  absence 
of  a  showing  to  the  contrary.87 

§  361.  When  considered  in  absence  of  evidence. — As  a  general 
rule  the  assignment  of  errors  on  the  giving  or  refusing  of  in- 
structions will  not  be  considered  on  appeal  or  writ  of  error  unless 
the  record  contains  all  the  evidence  on  which  the  instructions 
complained  of  were  based.88  Or  at  least  all  the  evidence  on  the 
particular  question  to  which  the  instruction  relates  must  be  pre- 
served by  a  bill  of  exceptions.89  It  is  seldom  necessary,  how- 
ever, to  set  out  all  the  evidence  where  it  is  only  desirable  to 
question  the  decision  of  the  trial  court  in  its  rulings  as  to  the 
giving  or  refusing  of  instructions.90  Enough  of  the  facts  should 
be  preserved  to  show  the  materiality  and  legitimate  bearing  of 


se  Indiana,  D.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hendrain,  190  111.  504;  Riley  v.  Al- 
len, 154  Ind.  176,  56  N.  E.  240; 
Tusley  v.  White  (Ky.),  54  S.  W. 
169;  Sternberg  v.  Mailhos,  99  Fed. 
43;  Holt  v.  Roberts,  175  Mass.  558, 
56  N.  E.  702;  Smith  v.  Kennard,  54 
Neb.  523,  74  N.  W.  859;  Cherry  v. 
Cox,  1  Indian  Ter.  578,  45  S.  W.  122; 
Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Baker,  85 
Fed.  690;  Texas  Brew.  Co.  v.  Wal- 
ters (T<ex.  Cv.  App.),  43  "S.  W. 
548;  Little  v.  Town,  &c.  102  Wis. 
250.  78  N.  W.  416. 

ST  Belknap  v.  Grover  (Tex.  Cv. 
App.),  56  S.  W.  249.  Questions  of 
law  will  not  be  passed  upon  in  a 
court  of  review  unless  they  were 
submitted  to  the  jury  by  the  trial 
court  in  the  form  of  instructions 
and  preserved  in  the  record,  Gasch 
v.  Neihoff,  162  111.  395,  44  N.  E. 
731. 

ss  Geiser  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Krogman 
(Iowa),  82  N.  W.  938;  Jackson- 
ville St.  R.  v.  Walton,  42  Fla.  54, 
28  So.  59;  Griffith  v.  Potter,  65  N. 
Y.  S.  689;  Pierce  v.  Engelkemier, 
10  Okla.  308,  61  Pac.  1047.  See 
Wright  v.  Griffey,  146  111.  394,  397, 
34  N.  E.  941;  Berry  v.  Rood,  168 
Mo.  316,  67  S.  W.  644;  Felmat  v. 


Southern  Ex.  Co.  123  N.  Car.  499, 
31  S.  E.  722;  Advance  Thresher 
Co.  v.  Esteb.  41  Ore.  469,  69  Pac. 
447;  Eickhof  v.  Chicago  N.  S.  St. 
R.  Co.  77  111.  App.  196;  Yates  v. 
U.  S.  90  Fed.  57;  Hedrick  v.  Smith, 
77  Tex.  608,  14  S.  W.  197;  Phil- 
brick  v.  Town  of  University  Place, 
106  Iowa,  352,  76  N.  W.  742;  Mex- 
ican C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilder,  114  Fed. 
708;  Warbasse  v.  Card,  74  Iowa, 
306,  37  N.  W.  383;  Owens  v.  Calla- 
way,  42  Ala.  301;  Love  v.  Moyne- 
han,  16  111.  277;  Board  Com'rs  v. 
Boyd,  31  Kas.  765,  3  Pac.  523; 
Ward  v.  S.  52  Ind.  454;  Law  v.  Mer- 
rills, 6  Wend.  (N.  Y.),  268. 

89  Sherwin  v.  Rutland,  74  Vt.  1, 
51  Atl.  1089;  Lesser  Cotton  Co.  v. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  114  Fed. 
133;  Hill  v.  S.  43  Ala.  335;  Jones 
v.  Foley,  121  Ind.  180,  22  N.  E.  987; 
Phoenix  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Raddin, 
120  U.  S.  183,  7  Sup.  Ct.  500;  Wil- 
cox  v.  McCune,  21  Iowa,  294; 
Whitehead  &  A.  M.  Co.  v.  Ryder, 
139  Mass.  366,  31  N.  E.  736;  Horton 
v.  Cooley,  135  Mass.  589;  Blige  v. 
S.  20  Fla.  742. 

»o  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Keefe, 
154  111.  508,  513,  39  N.  E.  606;  Na- 
son  v.  Letz,  73  111.  371,  374. 


361  PRESUMPTIONS  IN  ABSENCE  OF  EVIDENCE.  §    362 

the  instructions,  otherwise  the  action  of  the  trial  court  in  giv- 
ing or  refusing  them  cannot .  be  reviewed  on  appeal  or  error.91 
The  action  of  the  trial  court  in  refusing  to  give  an  instruction 
cautioning  the  jury  as  to  improper  remarks  of  counsel  in  argu- 
ment, will  not  be  considered  on  review,  unless  the  objection- 
able remarks  are  preserved  in  the  record  by  bill  of  exceptions.92 
But  if  instructions  are  radically  wrong  under  any  state  of  facts 
and  direct  the  minds  of  the  jury  to  an  improper  basis  on  which 
to  place  a  verdict,  error  may  be  assigned  on  such  instructions 
though  the  evidence  is  not  preserved  in  the  record.93  And  error 
may  be  assigned  as  to  the  giving  or  refusing  of  instructions  with- 
out preserving  all  the  evidence  in  the  record  where  the  instruc- 
tions are  based  upon  incompetent  evidence.94  So,  if  the  plead- 
ings, irrespective  of  the  evidence,  render  the  instructions  errone- 
ous, error  may  be  assigned  as  to  the  giving  of  instructions  with- 
out preserving  all  the  evidence.95 

§  362.  Presumptions  in  absence  of  evidence. — And  if  the  evi- 
dence is  not  preserved  in  the  record  it  will  be  presumed  that  the 
instructions  given  were  applicable  to  the  facts  of  the  case.96  Thus, 
where  it  appears  from  the  bill  of  exceptions  that  an  instruc- 
tion was  refused  on  the  ground  that  it  was  inapplicable,  a  court 
of  review  will  not  further  inquire  into  the  propriety  of  the  rul- 
ing, unless  the  evidence  is  embodied  in  the  record  to  which  the 
instruction  is  claimed  to  apply.97 

si  Leavitte    v.    Randolph    County,  Nev.    424,    30   Pac.    1080;    Willis   v. 

85  111.  509;  Schmidt  v.  Chicago  &  N.  S.  27  Neb.  98,  42  N.  W.  920;   Tharp 

R.  Co.  83  111.  412;   Kelleher  v.  City  v.    S.   15   Ala.   749. 
of    Keokuk,    60    Iowa,    473,    15    N.          »*  Lane   v.   Miller,   17   Ind.    58. 
W.   280.  95  Pfeuffer     v.     Maltby,     54     Tex. 

92  Kipperly    v.    Ramsden,    83    111.  454;    Duggins    v.    Watson,    15    Ark. 
354.  118;    Mason  v.  McCampbell,  2  Ark. 

93  Downing  v.  S.   (Wyo.),  69  Pac.  506. 

264;    Murphy  v.   Johnson,   45   Iowa,  96  Yates  v.  United  States,  90  Fed. 

57;    Wenning    v.    Teeple,    144    Ind.  57;  Philbrick  v.  Town,  &c.  106  Iowa, 

189,    41    N.    E.    600;    Sigsbee    v.    S.  352,     76     N.     W.     742;     Deering    & 

(Fla.),   30   So.   816;    Wier  Plow   Co.  Co.    v.    Hannah,    93    Mo.    App.    618, 

v.    Walmsley,    110    Ind.    242,    11    N.  67    S.   W.    714;    Chestnut   v.    South- 

E.  232:  Baltimore  &  O.  &  C.  R.  Co.  era  I.  R.  Co.  157  Ind.  509,  62  N.  E. 

v.  Rowan,  104  Ind.  88,  3  N.  E.  627;  32;    Ball    v.    S.    (Iowa),    92    N.    W. 

Rapp  v.  Kester,  125  Ind.  82,  25  N.  691;   Shafer  v.  Stinson,  76  Ind.  374; 

E.   141;    Cincinnati,  H.  &  I.  R.   Co.  Blizzard    v.    Bross,    56    Ind.    74. 

v.    Clifford,   113   Ind.   460,   15   N.   E.  9-  Pittman    v.    Gaty,    10    111.    186, 

524;    S.  v.  Broadwell,  73  Iowa,  765,  190. 
35   N.   W.    691;    S.    v.    Loveless,    17 


§  363 


OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS. 


362 


§  363.  Error  caused  at  one's  own  request. — A  party  has  no 
right  to  complain  of  error  in  the  giving  of  an  instruction  when  a 
like  error  appears  in  an  instruction  given  at  his  own  request 
on  the  same  subject.98  But  this  rule  should  not  preclude  one 
from  objecting  to  an  erroneous  instruction  which  operates  against 
him,  merely  because  it  is  given  in  connection  with  one  he  may 
have  asked,  although  the  one  asked  by  him  may  also  be  illegal." 
So,  if  the  instruction  complained  of  by  a  party  states  a  rule  or 
principle  substantially  the  same  as  stated  in  an  instruction  given 
at  his  own  request,  he  cannot  assign  error  on  that  subject;100 
or  if  he  uses  a  particular  word  or  clause  in  the  same  sense  as  the 


os  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
rington, 192  111.  10,  25;  Consoli- 
dated Coal  Co.  v.  Haenni,  146  111. 
614,  620,  35  N.  E.  162;  Greene  v. 
Greene,  145  111.  264,  273,  33  N.  E. 
941;  Springer  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
135  111.  552,  560,  26  N.  E.  514;  Ochs 
v.  P.  124  111.  399,  425,  16  N.  E.  662; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Beebe,  174  111. 
13,  27,  50  N.  E.  1019;  Peirce  v. 
Walters,  164  111.  561,  45  N.  E.  1068; 
Chicago,  Burlington  &  Q.  R.  Co. 
v.  Murowski,  179  111.  77,  53  N.  E. 
572;  Egbers  v.  Egbers,  177  111.  82, 
89,  52  N.  E.  285;  Hacker  v.  Mun- 
roe  &  Son,  176  111.  384,  394,  52  N. 
E.  12;  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Al- 
len, 169  111.  287,  48  N.  E.  414;  Lake 
Shore  &  Mich.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
way,  169  111.  505,  48  N.  E.  483; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Sanders, 
154  111.  531,  39  N.  E.  481;  Swift  & 
Co.  v.  Rutkowski,  167  111.  156,  160, 
47  N.  E.  362;  Hafner  v.  Herron, 
165  Illi.  242,  251  46  N.  E.  211; 
Boecker  v.  City  of  Nuperville,  166 
111.  151,  48  N.  E.  1061;  Cicero  St. 
Car  Co.  v.  Meixner.  160  111.  320, 
328,  43  N.  E.  893;  Baltimore  &  O. 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Then,  159  111.  535,  42 
N.  E.  971;  Hill  v.  Bahrns,  158  111. 
304,  320,  41  N.  E.  912;  Funk  v. 
Babbitt,  156  111.  408,  41  N.  E.  166, 
41  N.  E.  166;  Judy  v.  Sterrett,  153 
111.  94,  101,  38  N.  E.  633;  City  of 
Beardstown  v.  Smith,  150  111.  169, 
175,  37  N.  E.  211;  Springfield  C  R. 
Co.  v.  Puntenney,  200  111.  12;  Am- 
erican Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Landfare.  56 


Neb.  482,  76  N.  W.  1068;  Hess  v. 
Preferred  M.  M.  A.  Asso.  112  Mich. 
196,  70  N.  W.  460;  McDonnell  v. 
Nicholson,  67  Mo.  App.  408;  Sib- 
ley  Warehouse  &  S.  Co.  v.  Durand 
&  K.  Co.  65  N.  E.  676;  S.  v.  Martin, 
166  Mo.  565,  66  S.  W.  534;  Bishop 
v.  P.  200  111.  37,  65  N.  E.  421;  Slack 
v.  Harris,  200  111.  115,  65  N.  E.  669; 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Buckley, 
200  111.  262,  65  N.  E.  708;  Jackson- 
ville St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilhite,  209 
111.  84,  87;  Collier  v.  Gavin,  (Neb.), 
95  N.  W.  842. 

99  Oneil  v.  Orr,  5  111.  (4  Scam.),  3. 

100  city  of  Beardstown  v.   Smith, 
150  111.  169,  175,  37  N.  E.  211;   Chi- 
cago &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  182  111. 
267,  54  N.  E.  979;   Louisville,  N.  A. 
&  C.  R.  v.  Shires,  108  111.  617,  631; 
Foster  v.   Pitts,   63   Ark.   387,  38  S. 
W.   1114;    International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Newman  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  40 
S.   W.    854;    Olferman   v.   Union   D. 
R.   Co.   125  Mo.   408,  28  S.  W.   742; 
Omaha    Fair    &    E.    Asso.    v.    Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.  42  Neb.  105,  60  N. 
W.    330;    International   &   G.   N.    R. 
Co.   v.   Sun,   11   Tex.   Cv.    App.    386, 
33   S.   W.   558;    Byrd   v.   Ellis    (Tex. 
Cv.  App.),  35  S.  W.  1070;  Needham 
v.  King,  95  Mich.  303,  54  N.  W.  891; 
Hazell   v.    Bank  of   Tipton,   95   Mo. 
60,  8  S.  W.  173;   Sibley  Warehouse 
Co.   v.   Durand   Co.   200   111.   357,   65 
N.  E.  676;   Illinois  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Wells,   200  111.   453,   65   N.   E.    1072; 
Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Patton,  203    111.   379,  67   N.   E.   804. 


363  ERROR  AT  ONE'S  OWN  REQUEST.  §  363 

other  party,  he  cannot  complain  of  error  in  that  respect.101  Thus, 
where  the  plaintiff  uses  the  words  "ordinary  care"  in  an  in- 
struction without  denning  that  expression  he  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  complain  of  error  that  the  defendant's  instructions 
contain  the  same  term  without  defining  it.102 

Where  a  question  is  submitted  to  the  jury  by  instruction  at 
the  special  request  of  both  parties  neither  will  be  heard  to 
complain  of  the  giving  of  instructions  on-  that  particular  ques- 
tion. A  party  cannot  ask  the  court  to  rule  upon  a  certain  branch 
of  the  case  and  then  be  heard  to  say  that  the  court  had  no  right 
to  thus  rule  at  all.103  So,  where  an  instruction  is  given  by  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  they  are  precluded  from  assigning  it  as  a 
cause  of  error  whether  it  states  a  correct  principle  of  law  or 
not.104  Or  if  both  parties  have  given  instructions  substantially 
on  the  same  theory,  neither  is  in  a  position  to  complain  of 
erroneously  instructing  the  jury  as  to  such  theory.105 

On  the  same  principle,  he  who  procures  an  erroneous  instruc- 
tion to  be  given  which  is  in  conflict  with  a  proper  one  given  at 
the  instance  of  his  opponent,  will  not  be  heard  to  complain  of 
error  in  the  giving  of  instructions.106  Thus,  where  a  party  by 
his  instructions  asks  to  have  a  material  question  submitted  to 
the  jury  he  will  not  be  permitted,  on  appeal,  to"  complain  that 

101  Eastman  v.  Curtis,  67  Vt.  432,  App.   32;    Dunnington  v.   Prick  Co. 
32  Atl.  232;    Keeler  v.  Herr,  54  111.  60    Ark.    250,    30    S.    W.    212.      See 
App.  468.  Hayden  v.   McCloskey,   161   111.   351. 

102  Quirk  v.   St.   Louis   N.  E.   Co.  43  N.  E.  1091;  Queen  City  Mfg.  Co. 
126  Mo.  279,  28  S.  W.  1080.  v.     Blalack     (Miss.),     18     So.     800; 

103  Illinois  Cent.   R.   Co.   v.   Lati-  Gould    v.    Magnolia    Metal    Co.    207 
mer,  128  111.  171,  21  N.  E.  7;  Greene  111.  178,  69  N.  E.  896.     A  party  can- 
v.  Greene,  145  111.  272,  33  N.  E.  941,  not    except    to    the    ruling    of    the 
69    N.    E.    925.      See    Spring   Valley  court   in    refusing   to   give    instruc- 
Coal    Co.    v.    Robizas,    207    111.    22;  tions   for   his    opponent,    Bailey   v. 
Gould    v.    Magnolia    Metal    Co.    207  Campbell,    2    111.    (1    Scam.),    46. 
111.    178,    69    N.    E.    896;    Jordan    v.          106  Christian  v.   Connecticut  Mut. 
Philadelphia,    125    Fed.    825;    Little  Life  Ins.  Co.  143  Mo.  460,  45  S.  W. 
Dorritt  Gold  Min.  Co.  v.  Arapahoe  268:   Conners  v.  Indiana,  I.  &  Q.  R. 
Gold  Min.  Co.  30  Colo.  431,  71  Pac.  Co.   193  111.  464,  473,  62   N.  E.  221; 
389;  Ward  v.  Bass,  (Indian  Ter.)  69  Chicago,    P.    &    St.    L.    R.    Co.    v. 
N.  W.  879;   Stoner  v.  Mau,   (Wyo.)  Leach,    152    111.    249,    38   N.    E.    556; 
73  Pac.  548;  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  Leslie  v.  S.  35  Fla.  171,  17  So.  555: 
v.    Johnson,    (Neb.)    95   N.   W.    614.  Sanders  v.  Brock    (Tex.   Cv.   App.), 

104  Emory  v.  Addis,  71  111.  275.  31  S.  W.  311;  Moore  v.  Graham,  29 

105  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris,  Tex.    Cv.    App.    235,    69    S.    W.    200. 
162  111.  200,  44  N.  E.  498;   Bracken  See    Blanchard    v.    Jones,    101    Ind. 
v.  Union  Pac.  R.   Co.  75  Fed.  347;  542. 

East  St.  L.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  54  111. 


364 


OBJECTIONS  AND  EXCEPTIONS. 


364 


the  evidence  was  not  sufficient  to  warrant  the  submission  of  such 
question  to  the  jury.107  So,  where  a  party,  against  objection, 
introduces  evidence  which  is  outside  of  the  issues  presented  by 
the  pleadings,  will  not  be  heard  to  complain  of  the  giving  of 
instructions  based  on  such  evidence.108  On  appeal  or  writ  of 
error  a  party  will  be  held  to  the  position  assumed  by  him  in 
the  trial  court  and  will  be  estopped  to  complain  in  the  court  of 
review,  of  an  erroneous  ruling  made  by  the  trial  court  as  to  the 
instructions  if  the  court  was  induced  to  make  such  ruling  by 
the  procurement  or  invitation  of  such  party.109 

§  364.  After  cause  is  remanded. — On  the  second  trial  of  a 
cause  after  it  has  been  remanded  for  a  new  trial,  for  the  reason 
that  the  trial  court  erred  in  refusing  instructions,  the  refusal 
of  the  same  instructions  on  the  second  trial  is  error  where  the 
evidence  was  substantially  the  same  as  on  the  former  trial.110 
After  a  case  has  been  remanded  for  a  new  trial,  the  giving  of  an 
instruction  which  embodies  the  language  of  the  court  of  review, 
stating  that  the  Supreme  Court  is  authority  for  such  instruc- 
tion, is  improper.111 


107  Boyer  v.  Soules,  105  Mich.  31, 
62  N.  W.  1000.  •  See  Light  v.  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  93  Iowa. 
83,  61  N.  W.  380;  Means  v.  Grid- 
ley,  164  Pa.  St.  387,  30  Atl.  390; 
Hahn  v.  Miller,  60  Iowa,  96,  14  N. 
W.  119;  Spears  v.  Town  of  Mt. 
Ayr,  66  Iowa,  721,  24  N.  W.  504. 

IDS  Bowen  v.  Carolina,  C.  G.  & 
C.  R.  Co.  34  S.  Car.  217,  13  S.  E. 
421. 


109  North  Chicago  Blec.  R.  Co.  v. 
Peuser,  190  111.  67,  72.  See  Mat- 
thews v.  Granger,  196  111.  164,  63 
N.  E.  658;  Iron  M.  Bank  v.  Arm- 
strong, 92  Mo.  265,  4  S.  "W.  720. 

no  Watkins  v.  Moore,  196  Pa.  St. 
469,  46  Atl.  482.  See  English  v. 
Yore,  123  Mich.  701,  82  N.  W.  659. 

in  Board  of  Comrs.  v.  Vicker,  62 
Kas.  25,  61  Pac.  391. 


FORMS 

CHAPTER  XXVII. 

WITNESSES   IN   CIVIL  OR  CRIMINAL  CASES. 

Sec.  Sec. 

365.  Jury  judges  of  credibility  of      369.    Party  witness  in  his  own  be- 

witnesses.  half. 

366.  Jury   weigh   the   testimony.  370.     Husband   a  witness  for  wife. 

367.  Impeachment   of   witnesses.  371.    Positive    and    negative    testi- 

368.  Witness      testifying     wilfully  mony. 

falsely. 

Forms  of  Instructions — Generally. — When  a  party  prepares  in- 
structions to  be  given  by  the  court,  he  should  provide  them  with 
a  title,  as  in  a  pleading,  with  the  name  of  the  court  and  with 
the  names  of  the  parties.  Then  should  follow  a  request,  ad- 
dressed to  the  court,  that  the  instructions  submitted,  be  given; 
as  follows: 

State  of  Indiana,         £  jln  the  Marion  Circuit  Court, 

County  of  Marion.^  ^     September  Term,   1903. 

John  Doe        ] 

> 

Richard   Roe.J 

The  defendant  in  the  above  entitled  cause,  at  the  conclusion 
of  the  evidence  and  before  the  beginning  of  the  argument,  here- 
by requests  the  court:  (to  instruct  the  jury  in  writing  and)1 
to  give  to  the  jury  each  of  the  following  instructions  numbered 
from  one  to  five,  inclusive,  to  wit,  etc. 

Each  series  of  instructions,  or  if  it  seems  necessary  to  make 

i  This  clause  may  be  omitted  if  written   instructions  are  not  desired. 

365 


§    365  WITNESSES   IN   CIVIL  OR   CRIMINAL  CASES.  366 

the  sense  complete,  each  instruction,  that  is  modelled  upon  the 
forms  outlined  in  the  following  pages,  should  be  commenced  by 
the  following  statement:  "The  court  instructs  the  jury,"  or 
"You  are  hereby  instructed  that,"  or  "The  jury  is  hereby  in- 
structed that,"  or  the  like." 

§  365.  Jury  judges  of  credibility  of  witnesses. — (1)  The  law 
makes  you  the  exclusive  judges  of  the  weight  of  the  testimony  and 
the  credibility  of  the  witnesses.  You  are  sworn  to  find  what 
are  the  true  facts  from  the  testimony  before  you  without  being 
influenced  in  the  least  by  any  feeling  of  sympathy  or  prejudice, 
giving  such  weight  and  credit  to  the  testimony  of  the  different 
witnesses,  as  you  may  believe  the  same  entitled  to;  but  after 
you  have  so  found  the  facts,  then,  in  determining  what  your 
verdict  will  be  upon  these  facts,  you  have  sworn  to  be  governed 
by  the  law  as  set  forth  in  this  charge.2 

(2)  You  are  the  judges  of  the  evidence  and  credibility  of  the 
witnesses.    It  is  your  duty  to  reconcile  all  the  statements  of  the 
several  witnesses  so  as  to  believe  all  the  testimony  if  you  can. 
But  if  you  cannot  do  so  on  account  of  contradictions,  then  you 
have  the  right  to  believe  the  witnesses  whom  you  deem  most 
worthy  of  credit,  and  disbelieve  those  least  worthy  of  credit. 
And  in  weighing  the  testimony  it   is  proper  for  you  to   take 
into  consideration  all  the  surrounding  circumstances  of  the  wit- 
nesses, their  interest  in  the  result  of  the  action,  if  any,  and  their 
opportunity  of  knowing  the  truth  of  the  matter  about  which 
they  testify,  and  from  a  preponderance  of  all  the  evidence  thus 
considered,  you  will  determine  the  rights  of  the  parties  to  this 
action  and  find  a  verdict  accordingly.3 

(3)  You  are  the  exclusive  judges  of  the  weight  of  the  evidence 
before  you,  and  of  the  credit  to  be  given  to  the  witnesses  who 
have  testified  in  the  case.     If  there  is  any  conflict  in  the  testi- 
mony you  must  reconcile  it  if  you  can.    If  you  cannot,  you  may 
believe  or  disbelieve  any  witness  or  witnesses  as  you  may  or 
may  not  think  them   entitled  to   credit.     In  civil  cases  juries 
are  authorized  to  decide  according  as  they  may  think  the  evi- 
dence preponderates  in  favor  of  one  side  or  another.4 

2  Smith  v.  Merchants  and  Print-          3  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker, 
ers'    Nat.    Bank    (Tex.    Cv.    App.),      94  Ind.  95. 

40  S.  W.  1038.  *  Liverpool   &   L.    G.    Ins.   Co.   v. 

Ende,  65  Tex.  124. 


367  JURY    JUDGES   OF    CREDIBILITY   OF    WITNESSES.  §•  365 

(4)  You  are  the  judges  of  the  credibility  of  each  and  every  wit- 
ness, and  you  should  give  the  testimony  of  each  and  every  wit- 
ness such  weight  as,  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in 
proof  before  you  in  this  case,  you  shall  deem  the  same  entitled 
to;  it  is  your  duty,  if  you  can,  to  reconcile  the  testimony  of 
the  witnesses,  if  there  be  any  disagreement  between  them;  but, 
if  you  cannot,  then  you  must  determine,  from  all  the  evidence 
before  you,  which  of  the  witnesses  is  entitled   to  the   greater 
credit.5 

(5)  The  credibility  of  the  witnesses  is  a  question  exclusively  for 
the  jury;  and  the  law  is  that  where  a  number  of  witnesses  tes- 
tify directly  opposite  to  each  other  or  one   another,   the  jury 
are  not  bound  to  regard  the  weight  of  the  evidence  as  evenly 
balanced  merely  because   of  numbers.     The  jury  have  a  right 
to  determine  from  the  appearance  of  the  witnesses  on  the  stand, 
their  manner  of  testifying,  their  apparent  candor  and  fairness, 
their  apparent  intelligence  or  lack  of  intelligence,  and  from  all 
the    other   surrounding    circumstances    appearing    on   the    trial, 
which  witnesses  are  the  more  worthy  of  credit,  and  to  give  them 
credit  accordingly.6 

(6)  The  credibility  of  the  witnesses  is  a  question  exclusively  for 
the  jury.     You  have  the  right  to  determine  from  the  appear- 
ance of  the  witness  on  the  stand,  his  manner  of  testifying  and 
his  apparent  candor  and  fairness,  interest  or  lack  of  interest 
in  the  case,  if  any  should  appear,  his  bias  or  prejudice,  if  any 
should  appear  from  all  the  surrounding  circumstances,  if  any 
appear  on  the  trial,  which  witnesses  are  more  worthy  of  credit, 
and  give  credit  accordingly.7 

(7)  You  are  the  sole  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses, 
of  the  weight  of  the  evidence,  and  of  the  facts.    It  is  your  right 
to  determine  from  the  appearance  of  the  witnesses  on  the  stand, 
their  manner  of  testifying,  their  apparent  candor  or  frankness 
or  the  lack  thereof,  their  apparent  intelligence  or  want  of  in- 
telligence, which  of  the  witnesses  are  more  worthy   of  credit. 

5  Albright  v.  Brown,  23  Neb.  141,  ?  Citizens'  Gas  &  Oil  M.  Co.  v. 

36  N.  W.  297.  Whipple,  (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  560;  Ho- 

e  North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wallner,  gan  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.  150  Mo.  45, 

206  111.  276,  69  N.  E.  6.  51  S.  W.  473. 


§    366  WITNESSES   IN    CIVIL   OR   CRIMINAL   CASES.  368 

and  to  give  weight  accordingly.  In  determining  the  weight  to 
be  given  to  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  you  are  authorized 
to  consider  their  relationship  to  the  parties,  if  any  is  shown, 
their  interest,  if  any,  in  the  result  of  this  suit,  their  temper, 
feeling  or  bias,  if  any  has  been  shown,  their  demeanor  on  the 
stand,  their  means  of  information  and  the  reasonableness  of 
the  story  told  by  them,  and  to  give  weight  accordingly.8 

(8)  You  are  the  exclusive  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  wit- 
nesses, and  it  is  your  duty  to  reconcile  any  conflict  that  may 
appear  in  the  testimony  as  far  as  may  be  in  your  power,  upon 
the  theory  that  each  witness  has  sworn  to  the  truth;  when  this 
cannot  be  done,  you  may  consider  the  conduct  of  the  witnesses 
upon  the  witness  stand ;  the  nature  of  the  testimony  given  by 
them ;  to  what  extent,  if  any,  they  are  corroborated  or  con- 
tradicted by  other  testimony ;  their  interest,  if  any,  in  the  cause ; 
their  relation  to  the  parties,  and  such  other  facts  appearing  in 
the  evidence  as  will,  in  your  judgment,  aid  you  in  determining 
whom  you  will  or  will  not  believe;  and  you  may  also,  in  con- 
sidering whom  you  will  or  will  not  believe,  take  into  account 
your  experience  and  relations  among  men.9 

§366.  Jury  weigh  the  testimony. — (1)  In  judging  of  the 
weight  and  importance  to  be  given  to  the  testimony  of  any  of  the 
witnesses  who  have  testified,  you  should  take  into  account  their 
means  of  knowledge  of  the  facts  of  which  they  speak,  and 
you  have  a  right  to  judge  from  your  own  common  observation 
of  the  ability  of  persons  to  judge  of  given  facts  from  given 
opportunities,  and  you  are  not  obliged  to  accept  as  true  the 
testimony  of  any  witness  or  witnesses,  if  in  your  opinion,  judg- 
ing from  such  common  observation,  they  are  or  may  be  mis- 
taken concerning  the  facts  of  which  they  speak.10 

(2)  In  determining  the  weight  to  be  given  to  the  testimony  of 
the  different  witnesses,  you  should  take  into  account  the  in- 
terest or  want  of  interest,  if  any,  they  have  in  the  case,  their 
manner  on  the  witness  stand,  the  probability  or  improbability 

s  S.   v.   Morgan,    (Utah) ,   74   Pac.  Pf aff enback  v.  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R. 

528;    Miller    v.    S.    (Miss.),    35    So.  Co.  142  In-d.  249,  41  N.  E.  530. 

690.  10  Bressler  v.  P.  117  111.  422,  443, 

»  Jenny    Elec.    Co.    v.    Branham,  8  N.  E.  62. 
145    Ind.    322,    41    N.    E.    448.      See 


369  JURY    WEIGH    THE    TESTIMONY.  §    366 

of  their  testimony  with  all  the  other  facts  and  circumstances 
before  you,  which  can  aid  you  in  weighing  their  testimony.11 

(3)  In  determining  the  weight  to  be  given  to  the  testimony  of  a 
witness,  you  will  take  into  consideration  the  intelligence  of  the 
witness,  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  witness  at  the  time 
concerning  which  he  testifies;  his  interest,  if  any,  in  the  event 
of  the  suit;  his  bias  or  prejudice,  if  any;  his  manner  on  the 
witness  stand;  his   apparent  fairness  or  want   of  fairness,  the 
reasonableness  or  unreasonableness  of  his  testimony ;  his  knowl- 
edge and  means  of  observation,  the  character  of  his  testimony — 
whether  negative  or  affirmative — and  all  matters  and  facts  and 
circumstances  shown  in  evidence  on  the  trial  bearing  upon  the 
question  of  the  weight  to  be  given  to  his  testimony,  and  give 
each  witness'  testimony  such  weight  as  to  you  it  may  seem 
fairly  entitled  to.12 

(4)  You  are  to  take  into  account,  in  weighing  the  testimony  of 
any  witness,  his  interest  or  want  of  interest  in  the  result  of 
the  case,  his  appearance  upon  the  witness  stand,  his  manner  of 
testifying,  his  apparent  candor  or  want  of  candor,  whether  he 
is  supported  or  contradicted  by  the  facts  and  circumstances  in 
the  case  as  shown  by  the  evidence.     You  have  a  right  to  be- 
lieve all  the  testimony  of  a  witness  or  believe  it  in  part  and  dis- 
believe it  in  part,  or  you  may  reject  it  altogether  as  you  may 
find  the  evidence  to  be.    You  are  to  believe  as  jurors  what  you 
would  believe  as  men,  and  there  is  no  rule  of  law  which  requires 
you  to  believe  as  jurors  what  you  would  not  believe  as  men.13 

(5)  While  the  jury  are  the  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  wit- 
nesses,  they  have  no   right  to   disregard  the   testimony   of   an 
unirflpeached  witness,  sworn  on  behalf  of  the  defendant,  simply 
because   such  witness   was   an   employe   of  the    defendant,   but 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  receive  the  testimony  of  such  wit- 
ness in  the  light  of  all  the  evidence,  the  same  as  they  would 
receive  the  testimony  of  any  other  witness,   and  to   determine 
the    credibility    of   such   employe   by  the  same  rules  and  tests 

11  Deal  v.  S.  140  Ind.  354,  39  N.      sht.ll,  or  will,  take  certain  matters 
E.  930.  into  consideration:   Fifer  v.  Rifcter, 

12  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Pol-       159  Ind.   8,  64  N.  E.  463. 

lock,     195     111.     162,   62   N.   E.    831.          is  Dodge  v  Reynolds,    (Mich.),  98 
Instructions    that    the    jury    must,      N.  W.  738. 


§    366  JURY    JUDGES    OF    CREDIBILITY    OF    WITNESSES.  370 

by  which  they  would  determine  the  credibility   of   any   other 
witness.14 

(6)  The  jury,  in  determining  whether  witnesses  should  be  be- 
lieved or  not,  are  not  bound  by  the  opinions  of  other  witnesses,  but 
have  a  right  to  consider  all  the  testimony  in  the  case,  the  mo- 
tives and  interest  of  the  witness,  the  nature  of  his  testimony 
and  all  the  facts  in  evidence  throwing  any  light  upon  the  point.15 

(7)  The  jury  are  the  sole  judges  of  the  facts  of  this  case  a^nd  of 
the  credit,  if  any,  to  be  given  to  the  respective  witnesses  who 
have  testified ;  and  in  passing  upon  the  credibiity  of  the  wit- 
nesses, the  jury  have  a  right  to  take  into  consideration,  not  only 
their  testimony  itself,  but  also  their  conduct,  demeanor  or  bear- 
ing while  testifying  on  the  witness  stand,   their   objects,   pur- 
poses or  designs,  if  any  have  been  shown  by  the  evidence  in  so 
testifying,    their   feelings    of   prejudice    against   the    defendant, 
if  any  have  been  shown,  and  their  means  of  knowing  the  facts 
and  circumstances  in  evidence,   if  any,  tending  to   expose  the 
feelings  or  purposes  of  such  witnesses.16 

(8)  In  judging  of  the  weight  and  importance  to  be  given  to  the 
testimony  of  any  witness  who  has  testified,  you  have  a  right 
to  judge  from  your  own  common  observation  of  the  ability  of 
persons  to  judge  of  a  state  of  facts  from  given  opportunities; 
and  you  should  take  into  consideration  the  circumstances  sur- 
rounding the  witness  at  the  time  concerning  which  he  has  tes- 
tified,  the   character  of  his   testimony,   whether   affirmative   or 
negative,  the  probability  or  improbability  of  his  testimony,  to- 
gether with  all  the  other  facts  and  circumstances  proved,  if  any 
have  been  proved. 

You  are  not  obliged  to  accept  as  true  the  testimony  of  any 
witness  merely  because  he  has  testified  positively  to  a  fact  or 
state  of  facts,  if  in  your  opinion,  judging  from  your  own  com- 
mon observation,  he  is  or  may  be  mistaken  concerning  the  mat- 
ters and  things  about  which  he  has  testified.  You  have  the 
right  to  believe  all  the  testimony  of  a  witness  or  believe  it  in 

"  Cicero  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Rollins,  "  Bressler  v.  P.  117  111.  441,  8 
195  111.  219,  63  N.  'E.  98.  N.  E.  62. 

is  Brown    v.    S.   75   Miss.    842,   23 
So.   422. 


371  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    367 

part  and  disbelieve  it  in  part,  or  you  may  reject  it  altogether 
as  you  may  find  the  evidence  to  be  when  considered  as  a  whole.17 
(9)  While  you  are  the  sole  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  wit- 
nesses who  have  testified,  you  have  no  right  to  arbitrarily  dis- 
regard an  unimpeached  witness  simply  because  he  is  or  has 
been  an  employe  of  the  defendant,  but  you  should  receive  the 
testimony  of  such  witness  in  the  light  of  all  the  evidence,  the 
same  as  you  would  receive  the  testimony  of  any  other  witness, 
and  determine  his  or  her  credibility  by  the  same  rules  and 
tests  by  which  you  determine  the  credibility  of  any  other  wit- 
ness. In  determining  whether  a  witness  should  or  should  not  be 
believed,  you  have  a  right  to  consider  his  motives,  objects,  pur- 
poses or  designs,  if  any  have  been  shown  by  the  evidence  before 
you.  Whether  the  testimony  of  a  witness  is  or  is  not  worthy  of 
belief  must  be  determined  by  you,  not  only  from  his  own  testi- 
mony alone,  but  from  all  the  other  credible  evidence  and  facts 
and  circumstances  established  by  the  evidence  in  the  case.18 

§367.  Impeachment  of  witnesses. —  (1)  The  credit  of  a  witness 
may  be  impeached  by  showing  that  he  has  made  statements 
out  of  court  contrary  to  and  inconsistent  with  what  he  has 
testified  on  the  trial  concerning  matters  material  and  relevant 
to  the  issues,  and  when  such  witness  has  been  thus  impeached 
about  matters  material  and  relevant  to  the  issue,  you  have  the 
right  to  reject  all  the  testimony  of  such  witness  except  in  so 
far  as  the  testimony  of  such  witness  has  been  corroborated 
by  other  credible  evidence.19 

(2)  If  a  witness  is  successfully  impeached,  you  will  disregard 
his  testimony,  unless  he  is  corroborated  by  other  unimpeached 
testimony  or  circumstances  in  the  case.20 

(3)  You  are  at  liberty  to  disregard  the  statements  of  any  wit- 
ness or  witnesses,  if.  any  there  be,  who  have  been  successfully  im- 

IT  Bressler  v.  P.  117  111.  443,  8  N.  v.  S.  75  Miss.  842,  23  So.  422;   Mc- 

B.  62;    Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Go.  v.  Mahon  v.  P.   120  111.   584,  11  N.  E. 

Pollock    195  111.  162,  62  N.  B.  831;  883;    Illinois  C.  R.   Co.  v.  Haskins, 

Dodge  v.    Reynolds    (Mich.),   98   N.  115   111.    308,   2    N.   E.   654. 

W.    738;    Deal   v.    S.   140   Ind.    354,  ™  White  v.  New  York,  C.  &  S.  L. 

39  N.  E.  930;   Strong  v.  S.  63  Neb.  R.   Co.   142   Ind.   654,  42   N.   E.   456. 

440,  88  N.  W.  772.  See    Craig    v.    Rohrer,    63    111.    325. 

is  Cicero    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Rollins,  20  Holston  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  116 

195   111.   219,   63   N.   E.   98;    Bressler  Ga.  656,  43  S.  E.  29. 
v.  P.  117  111.  441,  8  N.  E.  62;  Brown 


§    367  JURY    JUDGES    OF    CREDIBILITY    OF    WITNESSES.  372 

peached,  either  by  direct  contradiction  or  by  proof  of  general  bad 
character,  unless  the  statements  of  such  witnesses  have  been  cor- 
roborated by  other  credible  evidence.-1 

(4)  While  the  law  permits  the  impeachment  of  a  witness  by 
proving  his  general  reputation  for  truth  and  veracity  in  the  neigh- 
borhood where  he  resides  to  be  bad,  yet  if  you  believe  that  the 
plaintiff,  while  on  the  stand,  gave  a  truthful,  candid  and  honest 
statement  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  surrounding  the  trans- 
action in  question,  then  you  should  not  disregard  his  testimony, 
but  you  should  give  it  such  faith  and  credit  as  in  your  opinion 
it  is  entitled  to.22 

(5)  Where  evidence  is  given  tending  to  contradict  the  sworn 
statement  of  a  witness,  that  does  not,  of  itself,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
take  out  of  the  case  the  testimony  of  the  witness,  but  it  goes 
to  you  for  what  you  may  deem  it  worth,  as  affecting  the  value 
of  the  sworn  statements  of  the  witness  before  you;  and  it  is 
for  you  to  determine,  when  all  these  statements  are  taken  to- 
gether, how  much  importance  you  will  attach  to  the  testimony 
of  the  witness.23 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  any  witness  be- 
fore testifying  in  this  case  made  any  statements  out  of  court 
concerning   any   of   the   material   matters,    materially    different 
and  at  variance  with  what  he  or  she  has  stated  on  the  witness 
stand,  then  the  jury  are  instructed  by  the  court  that  these  facts 
tend  to  impeach  either  the  recollection  or  the  truthfulness  of 
the  witness,   and  the  jury  should   consider  such  facts  in   esti- 
mating the  weight  which  ought  to  be  given  to  his  or  her  tes- 
timony;  and   if  the   jury   believe   from   the   evidence   that   the 
moral  character  of  any  witness  or  witnesses  has  been  success- 
fully  impeached   on  this   trial,   then   that   fact   should    also   be 
taken  into  consideration  in  estimating  the  weight  which  ought 
to   be   given  to   the   testimony   of  such  witness   or   witnesses.24 

(7)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence,  written  or  oral,  or  both, 

21  Miller   v.    P.    39   111.    463.     See      (while  this  instruction  is  not  artis- 
Crabtree    v.     Hagenbaugh,     25    111.      tically    drawn,    it   states   a   correct 
219;   Bowers  v.  P.  74  111.  419.     See      rule  of  law). 

Instructions  2,  5  and  13,  in  this  sec-  23  s.  v.  Birchard,  36  Ore.  484,  59 

tion;   also,  Fifer  v.  Bitter,  159  Ind.  Pac.  468. 

8,  64  N.  E.  463.  24  Smith    v.    S.    142    Ind.    289,    41 

22  Roy    v.     Goings,     112     111.    566  N.  E.  595. 


373  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    367 

that  any  witness  in  the  case  is  discredited  or  impeached  as  to 
his  testimony  on  any  one  material  fact,  then  the  jury  may,  in 
their  discretion,  regard  the  testimony  of  such  witness  who  is 
not  corroborated  or  supported,  as  discredited  or  impeached  as 
to  other  statements  he  has  made  in  his  testimony.25 

(8)  You  are  instructed  that  while  you  are  the  sole  judges  of  the 
credibility  of  the  witness,  you  have  no  right  to  disregard  the  tes- 
timony of  an  unimpeached  witness  simply  because  such  witness 
is  or  was  an  employe  of  the  defendant.26 

(9)  A  witness  may  be  impeached  by  proof  of  contradictory 
statements,  and  if  you  believe  that  any  witness  has  been  success- 
fully impeached,  then  it   would   be  your  duty   to   discard   the 
testimony  of  such  witness ;  but  it  is  for  you  to  say  whether  or 
not  you  will  believe  the  witness   sought  to  be   impeached,   or 
the  witness  brought  to  impeach  him,  the  credibility  of  all  the 
witnesses  being  for  you  and  your  consideration.     If  you  believe 
that  any  witness  has  been  successfully  impeached  by  showing 
contradictory   statements   on   some   material   issue   in   the    case, 
then  you  would  not .  be  authorized  to  believe  him,  unless  you 
find  from  the  evidence  that  he  has  been  corroborated.     He  may 
be  corroborated,  or  he  may  be  sustained  by  proof  of  good  char- 
acter, or  by  other  facts  and  circumstances  in  the  case.27 

(10)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  any  witness  who  has 
testified  is  a  person  of  bad  moral  character,  you  should  consider 
that  fact  in  determining  what  weight,  if  any,  you  will  give  to  his 
testimony.28 

(11)  Some  evidence  has  been  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  im- 
peaching the  testimony  of  certain  witnesses  by   attempting  to 
show  that  they  have  made  statements  out  of  court  in  conflict 
with  their  testimony  in  this  case.     Witnesses  may  be  impeached 
in  this  manner,  but  whether  a  witness  has  been  impeached  in 
this  manner,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent,  are  questions  of  which 
you  are  the  exclusive  judges.29 

(12)  The  reputation  of  a  person  for  truth  is  made  by  what  his 

25  Dye  v.  Scott,  35  Ohio  St.  194.      E.  309;  2  Thompson  Tr.  §  2426.  See 

26  Illinois   C.   R.   Co.   v.   Haskins,      also,  Smith  v.  S.  142  Ind.  289,  41  N. 
115  111.  308,  2  N.  E.  654;  McMahon  v.       E.  595. 

P.  120  111.  584,  11  N.  E.  883;   Rock-  28  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Crancher, 

ford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Coul-  132  Ind.  277,  31  N.  E.  941. 

tas,  67  111.  403.  29  Treschman    v.    Treschmani,    28 

27  Powell   v.    S.    101   Ga.    9,   29    S.  Ind.  App.  206,  218,  61  N.  E.  961. 


§    367  JURY    JUDGES   OF    CREDIBILITY    OF    WITNESSES.  374 

neighbors  generally  say  of  him  in  that  respect.  If  they  generally 
say  he  is  untruthful,  that  makes  his  general  reputation  for  truth 
bad.  On  the  other  hand,  if  one's  neighbors  say  nothing  whatever 
about  him  as  to  his  truthfulness,  that  fact  of  itself  is  evidence 
that  his  general  reputation  for  truth  is  good.30 

(13)  You  should  consider  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  and  while 
it  is  your  duty  to  reconcile,  if  possible,  the  testimony  of  all  the 
witnesses  in  the  case,  you  are  not  bound  to  believe  anything  to 
be  a  fact  because  a  witness  has  stated  it  to  be  so,  provided  the 
testimony  of  such  witness  is  uncorroborated,  and  you  believe  from 
all  the  evidence  that  such  witness  is  mistaken  or  has  intentionally 
misstated  the  facts.31 

(14)  The  credit  of  a  witness  may  be  impeached  by  showing  that 
he  or  she  has  made  statements  out  of  court  contradictory  to  and 
inconsistent  with  his  or  her  testimony  on  the  trial,  concerning 
matters  material  and  relevant  to  the  issue,  or  by  proof  of  gen- 
eral bad  character  of  such  witness.     And  when  a  witness  has 
been  successfully  impeached  by   either   of  these  modes   of  im- 
peachment, the  jury  are  at  liberty  to  disregard  the  entire  tes- 
timony of  such  witness,  unless  his  or  her  testimony  has  been 
corroborated  by  other  credible  evidence.     But  the  jury  are  not 
bound  to  disregard  the  testimony  of  a  witness  thus  impeached. 
If  the  jury  believe  that  the  witness  while  on  the  stand  gave  a 
truthful,  candid  and  honest  statement  of  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances surrounding  the  transaction  in  question,  then  they  should 
not  disregard  his  or  her  testimony,   notwithstanding  such  im- 
peachment,  but   should   give   it  such   weight   and   credit   as   in 
their  opinion  from  all  the  evidence  before  them  it  is  entitled 
to.     So  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  any  witness 
who  has  testified  in  this  case,  made  any  statements  out  of  court 
concerning  any  of  the  material  matters  materially  different  and  ' 
at  variance  with  what  he  or  she  has  stated  on  the  witness  stand, 
then  the  jury  are  instructed  that  such  facts  tend  to  impeach 
the  truthfulness  of  the  witness,  and  the  jury  should  consider 

so  Treschmajn  v.  Treschman,  28  N.  W.  772.  This  instruction  is  not 

Ind.  App.  206,  61  N.  E.  961;  Davis  v.  objectionable;  it  merely  states  that 

Foster,  68  Ind.  238;  Conrad  v.  S.  the  false  testimony,  whether  given 

132  Ind.  259,  31  N.  E.  805,  (held  not  corruptly  or  through  mistake, 

invading  the  province  of  the  jury),  should  not  influence  the  decision. 

si  Strong    v.    S.    63    Neb.    440,    88 


375  WITNESS   TESTIFYING  FALSELY.  §    368 

such  facts  in  estimating  the  weight  which  ought  to  be  given  to 
his  or  her  testimony;  and  if  the  jury  believe  that  the  moral 
character  of  any  witness  has  been  successfully  impeached  on 
this  trial,  then  that  fact  should  also  be  taken  into  consideration 
in  estimating  the  weight  which  ought  to  be  given  to  the  tes- 
timony of  any  such  witness.32 

§  368.  Witness  testifying  wilfully  falsely.— (1)  The  jury  are 
the  judges  of  the  credit  that  ought  to  be  given  to  the  testimony 
of  the  different  witnesses,  and  that  they  are  not  bound  to  be- 
lieve anything  to  be  a  fact  merely  because  a  witness  has  stated 
it  to  be  so,  provided  the  jury  believe,  from  all  the  evidence, 
that  such  witness  is  mistaken  about  such  fact,  or  that  he  has 
knowingly  testified  falsely  to  the  same.33 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  any  witness  has  wil- 
fully testified  falsely  to  any  material  fact  in  the  case,  you  are  at 
liberty  to  disregard  the  entire  testimony  of  such  witness,  except 
in  so  far  as  it  may  be  corroborated  by  the  testimony  of  other  cred- 
ible witnesses  or  supported  by  other  credible  evidence  in  the  case.3* 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
that  any  witness  has  wilfully  and  knowingly  testified  falsely  to 
any  material  fact  in  issue,  then  you  have  a  right  to  disregard  his 
entire  testimony,  except  wherein  it  is  corroborated  by  other  cred- 
ible evidence  in  the  case.35 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  any  witness  has  here- 
tofore, or  on  his  trial,  sworn  falsely  to  any  material  fact  in  the 
case,   you  may  disregard  the  testimony   of  such  witness   alto- 
gether.36 

(5)  The  jury  are  the  sole  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  several 
witnesses  that  have  appeared  before  them,  and  of  the  weight 
or  importance  to  be  given  to  their  respective  statements  or  tes- 
timony; and  if  they  believe  from  all  that  they  have  seen   or 

3*2  Smith    v.    S.    142    Ind.    289,    41  E.  941;  Holston  v.  Southern'  R.  Co. 

N.  E.   595;    White  v.  New  York  C.  116  Ga.  656,  43  S    E.  29. 

&  S.  R.  Co.  142  Ind.  654,  42  N.  E.  33  Taylor  v.   Felsing,  164  111.   331, 

456;  Miller  v.  P.  39  111.  463;  Hoy  v.  332,  45  N.   E.   161. 

Goings,  112  111.  566;  S.  v.  Birchard,  34  Trimble  v.  Ter.  (Ariz.),  71  Pac. 

35    Ore.    484,    59   Pac.    468;    Dye    v.  932. 

Scott,  36  Ohio  St.  194;  Powell  v.  S.  ss  Waters    v.    P     172    111.    372,    50 

101  Ga.  9,  29  S.  E.  309;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  N.  E.  148. 

Co.  v.  Grancher,  132  Ind.  277,  31  N.  36  Owens   v.    S.    80   Miss.  "  499,    32 

So.  153. 


§    368  JURY    JUDGES    OF    CREDIBILITY   OF    WITNESSES.  376 

heard  at  the  trial  that  any  witness  has  wilfully  sworn  falsely 
to  any  of  the  facts  mentioned  in  the  instructions  herein,  as  bear- 
ing on  the  plaintiff's  alleged  claim  or  defendant's  alleged  de- 
fense thereto,  then  they  are  at  liberty  to  disregard  entirely  the 
testimony  of  said  witness.37 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  any  witness  has 
wilfully  and  corruptly  testified  falsely  concerning  any  material 
matter  in  dispute,  they  may  disregard  the  whole  or  any  portion  of 
the  testimony  of  such  witness;  there  is  no  inflexible  rule  inter- 
posed between  the  witnesses  and  the  jury  requiring  the  jury  to 
accept  or  reject  all  the  testimony  of  any  witness.38 

(7)  You  are  the  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  different  wit- 
nesses and  the  weight  to  be  attached  to  the  testimony  of  each 
of  them,  and  you  are  not  bound  to  take  the  testimony  of  any 
witnesses  as  absolutely  true,  and  you  should  not  do  so  if  you  are 
satisfied  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  proved  on  the  trial 
that  such  witness  is  mistaken  in  the  matters  testified  to  by  him, 
or  that  he  has  knowingly  testified  falsely  to  any  matter  ma- 
terial to  the  issue,  or  that  for  any  other  reason  his  testimony 
is  untrue  or  unreliable.39 

(8)  You  are  the  judges  of  the  credibility  of  the  different  wit- 
nesses and  the  weight  to  be  attached  to  the  testimony  of  each  of 
them,  and  you  are  not  bound  to  take  the  testimony  of  any  witness 
as  absolutely  true,  and  you  should  not  do  so  if  you  are  satisfied 
from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  proven  on  the  trial  that  such 
witness  is  mistaken  in  the  matters  testified  to  by  him  or  her,  or 
that  he  or  she  has  knowingly  and  intentionally  testified  falsely  to 
any  matter  material  to  the  issues,  or  that  for  any  other  reason  his 
or  her  testimony  is  untrue  or  unreliable.    You  are  at  liberty  to 
disregard  the  entire  testimony  of  any  such  witness,  except  in  so 
far  as  his  or  her  testimony  may  be  corroborated  by  the  testimony 
of  other  credible  witnesses  or  supported  by  other  credible  evi- 
dence in  the  case.40 

37  O'Connell  v.  St.  Louis,  C.  &  «  Taylor  v.  Felsing,  164  111.  332, 

W.  R.  Co.  106  Mo.  485,  17  S.  W.  45  N.  E.  161;  Trimble  v.  Ter.  (Ariz.) 

494.  See  S.  v.  Thompson,  21  W.  71  Pac.  932;  Waters  v.  P.  172  111. 

Va.  746.  372,  50  N.  B.  148;  O'Connell  v.  St. 

ss  Kansas  City  v  Bradbury,  45  Louis,  C.  &  W.  R.  Co.  106  Mo. 

Kas.  383,  25  Pac.  889.  485,  17  S.  W.  494;  Kansas  City  v. 

39  Taylor  v.  Felsing,  164  111.  331,  Bradbury,  45  Kas.  388,  25  Pac.  889. 
332,  45  N.  E.  161. 


377  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE — POSITIVE  AND  NEGATIVE  TESTIMONY.  §    371 

§  369.  Party  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf. — While  the  law 
permits  the  plaintiff  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  nevertheless 
the  jury  have  a  right,  in  weighing  his  testimony  and  in  de- 
termining how  much  credence  is  to  be  given  it,  to  take  into 
consideration  the  fact  that  he  is  the  plaintiff  and  his  interest 
in  the  result  of  the  suit.41 

§  370.  Husband  a  witness  for  wife. — Under  the  law  of  this 
state  a  husband  is  a  competent  witness  to  testify  in  behalf  of 
his  wife  in  a  suit  brought  by  her  for  personal  injury  alleged 
to  have  been  sustained  by  her.  You  are  instructed  that  if  the 
testimony  of  the  husband  appears  to  be  fair,  is  not  unreason- 
able and  is  consistent  with  itself,  and  the  witness  has  not  been 
in  any  manner  impeached,  then  you  have  no  right  to  disre- 
gard the  testimony  of  such  witness  merely  from  the  fact  that 
he  is  related  by  marriage  to  the  plaintiff  in  the  case.42 

§  371.  Positive  and  negative  testimony. — When  one  witness 
testifies  that  a  certain  fact  took  place,  or  that  certain  words  were 
spoken,  and  several  other  witnesses  equally  credible  testify  that 
they  were  present  at  the  time  and  place,  and  had  the  same 
means  of  information,  and  further  testify  that  such  fact  did  not 
take  place  or  that  such  words  were  not  spoken,  it  is  their  prov- 
ince to  weigh  the  testimony  and  give  a  verdict  according  to 
the  weight  of  the  testimony  as  it  may  preponderate  on  either 
side.43 

41  West   C.    St.   R.    Co.   v.   Estep,  42  North   C.   St.   R.   Co.   v.   Well- 

162  111.  130,  44  N.  E.  404;   West  C.  ner,  206  111.  275,  69  N.  E.  6. 

St.  R.  Co.  v.  Nash,  166  111.  528,  46  «  Frizell    v.    Cole,    42    111.    363. 
N.  E.  1082. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

WITNESSES,   IN   CRIMINAL  CASES  ONLY. 

Sec.  Sec. 

Defendant  a  Witness.  375.    Demeanor     and     conduct     of 

witness. 

372.  Instructions  for  the  prosecu-      376.    Accomplice  as  witness. 

tion.  377.     Opinions  of  expert  witnesses. 

373.  Instructions    for    defense.  378.    Detectives   as   witnesses. 

374.  Defendant's  failure  to  testify. 

§  372.  Defendant  a  witness,  instructions  for  prosecution. 
(1)  Under  the  law  the  defendant  has  the  right  to  testify  on  his 
own  behalf,  but  the  credibility  and  weight  to  be  given  to  his 
testimony  are  matters  exclusively  for  the  jury.  In  weighing 
the  testimony  of  the  defendant  in  this  case,  you  have  a  right 
to  take  into  consideration  his  manner  of  testifying,  the  rea- 
sonableness or  unreasonableness  of  his  account  of  the  transac- 
tion and  his  interest  in  the  result  of  the  verdict  as  affecting 
his  credibility.  You  are  not  required  to  receive  blindly  the 
testimony  of  the  accused  as  true,  but  you  are  to  consider  whether 
it  is  true  and  made  in  good  faith,  or  only  for  the  purpose  of 
avoiding  conviction.1 

(2)  You  are  not  required  to  receive  blindly  the  testimony  of 
the  accused  as  true,  but  you  are  to  consider  whether  it  is  true  and 
made  in  good  faith,  or  only  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  conviction. 
And  you  are  not  bound  to  believe  the  testimony  of  the  defendant 
any  further  than  it  may  be  corroborated  by  other  credible  evi- 
dence in  the  case.2 

i  Blair  v.  S.  69  Ark.  558,  64  S.  W.  2  s.  v.  Hunter,  118  Iowa,  686,  92 
948,  citing:  Hamilton  v.  S.  62  Ark.  N.  W.  872;  S.  v.  Mecum,  95  Iowa, 
543,  36  S.  W.  1054;  Jones  v.  S.  433,  64  N.  W.  286.  This  instruction 
61  Ark.  88,  32  S.  W.  81.  was  held  not  objectionable  as  sing- 

378 


379  DEFENDANT    A    WITNESS.  §    372 

(3)  That  although  a  defendant  has  a  right  to  be  sworn  and  to 
give  testimony  in  his  own  behalf,  the  jury  are  not  bound  to  believe 
his  testimony,  but  they  are  bound  to   give  it   such  weight   as 
they  believe  it  is  entitled  to ;  and  his  credibility,  and  the  weight 
to  be  attached  to  his  testimony,  are  matters  exclusively  for  the 
jury;   and  the   defendant's   interest  in  the   result   of  the   trial 
is  a  matter  proper  to  be  taken  into  consideration  by  the  jury 
in  determining  what  weight  ought  to  be  given  to  his  testimony.3 

(4)  In  determining  the  weight  to  be  given  to  the  testimony  of 
the   different   witnesses   you   should  take   into   account   the   in- 
terest or  want  of  interest  they  have  in  the  case,  their  manner 
on  the  witness  stand,  the  probability  or  improbability  of  their 
testimony,  with  all  the  other  circumstances  before  you  which 
can  aid  you  in  weighing  the  testimony. 

The  defendant  has  testified  as  a  witness,  and  you  should 
weigh  his  testimony  as  you  weigh  that  of  any  other  witness; 
consider  his  manner  as  such  witness,  and  his  interest  in  the 
result  of  the  trial  and  the  probability  or  improbability  of  his 
testimony.4 

(5)  The  defendant  is  a  proper  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  but 
the  jury  may  consider  the  fact  that  he  is  the  accused  person 
testifying  in  his  own  behalf,  in  determining  what  weight  and 
credibility  they  will  give  to  his  testimony.5 

(6)  The  defendants  having  become  witnesses  in  their  own  be- 
half at  once  become  the  same  as  any  other  witness,  and  their 
credibility  is  to  be  tested  by  and  subjected  to  the  same  tests  as  are 
legally  applied  to  any  other  witness;  and  in  determining  the  de- 
gree of  credibility  that  should  be  accorded  to  their  testimony,  the 
jury  have  the  right  to  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that  they 
are  interested  in  the  result  of  the  prosecution,  as  well  as  their 
demeanor  and  conduct  upon  the  witness  stand;   and  the  jury 

ling   out  the  defendant.     But  is  it  a   right*  to    believe   the   testimony 

not   erroneous   in   telling   the   jury  of    the    defendant    without   corrob- 

that  they  are  not  bound  to  believe  oration. 

the  testimony  of  the  defendant  any  s  Bressler    v.    P.    117    111.    439,    8 

further  than  it  may  be  corrobora-  N.  E.  62. 

ted?     The  defendant  may  tell  the  *  Anderson  v.   S.   104  Ind.   472,  4 

truth,   and  where  the  jury  believe  N.  E.  63;   Deal  v.  S.  140  Ind.  354, 

he  tells  the  truth  they  should  not  39  N.  E.  930. 

disregard   his    testimony,    although  5  S.  v.  Jones,  78  Mo.  282. 

not   corroborated.     The   jury   have 


§    372  WITNESSES,  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES  ONLY.  380 

are  to  take  into  consideration  the  fact,  if  such  is  the  fact,  that 
they  have  been  contradicted  by  other  credible  evidence  on  mat- 
ters material  to  the  issue.  And  the  court  further  instructs  the 
jury  that  if,  after  considering  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  they 
find  that  the  accused  have  wilfully  and  corruptly  testified  falsely 
to  any  fact  material  to  the  issue  in  this  cause,  they  have  the 
right  to  entirely  disregard  their  testimony,  excepting  in  so  far 
as  their  testimony  is  corroborated  by  other  credible  evidence 
or  facts  and  circumstances  proven  by  the  evidence  in  the  case.6 
(7)  The  defendant  is  a  competent  witness,,  and  has  the  right  10 
testify  in  his  own  behalf,  and  when  he  does  so  testify  he  at 
once  becomes  the  same  as  any  other  witness,  and  his  credibility 
is  to  be  tested  by  and  subjected  to  the  same  tests,  and  only  the 
same  tests,  as  are  legally  applied  to  any  other  witness;  and  in 
determining  the  degree  of  credibility  that  should  be  accorded 
to  his  testimony  the  jury  have  the  right  to  take  into  considera- 
tion the  fact  that  he  is  the  defendant  and  interested  in  the  re- 
sult of  the  prosecution,  as  well  as  his  demeanor  and  conduct  on 
the  witness  stand;  and  the  jury  are  to  take  into  consideration 
the  fact,  if  such  is  the  fact,  that  he  has  been  contradicted  or 
corroborated  by  other  credible  evidence  on  matters  material  to 
the  issue.  You  have  also  the  right  to  take  into  consideration 
the  reasonableness  or  unreasonablenss  of  his  account  of  the 
transaction  in  question,  the  probability  or  improbability  of  his 
testimony,  with  all  the  other  facts  and  circumstances  before  you 
which  can  aid  you  in  weighing  his  testimony.  You  are  not  re- 
quired to  receive  blindly  the  testimony  of  the  accused  as  true, 
but  you  are  to  consider  whether  it  is  true  and  made  in  good 
faith,  or  only  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  conviction.  The  cred- 
ibility of  the  defendant  as  a  witness  and  the  weight  to  be  at- 
tached to  his  testimony  are  matters  exclusively  for  the  jury; 
and  if  after  considering*  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  the  jury 
find  that  the  accused  has  wilfully  and  corruptly  testified  falsely 
to  any  fact  material  to  the  issue  in  the  cause,  they  have  the 
right  to  entirely  disregard  his  testimony,  excepting  in  so  far 

e  Siebert    v.     P.     143   111.   592,  32      29  N.  E.  700;  Ridfir  v.  P.  110  111.  11; 
N.  E.  431;   Purdy  v.  P.  140  111.  49,      Hirschman  v.  P.  101  111.  576. 


381  DEFENDANT   A   WITNESS — INSTRUCTIONS  §    373 

as  it  has  been  corroborated  by  other  credible  evidence  in  the 
case.7 

§373.  Instructions  for  defenses. — (1)  The  defendant  is  a  com- 
petent witness  in  her  own  behalf,  and  you  have  no  right  to  dis- 
credit her  testimony  from  caprice  nor  merely  because  she  is 
the  defendant.  You  are  to  treat  her  the  same  as  any  other 
witness,  and  subject  her  testimony  to  the  same  tests,  and  only  the 
same  tests,  as  are  legally  applied  to  the  other  witnesses,  and  while 
you  have  the  right  to  take  into  consideration  the  interest  she 
may  have  in  the  result  of  this  trial,  you  have  also  the  right, 
and  it  is  your  duty,  to  take  into  consideration  the  fact,  if  such 
is  the  fact,  that  she  has  been  corroborated  by  other  credible 
evidence.8 

(2)  The  jury  have  no  right  to  disregard  the  testimony  of  the 
defendant  through  mere  caprice,  or  merely  because  he  is  the  de- 
fendant.    The  law  makes  him  a  competent  witness,  and  you  are 
bound  to  consider  his  testimony,  and  give  it  such  weight  as  you 
believe  it  entitled  to,  and  you  are  the  sole  judges  of  his  credibil- 
ity.9 

(3)  A  person  charged  with  the  commission  of  a  crime  is  a  com- 
petent witness,   and  may  testify  in  his   own   behalf.     The   de- 
fendant in  this  case  has  availed  herself  of  this  privilege,  and  in 
determining  her  guilt  or  innocence  you  must  consider  her  tes- 
timony.    She  testifies  as  an  interested  witness  and  from  an  in- 
terested standpoint,  and  as  such  you  should  consider  her  tes- 
timony;  and   when   you   do   this,   together   with   all   the    other 
surrounding  circumstances  developed  by  the  evidence,  give  the 
testimony  of  the  defendant  such  weight,  in  connection  with  the 
other  evidence  in  the  case,  as  you  may  think  it  entitled  to,  and 
no  more.10 

T  Seibert  v.  P.  143  111.  592,-  32  N.  this     instruction     where     another 

E.  431;   Purdy  v.  P.  140  111.  49,  29  given    for    the    prosecution  stated 

N.  E.  700;   Blair  v.  S.  69  Ark.  558,  that   the   jury    might   consider   the 

64  S.  W.  948;   S.  v.  Hunter,  118  lo-  fact,   if  it  be  a  fact,   that  the  de- 

wa  686,  92  N.  W.  872;  Bressler  v.  P.  fendant   had   been   contradicted   by 

117   111.   439,   8  N.  E.  62;    Anderson  other  evidence. 

v.   S.   104   Ind.   472,   4  N.   E.   63;    S.  »  Bressler  v.   P.   117   111.   422,  441, 

v.   Jones,   78   Mo.   282;    Rider  v.   P.  8  N.  E.  62. 

110  111.  11.  10  S.   v.   Hossack,   116    Iowa,   194, 

s  McElroy   v.    P.    202    111.    478,   66  89   N.    W.   1077;    S.   v.    Sterrett,    71 

N.   E.    1058.     Held    error  to   refuse  Iowa,    386,    32    N.    W.    387. 


§    374  WITNESSES,  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES  ONLY.  382 

§374.  Defendant's  failure  to  testify.— While  the  statute  of 
this  state  provides  that  a  person  charged  with  crime  may  tes- 
tify in  his  own  behalf,  he  is  under  no  obligation  to  do  so,  and 
the  statute  expressly  declares  that  his  neglect  to  testify  shall 
not  create  any  presumption  against  him.11 

§  375.  Demeanor  and  conduct  of  witness. — You  are  the  sole 
judges  of  the  facts  in  this  case,  and  of  the  credit  to  be  given  to 
the  respective  witnesses  who  have  testified;  and  in  passing  on 
the  credibility  of  the  witnesses  you  have  a  right  to  take  into 
consideration  not  only  their  testimony  itself,  but  their  conduct, 
demeanor  and  bearing  while  testifying  on  the  witness  stand, 
their  objects,  purposes  or  designs,  if  any  have  been  shown  by 
the  evidence,  in  so  testifying,  their  feelings  of  prejudice  against 
the  defendant,  if  any  have  been  shown,  and  their  means  of 
knowing  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  proof,  if  any,  tending 
to  expose  the  feelings  or  purposes  of  such  witness.12 

§376.  Accomplices  as  witnesses. — (1)  The  testimony  of  an  ac- 
complice is  competent  evidence,  and  the  credibility  of  his  testi- 
mony is  for  the  jury  to  pass  upon  as  they  do  upon  that  of  any 
other  witness ;  and  while  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  will  sus- 
tain a  verdict  of  guilty,  though  uncorroborated,,  yet  his  testimony 
must  be  received  with  great  caution ;  but  if  his  testimony  carries 
conviction,  and  the  jury  are  convinced  of  its  truth,  they  should 
give  it  the  same  effect  as  would  be  allowed  to  a  witness  who 
is  in  no  respect  implicated  in  the  offense  charged.13 

(2)  It  is  competent  to  convict  upon  the  uncorroborated  testimo- 
ny of  an  accomplice,  if  the  jury,  weighing  the  probability  of  his 
testimony,  think  him  worthy  of  belief.14 

(3)  The  degree  of  credit  which  ought  to  be  given  to  the  testimo- 
ny of  an  accomplice  is  a  matter  exclusively  within  the  province 
of  the  jury;  but  great  caution  should  be  used  in  weighing  such 
testimony,  and  the  jury  should  not  convict  upon  the  testimony 
of   an    accomplice   alone,   unless   his   testimony   is   corroborated 

11  S.  v.  Ryno  (Kas.),  74  Pac.  1116;  is  Shiver   v.    S.    41    Fla.    630,    27 
(Indiana  Statute,)   see  Thrawley  v.      So.   39. 

S.,   153   Ind.   375,   380,   55   N.   E.   95.          14  Earll  v.  P.  73  111.  383;  Johnson 

12  Bressler  v.  P.  117  111.  422,  441,       v.  S.,  66  Ind.  269. 
S  N.  E.  62. 


383  ACCOMPLICES — EXPERTS.  §    377 

by  other  evidence  in  some  material  point  in  issue,  but  such 
corroboration  need  not  be  as  to  everything  to  which  the  accom- 
plice testifies.15 

(4)  Should  you  find  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  pros- 
ecuting witness,  D  A,  with  whom  the  alleged  incestuous  inter- 
course is  charged  to  have  been  had,  did  voluntarily,  and  with  the 
same  intent  which  actuated  the  defendant,  or  directly  or  indi- 
rectly consent  to  commit  such  act  with  him  as  alleged,  then,  in 
that  event,  she  would  be  an  accomplice,  and  her  testimony  would 
not  be  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction  unless  corroborated  by 
other  credible  evidence  tending  to  connect  the  defendant  with 
the  commission  of  the  offense  charged.16 

(5)  In  determining  the  interest  a  witness  has  in  the  case  you  are 
at  liberty  to  consider  the  fact,  if  the  proof  shows  it,  that  such 
witness  is  under  indictment  for  gaming,  and  that,  if  he  testifies 
in  behalf  of  the  state,  is  hereby  discharged  from  liability  to  fine 
or  punishment  on  account  of  such  violation.    You  have  the  right 
to  look  to  this  fact,  if  shown  by  the  evidence,  in  determining 
what  weight,  if  any,  you  will  give  to  his  testimony.17 

(6)  An  accomplice  is  a  competent  witness,  and  the  credibility 
and  weight  of  his  testimony  is  for  the  jury  to  pass  upon  and  de- 
termine the  same  as  they  do  the  testimony  of  any  other  witness. 
The  degree  of  credit  which  ought  to  be  given  to  the  testimony  of 
an  accomplice  is  a  matter  exclusively  within  the  province  of  the 
jury ;  and  while  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  will  sustain  a  con- 
viction, though  uncorroborated,  yet  his  testimony  should  be  re- 
ceived and  acted  upon  with  great  caution ;  but  if  his  testimony  car- 
ries conviction,  and  the  jury  are  convinced  of  its  truth,  they 
should  give  it  the  same  effect  as  would  be  allowed  to  any  witness 
who  is  in  no  respect  implicated  in  the  offense  charged.18 

§  377.     Opinions  of  expert  witnesses. — (1)  The  opinions  of  med- 

is  S.   v.   Greenburg,   59   Kas.   404,  ity  to  fine  or  punishment  for  gaming 

53  Pac.   61.     See  Waters  v.   P.   172  in    consideration   that   he  will   ap- 

111.    367    (extreme    caution),    50    N.  pear  as  a  witness  against  his  co- 

E.  148.  defendants. 

i«  Tate  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  77  «  Shiver     v.    S.     41   Fla.   630,     27 

S.  W.  796.  So.    39;    S.    v.    Greenburg,    59    Kas. 

IT  Howard    v.    S.    (Miss.),    35    So.  404,  53  Pac.   61;   Earll  v.  P.  73  111. 

653.     Held  proper  under  a  statute  333;  Ayers  v.  S.,  88  Ind.  275. 
releasing  the  witness  from  liabil- 


§    377  WITNESSES,  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES  ONLY.  384 

ical  experts  are  to  be  considered  by  you  in  connection  with  all  the 
other  evidence  in  the  case;  but  you  are  not  bound  to  act  upon 
such  opinions  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  other  evidence.  Taking 
those  opinions  into  consideration,  and  giving  them  just  weight, 
you  are  to  determine  from  the  whole  evidence  taken  together 
whether  the  accused  was,  or  was  not,  of  sound  mind  at  the  time 
in  question,  giving  him  the  benefit  of  any  reasonable  doubt,  if 
any  such  doubt  arises  from  the  evidence.19 

(2)  The  opinions  of  medical  experts  are  to  be  considered  by 
you  in  connection  with  all  the  other  evidence  in  the  case,  but  you 
are  not  bound  to  act  upon  such  opinions  to  the  exclusion  of  all 
other  evidence.  Taking  into  consideration  these  opinions,  and  giv- 
ing them  just  weight,  you  are  to  determine  for  yourselves,  from 
the  whole  evidence,  whether  the  accused  was,  or  was  not  of  sound 
mind,  yielding  him  the  benefit  of  a  reasonable  doubt,  if  any  such 
doubt  arises.20 

(3)  The  opinions  of  expert  witnesses  are  to  be  considered  by  you 
in  connection  with  all  the  other  evidence  in  the  case.     You  are 
not  to  act  upon  such  opinions  to  the  exclusion  of  other  testimony. 
In  determining  the  weight  of  the  testimony  of  expert  witnesses, 
you  are  to  apply  the  same  general  rules  that  are  applicable  to  the 
testimony   of   other   witnesses.      Taking   into    consideration   the 
opinions   of  the   expert  witnesses,   together  with   all  the   other 
evidence,  you  are  to  determine  for  yourselves,  from  the  whole 
evidence,  whether  it  establishes  the  guilt  of  the  defendant  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt,  as  charged  in  the  indictment.21 

(4)  You  are  not  required  to  take  for  granted  that  the  state- 
ments contained  in  the  hypothetical  questions  which  have  been 
propounded  to  the  witnesses  are  true.  On  the  contrary,  you  should 
carefully  scrutinize  the  evidence,  and  from  it  determine  what,  if 
any,  of  such  statements  are  true,  and  what,  if  any,  are  not  true. 
Should  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  any  of  the  material  state- 
ments contained  in  the  hypothetical  questions  are  not  correct, 
and  that  they  are  of  such  a  character  as  to  entirely  destroy  the  re- 
liability of  the  opinions  based  upon  the  hypothesis  stated,  you 
should  attach  no  weight  whatever  to  the  opinions  based  thereon. 

18  Guetig    v.    S.    66    Ind.    106.  21  Epps  v.  S.  102  Ind.  553  1  N.  B. 

20  Goodwin  v.  S.  96  Ind.  561.  491. 


385  DETECTIVES    AS    WITNESSES.  §    378 

You  are  to  determine  from  all  the  evidence  what  are  the  real  facts, 
and  whether  such  hypothetical  questions  state  them  correctly 
or  not.22 

§378.  Detectives  as  witnesses. — (1)  That  in  weighing  the  tes- 
timony, greater  care  should  be  used  by  the  jury  in  relation  to  the 
testimony  of  persons  who  are  interested  in  or  employed  to  find 
evidence  against  the  accused  than  in  other  cases,  because  of  the 
natural  and  unavoidable  tendency  and  bias  of  the  minds  of  such 
persons  to  construe  everything  as  evidence  against  the  accused, 
and  disregard  everything  which  does  not  tend  to  support  their 
preconceived  opinion  of  the  matter  in  which  they  are  engaged.23 

(%Y  The  police  department  is  an  important  part  of  the  machi- 
nery of  our  government,  and  it  is  well  enough  to  bear  in  mind  that 
your  homes,  your  lives  and  your  property  would  not  be  safe  but 
for  the  police  department  and  officers.  It  does  not  follow  that 
because  an  officer  testifies,  that  his  testimony  is  to  be  discarded, 
or  any  suspicion  cast  upon  it  unless  there  is  something  about  it 
which  calls  your  attention  to  it.24 

22  Guetig  v.  S.  66  Ind.  107.  a*  p.    v.     Shoemaker,    131    Mich. 

23  Prenit  v.  P.  5  Neb.   377;    San-  107,  90  N.  W.  1035.     (This  instruc- 
dage  v.   S.   61  Neb.   240,   85  N.  W.  tion  was  held  proper  where  an  at- 
35;   Frudie  v.  S.    (Neb.),  92  N.  W.  tack  was  made  on  the  police  offi- 
320.  cers). 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

CAUTIONARY    INSTRUCTIONS  IN   CIVIL  OR  CRIMINAL  CASES. 

Sec.  Sec. 

379.  Jury  determine  the  facts.  381.     Court  construes  writings. 

380.  Court  determines  the  law. 

§  379.  The  jury  determine  the  facts. — (1)  In  determining  what 
facts  are  proved  in  this  case  the  jury  should  carefully  consider 
all  the  evidence  before  them,  with  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
transaction  in  question  as  detailed  by  the  witnesses;  and  they 
may  find  any  fact  to  be  proved  which  they  think  may  be  right- 
fully and  reasonably  inferred  from  the  evidence  in  the  case, 
although  there  may  be  no  direct  evidence  or  testimony  as  to 
such  fact.1 

(2)  In  determining  any  of  the  questions  of  fact  presented  in 
this  case,  the  jury  should  be  governed  solely  by  the  evidence  in- 
troduced before  them.    The  jury  have  no  right  to  indulge  in  con- 
jectures or  speculations  not  supported  by  the  evidence.2 

(3)  The  jury  have  been  taken  out  to  view  the  scene  of  this  acci- 
dent twice,  the  first  time  for  the  purpose  of  being  able  to  under- 
stand the  testimony,  and  the  second  time  to  witness  certain  expe- 
riments, by  agreement  of  the  parties.    I  charge  you,  that  you  are 
not  to  consider  as  evidence  what  you  saw  on  the  first  view;  but 
what  you  saw  on  the  second  view,  that  was  shown  to  you  by  the 

i  North  C.   St.  R.   Co.  v.  Rodert,          2  Ramsey  v.  Burns,  27  Mont.  154, 
203  111.  415;  (held  mot 'objectionable      69  Pac.  711;    (held  error  to  refuse 
in  the  use  of  the  word  "think"  in-      this  instruction.) 
stead  of  believe.) 

386 


387  JURY  DETERMINE  FACTS.  §  379 

parties  under  their  agreement,  you  should  take   and  consider 
as  evidence  in  the  case.3 

(4)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  find  the  facts  of  this  case 
from  the  evidence,  and  having  done  so,  then  to  apply  to  such  facts 
the  law  as  stated  in  these  instructions.4 

(5)  Neither  by  these  instructions  nor  the  special  interrogatories, 
nor  by  any  words  uttered  or  remark  made  by  the  court  during 
this  trial,  does,  or  did  the  court  intimate,  or  mean  to  give,  or 
wish  to  be  understood  as  giving,  an  opinion  as  to  what  the  proof 
is,  or  what  it  is  not,  or  what  the  facts  are  in  this  case,  or  what 
are  not  the  facts  therein.     It  is  solely  and  exclusively  for  the 
jury  to  find  and  determine  the  facts,   and  this  they  must   do 
from  the  evidence,  and  having  done  so,  then  apply  to  them  the 
law  as  stated  in  these  instructions.     The  instructions  given  to 
the  jury  are,  and  constitute,  one  connected  body  and  series,  and 
should  be  so  regarded  and  treated  by  the  jury;  that  is  to  say, 
they  should  apply  them  to  the  facts  as  a  whole,  and  not  detached 
or  separated,  any  one  instruction  from  any,  or  either,   of  the 
others.5 

(6)  In  determining  what  facts  have  been  proved  in  this  case  the 
jury   should   carefully   consider   all   the   evidence   before   them, 
with  all  the  circumstances  of  the  transaction  as  detailed  by  the 
witnesses;  and  they  may  find  any  material  fact  to  have  been 
proved,   which   they   think   may   be    rightfully   and    reasonably 
inferred  from  the  evidence  in  the  case,  although  there  may  be 
no  direct  evidence  tending  to  establish  such  fact.     But  the  jury 
have  no  right  to  indulge  in  mere  conjecture  or  speculation  not 
supported  by  evidence.     It  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  find  the 
facts  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  before  them,  and,  having 
done  so,  then  to  apply  the  law  to  such  facts,  as  stated  in  these 
instructions.     The  court  is  not  authorized  to  give  or  intimate  an 
opinion  as  to  what  the  evidence  proves  or  does  not  prove,  nor 
has  the  court  intended,  by  any  remark  made  during  this  trial, 
to  give  or  intimate  any  opinion  as  to  what  the  evidence  proves 

s  Schweinfurth    v.    Cleveland,    C.  57   N.    E.    849,    (held   not   to   be   a 

C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  60  Ohio  St.  227,  direction  to  the  jury  to  determine 

54  N.  E.  89.  the  facts  independent  of  or  without 

*  North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wellner,  the  aid  of  the  law.) 
20G   111.   274,   69  N.   E.   6;    North   C.  *  North    C.    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Kas- 

St.  R.  Co.  v.  Raspers,  186  111.  246,  pers,  186  111.  246,  57  N.  E.  849. 


§    380  CAUTIONARY  INSTRUCTIONS,  CIVIL  CASES.  388 

or  does  not  prove,  or  what  are,  or  what  are  not,  the  facts.  The 
jury  are  solely  and  exclusively  the  judges  of  the  facts  of  the 
case,  and  must  determine  them  from  the  evidence  introduced, 
and  then  apply  the  law  as  given  in  these  instructions.0 

§380.  Court  determines  the  law. — (1)  In  considering  and  de- 
ciding this  case  you  should  look  to  the  evidence  for  the  facts 
and  to  the  instructions  of  the  court  for  the  law  of  the  case,  and 
find  your  verdict  accordingly,  without  reference  as  to  who  is 
plaintiff  or  who  is  defendant.7 

(2)  In  considering  this  case  it  is  not  only  your  duty  to  decide 
the  case  according  to  the  weight  of  the  evidence,  but  it  is  also 
your  duty  to  decide  it  according  to  the  law  as  given  you  by  the 
court,  applicable  to  the  evidence.    While  it  is  true,  as  a  matter  of 
law,  that  the  attorneys  for  the  respective  parties  may  state  to  you 
what  they  believe  the  law  to  be  and  base  arguments  thereon,  still, 
under  your  oaths,  and  under  the  law,  you  have  no  right  to  consider 
anything  as  law  except  it  be  given  you  by  the  court,  and  you  have 
no  right  to  take  the  statement  of  any  attorney  as  to  what  the 
law  is,  except  the  court  gives  you  an  instruction  to  the  same 
effect;  or  in  other  words,  you  should  consider  only  that  as  law 
which  is  given  you  by  the  court,  and  decide  the  case  accord- 
ingly.8 

(3)  You  are  to  try  the  question  in  the  case  submitted  to  you 
upon  the  testimony  introduced  upon  the   trial,    and   upon   the 
law  as  given  you  by  the  court  in  these  instructions.     The  court, 
however,  has  not  attempted  to  embody  all  the  law  applicable 
to  this  case,  in  any  one  of  these  instructions,  but  in  consider- 
ing any  one  instruction  you  must  construe   it  in  the  light  of 
and   in   harmony   with   every   other   instruction    given,    and   so 
considering  and  so  construing,  apply  the  principles  in  it  enun- 
ciated to  all  the  evidence  in  the  case.9 

(4)  In  considering  and  deciding  this  case  you  should  look  to  the 

o  North  C.   St.  R.  Co.  v.  Rodert,  i  Cicero  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  193 

203  111.  415,  67  N.  B.  812;    Ramsey  111.   277,   61   N.   E.   1093. 

v.  Burns,  27  Mont.  154,  69  Pac.  711;  «  Vocke  v.    City   of   Chicago,   208 

North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wellner,  206  111.   194. 

111.   274,   69   N.   E.  6;    North  C.   St.  »  Lampman  v.  Bruning,  120  Iowa, 

R.   Co.   v.   Raspers,  186  111.  246,  57  167,  94  N.  W.  562. 
N.  E.  849. 


389  COURT    DETERMINES    LAW    AND    CONSTRUES    WRITINGS.       §    381 

evidence  for  the  facts  and  to  the  instructions  of  the  court  for  the 
law  of  the  case  and  find  your  verdict  accordingly.  You  have  no 
right  to  consider  anything  as  law  unless  it  be  given  you  by  the 
court. 

(5)  You  have  no  right  to  take  the  statements  of  any  attorney  as 
to  what  the  law  is  unless  the  court  gives  you  an  instruction  to 
that  effect.  It  is  your  duty  to  try  this  case  upon  the  evidence 
introduced  and  the  law  given  you  by  the  court  in  these  in- 
structions. The  court  has  not  attempted,  however,  to  embody 
all  the  law  of  the  case  in  any  one  instruction.  Therefore  in 
construing  any  single  instruction  you  must  consider  it  in  con- 
nection with  all  the  other  instructions  given  you,  and  construe 
them  in  harmony  with  each  other.10 

§  381.  Court  construes  writings. — The  evidence  upon  this 
question,  whether  illegal  stock  was  issued,  is  mainly  record  evi- 
dence, or  written  evidence,  and  under  the  law  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  court  to  construe  such  instruments,  and  to  state  the 
effect  of  such  evidence,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  re- 
ceive and  to  accept  the  instructions  so  given;  and  this  is  so, 
even  though  you  may  think  the  instructions  here  given  are 
wrong.11 

10  Cicero    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Brown,  N.  W.  562;   North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 

193  111.  277,  61  N.  E.  1093;  Vocke  v.  Raspers,  186  111.  246,  57  N.  E.  849. 

City  of  Chicago,  208  111.  194;  Lamp-  "  Merrill     y.     Reaver,     50    Iowa 

man  v.  Bruning,  120  Iowa  167,  94  417. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF  IN  CIVIL  CASES  ONLY. 

Sec.  Sec. 

382.  Instructions     for      plaintiff —      385.    Preponderance     of     evidence; 

General.  number  of  witnesses. 

383.  Instructions    for    defendant —      386.    Evidence   equally    balanced. 

General.  387.     Preponderance    in    a    case    of 

384.  Burden  in  specific  cases.  negligence. 

§382.  Instructions  for  plaintiff— General.— (1)  While  the 
burden  of  proof  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  his  case  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence,  still,  if  the  jury  find  that  the  evi- 
dence bearing  upon  the  plaintiff's  case  preponderates  in  his 
favor,  although  but  slightly,  it  would  be  sufficient  for  the  jury 
to  find  in  his  favor.1 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has  proved 
his  case  as  laid  in  his  declaration,  or  in  any  count  thereof,  by  a 
preponderance  of  the  evidence,  then  you  should  find  the  defendant 
guilty.2 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has 
proved  her  case  as  laid  in  her  declaration,  or  either  count  thereof, 
you  will  find  the  issues  for  the  plaintiff.3 

(4)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has  made 
out  her  case  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  as  laid  in  her 
declaration,  or  any  single  count  thereof,  then  you  should  find  for 
the  plaintiff.4 

1  Taylor  v.  Felsing,  164  111.  331,  45      cher,    190    111.    540,    60    N.    E.    888; 
N.  E.  161;  Donley  v.  Dougherty,  174      Pennsylvania  Co.   v.   Marshall.   119 
111.    582,    51    N.    E.    714,    See    U.    S.       111.  404,  10  N.  E.  220. 

Brew.    Co.    v.    Stoltenberg,   211    111.  4  North   C.   St.  R.   Co.  v.   Hutch- 

585.  inson,    191    111.    104,    60    N.    E.    850 

2  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Filler,  (held   proper,   though  some  of  the 
195  111.  17,  62  N.  E.  919.  counts    had    been     dismissed,     the 

s  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Radema-       court    having     given    another     in- 

390 


391  INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  DEFENDANT.  §  383 

(5)  While  the  burden  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  his  case  by  a 
preponderance  of  the  evidence,  still,  if  the  jury  find  that  the 
evidence  bearing  upon  the  plaintiff's  case  preponderates  in  his 
favor,  although  but  slightly,  that  would  be  sufficient  to  war- 
rant the  jury  in  finding  in  his  favor.  If  you  find  from  the 
evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has  proved  his  case  as  laid  in  his 
declaration,  or  in  any  one  of  the  counts  thereof,  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence,  then  you  should  find  the  issues 
for  the  plaintiff.5 

§  383.  Instructions  for  defendant — General — (1)  The  burden 
of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff,  and  it  is  incumbent  on  her  to  estab- 
lish her  case  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  and  that 
unless  you  believe  she  has  done  so  from  all  the  evidence  in 
the  case,  you  will  find  for  the  defendant;  and  if  you  believe 
that  the  evidence  in  this  case  is  equally  balanced,  then  you  will 
find  for  the  defendant.6 

(2)  It  is  a  requirement  of  the  law  that  the  plaintiff  must  make 
out  and  establish  his  case  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence, 
and  unless  he  has  done  so  in  this  case,  then  your  verdict  should 
be  for  the  defendant.7 

(3)  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff,  and  he  cannot 
recover  unless  he  proves  to  your  satisfaction  and  by  the  greater 
weight  of  evidence  each  and  every  material  fact  of  his  case.8 

(4)  This  is  a  civil  suit,  and  is  to  be  determined  by  a  prepon- 
derance  of   the   evidence.      The   burden   of   proof   is   upon   the 
plaintiff,  and  to  entitle  him  to  a  verdict  in  his  favor  he  must 
have  proved  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence   all  the  ma- 
terial  averments  of  some  one   of  the  three  paragraphs   of  his 
complaint.9 

(5)  This  being  a  civil  suit,  it  is  to  be  determined  by  a  prepon- 
derance of  the  evidence.     The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plain- 

struction   stating  what  counts  had  e  Georgia   P.   R.   Co.   v.  West,   66 

been  dismissed.)  Miss.  314,  6  So.  207. 

s  Taylor  v.   Felsing,   164   111.   331,  ?  Tedens    v.    Schumers,     112    HI. 

45   N.   E.   161;    Chicago  &  E.   I.   R.  268;    Sievers  v.  Peters  B.  &  L.  Co. 

Co.   v.  Filler,   195  111.   17,  62  N.   E.  151  Ind.  661,  50  N.  E.  877,  52  N.  E. 

919;    Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Roden-  399. 

macher,  190  111.   540,  60  N.  E.   888;  s  Doyle   v.    Mo.    K.    &    T.    T.    Co. 

Donley   v.    Dougherty,   174   111.    582,  140  Mo.  1,  41  S.  W.  257.     See  San 

51  N.  E.  714;  East  v.  Crow,  70  111.  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Waller, 

92.  27  Tex.  Cv.  App.  44,  65  S.  W.  210. 

»  Leary  v.  Meier,  78  Ind.  397. 


§    384  BURDEN   OF   PROOF — CIVIL   CASES.  392 

tiff  to  make  out  his  case,  and  to  entitle  him  to  a  verdict  in  his 
favor  he  must  prove,  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  all  the 
material  facts  or  averments  of  some  one  of  the  several  paragraphs 
of  his  complaint,  and  unless  you  believe  he  has  done  so  from  all 
the  evidence  in  the  case  then  you  will  find  the  issue  for  the 
defendant;  and  if  you  believe  that  the  evidence  in  the  case  is 
equally  balanced,  then  you  will  find  for  the  defendant.10 

§384.  Burden  of  proof  in  specific  cases. — (1)  The  terms  of 
the  leasing  of  the  plaintiff's  farm  to  the  defendant  are  material 
in  this  suit,  and  the  plaintiff  must  prove  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  jury  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the  terms 
of  said  leasing  were  such  as  the  plaintiff  claims  the  same  to 
be;  and  if  the  jury  shall  find  that  the  evidence  preponder- 
ates in  the  slightest  degree  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  or  is 
equally  balanced,  then  the  law  is  for  the  defendant,  and  in 
such  case  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.11 

(2)  The  note  in  question  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  indebted- 
ness, and  must  be  -overcome  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence ; 
and  unless  you  believe  from  the   evidence  that  the   defendant 
has  sustained  his  plea  of  set-off  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evi- 
dence, then  you  should  find  for  the  plaintiff  as  to  that  plea.11* 

(3)  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence  that  the  note  in  controversy  is  the 
true,  genuine  note  of  said  B.,  the  deceased ;  that  it  was  delivered 
to  the  plaintiff  by  said  B.,  the  deceased,  in  his  lifetime;  and  if 
the  plaintiff  has  failed  to  so  prove,  then  it  is  your  duty  to  find 
your  verdict  in  favor  of  the  defendant's  estate  and  against  the 
plaintiff.12 

(4)  The  defendant  must  establish  the  existence  of  fraud  by  a 
preponderance  of  the  evidence    before    you  can    find    for    him, 
for   unless   you   are   satisfied    from   the    evidence   that   the    de- 
fendant has  clearly  proved  the  existence  of  fraud  in  the  lease 

if  Leary    v.    Meier,    78   Ind.    397;  not  required  to  be   made  up  from 

Georgia  P.  R.  Oo.  N.  West,  66  Miss.  testimony  of  the  defendant  alone) ; 

314,  6  So.  207;  East  v.  Crow,  70  111.  Indianapolis  St.   R.   Co.   v.   Taylor, 

92.  158  Ind.  274. 

11  East  v.  Crow,  70  111.  92.  12  Candy      v.      Biss>ell's      Estate, 

11*  Laird   v.   Warren,  92   111.   208,  (Neb.),  69  N.  W.  634. 

(the  preponderance  of  evidence  is 


393  PREPONDERANCE    OF    EVIDENCE.  §    385 

from  H  to  P,  the  plaintiff,  then  you  must  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff.13 

(5)  Fraud  is  never  to  be  presumed.     The  allegations  of  fraud 
in  defendant's  answer  must  be  by  him  affirmatively  established 
by  the  evidence,  and  will  not  be  presumed  from  acts  of  the 
parties  which  may  be  accounted  for  on  the  basis  of  honesty 
and  good  faith.1* 

(6)  Where  the  plaintiff  proves,  by  a  preponderance   of  the 
evidence,  that   certain  sums   of  money  have   been  paid   to   the 
defendant,  and  the  defendant  claims  that  said  payment  was  made 
upon  some  other  demand  or  account,  which  he  claims  he  then 
held  against  plaintiff,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  defendant 
to  show  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence  that  there  then  was  a 
subsisting  and  unpaid  debt  due  defendant  from  plaintiff  upon 
which  such  payment  was  applied.15 

§  385.  Preponderance  of  evidence ;  number  of  witnesses. 
(1)  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to  establish  each 
and  every  particular  fact  necessary  to  make  out  his  cause  of  action 
by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  By  the  preponderance 
of  the  evidence  is  meant  that  .greater  and  superior  weight  of 
the  evidence  which  satisfies  your  minds.  Preponderance  is  not 
alone  determined  by  the  number  of  witnesses  testifying  to  a 
particular  fact  or  state  of  facts.  It  may  occur  that  the  state- 
ments or  superior  knowledge  of  the  subject  matter  testified  to, 
of  one  or  a  few  witnesses,  may  be  of  more  importance  and 
be  relied  upon  with  a  greater  degree  of  assurance  than  that 
of  a  greater  number,  and  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  is  often- 
times strenghtened  or  weakened  by  other  facts  and  circum- 
stances disclosed  by  the  evidence.16 

(2)  By  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  is  not  necessarily 
meant  a  greater  number  of  witnesses,  but  if  the  plaintiff  has 
proven  the  material  allegations  of  her  declaration  by  such  evi- 
dence as  satisfies  and  produces  conviction  in  the  minds  of  the 
jury,  then  she  has  proven  her  case  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
evidence.17 

13  Prichard  v.  Hopkins,  52  Iowa  is  Ball  v.  Marquis  (Iowa),  98  N. 

122,  2  N.  W.  1028.  W.  497. 

i* Prichard  v.  Hopkins,  52  Iowa  "Mayers  v.  Smith,  121  111.  451. 

122,  2  N.  W.  1028.  13  N.  E.  216,  (this  instruction  does 

is  Prall  v.  Underwood,  79  111.  not  ignore  the  defendant's  evi- 

App.  452.  dtence.) 


§    385  BURDEN   OF   PROOF — CIVIL  CASES.  394 

(3)  The  preponderance  of  the  evidence  is  not  necessarily  de- 
termined alone  by  the  number  of  witnesses  testifying  to  any  fact 
or  facts,  but  in  determining  where  the  preponderance  is,  you  may 
also  take  into  consideration  the  opportunities  or  occasion  of  the 
witnesses  for  seeing  or  remembering  what  they  testify  to  or  about, 
the  probability  or  improbability  of  its  truth,  the  relation  or  con- 
nection,  if  any,   between   the   witnesses   and   the   parties,   their 
interest  or  lack  of  interest  in  the  result  of  the  case,  and  their 
couduct  and  demeanor  while  testifying.18 

(4)  While  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  does  not  consist 
in  the  greater  number  of  witnesses  testifying  the  one  way  or  the 
other,  yet  the  number  of  credible  and  disinterested  witnesses 
testifying  on  the  one  side  or  the  other  of  a  disputed  point  is  a 
proper  element  for  the  jury  to  consider  in  determining  where 
lies  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence.19 

(5)  The  plaintiff  holds  the  affirmative  of  the  issue,  or,  what  is 
called  the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  him,  the  defendant  hav- 
ing denied  the  charges   alleged  against  it  in  the   declaration. 
The  plaintiff  must  satisfy  you  by  what  is  called  a  preponder- 
ance of  the  proof,  that  the  wrong  complained  of  was  commit- 
ted by  the  servant  of  the  defendant,  in  manner  and  form  as 
charged  in  the  declaration.     By  a  preponderance  of  proof,  the 
court  does  not  mean  the  largest  number  of  witnesses  on  a  given 
point;  four  or  five  witnesses  may  testify  to  a  fact,  and  a  single 
witness  may  testify  to   the   contrary,   but  under  such   circum- 
stances and  in  such  manner  and  with  such  an  air  and  appear- 
ance of  truth  and  candor  as  to  make  it  the  more  satisfactory 
or  convincing  to  you  that  the  one  witness,  with  the  opportunity 
of   knowing   the   facts   testified   to,   has   told   the   truth   of   the 
matter.     When  you  are  thus  satisfied  that  the  truth  lies  with 
a  single  witness  or  any  other  number,  you  are  justified  in  re- 
turning  a   verdict   in   accordance   therewith.      This   is   what   is 
meant  by  a  preponderance  of  proof.     It  is  that  character  or 
measure  of  evidence  which  carries  conviction  to  your  minds.20 

(6)  By  mentioning  "the  burden  of  proof"  and  "preponder- 

is  Myer  v.  Mead,  83  111.  20  (held  19  West  G.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Liesero- 

not   excluding  from   the   jury    the  witz,  197  111.  612,  64  N.  E.  718;   St. 

facts) ;  Kansas  City  v.  Bradbury,  45  Louis,    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Union,    &c. 

Kas.  382,  25  Pac.  889;   Illinois  Steel  Bank,  209  Illinois,  457,  460. 

Co.   v.  Wierzbicky,   206   111.  201,   68  20  North  C.   C.  R.   Co.  v.  Gastka, 

N.  E.  1101.  27  111.  App.  523. 


395  PREPONDERANCE    OF    EVIDENCE.  §    385 

ance  of  evidence"  the  court  intends  no  reference  to  the  number  of 
witnesses  testifying  concerning  any  fact,  or  upon  any  issue  in 
the  case,  but  simply  by  way  of  expressing  the  rule  of  law, 
which  is  that,  unless  the  evidence  as  to  such  issue  appears  in 
your  judgment  to  preponderate,  in  respect  to  its  credibility. 
in  favor  of  the  party  to  this  action  on  whom  the  burden  of 
proof  as  to  such  issue  rests,  then  you  should  find  against  such 
party  on  said  issue.21 

(7)  The  jury  are  instructed  that  the  fact  that  the  number  of 
witnesses  testifying  on  one  side  is  larger  than  the  number  tes- 
tifying on  the  other  side  does  not  necessarily  alone  determine 
that  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  is  on  the  side  for  which 
the  larger  number  testified.  In  order  to  determine  that  ques- 
tion the  jury  must  be  governed  by  and  take  into  consideration 
the  appearance  and  conduct  of  the  witnesses  while  testifying; 
the  apparent  truthfulness  of  their  testimony  or  the  lack  of  it; 
their  apparent  intelligence  or  the  lack  of  it;  their  opportunity 
of  knowing  or  seeing  the  facts  or  subjects  concerning  which 
they  have  testified  or  the  absence  of  such  opportunity;  their 
interest  or  the  absence  of  interest  in  the  result  of  the  ease ; 
and  from  all  these  facts  as  shown  by  the  evidence,  and  from 
all  the  other  facts  and  circumstances  so  shown,  the  jury  must 
decide  on  which  side  is  the  preponderance. 

After  fairly  and  impartially  considering  and  weighing  all 
the  evidence  in  this  case,  as  hej-ein  suggested,  the  jury  are  at 
liberty  to  decide  that  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  is  on 
the  side  which,  in  their  judgment,  is  sustained  by  the  more 
intelligent,  the  better  informed,  the  more  credible  and  the  more 
disinterested  witnesses,  whether  these  are  the  greater  or  the 
smaller  number.  But  the  jury  have  no  right  to  capriciously 
disregard  the  testimony  of  the  larger  number  of  witnesses,  nor 
to  refuse  to  give  whatever  consideration,  in  their  judgment, 
should  be  attached  naturally  to  the  fact  that  the  larger  num- 
ber have  testified  one  way.  The  element  of  numbers  should 
'be  considered,  with  all  the  other  elements  already  herein  sug- 
gesjed,  for  whatever,  in  the  judgment  of  the  jury  that  ele- 
ment is  worth,  and  the  evidence  of  the  smaller  number  of  wit- 

21  O'Connell  v.  St.  Louis,  C.  &  W.       R.   Co.   106  Mo.  485,  17  S.  W.   494. 


§    385  BURDEN    OF   PROOF — CIVIL  CASES.  396 

nesses  cannot  be  taken  by  the  jury  in  preference  to  that  of 
the  larger  number  unless  the  jury  can  say,  on  their  oaths, 
that,  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  the  case,  it  is 
more  reasonable,  more  truthful,  more  disinterested  and  more 
credible.22 

(8)  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to  establish  each 
and  every  particular  fact  necessary  to  make  out  his  cause  of 
action  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  By  the  prepon- 
derance of  the  evidence  is  meant  that  greater  and  superior 
weight  of  the  evidence  which  satisfies  your  minds.  Prepon- 
derance is  not  determined  alone  by  the  number  of  witnesses 
testifying  to  a  particular  fact  or  state  of  facts,  but  if  the  plain- 
tiff has  proven  all  the  material  allegations  of  his  declaration 
by  such  preponderance  of  the  evidence  as  satisfies  the  jury 
and  produces  conviction  in  their  minds  then  that  is  sufficient 
to  entitle  him  to  a  verdict  in  his  favor. 

In  determining  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  you  must 
take  into  consideration,  not  alone  the  number  of  witnesses  tes- 
tifying to  any  fact  or  state  of  facts,  or  for  the  one  side  or 
the  other,  but  you  must  also  take  into  consideration  the  op- 
portunities or  occasion  of  the  different  witnesses  for  seeing, 
hearing,  knowing  or  remembering  what  they  have  testified  to 
or  about,  the  probability  or  improbability  of  the  truth  of  their 
statements,  the  relation  or  connection,  if  any  has  been'  shown, 
between  any  of  the  witnesses  and  the  parties  to  the  suit,  their 
interest  or  lack  of  interest,  if  any,  in  the  result  of  the  suit, 
and  their  conduct  and  demeanor  while  testifying.  Yet  the  num- 
ber of  credible  and  disinterested  witnesses  testifying  to  a  ma- 
terial fact  or  state  of  facts  in  dispute,  or  for  the  one  side  or 
the  other,  is  a  proper  matter  for  the  jury  to  consider,  together 
with  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  in  determining  where  lies 
the  preponderance  of  the  evidence. 

The  jury  have  no  right  to  capriciously  disregard  the  testi- 
mony of  the  number  of  witnesses,  nor  to  refuse  to  give  what- 
ever consideration,  in  their  judgment,  should  be  attached  nat- 
urally to  the  fact  that  the  larger  number  have  testified  one 

22  Ga.ee  v.   Eddy,  179  111.   503,   53       posing  party  called  the  larger  num- 
N.   E.   1008,    (held  to  be  a  proper      ber  of  witnesses.) 
statement  of  the  law  where  the  op- 


397  PREPONDERANCE    OF    EVIDENCE.  §    387 

way  and  the  smaller  number  the  other.  The  testimony  of  the 
smaller  number  of  witnesses  cannot  be  taken  by  the  jury  in 
preference  to  that  of  the  larger  number,  unless  the  jury  can  say. 
on  their  oaths,  that  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in 
the  case  it  is  more  reasonable,  more  trustworthy,  truthful,  dis- 
interested and  credible.23 

§  386.  Evidence  equally  balanced. — If  after  considering  all 
the  evidence  in  the  case  you  shall  find  that  the  evidence  upon 
any  question  is  equally  balanced,  you  should  answer  such  ques- 
tion against  the  party  who  has  the  burden  of  such  issues,  for 
in  such  case  there  would  be  no  preponderance  in  favor  of  such 
proposition.24 

§387.  Preponderance  in  a  case  of  negligence. — The  burden 
of  proof  in  this  case  is  upon  the  plaintiff,  and  before  he  can 
recover  on  account  of  the  alleged  negligence  on  the  part  of 
the  defendants  in  providing  or  having  for  use  a  weak,  defective 
or  insufficient  plank  as  a  scaffold,  it  is  necessary  for  the  plain- 
tiff to  prove,  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  (1)  that  the 
plank  was  insufficient,  weak  or  defective,  and  that  the  acci- 
dent happened  as  the  result  of  such  weakness,  insufficiency  or 
defect;  (2)  that  the  defendants  had  notice  or  knowledge  of 
such  insufficiency,  weakness  or  defect,  or  that  they  might  have 
had  notice  thereof  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care;  (3)  that 
the  plaintiff  did  not  know  of  such  insufficiency,  weakness  or 
defect,  and  that  he  had  no  means  of  knowledge  thereof  equal 
to  those  of  the  defendants;  (4)  and  that  he  was,  in  his  relation 
to  the  accident,  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care.  If  the  plain- 
tiff fails  to  prove,  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  any 
one  of  these  four  propositions,  the  jury  should  find  for  the 
defendants,  even  though  they  find  that  Gallagher  was  foreman, 
and  gave  directions  to  use  the  plank  in  question.25 

23  Ball  v.  Marquis,   (Iowa)   98  N.  N.  E.  1008.     See  also,  Wray  v.  Tin- 

*W.   497;    Mayers  v.  Smith,   121   111.  dall,  45  Ind.  517. 

451,   13   N.   E.   216:    Myer  v.   Mead,  24  Renard  v.  Grande,  29  Ind.  App. 

83    111.    20;    West    C.    St.    R.    Co.    v.  579,  64  N.  E.  644. 

Leiserowitz,    197   111.   612,   64  N.   E.  25  Armour   v.    Brazeau,     191     111. 

718;    Gage  v.  Eddy,  179  111.  503,  53  117,  126,  60  N.  E.  904. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

AGENCY. 

See.  Sec. 

INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  PLAINTIFF.  392.    Railroad    company    bound   by 

agents'    negligence. 

388.  Principal  bound  acts  of  agent. 

389.  Agent    borrowing    money    for  INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  DEFENDANT. 

employer.  393.    Agent  acting  without  scope  of 

390.  Company    bound    by    acts    of  authority. 

paying  teller.  394.     Agent    selling    land    at    price 

391.  Agent     exceeding     authority;  agreed   upon. 

principal   bound.  395.    Contract  on   sale  of  machine 

by  agent. 

Instructions  for  Plaintiff. 

§388.  Principal  bound  by  acts  of  agent. —  (1)  If  you  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  prior  and  up  to  the  time  of  the  execution 
of  the  bond  sued  on,  the  said  F  &  H  had  voluntarily  and 
knowingly  held  said  M  out  to  the  world  as  authorized  to  sign 
sontracts  similar  to  the  one  in  question,  and  had  knowingly 
so  conducted  themselves  to  reasonably  justify  the  public  gen- 
erally and  those  dealing  with  them,  in  believing  that  said  M 
was  authorized  to  sign  their  firm  name  to  such  contracts,  and 
that  the  plaintiffs  accepted  said  bond,  believing  that  said  M 
had  authority  to  sign  the  same,  then  the  defendants  would  be 
bound  by  the  acts  of  said  M.1 

(2)  If  the  defendant  employed  and  authorized  R  to  sell  the 
land,  and  in  pursuance  of  that  authority  R  sold  the  land  and  in- 
duced the  plaintiff  to  buy,  and  made  false  representations  about 
the  land,  upon  which  the  plaintiff  relied  and  which  induced 

i  Fore  v.  Hitson,  70  Tex.  520,  8  Co.  58  111.  141,  principal  bound  by 
S.  W.  292.  See  Smith  v.  Wise  &  acts  of  agent. 

398 


399  PRINCIPAL  BOUND  BY  ACTS  OF  AGENT.          §  388 

him  to  purchase,  then  the  defendant  would  be  responsible  for 
such  fraud,  notwithstanding  there  were  no  instructions  given 
to  R  by  the  defendant  which  authorized  him  to  make  fraud- 
ulent representations,  and  notwithstanding  the  defendant  did 
not  know  that  he  practiced  those  fraudulent  representations. 
Employing  him  as  agent,  or  as  his  agent,  to  do  that  thing, 
he  became  responsible  for  the  methods  which  his  said  agent 
adopted  in  doing  that  thing.  If  the  representations  were  false 
in  fact  and  R  had  no  knowledge  personally  of  the  truth  there- 
of, but  derived  his  information  from  others  as  to  those  facts, 
he  or  the  person  for  whom  he  was  acting  as  agent  in  that 
business  would  be  liable  to  an  action  for  deceit.2 

(3)  If  you  find  that  A,  the  treasurer,  had  express  authority 
to  sign  the  notes  and  checks  and  effect  the  loan  in  question, 
or  if  you  find  that  these  acts  were  within  the  apparent  scope 
of  his  authority,   or  within  the '  scope   of  the   authority   which 
he  was  accustomed  to  exercise  without  objection  by  these  de- 
fendants, your  verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiff;  but  if  you 
find  that  borrowing  this  money  in  the  way  testified  to  and  giv- 
ing  this  paper  was  not  within   the   authority   expressly    given 
to  him,   or  within  the  apparent  scope  of  the  authority  which 
he  was  accustomed  to  exercise,  then  your  verdict  should  be  for 
the  defendants;  and  if  you  find  that  this  money  borrowed,  or 
received  for  the  paper  in  suit,  was  not  for  the  use  of  the  de- 
fendants, and  the  plaintiff  knew,  or  had  good  cause  to  know 
the  fact,   or  if  for   any   other  reason  the  plaintiff  did    not   in 
good  faith  trust  the  credit  of  the  defendants,  then  your  ver- 
dict  should  be  for  the   defendants.3 

(4)  In  bringing  the  action  upon  these  notes  the  Globe  Savings 
Bank   and   the   plaintiff   adopt   and   ratify   all   the   acts   of   its 
agents   or   officers  by   which   the   notes   in   question    came   into 
the  bank;  that  is,  when  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover  upon  these 
notes  from  the   defendant,   it  is  bound  by  what  the   evidence 
in  the  case  shows  to  be  the  facts  connected  with  the  transac- 
tion.4 

2  Haskell   v.    Starbird,   152   Mass.          *  Chicago,  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Brady. 
118,  25  N.  E.  14.  165  Mo.  203,  65  S.  W.  303. 

3  Rowland   v.    Apothecaries'   Hall 
Co.  47  Conn.  387. 


§    389  AGENCY.  400 

§  389.  Agent  borrowing  money  for  employer. — (1)  If  you  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  C  borrowed  money  from  plain- 
tiff, claiming  to  act  as  agent  of  defendants,  and  if  such  act  of 
borrowing  was  within  the  usual  and  ordinary  scope  or  pur- 
view of  the  business  in  which  C  was  employed,  and  which  he 
was  authorized  by  defendants  to  conduct  and  carry  on,  and 
plaintiff  loaned  the  money  to  C  for  the  benefit  of  defendants, 
then  defendants  would  be  bound  for  such  money,  even  if,  by 
the  private  contract  between  defendants  and  C,  he  was  not 
authorized  to  borrow  money,  unless  plaintiff  knew  he  was  not 
so  authorized  when  he  loaned  the  money.5 

(2)  If  C  borrowed  money  from  plaintiff  for  the  benefit  of  de- 
fendants,' without  authority  from  defendants,  either  express  or 
implied,  and  if  defendants,  knowing  that  such  money  had  been 
borrowed,   ratified   and   acquiesced  in  the   act   of  C,   or  know- 
ing  such   money   to    be   borrowed,    accepted   the   benefit   of   it. 
then  they  would  be  held  bound  by  the  act  of  C,  as  much  as 
if  they  had  authorized  it  before  it  was  done.6 

(3)  It  is  not  necessary  for  plaintiff  to  show  any  express  au- 
thority in  C  to  borrow  money  to  render  defendant  liable.     If 
money  was  borrowed  by  C  in  the  general  course  and  conduct  of 
the  business  of  defendants,  and  defendants  knew  this  fact  and 
acquiesced  in  it,  and  the  note   sued  on  was  given  for  money 
borrowed   of  plaintiff,   by   C,   for  the   business   of   defendants, 
and  the  money  was  in  good  faith  used  in  such  business,  and 
plaintiff  had  no  knowledge  of  any  want  of  express  authority 
on  C 's  part  to  borrow  -money,  then  you  will  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff.7 

(4)  If  you  find  that  C   was  an  agent  of  defendants,  but  that 
express  authority  was  not  given  to  him,  as  such  agent,  to  bor- 
row money  for  defendants,  then  you  may  look  to  the  contract 
between  them   as  it  may  be  shown,   by  the   evidence,   the   na- 
ture and  character  of  the  business  in  which  C  was  employed 
to  act  as  agent,   and   all  the  transactions  between  them,   and 
ascertain  whether  or  not  it  is  to  be  fairly  implied  as  contem- 
plated by  them  or  embraced  in  the  scope  of  his  employment 

s  Collins  v.   Cooper,  65  Tex.   4G2.          1  Collins  v.  Cooper,  66  Tex.   462. 
e  Collins  v.  Cooper,   65  Tex.   462. 


401  PRINCIPAL    BOUND   BY   ACTS    OF   AGENT.  §    392 

as  agreed  on  between  them,  that  he  should  have  such  power 
to  borrow  money  to  be  used  in  such  business.8 

§  390.  Company  bound  by  acts  of  paying  teller. — If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  checks  were  certified  by  the  pay- 
ing teller  of  the  defendant  company,  and  if  you  further  find 
from  the  evidence  that  said  certifications  were  made  in  the 
general  course  of  the  defendant's  business,  and  if  you  further 
find  that  plaintiff,  in  good  faith,  dealt  with  said  defendant 
company  on  the  basis  of  said  course  of  business,  and  if  you 
further  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  officers  of  defendant 
knew  of  said  course  of  business,  then  defendant  will  be  bound 
by  the  act  of  its  paying  teller  in  making  the  certification  of 
the  check  sued  on.9 

§  391.    Agent  exceeding  authority — Principal  bound. — If  the 

jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  authorized  C,  his 
agent,  to  rent  the  house  in  question  to  defendant  for  but  one 
year,  but  that  said  agent  rented  it  for  two  years,  as  alleged  by 
the  defendant's  witnesses,  and  that  the  defendant  held  the 
same  for  two  years,  and  that  during  the  second  year  of  the 
said  tenancy  plaintiff  treated  the  defendant  as  his  tenant  by 
receiving  the  rent  originally  agreed  upon,  then  the  jury  may 
infer  that  the  landlord  ratified  the  contract  for  the  two  years' 
lease  and  may  find  for  the  defendant.10 

§  392.    Railroad  company  bound  by  agent's  negligence. — A 

railroad  company  is  liable  for  the  acts  of  its  employes  or  ser- 
vants done  in  the  prosecution  of  the  company's  business  and 
within  the  scope  of  the  authority  given  them  as  such  employes. 
And  so  one  of  the  important  questions  you  are  called  upon 
to  decide  is  whether  the  defendant,  by  its  agents  or  employes, 
placed  the  hand-car  that  caused  the  injury  on  the  highway. 
The  true  test  is  not  the  form  of  employment,  whether  by  the 
day  or  by  the  month,  but  whether  the  men  who  left  the  car 
on  the  highway  were  under  the  control  and  direction  of  the 
defendant  so  that  they  were  its  servants,  and  not  the  servants 
of  another.11 

s  Collins  v.  Cooper,  65  Tex.   462.          10  Reynolds   v.    Davison,    34    Md. 
s  Muth  v.  St.  Louis  T.  Co.  94  Mo.       666. 

App.  94,  67  S.  W.  978.  «  Pittsburg,   C.   &   St.   L.   R.   Co. 

v.  Sponier,  85  Ind.  169. 


§    393  AGENCY.  402 

Instructions  for  Defendant. 

§393.    Agent  acting  without  scope    of    authority. — (1)     No 

statement  made  or  action  taken  by  defendant's  agent  and  oper- 
ator, B,  before  its  office  opened  for  business,  and  when  said  agent 
and  operator  was  at  home,  or  not  in  the  service  of  the  com- 
>pany  or  engaged  in  the  functions  of  his  position,  was  binding 
upon  the  defendant ; -nor  can  the  defendant  be  held  liable  there- 
for, as  the  responsibility  of  the  company  began  when  the  mes- 
sage was  filed  with  it  for  transmission.12 

(2)  Unless   you   find   from   the   evidence   that   J,   the   person 
whose  name  appears  on  the  face  of  the  writing  introduced  by  the 
plaintiff,  was  authorized  or  held  out  to  the  public  by  the  de- 
fendant   company    as    being    authorized    to    certify    or    mark 
"good, "  writings  or  checks  of  the  character  of  the  paper  sued 
on  by  plaintiff,  you  will  find  for  the  defendant,  and  the  court 
states  to  the  jury  that  the   fact  that  the  said  J  signed  him- 
self as  the  "teller,"  or  was  designated  or  called  "teller"   or 
"paying  teller"  of  the  defendant  company,  is  not  of  itself  suf- 
ficient to  justify  the   conclusion  that   the   said  J  was   clothed 
with  any  such  authority.13 

(3)  Even  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  S  did  pur- 
chase  the   property   in    controversy   for   himself   and   L    &    M, 
yet  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  L  did  not  au- 
thorize him  to   do  so,  L   is  not  bound  by  such   purchase.     If 
the  jury  find  that  in  the  contract  and  arrangement  which  re- 
sulted in  the  giving  of  the  note  in  suit,  the  business  between 
L  and  B  was  done  by  S,  and  that  said  S  had  no  authority, 
as   a   general    agent,   from  said  L   beyond  that  resulting  from 
their  relation  as  general  partners  in  the  manufacture  of  plows, 
but  only  an  authority  to  do  that  particular  business,   he,  the 
said   S,  would  be,   as  far  as  this   case  is  concerned,   a  special 
agent  for  L  in  that  business,  and  so  far  as  the  jury  find  that 
the   said   S,   in   doing   it,   exceeded   the   authority  and   instruc- 
tions given  to  him  by  L,  L  would  not  be  bound.14 

(4)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  D  was  a  canvassing 

12  Hargrave  v.    Western    U.    Tel.          is  Muth   v.    St.    Louis   T.    Co.    94 
Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  60  S.  W.  689.          Mo.  App.  94,  67  S.  W.  978. 

n  Lytle  v.  Boyer,  33  Ohio  St.  510. 


403  CONTRACTS  BY  AGENTS.  §  395 

agent,  obtaining  subscriptions  for  the  plaintiff  for  books  pub- 
lished by  him  and  sold  by  subscription,  and-  that  said  D  was 
restricted  by  the  terms  of  his  employment  from  collecting  for 
any  books  or  parts  of  books,  except  such  as  were  delivered  by 
him,  and  if  you  further  find  that  the  said  canvassing  agent 
never  had  possession  of  the  parts  and  works  for  which  this 
suit  is  brought,  and  did  not  deliver  the  same  to  the  defendant, 
then  the  court  declares  the  law  to  be  that  the  employment  of 
D,  as  canvassing  agent,  gave  him  no  authority  to  collect  the 
money  for  which  this  suit  is  brought,  and  it  devolves  upon  the 
defendant  to  show  that  D  had  such  authority.15 

§  394.  Agent  selling  land  at  price  agreed  upon. — If  you  shall 
find  from  the  evidence  that  J,  as  agent  of  the  plaintiff,  agreed 
with  the  defendants  that  they  should  take  and  sell  for  the 
plaintiff  certain  of  the  lots  then  being  offered  for  sale  by  the 
plaintiff  for  a  certain  and  definite  price  fixed,  and  agreed  upon 
by  and  between  the  defendants  and  the  said  J,  for  which  the 
defendants  were  to  take  and  receive  an  agreed  commission,  viz. : 
one  and  one-half  per  cent  on  the  purchase  price,  and  that  the 
defendants  have  sold  said  lots  for  the  agreed  price,  and  have 
fully  accounted  to  the  plaintiff  for  the  proceeds  received  there- 
for, less  the  stipulated  commission,  then  they  are  not  liable 
to  the  plaintiff  in  this  action,  although  they  may  have  received 
from  the  purchasers  of  said  lots  a  sum  for  conducting  the  ne- 
gotiations, receiving  and  paying  out  the  notes  and  money,  and 
superintending  the  transactions,  and  receiving  the  deeds  and 
other  papers  for  them.16 

§  395,  Contract  in  sale  of  machine  by  agent. — If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  defendant,  Kemp,  at 
the  time  of  their  first  conversation  concerning  the  purchase  of 
the  machine,  told  the  plaintiff's  agent,  Minnick,  that  any  con- 
tract that  Cook  might  make  with  the  plaintiff  through  its  agent 
would  be  all  right  with  him,  and  used  such  language  as  would 
reasonably  give  the  plaintiff  to  understand  that  he  would  stand 
by  such  agreements  or  contracts  relative  to  the  purchase  of 
such  machine,  then  the  plaintiff  would  be  justified  in  dealing 

ia  Chambers  v.  Short,  79  Mo.  206.          is  Alexander  v.   Northwestern  C. 

U.   57   Ind.  466. 


§    395  AGENCY.  404 

with  him  (Kemp)  by  and  through  Cook,  and  the  acts  and  con- 
tracts, if  any,  made  by  him  for  himself  and  Kemp,  would  bind 
Kemp.  Any  orders  or  directions  by  Kemp  to  Cook  would  not 
affect  the  plaintiff  until  such  time  as  it  (the  plaintiff)  had  no- 
tice or  knowledge.  If  Kemp  authorized  Cook  to  act  for  him, 
and  the  plaintiff  had  knowledge  of  it,  then  he  could  have  with- 
drawn such  authority  by  notifying  the  plaintiff  of  his^  desire 
to  do  so,  but  not  by  giving  Cook  alone  the  notice  to  that  effect. 
Cook  could  not  bind  Kemp  without  authority  from  Kemp.17 

IT  Bell    City   Mfg.    Co.    v.    Kemp,      not   commenting   upon   the  facts — 
27   Wash.   Ill,   67    Pac.   580,    (held      not  intimating  what  the  facto  were.) 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 


Sec. 

INSTRUCTIONS    FOB    THE    PLAINTIFF. 

396.  Party  completing  contract  can 

recover. 

397.  Preventing  completion  of  con- 

tract. 

398.  Damages   for   failure   to    per- 

form contract. 

INSTRUCTIONS    FOR   THE   DEFENDANT. 

399.  Party  failing  to  complete  con- 

tract. 

400.  Damages  far  failure  to  deliv- 

er property  sold. 

401.  Joint   or   several    liability   on 

contract. 


CONTRACTS  IN  GENERAL. 
Sec. 


RESCINDING    CONTRACT. 

402.  Contract,    rescinding    without 

express   words. 

403.  Contract  void,  if  made  by  in- 

sane person. 


SETTLEMENT     OF     DISPUTED     CLAIMS. 

404.    Consideration    of     settlement, 
when  sufficient. 


CLAIMS    WITHOUT    CONSIDERATION. 

405.     Claim  based  upon  void  patent. 


Instructions  for  Plaintiff. 

§396.  Party  completing  contract  can  recover. — (1)  The  ex- 
ecution of  the  written  instruments  in  suit  is  admitted,  and  if  you 
find  from  the  evidence  that  the  railroad  in  question  was  built 
and  completed  from  A  to  K,  and  the  cars  running  thereon 
to  the  depot  at  K,  within  two  years  from  the  first  day  of  June, 
1875,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  the  full  amount 
named  in  said  instruments,  with  interest  thereon  at  the  rate 
of  ten  per  cent  per  annum  from  the  time  the  road  was  thus 
completed  to  the  present  time,  unless  you  find  that  the  de- 

405 


§397  CONTRACTS  IN  GENERAL.  406 

fendant  has  maintained  his  defense  of  failure  of  consideration 
as  hereinafter  explained,  by  a  preponderance  of  testimony.1 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiffs  entered 
upon  the  performance  of  their  part  of  the  said  contract,  and  per- 
formed work  under  it,  according  to  its  terms,  and  if  you  further 
find  that  the  engineer  made  out  monthly  proximate  estimates 
of  the  work  done  by  plaintiff  at  the  end  of  each  month,  which 
were  returned  and  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  defendant,  and 
that  the  defendant,  upon  the  request  of  the  plaintiffs,  after 
the  expiration  of  fifteen  days  from  the  return  of  any  such  es- 
timate, refused  and  neglected  to  pay  plaintiffs  the  amount  due 
according  to  any  such  estimate,  such  failure  or  refusal  of  the 
defendant  to  pay  was  a  breach  of  his  part  of  the  contract,  and 
the  plaintiffs  were  not  bound  to  go  on  and  complete  all  the 
work,  but  might  suspend  or  quit  the  work  until  payment  was 
made,  and  if  you  find  that  payment  has  not  been  made  and 
the  work  has  been  suspended,  the  plaintiffs  will  be  entitled 
to  recover  in  this  suit  for  all  work  done  under  said  contract 
at  the  rates  therein  stipulated.2 

§397.  Preventing  completion  of  contract. — (1)  Where  two 
parties  enter  into  a  lawful  contract  upon  sufficient  consideration, 
and  one  of  the  parties  is  ready  and  willing  to  perform,  and 
makes  preparations  to  perform  on  his  part,  but  is  prevented 
from  performing  by  the  other  party,  the  party  so  ready  and 
willing  to  perform  can  recover  all  damages  suffered  by  him 
by  reason  of  the  default  of  the  other  party,  including  necessary 
expenses  incurred  in  making  such  preparation.3 

(2)  Under  the  contract  it  was  not  the  duty  of  the  plaintiffs  to 
procure  the  right  of  way ;  and  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that 
the  plaintiffs  entered  upon  the  performance  of  their  part  of  the 
contract  by  grubbing,  clearing,  grading,  etc.,  as  therein  stipulat- 
ed, and  that  they  were  prevented  from  completing  their  part  of 
the  contract  because  the  right  of  way  had  not  been  obtained  from 
the  owners  of  the  land  through  which  the  road  ran,  and  where 
the  work  was  to  be  done,  who  forbade  and  refused  to  permit 
the  plaintiffs  to  enter  and  do  the  work,  this  would  be  a  sufficient 

1  Merrill  v.  Reaver,  50  Iowa,  404.         3  Kenwood  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dunder- 

2  Bean  v.  Miller,  69  Mo.  393.  date,  50  111.  App.  581. 


407  PREVENTING   COMPLETION   OF   CONTRACT.  §    398 

excuse  for  the  failure   of  the  plaintiffs  to  perform  the  work, 
where  such  right  of  way  had  not  been  obtained.4 

(3)  The  defendant  was  bound  by  the  contract  to  furnish  one 
track  scales  at  the  one-bark.     The  plaintiffs  claim  that  the  de- 
fendant failed  and  refused  to   furnish  such  track  scales,   and 
that  by  reason  thereof  they  were  damaged  five  hundred  dol- 
lars, and  they  claim  that  they  demanded  such  scales  under  the 
contract  of  the  defendant.     If  the  defendant  failed  and  refused 
to  furnish  such  scales,  and  the  plaintiffs  were  damaged  there- 
by, they  will  be  entitled  to  recover  such  damages  as  they  have 
sustained,  if  they  have  sustained  any  on  this  account.5 

(4)  If  the  jury  should  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 
was   wrongfully   discharged,    it   was   nevertheless   the    duty    of 
the   plaintiff  not  to  remain  idle,   but  to  use   every   reasonable 
effort  to  procure  employment,  and  the  jury  should  deduct  from 
such  amount  of  salary  as  they  find  to  have  been  unpaid  such 
sums   as   the   plaintiff   earned   in    any    other   employment,    and 
also  any  further  sums  which,  in  their  judgment,  he  might  have 
earned  by  due  and  reasonable  industry  and  diligence.6 

(5)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
made  with  the  plaintiff  the  agreement  in  either  count  of  the 
plaintiff's  declaration  alleged,  and  that  before  the  time  for  ex- 
ecution of  the  same  on  his  part,  by  his  own  act  put  it  out  of  his 
power  to  perform  said  agreement,  then  he  is  liable  to  the  plaintiff 
in  this   suit   for   such   damages    as   the   plaintiff  has   sustained 
by  any  failure  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  to  perform,  and 
in  such  case  it  was  unnecessary  for  the  plaintiff  to  make  de- 
mand, or  to  do  any  other  act  to  fix  the  defendant's  liability.1. 

§  398.  Damages  for  failure  to  perform  contract. — The  party 
who  has  been  wrongfully  deprived  of  the  gains  and  profits 
of  an  executory  contract  may  recover  as  an  equivalent,  and  by 
way  of  damages,  the  difference  between  the  contract  price — 
the  amount  which  he  would  have  earned  and  been  entitled  to 
recover  on  performance — and  the  amount  which  it  would  have 
cost  him  to  perform  the  contract.  In  estimating  such  costs, 
allowance  must  be  made  for  every  item  of  cost  and  expense 

*  Bean  v.  Miller,  69  Mo.  393.  e  Equitable   E.    A.    v.    Fisher,    71 

s  Eaves  v.   Cherokee  Iron  Co.   73       Md.  436,  18  Atl.  808. 
Ga.    459.  7  White  v.  Thomas,  39  111.  227. 


§399  CONTRACTS  IN  GENERAL.  408 

necessarily  attending  a  full  compliance  on  his  part;  and  in  es- 
timating his  profits,  you  will,  of  course,  exclude  all  such  as 
are  merely  speculative  and  conjectural.8 

Instructions  for  Defendant. 

§399.  Party  failing  to  complete  contract. — (1)  That  under 
the  written  contract  in  evidence  the  defendant  was  entitled  to 
have  erected  such  a  dock  as  was  called  for  by  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract, and  even  though  the  jury  may  believe  that  there  has 
been  a  substantial  performance  of  the  terms  of  the  contract 
by  the  plaintiffs,  yet  nevertheless,  if  the  jury  believe  that  the 
terms  have  not  been  fully  complied  with,  the  jury  should  al- 
low to  the  defendant  such  sum  or  sums  as,  from  the  evidence, 
they  may  believe  are  reasonable  and  proper  to  enable  the  de- 
fendant to  complete  the  dock  in  the  manner  stipulated  for  in 
the  contract.9 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 
contracted  to  perform  a  certain  job  of  work  in  making  a 
road  for  a  stipulated  price,  and  that  he,  the  plaintiff,  did  not 
complete  said  job,  but  without  cause  abandoned  the  same  be- 
fore it  was  completed  according  to  contract,  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  defendant,  and  that  it  would  cost  more  to  com- 
plete said  job,  according  to  the  contract,  than  the  original  con- 
tract price,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  for  the  work  done  by 
him.10 

§  400.    Damages  for  failure  to  deliver  property  sold. — If  the 

•jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  in  the  winter  of  1865  the 
defendant  sold  to  the  plaintiff,  and  the  plaintiff  purchased  of 
the  defendant,  the  best  sixty  head  of  a  lot  of  seventy  head  of 
cattle  the  defendant  was  then  feeding,  to  be  delivered  to  the 
plaintiff  at  any  time  between  the  first  and  fifth  of  March,  1865, 
at  the  option  of  the  plaintiff,  the  plaintiff,  on  such  delivery, 
to  pay  therefor  six  cents  per  pound  of  the  gross  weight  of 
the  same,  and  that  the  defendant,  in  February,  1865,  sold  and 
delivered  to  another  person  forty-eight  head  of  said  seventy 

s  Cincinnati,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lutes,          »  Keeler  v.  Herr,  157  111.  57,  59, 
112  Ind.  281,  11  N.  E.  784,  14  N.  E.       41  N.   E.    750. 
706.  10  Swift  v.   Williams,  2   Ind.   366 


409  JOINT   OR   SEVERAL — RESCINDING    CONTRACT.  §    403 

head  of  cattle,  and  put  it  out  of  his  power  to  comply  with  his 
agreement  of  sale  to  the  plaintiff,  then  he  is  liable  to  the  plain- 
tiff in  this  action  for  the  difference  between  such  contract  price 
and  what  said  sixty  head  of  cattle  were  worth  at  the  time 
and  place,  when  and  where,  by  said  agreement,  they  .were  to 
be  delivered  by  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff,  and  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  the  price  of  the  cattle  rose  or  fell  after 
the  time  the  cattle  were  to  be  delivered  under  the  contract.11 

§  401.  Joint  or  several  liability  on  contract. — If  some  of  the 
defendants  employed  the  plaintiff  by  a  contract,  express  or  im- 
plied, and  some  of  them  did  not  so  employ  him,  and  did  not  after- 
wards accept  and  enjoy  the  fruits  and  benefits  of  his  services, 
if  such  services  were  rendered  by  the  plaintiff,  then  as  to  such 
defendants  who  did  not  so  employ  the  plaintiff,  and  who  did 
not  accept  and  enjoy ,  the  fruits  of  such  services,  you  should 
find  for  such  defendants,  even  though  the  plaintiff  should  be 
entitled  to  recover  against  others.12 


Rescinding  Contract. 

§  402.    Contract,    rescinding    without    express    words. — Any 

contract  may  be  rescinded  by  consent  of  all  the  contracting 
parties,  and  such  consent  need  not  necessarily  be  expressed 
in  words.13 

§  403.    Contract  void  if  made  by  insane  person. — The   law 

cannot  undertake  to  measure  the  validity  of  contracts  by '  the 
greater  or  less  strength  of  the  understanding;  but  if  the  de- 
fendant was,  at  the  time  of  signing  the  notes,  so  insane  or 
destitute  of  reason  as  not  to  know  the  consequences  of  the  act, 
then  it  is  void.  If  he  did  know  what  he  was  doing,  and  un- 
derstood the  consequences  of  his  contract,  then  he  is  liable, 
and  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiffs  in  case  you  so 
find.14 

11  White  v.   Thomas,   39   111.   227;      nail   H.    Co.   201   111.   299,    66   N.   E. 
Garfield  v.  Huls,  54  111  427,  damages      237. 

for  failure  to  do  work  properly.  14  Van  Patton  v.  Beals,  46  Iowa, 

12  Hauss  v.   Niblack.   80  Ind.   414.      62. 
is  Iroquois    Furnace  Co.    v.    Big- 


CONTRACTS  IN  GENERAL.  410 

Settlement  of  Disputed  Claims. 

§  404.  Consideration  of  settlement,  when  sufficient. — (1)  A 
person  cannot  pay  and  satisfy  a  debt  by  the  payment  of  a  less 
sum  than  the  debt,  but  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  plaintiff,  in  order  to  avoid  a  suit,  of  the  result  of  which 
he  was  doubtful,  agreed  to  receive  a  sum  in  full  satisfaction 
of  the  amount  claimed  to  be  due  on  said  account,  and  upon 
such  agreement  the  defendant  paid  the  sum  agreed  upon,  then 
such  agreement  and  payment  would  completely  discharge  the 
defendant  of  all  liability.15 

(2)  The  abandonment  and  discontinuance  of  a  suit  or  action 
brought  to  enforce  a  doubtful  right  or  claim,  is  a  sufficient  con- 
sideration for  a  promise,  and  so  is  the  compromise  of  a  disputed 
claim  made  bona  fide,  even  though  it  ultimately  appears  that  the 
claim  compromised  was  wholly  unfounded.  If,  therefore,  you 
should  believe  and  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  note  sued 
on  in  this  case  was  given  in  consideration  of  a  compromise  of 
the  suit  instituted  by  plaintiffs  on  the  five  thousand  dollar  note, 
and  that  said  suit  was  dismissed  by  plaintiffs,  and  that  said 
agreement  of  compromise  was  carried  out  by  the  parties  thereto, 
then  you  are  instructed  that  said  agreement  forms  a  sufficient 
consideration  for  the  note  sued  on.16 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence"  that  the  parties  to  this 
action  compromised  their  differences,  as  set  forth  in  the  plaintiff's 
declaration,    and   that  the   writing   of   April   27,    1897,    marked 
exhibit  No.  6,  was  signed  by  the  plaintiff  after  being  prepared 
and  written  by  the   defendant's   agent,   and  that   said  writing 
embodied  the  actual  terms  of  such  compromise,  and  was  accepted 
and  acted  upon  by  the  defendant,  then  the  defendant  is  bound 
by  the  provisions  of  said  compromise.17 

(4)  If  these  two  men  made  an  unfounded  claim  (they  claim 
here  this  lumber  was  not  according  to  contract),  and  made  that 

is  Ogbom  v.  Hoffman,  52  Ind.  439.  ceipt  for  the  amount  in  full;  there 

is  Hunter,    E.    &    Co.    v.    Lanius,  must  be  a  consideration  before  such 

82    Tex.    677,    18   S.    W.    Z01,    (part  settlement   is  binding).     Osirander 

payment    of    the    amount    actually  v.  Scott,  161  111.  345,  43  N.  E.  1089. 

due  is  not  satisfaction  of  the  whote         IT  Rhodes  v  Chesapeake  &  O.  R. 

debt,     even     though     the     creditor  Co.    49    W.    \"a.    494,    55    L.    R.    A. 

agrees   to   receive    a   part   for    the  170,  175. 

whole  of  his  claim  and  gives  a  re- 


411  SETTLEMENT  OF  CLAIMS.  §  404 

knowingly,  knowing  there  was  no  color  of  right  to  it,  but 
asserted  an  unjust  claim,  and  induced  the  parties  to  compromise, 
under  the  circumstances,  in  order  to  avoid  litigation,  etc.,  it 
would  not  be  binding  on  the  company  here ;  but,  if  these  two 
men  did  find  fault  with  the  lumber,  and  had  good  reason  for 
finding  fault,  if  it  did  not  comply  with  the  contract,  and  they 
talked  about  it,  and  they  finally  made  this  offer  in  good  faith, 
and  these  parties  said,  "We  will  take  the  money,"  and  took  it, 
they  are  bound  by  the  contract,  because,  in  that  case,  there 
would  be  a  valid  dispute  between  the  parties,  settled  up  by 
agreement.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  were  a  fraudulent  scheme 
on  the  part  of  these  parties  to  beat  defendant  out  of  money,  it 
would  not  be  binding.18 

(5)  If  the  jury  find  that  the  parties  met  and  this  matter  was 
all  settled  up,  and  was  so  understood  by  the  parties,  each  party 
presenting  a  claim  against  the  other,  and  the  pretended  settle- 
ment was  not  a  myth,  but  a  reality,  that  constitutes   a   good 
defense  to  this  action,  and  the  verdict  must  be  for  the  defend- 
ants.19 

(6)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  from  time  to  time 
the  officers  or  agents  of  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  in  this  suit 
met  and  looked  over  their  accounts  together  and  settled  all  mat- 
ters between  them,  and  struck  a  balance  and  agreed  upon  that  as 
the  amount  due  from  the  one  to  the  other,  then,  in  the  absence 
of  a  mistake  or  fraud,  neither  party  will  be  allowed  to  go  behind 
that   settlement  for  the   purpose   of  increasing   or   diminishing 
the  amount  so  agreed  upon.20 

(7)  When  the  parties  have  gone  to  law  about  a  matter  they 
may  settle  between  themselves  with  the  intervention  of  an  attor- 
ney on  either  side,  or  with  an  attorney  on  one  side,  if  they  see 
fit  to  do  so,  but  after  an  action  is  commenced,  and  the  parties 
appear  with  an  attorney  in  court,  any  settlement  of  the  claim  out 
of  court,  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  attorney,  is  to 
be  viewed  with  suspicion.     If  there  is  any  fraud  in  the  case, 
such  a  settlement  may  be  set  aside.21 

is  Nash  v.   Manistee  Lumber  Co.          20  Gottfried  Brewing  Co.  v.  Szark- 
75  Mich.  357,  42  N.  W.  840.  owski,  79  111.  App.  583. 

!»  Doyle   v.   Donnelly,   56  Me.   28.          21  Faloonio  v.  Larsen,  31  Ore.  149, 

48  Pac.  703. 


§405  CONTRACTS  IN  GENERAL.  412 

(8)  If  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  performed  certain  legal  ser- 
vices for  the  defendant,  with  the  defendant's  knowledge  and  con- 
sent, and  that  defendant  recived  the  benefits  thereof  without  ob- 
jection, then  plaintiff  will  be  entitled  to  recover  the  reasonable 
value  of  such  services,  unless  defendant  has  established  by  a 
fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  they  were  performed 
under  a  contract  made  by  him  with  plaintiff's  father,  by  which 
the  latter  agreed  that  plaintiff  should  perform  the  said  services, 
and  the  value  thereof  should  be  indorsed  upon  an  indebtedness 
which  was  then  owing  by  H  to  the  defendant,  and  that  the  plain- 
tiff had  knowledge  of  such  agreement.22 

(9)  No  particular  form  of  words  is  necessary,  to  constitute  a 
settlement,  nor  is  it  necessary  to  prove  a  promise  to  pay  the 
balance  found  to  be  due,  provided  a  balance  be  found  in  favor 
of  the  party.23 


Claim  without  Consideration. 

§  405.  Claim  based  on  void  patent. — (1)  The  jury  are  in- 
structed that  the  letters  patent  are  prima  facie  evidence  that  the 
plaintiffs  are  the  joint  inventors  of  the  so-called  improved  com- 
position, yet,  if  that  fact  may  be  disproved,  and  if  the  jury  should 
be  satisfied  from  the  testimony  that  said  composition  was  in- 
vented by  the  plaintiff  K  alone,  and  not  by  K  and  E  jointly, 
the  letters  patent  are  void ;  there  was  no  consideration  for  the 
note  sued  on,  and  the  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendants.24 

(2)  The  inventor  should  confine  his  specifications  to  sub- 
stances which  he  knows  will  answer  the  purpose  for  which  they 
are  used;  that  the  specification  accompanying  the  letters  patent 
read  in  evidence  makes  use  of  the  general  term  water;  and,  if 
the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  that  the  waters  of  the  terri- 
tory of  Colorado  in  general  use  will  not  accomplish  the  end  for 
which  water  is  used  in  the  said  composition,  either  by  reason 
of  alkaline  properties  or  otherwise,  then  the  specification  is 
not  sufficient  and  the  letters  are  void;  there  was  no  considera- 

22  Hudspeth  v.  Yetzer,  78  Iowa,  23  Brewer  v.  Wright,  25  Neb.  805, 
13,  42  N.  W.  529.  41  N.  W.  159. 

24  Keith  v.  Hobbs,  69  Mo.  87. 


413  CLAIMS  WITHOUT  CONSIDERATION.  §    405 

tion  for  the  note  sued  on,  and  the  verdict  must  be  for  the  defend- 
ants.25 

(3)  The  specification  accompanying  the  letters  patent  read 
in  evidence  must  in  and  of  itself  contain  a  full,  clear  and 
exact  description  of  the  invention,  and  if  the  object  of  the 
alleged  patent  improved  composition  for  tanning  cannot  be  ob- 
tained when  the  specification  is  clearly  followed  out  by  compe- 
tent workmen  of  ordinary  skill  and  proficiency  in  the  art  of 
tanning,  without  invention  or  addition  of  their  own,  or  if,  in 
order  to  attain  the  object  of  the  patent,  information  must  be 
derived  from  other  sources  than  the  specification,  as  by  experi- 
ments, or  from  using  other  ingredients  to  make  the  thing  de- 
scribed, or  if  it  requires  the  solution  of  a  problem,  then,  and  in 
either  of  said  cases,  the  letters  patent  are  void,  and  the  note 
sued  on  is  without  consideration  and  the  jury  must  find  for  the 
defendants.20 

25  Keith  v.  Hobbs,  69  Mo.  87.  at  no  definite  time,  the  law  implies 

26  Keith  v.  Hobbs,  69  Mo.  88.  that  it  is  to  be  performed  within 
*When  a  contract  is  made  to  b3  a  reasonable  time;  Sanborn  v.  Ben- 
performed   at  a   certain   place,   but  edict,  78  111.  309,  313  (form). 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

CONTRACTS— SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  , 

Sec.  Sec. 

406.  Sale    complete    on    delivery.  412.    Conditions     of  sale    complied 

407.  Sale  of  goods  by  sample.  with. 

408.  Sale  on  warranty"— Breach.  413.    Rescinding  sale    for     defects. 

409.  Implied   warranty.  414.    Purchasing  with  intent  to  de- 

410.  Burden   of   proving  warranty.  fraud. 

411.  Damages   for  breach   of  war- 

ranty. 

§  406.  Sale  complete  on  delivery. — (1)  All  that  is  necessary 
to  pass  property  is  that  the  buyer  and  seller  agree.  If  one  who 
has  a  long  course  of  dealing  with  another  have  a  correspondence 
in  regard  to  certain  specific  property,  nearer  to  the  purchaser 
than  to  the  seller,  and,  more  properly,  by  reason  of  their  busi- 
ness relations,  in  the  control  of  the  purchaser,  and  they  agree, 
one  to  buy  and  the  other  to  sell,  the  sale  is  complete  just  as 
soon  as  they  agree,  and  the  seller  charges  the  buyer,  and  the 
buyer  credits  their  respective  books  with  the  price  of  the  prop- 
erty.1 

(2)  If,  after  a  full  consideration  of  all  the  evidence  before 
you,  you  shall  find  that  there  was  a  delivery  of  the  goods  in 
question,  and  that  such  delivery  was  absolute  and  unconditional, 
and  was  by  the  parties  so  intended,  then  the  property  vested 
in  the  plaintiff,  and  he  should  be  entitled  to  recover.2 

(3)  If  you  should  find  that  there  was  a  delivery  to  the  plaintiff 
of  the  goods  in  question,  but  that  such  delivery  was  coupled 

*  Robinson  v.  Uhl,  6  Neb.  332.  2  Albright  v.  Brown,  23  Neb.  141, 

36  N.  W.  297. 
414 


415  SALE  COMPLETE  WHEN ;   SALE  BY   SAMPLE.  §    407 

with  the  condition  that  the  property  should  not  pass  until  the 
purchase  price  was  paid,  and  if  you  further  find  that  the  pur- 
chase price  as  agreed  upon  was  not  paid,  and  that  defendants 
repossessed  themselves  of  the  property,  then  the  conditions  are 
not  complied  with  on  the  part  of  the  purchaser,  and  if  the  seller 
has  done  all  he  agreed  to  do  on  his  part  the  seller  has  a  right  to 
repossess  himself  of  the  property,  and  such  repossession  is  a 
rescinding  of  the  sale,  and  defendants  would  be  entitled  to 
recover.8 

(4)  It  is  a  rule  of  law  that  a  sale  and  a  delivery  of  goods,  on 
condition  that  the  property  is  not  to  vest  until  the  purchase  money 
is  paid  or  secured,  does  not  pass  the  title  to  the  purchaser  until 
the  condition  is  performed ;  and  the  vendor,  in  case  the  condition 
is  not  fulfilled,  has  a  right  to  repossess  himself  of  the  goods, 
both  as  against  the  vendee  or  one  purchasing  from  such  vendee 
with  notice.    When  goods  are  delivered  to  the  vendee,  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  determines  the  interpretation  to  be  given  to 
the  delivery.4 

(5)  It  is  a  general  rule  of  law  that  when  goods  are  sold,  on 
condition  of  payment  being  made,  or  some  other  condition  pre- 
cedent being  performed,  before  or  on  delivery,  then  an  absolute 
and  unconditional  delivery  of  the  goods,  without  requiring  at  the 
time  of  delivery  payment  or  performance,  would  be  a  waiver  of 
such  payment  or  performance  as  a  condition  precedent,  and  a 
complete  title  would  pass  to  the  purchaser,  provided,  that  at  the 
time  of  such  delivery  it  was  the  intent  of  the  parties  that  it 
should   be   absolute  and  unconditional   delivery.     Though   it   is 
important,  it  is  not  absolutely  imperative  that  the  vendor  declare 
that  he  does  not  waive  any  condition  of  the  sale  at  the  time  of 
a  delivery  to  the  vendee.    The  situation  of  the  parties,  the  nature 
of  the  transaction,  the  presumption  of  honest  dealing,  and  like 
considerations  may  be  taken  into  account  in  determining  whether 
any  conditions  of  the  sale  have  been  waived.5 

§  407.     Sale  of  goods  by  sample. — (1)     In  a  sale  of  goods  by 
sample,  the  vendor  warrants  the  quality  of  the  bulk  to  equal 

3  Albright  v.  Brown,  23  Neb.  141,         *>  Albright  v.  Brown,  23  Neb.  140, 
36  N.  W.  297.  36  N.  W.  297. 

*  Albright  v.  Brown,  23  Neb.  140 
36  N.  W.  297. 


§    407  CONTRACTS,   SALE  OF   PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  416 

that  of  the  sample.  In  such  sale,  there  is  also  an  implied  con- 
dition that  the  buyer  shall  have  a  fair  opportunity  to  compare 
the  bulk  with  the  sample.  It  must  not  be  assumed,  however, 
that  in  all  cases  where  a  sample  is  exhibited,  the  sale  is  a  sale 
by  sample,  for  the  vendor  may  show  a  sample,  but  decline  to 
sell  by  it,  and  require  the  purchaser  to  inspect  the  bulk  at  his 
own  risk.6 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  in- 
tended by  exhibition  of  the  samples  to  the  defendant,  taken  in 
connection  with  all  he  said  and  did  at  the  time  the  alleged  con- 
tract of  sale  was  made,  to  impress  the  defendant  with  the  belief 
that  he  was  selling  by  sample,  and  that  the  defendant  believed 
he  was  purchasing  by  the  sample  so  exhibited,  then  they  must  find 
for  the  defendant,  unless  they  further  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  bulk  did  correspond  in  quality  with  the  sample,  or  that 
the  defendant  has,  by  clear  and  unequivocal  acts,  accepted  the 
peanuts  after  knowledge  that  the  bulk  did  not  correspond  in 
quality  with  the  sample.7 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  all  the  evidence  in  this  case  that 
the  sale  of  the  peanuts  by  S  to  the  defendant  was  made  by  a  sam- 
ple, exhibited  at  the  time  of  such  gale,  and  that  upon  an  inspection 
and  comparison  of  the  bulk  of  said  peanuts  with  such  sample, 
made  by  the  defendant  or  his  agent  within  a  reasonable  time 
after  their  delivery,  it  was  ascertained  that  the  bulk  of  such 
peanuts  were  inferior  in  quality  to  and  did  not  correspond  with 
such  sample,  and  that  the  plaintiffs  had  notice  thereof  within 
a  reasonable  time,  then  they  must  find  for  the  defendant,  unless 
the  jury  believe  further  from  the  evidence  that  after  the  peanuts 
purchased  by  the  defendant  of  the  plaintiffs  were  received  and 
inspected  by  the  defendant  or  his  agent,  and  the  sample  exhibited 
at   the    time    of   the    sale    compared    with    the    bulk,  that    the 
defendant  personally  or  by  his  agent  exercised  any  act  of  owner- 
ship over  them,  or  did  any  act  amounting  to  an  acceptance  of 
them.    The  said  acceptance  is  a  waiver  of  any  objection  to  their 
quality,   and   the   failure   of  their   quality  will   not   afterwards 
avail  him  as  a  defense,  except  in  case  of  fraud ;  but  the  proof  of 

e  Proctor  v.  Spratley,  78  Va.  255.      Wood,  84  Mich.  459,  48  N.  W.  28. 
See    Gutta    P.    &    R.    Mfg.    Co.    v.         ?  Proctor  v.  Spratley,  78  Va.  257. 


417  SALE    ON    WARRANTY — BREACH.  §    408 

such  acceptance  must  be  clear  and  unequivocal,  and  not  founded 
upon  or  induced  by  a  mistake  as  to  the  facts  at  the  time  of  such 
reception  by  the  agent,  and  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  whether, 
under  all  the  circumstances,  the  acts  which  the  buyer  or  his 
agent  does  or  forbears  to  do  amount  to  an  acceptance.8 

§408.  Sale  on  warranty — Breach  of  warranty. — (l)The  bur- 
den of  proof,  in  this  case,  is  upon  the  defendants  to  establish  any 
warranty  by  the  plaintiff  respecting  the  quality  of  machinery 
sold  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendants.9 

(2)  It  is  not  necessary  that  a  representation,  in  order  to  con- 
stitute a  warranty,  should  be  simultaneous  with  the  conclusion 
of  the  bargain ;  but  only  that  it  should  be  made  during  the  course 
of  the  dealing  which  leads  to  the  bargain,  and  should  then  enter 
into  the  bargain  as  a  part  of  it.10 

(3)  The  burden  of  proof,  in  this  case,  is  upon  the  defendants 
to  establish  any  warranty  by  the  plaintiff  respecting  the  quality 
of  the  machinery  sold  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendants.     It  is 
not  necessary,  however,  that  the  warranty  should  be  simultane- 
ous with  the  conelusion  of  the  bargain ;  but  only  that  it  should 
be  made  during  the  course  of  dealing  which  leads  to  the  bargain 
and  should  then  enter  into  the  bargain  as  a  part  of  it.11 

(4)  If  you   believe   from  the   evidence   that   the   defendant, 
Thorne,  represented  to  the  plaintiff,  Raymond,  that  the  hams  in 
question  were  first  class  hams,  equal  in  quality  to  any  brand  of 
hams  made  in  the  market,  and  that  such  representation  was  made 
by  Thorne  with  the  intention  thereby  of  warranting  the  hams  to 
be  of  such  quality,  and  to  induce  the  plaintiff  to  buy  the  same, 
and  that  Reynolds  purchased  said  hams  relying  upon  such  rep- 
resentations as  a  warranty  of  the  quality,  and  that  at  the  time 
of  purchasing  the  hams,   they  were  not  of  the   quality  repre- 
sented, but  were  of  a  poor,  inferior  and  bad  quality,  then  your 
verdict  will  be  for  the  plaintiffs.     And,  upon  the  question  of 
damages,  the  court  instructs  you  that  if  you  believe,  from  the 
evidence,  that  they,  at  the  time  of  such  sale  to  the  plaintiffs, 

s  Proctor  v.  Spratley,  78  Va.  256.  «  Adler  v.  Robert  Portner  Brew- 

a  Adler  v.  Robert  Portner  Brew-  ing  Co.  65  Md.  28,  2  Atl.  918;  Eureka 

ing  Go.  65  Md.  28,  2  Atl.  918.  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Baltimore,  C.  S. 

10  Eureka  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Balti-  &c.  R.  Co.  78  Md.  183,  27  Atl.  1035. 

more   Copper,   Smelt  and   Roll   Co. 

78   Md.    183,    27    Atl.    1035. 


§    408  CONTRACTS,   SALE  OF   PERSONAL   PROPERTY.  418 

had  a  contract  for  the  resale  of  said  hams  to  one  Davis,  of  Salt 
Lake  City,  and  that  they  had  sold  the  same  as  hams  of  the 
quality  aforesaid,  and  that,  at  the  time  of  the  sale  to  the  plain- 
tiffs, the  defendant,  Thorne,  had  knowledge  of  such  contract  of 
resale,  and  knew  that  the  plaintiffs  purchased  said  hams  to 
fulfill  said  contract  of  resale,  and  that  the  hams  were  shipped 
to  said  Davis  before  the  plaintiffs  had  any  notice  of  their  quality, 
and  that  upon  their  arrival  at  Salt  Lake  City  the  said  Davis 
refused  to  receive  or  pay  for  the  same,  for  the  reason  that  they 
were  not,  at  the  time  of  their  shipment  to  him,  of  the  quality 
he  had  bargained  for,  then  you  will  award  to  the  plaintiffs 
as  damages  such  sums  of  money  as  you  may  belive,  from  the 
evidence,  the  plaintiffs  had  sold  said  hams  to  said  Davis  for, 
less  such  sum,  as  you  may  believe  from  the  evidence,  said  hams 
were  actually  worth  at  the  time  of  their  purchase  by  the  plain- 
tiffs ;  and  you  will  further  allow  the  plaintiffs  such  sum  of 
money,  if  any,  as  you  may  believe  from  the  evidence  they  were 
obliged  to  pay  out  on  account  of  the  transportation  of  said  hams 
to  said  Salt  Lake  City  at  the  time  of  their  sale  to  the  plaintiffs.12 
(5)  If  the  jury  believe  that  the  plaintiff  sold  to  the  defendant 
the  barge  mentioned  in  the  evidence,  for  which  the  notes  sued 
on  were  given,  and  as  inducement  to  the  defendant  to  make 
said  purchase,  represented  that  said  barge  was  all  right,  and 
was  in  condition  for  service  at  once,  and  that  the  defendant, 
relying  on  said  representations,  agreed  to  purchase  and  did 
actually  purchase  and  accept  the  same,  and  gave  the  said  notes 
for  the  purchase  money;  and  shall  further  believe  that  said 
barge  was  not  all  right  and  in  condition  for  service  at  once, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  was  unsound  and  unseaworthy,  and  in 
consequence  of  such  unsoundness  was,  together  with  a  valuable 
cargo,  lost  and  damaged,  then  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  re- 
coup against  plaintiff's  claim  on  said  notes  the  amount  of  dam- 
age (if  any)  sustained  as  a  direct  consequence  of  said  breach 
of  warranty.13 

§  409.     Implied  warranty. — (1)     An  implied  warranty  is  not 

12  Thorne  v.  McVeagh,  75  111.  81,      more  Copper,   S.   &  R.   Co.   78  Md. 
83.  183,  27  Atl.  1035. 

!3  Eureka  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Balti- 


419  IMPLIED   WARRANTY.  §    409 

that  the  article  or  thing  sold  shall  be  the  best  of  its  kind,  or  such 
as  might  have  been  represented  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  hut 
only  that  such  article  or  thing  shall  be  reasonably  suitable  for 
the  purpose  for  which  it  was  inteded  to  be  used.14 

(2)  When  one  sells  articles  of  personal  property,  he  impliedly 
warrants  that  it  is  merchantable  and  reasonably  suited  to  the  use 
intended,  and  that  the  seller  knows  of  no  latent  defects  undis- 
covered.    "Latent  defects"  means  such  defects  as  are  hidden. 
The  implied  warranty,  however,  does  not  cover  defects  which 
can  be  discovered  by  ordinary  prudence   and   caution.     As  to 
these,  the  law  presumes  the  buyer  to  exercise  his  own  judgment. 
If  you  believe  that  the  consideration  of  the  note  sued  on  was 
a  lot  of  horses,  that  they  were  not  at  the  time  of  the  sale  mer- 
chantable and  reasonably  suited  to  the  use  intended,  and  that 
they  were  so  because  of  defects  which  were  not  discoverable 
by   ordinary   prudence,   1jiis   would   be   a    good   defense   to   the 
note.     If  the  evidence  shows  that  the  consideration  of  the  note 
failed   entirely,   this   would   altogether   defeat    a   recovery.       If 
there  was  a  partial  failure,  there  should  be  an  apportionment 
between  the  parties,  according  to  the  facts  of  the  case.15 

(3)  An  implied  warranty  is  not  that  the  article  or  thing  sold 
shall  be  the  best  of  its  kind,  or  such  as  might  have  been  rep- 
resented at  the  time  of  the  sale,  but  only  such  article  or  thing 
shall  be  reasonably  suitable  for  the  purposes  for  which  it  was 
intended   to   be   used. 

When  one  sells  articles  of  personal  property  he  impliedly 
warrants  the  same  to  be  merchantable  and  reasonably  suited 
to  the  use  intended,  and  that  the  seller  knows  of  no  latent 
defects  undiscovered — that  is,  such  defects  as  are  hidden.  The 
implied  warranty,  however,  does  not  cover  defects  which  can 
be  discovered  by  ordinary  prudence  and  caution.  In  such  case 
the  law  presumes  that  the  buyer  exercises  his  own  judgment 
in  making  the  purchase.16 

(4)  A  purchaser  of  property  has  no  right  to  rely  upon  the 
representations  of  the  vendor  or  seller  of  the  property  as  to  the 

"  Hodge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala.  is  Hodge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala. 
370,  22  So.  422.  370,  22  So.  422;  Hoffman  v.  Gates, 

is  Hoffman  v.   Gates,   77  Ga.   703.      77  Ga.  703. 


§    410  CONTRACTS,   SALE  OF   PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  420 

quality  where  he  has  reasonable  opportunity  of  examining  the 
property  and  judging  for  himself  as  to  its  qualities.17 

§  410.  Burden  of  proving  warranty. — (1)  The  burden  of 
showing  that  the  oats  delivered  by  the  defendant  were  not  the 
kind  which  he  contracted  to  deliver  is  upon  the  plaintiff,  and  un- 
less he  has  satisfied  the  minds  of  the  jury,  by  the  evidence 
adduced,  that  the  oats  delivered  were  not  the  kind  or  variety 
so  agreed  to  be  delivered,  then  they  must  find  for  the  defend- 
ant.18 

(2)  In  so  far  as  the  defendant  relies  upon  a  warranty  of 
quality  of  the  property  sold  and  a  breach  of  the  same,  the 
burden  of  proving  the  warranty  is  upon  the  defendant;  and 
unless  it  has  proved  both  the  warranty  and  the  breach  alleged 
by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  it  will  not  be  entitled  to 
any  benefit  therefrom  in  the  suit.19 

§  411.  Damages  for  breach  of  warranty. — (1)  In  ascertaining 
the  extent  of  the  damages  suffered  by  the  defendants,  if  any,  the 
jury  must  look  to  all  the  evidence  to  determine  what  it  would 
reasonably  cost  to  put  the  apparatus  in  a  condition  reasonably 
suitable  for  the  manufacture  and  dispensing  of  soda  water  bev- 
erages; and  if  the  only  evidence  on  that  point  is  that  it  would 
not  cost  over  one  hundred  dollars,  then  that  is  the  only  abate- 
ment the  defendants  would  be  entitled  to,  and  the  plaintiff 
would  be  entitled  to  a  verdict  for  the  balance  of  notes  and 
interest.20 

(2)  Even  if  the  jury  should  find  from  the  evidence  that  the 
apparatus  was  not  suitably  fitted  for  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was   sold,   then   the    measure   of   defendant's    damage    is    the 
amount  necessary  to  repair  the  apparatus  as  it  may  be  shown 
to  be  defective.21 

(3)  If  the  evidence  reasonably  satisfies  the  jury  that  the  appa- 
ratus as  a  whole  was  costly  and  expensive,  and  was  only  de- 
fective in  some  minor  respects,  and  they  further  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  such  defects  could  be  remedied  and  put  in 
such  condition  as  would  make  the  apparatus  reasonably  suit- 

17  Shepard  v.  Goben,  142  Ind.  322,  20  Hoge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala. 

39  N.  E.  506.  372,   22   So.   422. 

is  Gachet  v.  Warren,  72  Ala.  291.  21  Hodge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala. 

10  Tacoma  Coal  Co.  v.  Bradley,  2  370,  22  So.  422. 
Wash.  606,  27  Pac.  454. 


421  CONDITIONS  OF  SALE  COMPLIED  WITH.  §    412 

able  for  the  purposes  intended,  then  the  costs  of  putting  the 
same  in  such  condition  would  be  the  measure  of  defendant's 
damages.22 

(4)  If  you  find  for  the  plaintiff,  you  will  award  plaintiff  as 
damages  the  difference  between  what  you  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence to  be  the  actual  value  of  the  goods  described  in  the  declara- 
tion at  the  time  of  the  sale,  and  what  you  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence their  value  would  have  been,  if  they  had  been  as  represent- 
ed in  the  warranty  made  by  the  defendant.23 

§  412.  Conditions  of  sale  complied  with. — (1)  If  it  appears 
from  the  greater  weight  of  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  con- 
structed the  apparatus  in  question  in  a  good,  workmanlike  man- 
ner, and  that,  by  the  tests  made  of  said  apparatus  by  plaintiff  and 
defendant,  the  same  complied  with  all  the  terms  of  plaintiff's 
guaranty,  then  and  in  that  event  the  plaintiff  would  be 
entitled  to  recover  the  contract  price.24 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  that  the  contract  between  the  parties 
was  that  the  defendant  was  to  deliver  to  the  plaintiff  one  hundred 
and  fifty  tons  of  iron  as  soon  as  he  could  get  it  from  the  railroad 
company,  and  was  to  receive  twenty-eight  dollars  per  ton  there- 
for, and  that  he  did  offer  to  deliver  to  the  plaintiff  so  much  of 
said  iron  as  he,  the  said  defendant,  received  from  said  company, 
and  as  soon  as  he  so  received  it,  and  that  the  plaintiff,  after  ac- 
cepting a  part  of  said  iron,  refused  to  receive  any  more,  then  they 
are  to  find  for  the  defendant.25 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  nothing  was 
agreed  upon  between  the  parties  about  the  time  for  the  delivery 
of  the  iron,  but  that  the  plaintiff,  or  his  agent,  was  informed  by 
the  defendant,  at  or  about  the  time  the  said  contract  was  agreed 
on,  that  he,  the  defendant,  was  to  get  the  iron  from  the  rail- 
road company,  and  that  he  was  dependent  upon  such  company 
as  to  when  it  would  be  delivered,  and  further  believe  that  the 
defendant   did,   as  soon   as  he   received   any   of  the   iron   from 
the  said  company,  offer  to  deliver  it  to  the  said  plaintiff,  who, 
after  receiving  a  part,  refused  to  accept  any  more,  then  they 
are  to  find  for  the  defendant.26 

22  Hodge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala.  24  Smith  v.     Independent    School 
371,    22    So.    422.  Dist.    112    Iowa,   38,    83   N.   W.    810. 

23  Ferguson    v.    Hosier,     58     Ind.  25  Smith  v.  Snyder,  77  Va.  440. 
438.  26  Smith  v.  Snyder,  77  Va.  440. 


§    413  CONTRACTS,   SALE  OF   PERSONAL   PROPERTY.  422 

§  413.  Rescinding  sale  for  defects. — (1)  A  defrauded  vendee 
has  the  right,  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  knowledge  of 
fraud,  to  rescind  the  contract,  unless  he  has  with  such  knowledge 
affirmed  the  sale  by  express  words  or  unequivocal  acts,  or,  while 
he  is  deliberating,  an  innocent  third  party  has  acquired  an  in- 
terest in  the  property.27 

(2)  The  defendants  cannot  rescind  the  contract  on  the  ground 
that  the  apparatus  shipped  them  was  not  new,  and  had  been  used 
by  others  prior  to  the  sale,  if  they,  after  being  informed  by  letter 
or  otherwise  that  said  apparatus  had  been  used  by  other  persons 
in  the  year  1887,  continued  to  use  the  same.28 

(3)  If  defendants  knew  of  all  the  defects  complained  of  in 
March  or  April,  1888,  and  with  this  knowledge  kept  and  used  the 
same  until   midsummer   of  that  year  or  later,   and  paid  their 
notes  given  for  the  purchase  money  until  November,  1888,  this 
would  be,  as  a  matter  of  law,  a  waiver  of  their  right  to  rescind 
the  contract.-9 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  defendants  kept 
and  used  the  soda  fountain  and  apparatus  for  three  or  more 
months  after  they  had  knowledge  of  all  the  alleged  defects  and 
fraud  complained  of,  they  should  find  for  the  plaintiff  at  least 
the  amount  of  debt  proven,  less  the  value  of  repairing  said  de- 
fects.30 

(5)  If  the  evidence  shows  that  the  defendants  claimed  in  July, 
1888,  that  they  had  rejected  the  apparatus  and  held  it  subject  to 
the  order  of  plaintiffs,  and  then  continued  to  make  monthly  pay- 
ments until  November  or  December,  that  was  evidence  tending 
to  show  that  the  claims  or  defects  were  unfounded.31 

(6)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  defendants,  after  the 
receipt  of  this  belting  by  them,  had  an  opportunity  to  inspect 
and  examine  and  determine  by  such  examination  and  inspec- 
tion the   quality  of  the  belting  they  received,   and  if  defects 
could   have    been    ascertained    by    examination    and    inspection 
thereof,  and  without  doing  so  they  voluntarily  paid  their  bill, 

2T  Proctor  v.  Spratley,  78  Va.  257.          so  Hodge    &    Williams  v.    Tufts, 

28  Hodge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala.      115  Ala.   371,  22  So.   422. 

371,  22  So.  422.  31  Hodge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala. 

29  Hodge  &  W.  v.  Tufts,  115  Ala.      371,  22  So.  422. 
371,  22  So.  422. 


423  PURCHASING  WITH  FRAUDULENT  INTENT.  §    414 

then  they  cannot  have  set  off  the  amount  they  paid   at  that 
time.32 

(7)  If  the  jury  find  that  the  contract  offered  in  evidence  was 
entered  into  between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  was  ready  and  willing  and  did  offer  to  deliver,  during 
the  period  of  time  covered  by  said  contract,  coal  daily,  in  quan- 
tities and  of  the  quality  contemplated  by  the  contract, 
and  that  after  receiving,  consuming  and  paying  for  a  portion 
of  the  coal  embraced  in  said  contract,  the  master  of  machinery 
and  the  master  of  transportation  of  the  defendant  rejected  said 
coal  as  not  satisfactory  to  them,  and  that  said  rejection  was 
not  bona  fide,  and  that  the  defendant  setting  up  such  rejec- 
tion as  an  excuse  thereafter  refused  to  receive  the  balance  of 
said  coal  from  the  plaintiff,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to 
recover.33 

§  414.  Purchasing  with  intent  to  defraud. — In  considering 
the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  S  bought  the  goods  with 
the  intention  and  purpose  of  defrauding  the  plaintiff — you  are 
told  that  there  are  in  law  certain  matters  which  are  sometimes 
termed  "badges  of  fraud,"  that  is,  matters  which,  if  shown, 
are  usually  considered  as  evidence  tending  to  show  fraud. 
Among  these  are  unusual  or  extraordinary  methods  of  conduct- 
ing business,  if  shown.  Any  secrecy  or  concealment  in  said 
business,  if  shown,  or  any  other  unusual  methods  or  acts  con- 
nected with  the  transaction  in  question,  if  shown  by  the  evi- 
dence, are  proper  to  be  considered  when  deciding  whether 
fraud,  in  fact,  existed  in  connection  with  the  transaction.  As 
applied  to  this  case,  if  S,  by  his  acts  prior  to  or  at  the  time 
of  the  sale,  intentionally  induced  plaintiff  to  believe  that  he 
intended  to  pay  for  the  goods,  and  said  S,  in  fact,  did  not 
intend  to  pay  therefor,  and  the  said  S  induced  this  belief  in- 
tending to  deceive  the  plaintiff  and  induce  him  to  sell  the 
goods  to  him,  and  the  plaintiff  was  thereby  deceived,  and  was 
induced  by  this  misrepresentation  to  make  the  sales,  and  would 
not  have  made  them  if  defendant  had  not  made  this  misrepre- 
sentation, then  the  debt  was  created  by  fraud  of  said  S,  and 

32  Gutta    P.    &    R.    Mfg.    Co.    v.          ss  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Bry- 
Wood,   84   Mich.    459,   48   N.   W.   28.       don,  65  Md.  200,  3  Atl.  306,  9  Atl.  126. 


§    414                   CONTRACTS,   SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.                        424 

the  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  recover,   provided  you  find 
that  said  S.  was  at  the  time  of  the  sale  insolvent.34 

a*  Phelps  D.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Samson,  age,   by   transfer   of  warehouse  re- 

113  Iowa.  150.  84  N.  W.  1051.  ceipts,   see:    Cole   v.   Tyng,   24    111. 

*For   forms   of   instructions   held  100. 
good  on  the  sale  of  grain  in  stor- 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

CONTRACTS— PROMISSORY   NOTES. 

Sec. 

Holder  of  note   may   recover,      417.    Transferring  note  by  endorse- 
when,  ment. 
416.    Holder  of  note,  when  cannot      418.     Interest  on  note — Usury. 

recover.  419.    Suit  to  recover  value  of  lost 

note. 

§  415.  Holder  may  recover  on  note,  when. — (1)  In  the  absence 
of  evidence,  the  holder  of  a  promissory  note  indorsed  by  the  per- 
son to  whose  order  it  is  made  payable  is  presumed  to  be  a  holder 
in  good  faith,  and  entitled  to  recover.  Such  presumption  may 
be  rebutted  or  overcome  by  evidence  from  which  the  jury  be- 
lieve either  that  the  note  was  transferred  by  the  payee  after 
due,  or  that  the  party  to  whom  it  was  transferred  took  it  with, 
notice  of  the  defense  thereto.1 

(2)  If  under  all  the  circumstances  you  find  the  plaintiff  ac- 
quired and  holds  the  note  by  purchase  in  good  faith  in  the  usual 
course  of  trade  for  a  valuable  consideration  before  due,  without 
notice  of  such  infirmatives,  your  verdict  will  be  in  his  favor  for 
fifty  dollars  with  six  per  cent,  interest  to  date.     Add  together 
the  sum  so  found,  that  is,  the  interest  and  principal,  and  the 
whole  amount  will  be  his  damages.2 

(3)  Even  though  you  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
note  in  controversy  was  given  to  Dines  by  Hall  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  using  it  as  collateral  in  securing  a  loan  for  a  smaller 

i  Mahaska   County     S.     Bank     v.      here  laid  down,  Hardy  v.  Brier,  91 
Crist,   87   Iowa,   418,   54   N.  W.   450.       Ind.  91. 

Under    the    laws    of    Indiana    only          2  Kitchen  v.  Loudenback,  48  Ohio- 
notes  payable  at  a  designated  bank      St.  177,  26  N.  E.  979. 
in  tine  state  come  within  the  rule 

425 


§    -i!5  CONTRACTS — PROMISSORY   NOTES.  426 

amount,  if  you  also  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plain- 
till'  purchased  said  note  from  Dines  before  its  maturity  for 
a  valuable  consideration,  you  must  find  your  verdict  for  the 
plaintiff,  unless  you  shall  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that, 
at  the  time  the  plaintiff  purchased  said  note,  it  had  notice  or 
knowledge  of  the  circumstances  and  conditions  under  which 
Dines  secured  and  held  said  note.3 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  pur- 
chased the  note  in  controversy  for  value  before  maturity,  you 
must  find  your  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  even  though  you  may  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  Dines  had  no  right  or  authority  to 
sell  the  note,  unless  you  shall  further  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  at  the  time  the  plaintiff  purchased  said  note,  it  had  notice 
or  knowledge  that  Dines  had  no  right  or  authority  to  sell  the 
note.4 

(5)  In  order  to  defeat  a  recovery  by  the  plaintiff  bank,  it  is  in- 
cumbent  on   the   defendants   to    establish   by   a   preponderance 
of  the  evidence,  first,  the  truth  of  the  defense  which  they  have 
pleaded   against   the   note   in   suit ;   and,   second,   the   fact   that 
the  bank  purchased  the  note  with  notice   of  such  defense,   or 
that  it  made  such  purchase  after  the  note  became  due.     If  both 
these  propositions  have  been  so  established,  then  the  plaintiff 
cannot  recover;  but,  if  either  proposition  has  not  been  so  estab- 
lished, then  plaintiff  will  be   entitled  to  your  verdict  for  the 
full  amount  of  the  note  in  suit.5 

(6)  If  the  defendant's  testator,  having 'been  discharged  from 
the  liability  as  surety  upon  the  note  sued  on  in  this  action  with 
full  knowledge  and  understanding  of  his  release  as  surety,  prom- 
ised the  holder  or  payee  to  pay  said  note  if  the  principal  did  not, 
he  thereby  revived  his  liability  as  surety,  and  such  subsequent 
promise  was  binding  without  any  new  consideration  to  support  it.6 

(7)  Even  if  the  defendant  was  an  indorser  of  the  note,  and  not 
a  maker,  and  if  no  notice  of  the  nonpayment  of  the  note  was 
given  him  within  the  time  required  to  make  him  liable,  if  he 
subsequently,  with  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  such  notice  had 
not  been  given,  promised  to  pay  or  "fix  it  up,"  or  any  equiv- 

s  Wright  Investment  Co.  v.  Fris-  s  Mahaska  County  S.  Bank  v. 

coe  Realty  Co.  (Mo.),  77  S.  W.  296.  Crist,  87  Iowa,  419,  54  N.  W.  450. 

4  Wright  Investment  Co.  v.  Fris-  c  Bramble  v.  Ward,  40  Ohio  St. 

coe  Realty  Co.  (Mo.),  77  S.  W.  296.  267. 


427  RECOVERY   ON    NOTE,    WHEN.  §    -ilo 

alent  words,  meaning  thereby  to  arrange  for  its  payment,  this 
would  be  a  waiver  of  the  want  of  notice,  and  he  would  be  liable 
as  though  the  notice  had  been  duly  given.7 

(8)  If  you  find — to  make  it  more  specific — that  when  this  note 
was  drawn  and  signed  by  S  there  was  no  understanding  and 
agreement  on  the  part  of  H  with  the  other  defendants  that  he  was 
to  sign  the  note  with  them,  and  that  the  payee  did  not  accept  the 
note  as  signed,  but  merely  took  it  into  his  possession  temporarily 
in  order  to  procure  the  other  signers,  and  that  he  did  not  turn 
over  this  personal  property  to  S  until  after  all  the  others  had 
signed  it,  then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiff.8 

(9)  If  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  said  notary 
did  use  reasonable  diligence  to  ascertain  the  residence  or  place 
of  business  of  the  makers  of  said  note  as  set  out  in  its  first 
instruction,   but  did  not  use  reasonable   diligence   to   ascertain 
the  dwelling  or  place  of  business  of  the  defendant,  that  then 
the  notice  deposited  in  the  postoffice,  as  aforesaid,  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  hold  the  defendant,  and  the  plaintiffs  are  not  entitled 
to   recover,   unless   the   jury   shall   further   find   from   the    evi- 
dence that  the  notice  so  deposited  in  the  postoffice,  as  afore- 
said,   did  actually  reach  the  defendant  on  that  or  the  succeed- 
ing day;  or  unless  they  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  subse- 
quently to  the  day  of  the  protest  of  said  note,  said  defendant 
promised  the  plaintiffs  or  their  attorney  to  pay  the  amount  of 
said  note,  with   a  knowledge   of  the  fact  that  notice   of  non- 
payment had  not  been  regularly   given  to   him.9 

(10)  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  defendant  in  this  case,  and 
unless  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
has  established,  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  his  allega- 
tion in  the  answer  that  said  notes  (or  some  of  them)  were  given 
for  the  accommodation  of  said  bank  (as  explained  in  other  in- 
structions), then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiff  as  to 
all  of  the  notes  sued  upon  in  this  case.10 

(11)  The  notes  involved  in  this  suit  being  joint  notes  executed 
by  several  persons,  and  one  of  the  names  thereon  having  been 
forged,  would  be  void  as  to  the  person  whose  name  was  forged, 

7  Cook   v.    Brown,    62   Mich.    477,  »  Staylor  v.  Ball,  24  Md.  190. 

29  N.  W.  46.  10  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Brady, 

s  Steers  v.  Holmes,  79  Mich.  434,  165  Mo.  201,  65  S.  W.  303. 
44  N.  W.   922. 


§    4:15  CONTRACTS — PROMISSORY    NOTES.  428 

but  valid  as  to  the  others,  unless  at  the  time  the  plaintiff  ac- 
cepted the  notes  she  had  knowledge  of  the  forging,  or  in  some 
way  participated  in  the  fraud  of  wrongfully  obtaining  the  said 
signature;  but  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  the  plaintiff  re- 
ceived and  accepted  said  notes  in  good  faith  and  without  any 
knowledge  or  information  that  any  of  the  signatures  were  not 
genuine,  being  innocent  of  any  wrong,  the  law  protects  her, 
and  you  should  find  for  the  plaintiff  against  those  who  did  sign 
the  notes.11 

(12)  Although  the  witness,  T,  delivered  the  note  in  suit  to  wit- 
ness, Y,  in  violation  of  the  instruction  of  defendants,  and  al- 
though he  communicated  his  instructions  to  witness,  Y,  at  the 
time  of  such  delivery,  yet,  if  the  jury  find  and  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  after  said  delivery,  and  after  having  knowl- 
edge  that   H   had   not   signed   said   note,   defendants   approved 
and  adopted  as  their  own  the   act  of  said  T  in  making  said 
delivery  to  said  Y,  the  verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiff.12 

(13)  It  would  make  no  difference  with  the  liability  of  B,  as  the 
maker  of  the  note,  that  it  was  not  signed  by  him  at  the  time  it  was 
originally  made  by  C.     His  liability  would  be  the  same  if  he 
subsequently  signed  it  and  sold  and  delivered  it  to  the  plain- 
tiff for  a  valuable  consideration,  as  if  he  had  signed  it  when 
first  made.13 

(14)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  bank  re- 
ceived the  note  in  good  faith  and  before  it  was  due,  as  a  col- 
lateral security  for  a  loan  made  to  S  &  W,  and  that  said  loan 
is  still  unpaid,  then  plaintiff  will  be  entitled  to  a  verdict;  that 
is,  the  holder  of  a  note  as  collateral  security  for  the  payment 
of  a  loan  made  at  the  time  the  collateral  security  is  deposited, 
is  to  be  treated  as  a  purchaser,   and  if  he  receives  such  col- 
lateral in   good  faith,   and  before   due,  he  holds  it  free  from 
the  defenses  to  which  it  would  be  liable  in  the  hands  of  orig- 
inal holders  to  the  same  extent.14 

11  Helms  v.   Wayne   Agr.   Oo.    73  12  Hurt  v.  Ford    (Mo.),  36  S.  W. 

Ind.   327.     Citing:    Stoner  v.   Milli-  673. 

kin,    85    111.    218;    Selser   v.    Brock,  13  Cook   v.   Brown,   62   Mich.   478, 

3   Ohio   St.   302;    Franklin  Bank  v.  29  N.  W.  46. 

Stevens,     39     Me.     532;      Craig     v.  14  Mahaska   County     S.     Bank   v. 

Hobbs,   44   Ind.    363:    York   County  Crist,  87  Iowa,  419,   54  N.  W.   450. 
M.    F.    Ins.   Co.   v.   Brooks,   51   Me. 
506. 


429  RECOVERY   ON   NOTE,   WHEN.  §    415 

(15)  Under  the  pleadings  and  evidence,  the  defendant  has  ad- 
mitted the  execution  of  all  the  notes  sued  upon  by  plaintiff  in  this 
case,  and  has  admitted  that  plaintiff  is  the  legal  owner  and  holder 
of  said  notes.    It  is,  therefore,  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  find  for  the 
plaintiff  as  to  each  or  all  of  said  notes,  unless  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  some  one  or  more  of  said  notes  was  obtained 
by  the  bank  as  a  matter  of  accommodation,   as   explained  in 
other  instructions.15 

(16)  A  note  to  settle  an  embezzlement  or  a  shortage  of  an 
agent  is  valid  and  good,  if  it  was  given  to  settle  the 'indebtedness 
or  shortage,  and  if  there  is  no  agreement  to  stifle  the  prosecu- 
tion for  the  embezzlement.10 

(17)  The  legal  effect  of  the  deed  of  trust  (which  has  been  read 
in   evidence),   and   the   said   notes   recited   in   said   deed,   is   to 
indicate  a  transaction  in  which  B  issued  the  said  notes  as  part 
payment  of  the  purchase  price  of  certain  land.     The.  jury  are 
further  instructed  that   by  his  answer  in  this  case   defendant 
admits   that  the   title   to   the   land    (described   in   the   deed   of 
trust)    was   conveyed   to   defendant   before   said   deed   of   trust 
was    executed    by    defendant.       The    court    instructs    you    that 
the  right  to  possession  of  said  land,  which  defendant  acquired 
by  the  admitted  conveyance  of  title  to  him  by  S,  was,  if  so 
intended  by  him  and  the  officers  of  the  bank  with  whom  he 
had  the  transaction,  a  valuable  consideration  for  the  notes  men- 
tioned in  the  deed  of  trust  and  sued  upon  in  this  case.17 

(18)  The  plaintiff  in  this  case  has  sued  on  a  note  alleged  to  have 
been  executed  by  the  defendants  to  W  and  C,  payable  at  the 
Vincennes   National  Bank  and   endorsed  to  the  plaintiff.     The 
defendant  by  his  answer  admits  the  execution  and  endorsement 
of  the  note.     This  admission  makes  out  the  plaintiff's  side  of 
the  case  and  entitles  him  to  a  verdict  for  the  full  amount  of 
the   note   and  interest,   unless   the   defendant  has   satisfied  you 
by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the  material  allega- 
tions of  the  amended  second  paragraph  of  his  answer  so  fa* 
as  the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  him,  are  true.18 

(19)  The  plaintiff  has  sued  upon  six  different  notes,  each  of 

is  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co  v.  Brady,  "  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Brady, 

165  Mo.  201,  65  S.  W.  303.  165  Mo.  197,  65  S.  W.  303. 

ie  Wolf  v.  Troxell,  94  Mich.  575,  is  Zook  v.  Simonson,  72  Ind.  88. 
54  N.  W.  383. 


§    416  CONTRACTS — PROMISSORY   NOTES.  430 

which  constitutes  a  separate  and  distinct  claim  or  cause  of  action 
in  plaintiff's  petition.  Those  claimed  are  called  "counts"  in  the 
instructions  to  you  by  the  court.  Your  verdict  should  state 
your  finding  or  decision  as  to  each  count  or  cause  of  action 
separately.  And  if  your  finding  is  for  the  plaintiff,  as  to  any 
one  or  more  counts,  you  should  also  state  in  your  verdict  the 
exact  amount  which  you  find  from  the  evidence  to  be  still  due 
and  unpaid  at  the  present  time  (including  principal  and  in- 
terest to  date)  on  each  particular  note  mentioned  in  the  count 
or  counts  of  the  petition  on  which  you  may  so  decide  to  find 
for  plaintiff.19 

§416.  Holder  of  note  cannot  recover,  when. —  (1)  As  between 
the  party  accommodated  and  the  party  accommodating,  the  lat- 
ter can  be  under  no  liability  to  the  former  whatever  by  the 
relation  which  they  are  placed  upon  the  paper;  and  in  this 
case,  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  B  was,  in  fact,  an  ac- 
commodation maker  of  the  paper  sued  on,  then  he  cannot  be 
held  liable — no  matter  in  what  form  the  transaction  was  put.20 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  promissory  note 
read  and  shown  in  evidence  was  made  by  the  defendant,  M,  and 
indorsed  by  the  defendant,  A,  and  delivered  by  him  to  his  co- 
defendant,   M,   for  the   purpose   of  enabling   M,   the   maker   of 
the  note,  to  raise  money  thereon  for  his  own  use;  and  if  you 
further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  after  the  defendant,  A, 
had   so   indorsed   and   delivered   the   note   to   the   said   M,   the 
words  and  figures  "with  interest  at  ten  per  cent,  per  annum 
after  maturity,"  now  appearing  in  said  note,  were  written  there- 
in without  the  knowledge,  consent  or  authority  of  the  defend- 
ant, A,  by  the  said  M  or  by  an  agent  or  clerk  of  his,  whether 
done  in  the  presence   of  any   officer  or   agent   of  the  plaintiff 
or  not,    and   whether   with    or   without   the   knowledge    of   the 
plaintiff,   the   verdict  should   be   for  the   defendant,   A.21 

(3)  It  is  claimed  by  the  defendant,  B,  that  after  he  signed  a 
note  similar  in  all  respects  to  the  one  sued  on,  excepting  that  the 
written  words  "with  interest  at  ten  per  cent"  were  not  then 

19  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Brady,          21  Capital  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  62 
165  Mo.  200.  65  S.  W.  303.  Mo.  62. 

20  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Brady, 
165  Mo.  202,  65  S.  W.  303. 


431  CANNOT  RECOVER,  WHEN.  §    416 

in  the  note,  and  since  he  signed  it,  without  his  knowledge  or 
consent,  the  said  printed  words  were  stricken  out  and  the  said 
written  words  inserted.  If  such  an  alteration  of  the  note  were 
made  by  any  holder  of  the  note,  or  made  with  the  knowledge 
of  any  holder  of  the  note,  without  the  knowledge  of  B,  it  would 
be  a  material  alteration,  and  would  release  him  from  all  liability 
on  the  note,  and  if  the  defendant,  B,  proves  this  fact  by  a  fair 
preponderance  of  the  evidence,  the  verdict  must  be  in  his  favor; 
and  it  would  make  no  difference  whether  A,  the  plaintiff,  was 
or  was  not  the  owner  of  the  note  at  the  time  of  the  alteration, 
if  he  made  the  alteration  after  B,  the  defendant,  signed  it.22 

(4)  Where  an  accommodation  note  is  diverted  from  the  purpose 
for  which  it  was  given,  one  who  takes  it  with  knowledge  can- 
not recover  from  the  accommodation  party;  and  in  this   case, 
the  receiver  possesses,  as  a  matter  of  law,  all  the  knowledge 
that  the  G  S  bank  possessed  upon  the  subject  of  this  note.23 

(5)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  before  .you  that  the  prom- 
issory  note   in   controversy  was   never   delivered   by  B   in   his 
lifetime,  nor  by  the  duly  appointed  executor  of  his  estate  after 
his  death,  then  it  is  your  duty  to  find  your  verdict  in  favor 
of  the  said  B  estate,  the  defendant,  and  against  G,  the  plain- 
tiff.24 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that 
J  indorsed  his  name  on  the  back  of  the  note  sued  on  in  this 
case  as  indorser  and  not  as  joint  maker  thereof,   and  that  at 
the  time  said  note  was  delivered  to  the  plaintiff  he  knew  the 
said  J  indorsed  the  said  note  as  an  indorser  thereon,  and  not 
as  a  joint  promisor,  and  that  the  said  plaintiff  had  said  note 
regularly  protested  and  had  notice  sent  to  the  said  J  as  in- 
dorser of  such  protest,  then  the  jury  may  consider  said  facts, 
along  with  the  other  evidence  in  the  case,  and  that  if  therefrom 
they  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  said  J  was  an  indorser 
on  the  note  sued  on,  and  not  a  joint  maker,  or  promisor,  they 
should  find  for  the  defendant.25 

(7)  The  defendant  in  his  answer  alleges,  in  substance,  that  W 

22  Brooks  v.  Allen,  62  Ind.  405.  25  Roanok   Grocery   &   M.    Co.   v. 

23  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Brady,      Watkins,   41  W.   Va.   793,   24   S.   E. 
165  Mo.  203,  65  S.  W.  303.  612. 

2*  Gandy      v.      Bissell's      Estate 
(Neb.),  69  N.  W.  633. 


•§   416  CONTRACTS — PROMISSORY   NOTES.  432 

and  C  made  an  agreement  with  him  by  which  they  undertook 
to  graft  the  defendant's  apple  trees  with  grafts  that  would  grow 
.and  bear  a  good  quality  of  fruit,  and  do  the  work  in  a  skillful 
manner;  that  the  grafting  was  done  in  an  unskillful  manner 
to  the  injury  of  the  plaintiff's  trees  and  with  worthless  grafts; 
.that  the  note  was  given  in  consideration  of  said  undertaking, 
and  the  plaintiff  had  knowledge  of  these  facts  when  he  took 
the  assignment  of  said  note.  It  is  not  incumbent  on  the  defend- 
.ant  to  prove  that  the  plaintiffs  had  knowledge,  when  the  note  was 
indorsed  to  them,  of  the  other  matters  alleged  in  the  said  para- 
graph. Upon  proof  of  these  matters  the  burden  of  proof  would 
rest  on  plaintiffs  to  show  that  they  took  the  note  in  ignorance  of 
.the  existence  of  those  matters.26 

(8)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  B  signed  the  notes  sued 
*on  in  this  case  as  an  accommodation  maker  for  the  G  S  bank, 
and  delivered  them  to  the  bank  or  one  of  its  officers  for  the  bank, 
he  cannot  be  held  liable  thereon,  no  matter  how  the  bank  may  have 
dealt  with  the  notes,  so  long  as  it  retained  ownership  and  control 
thereof;  and  even  though  you  find  that  the  bank,  after  the  notes 
were  delivered  to  it,  gave  S  the  benefit  of  the  whole  or  a  part  of 
the  benefit  thereof,  this  fact  would  not  render  B,  the  defendant, 
liable  on  the  notes.     And  in  this  connection  you  are  instructed 
that   the    possession   of   the   receiver   is   the   possession    of   the 
bank.27 

(9)  As  between  the  maker  and  the  payee  of  a  promissory  note, 
oral  evidence  touching  the   consideration  thereof  may  be   con- 
sidered  by  you,   and  if  you  find   from   the   evidence   that   the 
defendant,  B,  received  no  consideration  for  the  signing  of  the 
notes  sued  on,   and  that  the  same  were  made  for  the   accom- 
modation of  the   G   S  bank,  then  your  verdict  should  be   for 
the  defendant.28 

(10)  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  the 
note   was    given   upon   a   valuable    consideration,    and,   if   that 
is   doubtful    upon   the   whole   evidence,   he   could  not   recover; 
that  proof  of  the  execution  of  the  note  and  its  production  in 
evidence  made  a  prima  facie  case  for  the  plaintiff,  upon  which 

20  Zook  v.  Simonson,  72  Ind.  88.  28  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Brady, 

27  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Brady,      165  Mo.  202,  65  S.  W.  303. 
165  Mo.  203,  65  S.  W.  303. 


433  TRANSFERRING  NOTE  BY  ENDORSEMENT.  §    417 

they  might  find  a  verdict  for  him,  unless  the  defendant  intro- 
duced evidence  which  shows  either  that  it  was  not  given  for 
a  valuable  consideration,  or  that  the  consideration  had  failed, 
or  evidence  to  render  it  doubtful  in  their  minds  whether  it 
was  given  on  a  valuable  consideration;  and,  that  if  not  so  given. 
or  if  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  was  given  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration, either  for  want  of  consideration  or  for  failure  of 
consideration,  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover.29 

(11)  If  you  are  satisfied  from  the  evidence  that  the  note  in  ques- 
tion was  given  for  seed  wheat,  at  fifteen  dollars  per  bushel,  and 
that  such  seed  wheat  proved  worthless  as  such,  then  your  verdict 
would  be  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  provided  you  further  find 
that  the  plaintiff  had  notice  of  the  worthless  character  of  the 
wheat  and  of  such  consideration,  or  had  such  notice  as  to  put 
him  on  inquiry,  and  he  failed  to  inquire  solely  for  the  reason  that 
he  did  not  want  to  know  the  consideration.30 

(12)  If  the  defendant  intended  the  note  to  be  a  gift  to  the 
plaintiff,  it  was  given  without  any  legal  consideration  therefor, 
although  the  plaintiff  may  have  supposed  the  note  to  be  in  pay- 
ment for  a  prior  indebtedness,  unless  the  defendant  by  his  words 
or  conduct  gave  the  plaintiff  reasonable  cause  to  believe,  and  the 
plaintiff  was  thereby  led  to  believe,  that  the  note  was  given  in 
settlement  of  her  claim  against  the  estate  of  the  wife  for  services, 
or  of  some  claim  in  controversy  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  de- 
fendant.31 

§  417.  Transferring  note  by  endorsement. — (1)  Where  one 
party,  for  a  full  and  valuable  consideration,  agrees  to  give  or 
transfer  or  let  another  have  a  promissory  note,  the  law  implies 
that  the  transfer  is  to  be  made  by  endorsement,  unless  a  different 
agreement  is  made  by  the  parties.32 

(2)  And,  where  the  agreement  for  the  transfer  is  shown,  and  a 
valuable  consideration  therefor,  the  party  claiming  that  the  trans- 
fer was  to  be  by  delivery  or  by  endorsement,  without  recourse  or 
otherwise  than  by  simple  endorsement,  has  on  him  the  burden  of 
so  proving.33 

29  Burnham  v.  Allen,  1  Gray  32  Wade  v.  Guppinger,  60  Ind. 

(Mass.)  497.  378. 

so  Kitchen  v.  Loudenbeck,  48  33  Wade  v.  Guppinger,  60  Ind 

Ohio  St.  177.  378. 

31  Nye  v.  Chace,  139  Mass.  380. 


§  418  CONTRACTS — PROMISSORY  NOTES.  434 

(3)  Where  a  note  has  been  endorsed  in  blank,  the  holder  of  the 
same  may  fill  the  blank  with  the  name  of  the  endorsee ;  that 
the  endorsement  of  the  note  is  said  to  be  in  blank  when  the  name 
of  the  endorser  is  simply  written  on  the  back  of  the  note,  leaving 
a  blank  over  it  for  the  insertion  of  the  name  of  the  endorsee, 
or  of  any  subsequent  holder;  and  that  in  such  case,  while  the 
-endorsement  continues  blank,  the  note  may  be  passed  by  mere 
delivery,  and  the  endorsee  or  other  holder  is  understood  to  have 
full  authority  personally  to  demand  payment  of  it,  or  make  it 
payable  at  his  pleasure  to  himself  or  to  another  person.34 

§418.  Interest  on  note — Usury. — (1)  If  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  more  than  ten  percent  interest  per  annum  has 
been  paid  by  the  defendants  to  the  plaintiff,  the  law  presumes 
that  such  amount,  exceeding  ten  percent  per  annum,  if  proven, 
is  a  payment  on  the  principal  of  the  note,  unless  explained  by 
the  evidence.35 

(2)  That  under  the  issues  in  this  case,  if  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  Crabtree,  borrowed  of  the  plain- 
tiff the  sum  of  four  hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  on  or  about  Jan- 
uary first,  1858,  for  which  said  Crabtree  gave  the  note  sued  on, 
with  the  defendant,  Woods,  the  said  Woods  being,  in  fact,  only 
security  on  said  note,  and  that,  at  the  time  the  said  money 
was  borrowed,  the  plaintiff  and  defendant,  Crabtree,  agreed  that 
Crabtree  should  pay,  besides  the  interest  mentioned  in  the  note, 
interest  at  the  rate  of  six  percent  per  annum  in  addition,  the  said 
additional  interest  was  and  is  usury,  and  against  the  statute 
of  the  state.  And  if,  from  the  evidence  in  the  ease,  the  jury 
believe  that  said  Crabtree  has  paid  interest  on  said  note 
at  the  rate  of  sixteen  percent  per  annum,  then  under 
the  law  of  this  state,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  any 
interest  whatever  on  the  principal  of  the  said  note,  and  whatever 
payments  the  evidence  in  the  case  may  show  the  defendant  has 
paid  on  said  note  as  interest,  must  be  allowed  on  the  principal 
of  the  said  note,  and,  if  the  sum  actually  paid,  according  to 
the  evidence,  amounts  to  more  than  the  sum  of  four  hundred  and 

s*  Palmer  v.  Marshall,  60  111.  292.         ss  Reinback   v.    Crabtree,    77    111. 

182,  187. 


435  SUIT  ON   LOST   NOTE.  §    419 

fifty  dollars,  then  the  defendants  are  entitled  to  a  verdict  in 
this  case.30 

§  419.  Suit  to  recover  value  of  lost  note. — If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  gave  to  the  defendants,  and 
the  defendants  received  from  the  plaintiff,  the  promissory  note 
in  question  for  collection,  for  a  compensation  or  reward  therefor 
to  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendants,  and  that  the  defend- 
ants or  other  persons  to  whom  they  intrusted  it  for  collection 
lost  it  by  carelessness,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover 
the  value  of  the  note;  and  that  the  value,  in  the  absence  of 
evidence  to  the  contrary,  is  the  amount  of  the  note;  and  that, 
if  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  the  value  of  the  note,  she 
is  also  entitled  to  interest  on  that  value  from  the  time  the  note 
became  due  to  the  date  of  the  verdict;  and  that,  if  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendants,  or  those  to  whom 
they  intrusted  it  lost  it,  and  it  is  not  shown  under  what  circum- 
stances it  was  lost,  it  is  presumed  that  it  was  lo^t  by  careless- 
ness.37 

36  Reinback    v.    Crabtree,    77    111.      44  111.  314,   (held  not  erroneous  as 
182,  185.  suggesting    a     legal   conclusion  of 

37  American  Ex.   Co.  v.  Parsons,      carelessness.) 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

CONTRACTS    RELATING   TO    INSURANCE. 
Sec.  Sec. 

LIFE    INSUKANCE.  FIBE    INSURANCE. 

420.  False   statements   in   applica-      425.    Property  not  destroyed  by  fire 

tion  avoids  policy.  — No  recovery. 

421.  The  right  to  avoid  policy  may      426.     Holder  of  policy  not  responsi- 

be   waived.  ble   for  agent's   acts. 

422.  Manner     or    mode     of   giving      427.    Fraud  in  proof  of  loss  defeats 

notice  of  death.  recovery. 

423.  Formal  proof  of  death  unnec-      428.     Abandonment  of  insured  boat, 

essary,  when.  .       when  justifiable. 

424.  Assignment  of  policy  without      429.    Boat   not  in     safe    and     sea- 

authority  of  beneficiary.  worthy  condition  defeats  re- 

covery. 

Life  Insurance. 

§  420.    False  statements  in  application  avoids  policy. — (1)  A 

misrepresentation  or  false  statement  made  in  his  application  for 
insurance  by  the  person  whose  life  is  insured,  respecting  a  ma- 
terial fact,  avoids  the  policy  issued  upon  such  application,  and 
this,  whether  the  misrepresentation  was  made  innocently  or 
designedly.  If,  therefore,  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  S,  the  insured,  in  his  application  for  the  policy  or  certificate 
here  sued  on,  stated  that  he  had  no  serious  illness,  or  stated 
that  he  had  not  had  during  the  last  seven  years  any  disease  or 
severe  sickness,  and  that  either  of  those  statements  was  false  in 
any  respect,  and  are  deemed  by  the  jury  to  be  material,  then, 
whether  S,  the  insured,  intended  to  deceive  or  not,  the  said 
policy  or  certificate  is  void,  and  the  jury  should  find  for  the 

436 


437  AVOIDING  INSURANCE  POLICY.  §  421 

defendant,  unless  they  further  believe  that  the  avoidance  of  the 
policy  or  certificate  has  been  waived  by  the  defendant.1 

(2)  If  you  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  on  the  thirtieth 
day  of  November,  M,  the  insured,  had  consumption,  you  must 
find  a  verdict  for  the  defendant,   and  it  makes  no   difference 
whether  he  knew  he  was  thus  afflicted  or  not.    He  may  have  been 
entirely  ignorant  of  the  fact,   or  may  have  believed  that  the 
symptoms  he  had  did  not  indicate  consumption.    Yet  if,  in  fact, 
he  had  consumption  at  that  time,  you  must  find  for  the  defendant.2 

(3)  The  contract  between  the  insurance  company  and  the  in- 
sured is  like  a  contract  between  two  individuals.    If  one  makes  a 
false  statement  as  to  facts,  material  to  the  settlement  of  the  terms 
upon  which  the  contract  shall  be  made,  which  are  exclusively 
within  his  knowledge,  and  thereby  induces  the  other  to  agree 
to  terms  which  he  might  not  otherwise  have  assented  to,  the 
party  deceived  cannot  be  held  liable  upon  the  contract.3 

(4)  If  you  find  that  on  the  thirtieth  day  of  November,  1894,  the 
date  of  the  policy,  or  when  it  was  delivered  to  the  plaintiff,  Mrs. 
H  was  not  in  a  state  of  sound  health,  you  must  find  for  the  defend- 
ant.* 

(5)  Sound  health,  as  used  with  reference  to  life  insurance, 
means  that  state  of  health  free  from  any  disease  or  ailment  that 
affects  the  general  soundness  and  healthfulness  of  the  system  se- 
riously and  not  a  mere  indisposition  which  does  not  tend  to  weak- 
en or  undermine  the  constitution  of  the  assured.  The  word  serious 
is  not  generally  used  to  signify  a  dangerous  condition,  but  rather 
a  grave  or  weighty  trouble.5 

§421.  The  right  to  avoid  policy  may  be  waived. — There  can 
be  no  waiver  of  the  avoidance  of  a  policy  by  reason  of  material 
false  statements  or  misrepresentations  in  the  application,  unless 
the  acts  relied  upon  as  showing  the  waiver  were  done  with  full 
knowledge  of  the  facts.  While,  therefore,  the  receipt  of  pre- 
miums or  assessments  with  full  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 

1  Schwarzbach  v.  Ohio  &c.  Union       Howie,  62  Ohio  St.  206  (held  error 
26  W.  Va.  640.  to  refuse  this  instruction  under  the 

2  Mutual  B.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Miller,      wording   of   the   policy),   56   N.   E. 
39  Ind.  483.  908. 

s  Mutual  B.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Miller,          s  Metropolitan     L.     Ins.     Co.     v. 
39    Ind.    483.  Howie,    62    Ohio  St.    207,    56   N.    E. 

*  Metropolitan     L.     Ins.     Co.     v.      908. 


CONTRACTS   RELATING   TO   INSURANCE.  438 

«J 

defendant  of  facts  working  a  forfeiture  of  the  policy,  might 
constitute  a  waiver  of  such  forfeiture,  yet  the  receipt  of  such 
premiums  or  assessments  in  ignorance  of  such  facts  would  not 
constitute  a  waiver.6 

§  422.  Manner  or  mode  of  giving  notice  of  death. — (1)  A  sub- 
stantial compliance  with  the  conditions  of  the  policy  of  insurance, 
as  to  the  manner  and  mode  of  giving  notice  of  the  death  of  the 
insured  to  the  defendant,  is  all  that  can  be  required  on  the  part 
of  the  plaintiff  in  giving  such  notice.  No  particular  form  of 
notice  is  required.7 

(2)  Under  the  policy  of  insurance  in  this  case  no  particular 
form  of  notice  was  required ;  and  that  if  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  the  letter  written  on  August  24,  1884,  was  intended 
by  the   plaintiff  to   give  the   required  notice  to  the   company, 
and  that  upon  receipt  of  said  letter  the  company  sent  its  agent 
to  the  city  of  R,  the  place  of  the  death  of  the  insured,  for  the 
purpose  of  investigating  the  facts  and  circumstances  connected 
with  the  said  death,  and  that  such  investigation  was  made  imme- 
diately thereafter,  then  no  further  proof  could  be  required  in 
this  case  before  the  suit  was  brought.8 

(3)  One  of  the  conditions  of  the  policy  is  that  "immediate  no- 
tice of  any  accidental  injury  or  accidental  death  for  which  claim 
is  to  be  made  under  this  contract  shall  be  given  in  writing  to  the 
secretary  of  the  company  at  P,  with  full  particulars  of  the  acci- 
dent and  injury,  and  unless  affirmative  and  positive  proof  of  death 
or  injury,  and  that  the  same  resulted  from  bodily  injuries  cov- 
ered by  this  contract,  shall  be  furnished  to  the  company  within 
six  months  of  the  happening  of  such  accident,  in  case  of  such 
injuries  resulting  fatally,  then  all  claims  based  thereon  shall  be 
forfeited  to  the  company."9 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  0  was  a  general 
agent  of  the  defendant  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  policies  of 
insurance  and  adjusting  losses,  and  if  they  further  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  said  agent  declined  to  pay  the  policy  upon 
the  sole  ground  that  the  insured  was  intoxicated  at  the  time  of 

o  Schwarzbach  v.  Ohio  V.  P.  8  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harvey, 

Union,  25  W.  Va.  640.  82  Va.  951,  5  S.  E.  553. 

7  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harvey,  °  Braymer  v.  Commercial  M.  A. 

82  Va.  951,  5  S.  E.  553.  Co.  199  Pa.  St.  259.  48  Atl.  972. 


439  PROOF  OF  DFATH — ASSIGNING  POLICY.         §  425 

the  accident,  or  that  he  so  acted  as  to  warrant  the  plaintiff  in 
believing  that  the  payment  by  the  company  would  be  resisted 
upon  that  ground,  then  the  plaintiff  had  the  right  to  institute 
this  suit,  although  ninety  days  had  not  expired  from  the  death 
of  the  insured.10 

§  423.  Formal  proof  of  death  unnecessary,  when. — The  court/ 
instructs  the  jury  .that  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  plaintiff  wrote  to  the  insurance  company  the  letter  dated 
August  21,  1884,  giving  notice  of  the  death  of  B,  the  insured,  and, 
that  after  receipt  of  said  letter,  and  in  consequence  thereof,  the 
company  sent  its  agent,  C,  to  inquire  and  ascertain  all  the  facts 
in  reference  to  said  death,  and  that  the  said  agent  came  to  R,' 
the  place  of  said  death,  and  investigated  the  facts  as  to  the  death 
and  the  cause  thereof,  and  that  after  making  such  investigation, 
the  said  agent,  upon  the  sole  ground  of  intoxication  at  the  time 
of  the  accident,  told  the  plaintiff  "that  he  had  no  case,  and  that 
in  his  opinion  the  company  ought  not  to  pay  and  would  not  pay 
the  policy,"  and  that  such  denial  of  liability  was  not  because 
the  formal  proofs  of  the  death  had  not  been  given,  then  it  was 
not  incumbent  on  the  plaintiff  to  furnish  any  further  proof  of 
said  death,  and  the  plaintiff  had  the  right  at  any  time  thereafter 
to  institute  this  suit.11 

§  424.  Assignment  of  policy  without  authority  of  beneficiary. 
The  policy  of  insurance  being  payable  to  M  vested  in  her  alone 
the  absolute  ownership  of  it,  and  it  could  not  be  assigned 
or  transferred  to  C  or  any  other  person  by  her  husband  or  any 
other  person  without  her  authority ;  and  an  assignment  or  deliv- 
ery of  the  policy  to  C  by  the  husband  of  the  defendant  without 
her  authority  would  not  bind  her  in  any  respect.12 


Fire  Insurance. 

§  425.    Property  not  destroyed  by  fire — No  recovery. — (1)  The 

court  instructs  the  jury  that  the  plaintiffs  under  the  pleadings 

10  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harvey,         12  Pence  v.   Makepeace,     66   Ind. 
82  Va.  952,  5  S.  E.  553.  357,   (held  proper  under  the  plead- 

n  Travelers'  Ins.   Co.  v.  Harvey,      ings.) 
82  Va.  950,  5  S.  E.  553. 


§   426  CONTRACTS  RELATING  TO  INSURANCE.  440 

in  this  case  cannot  recover  if  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  testi- 
mony that  the  goods  shipped  by  the  plaintiffs  to  their  con- 
signees in  L.  were  damaged  or  destroyed  from  spontaneous  com- 
bustion caused  by  their  inherent  infirmity.13 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  before  you  that  the  build- 
ing described  in  the  policy  sued  on  was  not  destroyed  by  fire  you 
will  find  for  defendant.  In  this  connection  you  are  instructed 
that  before  the  plaintiff  can  recover,  it  must  appear  from  the 
evidence  to  your  satisfaction  that  the  fire  caused  the  destruction 
of  this  building.  If  the  building  fell  down  before  it  was  burned, 
and  the  fire  occurred  after  the  building  fell  down,  and  if  you  so 
believe  from  the  evidence  before  you,  you  will  find  for  the 
defendant.  If  the  evidence  satisfies  you  that  the  building  was 
on  fire  before  it  fell,  and  that  such  fire  caused  the  fall  of  the 
building,  then  you.  should  find  for  the  plaintiff.14 

§  426.  Holder  of  policy  not  responsible  for  acts  of  agent. 
If  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  was  asked  to  and  did  sign  the  appli- 
cation in  blank,  and  the  agent  of  the  defendant  filled  it  up  on 
his  own  motion  without  knowledge  of  the  plaintiff  as  to  what  the 
answers  were,  or  if  you  should  find  that  the  plaintiff  made  true 
and  correct  answers,  but  the  agent,  in  writing  the  answers,  for 
any  reason,  wrote  incorrect  answers,  the  plaintiff  will  not  be 
responsible  for  the  acts,  mistakes  or  wrongs  of  such  agent.15 

§  427.    Fraud  in  proof  of  loss  defeats  a  recovery. — If  you 

believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  policy  in  question  contained 
a  provision  that  all  fraud  or  attempt  at  fraud,  by  false  swearing 
or  otherwise,  shall  cause  a  forfeiture  of  all  claims  under  the 
policy,  and  that  if  you  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  plaintiffs  have  fraudulently  offered  to  the  defendant  proofs 
of  loss  under  the  policy  containing  material  statements  in  regard 
to  the  loss  under  said  policy,  which  the  plaintiff  knew  to  be  false 
at  the  time  the  same  were  offered,  you  will  find  for  the  defend- 
ant.16 

13  Providence     and     Washington         is  Kingston  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  42 
Ins.  Co.  of  Providence,  R.  I.  v.  Ad-      Iowa,  47. 
ler,  65  Md.  163,  4  Atl.  121.  ie  Shulter  v.  Ins.  Co.  62  Mo.  237. 

i*  Liverpool   &   L.   &  G.   Ins.   Co. 
v.  Ende,  65  Tex.  124. 


441  ABANDONMENT  OF  INSURED  PEOPEETY.  §    428 

§  428.     Abandonment   of    insured   boat,    justifiable    when. 

(1)  Although  it  was  the  duty  of  the  master  and  crew  to  labor  for 
the  recovery  of  the  vessel,  they  were  not  bound  to  do  impossi- 
bilities; and  that  if  it  appeared  to  practical  men  that  the  vessel 
could  not  be  saved,  they  would  be  justified  in  abandoning  her, 
and  were  not  bound  to  wait  for  the  decision  of  the  underwriters 
on  the  offer  to  abandon.17 

(2)  If  the  condition  of  the  boat  was  such  that  in  the  opinon 
of   practical   men   the    great   probability   appeared   to    be   that 
she  could  not  be  raised  and  repaired,  it  was  sufficient  to  justify 
an  abandonment  as  for  a  total  loss,  though  she  was  afterwards 
raised  and  repaired  at  a  cost  of  less  than  half  her  value.18 

(3)  If  the  injury  to  the  boat  was  such  that  her  repairs  would 
cost  more  than  half  her  value  when  repaired  at  the  port  of 
repair,   then   the   assured   had   the   right   to   abandon;    and   in 
estimating   the   expense    of   repairs   the   jury   should   take   into 
consideration  the  amount  paid  by  the  insurance  companies  for 
raising  the   boat  and  bringing  her  to   M,  if  fairly  expended; 
that  it  was  not  necessary  that  the  expense  of  repairs  should 
amount  to  half  the  sum  named  in  the  policy  as  the  agreed  value 
of  the  boat,  but  it  was  sufficient  if  equal  to  half  of  her  value  in 
fact  when  repaired.19 

(4)  An  abandonment  not  accepted  might  be  waived  by  the 
party  making  it;  that  the  fact  that  the  mortgagee,  G,  had  taken 
possession  of  the  boat  and  sold  her  because  of  his  interest,  would 
not  have  the  effect  of  waiving  abandonment,  if  he  took  possession 
on  notice  by  the  insurers  that  they  would  no  longer  be  respon- 
sible for  her,  and  after  her  abandonment  by  G,  and  did  so  to 
protect  the  interests  of  all  concerned ;  and  that  this  was  a  ques- 
tion of  intention  to  be  judged  by  the  acts  and  declarations  of 
sajd  G,  done  and  made  at  the  time.20 

(5)  If  the  mortgagor  was  in  possession  and  command  of  the 
boat  as  captain,  and  the  mortgages  were  forfeited,  perhaps  neither 
he  nor  the  mortgagee  alone  could  make  an  abandonment;  but  if 
there  was  a  right  to  abandon,  and  the  mortgagor,  having  the 

i?  Fulton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Goodman,  32  19  Fulton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Goodman,  32 

Ala.  113.  Ala.  113. 

is  Fulton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Goodman,  20  Fulton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Goodman,  32 

32  Ala.  113.  Ala.  113,  114. 


§   429  CONTRACTS  RELATING  TO  INSURANCE.  442 

command  and  control  of  the  boat  as  master,  did  abandon  or  offer 
to  abandon  to  the  defendants,  and  they  knew  of  the  existence  of 
the  mortgages  and  did  not  reject  the  abandonment  on  account  of 
the  mortgages,  and  if  the  mortgagee  shortly  afterwards,  when  the 
offer  of  abandonment  by  the  mortgagor  was  still  unrevoked,  and 
the  boat  was  still  at  the  disposal  of  the  defendants  so  far  as  the 
mortgagor  was  concerned,  assented  to  and  approved  of  the  aban- 
donment by  the  mortgagor  and  made  known  to  the  defendants  his 
assent  and  approval,  an  abandonment  so  made,  if  in  other  respects 
good,  would  be  valid.21 

(6)  A  parol  abandonment  was  sufficient,  and  when  once  right- 
fully made  it  fixed  the  rights  of  the  assured,  and  could  not  be 
forfeited  by  any  subsequent  event  without  the  consent  of  the 
assured.22 

§  429.  Boat  not  in  safe  and  seaworthy  condition  defeats 
recovery. — (1)  The  boat  must  have  been  kept  in  such  condition  as 
to  be  reasonably  sufficient  to  withstand  the  ordinary  perils  attend- 
ing a  boat  so  laid  up  at  that  time  and  place.  If  she  was  not  so 
kept  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  no  matter  what  peril  she  may 
have  encountered.  If  she  was,  and  encountered  wind  or  waves  by 
which  she  broke  her  spars,  was  driven  against  the  bank  and 
careened  so  as  to  be  thrown  on  her  side  in  such  a  way  as  to  take 
in  water  at  her  seams  which  were  far  enough  above  the  water- 
line  so  as  not  to  endanger  her  safety  while  lying  up  under  or- 
dinary circumstances,  and  sunk  in  consequence  thereof,  then  the 
plaintiff  can  recover  if  he  had  provided  and  kept  at  the  boat 
a  force  of  men  sufficient  to  take  care  of  the  boat  under  ordi- 
nary perils,  whether  all  such  men  were  directly  in  his  employ 
and  pay  or  not.22 

(2)  If  the  boat  was  seaworthy  when  laid  up,  but  thereafter 
her  seams  were  suffered  to  become  open  by  exposure,  which  .the 
plaintiff  failed  to  have  properly  caulked,  and  she  was  not  in  a 
safe  and  seaworthy  condition  requisite  for  her  safety  when  tied 
up,  then  plaintiff  cannot  recover.24 

(3)  The  boat  need  not  have  been  sufficiently  seaworthy  to  per- 

21  Fulton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Goodman,  32          23  Enterprise  Ins.   Co.  v.  Parisat, 
Ala.  113.  35  Ohio  St.  35. 

22  Fulton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Goodman,  32         24  Enterprise  Ins.  Co.  v.  Parisat, 
Ala.  113.  35  Ohio  St.  35. 


443  BOAT  UNSEA WORTHY.  §    429 

form  a  voyage,  but  it  must  hav.e  been  for  her  preservation  under 
all  ordinary  circumstances  while  tied  up  during  such  period 
of  non-user,  and  if  she  encountered  a  peril  insured  against 
which  she  would  have  safely  resisted  if  seaworthy,  but  in  con- 
sequence of  being  unseaworthy  was  sunk  by  encountering  a 
peril  insured  against,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.25 

25  Enterprise  Ins.  Co.  v.  Parisat,     35  Ohio  St  35. 


CHAPTER  XXXYI. 


CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS. 


Sec. 

ATTORNEY    AND    CLIENT. 

430.  Value  of  services  of  an  at- 
torney. 

431.'  Party  not  liable  for  services  of 
attorney — Wh  en . 


ARBITRATION. 

432.  Submitting   disputes    to   arbi- 

tration. 

BAILMENTS. 

433.  Party  hiring  horse  liable  for 

injury. 

434.  Party   liable   for     money     in- 

trusted to  him. 

433.     Hotel  losing  property  of  guest 
entrusted  to  it. 

BANKING    TRANSACTIONS. 

436.  Company  holding  one  out  as 

agent. 

437.  Attempt  to  defraud  company. 

BROKERS. 

438.  Brokers    entitled    to   commis- 

sions— When. 

439.  What    is    essential    to    entitle 

one  to  commissions. 

440.  Failure   to  comply   with   con- 

tract prevents  recovery. 

441.  Notice  to  be  given  under  the 

contract. 

442.  Burden  of  proof  on  plaintiff — 

When. 


Sec. 
443. 


444. 
445. 


446. 
447. 
448. 
449. 
450. 
451. 


452. 


453. 
454. 


455. 


Payment  of  interest  on  month- 
ly balances. 

BUILDING    CONTRACTS. 

Contractor  complying  with 
contract  can  recover. 

Parties  abandoning  original 
contract. 

DOMESTIC    RELATIONS. 

Husband  entitled  to  income 
of  wife's  estate. 

Liability  of  wife  for  hus- 
band's debts. 

Duty  of  both  parents  to  sup- 
port their  children. 

Father  entitled  to  minor 
child's  services  and  earnings. 

Minor  remaining  with  family 
after  full  age. 

Minor  liable  on  his  contracts 
—When. 

Head  of  family  or  house- 
holder. 

LANDLORD    AND    TENANT. 

Liability  of  tenant  for  dam- 
ages to  premises. 

New  leasing  of  premises  dis- 
charges guaranty. 

MARRIAGE    CONTRACTS. 

What  essential  to  entitle 
plaintiff  to  recover  for 
breach. 


444 


445 


CONTRACTS  BETWEEN  ATTORNEY  AND  CLIENT. 


430 


Sec. 

456.  Unchastity     of     woman     not 

breach  of  contract. 

457.  Assessing  damages  for  breach 

of  contract. 


PARTNERSHIP   CONTRACTS. 

458.  What   constitutes   a   partner- 

ship. 

459.  Each    partner    has    power  to 

bind  all  others. 

460.  Partners — Not    general     part- 

ners. 


CHATTEL    MORTGAGES. 

461.    Mortgagee   may   take   posses- 
sion of  the  property. 


SUBSCRIPTION     CONTRACT. 

462.  Alteration      of      subscription 

contract. 

463.  Stock  illegally  issued,  invalid. 


Sec. 

SERVICES    RENDERED    TO    PUBLIC. 

464.  Liability  of  county  for  physi- 

cian's services. 

STATUTE    OF    LIMITATIONS. 

465.  Reviving   a    claim    barred   by 

statute  of  limitations. 

466.  The     promise     reviving     dis- 

charged claim  must  be  clear. 

467.  Payment  o>n  running  account 

— How   applied. 

468.  Deeds  executed  and  placed  in 

escrow. 

OTHER    MATTERS. 

469.  Rights     in    contract    may  be 

waived. 

470.  Correspondence       constituting 

contract. 

471.  Written    contract    cannot    be 

varied  by  parol  proof. 

472.  Unsigned  contract  binding. 

473.  Execution     and     delivery     of 

deed. 


Attorney  and  Client. 

§  430.  Value  of  services  of  an  attorney. — (1)  If  the  jury  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has  performed  services  for 
the  defendant,  with  her  consent,  since  September,  1873,  and  has 
advanced  and  paid  moneys  for  her  while  acting  as  her  solicitor, 
in  matters  connected  with  her  employment,  they  will  find  for 
the  plaintiff  a  reasonable  value  for  such  services,  as  shown  by 
the  evidence,  and  also  the  amount  of  moneys  which  the  evi- 
dence shows  he  has  advanced  for  her.1 

(2)  In  ascertaining  the  reasonable  value  of  the  services  of 
plaintiff  you  will  consider  the  nature  of  the  litigation,  the  amount 
involved  and  the  interests  at  stake,  the  capacity  and  fitness  of  the 
plaintiff  for  the  required  work,  the  services  and  labor  rendered  by 
plaintiff,  the  length  of  time  occupied  by  him  and  the  benefit,  if 
any,  derived  by  defendants  from  the  litigation.  You  are  further 
instructed  to  look  at  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  and  to  exercise 
your  sound  discretion  and  judgment  thereon,  and  allow  the  plain- 


Bennett    v.    Connelly,     103     111.      50,  55. 


§   431  CONTRACTS   ON   DIFFERENT   MATTERS.  446 

tiff  such  reasonable  amount  as  you  may  believe  he  is  justly 
entitled  to,  not  to  exceed  the  amount  claimed  in  his  petition.2 

(3)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  before  you  that  the  plaintiff 
has  performed  any  services  for  the  defendant,  with  his  con- 
sent, since  the  month  of  September,  1873,  and  has  advanced 
and  paid  moneys  for  him  while  acting  as  his  solicitor  in  matters 
connected  with  his  employment,  then  you  will  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff a  reasonable  value  for  such  services,  as  shown  by  the  evi- 
dence, and  also  the  amount  of  moneys  which  the  evidence  shows 
he  has  advanced  for  him;  and  in  ascertaining  the  reasonable 
value  of  the  services  of  the  plaintiff  you  will  consider  the  na- 
ture of  the  litigation,  the  amount  involved,  the  interests  at 
stake,  the  capacity  and  fitness  of  the  plaintiff  to  perform  the 
work  required,  the  services  and  labor  rendered  by  the  plain- 
tiff, the  length  of  time  occupied  by  him  and  the  benefit,  if 
any,  derived  by  the  defendant  from  such  litigation.3 

§431.    Party  not  liable  for  services  of  attorney — When. —  (1) 

Notwithstanding  the  land  company  may  have  been  benefitted  by 
the  services  rendered  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  case  of  G  against  B 
if  you  believe  such  to  be  a  fact,  yet  the  jury  are  not  authorized 
to  go  beyond  the  parties  making  the  contract  by  which  such 
services  in  such  cause  were  procured  in  search  of  an  implied 
promise  to  pay  for  such  incidental  benefit.4 

(2)  So  far  as  the  liability  of  this  defendant  land  company  is 
concerned,  it  makes  no  difference  what  plaintiffs  understood  as  to 
the  defendant  being  liable  to  them  for  their  fee  in  said  case  of 
G  against  B.     If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiffs' 
services  in  said  cause  were  not  procured  by  the  defendant,  then 
this  defendant  is  not  liable  to  plaintiffs  for  their  services  in  said 
case,  and  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.5 

(3)  The  law  is  that  when  plaintiffs  were  employed,  and  entered 
upon  their  employment  in  the  case  of  G  against  B,  their  duty 
was  a   vigilant  prosecution   of  the  rights  of  I    in  that  litiga- 
tion.    If  you  believe  from  the   evidence  they  were  employed 

2  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  *  Humes    v.    Decatur    Land    Im. 
Clark,  81  Tex.  48,  16  S.  W.  631.  &  F.  Co.  98  Ala.  465,  13  So.  368. 

3  Bennett   v.    Connelly,     103     111.  *  Humes  v.  Decatur  Land   Im.  & 
55;    International   &   G.   N.   R.   Co.  F.  Co.  98  Ala.  461,  13  So.  368. 

v.  Clark,  81  Tex.  48,  16  S.  W.  631. 


447  ARBITRATION — BAILMENT.  §    433 

by  the  defendant,  it  is  immaterial  what  benefit  the  land  company 
derived  from  the  services  rendered  by  them  in  this  cause  in 
the  prosecution  of  the  rights  of  said  G.  If  said  services  were 
not  procured  by  said  land  company,  it  is  not  liable  to  plain 
tiffs  in  this  case.0 

(4)  The  parties  making  the  contract  by  which  plaintiffs'  serv- 
ices in  the  case  of  G  against  B  were  procured,  if  you  find  such 
contract  was  made,  are  alone  liable  to  plaintiffs  for  their  fee  in 
said  cause.7 

Arbitration. 

§432.  Submitting  disputes  to  arbitration. — (1)  If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant  agreed  to 
submit  their  differences  to  arbitration,  and  if  you  find  such  award 
was  made  as  agreed,  you  should  find  for  the  plaintiff  for  the 
amount  found  by  the  arbitrators  in  such  matter,  unless  you 
further  find  (1),  that  said  award  does  not  include  all  the  dif- 
ferences in  dispute  between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  at  the 
time  of  the  alleged  award;  or  (2)  that  the  defendant  was  not 
accorded  a  reasonable  notice  of  the  time  of  the  hearing.8 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  one  of  the  arbitrators, 
G,  was  induced  to  resign  or  withdraw  from  the  arbitration  by 
reason  of  the  agreement  of  the  other  two  arbitrators  to  with- 
draw and  resign  their  authority  as  such  arbitrators,  and  thereby 
the  said  arbitrator,  G,  so  resigning  was  prevented  from  meet- 
ing with  the  arbitrators  at  the  time  of  the  making  of  the  award, 
in  such  case  the  award  is  void,  and  you  should  find  for  the  de- 
fendant.9 

Bailments. 

§  433.  Party  hiring  horse  liable  for  injury. — (1)  If  you  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  hired  the  horse  from  the 
plaintiff  to  go  to  one  or  more  particular  places  specified  in  the  con- 
tract, and  that  he  went  to  another  and  a  different  place  in  a 

s  Humes  v.  Decatur  Land  Im.  &  8  Amos  v.  Buck,  75  Iowa,  654,  37 
F.  Co.  98  Ala.  461,  13  So.  368.  N.  W.  118. 

T  Humes  v.  Decatur  Land  Im.  &  »  McCord  v.  McSpaden,  34  Wis. 
F.  Co.  98  Ala.  465,  13  So.  368.  549. 


§    433  CONTRACTS    ON    DIFFERENT    MATTERS.  448 

different  direction  and  over  a  different  route  from  what  was 
specified  in  the  contract,  that  would  amount  to  a  conversion  of 
the  horse ;  and  if  the  horse  died  while  in  his  possession  and 
after  he  had  thus  converted  it  to  his  own  use,  he  would  be 
liable  for  the  value  of  the  horse  at  the  time  of  the  conversion.10 

(2)  If  the  plaintiffs  and  defendant  made  a  contract,  by  which 
the  defendant  hired  the  plaintiffs'  horse  and  carriage  for  use 
in  driving  to  and  from  Lynnfield  only,  and  in  violation  of  that 
contract  the  defendant  drove  the  plaintiffs'  horse  and  carriage 
to  Lynnfield  and  from  thence  several  miles  to  Peabody,  he  be- 
came thereby  responsible  to  the  plaintiff  for  any  injury  to  such 
horse  and  buggy  in  Peabody,  or  while  driving  from  Lynnfield 
to  Peabody.     Whether  or  not  such  injury  was  caused  by  any 
want  of  ordinary  care  or  skill  of  the  defendant  in  driving  the 
horse  and  carriage  from  Lynnfield  to  Peabody,  or  in  tying  or 
managing  the  horse  and  carriage  in  Peabody,  or  by  any  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  harness  of  said  horse,  or  any  physical  infirmity 
or  want  of  docility  of  the  horse,  would  be  immaterial,  as  the 
defendant's  use  of  the  horse  and  carriage,  in  driving  beyond 
Lynnfield  in  violation  of  his  contract,  was  a  conversion  of  such 
horse  and  carriage,  in  the  nature  of  an  original  unlawful  tak- 
ing of  such  horse  and  carriage,  at  the  time  of  the  defendant's 
leaving  Lynnfield,   and   such   conversion   caused   the   defendant 
to  be  liable  in  damages  to  the  plaintiff  therefor,  equal  to  the 
difference  between  the  value  of  such  horse  and  carriage  at  the 
time  it  was  taken  by  the   defendant  from  Lynnfield,   and  the 
value  of  the  same  when  restored  by  the  defendant  to  the  plain- 
tiff.    Accepting  pay  for  the   use   of  the   horse   under   such   a 
contract  was  a  waiver  of  the  conversion.11 

(3)  If  the  plaintiffs  and  defendant  made  a  contract  by  which 
the  defendant  hired  the  plaintiff's  horse  and  carriage  for  use 
in  driving  for  pleasure  for  a  time  and  distance  not   fixed   or 
agreed  upon  by  them,  the  defendant  rightfully  drove  the  horse 
to  Lynnfield  and  thence  to  Peabody,  and  was  responsible  for  an 
injury  to  such  horse  or  carriage,  which  was  caused  by  the  de- 
fendant's want  of  ordinary  care  and  skill  in  driving  or  manag- 
ing such  horse  and  carriage  in  Peabody,  to  be  determined  in 

*°  Malone     v.     Robinson,   77   Ga.         n  Perham  v.   Coney,     117    Mass. 
719.  103. 


449  BAILMENT    CONTRACTS.  §    433 

view  of  the  fact  known  by  the  plaintiffs,  and  presumed  to  have 
been  considered  by  them  in  letting  the  horse,  that  the  defend- 
ant was  a  one-armed  man,  but  was  not  responsible  for  any  in- 
jury to  such  horse  and  carriage  caused  by  the  insufficiency  of 
the  plaintiffs'  harness  for  driving  or  tying  the  horse,  or  by  rea- 
son of  any  disease  or  physical  infirmity,  or  want  of  docility 
of  the  horse,  or  by  any  peculiar  habits  or  dispositions  of  the 
horse  when  tied,  unless  the  defendant  was  notified  of  such  pe- 
culiar habits  and  dispositions.12 

(4)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  un- 
dertook for  a  reward  to  deliver  the  team  of  horses  and  vehicle 
attached,  and  described  in  the  evidence,  to  a  person  designated 
by  the  plaintiff,  and  in  the  course  of  this  undertaking  intrusted 
the   driving  of  the  team  to   one  who,   by  his  negligence,   per- 
mitted the  horses  to  run  away,  whereby  the  plaintiff  suffered 
damage,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  and  the  jury 
will  allow  such  damages  as  they  may  find  from  the  evidence 
the  plaintiff  suffered  by  reason  of  the  defendant's  fault  in  the 
premises.13 

(5)  Although  it  is  true  that,  by  hiring  his  mare  to  the  defend- 
ants for  use  on  the  street  cars,  the  plaintiff  impliedly  engaged 
that  she  was  reasonably  fit  for  that  purpose,  this  gave  the  'de- 
fendants no  right  to  use  her  after  it  became  manifest  to  them 
that  by  reason  of  her  nervousness,   or  fretfulness,  or  diseased 
condition,  she  was  not  fit  for  such  work.     They  had  no  right 
to  use  her.     If  her  board   devolved   upon  them,   it   was   their 
duty  to  supply  her  with  plentiful  food  and  water  at  the  proper 
time.     It  was  their  duty,  also,  not  to  require  her  to  do  more 
work  than  it  was  manifest  she  could  perform  without  injury, 
and  if,  during  such  use,  it  was  plainly  evident  to  the  defend- 
ant's employes  that  she  was  exhausted,   overheated,  or  suffer- 
ing by  reason  of  disease,  and  her  continued  use  was  dangerous 
to  her  health  and  life,  it  was  their  duty  then  to  abstain  from 
further  use  of  her  without  obtaining  the  plaintiff's  consent  to 
the  same;  and  if,  without  so  doing  they  negligently  persisted 

12  Perham   v.    Coney,    117     Mass.          is  American  D.  T.  C.  Co.  v.  Walk- 
404.  er,  72  Md.  457,  20  Atl.  1. 


§    434  CONTRACTS   ON    DIFFERENT    MATTERS.  450 

in  such  use,  and  by  reason  of  the  same  she  was  so  injured  that 
she  died,  the  defendants  are  liable.14 

(6)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  hired  his 
mare  to  the  defendants  for  the  purpose  of  being  used  by  them  in 
pulling  street  cars,  the  plaintiff  thereby  engaged  and  bound 
himself  that  the  mare  so  hired  was  reasonably  fit  and  suitable 
for  such  purposes  and  such  uses.  If,  therefore,  you  find  that 
the  mare  so  hired  was  injured  while  in  the  use  of  the  defend- 
ants in  pulling  their  street  cars,  without  their  fault,  and  through 
the  nervousness  and  fretfulness  of  said  mare,  or  because  of  her 
diseased  condition  at  the  time  the  plaintiff  hired  her  to  the 
defendants,  or  because  of  her  unfitness  to  pull  said  street  cars, 
then  you  should  find  for  the  defendants.15 

§  434.  Party  liable  for  money  intrusted  to  him. — If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  was  intrusted  with 
the  safe-keeping  of  money  belonging  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that 
part  of  said  money  was  delivered  to  him  on  Sunday,  and  the 
defendant  thereafter  on  a  week  day  admitted  the  sum  of  one 
hundred  and  sixty-seven  dollars  and  forty-four  cents  to  be  iti 
his  hands  belonging  to  the  plaintiff,  and  promised  to  apply  the 
same  in  payment  of  the  rent  for  the  premises  mentioned  in 
and  under  the  contract  offered  in  evidence,  but  neglected  and 
failed  to  apply  said  money  in  payment  of  said  rent,  then  the 
jury  must  find  for  the  plaintiff  for  said  amount  of  money  in 
the  hands  of  the  defendant,  and  in  their  discretion  may  allow 
interest  thereon  from  the  time  the  defendant  failed  to  pay  the 
same  as  promised  by  him  16 

§  435.  Hotel  losing  property  of  guest  entrusted  to  it. — If  the 
jury  find  from  the  evidence  in  the  cause  that  the  plaintiff  was 
a  guest  of  the  defendant,  as  alleged  in  the  declaration  in  this 
cause,  that  the  trunk  of  the  plaintiff  was  brought  by  him  into 
the  hotel  of  the  defendant,  while  the  plaintiff  was  a  guest  in 
said  hotel,  that  the  said  trunk  contained  the  bank  notes  tes- 
tified to  by  the  plaintiff,  and  that  said  trunk  and  its  contents 

14  Bass  v.  Cantor,  123  Ind.  446,  24  «  Haacke  v.  Knights,  &c.  76  Md. 
N.  E.  147.  431,  25  Atl.  422. 

i*  Bass   v.    Cantor,    123   Ind.    446, 
24  N.  E.  147. 


451  BANKING  TRANSACTIONS.  §    436 

were  lost  while  so  in  said  hotel,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover 
for  said  bank  notes  in  this  action,  unless  they  shall  also  find  that 
the  said  bank  notes  were  designed  by  the  plaintiff  for  his  use 
while  on  his  journey,  or  while  a  guest  in  said  hotel,  or  unless 
they  shall  find  that  they  were  lost  by  the  fraud  or  negligence 
of  the  defendant.17 


Banking  Transactions. 

§  436.  Company  holding  one  out  as  agent. — (1)  The  indorse- 
ment on  the  face  of  the  check  sued  on  is  in  proper  form  to  consti- 
tute a  certification  thereof;  and  if  you  find  from  the  evidence 
that  defendant's  paying  teller  at  the  time  of  making  said  in- 
dorsement had  authority  or  apparent  authority,  as  defined 
in  these  instructions,  to  make  the  indorsement  of  certification 
upon  said  check,  and  if  you  find  further  from  the  evidence 
that  the  plaintiff  acted  in  good  faith  and  without  fraud,  as  de- 
fined in  another  instruction  herewith  given,  then  your  verdict 
must  be  for  the  plaintiff.18 

(2)  The  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  prove  that  the  defendant's 
paying  teller  had  actual  authority  conferred  upon  him  by  de- 
fendant to  certify  checks,  but  that  plaintiff  had  the  right  in 
good  faith  to  rely  upon  the  apparent  authority  of  said  paying 
teller  to  certify  checks.  And  the  court  further  instructs  you 
that  whenever  a  person  has  held  out  another  as  his  agent  au- 
thorized to  act  for  him  in  a  given  capacity,  or  has  knowingly 
and  without  dissent  permitted  such  other  to  act  as  his  agent 
in  such  capacity,  or  where  his  habits  and  course  of  dealing 
have  been  such  as  to  reasonably  warrant  the  presumption  that 
such  other  was  his  agent,  authorized  to  act  in  that  capacity, 
whether  it  be  in  a  single  transaction  or  in  a  series  of  trans- 
actions, his  authority  to  such  other  to  act  for  him  in  that  ca- 
pacity will  be  conclusively  presumed,  so  far  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  protect  the  rights  of  third  persons  who  have  relied  thereon 
in  good  faith,  and  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  prudence,  and  the 
principal  will  not  be  permitted  to  deny  that  such  other  was  not 

17  Treiber  v.  Burrows,  27  Md.  132.         is  Muth  v.  St.  Louis  T.  Co.  94  Mo. 

App.  94,  67  S.  W.  978. 


§    437  CONTRACTS    ON    DIFFERENT    MATTERS.  452 

his  agent  authorized  to  do  the  act  that  he  assumed  to  do,  pro- 
vided that  act  was  within  the  real  or  apparent  scope  of  the 
presumed  authority.10 

(3)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  check  sued  on  was 
certified  by  the  authority  of  the  defendant  company,  and  that 
at  the  time  of  said  certification  there  was  sufficient  funds  of 
the  maker  of  said  check  on  deposit  with  defendant  to  pay  said 
check,  then  defendant  had  the  right  to  retain  out  of  the  funds 
of  said  maker  a  sufficient  amount  to  pay  said  check  whenever 
the  same  might  be  presented.20 

§  437.  Attempt  to  defraud  company. — (1)  If  the  jury  find  from 
the  evidence  that  the  writing  or  paper  sued  upon  by  the  plain- 
tiff was  marked  or  certified  ''good"  in  the  name  of  the  defend- 
ant by  an  employe,  and  that  the  plaintiff  obtained  such  mark- 
ing or  certification  in  pursuance  of  a  design  or  plan  to  defraud 
the  defendant  by  keeping  or  secreting  said  paper  for  such  time 
as  might  be  necessary  to  permit  the  money  represented  by  such 
paper  to  be  drawn  out  upon  other  orders,  writings  or  checks, 
with  the  intention  of  then  presenting  the  said  writing,  and 
demanding  payment  of  the  amount  ordered  therein  to  be  paid, 
the  jury  will  find  for  the  defendant.21 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  and 
one  M,  his  brother,  confederated  or  conspired  together  to  de- 
fraud the  defendant  by  placing  it  in  such  a  position  that  it 
might  be  called  upon  to  pay  the  amount  of  the  writing  or  cheek 
sued  upon  by  plaintiff,  after  having  already  paid  out  upon 
other  orders  or  checks  the  money  to  the  credit  of  the  drawer 
or  drawers  of  such  order  or  check,  and  that  the  plaintiff  is  in 
possession  of  the  instrument  sued  on,  as  a  party  to  such  con- 
federacy or  conspiracy,  the  jury  will  find  for  the  defendant.22 

«  Muth  v.  St.  Louis  T.  Co.  94  21  Muth  v.  St.  Louis  T.  Co.  94 

Mo.  App.  94,  67  S.  W.  978.  Mo.  App.  94,  67  S.  W.  973. 

20  Muth  v.  St.  Louis  T.  Co.  94  22  Muth  v.  St.  Louis  T.  Co.  94 

Mo.  App.  94,  67  S.  W.  978.  Mo.  App.  94,  67  S.  W.  978. 


453  COMMISSION     OF   BROKERS.  §    438 

Brokers. 

§  438.  Broker  entitled  to  commissions — When. — (1)  In  ordi- 
nary cases,  the  law  is  well  settled  where  a  broker  is  employed  in 
reference  to  a  sale  of  real  estate,  that  when  he  brings  a  buyer 
to  the  seller  who  is  willing  and  ready  to  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment with  the  seller  for  the  purchase  of  his  property  on  the 
terms  that  the  seller  has  fixed,  and  the  seller  is  satisfied  to 
accept  him  as  a  purchaser,  then  the  broker  has  earned  his  com- 
mission. The  earning  of  it  is  not  dependent,  in  such  cases,  on 
the  question  as  to  whether  the  buyer  carries  out  the  contract, 
or  as  to  whether  the  seller  is  able  to  complete  his  contract. 
Therefore,  in  the  absence  of  any  express  agreement  to  the  con- 
trary, the  law  is  that  the  broker  is  entitled  to  his  commissions 
when  the  vendor  accepts,  when  he  (the  broker)  brings  to  the 
vendor  a  party  ready  and  willing  to  accept  the  terms  fixed 
by  the  vendor,  and  the  party  is  satisfactory  to  the  vendor, 
and  he  enters  into  a  contract  with  him.  The  contention  is  that 
there  was  a  different  agreement  here.  That  question  is  for  you 
to  determine.  If  you  find  that  this  was  an  ordinary  contract, 
made  without  any  conditions,  the  broker  employed  in  the  usual 
way,  and  that  there  was  no  bargain  entered  into  between  the 
plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  Mr.  B,  that  he  was  only  to  be 
paid  his  commission  in  case  this  sale  went  through,  then  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  recover.  If,  however,  the  bargain  agreed  upon 
between  plaintiff  and  defendant  was  that  commission  was  only 
to  be  paid  in  case  this  whole  transaction  went  through,  as 
provided  by  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  sale,  the  plaintiff  is 
not  entitled  to  recover,  unless  you  are  satisfied  from  the  evi- 
dence here  that  the  defendant  capriciously  refused  to  carry 
out  the  contract.23 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  was  en- 
gaged in  the  business  of  a  property  broker  in  the  city  of  B, 
and  that  the  defendant  offered  certain  property  for  sale  to  the 
park  commissioners  of  said  city,  and  that  he  employed  the 
plaintiff  to  aid  and  assist  him  in  effecting  said  sale,  either  by 
previous  authority  or  the  acceptance  of  the  plaintiff's  agency 

as  Kalley  v.  Baker,  132  N.  Y.  5,      29  N.  E.  1091. 


§    438  CONTRACTS    ON    DIFFERENT  , MATTERS.  454 

and  the  adoption  of  his  acts,  and  that  the  plaintiff  did  diligently 
and  faithfully  occupy  his  time  and  render  services  in  so  aiding 
him  to  effect  said  sale,  and  a  sale  of  said  property  to  said  com- 
missioners was  in  a  short  time  made  and  effected,  and  that 
said  services  were  of  advantage  and  value  to  the  defendant 
in  effecting  the  said  sale,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  re- 
cover such  sum  as  the  jury  may  find  from  the  evidence  to  be 
a  reasonable  remuneration  to  the  plaintiff  for  said  services;  and 
in  ascertaining  what  is  a  reasonable  remuneration,  the  jury  may 
consider  the  rate  of  compensation,  which  they  may  find  from 
the  evidence  was  usual  and  customary  in  the  said  city  for  ser- 
vices of  a  like  kind.24 

(3)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  em- 
ployed the   plaintiff   to   procure   a  purchaser  for   the   property 
spoken   of   by   the   witnesses,   and   the   plaintiff   did   procure    a 
purchaser  for  said  property,   and  the   said  property  was   sold 
by  the  defendant  to   the  purchaser  procured   by  the  plaintiff, 
then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  such  compensation  as 
they  may  find  usual  and  customary.25 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  de- 
fendant employed  the  plaintiff,  Stewart,  as  his  agent  to  negotiate 
the  sale  of  his,   the  defendant's,  street  railway  property,   and 
that  the  plaintiff  undertook  said  employment  and  was  instru- 
mental in  bringing  together  the  buyer  and  the  defendant,  then 
and  in  that  case  the  plaintiff  is  entitled,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
to   recover  from  the   defendant   compensation  for  his   services, 
regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  defendant  himself  concluded  the 
sale,  and  upon  a  price  less  and  upon  terms  different  from  those 
at  which  the  plaintiff  was  authorized  to  sell.26 

(5)  If  the  jury  find  that  the  defendant  employed  the  plaintiffs 
as  his   brokers   to   buy  'and   sell   on   commission   stocks,   bonds 
and  grain  for  him  in  the  markets  of  New  York,  Baltimore  and 
Chicago,  under  an  agreement  that  the  defendant  should  secure 
to  the  plaintiffs  by  depositing  with  them  a  margin  as  testified 
to  by  the  defendant,  and  if  they  find  that  the  plaintiffs,  through 
their   agents,    executed   said    orders    of   the    defendant   in   said 

24  Walker  v.  Rogers,  24  Md.  237.      57    N.    E.    195.     See,    Fessenden   v. 

25  Jones  v.   Adler,  34  Md.   440.  Doane,     188     111.     228;     Swigart    v. 
20  Henry  v.   Stewart,  185  111.  452,      Hawley,   140  111.  186,   190. 


455  COMMISSIONS  OF  BROKERS.  §    438 

markets  as  required  to  be  found  in  the  plaintiffs  third  and 
fourth  prayers,  according  to  the  custom  and  usage  of  said  mar- 
kets, and  that  plaintiffs  paid  all  money  necessary  and  required 
to  be  paid  in  the  execution  of  such  orders,  and  received  all 
moneys  that  became  receivable  in  the  execution  of  such  orders, 
and  that  they  reported  all  such  transactions  to  the  defendant 
and  charged  him  with  the  money  so  paid  for  him  and  credited 
him  with  the  money  so  received  by  them  for  him;  and  if  they 
find  that  the  defendant  failed  to  secure  the  plaintiffs  by  keep- 
ing up  said  margin  when  required,  and  that  the  plaintiffs  there- 
upon sold  such  securities  of  the  defendant  as  they  had  in  hand 
after  notice  to  him  in  the  manner  shown  in  evidence  and  re- 
ported such  sales  to  defendant,  then  the  plaintiffs  are  entitled 
to  recover  the  loss  sustained  by  them  in  the  execution  of  the 
defendant's  orders,  as  above  set  forth,  and  their  commissions 
for  executing  the  same.27 

(6)  If  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 
was  a  stock  broker  in  B.  and  that  the  defendant  on  March  9,  1868, 
authorized  him  to  purchase  on  his  account  two  hundred  shares 
of  the  C  stock,  and  shall  find  that  the  place  where  said  stock 
was  ordinarily  bought  and  sold  was  at  the  Stock  Exchange, 
in  New  York,  and  shall  further  find  that  the  plaintiff  there- 
for actually  purchased  two  hundred  shares  of  said  stock 
through  his  sub-agents,  P  &  Co.,  stock  brokers  in  New  York, 
and  at  a  price  not  exceeding  the  price  limited  by  the  defend- 
ant, and  that  the  defendant  did  not  supply  the  plaintiff  with 
funds  to  make  said  purchase,  and  that  the  plaintiff  had  funds 
and  credit  with  his  sub-agents,  which  were  applied  by  them 
in  making  said  purchase;  and  if  they  shall  further  find  that  the 
defendant,  on  the  next  day  after  the  purchase,  was  informed 
of  said  purchase,  and  that  the  plaintiff  notified  the  defendant 
on  March  17,  1868,  by  letter  addressed  to  him  at  his  proper  post- 
office,  that  he  was  ready  to  deliver  to  him  two  hundred  shares 
of  said  stock  so  purchased  on  his  account,  and  that  unless  he 
came  forward  and  paid  for  it,  he,  the  plaintiff,  on  or  after 
March  19,  1868,  would  sell  said  stock  at  the  risk  and  cost  of 
the  defendant;  and  if  they  shall  further  find  that  the  plaintiff 

27  Stewart  v.   Schall,  65  Md.  289,      4  Atl.  399. 


§    439  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  45G 

had  ready  for  delivery  to  the  defendant  such  stock,  and  that 
he  did  sell  on  March  21,  1868,  at  the  Stock  Exchange,  in  New 
York,  two  hundred  shares  of  said  stock  for  and  at  the  risk  of  said 
defendant,  and  that  after  applying  the  whole  proceeds  of  said 
sale  there  was  a  loss  upon  the  said  original  purchase,  which 
said  loss  the  plaintiff  did  pay  to  his  sub-agents,  then  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  recover  the  amount  of  said  loss  or  the  differ- 
ence in  price,  together  with  his  reasonable  commission  for  the 
purchase  and  the  expense  of  said  resale.28 

§  439.  What  is  essential  to  entitle  one  to  commissions. — (1)  If 
a  principal  rejects  a  purchaser  and  the  broker  claims  his  com- 
mission, he  (the  broker)  must  show  that  the  person  furnished 
by  him  (the  broker)  to  make  the  purchase  was  willing  to  accept 
the  offer  precisely  as  made  by  the  principal,  that  he  was  an 
eligible  purchaser  and  such  a  one  as  the  principal  was  bound 
in  good  faith,  as  between  himself  and  the  broker,  to  accept.29 

(2)  If  the  plaintiffs  agreed  and  undertook  to  sell  the  defend- 
ant 's  farm  for  a  commission  upon  the  price  realized,  then  in  order 
to  earn  their  said  commission  it  must  appear  by  a  preponder- 
ance of  the  evidence  that  they  effected  a  sale  of  the  farm  to  a 
party  ready,  willing  and  able  to  perform  the  conditions  of  the 
sale.     The  mere  procuring  of  a  person  to  enter  into  a  contract 
to  purchase  the  land,  unless  such   purchaser  was  ready,   will- 
ing and  able  to  make  the  cash  payments  named  in  the  contract, 
and  to  make  the  mortgage  therein  named  for  the  deferred  pay- 
ments, would  not  be  sufficient  to  entitle  the  plaintiffs  to  their 
commission.30 

(3)  If  the  principal  rejects  a  purchaser  secured  by  the  broker, 
and  the  broker  claims  commission  for  his  services,  he  must  show 
that  the  person  secured  by   him   as  purchaser  was  willing  to 
accept  the   offer  precisely   as  made   by   the   principal,   that   he 
was  an  eligible,  competent  purchaser,  such  as  the  principal  was 
bound  in   good  faith,   as  between  himself   and  the   broker,   to 
accept.    The  mere  procuring  of  a  person  to  enter  into  a  contract 
to  purchase  the  land,  unless  such  person  was  ready,  willing  and 

28  Worthington  v.  Yormey,  34  so  Stewart  v.  Fowler,  37  Kas.  679, 
Md.  185.  15  Pac.  918. 

2»  Buckingham  v.  Harris,  10  Colo. 
458,  15  Pac.  817. 


457  FAILURE  TO  COMPLY  WITH  CONTRACT.  §    440 

able  to  make  the  payments  named  in  the  contract,  and  to  make 
the  mortgage  therein  mentioned  for  the  deferred  payments, 
would  not  be  sufficient  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  commis- 
sion.31 

(4)  The  plaintiffs  cannot  recover  in  this  case  upon  the  dealings 
in  grain  between  them  and  the  defendant  unless  the  jury 
shall  find  from  the  evidence  all  the  following  facts:  (1st.)  that 
the  defendant  authorized  said  dealings;  (2d.)  that  the  pur- 
chase and  sales  authorized  by  him  were  actually  and  bona 
fide  made;  (3d.)  that  the  grain  directed  by  him  to  be  bought 
was  in  fact  bought  by  the  authorized  agent  or  agents  of  the 
plaintiffs  in  C,  and  was  in  fact  delivered  by  the  seller  or  sellers 
to  and  accepted  by  said  authorized  agent  or  agents;  (4th.)  that 
the  grain  directed  by  the  defendant  to  be  sold  was  in  fact 
sold  by  the  authorized  agent  or  agents  of  the  plaintiff  in  C, 
and  was  in  fact  delivered  by  such  authorized  agent  or  agents 
to  the  purchasers  thereof.32 

§  440.    Failure  to  comply  with  contract  prevents  recovery. 

(1)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  on  April  30,  1885,  the 
plaintiff  authorized  the  defendants  to  buy  wheat  for  him  in 
quantities  of  five  thousand  bushels  at  a  time  whenever  they 
bought  at  the  same  time  and  price  ten  thousand  bushels  for 
themselves,  and  not  otherwise,  and  that  the  plaintiff  agreed  to  pay 
to  defendants  a  commission  of  one-fourth  of  one  per  cent,  per 
bushel  for  all  wheat  so  bought  for  him  by  them,  and  that  de- 
fendants undertook  and  agreed  that  they  would  not  buy  five 
thousand  bushels  for  plaintiff  unless  they  at  the  same  time 
and  price  bought  ten  thousand  bushels  for  themselves ;  and  shall 
further  find  that  defendants  did  thereafter,  on  May  1,  1885,  and 
June  8,  1885,  respectively,  buy  for  the  plaintiff  five  thousand 
bushels  of  wheat  and  charged  the  same  to  plaintiff,  and  that  they 
represented  to  plaintiff  that  they  had  on  each  of  said  occasions 
bought  ten  thousand  bushels  for  themselves  at  the  same  time 
and  price  as  that  at  which  they  bought  for  plaintiff;  and  shall 
find  that  the  plaintiff,  on  the  faith  of  such  representation  (should 

si  Buckingham  v.  Harris,  10  Colo.          «2  Stewart  v.   Scholl,  65  Md.   294, 
458,  15  Pac.  817;  Stewart  v.  Fowler,      4  Atl.  399. 
37  Kas.  679,  15  Pac.  918. 


§    441  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  458 

the  jury  find  it  to  have  been  made)  and  in  the  belief  that  de- 
fendants had  bought  ten  thousand  bushels  for  themselves  as 
aforesaid,  paid  to  defendants  on  account  of  the  purchase  of,  and 
on  account  of  the  depreciation,  when  sold,  in  the  value  of  said 
wheat  bought  as  aforesaid  for  him  (should  the  jury  so  find)  the 
moneys  testified  to  by  plaintiff  to  have  been  paid;  and  shall 
further  find  that  in  fact  the  defendants  did  not  upon  either 
of  the  said  occasions  buy  ten  thousand  bushels  for  themselves, 
then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  the  moneys  so  paid.33 
(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  given  to  you  in  this  cause 
that  the  defendant  employed  plaintiff  as  a  real  estate  broker 
to  sell  his  farm,  and  that  the  plaintiff,  for  the  purpose  of  aid- 
ing and  assisting  him  in  selling  said  farm,  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  procuring  a  purchaser  therefor,  took  into  his  employ 
and  service  one  W,  and  if  you  further  find  that  said  W,  aid- 
ing and  assisting  said  plaintiff  in  the  sale  of  said  farm,  took 
to  this  defendant  one  L,  as  a  probable  purchaser  for  said  farm, 
and  if  you  further  find  that  in  the  presence  of  said  W  the 
said  L  inquired  of  this  defendant  the  selling  price  of  said  farm 
and  then  and  there  informed  the  defendant  that  he  desired  to 
purchase  direct  from  the  owner,  and  that  he  had  never  seen  or 
been  introduced  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  he  would  not  pur- 
chase of  commission  men;  and  you  further  find  that  the  de- 
fendant did  not  know  that  'the  sale  was  being  made  by  the 
plaintiff,  and  if  the  said  W  stood  by  and  did  not  inform  the 
defendant  that  the  sale 'was  being  made  by  the  plaintiff,  the 
plaintiff  would  now  be  estopped  from  claiming  that  the  said 
W  was  acting  for  and  on  his  behalf  in  the  sale  of  said  farm,  you 
should  find  for  the  defendant.34 

§  441.  Notice  to  be  given  under  the  contract. — (1)  If  the  jury 
find  from  the  evidence  that  specific  instructions  were  given  by 
the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff  on  March  9,  1868,  that  in  the 
event  of  the  purchase  of  the  stock  in  the  evidence  mentioned, 
the  plaintiff  should  immediately  communicate  the  fact  of  the 
purchase  to  the  defendant,  and  inform  the  plaintiff  where  to 
send  the  notice;  and  if  they  shall  further  find  that  the  said 

33  Burt  v.  Myer,  71  Md.  467, 18  Atl.  34  Mullen  v.  Bower,  22  Ind.  App. 
736.  294,  300. 


459  BURDEN   OF    PROOF — PAYMENT   OF    INTEREST.  §    443 

stock  was  purchased  on  the  said  9th  of  March,  by  the  plaintiff, 
and  that  the  plaintiff  did  not  communicate  the  fact  of  the  pur- 
chase immediately  to  the  defendant,  according  to  the  order  and 
instructions  of  the  defendant,  then  the  defendant  was  not  re- 
quired to  take  said  stock.35 

(2)  If  the  jury  shall  find  that  the  defendant  resided  near  R,  in 
Baltimore  county,  and  the  plaintiff  in  B  city,  and  that  there 
was  a  daily  mail  from  B  to  R,  which  was  the  proper  post- 
office  of  the  defendant,  and  that  the  plaintiff  deposited  in  the 
postoffice  in  B  on  March  17,  a  letter  containing  the  notice 
mentioned  in  the  first  instruction,  then  the  said  notice  was  suf- 
ficent,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  was  not  received  by  the 
defendant  until  March  24,  1868,  and  after  the  sale.36 

§442.  Burden  of  proof  on  plaintiff— When.— The  burden  of 
proof  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  make  out  his  case  by  a  preponder- 
ance of  the  evidence.  In  this  case  the  plaintiff's  claim,  accord- 
ing to  his  bill  of  particulars,  is  for  commissions  alleged  to  have 
been  improperly  retained,  and  not  paid  to  him,  as  shown  by 
statements  of  account  rendered  and  filed  with  said  bill  of  par- 
ticulars; and  the  jury  are  instructed  that  the  burden  is  on  the 
plaintiff,  to  show  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the 
items  referred  to  in  such  statement  of  accounts,  and  charged 
in  his  bill  of  particulars,  are  not  lawful  charges  against  the 
plaintiff,  otherwise  he  is  not  entitled  to  recover  in  this  action, 
and  you  must  find  for  the  defendant.37 

§  443.  Payment  of  interest  on  monthly  balance. — If  the  jury 
find  the  facts  stated  in  the  plaintiffs'  third,  fourth  and  fifth  pray- 
ers, and  further  find  that,  in  the  execution  of  the  orders  of  the 
defendant  therein  referred  to,  the  plaintiffs  paid  to  the  brokers 
employed  by  them  interest  on  the  monthly  balances  due  said 
brokers  for  the  execution  of  said  orders,  and  reported  said  pay- 
ments, if  entered  to  the  defendant,  and  if  they  find  that  the  cus- 
tom and  usage  of  the  business  in  the  markets  where  such  orders 
were  executed  was  to  charge  interest  on  such  monthly  balances 

as  Worthington  v.  Yormey,  34  Md.  37  Shrewsbury  v.  Tufts,  41  W  Va. 
189.  212,  23  S.  E.  692. 

se  Worthington  v.  Yormey,  34  Md. 
186. 


§    444  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  460 

of  accounts,  then  the  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to  recover  the  interest 
so  paid  by  them  on  account  of  the  defendant.38 

Building  Contracts. 

§444.    Contractor  complying  with  contract  can  recover. — (1) 

If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  either  him- 
self or  through  others  employed  by  him,  constructed  the  building 
in  the  agreement  in  the  declaration  mentioned,  in  accordance 
with  the  specifications  in  said  agreement  set  forth,  and  relying 
upon  the  contract  in  the  declaration  mentioned,  then  the  jury 
shall  find  for  the  plaintiff  the  price  therefor  in  said  agreement 
stipulated  to  be  paid  by  defendant  to  the  plaintiff,  although  from 
the  evidence  the  jury  may  believe  that  outside  parties,  by  parol 
agreement,  guaranteed  that  the  plaintiff  should  lose  nothing  by 
his  construction  of  said  building  under  said  agreement,  and 
actually  advanced  to  the  plaintiff  the  money  necessary  to  pay 
for  the  materials  and  labor  employed  in  the  construction  of  the 
said  building.39 

(2)  In  deciding  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff  was  proceeding 
with  said  building  in  compliance  with  the  contract,  you  are 
instructed  that  there  must  have  been  a  substantial  compliance 
in  every  material  particular  in  each  item  as  called  for  by 
a  fair,  reasonable  and  practical  construction  of  the  contract,  and 
plans  and  specifications,  taken  together,  and  where  there  is  a 
conflict,  if  any,  in  these,  this  should  be  reconciled  in  a  practical, 
workmanlike  manner,  so  as  to  arrive  at  the  fair  and  reasonable 
intention  of  the  same.40 

§  445.  Parties  abandoning  original  contract. — If  the  plaintiff 
wilfully  abandoned  the  work,  leaving  the  house  not  finished 
according  to  the  contract,  he  cannot  recover.  But  if  a  party 
in  good  faith  proceeds  under  a  contract,  and  doing  what  he 
reasonably  supposes  is  required  and  substantially  completes  the 
work  and  the  other  party  accepts  the  benefit  of  it,  although  the 
contractor  may  not  have  done  all  that  was  really  his  duty,  or  in 

ss  Stewart  v.  Schall,  65  Md.  289,  *<>  Linch  v.  Paris  L.  &  G.  B.  Co. 
4  Atl.  399.  80  Tex.  23,  15  S.  W.  208. 

3»  Ferguson's   Adm.   v.   Wills,    88 
Va.  139,  13  S.  E.  392. 


461  DOMESTIC    RELATIONS — HUSBAND   AND   WIFE.  §    447 

the  exact  manner  required  by  the  contract,  still  the  contractor 
may  maintain  an  action  to  recover  the  value  of  his  labor  and 
materials,  but  he  will  not  necessarily  be  entitled  to  recover  the 
cost  of  his  materials  or  the  ordinary  price  of  his  labor.  The 
party  for  whom  the  work  is  done  is  entitled  to  have  deducted 
from  the  contract  price  the  difference  between  the  v<Jue  of  the 
work  as  done,  and  its  value  if  it  had  been  done  in  accordance 
with  the  contract.41 


Domestic  Relations. 

§  446.  Husband  entitled  to  income  of  wife's  estate. — The  hus- 
band is  entitled  to  the  rents,  income  or  profits  of  the  wife 's  statu- 
tory separate  estate  and  is  not  required  to  account  to  her,  her 
heirs  or  representatives  for  them ;  and  he  may  use  them  or  invest 
them  for  himself  if  he  chooses ;  or  he  may  give  them  to  his  wife 
in  the  same  manner  as  he  may  give  any  other  property.  But  if 
she  claims  them  as  a  gift  from  her  husband,  she  must  show  by 
proof  that  he  had  divested  himself  of  the  title  and  invested  it 
in  her ;  he  must  abandon  his  right  and  title  to  it  and  transfer  it 
to  her  by  such  words,  acts  or  writing  as  will  clearly  show  that 
the  title  had  passed  from  him  to  her.42 

§  447.  Liability  of  wife  for  husband's  debts.— (1)  If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  account  which  the  defendants 
were  owing  to  M,  and  to  secure  which  they  had  given  M  a 
mortgage  on  this  property,  was  for  articles  of  comfort  and  sup- 
port of  the  household,  suitable  to  the  degree  and  condition  of 
the  family,  and  for  which  the  husband  would  be  liable  at  com- 
mon law,  and  that  the  plaintiff,  at  the  request  of  the  defendants, 
paid  said  account  for  them,  and,  in  consideration  of  the  payment 
of  said  account,  they  executed  to  him  the  said  bill  of  sale  for 
the  property  sued  for,  then  the  contract  was  legal,  and  binding 
on  the  wife  and  on  her  statutory  separate  estate,  so  far  as  con- 
veyed by  said  bill  of  sale,  and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover.43 

41  Cunningham  v.  Washburn,  119      by  statute  declared  to  be  her  sep- 
Mass.  224.  arate    property.       Montgomery    v. 

42  Logwood    v.    Hussey,    60    Ala.       Hickman,  62  Ind.  598. 

421.     The  rule  is  wholly   different         43  Logwood    v.    Hussey,    60    Ala. 
in  states  where  the  rents  and  prof-      421. 
its  of  a  m-arried  woman's  land  are 


§    448  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  462 

(2)  If  the  jury  should  find  that  the  account  due  M  was  not  for 
articles  of  comfort  and  support  of  the  household,  suitable  to  the 
degree  and  condition  of  the  family,  but  that  it  was  the  personal 
debt  of  the  husband,  and  payment  of  said  debt  of  her  husband 
was  the  consideration  of  the  sale  of  her  property,  then  her  statu- 
tory separate  estate  was  not  liable  for  and  could  not  be  sold  to 
pay  her  husband's  debt;  and  if  any  part  of  the  property  in  the 
bill  of  sale  was  her  statutory  estate,  said  bill  of  sale  was  void 
as  to  it,  and  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  it.44 

(3)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  L  had  made  a  gift  of 
the  rents,  income  or  profits  of  his  wife's  separate  estate  to  her, 
in  such  manner  as  divested  him  of  the  right  and  title  to  them, 
and  invested  it  in  her,  and  that  this  gift  was  made  before  the 
debt  to  M  was  incurred,  which  was  paid  off  for  him  by  the  plain- 
tiff, then  the  said  rents  and  profits  so  given  became  a  part  of  her 
statutory  separate  estate,  and  could  not  be  sold  by  her,  unless 
for  the  payment  of  a  debt  for  articles  of  comfort  and  support  of 
the  household,  suitable  to  the  degree  and  condition  in  life  of  the 
family,  and  for  which  the  husband  would  be  liable  at  common 
law ;  and  if  the  jury  find  that  the  property  sued  for  was  bought 
with  the  proceeds  of  her  separate  estate  received  from  her  father, 
or  with  the  rents  and  profits  which  her  husband  had  given  her, 
in  the  manner  as  before  stated,  then  the  sale  of  said  property 
conveyed  no  title  to  the  plaintiff,  unless  it  was  in  payment  of 
articles  of  comfort  and  support,  as  before  stated.45 

§  448.    Duty  of  both  parents  to  support   children. — (1)  No 

promise  on  the  part  of  the  father  to  pay  a  mother  for  anything 
she  may  do  in  the  discharge  of  her  moral  duties  to  their  offspring 
can  be  implied.  The  mother  is  as  much  morally  bound  to  care  for, 
support,  nourish  and  educate  the  child  as  the  father;  and  the  law 
will  not  allow  her  to  recover  for  so  doing,  simply  because  the 
father  omits  his  duty.46 

§  449.     Father  entitled  to  minor  child's  services  and  earnings. 
—  (1)  When  a  person  or  corporation  employs  a  minor,  it  devolves 

4*  Logwood    v.    Hussey,    60    Ala.         46  Lapworth  v.  Leach,  79  Mich.  20, 
421.  44  N.   W.   338. 

45  Logwood    v.    Kussey,    60    Ala. 
421. 


463  PARENTS    AND    CHILDREN.  §    449 

on  such  employer  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  father,  when  such 
minor  is  under  the  control  of  the  father,  and  while  said  minor 
forms  a  part  of  the  father's  family.  The  father  is  liable  for  the 
support  of  his  minor  child  and  is  entitled  to  the  earnings  of 
said  child.  And  where  the  son,  through  the  negligence  of 
the  employer  or  its  servants,  receives  an  injury  incapacitating 
him  from  labor,  and  rendering  him  less  serviceable  up  to  his 
arrival  at  the  age '  of  twenty-one  years,  the  employer  thus  en- 
gaging a  minor,  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  his  father, 
is  liable  to  the  father  in  damages.*7 

(2)  When  a  person,  company  or  corporation  employs  a  minor,  it 
devolves  upon  such  employer  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  father 
when  such  minor  is  under  the  control  of  his  father  and  forms  a 
part  of  his  father's  family.    A  minor  cannot,  without  the  consent 
of  his  father,  make  a  legal  and  binding  contract.     The  father  is 
liable  for  the  support  of  his  child  during  the  child's  minority 
and  is  entitled  to  his  earnings.48 

(3)  Under  the  law  the  father  is  entitled  to  the  services  of  his 
minor  children  during  their  minority.  Minors  cannot,  without  their 
father's  consent,  make  legal  contracts;  nor  without  such  consent, 
either  before  or  by  acquiescence  after  knowledge  of  the  father, 
engage  in  business  for  themselves.    If  you  believe,  then,  from  the 
evidence  that  M  was  a  minor,  under  twenty-one  years  of  age ; 
that,  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  his  father,  he  engaged 
himself  to  defendant,  and  while  so  engaged  received  the  injury 
alleged,  then,  if  such  injury  was  not  caused  by  said  M's  own 
negligence,  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  for  the  loss  of  his  son's 
services   while   under   medical   treatment,   to   his   necessary   ex- 
penses   in   perfecting   a    cure,    including   medicines    and    extras 
required  in  effecting  a  cure ;  also  to  all  reasonable  medical  bills 
for  which  the  father  is  liable,  and  to  such  damages  as  result  and 
flow  directly  from  the  injury — such  as  the  diminished  value  of 
services  up  to  the  arrival  at  the  age  of  majority  of  said  minor.49 

(4)  Under  the  law,  the  father  is  entitled  to  the  services  of  his 
minor  children  during  their  minority.  Minors  cannot,  without  their 

47  Houston  &  G.  N.  R.  Oo.  v.  Mil-          «  Houston  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler, 49  Tex.  323.  ler,  49  Tex.  323. 

*s  Houston  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler, 49  Tex.  323. 


§    450  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  464 

father's  consent,  make  legal  contracts;  nor  without  such  consent 
engage  in  business  for  themselves.  If  you  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  E  was  a  minor,  under  twenty-one  years  of  age ;  that, 
without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  his  father,  he  engaged  him- 
self to  defendant,  and  while  so  engaged  received  the  injury 
alleged,  then  if  such  injury  was  not  caused  by  said  minor's  own 
negligence,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  for  the  loss  of  his 
son's  services  while  under  medical  treatment,  to  his  necessary 
expenses  in  perfecting  a  cure,  including  medicines  and  extras 
required  in  effecting  a  cure ;  also  to  all  reasonable  medical  bills 
for  which  the  father  is  liable,  and  to  such  damages  as  result  and 
flow  directly  from  the  injury — such  as  the  diminished  value  of 
services  up  to  the  arrival  at  the  age  of  majority  of  said  minor.50 

§  450.  Minor  remaining  with  family  after  full  age. — If  the 
plaintiff,  after  she  arrived  at  full  age,  continued  to  live  with  her 
father,  as  she  had  done  previously,  with  no  new  duties  or  respon- 
sibilities assumed  in  the  family  by  her,  and  was  provided  with 
necessaries,  etc.,  as  one  of  the  family,  she  would  not  be  entitled 
to  recover  for  such  services,  unless  there  was  an  express  under- 
standing between  her  and  her  father,  before  these  services  were 
rendered,  that  she  should  receive  such  compensation;  and  if  the 
note  was  given  for  such  past  services,  and  there  was  no  such 
understanding  existing  between  them,  she  cannot  recover.  But 
if  the  note  was  given  for  such  past  services,  the  fact  that  it  was 
given  will  raise  a  presumption  that  there  had  been  a  previous 
understanding  or  agreement  between  the  plaintiff  and  her  father 
that  such  compensation  was  to  be  made,  and  unless  such  pre- 
sumption is  overcome  by  evidence  that  no  such  understanding 
existed,  the  plaintiff  will  be  entitled  to  recover.51 

§  451.  Minor  liable  on  his  contracts — When. — If  the  jury  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  A,  after  she  became  twenty-one 
years  of  age  and  before  marriage,  with  knowledge  that  she,  on 
account  of  infancy,  was  not  liable  to  the  plaintiff  for  any  pur- 
chases she  may  have  made  of  him,  expressly  promised  that  she 
would  pay  for  any  portion  of  the  articles  mentioned  in  the  bill 

so  Houston  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil-          «  Pitts  v.  Pitts,  21  Ind.  314. 
ler,  49  Tex.  323. 


465  HOUSEHOLDER LANDLORD    AND    TENANT.  §    453 

of  particulars,  such  a  promise  would  be  a  ratification  of  the  pre- 
'vious  contract  to  the  amount  she  promised  to  pay.  If  she 
promised  to  pay  all,  it  would  render  her  liable  for  all.  If  she 
promised  to  pay  a  part,  or  a  certain  sum,  it  would  render  her 
liable  for  such  part,  or  for  such  certain  sum;  and  if  she,  after 
such  promise,  paid  any  money  to  the  plaintiff,  it  would  go  as  a 
credit  on  the  amount  for  which  she  made  herself  liable  on  the 
new  promise.52 

§  452.  Head  of  family  or  householder. — As  to  what  constitutes 
a  householder  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  you  are 
instructed  that  a  householder  is  the  father  or  head  of -a  family 
whom  he  supports  or  assists  in  supporting.  It  is  not  necessary 
that  the  family  should  keep  house  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  that 
term.  The  father,  as  head  of  a  family,  may  put  his  family  out  to 
board,  and  still  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  law.  If  the 
plaintiff,  at  the  time  of  said  demand  for  exemption,  and  after 
the  bringing  of  this  suit,  was  supporting  his  wife  or  aiding  in 
her  support,  and  was  intending  to  continue  to  live  with  her  and 
return  to  Indiana  to  reside  and  remain  permanently  or  indefi- 
nitely, when  his  business  in  Colorado  was  terminated  and  finished, 
then  he  was  a  householder  within  the  meaning  of  that  term  in 
the  statute  providing  for  the  exemption  of  property  from  sale 
on  execution.53 

Landlord  and  Tenant. 

§  453.    Liability  of  tenant  for  damage  to  building. — (1)  If  the 

jury  find  that  the  defendants  entered  into  possession  of  the  build- 
ing in  question  under  the  lease  in  evidence,  and  made  such  altera- 
tions as  they  thought  fit  in  order  to  adapt  it  to  their  purpose  under 
the  authority  given  in  the  lease,  and  afterwards  stored  a  large 
quantity  of  heavy  goods  therein,  and  that  owing  to  the  excessive 
quantity  of  said  goods,  if  they  shall  find  such  quantity  was  exces- 
sive, or  by  the  manner  in  which  they  were  stored  by  the  defend- 
ants a  large  part  of  the  building  was  caused  to  fall  down,  then 
the  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to  recover.5* 

52  Ogborn  v.  Hoffman,  52  Ind.  439.          ^  Machen  v.  Hooper,  73  Md.  354, 
ss  Astley  v.  Capron,  89  Ind.  175.          21    Atl.    67. 


§    454  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFEKENT  MATTERS.  466 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  that  the  injury  shown  by  the  evidence  to 
have  been  sustained  by  the  building  in  question,  occurred  while 
the  same  was  in  the  occupation  of  the  defendants  under  the  lease 
offered  in  evidence,  and  that  the  said  injury  is  attributed  to  the 
alterations  made  in  the  building  by  the  defendants  in  connection 
with  the  use  thereafter  made  of  it  by  them,  then  the  plaintiffs  are 
entitled  to-  recover  in  this  action  the  damages  which  the  jury  may 
find  from  the  evidence  they  have  thereby  suffered.55 

(3)  If  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  evidence  in  this  case,  that  the 
defendants  entered  upon  the  said  demised  premises  in  pursuance 
of  the  lease  declared  on,  and  which  is  in  evidence,  and  shall  fur- 
ther find  that  they  used  and  .occupied  the  said  premises,  and  that 
during  said  term  or  tenancy,  and  while  the  defendants  were  so 
in  possession  of  said  premises,  they  used  the  said  building  or 
warehouse  as  persons  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  would  have 
done,  looking  to  its  character,  size,  apparent  construction  and 
strength,  and  that  the  said  house  fell  down  during  said  tenancy 
in  consequence  of  some  defect  in  the  structure  of  the  same  or  on 
account  of  a  want  of  a  proper  thickness  of  the  wall,  or  on  account 
of  inferior  materials  used  or  on  account  of  the  ordinary  decay  of 
the  materials  used  in  the  erection  of  said  building,  all  of  which 
was  unknown  to  the  defendants,  and  shall  further  find  that  the 
same  could  not  have  been  discovered  by  reasonable  and  ordinary 
diligence,  then  the  plaintiffs  are  not  entitled  to  recover  in  this 
action,  and  the  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendants.56 

§  454.  New  leasing  of  premises  discharges  guaranty. — If  the 
jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  N,  from  November,  1857,  to 
the  time  of  his  death,  and  his  widow  after  his  decease  to  May, 
1859,  occupied  the  premises  in  question  at  a  different  rate  of  rent 
and  under  a  different  agreement  from  that  specified  in  the  lease 
in  question,  then  the  jury  may  infer  a  new  leasing  of  the 
premises,  and  the  defendant  is  thereby  discharged  upon  his  guar- 
anty and  is  entitled  to  a  verdict  in  his  favor.57 

55  Machen  v.  Hooper,  73  Md.  353,  Smith  v.  Wise,  58  111.  141,  act  of 

21  Atl.  67.  landlord  is  an  eviction  and  termi- 

oo  Machen  v.  Hooper,  73  Md.  355,  nates  lease.  Several  instructions 

21  Atl.  67.  held  good. 

57  white  v.   Walker,   31   111.   438; 


467  MARRIAGE    CONTRACTS BREACH.  §    456 

Marriage  Contracts. 

§  455.  What  essential  to  entitle  plaintiff  to  recover. — In  order 
to  entitle  the  plaintiff,  H,  to  recover  in  this  case,  it  is  necessary 
that  it  shall  be  made  to  appear  to  your  satisfaction,  by  a  prepon- 
derance of  the  evidence,  that  at  some  time  before  the  commec ce- 
ment of  this  action  the  defendant  promised  to  marry  her  in  con- 
sideration of  a  like  promise  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant  to 
marry  him;  that  the  plaintiff  thereafter  either  requested  the 
defendant  within  a  reasonable  time  and  before  the  commencement 
of  this  action  to  marry  her,  the  plaintiff,  in  pursuance  of  such 
contract,  and  he  refused  to  do  so;  or  that,  by  the  terms  of  the 
contract,  a  day  certain  beyond  the  time  of  the  commencement  of 
this  action  was  fixed  for  the  performance  of  such  marriage  con- 
tract without  performance  or  offer  of  performance  of  the  same 
by  the  defendant  on  or  before  the  day  so  fixed,  and  that  the  plain- 
tiff, at  all  times,  from  and  after  the  making  of  such  contract  or 
contracts  up  to  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  this  action,  was 
ready  and  willing  to  marry  the  defendant.58  . 

§  456.    Unchastity  of  woman  not  breach  of  contract — When. 

(1)  Illicit  intercourse  between  parties  to  a  marriage  contract,-  af- 
ter the  promise  is  made,  is  no  defense  to  an  action  for  a  breach.  A 
plaintiff's  immorality  or  unchaste  conduct  with  third  persons 
after  the  promise  is  no  defense  if  done  with  the  defendant's  con- 
nivance or  consent,  or,  if  knowing  it,  he  continued  his  attentions 
and  engagements.59 

(2)  If  the  defendant  in  an  action  for  breach  of  marriage  con- 
tract bases  his  renunciation  of  and  his  right  to  discharge  from 
his  contract  upon  the  bad  or  immoral  conduct  of  the  plain- 
tiff, it  must  appear  that  his  refusal  to  consummate  his  promise 
was  due  to  such  bad  or  immoral  conduct,  and  that  he  renounced 
his  promise  as  soon  as  he  reasonably  could  after  the  conduct 
happened,  or  was  discovered  by  him.  Dissolute  conduct,  upon 
the  part  of  the  woman,  is  no  defense,  if  the  man  was  a  party 
to  it,  or  connived  at  it.60 

BS  McCrum  v.  Hildebrand,  85  Ind.  «o  Bowman  v.  Bowman,  153  Ind. 
205.  503,  55  N.  E.  422. 

59  Bowman  v.   Bowman,   153   Ind. 
503,  55  N.  E.  422. 


§    457  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  468 

§  457.  Assessing  damages  for  breach  of  contract. — If  you  find 
the  contract  was  made  and  has  been  broken,  and  consider  the 
question  of  damages,  you  may  take  into  consideration  the  char- 
acter of  the  plaintiff.  If  it  is  subject  to  any  criticism  on  your 
part,  and  if  she  is  a  woman  of  coarse  manners,  coarse  in  her  asso- 
ciations, and  imprudent,  careless  and  reckless  in  regard  to  her 
conduct  and  demeanor,  these  circumstances  you  may  take  into 
consideration  in  assessing  damages ;  such  a  woman  is  not  injured 
to  the  same  extent  by  a  breach  of  promise  of  marriage  that  one 
more  confiding,  retiring  and  modest  would  be.  Understand  that 
I  am  passing  no  judgment  upon  the  plaintiff  or  suggesting  that 
you  shall  pass  any  judgment  upon  her,  but  I  wish  you  to  under- 
stand that  if  you  think  she  deserves  consideration  of  that  kind, 
it  is  your  privilege  and  duty  to  give  such  consideration  to  that 
phase  of  the  matter  as  you  think  it  deserves.61 

Partnership  Contracts. 

§458.  What  constitutes  a  partnership. —  (1)  Partnership  is  a 
contract  of  two  or  more  competent  persons  to  place  their  money, 
effects,  labor  and  skill  or  some  or  all  of  them  in  lawful  commerce 
or  business  and  to  divide  the  profits  and  bear  the  losses  in  certain 
proportions.62 

(2)  A  partnership  in  fact  can  only  exist  when  there  is  a  vol- 
untary agreement  made  for  that  purpose  and  there  cannot  be 
such  partnership  against  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  con- 
tract.63 

§  459.    Each  partner  has  power  to  bind  all  the  partners. — A 

partnership  can  only  exist  as  between  the  parties  themselves,  in 
pursuance  of  an  agreement  to  which  the  minds  of  all  have 
assented ;  but  that,  when  created,  each  partner  has  full  power  and 
authority  to  bind  all  the  partners  by  his  acts  or  contracts  in 
relation  to  the  business  of  the  partnership;  and  as  between  the 
firm  and  third  persons  dealing  with 'them  in  good  faith,  it  is  of 

si  Kelley    v.    Highfield,    15    Ore.      Indianapolis  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Tay- 
277,  14  Pac.  744.     This  is  objection-      lor,   (Ind.),   (Jan.  3,  1905). 
able  as  declaring  a  fact  which  it  is         02  Weeks   v.   Hutchinson   (Mich.), 
the   province   of   the   jury   to   pass      97  N.  W.  697. 

on     under    the    rule    declared     in,         63  Weeks   v.   Hutchinson    (Mich.), 

97  N.  W.  697. 


469  PARTNERSHIP   CONTRACTS — MORTGAGES.  §    461 

no  consequence  whether  the  partner  is  acting  in  good  faith  with 
his  copartners  or  not,  provided  the  act  done  is  within  the  scope 
of  partnership  business,  and  professedly  for  the  firm;  but  the 
relation  of  the  partnership  confers  no  authority  on  one  party  to 
bind  the  others,  except  as  to  transactions  within  the  scope  of  the 
partnership  business.  And  if  you  believe  that  said  F  M  &  H 
were  partners,  yet,  if  you  believe  that  the  partnership  existing 
between  them  was  entered  into  for  the  sole  purpose  of  buying 
and  selling  cattle,  then  such  partnership  relation  could  not 
authorize  either  party  to  sign  the  firm  name  as  sureties  on  the 
bond  of  a  third  party.  And  if  you  find  that  the  bond  sued  on 
was  signed  by  M  without  the  consent  of  said  F  &  H  and  without 
other  authority  from  them,  then  you  should  find  in  favor  of  said 
F  &  H,  unless  you  should  further  find  that  said  F  &  H,  after 
being  informed  that  the  bond  was  so  signed  by  M,  consented  to 
the  same.64 

§  460.  Partners  not  general  partners. — If  the  jury  find  that 
the  defendants  had  any  arrangement  for  shipping  cattle  from  S, 
by  which  it  was  agreed  that  either  of  them  might  buy  stock  on 
his  own  responsibility,  and  upon  its  delivery  for  shipment  at 
said  place  the  others  might  take  an  interest  in  any  stock  so  pur- 
chased and  delivered,  if  upon  examination  of  it  they  thought  it 
suitable  to  ship  or  not  purchased  too  high;  or  by  which,  if  they 
purchased  stock  when  all  together,  it  was  to  be  shipped  on  joint 
account ;  or  if,  after  looking  at  or  agreeing  to  take  an  interest  in 
stock  purchased  by  any  one  of  them  before  delivered  at 
said  place,  it  was  to  be  shipped  on  joint  account  and  the  parties 
to  share  in  the  profits  and  losses,  such  facts  or  agreements  did 
not  constitute  them  general  partners,  but  only  partners  in  each 
transaction.85 

Chattel  Mortgages. 

§  461.  Mortgagee  may  take  possession  of  the  property.— Under 
the  mortgage  defendant  had  the  right  to  take  possession  of  all 
the  property  therein  described,  at  any  time  he  chose  to  do  so,  and 

e*  Fore  v.  Hitson,  70  Tex.  520,  8         «5  Valentine    v.    Kickle,    39    Ohio 
S.  W.  292.  St.  23. 


§    4G2  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  470 

no  damage  could  be  assessed  against  him  for  such  taking.  He 
did  not,  however,  have  any  right  to  sell  said  property  before  the 
debt  secured  thereby  became  due.  In  other  words,  while  he 
would  have  a  right  under  said  mortgage  to  take  possession  of 
all  the  property  therein  described,  for  the  purpose  of  preserving 
the  same  until  the  debt  became  due,  he  would  have  no  right  to 
sell  the  said  property  unless  the  debt  secured  by  said  mortgage, 
or  some  part  of  it,  was  due ;  and  if  he  did  sell  said  property,  or 
any  part  of  it,  before  the  debt  secured  thereby  became  due,  or 
any  part  thereof,  then  he  is  liable  to  account  to  the  plaintiffs  for 
the  fair  and  reasonable  value  of  the  property  so  sold,  without 
reference  to  the  amount  for  which  the  sale  was  made.66 


Subscription  Contract. 

§  462.  Alteration  of  subscription  contract. — If  the  jury  shall 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  at  the  time  the  defendant  signed 
the  subscription  paper  the  capital  of  the  plaintiff  was  to  be  but 
fifty  thousand  dollars,  and  that  it  was  then  so  written  in  said 
subscription  paper,  and  the  same  was  at  any  time  afterwards 
changed  by  an  interlineation  so  as  to  make  it  read  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  dollars,  and  that  the  defendant  did  not  know 
of  such  change  and  never  assented  to  the  same,  then  the  defend- 
ant cannot  be  required  to  pay  and  is  exonerated  from  his  sub- 
scription, and  in  such  case  the  verdict  should  be  for  the  defend- 
ant.67 

§  463.  Stock  illegally  issued  invalid. — That  under  the  articles 
of  incorporation  the  board  of  directors  had  no  power  to  increase 
the  capital  stock  of  the  company;  at  least  they  had  no  such 
power  at  a  meeting  of  which  there  had  been  no  notice  given, 
and  at  which  all  of  the  directors  were  not  present.  Therefore, 
if  you  find  that  no  notice  was  given  of  the  meeting  of  directors 
of  May  24,  1875,  and  all  of  the  directors  were  not  present  at  such 
meeting,  then  their  action  in  attempting  to  increase  the  capital 
stock  of  the  company  was  invalid,  and  consequently  the  stock 

ee  Koster  v.  Seney,  100  Iowa,  562,         e?  Hughes   v.    Antietam   Mfg.   Co. 
69  N.  W.  868.     See,  Bell  v.  Prewitt,      34  Md.  319. 
62  111.  3-61. 


471  SUBSCRIPTION  CONTRACTS — SERVICES  TO  PUBLIC.  §    465 

issued  in  excess  of  the  original  capital  stock  of  the  company  was 
illegally  issued  and  was  invalid.68 


Services  Rendered  to  Public. 

§  464.  Liability  of  county  for  physician's  services. — If  you 
find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  rendered  the  services 
stated  in  the  first  paragraph  of  the  complaint  or  any  part  thereof 
at  the  request  of  the  township  trustee,  and  that  the  person  who 
received  the  services  was  a  pauper  of  -  -  township  in  Jay 
County,  Indiana,  and  that  there  was  no  physician  provided  by 
the  board  of  commissioners  of  said  Jay  County,  whose  duty  it 
was  to  render  said  services,  then  you  should  find  for  the  plaintiff 
on  the  first  paragraph  of  the  complaint.69 

Statute  of  Limitations. 

§  465.  Reviving  a  claim  barred  by  statute  of  limitations. — (1) 
In  order  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute  of  limitations  and  en- 
title the  plaintiff  to  recover,  the  jury  must  find  from  the  evidence 
that  the  defendant  has,  within  the  last  ten  years  before  the  com- 
mencement of  this  action,  made  his  promise  in  writing  to  pay 
said  note,  or  that  he  has  actually  paid  thereon  some  portion  of 
the  principal  or  interest  thereon  within  the  time  aforesaid.70 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  some  portion  of 
plaintiff's  claim  for  services  accrued  more  than  three  years  before 
the  institution  of  this  suit,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  for 
such  portion  under  the  pleadings  in  this  cause,  unless  they  shall 
further  find  that  the  defendant  or  his  testatrix  promised  to  pay 
the  same  within  three  years  before  the  bringing  of  this  suit.71 

(3)  If  you  find  there  was  no  understanding  or  agreement  in  re- 
gard to  the  credit  of  the  fifteen  dollars,  then  it  does  not  avail  as  a 
payment  to  take  this  claim  out  of  the  statute  of  limitations  to 
prevent  its  being  barred,  because  the  parties  must  agree  upon 

68  Merrill  v.  Reaver,  50  Iowa,  404.         TO  Bridgeton  v.  Jones,  34  Mo.  472. 

69  Board  v.  Brewington,  74  Ind.  10.          ?i  Bonic   v.    Maught,    76   Md.    442, 
See    also    Board,    &c.    v.    Galloway,      25  Atl.  423. 

17  Ind.  App.  689,  47  N.  E.  390;   Ind. 
Acts,  1901,  p.  324,  §  6. 


§    46G  CONTRACTS  ON  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  472 

the  payment.  The  plaintiff  cannot,  by  giving  credit  upon  an 
account,  upon  an  outlawed  bill  or  a  bill  that  may  be  outlawed, 
for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  running  of  the  statute,  make  a 
credit  of  his  own  volition  on  that  account,  and  save  the  running 
of  the  statute.  He  cannot  do  it  unless  it  is  agreed  between  the 
parties  that  there  is  to  be  an  application  upon  the  account;  and 
that  is  a  question  'for  you  to  determine,  whether  or  not  it  was 
understood  between  the  parties  that  such  credit  was  to  be  made 
to  E,  and  that  it  was  to  be  credited  upon  that  account  and  prop- 
erly applied  upon  it.  If  it  was  so  understood  between  them  it 
would  be  a  proper  application,  and  the  plaintiff  might  maintain 
this  acton ;  otherwise  he  cannot,  and  that  is  the  question  for  you 
to  determine.72 

§  466.  The  promise  reviving  a  discharged  claim  must  be  clear 
and  distinct. — The  promise  by  which  a  discharged,  debt  is  revived 
must  be  clear,  distinct,  and  unequivocal.  There  must  be  an 
expression  by  the  defendant  of  a  clear  intention  to  bind  himself 
to  the  payment  of  the  debt.  The  new  promise  must  be  distinct, 
unambiguous,  and  certain.  The  expression  of  an  intention  to 
pay  the  debt  is  not  sufficient.  There  must  be  a  promise  before 
the  debtor  is  bound.  An  intention  is  but  the  purpose  a  man 
forms  in  his  own  mind ;  a  promise  is  an  express  undertaking  or 
agreement  to  carry  that  purpose  into  effect,  and  must  be  express 
in  contradistinction  to  a  promise  implied  from  an  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  justness  or  existence  of  the  debt.73 

§  467.    Payments  on  running  account — How  applied. — If  the 

jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendants  owed  the 
plaintiffs  different  debts,  and  have  made  several  payments  to  the 
plaintiffs  without  designating  the  debts  to  which  such  payments 
should  be  applied,  then  the  plaintiffs  had  the  right  to  make  the 
application  of  the  paj^ments  to  the  debts  as  they  pleased,  and  if 
the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  neither  the  plaintiffs  nor 
the  defendants  made  any  specific  application  of  the  payments  to 
the  discharge  of  any  particular  debt  or  debts,  the  presumption  is 

72  Bay  City  Iron  Co.  v.  Emery,  73  Shockley  v.  Mills,  71  Ind.  292. 
128  Mich.  506,  87  N.  W.  652. 


473  CONTRACTS  IN   ESCROW WAIVING  RIGHTS.  §    470 

that  the  first  items  of  a  running  account,  or  that  the  debts  which 
are  first  in  point  of  time,  were  to  be  thereby  discharged.74 

§  468.  Deed  executed  and  placed  in  escrow. — A  deed  which 
has  been  surreptitiously  obtained  from  the  grantor  without  his 
knowledge  or  consent  does  not,  as  a  general  rule,  transfer  title; 
but  a  deed  made  by  a  grantor  and  placed  in  escrow  to  be  deliv- 
ered to  the  grantee  upon  the  performance  of  certain  conditions, 
and  which  has  been  obtained  from  the  party  in  whose  possession 
it  was  placed  by  untruthful  statements,  and  afterwards  the  con- 
dition upon  which  the  deed  was  delivered  was  performed  and 
the  grantee  does  not  demand  the  possession  of  the  deed  nor  take 
any  steps  to  recover  the  possession  of  the  same,  said  deed  will  be 
effectual  to  convey  the  title.75 


Other  Matters.  • 

§  469.  Rights  in  contract  may  be  waived. — If  the  plaintiffs 
were  not  ready  on  the  first  day  of  April,  1881,  to  comply  with 
their  part  of  the  contract,  or  if  the  ore  was  then  and  there 
after  and  until  July  15,  1882,  being  mined  and  received  in  less 
quantities  and  in  a  manner  otherwise  than  as  the  contract  pro- 
vided for,  and  if  the  plaintiffs  acquiesced  therein,  or  if  the  plain- 
tiffs during  the  time  did  not  complain  and  did  not  give  the 
defendant  reasonable  notice  that  they  were  standing  on  their 
contract,  and  that  he  would  be  expected  to  receive  daily,  Sun- 
days excepted,  from  fifty  to  sixty  tons  of  ore,  then  the  plaintiffs 
would  not  be  entitled  to  recover  damages  on  this  account  for 
defendant's  failure  to  receive  such  amount  of  ore.76 

§470.  Correspondence  constituting  contract.— If  the  jury  be- 
lieve that  the  contract  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant 
consisted  of  letters  and  the  circular  mentioned  in  the  last  instruc- 
tion above,  then  such  contract  was  a  contract  in  writing  and  it 

T*  Sprague,  Warner  &  Co.  v.  Ha-  "  Chicago,  I.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Linn, 

zemvinkle,  53  111.  419.     See,  Snell  v.  •  30  Ind.  App.  88,  92,  65  N.  E.  552. 

Cottingham,  72  111.  124,  payment  cm  ?«  Eaves    &    Collins    v.    Cherokee 

which  matter.  Iron  Co.   73   Ga.   459. 


§    471  COX  TRACTS  OX  DIFFERENT  MATTERS.  474 

bears  date  from  the  acceptance  by  the  plaintiff  of  the  terms 
proposed  by  the  defendant  in  the  year  1884.77 

§  471.    Written  contract  cannot  be  varied  by  parol  proof — 

What  the  contract  was  between  these  parties  is  to  be  determined 
by  the  writing — the  note  itself.  This  is  not  to  be  controlled  or 
altered  or  varied  by  proof  of  any  parol  or  verbal  agreement  or 
understanding  between  them  at  or  before  the  time  of  signing  the 
note.78 

§  472.  Unsigned  contract  binding. — The  unsigned  contract  in- 
troduced in  evidence  cannot  be  regarded  as  the  contract  of  the 
defendant,  upon  which  the  plaintiff  can  recover  as  upon  a  written 
contract  signed  by  him.  It  at  the  most  can  only  be  considered 
as  a  part  of  the  transaction  at  the  time  of  the  negotiation  and 
agreement  between  the  parties.  If  said  paper  was  read  over  to 
the  defendant  .accurately  and  fully  and  fairly  understood  by 
him,  and  he  assented  and  agreed  to  the  terms  therein  stated,  he 
is  bound  by  said  terms,  and  his  liability  will  be  determined 
accordingly.79 

§  473.  Execution  and  delivery  of  deed — Signature. — (1)  Every 
deed  for  the  conveyance  of  real  estate  must  be  signed  by  the 
grantor.  This  may  be  done  in  one  of  three  ways :  first,  the 
grantor  may  sign  it  in  person  with  his  own  hand  by  writing  or 
making  his  or  her  mark  to  his  or  her  name  written  by  another  to 
the  deed ;  second,  he  may  in  writing  or  by  parol  direct  another 
person  in  his  presence  to  sign  his  name  to  the  deed ;  third,  he 
may,  by  power  of  attorney  duly  executed,  authorize  another  to 
sign  his  name  to  the  deed  for  him  either  in  his  presence  or 
absence.80 

(2)  A  deed  takes  effect  from  its  delivery,  and  until  the  maker 
parts  with  its  possession  and  yields  up  his  right  to  control 
it  the  deed  has  no  legal  existence,  and  no  other  person  can  gain 
any  rights  under  it.81 

77  Shrewsbury  v.  Tufts,  41  W.  Va.  79  Osborne   &   Co.   v.    Simmerson, 
216.  23  S.  B.  692.  73  Iowa,  513,  35  N.  W.  615. 

78  Cook    v.   Brown,   62   Mich.   478,  so  Fitzgerald  v.  Goff,  99  Ind.  39. 
29  N.  W.  46:  si  Fitzgerald  v.  Goff,  99  Ind.  40. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 


DAMAGES. 


Sec. 

INJURY    TO    THE    PERSON. 

474.  Assaulting    another    in    self- 

defense. 

475.  Assaulting     another     not     in 

self-defense. 

476.  Assessing  damages   for   phys- 

ical  injury. 

477.  Damages   for  assault   to  rav- 

ish. 

478.  Injury  to  the  person  by  ani- 

mal. 

479.  Attack  by   vicious   dog. 

480.  Dangerous       obstruction       in 

highway. 

481.  Turnpike    unsafe —  Liability. 

482.  Injury     to     bicycle-rider     on 

bridge. 

483.  Accidental    injury   to   traveler 

on    highway. 

'     MALPRACTICE    BY    PHYSICIAN. 

484.  Negligence  of  doctor — Liabil- 

ity. 

485.  Physician    required    to    exer- 

cise ordinary  care. 

486.  Patient     must     observe     doc- 

tor's directions. 


Sec. 

LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 

491.  Libel  and  slander  defined. 

492.  Malice  an  essential  element. 

493.  Slanderous     words     must     be 

proved. 

494.  Proof  of  part  of  words  suffi- 

cient. 

495.  Words  libelous  in  themselves. 

496.  Charging  another  with  crime. 

497.  Publication — Letter    so    held. 

498.  Measure  of  damages — Consid- 

erations. 

499.  Punitive       damages  —  When 

proper. 

500.  Matters  in  mitigation. 

501.  Good    faith — Probable    cause. 

502.  Degree   of   proof   in   justifica- 

tion. 

MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 

503.  Arrest  without  warrant. 

504.  Probable    cause    for    prosecu- 

tion. 

505.  Unlawful  arrest— Liability. 

506.  Advice   of    counsel    as    a    de- 

fense. 

507.  Essential  elements  of  a  cause. 

508.  Estimating  damages. 


UNLAWFUL    SALE    OF    LIQUOR. 

487.  Liability     for    selling    liquor 

unlawfully. 

488.  Wife— Selling  to  her  husband 

— Liability. 

489.  Transfer    of    liquor    license — 

Effect. 


DAMAGE    TO    PERSONAL    PROPERTY. 

509.  Unlawful   seizure  of  property 

— Liability. 

510.  Landlord       seizing       tenant's 

property. 

511.  Damages  for  seizure — How  es- 

timated. 

512.  Killing  stock— Liability. 


490.    Sales    made    since    commenc-      513.    Damages    from    diseased    cat- 


ing   suit — Evidence. 


tie. 


475 


§    474  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO  PERSON.  476 

Injury  to  the  Person. 

§  474.  Assaulting  another  in  self-defense. — (1)  To  justify  the 
taking  of  the  life  of  an  assailant  when  attacked  by  him  there 
must  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury,  first,  that  the  defend- 
ant, if  assaulted  without  any  wrong  or  cause  on  his  part,  honestly 
and  truly  believed  that  he  was  in  imminent  danger  of  his  life  or 
great  bodily  harm;  and  second,  if  he  had  just  and  reasonable 
cause  to  apprehend  such  danger  which  he  could  not  avoid  with- 
out taking  the  life  of  his  adversary.  Then  it  is  excusable.1 

(2)  It  is  not  necessary,  however,  that  the  danger  should  be  real 
or  in  fact  existing,  for,  whether  real  or  apparent,  if  the  circum- 
stances are  such  as  to  induce  a  belief  sufficiently  well  founded 
that  life  is  in  peril  or  that  grievous  bodily  harm  is  intended ;  and 
to  be  threatened  with  danger  the  accused  may  act  upon  appear- 
ances and  slay  his  assailant.  Yet  there  must  be  reasonable  ground 
for  his  belief  in  the  danger  threatened  arising  out  of  the  circum- 
stances in  which  he  is  placed,  otherwise  the  act  of  taking  the  life 
of  the  assailant  is  entirely  without  justification.2 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  that  the  plaintiff  assaulted  the  defend- 
ant and  was  using  a  crowbar  in  a  threatening  manner,  then  the 
defendant  had  the  right  to  defend  himself  and  to  use  such  force  as 
was  necessary  to  repel  such  assault.3 

(4)  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that  the  defendant  was  the  best 
judge  of  what  was  necessary  to  defend  himself  against  the  attack, 
and  of  the  means  to  be  used  for  his  own  protection.     As  a  techni- 
cal legal  proposition  this  is  undoubtedly  correct,  and  it  is  true  not 
only  as  a  matter  of  law,  but  as  a  matter  of  common  sense,  that 
the  party  attacked  is  obliged,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  to 
exercise  his  best  judgment  at  the  time  as  to  what  shall  be  done 
in  his  own  defense,  and  his  judgment  is  one  which,  if  honestly 
exercised,  is  to  a  large  extent  controlling.     It  would  be  abso- 
lutely controlling  unless  the  jury  should  find  that  his  exercise  of 
it  at  the  time  and  under  the  circumstances  was  such  an  exercise 
as  was  unreasonable  under  all  the  evidence  in  the  case.4 

1  Darling  v.    Williams,    35    Ohio          s  Ickenroth  v.   St.   Louis   Tr.   Co. 
St.    61.  102  Mo.  App.  597,  77  S.  W.  163. 

2  Darling  v.    Williams,    35    Ohio          *  Kent  v.   Cole,   84  Mich.   581,   48 
St.  62.  N.  W.  168. 


477  ASSAULTING   NOT   IN    SELF-DEFENSE.  §    475 

(5)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  did  not  as- 
sault the  plaintiff,  but  having  his  pistol  in  his  hand  for  a  lawful 
purpose  and  by  the  negligent  of  careless  handling  of  the  pistol  or 
by  accident  the  pistol  was  discharged  and  the  plaintiff  received 
an  injury,  he  cannot  recover  damages  for  that  injury  in  this  ac- 
tion.5 

§  475.  Assaulting  not  in  self-defense. — (1)  If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  had  no  reasonable  cause  to 
apprehend  that  the  deceased  intended  to  take  the  defendant's 
life,  or  to  do  him  any  other  great  bodily  harm,  and  that  thereupon 
the  defendant  fired  the  pistol  shot  in  revenge  or  in  a  reckless  and 
vindictive  spirit,  then  there  is  no  self-defense  in  the  case  and  the 
jury  cannot  find  for  the  defendant  on  that  ground.6 

(2)  Although  you  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  de- 
ceased took  hold  of  the  defendant  and  held  him,  and  may  also  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  he  attempted  to  follow  him,  when  re- 
leased with  the  intention  of  again  taking  hold  of  him,  yet  that 
would  not  justiiy  the  defendant  in  taking  his-  life  unless  the  jury 
believe  from  all  the  evidence  before  them  that  the  defendant  had 
reasonable  cause  to  believe  that  the  deceased  was  then  about  to 
take  his  life,  or  do  him  some  other  great  personal  injury.7 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant's  con- 
ductor struck  the  plaintiff,  then  your  verdict  must  be  in  favor  of 
the  plaintiff,  unless  you  further  find  from  the  evidence  that  said 
conductor  struck  the  plaintiff  in  self-defense  or  to  save  himself 
from  bodily  harm.8 

(4)  Abusive  language  or  opprobrious  epithets  alone  never  justi- 
fy the  commission  of  an  assault  by  a  conductor  in  charge  of  a  train 
upon  a  passenger.9 

(5)  If  the  deceased  had  been  wounded  and  had  not  died  of  his 
wounds  and  had  brought  an  action  against  the  defendant  for 
damages,  if  it  appeared  that  the  deceased  made  the  first  assault 
and  the  defendant  repelled  it  by  force,  employing  no  more  force 
than  was  necessary  to  protect  himself,  he  could  not  recover ;  but 

s  Krall  v.  Lull,  49  Wis.  405,  5  N.  «  Birmin-gibam  R.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

W.  874.  Mullen  (Ala.),  35  So.  702. 

«  Nichols  v.  Winfrey,  90  Mo.  407,  9  Birmingham  R.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

2  S.  W.  305.  Mullen  (Ala.),  35  So.  702. 

~  Nichols  v.  Winfrey,  90  Mo.  407, 
2    S.   W.   305. 


§    476  DAMAGES — INJURY  TO  PERSON.  478 

if  the  defendant  went  unnecessarily  beyond  this  and  employed 
force  entirely  disproportionate  to  the  attack,  such  as  to  show 
wantonness,  malice  or  revenge,  he  himself  would  become  a  wrong- 
doer and  would  be  liable  for  any  injury  inflicted  beyond  what 
was  reasonably  necessary.10 

(6)  In  defending  himself  against  an  unlawful  attack  of  another 
a  man  is  justified  in  resorting  to  such  violence  and  the  use  of 
such  force  as  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case  may 
require  for  his  protection.  Now  the  degree  of  force  to  be  em- 
ployed in  protecting  one's  person  must  be  in  proportion  to  the 
attack  made,  and  must  depend  upon  the  circumstances  in  each 
particular  case,  and  the  imminence  of  danger  as  it  appears  to 
him  at  the  time.  Jhe  only  purpose  which  justifies  the  employ- 
ment of  force  against  the  assault  is  to  defend  one's  self,  that  is 
the  object  to  be  attained;  and  a  man  is  only  justified  in  using 
such  an  amount  of  force  as  may  appear  to  him  at  the  time  to 
be  necessary  to  accomplish  that  purpose.  As  soon  as  that  object 
is  attained,  it  is  his  duty  to  desist.  If  he  used  a  kind  of  force 
towards  his  assailant  in  excess  or  out  of  proportion  to  what  may 
be  necessary  to  his  own  defense,  as  it  honestly  appeared  to  him  at 
the  time,  he  is  himself  guilty  of  an  assault.11 

§  476.  Assessing  damages  for  physical  injury. — If  you  find  for 
the  plaintiff  you  will  award  him  such  damages  as  will  fairly 
compensate  him  for  any  injuries  or  indignity  he  may  have  sus- 
tained. In  awarding  such  damages  you  may  consider  the  charac- 
ter of  his  injuries,  what  physical  injury,  if  any,  he  sustained, 
and  also  the  mental  suffering,  if  any ;  also  any  sense  of  shame 
or  humiliation  he  may  have  suffered  on  account  of  such  wrong- 
ful acts,  if  any,  that  were  committed  against  him  and  award  him 
such  damages  as  will  be  a  fair  compensation  in  the  premises.12 

§  477.  Damages  for  assault  to  ravish. — If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  assaulted  the  plaintiff  as 
testified  to  by  her,  by  laying  his  hands  on  her  accompanied  with 
the  threat  that  he  would  kill  her,  or  words  in  substance,  that  if 

10  Darling    v.    Williams,    35    Ohio  App.   428,   66  N.   E.   188,    (held   not 
St.   58.  assuming    facts    and    confined    the 

11  Kent  v.  Cole,  84  Mich.  581,  48  jury  to  the  eivdence.    See,  Ously  v. 
N.  W.  1G8.  Hardin,  23  111.  353. 

12  Golibart   v.    Sullivan,    30    Ind. 


479  PERSONS  INJURED  BY  ANIMALS.  §    479 

she  did  not  consent  to  sexual  intercourse  with  the  defendant, 
this  in  itself  will  warrant  the  jury  in  finding  the  defendant 
guilty,  although  the  jury  may  further  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  she  ultimately  freely  consented  to  such  intercourse.  If, 
however,  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  such  ultimate 
assent  was  not  freely  given,  but  was  yielded  by  the  plaintiff  only 
as  a  consequence  of  the  preceding  violence  or  force,  then  such 
sexual  intercourse  should  be  regarded  by  the  jury  as  a  part  of 
the  assault,  and  a  ground  for  exemplary  damages,  that  is,  such 
as  will  compensate  the  plaintiff  for  any  wrong  to  her  and  to 
punish  the  defendant,  and  to  furnish  an  example  to  deter  others 
from  like  practices.13 

§  478.  Injury  to  the  person  by  animals. — (1)  The  defendant 
claims  that  the  plaintiff,  in  passing  the  bull,  provoked  the  bull  to 
make  the  attack  upon  him,  by  striking  the  bull  with  a  cane  or  stick 
without  reasonable  cause.  If  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  struck 
the  bull,  and  thereby  excited  him  to  make  the  attack,  you  will 
not  assume,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  the  plaintiff  was  in  fault,  but 
you  will  inquire  whether,  under  the  circumstances,  the  plaintiff 
had  or  had  not  reasonable  cause  to  strike  the  bull  with  his  cane. 
You  will  carefully  notice  what  the  plaintiff  did,  if  anything ;  his 
situation  at  the  time  as  it  appeared  to  him,  and  all  the  circum- 
stances surrounding  him,  and  decide  whether  he  acted  as  a  man 
of  ordinary  prudence  or  not.14 

(2)  The  plaintiff  has  alleged  in  each  paragraph  of  his  complaint 
that  the  steer  in  question  was  of  a  dangerous  and  vicious  dis- 
position, in  the  habit  of  attacking  persons  and  animals.  He  has 
also  alleged  that  the  defendant  knew .  of  such  dangerous  and 
vicious  disposition  of  said  steer,  and  that  he  the  plaintiff  had 
no  knowledge  of  such  dangerous  and  vicious  disposition.  To 
entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  he  must  prove,  by  a  fair  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence,  not  only  that  the  steer  was  dan- 
gerous and  vicious,  but  that  the  defendant  knew  that  fact  and 
the  plaintiff  was  ignorant  of  it.15 

!3  Miller  v.  Bathasser,  78  111.  302,  a  recent  statute,   the  plaintiff  was 

304.    Held  competent  where  no  wit-  relieved  from  the  burden  of  prov- 

ness    except    the    plaintiff    testified  ing  his  own  freedom  from  contrib- 

to  the  assault  on  her.  utory  negligence  in  actions  for  per- 

]*  Meier  v.   Shrunk,   79   Iowa,   21,  sonal  injuries.     Indianapolis  Street 

44  N.  W.  209.  R.    Co.    v.    Robinson,    157   Ind.    232, 

is  Todd   v.   Banner,   17   Ind.   App.  61  N.  E.  197. 
368,   46  N.   E.   829.     In  Indiana,  by 


DAMAGES — INJURY   TO   PERSON.  480 

§  479.  Attack  by  vicious  dogs. — (1)  If  the  defendant  had  the 
dog  in  his  possession,  and  was  harboring  him  on  his  premises 
as  owners  usually  harbor  their  dogs,  then  he  is  the  owner  within 
the  meaning  of  the  law.  If  the  dog  was  only  casually  upon 
his  premises,  and  was  not  being  harbored  by  defendant  as  owners 
usually  harbor  their  dogs,  then  he  was  not  the  owner.  In  de- 
termining how  this  was  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  attack,  you 
will  consider  the  defendant's  former  treatment  of  the  dog,  his 
declarations  concerning  him,  and  the  habit  of  the  dog  as  to 
staying  at  the  defendant's  place,  if  he  was  in  the  habit  of  stay- 
ing there.16 

(2)  The  fact  that  the  defendant  or  defendant's  wife  may  have 
been  able  to  control  the  dog  by  calling  him  off  or  speaking  to  him 
when  he  would  run  at  any  one,  even  if  the  jury  believe  this  fact 
proved,  is  not  such  a  restraining  as  is  contemplated  by  the  law, 
and  would  not  relieve  or  excuse  the  defendant  from  the  charge 
of  negligence  if  the  other  facts  in  said  cause  are  proved  that 
would  require  the  defendant  to  restrain  his  dog.17 

§480.  Dangerous  obstructions  in  highway. — (1)  The  way  in 
question  was  a  highway  which  the  defendant  was  bound  to  keep 
in  repair,  and  was  liable  to  the  plaintiff  if  he  was  injured  by 
a  defect  in  it  while  he  was  traveling  over  it  and  using  due  care. 
The  defendant  had  a  right  to  repair  the  road  and  to  put  the 
mound  of  earth  where  it  was  for  that  purpose,  •  but  would  be 
bound  to  fence  or  guard  it  in  some  manner  so  as  to  prevent 
travelers  from  injury  by  means  of  it.  The  defendant  could 
protect  travelers  from  injury  and  the  town  from  liability  in 
either  of  two  ways:  first,  by  placing  and  keeping  a  sufficient 
guard  or  barrier  at  the  place  where  the  mound  was,  so.  as  to 
keep  travelers  away  from  it;  second,  by  placing  and  keeping 
a  suitable  and  sufficient  fence  or  barrier  across  the  highway  at 
the  end  of  the  part  that  was  being  constructed,  so  as  to  notify 
travelers  that  the  way  was  not  for  use  and  to  prevent  the  us- 
ing of  it.  If  the  defendant  placed  a  proper  and  sufficient  fence 
or  barrier  across  the  way  at  the  east  end,  the  direction  the 
plaintiff  came,  sufficient  and  suitable  to  notify  a  person  of  or- 
dinary prudence  that  the  way  was  not  for  use,  and  such  fence 

IB  O'Hara  v.  Miller,  64  Iowa,  462,          "  Dockerty   v.    Hutson,    125    Ind. 
20   N.   W.    760.  102,   25   N.   E.   144. 


481  OBSTRUCTIONS  IN    HIGHWAY,   TURNPIKE.  §    481 

or  barrier  was  there  in  place  at  the  close  of  the  day  of  the 
accident  the  defendant  would  not  be  liable.  It  is  for  the  jury  to 
say  whether  the  fence  which  was  placed  across  the  way  at  the 
east  end  was  suitable  and  sufficient.  If  the  town  attempted 
to  close  the  whole  road  by  barriers,  and  knew  or  had  reason 
to  know  that  those  barriers  had  been  constantly  and  repeatedly 
taken  down  or  left  down,  that  knowledge  is  to  be  considered 
by  the  jury  in  determining  whether  the  defendant's  precau- 
tions were  such  as  were  reasonable.18 

(2)  The  county  commissioners  were  bound  to  foresee  and  rea- 
sonably provide  against  a  common  danger  to  ordinary  travel 
on  the  bridge.  It  may  be  taken  as  a  well  known  fact  that  when 
bicycles  strike  obstructions  in  their  path,  even  though  in  the  con- 
trol of  expert  riders,  they  are  apt  to  deviate  from  their  course 
and  take  a  sudden  and  erratic  direction,  unexpected  by  the 
riders,  just  as  no  one  can  foretell  the  conduct  of  a  frightened 
horse.  The  presence  of  guard  rails  or  barriers  at  the  point  of 
the  accident  would  have  been  a  protection  from  the  danger 
of  going  over  the  bridge,  no  matter  what  the  movements  of  a 
bicycle  would  be.  The  aptness  of  bicycles  to  deviate  from  their 
course  and  to  take  sudden  and  unexpected  direction  when  meet- 
ing obstructions  in  their  path  was  ordinary  knowledge  and  to 
be  expected.  If  it  were  otherwise,  it  would  be  extraordinary, 
because  contrary  to  common  observation  and  experience.  The 
county  commissioners  should  have  guarded  against  that  which 
was  to  be  expected,  and  it  will  not  excuse  the  negligence  of 
the  commissioners,  or  make  that  negligence  the  remote  cause 
to  assert  that  they  could  not  foresee  the  peculiar  aptness  or 
freak  of  a  bicycle  to  take  sudden  and  unexpected  courses  when 
meeting  obstacles  in  its  path.  The  injury  in  the  case  must  be 
the  natural  and  probable  consequence  of  the  neglect  to  have 
had  up  guards  or  barriers,  and  the  consequence  is  such  as,  under 
the  surrounding  circumstances  of  this  case,  might  and  ought  to 
have  been  foreseen  by  the  county  commissioners.19 

§  481.  Turnpike  unsafe — Liability. — (1)  If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  defendant  corporation  owned  and  kept 

is  Howard     v.     Inhabitants,     117  &c.  v.  Allman,  142  Ind.  573,  42  N. 

Mass.  588.  E.  206;    Town  of  Boswell  v.  Wak- 

19  Strader  v.  Monroe,  202  Pa.  St.  ley,  149  Ind.  64,  48  N.  E.  637. 
626,   51   Atl.    1100.     But  see  Board, 


§    482  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO  PERSON. 

open  for  public  travel  the  turnpike  road  spoken  of  in  evidence, 
then  it  was  the  duty  of  defendant  to  make  its  said  road  in  such 
manner  and  in  such  condition  as  to  make  it  safe  for  persons 
traveling  over  the  same,  using  ordinary  care  and  caution  while 
so  traveling;  and  if  they  shall  further  find  that  the  defend- 
ant negligently  permitted  a  part  of  its  road  to  be  in  an  un- 
safe and  perilous  condition  for  persons  using  the  same  with 
ordinary  care  and  caution,  and  that  G,  while  traveling  over  said 
road  and  said  part  and  using  ordinary  care  and  caution,  was 
injured  by  the  upsetting  of  the  vehicle  in  which  he  was  travel- 
ing, as  described  in  the  evidence,  and  shall  further  find  that 
the  said  accident  was  caused  by  the  'negligence  of  the  defend- 
ant corporation  in  having  its  said  road  in  an  unsafe  and  peril- 
ous condition  for  public  travel  at  the  place  of  accident,  and 
not  by  any  negligence  of  the  said  G  directly  contributing  there- 
to, then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover.20 

(2)  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  the  in- 
jury complained  of  was  caused  by  the  defendant's  negligence, 
and  that  but  for  such  negligence  the  injury  would  not  have  hap- 
pened ;  and  further,  that  unless  the  jury  should  find  from  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  testimony  that  the  death  of  G  was  caused  solely 
by  the  defendant's  negligence,  the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to 
recover.21 

§482.  Injury  to  bicyclist  on  bridge. — (1)  Should  you  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  expert,  or  was  in- 
experienced in  the  use  of  the  wheel,  yet  she  had  a  legal  right 
to  use  the  bridge  in  question  with  her  wheel,  and  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  county  commissioners  to  have  anticipated  such  use 
and  provided  for  the  same,  and  their  failure  to  do  so  was  neg- 
ligence, and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  provided  she 
was  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence.22 

(2)  It  is  the  law  of  this  state  that  persons  using  bicycles  on  the 
public  highways  and  bridges  are  entitled  to  the  same  rights  and 
subject  to  the  same  restrictions  in  the  use  thereof  as  are  prescribed 
by  the  law  in  the  case  of  persons  using  carriages  drawn  by 
horses.23 

20  President,  &c.  v.  S.  71  Md.  576,      627,  51  All.  1100;   See  City  of  Lo- 
18  Atl.  884.  gansport  v.   Kihm,   159   Ind.   68,   64 

21  President,  &c.  v.  S.  71  Md.  581,      N.  E.  595. 

18  Atl.  884.  23  strader  v.  Monroe,  202  Pa.  St. 

22  Strader  v.  Monroe,  202  Pa.  St.      627,  51  Atl.  1100. 


483  ACCIDENTAL   INJURY    TO   TRAVELER.  §    483 

(3)  The  plaintiff  in  the  use  of  her  bicycle  on  the  bridge  in  ques- 
tion was  not  "bound  to  use  the  carriage  drive,  but  had  the  right 
to  go  over  any  part  of  the  bridge  open  for  travel.24 

(4)  If  the  plaintiff  knew  of  the  existence  of  the  obstruction,  the 
plank  on  the  bridge,  or  saw  it  before  she  reached  it,  or  was  care- 
less in  not  observing  it,  and  then  carelessly  or  imprudently  ran  in- 
to it  or  on  it  and  the  accident  resulted  from  such  carelessness 
and  imprudence,  then  she  cannot  recover.     She  must  show  you 
that  she  was  reasonably  careful  and  prudent  as  she  rode  across 
the  bridge  at  the  point  of  the  accident.     She  must  satisfy  you 
of  that  first.     If  she  has  done  so,  then  you  may  proceed  to  the 
second  question.25 

§  483.  Accidental  injury  to  traveler  on  highway. — (1)  If  the 
jury  shall  find  that  the  turnpike  road  of  the  defendant  at  the 
place  in  question  was  reasonably  safe  and  fit  to  be  driven  upon 
with  a  team  of  horses  which  were  ordinarily  gentle  and  man- 
ageable, and  that  one  of  the  horses  of  the  deceased' was  fright- 
ened at  an  object  which  would  not  ordinarily  have  frightened 
a  gentle  and  well-broken  horse,  and  that  in  consequence  of 
which  the  horse  got  beyond  the  control  of  the  deceased  and 
that  the  wagon  was  upset  and  the  death  of  G  was  caused  by 
his  loss  of  control  over  said  horse,  then  the  verdict  must  be 
for  the  defendant.26 

(2)  The  owner  or  driver  of  the  horse  being  driven  along  the 
highway  is  not  responsible  for  the  consequences  of  his  horse  run- 
ning away  or  for  injuries  inflicted  while  the  horses  were  out 
of  his  control,  provided  he  has  used  reasonable  care  in  driving 
and  controlling  them.  The  horses  and  truck  of  the  defendant 
were  being  lawfully  used  upon  the  highway  at  the  time  of  the 
collision  with  plaintiff's  buggy;  and  if  the  collision  occurred 
while  the  driver  had  -temporarily  lost  control  of  the  horse 
by  reason  thereof,  if  you  should  find  that  he  was  thrown  from  the 
truck  in  the  manner  that  he  has  described,  but  if  his  loss  of 
control  was  not  the  result  of  want  of  care  on  his  part,  the 

z*  Strader  v.  Monroe,  202  Pa.  St.  plaintiff  in  actions  for  personal  in- 

627,  51  Atl.  1100.  juries     in     Indiana:      Indianapolis 

25  Strader  v.  Monroe,  202  Pa.  St.  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  157  Ind. 

626,    51   Atl.    1100.     The  burden   of  232,  61  N.  E.  197. 

disproving    his    own     contributory  20  President,  &c.  v.  S.  71  Md.  581, 

negligence,    does    not    rest    on    the  18  Atl.   884. 


§    484  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO   PERSON. 

collision  must  be  regarded  as  accidental,  and  the  plaintiff  could 
not,   under  those   circumstances,   recover.-7 


Malpractice  by  Physician. 

§  484.  Negligence  of  doctor — Liability. — (1)  If  the  jury  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  plaintiff,  having 
broken  his  leg,  employed  the  defendant  as  his  physician  and  sur- 
geon, to  set  and  attend  the  same,  and  that  the  defendant,  holding 
himself  out  as  a  physician  and  surgeon,  undertook  and  entered 
upon  such  employment,  and  for  a  considerable  time  had  charge 
of  the  same,  then  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  receive  the  care, 
attention  and  skill  of  an  ordinarily  skilled  physician  and  sur- 
geon. And  if,  from  the  evidence  in  the  case,  the  jury  be- 
lieve that  the  plaintiff  did  not  receive  from  the  defendant  such 
care,  attention  and  skill,  and  that  in  consequence  of  not  receiv- 
ing the  same,  and  without  fault  on  his  part,  suffered  increased 
pain,  suffering  and  injury,  then  the  jury  are  instructed  that 
the  defendant  is  liable,  and  the  jury  will  render  a  verdict  for 
the  plaintiff,  and  assess  his  damages,  as  found  from  all  the 
evidence  in  the  case,  at  some  amount  not  exceeding  the  sum 
of  three  thousand  dollars  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  in  his  declara- 
tion.28 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  put  the 
plaintiff's  leg  in  proper  place  and  dressed  it,  you  should  in- 
quire what  means,  if  any,  were  used  by  him  to  keep  it  in  place 
and  to  guard  against  the  effects  of  the  ordinary  and  natural 
movements  of  the  plaintiff  and  his  muscles  in  his  then  con- 
dition ;  and  whether  the  responsibility  of  not  providing  such  safe- 
guards as  were  necessary  and  proper  in  the  case  rests  with  the 
defendant.  You  should  also  consider  what  directions  or  instruc- 
tions, if  any,  were  given  by  the  defendant,  or  whether  any  di- 
rections or  instructions  were  given,  as  to  the  necessity  of  remain- 
ing quiet  and  not  moving,  or  the  dangerous  results  likely  to 
follow  from  undue  motion.  The  responsibility  for  not  giving  such 
instructions  and  directions  as  were  necessary  and  proper  rests 

2T  Silsby  v.  Michigan  Car  Co.  95  liday  v.  Gardner,  27  Ind.  App.  231, 
Mioh.  207,  54  N.  W.  761.  See  Hoi-  59  N.  E.  686,  61  N.  E.  1€. 

28  Kendall  v.  Brown,  86  111.  388. 


485  MALPRACTICE    BY    PHYSICIAN.  §    487 

with  the  defendant,  and  if  such  directions  and  instructions  were 
necessary  and  proper,  and  he  failed  and  neglected  to  give  them, 
you  will  be  justified  in  considering  such  failure  as  negligence 
and  want  of  proper  care  and  attention.20 

§  485.  Physician  required  to  exercise  ordinary  skill. — A  sur- 
geon in  the  treatment  of  a  fractured  limb  is  not  required  to 
have  an  infallible  judgment  or  perfect  skill.  If  he  is  possessed 
of-  ordinary  knowledge  and  skill,  and  exercises  them  to  the  best 
of  his  ability,  he  is  not  bound  to  warrant  his  judgment.  Act- 
ing in  good  faith,  a  physician  or  surgeon,  possessed  of  reason- 
able or  ordinary  skill,  may  do  an  act  or  adopt  a  treatment 
which  may  do  harm  or  produce  a  bad  result,  yet  if  done  in 
good  faith  and  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  knowledge  and  skill 
he  would  not  be  liable.30 

§  486.  Patient  must  observe  directions  of  doctor. — If  you  find 
that  the  injuries  of  which  the  plaintiff  complains  were  caused 
wholly  or  in  part  by  his  own  acts  or  negligence,  then  he  can- 
not recover.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  patient  to  observe  and  fol- 
low the  reasonable  directions  of  his  physician  and  surgeon.  If 
the  plaintiff,  after  having  been  treated  for  some  time  by  the 
defendant,  upon  going  away  from  the  place  where  the  treat- 
ment had  been  given  was  instructed  by  the  defendant  to  return 
for  further  treatment  as  soon  as  he  began  to  suffer  pain,  and 
that,  although  he  suffered  pain,  he  neglected  for  a  week  to 
return  for  treatment,  this  is  a  fact  for  you  to  take  into  con- 
sideration, with  the  other  facts  in  the  case,  in  determining 
whether  the  plaintiff  himself  was  or  was  not  negligent.31 


Unlawful  Sale  of  Liquor. 

§  487.  Liability  for  selling  intoxicating  liquors. — (1)  It  is  un- 
lawful and  punishable  for  any  person  to  furnish  any  intoxicating 
liquors  to  one  who  is  intoxicated  or  who  is  in  the  habit  of 
getting  intoxicated  at  the  time  of  so  furnishing  such  liquors, 

29  Wallace    v.    Ransdell,    90    Ind.          so  Jones  v.  Angell,  95  Ind.  382. 
173,    (held    proper   when    taken    in          si  Jones  v.  Angell,  95  Ind.  380. 
connection  with   other  instructions 
given.) 


§    488  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO  PERSON.  486 

unless  given  by  a  physician  in  the  regular  course  of  his  prac- 
tice.82 

(2)  The  amount  of  a  sale  is  not  material,  nor  is  it  material 
that  the  sale  should  be  the  one  which  produced  the  final  in- 
toxication; but  the  saloon-keeper  or  the  person  furnishing  in- 
toxicating  liquors   is   responsible   for   all    damages   which   may 
accrue  as  the  result  of  his  sales,  if  a  person  obtains  but  one 
drink  and  then  drinks  at  other  places  sufficient  to  intoxicate 
him.     And,  if  the  death  is  established  as  a  result  of  sales  by 
more  than  one  person,  you  are  not  required  to  find  which  one 
furnished  the  liquor  that   caused  the  death.33 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  said  C   was 
intoxicated  at  the  time  he  upset  and  overturned  his  sled  and 
lost  his  team,   and  that  the   defendants   sold   any  part   of  the 
liquors  that  produced  such  intoxication,  and  that  he  upset  his 
sled  and  lost  his  team  in  consequence  of  such  intoxication,  and 
that  in  endeavoring  to  reach  home  on  foot  he  became  exhaust- 
ed, and  that  such  exhaustion  was  caused  by  reason  of  his  being 
compelled  to  walk,  and  that  he  was  unable  to  reach  home  and 
was   frozen  to   death,   the   defendants  would   be   liable.34 

(4)  If  you  should  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  deceased 
came  to  his  death  by  violence  inflicted  by  any  other  person,  and 
should  further  find  that  the  person  inflicting  the  violence  was 
intoxicated  at  the  time,  and  that  he  obtained  from  the  defend- 
ants or  either  of  them  the  liquors  which  caused  his  intoxica- 
tion, and  that  he  would  not  have  used  the  violence  that  caused 
the  death  except  as  a  result  of  such  intoxication,  then,  and  in 
that  case,  such  of  the  defendants  and  their  bondsmen  as  fur- 
nished such  intoxicating  liquors  would  be  equally  liable.35 

§  488.  Wife — Selling  to  her  husband — Liability.— (1)  In  a  suit 
brought  by  a  wife  or  widow  to  recover  for  an  injury  to  her  means 
of  support,  caused  by  the  intoxication  of  her  husband,  produced, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  by  intoxicating  liquors  sold  or  given  to  him 
by  the  defendant  or  defendants  (if  such  facts  are  shown  by 

32  Sibila  v.  Bahnez,  34  Ohio  St.  man,  29  Kas.  109;  Smiser  v.  S.  17 
399.  Ind.  App.  519,  47  N.  E.  229. 

ss  Scott  v.  Chope,  33  Neb.  75.  49  34  Scott  v.  Chope,  33  Neb.  76,  49 
N.  W.  940.  See  Kearney  v,  Fitz-  N.  W.  940. 

geral,  43  Iowa,  582;  Jokers  v.  Borg-          35  Scott  v.  Chope,  33  Neb.  74,  49 

N.  W.  940. 


487  DAMAGES  IN   SELLING   LIQUORS.  §    490 

the  evidence),  if  it  further  appears,  from  the  evidence,  that 
in  consequence  of  such  act  of  causing  such  intoxication,  and 
as  a  proximate  result  or  consequence  of  such  intoxication  so 
caused,  she  has  sustained  actual  and  real  damages  to  her  means 
of  support,  then  the  jury  may,  in  addition  to  the  actual  dam- 
ages shown,  give  exemplary  or  vindictive  damages,  unless  it 
shall  further  appear,  from  the  evidence,  that  such  liquor  was 
sold  or  given  to  the  husband,  not  by  the  defendants,  but  by 
their  agents  or  servants,  and  that  the  defendant  or  defendants 
had  forbidden  his  or  their  said  agent  or  agents  to  sell  or  give 
such  liquor  to  said  husband,  and  did  not  know  of  or  permit 
such  sale  or  gift  when  made,  in  which  case  the  defendants 
would  not  be  liable  to  exemplary  or  vindictive  damages.36 

(2)  The  law  requires  that  a  husband  shall  provide  for  his  wife 
reasonable  support  according  to  her  rank  and  station  in  society; 
and  to  this  end  she  is  entitled  with  her  husband  and  family  to 
share  his  property  and  the  proceeds  of  his  labor.37 

§  489.  Transfer  of  liquor  license — Effect. — (1)  An  individual 
or  partnership  taking  out  a  license  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  cannot  sell  and  transfer  that  license  to  another  person 
or  party,  and  if  they  do  sell  and  transfer  their  business,  to- 
gether with  their  rights  under  the  license,  the  purchaser  would 
be  holden  to  their  agent,  and  they  would  be  liable  for  all  sales 
made  by  him  under  and  by  virtue  of  such  license.  And  if  the 
bondsmen  of  such  license  holder  knew  of  such  sale  and  trans- 
fer, and  took  no  steps  to  relieve  themselves  from  liability,  their 
liability  will  continue.38 

(2)  It  would  be  the  duty  of  a  person  going  out  of  the  saloon 
business,  selling  and  transferring  his  property,  to  return  his  li- 
cense under  which  he  was  transacting  business  to  the  authority 
granting  the  license  and  have  the  same  canceled,  and  if  he  did  not 
do  this,  that  he  would  be  held  liable  for  all  damages  accruing  as 
the  result  of  the  sales  of  intoxicating  liquors  by  his  successor  in 
business.39 

36  Betting  v.  Hobbett,  142  111.  76,  38  Scott  v.  Chope,  33  Neb.  75,  49 
30   N.    E.    1048.     But   see   State   v.  N.   W.   940.     .License  not  transfer- 
Knotts,  24  Ind.  App.  477,  56  N.  E.  able:  Pierce  v.  Pierce,  17  Ind.  App. 
941.  107,  46  N.  E.  486. 

37  Thill  v.  Pohlman,  76  Iowa,  639,  39  Scott  v.  Chope,  33  Neb.  75,  49 
41   N.   W.   385.  N.  W.  940. 


§   491  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO  PERSON.  488 

§  490.  Sales  since  commencing  suit — Evidence. — If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  since  the  commencement  of  this  suit 
the  defendant  has  sold  intoxicating  liquors  to  G  in  violation 
of  law,  that  would  afford  no  ground  whatever  for  a  recovery 
on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff;  but  if  you  find  that  the  plaintiff 
ought  to  recover  on  account  of  intoxicating  liquors  having  been 
sold  to  G,  her  husband,  by  the  defendant  for  the  four  years 
previous  to  the  time  of  beginning  this  suit,  you  have  a  right 
to  consider  the  fact,  if  it  is  a  fact,  that  it  has  been  repeated  and 
the  unlawful  sales  made  since  its  commencement,  for  the  purpose 
of  throwing  light  upon  the  mind  of  the  defendant  at  the  time  he 
sold  such  liquors  to  the  said  G  during  the  four  years  prior 
to  'the  plaintiff's  filing  her  petition;  you  have  a  right  to  con- 
sider it  in  aggravation  of  her  damages,  or  as  a  reason  why 
they  should  or  may  be  increased.  You  cannot  found  her  right 
to  recover  upon  any  such  sales,  but  the  most  you  can  do  would 
be  to  increase  the  amount  of  her  recovery  by  way  of  exemplary 
damages  for  such  sales,  -if  she  is  otherwise  entitled  to  a  ver- 
dict.40 

Libel  and  Slander. 

§  491.  Libel  and  slander  defined. — (1)  Libel  is  defined  by  our 
statute,  so  far  as  applicable  to  this  case,  as  the  malicious  defama- 
tion of  a  person,  made  public  by  any  printing  or  writing  tend- 
ing to  provoke  him  to  wrath,  or  expose  him  to  public  hatred, 
contempt  or  ridicule,  or  to  deprive  him  of  the  benefits  of  public 
confidence  and  social  intercourse.41 

(2)  Slander  may  be  defined  to  be  the  false,  wilful  and  malicious 
speaking  or  publishing  by  another  of  any  defamatory  words, 
charging  him  with  being  guilty  of  a  felony  or  crime.42 

§492.  Malice  an  essential  element. — (1)  Malice  is  essential  to 
the  support  of  an  action  for  slanderous  words;  but  if  one  false- 
ly, wrongfully  and  wilfully  charges  another  with  a  felony,  the 
law  will  imply  malice  until  the  contrary  is  shown.43 

(2)  If  in  this  case  the  jury  find  that  defendant  spoke  the  slan- 

40  Bean  v.  Green,  33  Ohio  St.  457.          42  Slallings    v.    Newman,    26    Ala. 

41  Dever   v.    Clark,    44    Kas.    752,      303. 

25   Pac.    205.  « Slallings    v.    Newman,    26    Ala. 

303. 


489  LIBEL  AND  SLANDER.  §    494: 

derous  words  as  charged  in  the  second  and  third  counts  of  plain- 
tiff's petition,  then  the  law  presumes  they  were  spoken  malicious- 
ly, and  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  any  express  malice  in  order  to 
warrant  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff.44 

(3)  If  you  find  that  the  information  was  made  and  filed  without 
probable  cause,  or  without  honestly  believing  that  the  statements 
therein  were  true,  but  was  done  to  injure  the  plaintiff  in  his  good 
name  and  reputation,  or  for  some  advantage  over  him,  then  the 
law  would  imply  malice,  and  you  should  find  for  the  plaintiff.45 

§493.  Slanderer's  words  must  be  proved. — (1)  In  this  action, 
to  authorize  the  plaintiff  to  recover,  it  is  necessary  for  him  to 
prove  that  the  defendant  maliciously  and  falsely  spoke  of  and 
concerning  the  plaintiff,  the  words  charged  in  his  declaration., 
or  some  of  them;  and  when  plaintiff  proves,  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  jury,  that  defendant  falsely  and  maliciously  spoke  or 
uttered  of  and  concerning  plaintiff,  the  words  charged  in  the 
declaration,  then  he  may  recover  such  damages  as  he  has  sus- 
tained.46 

(2)  If  you  find  from  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the- 
defendant  spoke  the  words,  in  substance,  as  alleged  in  the  com- 
plaint, that  he  intended  in  the  use  of  said  words  to  say  and 
charge  that  the  plaintiff  had  been  guilty  of  the  crime  of  lar- 
ceny, and  that  said  words  were  spoken  maliciously  and  in  the 
presence  of  some  person  other  than  the  plaintiff,  then  you  should 
find  for  the  plaintiff.47 

(3)  The  jury  are  the  sole  judges  as  to  whether  the  article  com- 
plained of  is  libelous.48 

§  494.  Proof  of  part  of  words  may  be  sufficient. — (1)  All  the 
words  laid  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration  need  not  be  proved 
to  maintain  the  action,  unless  it  takes  them  all  to  constitute 
the  slander,  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  a 
sufficient  number  of  the  words  laid  in  the  declaration  to  amount 
in  their  common  acceptation  to  a  charge  of  fornication  against 

44  Lewis  v.  McDonald,  82  Mo.  582.  ing  the  idea  that  other  words  with 

45  Comfort   v.    Young,    100    Iowa,  the  same  meaning  would  be  suffi- 
629,   69  N.  W.   1032.  cienit.) 

46  SMlings    v.    Newman,    26    Ala.  4s  McCloskey  v.  Pulitzer  Pub.  Co. 
303.  152  Mo.  346,  53  S.  W.  1087.    But  see 

47  Durrah  v.  Stillwell.  59  Ind.  142,  Alcoro  v.  Bass,  17  Ind.  App.  500. 
(held  not  objectionable  as  convey- 


§    495  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO  PERSON.  490 

the  plaintiff  have  been  proved  to  have  been  spoken  by  the  de- 
fendant, B,  then  they  must  find  for  the  plaintiff.40 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
spoke  of  and  concerning  the  plaintiff  in  the  presence  and  hearing 
of  T,  or  others  as  mentioned,  the  words  in  the  petition  alleged, 
to  wit:     "T  killed  my  hogs,  and  I  can  prove  it,  and  he  is  the 
biggest  thief  on  this  creek,   and  I  can  prove  by  M    and  his 
boys  that  he  has  stolen  my  hogs;"  or  that  enough  of  the  words 
stated  in  the  petition  have  been  proved  to  (substantially)   con- 
stitute the  charge  imputed  to  plaintiff,  then  the  jury  must  find 
for  the  plaintiff.50 

(3)  The  plaintiffs  are  not  bound  to  prove  the  speaking  of  the 
words  charged  in  the  petition.    If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  the  defendant  spoke  of  and  concerning  the  plaintiff, 
in  the  presence  and  hearing  of  others,  any  of  the  slanderous  words 
charged  in  the  petition?  the  fair  import  of  which  would  be  to 
charge  the  plaintiff  with  being  a  whore,  then  she  is  entitled  to  a 
verdict.51 

(4)  The  defendant  is  charged  by  plaintiff  with  speaking  of 
plaintiff  the  following  words :  "  T  killed  my  hogs,  and  I  can  prove 
it;  he  is  the  biggest  thief  on  this  creek,  and  I  can  prove  it  by 
M.  and  his  boys  that  he  has  stolen  my  hogs;"  and  with  speak- 
ing  of  plaintiff  the   following  words:   "T's  water   gates   were 
traps  to   steal   other   people's  stock  in;"   and  unless  they  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  defendant  spoke  of  plaintiff  the 
said  words,  or  so  much  of  the  said  words  as  may  be  sufficient 
to  constitute  a  charge  that  plaintiff  stole  hogs,  or  was  a  hog 
thief,  they  must  find  the  issue  in  this  cause  for  the  defendant.52 

§  495.  Words  libelous  in  themselves. — (1)  To  print  and  publish 
concerning  any  person  that  he  has  been  a  convict  in  the  state 
penitentiary  of  the  state  of  Kansas,  is  libelous  per  se,  unless 
the  same  is  true;  and  in  this  connection  you  are  instructed 
that  there  was  no  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  in  this 
case  to  prove  the  truth  of  the  matter  charged  as  libelous,  or 
to  show  that  the  same  was  published  for  justifiable  ends.53 

49  Baker  v.  Young,  44  111.  43.  52  Lewis  v.  McDaniels,  82  Mo.  583, 

so  Lewis  v.  McDaniel.  82  Mo.  583.  53  S.  v.  Brady,  44  Kas.  436,  24  Pac. 

•11  Boldt  v.  Budwig,  19   Neb.  742,  948. 
28  N.  W.  280. 


491  WOKDS   LIBELOUS   IN    THEMSELVES.  §    496 

(2)  Words  charging  a  woman  with  being  a  whore  are  action- 
able in  themselves,  and  the  law  presumes  that  a  party  uttering 
them  intended  maliciously  to  injure  the  person  against  whom  they 
are  spoken,  unless  the  contrary  appears  from  the  circumstances, 
occasion  or  manner  of  the  speaking  of  the  words;  but  all  that 
the  plaintiffs  are  bound  to  prove  in  the  case  to  entitle  them 
to  recover  is  the  speaking  by  the  defendant  of  enough  of  the 
slanderous  words  charged  in  the  petition  to  amount  to  a  charge 
that  the  plaintiff  was  a  whore,  and  express  malice  or  ill  will 
need  not  be  proved;  but  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  plaintiff  has  failed  to  prove  enough  of  the  words  to  amount 
to  a  charge  that  plaintiff  was  a  whore,  then  plaintiff  cannot 
recover,  and  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.54 

(3)  Although  the  plaintiff  alleges  in  his  petition  that  he  has,  on 
account  of  the  publications  complained  of,  sustained  a  damage 
of  one  thousand   dollars   on   account   of   each   of  said  publica- 
tions, it  is  not  necessary  for  him  to  prove  any  specific  damage; 
for  the  law  presumes  that  his  official  duties  as  a  public  officer 
were  honestly  performed,  and  his  professional  obligations  prop- 
erly discharged;  and  an  article  which  tends  to  hold  him  up  to 
the   public   view   as   an   unskilled   lawyer   and   an   incompetent 
officer,  is  libelous 'per  se    (per  se  meaning  of  itself),   and  en- 
titles the  plaintiff  to  damages,  unless  the  defendant  establishes 
the  truth  of  said  publication  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evi- 
dence.55 

(4)  Both   of  the   articles   complained   of  by  the   plaintiff  in 
his  petition,  copies  of  which  articles  are  attached  to  said  peti- 
tion, are  libelous  in  themselves,  and  unless  the  defendant  proves 
them   to    be   true,    by   a   preponderance    of   the   evidence,   then 
the  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  recover  such  damages  as  he 
has  sustained  by  the  publication  of  said  articles.50 

§  496.  Charging  another  with  committing  a  crime. — (1)  To 
charge  one  of  murder  in  killing  another  is  actionable  and  slan- 
derous, and,  falsely  and  maliciously  spoken,  warrants  a  recovery 
of  such  damages  as  the  jury  may  think  the  party  has  sustained, 
commensurate  with  the  injury  sustained.57 

54  Boldt  v.  Budwig,  19  Neb.  743,          so  Dever   v.    Clark,    44    Kas.    752, 
28  N.  W.  280.  25   Pac.   205. 

55  Dever   v.    Clark,    44    Kais.  753,          RT  Stallings   v.   Newman,    26   Ala. 
25   Pac.   205.  303. 


§    497  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO  PERSON.  492 

(2)  The  plaintiff  did  not  commit  the  crime  of  larceny  in  taking 
this  ice,  and  no  one  now  claims  in  this  case  that  he  did.    And 
if  defendant's  language  used   on  the   occasion  complained   of, 
taken  as  a  whole  and  all  of  it,  did  not,  according  to  its  fair 
meaning  under  the  circumstances,  charge  plaintiff  with  larceny, 
or  if  the  hearers  did  not  understand  that  it  charged  him  with 
larceny,  but  that  it  simply  charged  him  with  doing  some  un- 
fair or  improper  or  dishonest  thing,  not  amounting  to  larceny, 
as  the  hearers  understood  it,  then  defendant  is  not  guilty,  for 
then  he  would  not  charge  the  plaintiff  with  crime,  and  the  charge 
of  crime  is  the  gist  of  the  alleged  slander.58 

(3)  If  the  language  of  the  defendant  under  the  circumstances 
did  not  charge  the  plaintiff  with  larceny,  and  if  none  of  the  hear- 
ers understood  it  as  charging  him  with  larceny,  then  the  de- 
fendant is  not  guilty.59 

§  497.  Publication — Letter  so  held. — If  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  on  the  eighth  day  of  February,  1899,  the  wit- 
ness W,  was  in  the  employ  of  the  defendant  as  a  stenographer 
and  typewriter  in  the  office  and  business  of  the  defendant,  and 
on  said  day  said  defendant  dictated  to  the  witness,  W,  the 
typewritten  words  and  figures  in  the  letter  of  date  of  February 
8,  and  set  out  in  the  first  count  of  the  declaration  and  offered 
in  evidence,  and  that  said  witness,  W,  took  down  said  dicta- 
tion in  shorthand  characters  upon  paper,  and  thereafter  and  on 
the  same  day  copied  the  same  upon  a  typewriting  machine  upon 
the  business  paper  of  the  defendant,  and  in  the  form  and  man- 
ing  appearing  in  said  letter  offered  in  evidence,  and  after  said  let- 
ter was  thus  typewritten  the  defendant  subscribed  his  name  there- 
to in  his  proper  handwriting,  and  thereafter  said  letter  was  copied 
by  a  letter-press  machine  into  the  letter  book  of  the  defend- 
ant by  the  witness,  "W,  in  the  course  of  her  said  employment 
in  the  business  of  the  defendant,  then  such  action  in  law  con- 
stitutes a  writing  and  publication  by  said  defendant  of  the  mat- 
ters and  things  appearing  in  said  letter,  and  if  the  jury  further 
find  that  the  person  therein  mentioned  and  referred  to  is  the 

«s  Ellis  v.  Whitehead,  95  Mich.  »»  Ellis  v.  WMtehead,  95  Mich. 
115,  54  N.  W.  752.  115,  54  N.  W.  752. 


493  MEASURE  OF  DAMAGES — PUNITIVE  DAMAGES.  §    499 

plaintiff,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  under  the  first 
count  of  the  declaration.60 

§  498.  Measure  of  damages — Considerations. — (1)  If  from  the 
evidence  and  the  instructions  of  the  court  the  jury  find  for  the 
plaintiffs,  then  the  jury  are  to  determine  from  all  the  evidence 
and  the  circumstances  as  proved  on  the  trial  what  damages  ought 
to  be  given  to  the  plaintiff,  and  find  their  verdict  accordingly, 
but  not  exceeding  the  amount  claimed.  In  finding  the  measure 
of  damages  the  jury  may  take  into  consideration  the  mental 
suffering  produced,  if  any,  by  the  uttering  of  the  slanderous 
words,  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence  that  such  suffering 
has  been  endured  by  the  plaintiff,  and  the"  present  or  probable 
future  injury,  if  any,  to  the  plaintiff's  character,  which  the  ut- 
tering of  the  words  was  calculated  to  inflict.  If  you  find  for 
the  plaintiff,  she  will  be  entitled  to  at  least  nominal  damages 
without  proof  of  actual  damages.01 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  P., 
uttered  the  words  as  set  forth  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration, 
then  in  estimating  the  amount  of  damages  they  may  take  into 
consideration  all  the  attending  facts  and  circumstances  under 
which  the  defendant  made  such  utterance,  in  mitigation  of  the 
damages,  and  further,  that  in  estimating  the  damages  the  jury 
may  consider  the  degree  of  malice  on  the  part  of  the  said  de- 
fendant.02 

§  499.  Punitive  damages — When  proper. — (1)  If  the  jury  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  is  guilty  of  utter- 
ing the  slanderous  words  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration, 
they  may  take  into  consideration  the  pecuniary  circumstances 
of  the  defendant  and  his  position  and  influence  in  society  in 
estimating  the  amount  of  damages;  and  if  they  shall  also  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  obtruded  himself  into  the 
plaintiff's  house  and  there  offered  undue  familiarities  to  the 
plaintiff's  wife,  at  the  time  and  on  the  occasion  of  the  uttering  of 
the  words  in  question,  there  circumstances  may  also  be  taken  into 
consideration  in  fixing  the  amount  of  damages,  and  the  jury,  in 

so  Gambrill  v.  Schooley,  93  Md.  62  Padgett  v.  Sweeting,  65  Md. 
49,  48  Atl.  730.  405,  4  All.  887. 

si  Boldt  v.  Budwig,   19   Neb.   743, 
28  N.  W.  280. 


§    500  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO  PERSON.  494 

their  discretion,  may  give  damages  by  way  of  punishment  to 
the  defendant,  proportioned  to  the  circumstances  in  evidence  as 
well-  as  for  compensation.63 

(2)  In  actions  for  slander  the  law  implies  damages  from  the 
speaking  of  actionable  words,  and  also  that  the  defendant  intend- 
ed the  injury  which  the  slander  is  calculated  to  effect,  and  in  case 
the  jury  find  a  verdict  of  guilty,  they  are  to  determine  from  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  in  the  case  what  damages  ought  to  be 
given,  and  are  not  confined  to  mere  pecuniary  loss  or  injury.6* 

(3)  If  the  defendant  published  the  paper  in  manner  and  form 
as  alleged,  and  injury  resulted  to  the  plaintiff  from  and  by  reason 
of  such  publication,  he  will  be  entitled  to  recover  such  damages 
as  he  has  directly  sustained;   and  in  estimating  compensatory 
damages  you  may  take  into  consideration  and  include  reason- 
able fees  of  counsel  employed  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  his  action.     If  the  publication  was  made   with   a  bad 
motive  or  wicked  intention,  you  may  go  beyond  mere  compen- 
sation and  award  vindictive  or  punitive  damages — that  is,  dam- 
ages by  way  of  punishment.65 

§  500.  Matters  in  mitigation. —  (1)  Anger  is  no  justification  for 
the  use  of  slanderous  words,  and  it  ought  not  to  be  considered 
even  in  mitigation  of  damages,  unless  the  anger  is  provoked  by  the 
person  against  whom  the  slanderous  words  were  used,  and  in 
this  case,  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  de- 
fendant, B,  spoke  of  the  plaintiff  any  of  the  slanderous  words 
charged  in  the  petition,  then  it  matters  not  who  commenced 
the  conversation,  and  that  the  defendant  was  angry  at  the  time, 
unless  her  anger  was  wrongfully  provoked  in  whole  or  in  part 
by  the  acts  or  language  of  the  plaintiff  herself.66 

(2)  Evidence  introduced  under  a  plea  of  justification  charging 
the  plaintiff  with  having  committed  a  crime,  tending  to  prove  his 
guilt,  but  not  establishing  his  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
cannot  constitute  a  complete  defense  and  bar  to  the  action,  but 
may  be  considered  in  mitigation  of  damages.67 

es  Hosley  v.  Brooks,  20  111.  117.  66  Boldt  v.  Budwig,  14  Neb.  743, 

64  Baker    v.     Young,    44    111.     44,  28  N.  W.  280. 

'  (held    not    assuming    the    guilt    of  «-  Tucker  v.   Call,  45  Ind.  31.  By 

the  defendant.)  a   recent    Indiana   statute  the   ru'e 

es  Finney   v.   Smith,   31   Ohio   St.  that     an     answer     in    justification 

529.  must   be   proved   beyond   a  reason- 


495  MATTERS  IN  MITIGATION.  §    501 

(3)  If  defendant  at  the  time  he  spoke  the  words  complained  of 
stated  that  he  had  heard  such  a  report  from  others  and  gave 
it  as  a  matter  of  rumor,  and  he  has  proved  that  he  heard  it, 
then  while  it  would  not  amount  to  a  justification,  for  no  one 
has  a  right,  even  through  idle  wantonness,  to  keep  a  slanderous 
report  afloat  against  another,  yet  it  may  be  considered  as  tend- 
ing to  show  that  he  did  not  originate  the  story  in  malice,  and 
given  its  due  weight  in  mitigation  of  damages.68 

(4)  For  the  purpose  of  rebutting  and  repelling  the  idea  of  mal- 
ice, the  defendant  has  the  right  to  prove  and  explain  all  the  facts 
and  circumstances  surrounding  the  speaking  of  the  words ;    also, 
he  has  the  right  to  show  and  explain  all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances surrounding  the  speaking  of  the  words  in  mitigation  of 
damages.69 

(5)  In  this  case  thexe  is  no  justification  pleaded,  but  only  a 
general   denial   and   a   plea   of  mitigation,   and   the   publication 
is  admitted  in  the  pleadings.    Under  the  evidence  and  the  plead- 
ings the  defendant  can  only  mitigate  the  damages.70 

§  501.  Good  faith — Probable  cause. — (1)  If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  libelous  matter,  complained  of  by  the 
plaintiff,  was  composed  and  published  in  the  due  course  of  ju- 
dicial procedure  by  the  defendants,  and  that  said  defendants 
had  reasonable  cause  for  belief,  and  did  actually  believe,  that 
the  said  matter  was  pertinent  to  the  case  they  sought  to  make, 
and  the  relief  they  prayed  for,  then  the  jury  will  find  for  the 
defendants.71 

(2)  The  real  question  for  you  to  determine  first  in  this  case  is, 
was  the  information  made  by  the  defendant  and  filed  by 
him  honestly  and  in  good  faith,  upon  probable  cause,  he  believing 
at  the  time  that  the  plaintiff  was  insane,  or  laboring  under  an 
insane  delusion,  and  was  the  act  done  for  a  laudable  purpose, 
to  protect  himself,  his  property  or  society?  And  if  you  find  from 
the  preponderance  of  the  credible  evidence  in  the  case  that  it  was 
so  done,  then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.72 

able  doubt  is  abrogated  in  Indiana,  69  Slallings   v.    Newman,    26    Ala. 

and   proof  by   a   preponderance  of  304. 

the  evidence  is  now  sufficient.  Acts  TO  Jones   v.   Murray,    167   Mo.   49, 

1897,    p.     137,    Burns'    R.     S.     1901  66  S.   W.   981. 

(Ind.),    §    376c.  71  Johnson  v.   Brown,   13  W.  Va. 

ss  Hinkle  v.  Davenport,  38  Iowa,  91. 

364.  72  Comfort    v.    Young,    100    Iowa, 

629,  69  N.  W.  1032. 


§    502  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO  PERSON.  496 

§  502.  Degree  of  proof  in  justification. — (1)  The  testimony,  to 
sustain  the  plea  of  justification,  should  be  as  certain  and  con- 
clusive as  would  be  required  to  justify  a  conviction  for  the 
larceny,  if  the  plaintiff  were  indicted  for  the  offense — such  as 
leaves  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  of  the  truth  of  the 
charge.73 

Malicious  Prosecution. 

§  503.  Arrest  without  a  warrant. — (1)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  sheriff 
•on  arresting  a  person  without  a  warrant  for  an  offense  com- 
mitted within  his  view,  or  when  he  arrests  a  person  without 
a  warrant  upon  information  when  he  has  reasonable  or  probable 
•cause  to  believe  that  such  person  has  committed  a  felony,  in 
either  case  without  delay,  and  as  soon  as  he  can  reasonably  do 
so,  to  take  the  person  whom  he  has  placed  under  arrest  be- 
fore some  magistrate  to  be  charged  by  affidavit  with  some  of- 
fense. Such  an  arrest  can  only  be  made  and  the  person  held 
for  such  purpose.  If  the  officer  shall  fail  to  take  the  person  so 
arrested  before  a  magistrate  as  required  by  law,  then  he  is 
liable  to  such  person  in  an  action  for  damages.74 

(2)  No  officer  is  justified  in  making  an  arrest  without  a  warrant 
when  the  person  whom  he  arrests  is  peaceable  and  not  engaged  in 
open  violence,  as,  for  example,  by  fighting,  engaging  in  a  riot,  or 
about  to  escape  after  committing  a  felony.75 

(3)  This  is  an  action  commenced  by  the  plaintiff  against  the  de- 
fendant for  the  illegal  arrest  of  the  plaintiff  by  the  defendant 
under   circumstances   of  aggravation   as   alleged   by   the   plain- 
tiff.    Under  the  laws  of  this  state,  no  civil  officer  has  the  right 
to  arrest  a  citizen  unless  he  has  a  warrant,  and  if  demand  be 
made,  to  exhibit  it;   or  unless  some   offense   against  the   crim- 
inal law  is  being  committed  by  the  person  arrested  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  officer.76 

(4)  The  law  does  not  look  with  favor  on  arrests  made  without 
a  warrant,  and  an  arrest  without  a  warrant  cannot  be  justified 
if  the  person  arrested  was  not  engaged  in  a  breach  of  the  peace, 

73  Wonderly  v.   Nokes,   8  Blackf.  75  Pinkerton  v.  Verberg,  78  Mich. 
(Ind.)    589.     See  ante   §   500.   n.   67.  580,  44  N.  W.  579. 

74  Harness  v.  Steele,  159  Ind.  293,  ™  Hall  v.  O'Malley,  49  Tex.  70. 
64  N.  E.  875. 


497  MALICIOUS  PROSECUTION.  §    504 

as,  for  example,  in  fighting,  or  in  a  riot,  or  about  to  escape  after 
having  committed  a  felony.77 

(5)  It  is  no  defense  that  the  sheriff  supposed  he  had  a  capias; 
nor  had  he  any  right  to  know  there  was  an  indictment  for  a  mis- 
demeanor or  any  other -indictment  against  M,  the  plaintiff.    Until 
a  capias  was  issued  and  placed  in  his  hands,  he  had  no  right 
to  arrest  M,  nor  in  any  manner  to  molest  him,  because  there 
may  have  been  an  indictment,  if  there  was  one.78 

(6)  If  the  jury  shall  find  that  the  plaintiff  was  at  the  time  she 
was  arrested  walking  on  the  street  without  molesting  any  one, 
then  she  was  not  committing  any  act  that  would  justify  the 
defendant  in  arresting  her  without  a  warrant,  and  his  act  in 
arresting  her  was  unjustifiable,   and  the  burden  is  on  him  to 
justify  the  act.79 

(7)  If  the  jury  shall  find  that  the  plaintiff,  at  the  time  she  was 
arrested  by  the  defendant,  was  conducting  herself  in  an  orderly 
manner,  and  not  committing  any  breach  of  the  peace,  then  the  de- 
fendant had  no  right  or  authority  to  arrest  her.80 

§  504.  Probable  cause  for  prosecution. — (1)  The  court  further 
instructs  the  jury,  that  to  constitute  a  probable  cause  for  a 
criminal  prosecution  there  must  be  a  reasonable  ground  of  sus- 
picion, supported  by  circumstances  sufficiently  strong  in  them 
selves  to  warrant  a  cautious  man  in  the  belief  that  the  person 
accused  is  guilty  of  the  offense  charged.81 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances 
as  given  in  evidence  that  the  defendant  had  not  a  probable  cause 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  plaintiff,  they  may  infer  malice  from 
such  want  of  probable  cause.82 

(3)  Though  probable  cause  cannot  be  inferred  from  malice, 
yet  in  determining  whether  there  was  or  was  not  probable  cause, 
the  fact,  if  such  is  the  fact,  that  there  was  ill  will  or  malice,  may 
be  considered.83 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 

77  Plnkerton  v.  Verberg,  78  Mich.          81  Chapman  v.  Cawrey,  50  111.  517. 

580,  44  N.  W.  579.  «2  Chapman  v.  Cawry,  50  111.  517; 

TS  Hall  v.  O'Malley,  49  Tex.  70.  Ray  v.  Goings,  112  111.  662. 

79  Pinkerton  v.  Verberg,  78  Mich.          *s  Evansville  &   T.   H.   R.   Co.   v. 

580,  44  N.  W.  579.  Talbot,  131  Ind.  223,  29  N.  E.  1134. 

so  Pinkerton  v.  Verberg,  78  Mich. 
580,  44  N.  W.  579. 


§    505  DAMAGES — INJURY   TO   PERSON.  498 

maliciously  caused  the  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  the  plaintiff 
without  a  probable  cause,  as  alleged  in  the  plaintiff's  declara- 
tion, they  will  find  for  the  plaintiff,  and  may  assess  his  dam- 
ages at  such  sum  as  they  may  think  proper,  from  the  facts 
or  circumstances  of  the  case,  not  exceeding  the  sum  of  five 
thousand  dollars.84 

(5)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
had  probable  cause  to  institute  the  criminal  proceedings  against 
the  plaintiff,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.    Probable  cause  is 
defined  to  be  a  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion,  supported  by 
circumstances  sufficiently  strong  in  themselves  to  warrant  a  cau- 
tious man  in  the  belief  that  the  person  accused  is  guilty  of  the 
offense  of  which  he  is  charged.85 

(6)  The  burden  of  proof  in  this  case  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to 
show  that  the  defendant,  in  instituting  the  prosecution  before 
a   justice   of  the   peace,   for   malicious   mischief,   acted   without 
probable  cause,  and  if  they  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the 
plaintiff  has  failed  to  show  a  want  of  such  probable  cause  by  a 
preponderance  of  the  evidence,  then  the  jury  will  find  for  the 
defendant.86 

(7)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
honestly  believed  that  the  plaintiff  had  committed  a  crime,  breach 
of  the  peace,  or  misdemeanor,  or  had  threatened  to  commit  a 
crime,  misdemeanor  or  breach  of  the  peace,  and  if  the  defendant's 
belief  was  founded  on  circumstances  tending  to  show  that  he  had 
committed,  or  was  about  to  commit  such  offense,  such  belief,  so 
founded,  negatives  the  idea  of  want  of  probable  cause  for  the  pros- 
ecution, and  the  jury  will  find  for  the  defendant.87 

§  505.  Unlawful  arrest — Liability. — (1)  The  defendants  act- 
ing as  a  board  of  police  commissioners,  or  a  majority  thereof, 
had  no  right  to  order  the  arrest  of  the  plaintiff  for  publicly  wear- 
ing the  uniform  and  badge  prescribed  by  said  "board  for  the 
police  force.88 

(2)  If  the  jury  shall  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defen- 
dants, whether  acting  as  the  board  of  police  commissioners  or  as 
individuals  did  issue  an  order  for  the  arrest  of  the  plaintiff  for  so 

s*  Chapman  v.  Cawrey,  50  111.  517.          s?  Chapman  v.  Cawrey,  50  111.  518. 
SB  Calif  v.  Thomas,  81  111.  486.  ss  Bolton  v.  Vellines,  94  Va.  399, 

ss  Calif  v.  Thomas,  81   111.  486.          26  S.  E.  847. 


499  ADVICE  OF  COUNSEL  AS  DEFENSE.  §    506 

wearing  such  uniform,  and  that  because  of  such  order,  so  issued, 
the  said  plaintiff  was  arrested  and  imprisoned,  then  they  must 
find  for  the  plaintiff.89 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has 
not  committed  any  offense  alleged  in  the  defendant's  pleas,  and 
that  both  the  defendants  concurred  in  laying  hands  on  him  and 
arresting  him,  then  the  jury  are  instructed  that  they  should  find 
both  defendants  guilty,  and  assess  the  plaintiff's  damages.90 

(4)  If  one  merely  announces  his  intention  of  arresting  a  per- 
son, such  person  is  not  justified  in  shooting  him,  although  the 
former's  official  character  is  not  known  to  the  latter,  and  although, 
in  fact,  the  arrest  would  be  unwarrantable.01 

§  506.  Advice  of  counsel  as  a  defense. — (1)  Before  the  de- 
fendant can  shield  himself  by  the  advice  of  counsel,  it  must  ap- 
pear from  the  evidence  that  he  made  in  good  faith  a  full,  fair  and 
honest  statement  of  all  the  material  circumstances  bearing  upon 
the  supposed  guilt  of  the  plaintiff  which  were  within  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  defendant,  or  which  the  defendant  could,  by  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care,  have  obtained,  to  a  respectable  at- 
torney in  good  standing,  and  that  the  defendant  in  good  faith 
acted  upon  the  advice  of  said  attorney  in  instituting  and  car- 
rying on  the  prosecution  against  the  plaintiff.92 

(2)  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  defendant  to  prove  that 
he  sought  counsel  with  an  honest  purpose  to  be  informed  as  to  the 
law,  and  that  he  was  in  good  faith  guided  by  such  advice  in 
causing  the  arrest  of  the  plaintiff,  and  that  whether  or  not  the 
defendant  did,  before  instituting  the  criminal  proceedings,  make 
a  full,  correct  and  honest  disclosure  to  his  attorney  or  attorneys 
of  all  the  material  facts  bearing  upon  the  guilt  of  the  plaintiff  of 
which  he  had  knowledge,  and  whether,  in  commencing  such  pro- 
ceedings, the  defendant  was  acting  in  good  faith  upon  the  advice 
of  his  counsel  are  questions  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  the  jury 
from  all  the  evidence  and  circumstances  proved  in  the  case.  And 
if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  did  not 
make  a  full,  correct  and  honest  disclosure  of  all  such  facts  to 

89  Bolton  y.  Vellines,  94  Va.  399,  01  Ready   v.    P.    (Colo.),   77   Pac. 

26  S.  E.  847.  895. 

»o  Mullin  v.  Spangenberg,  112  111.  ^  Roy  v.  Goings,  112  111.  663. 
140. 


§    507  DAMAGES — INJURY    TO   PERSON.  500 

his  counsel,  but  that  he  instituted  the  criminal  prosecution  from 
a  fixed  determination  of'  his  own,  rather  than  from  the  opinion 
of  counsel,  then  such  advice  can  avail  nothing  in  this  suit.93 

(3)  If  the  defendant  consulted  counsel  as  a  means  of  covering 
malice,  and  did  not  believe  the  advice  given  him,  or  that  the 
plaintiff  was  guilty  of  the  crime  charged  against  him,  but  com- 
menced the  prosecution  as  a  means  to  get  rid  of  the  liability  on 
the  note  in  question,  then  the  fact  that  he  consulted  counsel 
cannot  avail  him.94 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  con- 
sulted an  attorney,  and  made  a  full  and  fair  representation  to  him 
of  the  facts ;  that  said  attorney  advised  the  prosecution,  and  that 
the   defendant  acted  in  good  faith   on  such   advice,   then  you 
should  find  for  the  defendant.95 

§  507.  Essential  elements  of  a  cause. — (1)  Before  the  plaintiff 
can  recover  in  this  case  he  must  prove  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
evidence,  first,  that  he  was  charged  with  the  crime  of  embezzle- 
ment ;  second,  that  he  was  arrested  on  said  charge ;  third,  that 
he  was  tried  and  acquitted  on  said  charge;  fourth,  that  the 
defendants,  or  such  of  them  as  are  liable,  if  any,  caused  the  arrest 
of  the  plaintiff,  or  were  instrumental  therein,  or  in  some  way 
voluntarily  aided  or  abetted  in  the  prosecution  of  the  plaintiff; 
fifth,  that  such  prosecution  was  malicious  and  without  probable 
cause.96 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
did  no  other  acts  in  connection  with  the  trespass  charged 
in  the  complaint,  except  to  bring  an  action  before  a  justice  of  the 
peace  for  the  possession  of  the  tract  of  land  on  which  the  house 
described  in  the  complaint  is  situated,  as  landlord  against  D  as 
his  tenant  and  prosecute  the  action  to  judgment,  procure  a  writ 
of  possession  to  be  issued  thereon  and  placed  in  hands  of  a 
special  constable  for  service,  and  to  be  present  in  the  public  high- 
way ready  to  receive  the  possession  of  the  premises  when  the 

as  Jones  v.  Morris    97  Va.  44,  33  506.    See,  Flora  v.  Russell,  138  Ind. 

S.  E.  377.  153,   37  N.   E.   593. 

94  McCarthy   v.    Kitchen,   59    Ind.  ™  Evansville   &   T.   H.   R.   Co.   v. 
505.  Talbot,  131  Ind.  223,  29  N.  E.  1134. 

95  McCarthy   v.    Kitchen,    59    Ind. 


501  DAMAGES    TO    PERSONAL    PROPERTY.  §    509 

same  should  be  delivered  to  him  by  said  constable,  he  cannot  be 
held  liable  in  this  action.97 

§  508.  Estimating  damages. — (1)  In  estimating  damages,  the 
jury  are  not  to  be  confined  to  actual  damages,  but  are  at  liberty 
to  assess  damages  proportionate  to  the  circumstances  of  outrage 
attending  the  illegal  arrest.  The  limit  of  the  sum,  if  you  find 
for  plaintiff,  is  as  you  shall  find,  but  less  than  -  -  dollars.98 

(2)  In  the  event  you  should  find  for  the  plaintiff,  in  fixing  the 
amount  of  damages  you  may  take  into  consideration  every  cir- 
cumstance of  the  acts  of  his  arrest  and  prosecution,  and  also 
every  act  which  injuriously  affected  the  plaintiff,  if  any,  not  only 
in  his  person,  but  his  peace  of  mind  and  individual  happiness.99 


Damage  to  Personal  Property. 

§  509.  Unlawful  seizure  of  property — Liability. — (1)  It  is  for 
the  jury  to  determine  from  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  and  the 
facts  and  circumstances  proved,  whether  the  piano  in  question 
was  the  property  of  the  plaintiff  or  that  of  the  defendants  at  the 
time  the  same  is  alleged  to  have  been  taken  from  the  house  of  the 
plaintiff,  and  the  jury  should  determine  this  from  the  evidence; 
and  they  are  not  bound  to  take  the  copy  of  the  agreement  in  re- 
spect to  the  piano  introduced  in  evidence  as  conclusive  upon  this 
point,  but  should  consider  the  entire  evidence  in  the  case ;  and  if 
the  jury  believe  from  the  entire  evidence  that  the  defendants,  B 
and  B,  sold  said  piano  to  the  plaintiff  at  an  agreed  price  of  five 
hundred  and  ninety-five  dollars,  with  a  discount  of  forty  dollars, 
to  be  paid  for  in  monthly  installments,  and  if  the  jury  further  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence,  and  from  all  the  circumstances  proved  in 
the  case,  that  the  plaintiff  had  fully  paid  the  agreed  price  to  the 
defendants  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  taking  of  the  piano  by 
them ;  and  if  the  jury  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
dwelling  house  of  the  plaintiff  was  broken  into  against  the  will 
of  the  plaintiff  and  the  said  piano  carried  away  by  the  direction 

97  Steele   v,    Davis,    75    Ind.    197.          98  Hall  v.  O'Malley,  49  Tex.  71. 
See    this    case    for    an,    instruction          99  Fisher  v.  Hamilton,  49  Ind.  349. 
held  proper  as  to  the  justice  of  the 
peace  who  was  made  a  co-defend- 
ant. 


§  510  DAMAGES  TO  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  502 

or  connivance  of  the  defendants,  the  jury  should  find  for  the 
plaintiff  and  against  the  defendants,  or  such  of  them  as  it  is 
shown  by  the  evidence,  participated,  aided  and  encouraged  in 
the  commission  of  the  acts  complained  of.100 

§510.  Landlord  seizing  tenant's  property. — (1)  If  you  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  O,  was  removing,  was 
about  to  remove,  or  had  within  thirty  days  before  the  issuance  of 
the  said  attachment  removed  any  of  his  effects  from  the  leased 
premises  (whether  with  a  fraudulent  purpose  or  not,  or  whether 
any  rent  was  then  due  or  not),  then  such  removal,  or  contemplat- 
ed removal,  was  of  itself  sufficient  cause  for  the  said  attachment, 
and  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover  anything  in  this  action 
unless  you  believe  that  there  was  or  would  have  been  left  on  the 
premises  property  liable  to  distress  sufficient  to  satisfy  a  year's 
rent.101 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  there  was  a  deed  of 
trust  on  the  property  attached  to  P,  trustee,  made  by  the  plaintiff 
after  the  property  was  carried  on  the  leased  premises,  and  such 
trustee  intended  to  remove  any  of  the  said  property  from  the 
leased  premises,  by  sale  or  otherwise,  not  leaving  sufficient  prop- 
erty on  the  leased  premises  to  satisfy  a  year's  rent,  and  without 
securing  to  the  landlord  a  year's  rent,  such  intention  on  the  part 
of  said  trustee  was  of  itself  sufficient  cause  for  suing  out  the  said 
attachment.102 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  attachment  sued 
out  by  defendants  against  the  plaintiff  was  sued  out  with  suffi- 
cient cause,  then  the  jury  will  find  a  verdict  for  the  defendants ; 
and  the  burden  of  showing  the  absence  of  sufficient  cause  rests 
upon  the  plaintiff.103 

§  511.  Damages  for  seizure — How  estimated. — (1)  If  you 
find  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  then,  in  arriving: 
at  the  amount  of  your  verdict,  you  must  take  into  consideration 
the  market  value  of  the  goods  in  question  at  the  time  of  the 
seizure ;  and,  in  arriving  at  this  market  value,  you  have  the  right 
to  consider  the  question  as  to  whether  the  condition  of  the  goods 

100  Bauer  v.  Bell,  74  111.  226.  102  Offterdinger   v.    Ford,    92    Va. 

101  Offterdinger   v.    Ford,    92    Va.      644,  24  S.  E.  246. 

644,  24  S.  E.  246.  103  Offterdinger   v.    Ford,    92   Va. 

644,   24   S.   E.   246. 


503  KILLING  STOCK,   LIABILITY.  §    513 

had  changed  between  the  day  of  the  seizure  and  the  day  of  the 
sale  and  you  may  also  consider  in  this  connection  the  amount 
that  these  goods  brought  at  public  auction  under  the  execution 
sale  as  bearing  upon  this  question,  as  bearing  upon  the  market 
value  at  the  time  of  the  seizure  uid  upon  the  amount  of  your 
verdict.104 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  enti-1 
tied  to  recover,  she  can  only  recover  the  actual  value  of  the  goods 
at  the  time  of  the  seizure,  and  when  arriving  at  this  value  you 
have  the  right  to  take  into  consideration  all  the  evidence  in  the 
case  as  to  the  character  and  condition  of  the  goods,  whether  new 
or  second  hand,  or  in  good  or  bad  condition,  and  also  the  evi- 
dence of  the  length  of  time  the  goods  have  been  in  stock,  how  they 
have  been  used,  and  how  long  in  stock,  and  the  fact  that  they 
have  passed  from  hand  to  hand  for  a  number  of  years.105 

§512.  Killing  stock— Liability.— (1)  If  the  .defendant's 
horse  was  at  the  time  trespassing  in  the  plaintiff's  field  on  plain- 
tiff's land,  or  on  the  land  of  a  third  person  where  the  plaintiff 
was  pasturing  his  horse  by  the  month  for  a  consideration  paid 
by  the  plaintiff  to  such  owner,  and  there  attacked  and  killed  the 
plaintiff's  horse,  the  defendant  is  liable  for  the  injury,  whether 
he  knew  or  not  of  the  vicious  propensity  of  his  horse.106 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  that  the  defendant's  horse  was  in  pasture 
on  his  wife 's  premises,  and  while  there  broke  over  her  part  of  the 
partition  fence,  separating  her  lands  from  the  field  in  which  the 
plaintiff's  horse  was  being  rightfully  pastured  by  him,  the  de- 
fendant's horse  was  unlawfully  in  the  place  where  the  plaintiff's 
horse  was  on  pasture,  and  in  such  case,  if  the  jury  find  that  he 
killed  the  plaintiff's  horse,  the  defendant  is  liable  to  the  plaintiff 
for  the  injury,  whether  his  horse  was  in  fact  vicious  or  not,  and 
whether  he  knew  of  such  viciousness  or  not.107 

§  513.  Damages  from  diseased  cattle. — (1)  If  you  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  A,  brought  or  caused  to  be 
brought  into  R  County,  this  state,  Texas  cattle,  or  cattle  liable 

104  Showman  v.  Lee,  86  Mich.  564,  ioe  Morgan    v.    Hudnell,    52    Ohio 
49   N.   W.   578.  St.   552,  40  N.   E.   716. 

105  Showman  v.  Lee,  86  Mich.  564,  107  Morgan    v.    Hudnell,    52    Ohio 
49   N.   W.   578.  St.  552,  40  N.  E.  716. 


§    513  DAMAGES   TO   PERSONAL   PROPERTY.  504 

to  communicate  Texas,  Spanish  or  splenic  fever  to  the  domestic 
cattle  of  this  state,  and  that  said  cattle  came  from  the  country 
south  of  this  state  between  the  first  day  of  March,  1884,  and  the 
first  day  of  November,  1884,  and  that  the  defendant  knew  or  had 
reason  to  know  or  could  by  ordinary  diligence  have  known  thai 
said  cattle  were  diseased  cattle,  or  were  cattle  liable  to  communi- 
cate Texas,  Spanish  or  splenic  fever  to  the  domestic  cattle  of  this 
state ;  or  if  the  defendant  knew  or  could  with  ordinary  diligence 
have  known  that  such  cattle  were  diseased  with  said  disease  and 
were  liable  to  Gommunicate  it  to  the  domestic  cattle  of  this  state, 
and  such  cattle  so  brought  or  caused  to  be  brought  into  said  R 
county  communicated  such  disease  to  the  domestic  cattle  of  the 
plaintiff,  and  thereby  the  plaintiff's  cattle  died,  you  will  find  for 
the  plaintiff  for  the  value  of  such  cattle  as  she  lost  as  shown  by 
the  evidence.108 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  A,  pur- 
chased the  cattle  described  in  the  petition  in  good  faith  in  -  -  in 
this  state,  without  any  knowledge  that  said  cattle  were  infected 
with  Texas,  Spanish  or  splenic  fever,  and  that  he  had  no  reason  to 
believe  that  such  cattle  could  or  would  communicate  to  cattle  of 
this  state,  Texas,  Spanish  or  splenic  fever,  and  that  he  did  not 
know  or  have  reason  to  believe  or  know  that  such  cattle  would 
or  could  communicate  the  Texas,  Spanish  or  splenic  fever  to  the 
cattle  of  this  state,  until  they  arrived  at  R,  and  that  the  sheriff 
immediately  seized  such  cattle  by  virtue  of  a  process  issued  by 
W,  a  justice  of  the  peace,  and  before  the  plaintiff's  cattle  had 
been  exposed  and  were  by  the  sheriff  placed  in  quarantine,  and 
the  defendant,  A,  was  deprived  of  any  control  over  said  cattle, 
and  that  during  the  time  the  said  cattle  were  quarantined  by  the 
sheriff,  and  the  defendant  deprived  of  the  control  of  said  cattle, 
the  plaintiff's  cattle  took  such  disease  by  going  upon  said  quaran- 
tined ground,  either  while  the  defendant's  cattle  were  there  in 
the  custody  of  the  sheriff  or  his  deputy  or  after  they  were 
removed  therefrom,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  in  the 
action.109 

i°8  Patee  v.  Adams,  37  Kas.  135,          109  Patee  v.  Adams,  37  Kas.  135, 
14  Pac.  505.  14  Pac.  505. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

FRAUDULENT  TRANSACTIONS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

514.  The    law    presumes    men    act      522.     Fraud    practiced    in    sale    of 

fairly.  land  resulting  in  damages. 

515.  Fraudulent       representations      523.     Contracts     between     husband 

resulting  in  damages.  and   wife   scrutinized. 

516.  Fraudulent  representations  in      524.     Fraudulent      assignment      to 

sale  of  stocks.  compel  compromise. 

517.  Contracts     made     to     defeat      525.    Fraud  in  reference  to  indebt- 

creditors,  void.  edness. 

518.  Innocent    purchaser    for    fair      526.     Contract  made  under  compul- 

consideration,    protected.  sion  may  be  avoided. 

519.  Purchaser     knowing     fraudu-      527.    What    constitutes    duress    to 

lent  intent  of  seller.  avoid  contract. 

520.  Opinion  as  to  value  not  basis      528.     Gambling  contracts — On  mar- 

of  fraud.  kets. 

521.  Sureties  induced  to  sign  bond 

by  fraud. 

§  514,  The  law  presumes  men  act  fairly  and  honestly. — (1) 
Fraud  is  never  to  be  presumed  but  must  be  proved  by  the  party 
who  alleges  it.  The  law  presumes  that  all  men  are  fair  and 
honest,  that  their  dealings  are  in  good  faith  and  without  intention 
to  cheat,  hinder,  delay  or  defraud  others ;  and  if  any  transaction 
called  in  question  is  equally  capable  of  two  constructions,  one 
that  is  fair  and  honest  and  the  other  dishonest,  then,  in  that  case, 
the  law  presumes  the  transaction  to  be  fair  and  honest.1 

(2)  The  law  presumes  that  persons  in  their  dealings  intend  to 
conduct  them  honestly;  and  where  a  transaction  which  is  chal- 
lenged will  admit  equally  of  an  honest  or  a  dishonest  construc- 
tion, it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  accept  the  former,  that  is,  to 
accept  the  honest  construction.2 

i  Schroeder  v.  Walsh,  120  111.  410,  2  Detroit  Elec.  &  L.  P.  Co.  v.  Ap- 
11  N.  E.  70.  plebaum  (Mich.),  94  N.  W.  12. 

505 


§  515  FRAUDULENT  TRANSACTIONS.  506 

(3)  Fraud  is  odious  in  contemplation  of  law  and  not  to  be  pre- 
sumed, and  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  overcome 
such  legal  presumption  by  evidence  satisfactory  to  the  jury.3 

(4)  Fraud  is  odious  in  contemplation  of  law  and  not  to  be  pre- 
sumed, but  must  be  proved  by  the  party  alleging  it.     The  law 
presumes  that  all  men  are  fair  and  honest  in  their  dealings  with 
others,  and  that  they  act  in  good  faith  and  without  intention  to 
cheat,  hinder,  delay  or  defraud ;  and  where  a  transaction  which 
is  challenged  admits  equally  of  an  honest  or  dishonest  construc- 
tion, it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  accept  and  adopt  the  former, 
that  is,  the  construction  in  favor  of  honesty  and  fair  dealing.* 

(5)  If  the  jury  find  there  was  a  sale  by  0  to  plaintiff  of  the 
property  in  controversy,  then  you  will  inquire  into  and  determine 
the  character  of  this  sale;  that  is,  determine  from  the  evidence 
whether  or  not  it  was  fraudulent.     It  is  alleged  by  defendants 
that  it  was  and  is  fraudulent,  and  you  are  instructed  that  the 
burden  of  proving  the  same  rests  upon  the  defendants,  and  they 
must  do  so  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence ;  and  you  are 
instructed  that  the  law  presumes  that  all  persons  transact  their 
business  honestly  and  in  good  faith,  until  the  contrary  appears 
from  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence ;  and,  in  this  case,  if  you 
find  there   was  a  sale  as   claimed,   ifc  will    be    presumed    that 
plaintiff  and  0  acted  honestly  and  in  good  faith  in  making  the 
same,  until  such  time  as  the  defendants,  who  allege  the  contrary, 
establish  the  same  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence;  and 
if  the  case  is  left  in  equipoise  then  the  defendants  must  fail  as  to 
the  fraud ;  and  fraud  will  never  be  imputed  when  the  facts  upon 
which  the  charge  is  predicated    are  or  may  be  consistent  with 
honesty  and  purity  of  intention.5 

§  515.    Fraudulent  representations  resulting  in  damages. — (1) 

A  misrepresentation  to  be  fraudulent  must  be  as  to  a  material 
matter  or  fact;  it  must  be  false  and  must  be  relied  upon  by  the 
person  to  whom  it  is  made,  and  it  must  constitute  an  inducement 
to  enter  into  a  transaction,  must  work  injury  or  result  directly  in 

s  Robertson  v.  Parks,  76  Md.  125,  Elec.    &    L.    P.    Co.    v.    Applebaum 

24  Atl.  411.  (Mich.),  94  N.  W.  12. 

*  Robertson  v.  Parks,  76  Md.  125,  «  Sunberg   v.    Babcock,    66    Iowa, 

24    Atl.    411;    Schroeder   v.    Walsh,  519,  24  N.  W.  19. 
120   111.   410,   11   N.   E.   70;    Detroit 


507  DAMAGES    FROM    FRAUDULENT    REPRESENTATIONS.  §    516 

damages  to  the  person  relying  thereon,  and  the  person  to  whom 
such  misrepresentation  is  made  must  have  a  right  to  rely  thereon. 
If  all  these  circumstances  concur,  then  there  is  fraud,  and  the 
party  thus  injured  is  entitled  to  relief.0 

(2)  If  the  defendant  made  false  and  fraudulent  representations 
or  statements  as  to  any  material  matter  of  fact,  and  the  plaintiff 
did  not  rely  on  them,  but  sought  and  obtained  information  as  to 
such  statements  or  facts  from  other  sources,  and  then  on  his  own 
judgment  concluded  to  enter  into  the  contract  mentioned  and 
to  take  his  chances  as  to  what  he  should  get  by  reason  thereof, 
then  he  cannot  recover  on  that  issue  in  this  action.7 

(3)  If  the  defendant  made  false  -and  fraudulent  representa- 
tions or  statements,  and  the  plaintiff  did  not  rely  on  them,  but 
sought   and   obtained   information   as   to   the   facts   from    other 
sources,  and  then,  on  his  own  judgment,  concluded  to  enter  into 
the  contract  mentioned  in  the  complaint,  and  take  his  chances 
as  to  what  he  should  get  by  reason  thereof,  then  he  cannot  recover 
in  this  action  on  that  issue.8 

(4)  The  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  the  amount  due  on  said 
notes,  unless  the  jury  find  that  the  plaintiff  made  false  representa- 
tions in  regard  to  the  quality,  improvements  and  natural  advan- 
tages of  said  land ;  and  if  they  find  that  he  made  such  representa- 
tions, then  the  jury  can  only  deduct  from  the  amount  of  said 
notes  the  value  of  the  injury  sustained  by  defendant  on  account 
of  such  false  representations.9 

§  516.  Fraudulent  representations  in  sale  of  stock. — (1)  If  the 
jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  paid  the  sum  of  five 
thousand  dollars  to  the  company  in  question  for  certain  shares 
of  stock  in  said  company,  and  shall  find  that  the  said  plaintiff 
was  induced  to  purchase  said  shares  of  stock  in  said  company  by 
the  false  representations  and  statements  of  the  defendant,  to  the 
effect  that  the  said  shares  of  stock  in  said  company  were  a  safe 
and  sure  investment  and  would  pay  a  high  rate  of  interest,  and 
shall  further  find  that  such  representations  and  statements  were 
false  and  fraudulent  and  known  to  be  false  and  fraudulent  by 

B  Jones  v.  Hathaway,  77  Ind.  24.  »  Craig  v.  Hamilton,  118  Ind.  568, 

i  Craig  v.  Hamilton,  118  Ind.  568,  21  N.  E.  315. 

21  N.  E.  315;  Jones  v.  Hathaway,  »  House  v.  Marshall,  18  Mo.  370. 
77  Ind.  24. 


§    517  FRAUDULENT    HEP11ESENTATIONS.  508 

said  defendants,  and  that  plaintiff  relied  upon  these  said  false 
and  fraudulent  statements  and  representations  and  was  thereby 
induced  to  purchase  said  shares  of  stock,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  recover,  if  the  jury  further  find  that  the  said  plaintiff  suffered 
loss  and  damage  by  reason  of  said  false  and  fraudulent  represen- 
tations and  statements.10 

(2)  In  order  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  in  this  case  the 
jury  must  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendants,  with  a 
view  to  induce  the  plaintiff  to  subscribe  to  or  purchase  the  stock 
in  the  company  in  question,  made  representations  to  him  with 
respect  to  the  value  of  their  assets  and  extent  of  their  business, 
which  were  false  in  fact  when  made,  and  that  defendants  had  no 
reasonable  ground  to  believe  the  same  to  be  substantially  correct, 
when  made,  and  also  that  the  same  were  made  with  the  fraudu- 
lent intent  to  cheat  and  deceive  the  plaintiff,  and  that  the  plain- 
tiff had  not  at  hand  the  means  of  verifying  the  truth  of  such  rep- 
resentation, and  that  in  subscribing  to  or  purchasing  said  stock 
the  plaintiff  relied  on  such  representations  and  would  not  have 
made  such  purchase  except  upon  the  faith  of  the  same,  and  that 
in  consequence  thereof  he  was  misled  and  injured.11 

§517.    Contract  made  to  defeat  creditors  are  void. — (1)     If 

the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  adduced  that  the  conveyance 
from  the  plaintiff  to  the  .defendant  was  for  the  purpose  of  hinder- 
ing, delaying  or  defeating  the  creditors  of  the  plaintiff  in  any 
attempt  they  might  make  to  enforce  their  claims  against  the  plain- 
tiff, and  that  was  the  understanding  and  agreement  between  the 
plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  and  that  the  notes  in  suit  were  given 
in  pursuance  of  this  agreement  between  plaintiff  and  defendant, 
then  the  jury  are  instructed  as  a  matter  of  law  that  the  said 
agreement  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant  was  illegal 
and  cannot  be  enforced,  and  the  jury  must  find  for  the  defend- 
ant.12 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  convey- 
ances to  the  defendant  in  evidence  were  made  for  the  purpose  of 
hindering,  delaying  or  defrauding  the  creditors  of  the  said  plain- 

10  Robertson  v.  Parks,  76  Md.  120,          12  Riedle    v.    Mulhausen,    20    111. 
24  Atl.   411.  App.  72. 

11  Robertson  v.  Parks,  76  Md.  120, 
24  Atl.   411. 


509  CONTRACT  TO  DEFEAT  CREDITORS  VOID.  §    517 

tiff  or  any  of  them,  and  that  the  notes  sued  on  herein  were  execut- 
ed tod  delievered  by  defendant  to  plaintiff  in  pursuance  of  such 
unlawful  agreement  and  upon  no  other  consideration,  then  you 
are  instructed  that  such  unlawful  purpose  precludes  any  recovery 
by  the  plaintiff  against  the  defendant  upon  any  notes  so  given 
upon  such  unlawful  and  fraudulent  consideration,  and  your 
verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.13 

(3)  If  the  sale  of  said  goods  by  P.  and  purchase  by  R,  wras  not 
an  honest  and  real  sale  and  purchase  but  was  a  sham  transaction 
or  trade,  made  and  gone  into  by  them  for  the  purpose  of  deceiving 
the  creditors  of  P,  or  some  of  them,  as  to  the  real  disposition  to 
be  made  of  the  goods,  they,  P  and  R,  knowing  the  trade  would 
have  the  effect  to  defraud  some  of  P's  creditors,  or  hinder  or 
delay  some  of  them  in  the  collection  of  their  claims  against  him, 
then  such  sale  and  purchase  was  fraudulent  and  void  as  to  such 
creditors,  though  said  R  may  have  given  his  note  for  the  goods, 
and  the  note  may  have  been  applied  or  .used  in  extinguishing 
some  of  the  claims  against  P.    Said  R,  under  such  circumstances, 
and  if  such  were  the  real  character  of  the  transaction,  cannot, 
in  law,  be  considered  a  purchaser  in  good  faith,  and  if  you  -find 
said  sale  and  purchase  to  be  substantially  of  the  character  above 
stated,  or  for  other  reasons  or  facts  presented  by  the  evidence 
find  said  sale  and  purchase  to  have  been  made  with  intent  to 
hinder  or  delay  some  of  P's  creditors  in  the  collection  of  their 
claims,  then  you  should  find  said  sale  and  purchase  fraudulent 
and  void  as  to  the  creditors  of  said  P.14 

(4)  Whether  a  conveyance  of  this  character  is  fraudulent  or 
not  is  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  determined  on  a  view  of  all  the  cir- 
cumstances attendant  upon  the  making  of  the  grant  or  convey- 
ance, especially  on  the  condition  of  the  grantor  as  to  property, 
and  as  to  the  amount  of  debts  which  were  due  and  owing  from 
him   at   the  time  he  undertook  to   dispose   of  his   estate,   or  a 
portion  thereof,  by  gift,  or  without  adequate  consideration.     On 
the  one  hand,  it  could  not  be  properly  adjudged  that  a  volun- 
tary conveyance  was  fraudulent  and  void,  either  as  against  ex- 
isting or  subsequent  creditors,   if  it  was  proved  to  have  been 

is  Riedle    v.    Mulhausen,    20    111.  ning  Co.  v.  Reid,  &c.  Co.  159  Ind. 

App.  72.  614,   64  N.    E.    870,   1115    (power   of 

i-t  "Wadsworth  v.  Walker,  51  Iowa,  preferring  creditors). 
613,   2   N.   W.   420;    Nappanee  Can- 


§  518  FRAUDULENT  TRANSACTIONS.  510 

made  by  a  person  substantially  free  from  debt  and  possessed 
of  a  large  amount  of  property,  who  had  no  purpose  to  hinder 
or  delay  his  creditors,  whose  sole  motive  was  to  transfer  the 
property  to  his  wife  or  children,  so  that  it  should  not  remain 
at  the  hazard  of  business  or  be  subjected  to  the  risk  of  im- 
providence. On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be  very  clear  that  a 
voluntary  transfer  of  property  by  a  person  deeply  indebted,  and 
whose  property  was  inadequate  or  barely  sufficient  for  the  pay- 
ment of  his  debts,  would  furnish  strong  presumptive  evidence 
of  fraud,  and  if  unexplained  would  be  set  aside  as  void  against 
creditors.15 

§  518.    Innocent  purchaser  for  fair  consideration,  protected. 

(1)  Although  you  should  find  that  C  made  one  or  both  sales  to 
plaintiff,  with  intent  to  hinder,  delay  and  defraud  his  creditors, 
yet  if  he  paid  a  valuable  consideration  for  the  goods,  such  in- 
tent on  the  part  of  C  would  not  alone  make  the  sale  void. 
In  order  to  invalidate  the  sale,  it  must  further  appear  from  the 
evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  at  the  time  he  bought  and  paid  for 
the  goods,  had  notice  of  such  intent  on  the  part  of  C,  or  that 
he  had  knowledge  of  facts  or  circumstances  such  as  would  have 
put  an  ordinarily  prudent  man  upon  inquiry,  which,  by  the 
use  of  proper  diligence  on  his  part,  would  have  led  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  such  intention  on  the  part  of  C.1G 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  de- 
fendants purchased  the  property  in  controversy  in  this  action 
from  B  for  a  full,  fair  and  valuable  consideration  and  with- 
out notice  that  the  said  B  was  seeking  and  intending  thereby 
to  cheat,  hinder,  delay  and  defraud  his  creditors  out  of  their 
just  demands  existing  at  the  time  of  said  purchase,  and  that 
if  you  further  find  that  they,  the  defendants,  had  paid  the 
consideration  and  received  their  deeds  for  said  property  be- 
fore the  fraudulent  intent  of  the  said  B  to  cheat,  hinder  and 
defraud  his  creditors  had  come  to  their  knowledge,  then  and 
in  that  case  the  said  defendants  would  be  bona  fide  purchasers 
of  the  property  so  conveyed  to  them,  and  would  be  entitled 
to  hold  the  same  free  from  the  claims  of  the  creditors  of  the 
said  B.  And  any  person  buying  from  them,  the  defendants, 

is  Winchester  v.  Charter,  102  IG  Dodd  v.  Gaines,  82  Tex.  433,  18 
Mass.  273.  S.  W.  618. 


511  INNOCENT   PURCHASER   PROTECTED KNOWING   FRAUD.       §    521 

under  such  circumstances,  would  be  entitled  to  hold  the  prop- 
erty as  against  all  persons,  and  this,  whether  the  second  pur- 
chaser had  knowledge  of  the  fraudulent  intent  of  said  B  to 
cheat  and  defraud  his  creditors  in  the  original  conveyance  or 
not.17 

§  519.  Purchaser  knowing  fraudulent  intent  of  seller. — If  the 
sale  was  made  by  C  to  the  plaintiff,  G,  with  intent  to  hinder, 
delay  or  defraud  his  creditors,  and  that  G,  at  the  time  of  the 
purchase,  knew  of  such  intent  on  the  part  of  C  to  hinder,  de- 
lay or  defraud  his  creditors,  or  if  he  knew  such  facts  or  cir- 
cumstances as  would  have  put  a  man  of  ordinary  prudence 
upon  inquiry,  and  which,  by  the  use  of  ordinary  diligence  on 
his  part,  would  have  led  to  a  knowledge  on  his  part  that  such 
was  the  intention  of  C  in  selling  the  goods  to  him,  then  such 
sale  as  between  plaintiff  and  defendant  is  fraudulent  and  void.18 

§  520.  Opinion  as  to  value  not  basis  of  fraud. — The  plaintiff 
is  not  entitled  to  recover  on  account  of  any  representations 
they  may  find  the  defendants,  or  either  of  them,  may  have  made 
to  the  plaintiff,  that  the  stock  of  the  company  in  question  would 
pay  as  much  as  twenty  per  cent  dividend  or  for  any  other  ex- 
pression of  opinion  concerning  the  future  value  and  profita- 
bleness of  the  business  they  are  carrying  on.  The  jury  must 
exclude  such  representations  as  constituting  a  basis  of  recovery 
in  this  action.19 

§  521.  Sureties  induced  to  sign  bond  by  fraud. — If  you  find 
that  T.  at  and  before  the  time  the  bond  was  required  of  him 
was  intentionally  and  dishonestly  a  defaulter  to  the  express 
company,  as  to  moneys  intrusted  to  it,  which  he  had  received 
as  its  agent,  and  that  the  witness,  D,  acted  for  said  company 
in  demanding  and  receiving  said  bond,  and,  before  receiving 
the  same,  either  knew  of  such  default,  or  if  he  did  not  know 
it,  believed  upon  reasonable  and  reliable  ground  of  informa- 
tion or  belief  that  such  default  existed,  then,  if  suitable  and 
reasonable  opportunity  existed,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  witness, 

i?  Nicklaus  v.  Burns,  75  Ind.  96.          «  Robertson  v.  Parks,  76  Md.  123, 
is  Dodd  v.  Gaines,  82  Tex.  433,  18      24  Atl.  411. 
S.  W.  618. 


FRAUDULENT  TRANSACTIONS.  512 

D,  as  the  agent  of  the  company,  to  make  known  to  the  sure- 
ties upon  the  bond  such  fact  of  T's  delinquency,  or  witness' 
belief  of  such  delinquency,  before  accepting  the  bond,  although 
the  witness  did  not  know  before  the  bond  was  signed  by  the 
sureties  who  they  were  to  be,  and,  as  witness  did  not  give 
such  information,  if  the  sureties,  in  signing  the  bond,  acted 
under  a  belief  from  its  recitals  that  the  company  considered 
T  a  trustworthy  person,  and  would  not  have  signed  the  bond 
but  for  such  belief,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  against 
the  sureties,  or  either  of  them.20 

§  522.  Fraud  practiced  in  sale  of  land,  resulting  in  damages. 
(1)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  at  or 
before  the  sale  of  the  land  in  question  to  the  defendant,  know- 
ing said  land  to  be  subject  to  overflow,  used  any  artifice  to 
mislead  the  mind  of  the  defendant  and  throw  him  off  his  guard, 
and  to  prevent  him  from  making  as  careful  examination  of  the 
land  in  question  as  a  man  of  ordinary  prudence  would  other- 
wise have  made;  and  that  the  defendant  was  thereby  misled 
and  thrown  off  his  guard  and  prevented  from  examining  said 
land,  and  in  consequence  thereof,  was  and  remained  ignorant 
of  the  fact  that  said  land  was  subject  to  overflow  up  to  the 
time  when  he  bought  said  land,  then  and  in  that  case  the  jury 
should  find  for  the  defendant  and  assess  his  damages  accord- 
ing to  the  measure  heretofore  stated  by  the  court.21 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  at  the  time  the  plain- 
tiff purchased  the  lot  in  question  the  defendant  knew  that  it 
was  intended  as  a  residence  lot;  and  if  you  further  believe 
that  he  then  and  there  told  the  defendant  where  and  on  what 
part  of  said  lot  he  wished  to  build  his  house,  and  what  the 
style  of  the  house  should  be,  and  in  what  direction  it  should 
front:  and  if  you  believe  the  defendant  then  and  there  as  an 
inducement  to  the  plaintiff  to  purchase  said  lot  for  a  residence, 
represented  to  him  that  there  was  a  street  on  the  east  and  on 
the  north  side  of  him;  and  if  you  believe  that  by  said  repre- 
sentations the  plaintiff  was  induced  to  purchase  said  lot  for 
the  sum  of  four  hundred  dollars  for  the  purpose  aforesaid,  and 

20  Dinsmore   v.    Tidball    34   Ohio         21  McFarland   v.    Carver,   34   Mo. 
St.  411.  196. 


513  FRAUD  IN  SALE  OF  LAND — HUSBAND  AND  WIFE.  §    523 

that  such  purpose  was  known  to  the  defendant ;  if  you  believe 
that  the  plaintiff  then  arid  there  made  said  purchase  and  pro- 
ceeded to  build  and  did  build  a  residence  in  the  northeast  corner 
of  said  lot,  fronting  east  and  north,  and  that  such  design  was  com- 
municated to  the  defendant  at  and  before  the  time  of  said  sale; 
and  if  you  further  believe  that  said  representations  of  the  de- 
fendant made  about  a  street  on  the  north  were  false,  and  known 
to  the  defendant  at  the  time  they  were  made  to  be  false;  and 
if  you  believe  that  the  plaintiff  has  been  damaged  thereby,  then 
you  will  allow  him  for  the  same.22 

§  523.    Contracts  between  husband  and  wife  scrutinized. — (1) 

A  husband  may  contract  with  his  wife  in  relation  to  her  sep- 
arate estate,  but  on  account  of  the  peculiar  relations  of  the 
husband  and  wife  toward  each  other,  and  the  trust  and  con- 
fidence that  the  wife  is  presumed  to  have  in  her  hnsbaiid,  and 
the  influence  he  is  supposed  naturally  to  exercise  over  her,  the 
law  looks  with  much  caution  upon  such  contracts,  and  requires 
of  the  husband  the  most  scrupulous  good  faith,  and  if  there 
be  any  element  of  fraud  or  lack  of  consideration,  the  law  scru- 
tinizes it  with  much  care,  and  will  only  uphold  it  when  it  is 
for  the  benefit  of  the  wife  or  has  been  made  with  the  utmost 
good  faith.23 

(2)  Gross  inadequacy  of  consideration,  if  it  exists,  is  a  badge 
of  fraud  and  a  circumstance  which  may  be  considered  by  the 
jury  in  determining  whether  the  conveyance  by  A  to  his  wife, 
Mrs.  A  (claimant)  was  fair  an  honest  or  pretended  and  fraud- 
ulent. Transactions  between  husband  and  wife  should  be 
scanned  carefully  when  the  rights  of  creditors  are  to  be  af- 
fected thereby.  The  law  requires  them  to  exercise  good  faith, 
and  you  should  be  satisfied  that  they  have  done  so  before  sus- 
taining any  transaction  which  would  defeat  a  creditor  in  the 
collection  of  his  debt.  You  should  be  satisfied  of  the  actual 
existence  of  a  just  debt  due  from  A  to  Mrs.  A,  and  that  it 
was  the  consideration  of  the  deeds  to  her,  and  that  the  con- 
sideration was  not  inadequate  before  you  would  be  authorized 
to  sustain  the  title  against  creditors.  All  dealings  between  hus- 

22  White  v.  Smith,   54  Iowa,  237,          23  Ron  v.  Hon,  70  Ind.  135. 

6  N.  W.  284. 


§  524  FRAUDULENT  TRANSACTIONS.  514 

band  and'  wife  which  are  injurious  to  creditors  should  be  scru- 
tinized closely,  and  their  bona  fides  must  be  clearly  established, 
and  in  such  case  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  them  as  to  this.24 
(3)  A  husband  may  contract  with  his  wife  in  relation  to  her 
separate  estate,  but  on  account  of  their  peculiar  relation  toward 
each  other  and  the  trust  and  confidence  the  wife  is  presumed 
to  have  in  the  husband,  and  the  influence  he  is  supposed  nat- 
urally to  exercise  over  her,  the  law  looks  with  much,  caution 
upon  such  contracts,  and  requires  of  thfe  husband  the  most 
scrupulous  good  faith;  and  if  there  be  any  element  of  fraud 
or  lack  of  consideration,  the  law  scrutinizes  it  with  much  care, 
and  will  only  uphold  it  when  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  the  wife. 
or  has  been  made  with  the  utmost  good  faith.  Transactions 
between  husband  and  wife  should  be  scanned  carefully  when 
the  rights  of  creditors  are  to  be  affected  thereby.  All  dealings 
between  husband  and  wife  which  are  injurious  to  creditors 
should  be  scrutinized  closely,  and  their  good  faith  must  be  clear- 
ly established,  and  in  such  case  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  them, 
in  this  respect.25 

§524.  Fraudulent  assignment  to  compel  compromise. — (1)  If 
the  real  object  or  intent  of  M,  the  assignor,  in  making  this  assign- 
ment was  not  the  one  expressed  on  its  face,  but  to  induce, 
persuade  or  force  creditors  to  agree  and  consent  to  a  compro- 
mise, which  he  was  then  attempting  to  make  with  his  creditors, 
and  to  compel  such  creditors  to  accept  fifty  cents  on  the  dol- 
lar, then  and  in  such  case  the  assignment  was  fraudulent,  and 
void  as  to  creditors.26 

(2)  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that  as  to  the  assignment  under 
which  the  plaintiff  claims  in  this  case  there  is  but  a  single  ques- 
tion for  you  to  pass  upon,  viz. :    What  was  the  intent  of  M,  and 
what  was  his  purpose  in  making  it  ?     The  intent  with  which  the 
plaintiff,  B,  received  the  assignment  is  immaterial.27 

(3)  The  plaintiff,  B,  under  this  assignment,  does  not  stand  in 
the  position  of  a  purchaser  for  valuable  consideration ;  and  the 
fact  (if  such  be  the  case)  that  he  had  no  knowledge  that  it  was 

a*  Almond  v.  Gairdner,  76  Ga.  26  Bennett  v.  Ellison,  23  Minn. 

701.  246. 

25  Hon  v.  Hon,  70  Ind.  135;  Al-  27  Bennett  v.  Ellison,  23  Minn, 

mond  v.  Gaiidner,  76  Ga.  701.  245. 


515  CONTRACT  VOID  FOB  COMPULSION  Oil  DURESS.  §    527 

M's  intention,  in  making  the  assignment,  to  effect  a  compromise 
with  his  creditors  cannot  cure  the  effect  of  such  intention  on  M's 
part.  If  such  intention  existed  on  M's  part,  at  the  time  he  ex- 
ecuted the  assignment,  it  is  void,  no  matter  whether  plaintiff,  B, 
knew  M's  intention  or  not,  and  your  verdict  should  be  for  the 
defendant 28 

§  525.  Fraud  in  reference  to  indebtedness. — If  you  believe 
that  the  representation  charged  and  relied  upon  as  false  and 
fraudulent,  was  that  the  plaintiff  was  indebted  to  the  defend- 
ant in  a  certain  sum,  and  the  plaintiff  was  in  fact  so  indebted, 
then  your  finding  must  be  for  the  defendant  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  fraud.  This  will  be  so,  even  though  the  defendant  may 
have  by  mistake  wrongfully  stated  the  items,  or  some  of  the 
items,  which  formed  the  consideration  of  such  alleged  indebt- 
edness.29 

§  526.  Contract  made  under  compulsion  may  be  avoided. — (1) 
A  contract  made  under  compulsion  may  be  avoided  by  the  party 
compelled  to  execute  it.  Compulsion,  however,  to  have  this  ef- 
fect must  amount  to  what  the  law  calls  duress.  Mere  angry 
or  profane  words,  or  strong,  earnest  language  cannot  consti- 
tute such  compulsion  as  will  amount  to  duress,  or  enable  a  per- 
son to  be  relieved  from  his  contract.  There  may  be  duress 
by  threats.  But  duress  by  threats  exists  only  where  a  person 
has  entered  into  a  contract  under  the  influence  of  such  threat 
as  excites  or  may  reasonably  excite  a  fear  of  some  grievous 
wrong,  as  bodily  injury  or  unlawful  imprisonment.30 

(2)  If  the  payee  of  the  note  surrendered  it  to  the  maker  volun- 
tarily, in  liquidation  of  a  just  debt  then  due  from  him  to  them, 
the  note  was  fully  canceled  by  the  surrender;  but  if  the  note 
was  obtained  wrongfully  and  unlawfully  by  threats  and  duress, 
it  was  not  canceled  by  the  surrender,  and  the  plaintiff  can  main- 
tain an  action  for  the  amount  due  thereon,  if  she  is  the  owner 
thereof.31 

§527.    What  constitutes  duress  to  avoid  a  contract. —  (1)     To 

constitute  duress,  which  would  avoid  the  deed,  it  is  not  necessary 

28  Bennett    v.    Ellison,    23    Minn.          30  Adams  v.  Stringer,  78  Ind.  180. 
246.  si  Kohler  v.  Wilson,  40  Iowa,  185. 

29  Adams  v.  Stringer,  78  Ind.  181. 


§  528  FRAUDULENT  TRANSACTIONS.  516 

that  the  threats  be  of  a  physical  injury  alone;  but  if  the  plain- 
tiff, the  wife  of  Tapley,  was  induced  to  execute  the  deed  by 
the  threats  of  her  husband,  that  he  would  separate  from  her 
as  her  husband  and  not  support  her,  it  is  duress,  and  will  avoid 
the  deed.  The  threats  must  be  such  as  she  might  reasonably 
apprehend  would  be  carried  into  execution,  and  the  act  of  ex- 
ecuting the  deed  must  have  been  induced  by  the  threats.  It 
is  not  necessary  that  the  threats  be  made  at  the  time,  or  im- 
mediately before  signing,  if  it  was  within  such  time,  and  the 
circumstances  satisfy  you  that  the  threats  or  their  influence  prop- 
erly conduced  to  influence  the  plaintiff.32 

(2)  The  rule  in  this  class  of  cases  is,  that  where  a  payment  of 
money  is  made  upon  an  illegal  or  unjust  demand,  when  the 
party  is  advised  of  all  the  facts,  it  can  only  be  considered  in- 
voluntary when  it  is  made  to  procure  the  release  of  the  person 
or  property  of  the  party  from  detention,  or  when  the  other  party 
is  armed  with  apparent  authority  to  seize  upon  either,  and  the 
payment  is  made  to  prevent  it.  But  where  the  person  making  the 
payment  can  only  be  reached  by  a  proceeding  at  law,  he  is 
bound  to  make  his  defense  in  the  first  instance,  and  he  cannot 
postpone  the  litigation  by  paying  the  demand  in  silence  and 
afterwards  suing  to  recover  it  back.33 

§  528.  Gambling  contracts — On  markets. — (1)  If  the  jury 
shall  find  from  the  testimony  that  on  or  about  the  time  stated  in 
the  petition  in  this  cause  the  defendant  received  from  the  plain- 
tiff the  sum  of  money  in  question  under  an  arrangement  that  the 
same  should  be  invested  by  the  defendant  in  wheat  transactions, 
illegal  in  their  character,  for  the  benefit  of  the  plaintiff;  that 
said  sum  of  money  was  so  invested  by  the  defendant  and  a 
profit  realized  thereon;  and  that  before  the  commencement  of 
this  suit  said  sum  of  money  and  the  profits  so  made  came  into 
and  are  still  in  the  hands  of  the  defendant ;  or  that  he  received 
credit  therefor  in  the  final  settlement  of  his  accounts  with  the 
brokers,  through  whom  said  business  was  transacted,  then  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  said  sum  of  money  from  the  de- 
fendant; nor  in  such  case  can  the  defendant  avoid  his  liability 

32  Tapley  v.  Tapley,  10  Minn.  458.          33  Lieber  v.  Weiden,  17  Neb.  584, 

24  N.  W.   215. 


517  GAMBLING   CONTRACTS  VOID.  §    528 

to  account  for  said  moneys,  by  showing  that,  by  the  under- 
standing between  the  plaintiff  and  himself,  said  sum  of  money 
was  to  be  employed  in  illegal  transactions  in  wheat  of  the  na- 
ture stated  in  his  answer,  and  that  said  sum  of  money  was 
employed  and  said  profits  realized  in  such  transactions.34 

(2)  If  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  when  the  de- 
fendant gave  to  the  plaintiffs  the  several  orders  offered  in 
evidence  for  the  purchase  and  sale  of  grain,  it  was  mutually 
understood  between  them  that  the  defendant  was  not  to  deliver 
any  of  the  grain  that  he  ordered  to  be  sold,  or  to  accept  any 
of  the  grain  that  he  ordered  to  be  bought,  but  that  all  of  said 
transactions  in  grain  were  to  be  settled  and  adjusted  by  the 
payment  or  receipt,  as  the  case  might  be,  of  differences  be- 
tween the  price  at  which  said  grain  should  be  bought  and  at 
which  it  should  be  sold;  and  if  the  jury  shall  further  find  that 
in  pursuance  of  said  mutual  understanding,  the  plaintiffs,  in 
their  own  names,  transmitted  to  their  correspondents  for  execu- 
tion said  orders  of  the  defendant,  and  that  said  orders  were 
executed  by  the  said  correspondents  of  the  plaintiffs  upon  the 
credit  of  the  plaintiffs  and  upon  security  furnished  by  them, 
then  the  plaintiffs  are  not  entitled  to  recover  in  this  action 
for  services  rendered  or  advances  made  by  them  in  furthering 
and  conducting  said  transactions  for  the  defendant.35 

s*  Norton    v.    Blirni,    39    Ohio    St.      4  Atl.  399.     See,  Shaffner  v.  Pinch- 
145.  back,  133  111.  410,  betting  on  horse- 

85  Stewart  v.   Schall,   65  Md.   294,      race,  contract  void.     Forms. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY. 

Sec.  Sec. 

529.  Negligence,  carelessness,  care,      539.    Negligence   will    not   be  pre- 

defined, sumed. 

530.  Ordinary  care  defined.  540.    What  does  not  amount  to  neg- 

531.  Burden  of  proof  generally.  ligence. 

532.  Degree  of  care  required  of  de-  541.     Negligence     the     proximate 

fendant.  cause  of  injury. 

533.  Care  in  driving  vehicle.  542.     Instructions    submitting  ques- 

534.  Care  and  safety  of  machinery.  tion  of  negligence. 

535.  Care  of  injured  party  may  be  543.    Plaintiff's   contributory   negli- 

inferred.  gence. 

536.  Infant — Degree     of     care     re-      544.    Plaintiff   and    defendant   both 

quired  of.  negligent. 

537.  Children* — Care    of    defendant      545.     Injury    resulting    from    acci- 

for  them.  dent  or  natural  cause. 

538.  Negligence  may  be  inferred —      546.    Negligence  in  the  use  of  elec- 

when.  tricity. 

547.    Electric  wires  out  of  repair. 

§  529.  Negligence,  carelessness,  care,  defined. — (1)  Negli- 
gence and  carelessness,  applied  to  both  plaintiff  and  defendant, 
means  the  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care — that  is,  such  care  as 
ought  to  be  expected  of  a  reasonably  prudent  person  under  simi- 
lar cimcumstances.1 

(2)  Negligence  has  been  aptly  defined  to  be  the  omission  to  do 
something  which  a  reasonable  man,  guided  by  those  considera- 
tions which  ordinarily  regulate  the  conduct  of  human   affairs, 
would  do,  or  the  doing  of  something  which  a  prudent  and  reason- 
able man  would  not  do,  under  the  circumstances  of  a  given  case.2 

(3)  Negligence  consists  in  a  want  of  the  reasonable  care  which 

i  Henry  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.  113  2  Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  R.  Co.  25 
Mo.  534,  21  S.  W.  214.  Wash.  239,  65  Pac.  284. 

518 


519  NEGLIGENCE,    CARELESSNESS,    CARE    DEFINED.  §    530 

would  be  exercised  by  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence,  under  all 
existing  circumstances,  in  view  of  the  probable  danger  of  injury.3 

(4)  Negligence  is  the  failure  to  do  what  a  reasonably  prudent 
person   would    ordinarily   have   done   under   the   circumstances 
of  the  situation,  or  doing  what  such  a  person  under  the  exist- 
ing circumstances  would  not  have  done.4 

(5)  Negligence  is  the  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care — that 
is,  such  care  as  ought  to  be  expected  of  a  reasonably  prudent 
person  under  similar  circumstances.     In  other  words,  negligence 
is  the  failure  to  do  what  a  reasonably  prudent  person  would  or- 
dinarily have  done  under  the  circumstances  of  the  situation,  or 
doing  what  such  person  under  the  existing  circumstances  would 
not  have  done.5 

(6)  Gross  negligence  is  the  failure  to  take  such  care  as  a  per- 
son of  common  sense  and  reasonable  skill  in  like  business,  but  of 
careless  habits,  would  observe  in  avoiding  injury  to   his   own 
person  or  life  under  like  circumstances  of  equal  or  similar  dan- 
ger to  the  plaintiff  on  the  occasion  under  consideration.6 

(7)  As  to  the  question  of  negligence  upon  the  part  of  that  per- 
son or  those  persons   in  control   of  the   extra  passenger  train 
mentioned  in  the  evidence,  negligence  may  be  denned  as  a  fail- 
ure to  discharge  the  duty  of  taking  ordinary  care  to  avoid  the 
injury  of  one  to  whom  the  duty  is  due,  such  failure  being  the 
direct  and  proximate  cause  of  the  injury;  that  ordinary  care 
is  such  as  a  prudent  man  of  the  requisite  skill  will  take  under 
the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  and  that  the  plaintiff 
must  show  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence  such  failure  upon 
the  part  of  the  person  or  persons  in  charge  of  the  extra  pas- 
senger train,  before  the  defendant  can  be  held  liable  for  the 
acts  or  omissions  of  such  person  or  persons.7 

§  530.  Ordinary  care  denned. — (1)  In  relation  to  the  care 
required  of  each  party  you  will  only  hold  them  to  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  care,  which  consists  in  doing  everything  which  a  person 

3  Little  R.  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  At-  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  (Tex.  Cv.  App.), 
kins,   46   Ark.   430.  77  S.  W.  28. 

4  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  6  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Board 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.),  77  S.  W.  28.  (Ky.  App.),  77  S.  W.  189. 

s  Henry  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.  113  ~  Davidson  v.  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  & 
Mo.  534,  21  S.  W.  214;  St.  Louis  S.  St.  L.  R.  Co.  41  W.  Va.  417,  23  S.  E. 

593. 


§    530  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  520 

of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  would  do,  and  omitting  to  do  every- 
thing which  a  person  of  like  care  and  diligence  would  omit 
to  do.8 

(2)  The  defendant  is  only  required  to  use  ordinary  care  in 
the  operation  of  its  cars,  and  the  plaintiff  is  required  to  use  the 
same  degree  of  care — that  is,  ordinary  care — in  the  use  of  the 
streets,  and  in  crossing  or  going  upon  the  track  of  the  defendant. 
By  ordinary  care  is  meant  such  care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent 
person  would  use  under  the  particular  circumstances  involved.0 

(3)  Ordinary  care  is  that  degree  of  care  which  an  ordinarily 
prudent  person  would  exercise  under  like  situation  and  circum- 
stances.10 

(4)  Ordinary  care  is  that  degree  of  care  which  an  ordinarily 
prudent  person  would  exercise  under  like  situation  and  circum- 
stances.    Or  ordinary  care  consists  in  the  doing  of  something 
which  a  person  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  would  do,  and 
omitting  to  do  something  which  a  person  of  like  care  and  dili- 
gence would  omit  to  do.11 

(5)  Ordinary  care,  as  mentioned  in  these  instructions,  is  the 
degree  of  care  which  an  ordinarily  prudent  person,  situated  as 
the  deceased  was,  as  shown  by  the  evidence  before  and  at  the 
time  of  the  injury,  would  usually  exercise  for  his  own  safety.12 

(6)  By  the  term  ordinary  care,  as  used  in  these  instructions, 
is  meant  that  degree  of  care  that  would  be  used  by  a  person  of 
ordinary  prudence  under  the  same  or  similar  circumstances.     A 
failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care  is  negligence.13 

(7)  The  ordinary  care  and  prudence  which  the  plaintiff  was 
required   to  use   were   such   acts   and   conduct   on   her  part   as 
would  be  the  natural  and  ordinary  course  of  prudent  and  discreet 
persons  under  similar  circumstances — that  is  to  say,  such  degree 
of  care  as  should  have  been  reasonably  expected  from  an  or- 
dinarily prudent  person  in  her  situation.14 

s  Hart  v.  Oedar  R.  &  M.  C.  R.  12  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  .O'Donnell, 

Co.  109  Iowa,  637,  80  N.  W.  662.  208  111.  273.  Held  not  assuming 

»  Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  R.  Co.  25  that  the  deceased  was  in  the  exer- 

Wash.  242,  65  Pac.  284.  cise  of  due  care. 

10  North   C.   St.   R.   Co.   v.   Irwin,  ™  Peterson     v.     Wistman      (Mo. 
202  111.  348,  66  N.  E.  1077.  App.),  77  S.  W.  1016. 

11  North   C.    St.   R.    Co.   v.    Irwin,  «  Baltimore  &  O.   R.   Co.  v.  Ow- 
202  111.  348,  66  N.  E.  1077;   Hart  v.  ings,  65  Md.  504,  5  Atl.  329. 

Cedar  R.  &  M.  C.  R.  Co.  109  Iowa, 
637,  80  N.  W.  662. 


521  BURDEN  OF  PROOF,  GENERALLY.  §  531 

(8)  By  ordinary  care  is  meant  that  degree  of  care  which  may 
be  reasonably  expected  of  a  person  in  the  situation  of  the  plaintiff 
at  the  time  the  injury  was  received.15 

(9)  The  term  "ordinary  care,"  as  used  in  these  instructions, 
means     such     care    as    would    ordinarily    be    used    by    prudent 
persons  in  the  performance  of  like  service  under  the  same  cir- 
cumstances.16 

§531.  Burden  of  proof  generally. — (1)  The  burden  of  proof 
is  on  the  plaintiff  to  establish  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence 
the  facts  necessary  to  entitle  him  to  a  verdict,  under  these  in- 
structions, except  upon  the  issue  concerning  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  care  by  the  plaintiff.  As  to  that  issue,  the  burden  of 
proof  is  on  the  defendant  to  show  the  want  of  such  ordinary 
care  on  the  plaintiff's  part.17 

(2)  In  order  to  defeat  a  recovery  in  this  suit  on  the  ground 
of  contributory  negligence  upon  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  the 
burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  defendant  to  show  that  the  plaintiff 
was  guilty  of  negligence,  and  that  such  negligence  on  her  part 
directly  contributed  to  produce  the  injury.18 

(3)  In   order  to   defeat   a  recovery  on  the   ground   of   con- 
tributory negligence    on    plaintiff's    part,  the    defendant    must 
satisfy  the  jury  by  preponderating  evidence  of  two  facts:  first, 
that  the  plaintiff  was  negligent;  and,  second,  that  such  negli- 
gence directly  contributed  to  the  injury.19 

(4)  Before  the  plaintiff  can  recover  in  this  action,  it  must  ap- 
pear that  the  defendant  was  guilty  of  some  act  of  negligence 
which  directly  contributed  to  the  accident.     It  must   also   ap- 
pear that  the  plaintiff  was  without  the  least  fault  or  negligence 
on  her  part  which  may  in  any  wise  have   contributed   to  the 
accide'nt;  and  it  is  the  same  whether  what  she  did  was  of  her 
own  volition  or  by  the  advice  or  guidance   of  her  husband.20 

(5)  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiffs  to  show  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  defendant.     If  they  fail  to  show  any  facts 

is  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cor-  v.  Anderson,  72  Md.  520,  .20  Atl.  2. 

bett,   49   Tex.   575.  Such  an  instruction  should  be  quali- 

16  Mirrielees  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  163  fied  by  others,  stating  that  evidence 
Mo.  470,  63  S.  W.  718.  showing   plaintiff's    contributory 

17  O'Connell  v.  St.  Louis,  C.  &  W.  negligence    will    defeat    his    action 
R.  Co.  106  Mo.  485,  17  S.  W.  494.  whether  introduced  by  defendant  or 

is  Philadelphia,   W.    &   B.    R.    Co.      plaintiff. 

v.  Hogeland,  66  Md.  150,  7  Atl.  105.          20  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.   R.   Co. 
i»  Philadelphia,   W.    &   B.    R.    Co.      27  Wis.  160. 


§    532  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  522 

which  in  law  would  be  deemed  negligence,  then  the  plaintiffs 
cannot  recover,  and  the  fact  or  circumstance  relied  on  must 
have  contributed  to  the  injury  complained  of;  and  in  this  con- 
nection the  jury  will  also  understand  that  they  must  be  con- 
vinced from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiffs  were  guilty  of  no 
fault  or  negligence  on  their  part.21 

(6)  The  law  devolves  upon  the  plaintiff  the  duty  and  burden 
of  making  out  her  case  as  alleged,  and  showing  her  right  to  a 
recovery  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence.     When  she 
has  done  this,  then  the  burden  is  upon  the  defendant  company  to 
show  that  the  deceased  at  the  time  did  not  act  as  a  person  of 
ordinary  prudence  and  caution  would  have  acted,  or  was  in  a 
place  or  position  where  an  ordinarily  prudent  and  cautious  per- 
son would  not  have   been,   before  plaintiff  could   be   denied   a 
recovery.22 

(7)  The  plaintiff  has  alleged  in  each  paragraph,  among  other 
things,  that  he  received  the  injury  complained  of  without  fault 
or  negligence   on  his  part.     This  is  a   material  and  necessary 
allegation.     Without  such   allegation  his   complaint  would  not 
have  been  sufficient  to  have  constituted  a  cause  of  action,  and 
before  the  plaintiff  can  recover  he  must  have  proved  by  a  fair 
preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  he  did  receive  said  injuries, 
without  fault  or  negligence  on  his  part,  directly  and  materially 
contributing  to  the  injury.    It  is  not  enough  to  enable  the  plain- 
tiff to  recover  that  he  shall  have  proved  fault  and  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  defendant;  he  must  also  prove  that  he  him- 
self was   free   from   such   fault   or   negligence,    and,    if  he   has 
failed  to  prove  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that 
he  received  the  injury  without  such  fault  or  negligence  on  his 
own  part  he  cannot  recover.23 

§532.  Degree  of  care  required  of ,  defendant. — (1)  What  the 
law  demands  of  the  defendant  is  only  that  which  men  of  skill  and 
vigilance  are  capable  of  exercising  before  the  happening  of 
an  accident,  and  not  the  adoption  of  extraordinary  and  pro- 

21  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.  368,  46  N.  E.  829.    By  a  recent  stat- 
27  Wis.  1.61 ;  Baran  v.  Reading  Iron  ute  of  Indiana  the  plaintiff  has  been 
Co.  202  Pa.  280,  51  Atl.  979.  relieved  from  the  burden  of  proving 

22  Southerland    v.    Tex.    &    P.    R.  his  own  freedom  from  contributory 
Co.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  40  S.  W.  195.  negligence,   Indianapolis  St.  R.   Co. 

23  Todd   v.   Banner,   17   Ind.    App.  v.  Robinson,  157  Ind.  232. 


523  DEGREE  OF  CARE  REQUIRED.  §  532 

phetie  measures  of  precaution,  which  the  peculiar  circumstances 
of  the  event  may  afterwards  show  might  have  prevented  it.24 

(2)  A  corporation  or  person  furnishing  natural  gas    to    the 
stoves,  heaters,  burners,  pipes,  pipe  lines,  machinery  or  apparatus 
of  another,  to  be  used  for  the  purp.ose  of  domestic  heating,  for 
fuel  in  a  dwelling  house,   storeroom,   office   or  shop,   is  bound 
to  exercise  such  care,  skill  and  diligence  in  all  its  operations 
as  is  called  for  by  the  delicacy,   difficulty  and  dangerousness 
of  the  nature  of  its  business,  in  order  that  injury  may  not  be 
done  to  others — that  is  to  say,  if  the  danger,  delicacy  or  dif- 
ficulty   is    extraordinarily    great,    extraordinary   skill    and    dili- 
gence is  required.25 

(3)  It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  upon  all  the  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances in  evidence  whether  the  explosion  of  the  boiler  was  or 
was  not  caused  by  the  want  of  a  reasonable  degree  of  skill  of  one 
in  the  employ  of  said  company,  or  whether  said  explosion  was  or 
was  not  caused  by  the  failure  of  said  employe  in  charge  of  said 
boiler  to  use  a  reasonable  degree  of  care  and  caution  to  prevent 
said  explosion.26 

(4)  The  defendants  were  bound  to  adopt  such  precautions  to 
keep  the  track  clear  and  prevent  persons  from  driving  on  the 
track  during  the  race,  as  men  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence 
would  adopt  under  similar  circumstances ;  and  it  was  not  enough 
to  order  men  off  the  track,  but  they  should  have  had  a  force  suf- 
ficent  to  keep  them  off,  they  being  bound  to  use  due  and  proper 
skill  and  care  to  prevent  any  person  engaged  in  the  race  from 
being   injured   by  the   ignorant,   negligent   or   reckless   acts   of 
the  spectators,   or  persons  not  engaged  in  the   race ;   that  the 
degree   of  care  the   defendants  were  bound  to   use   in   such   a 
case  as  this  must  be  measured  by  the  extent  of  peril  to  human 
life  and  limb  which  would  be  occasioned  by  neglect,  and  must 
therefore  be  the  highest  which  may  reasonably  be  exercised  in 
order   to  prevent  those   injuries   which  human   foresight   could 
avert;  the  defendants  were  not  bound  at  all  events  to  keep  the 
track  clear;  and    the    plaintiff    can    not  make  out  his  case    by 
only  showing  that  there  was  an  obstruction  on  the  track,  but 
he  must  show  that  the  defendants  had  in  some  way  failed  in 

24  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.          ^  Citizens    Gas   &    O.    M.    Co.   v. 
27  Wis.  161.  Whipple  (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  559. 

26  Smith   v.   Warden,   86  Mo.   395. 


§    533  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  524 

their  duty,  which  was  to  use  every  effort  which  reasonable  men 
could  be  expected  to  use  to  keep  the  track  clear.27 

§  533.  Care  in  driving  vehicle. — Even  if  the  jury  should  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  was  not,  at  the  time  of 
the  injury  complained  of,  driving  at  an  unusual  rate  of  speed, 
still,  if  they  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant did  commit  the  injury  upon  the  plaintiff,  as  charged  in 
the  declaration,  while  she  was  using  due  and  proper  care,  and 
the  defendants  might,  by  using  ordinary  and  proper  care  at 
the  time,  have  avoided  committing  such  injury,  and  that  as  the 
consequence  of  a  want  of  such  reasonable  and  ordinary  care 
on  the  part  of  the  defendants,  the  plaintiff  received  the  in- 
juries complained  of,  then  the  jury  should  find  the  defendants 
guilty  a?id .  assess  the  plaintiff 's  damages  at  such  sum  as  they 
may  think,  from  the  testimony,  will  compensate  her  for  the 
injuries  so  sustained  by  her,  not  to  exceed  the  amount  claimed 
in  the  declaration.28 

§  534.    Care  and  safety  of  machinery. — (1)     It  was  not  the 

duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  furnish  a  guard  or  any  part  of  the  same 
to  be  used  on  the  machine  on  which  he  was  injured,  nor  was 
it  his  duty  to  ask  the  defendant  to  properly  guard  said  ma- 
chine for  the  various  kinds  of  work  he  was  required  to  do, 
nor  to  complain  to  it  because  the  machine  was  not  so  guarded.29 

(2)  If  the  plaintiff  was  in  the  employ  of  the  lessees  of  the 
elevator  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  and  had  been  ever  since  the 
building  in  question  was  erected,  and  the  firm  had  had  the  entire 
and   exclusive  use   and  occupancy   of  the  building  in   question 
and  of  the  elevator  during  all  that  time,  the  defendant  having 
no  right  to  use  or  occupy  any  of  it  in  any  way,  the  plaintiff 
cannot  recover.30 

(3)  The  defendant  was  not  bound  to  furnish  the  very  best  or 
most  improved  kind  of  machinery  to  be  used  in  its  manufactory ; 
and  if  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  engine,  gov- 
ernor, emery-wheel  and  the  frame  and  flanges  connected  with  the 

27  Goodale   v.   Worcester   Agr.    S.  29  Blanchard-Hamilton    Furniture 

102  Mass.  405.  Co.  v.  Calvin   (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  1035. 

ss  Schmidt  v.  Sinnott,  103  111.  160,  so  Sinton   v.    Butler,    40   Ohio   St. 

164.     Held    not   submitting   to   the  158. 
jury  a  question  of  law  to  be  deter- 
mined by  them. 


525  CARE  AND  SAFETY  OF  MACHINERY.  §534: 

same  were  reasonably  safe,  and  such  as  are  ordinarily  used  in 
similar  establishments,  they  must  find  for  the  defendant.31 

(4)  The  fact  that  there  were  boilers  and  engines  in  an  ad- 
joining store  which  created  the  power  to  run  the  elevator  in 
question,  and  heat  for  the  store  and  other  stores  just  like  it,  and 
the  defendant  hired  the  engineer  and  paid  for  the  running  of  it 
and  the  fuel,  upon  the  agreement  contained  in  the  lease  that  the 
lessees  should  pay  for  all  such  services,  did  not  give  the  use  of 
any  portion  of  the  building  or  elevator  in  question  to  the  defend- 
ant, or  deprive  the  lessees  of  the  exclusive  occupancy  of  it.32 

(5)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  when  he  accepted  employ- 
ment from  the  defendant  to  exercise  ordinary  care  for  his  own 
safety,    and   not   knowingly   to    expose   himself   to   unnecessary 
risks  or  dangers  connected  with  his  said  employment.     And  the 
court  instructs  the  jury   that  the  plaintiff,   when   he   accepted 
employment  from  the  defendant  to  operate  the  machine  known 
as  a  "joiner,"  assumed  all  the  risks  incident  to  such  employ- 
ment— that   is,   such   risks   as   naturally   arose   out   of   or   were 
necessarily  connected  with  said  employment.     But  he  did  not 
assume  risks  that  were  unknown  to  him,  and  which  were  not 
incident  to  his  employment,  nor  such  risks  which  the  defend- 
ant could  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  have  guarded  against.33 

(6)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant  when  he  employed  the 
plaintiff  to  exercise  ordinary  care  in  providing  him  with  a  rea- 
sonably safe  machine  or  joiner;  that  is,  one  in  good  order  and 
fitted  for  the  purpose  and  work  for  which  it  was  intended.     It 
was  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  exercise  ordinary  care  in  keep- 
ing the  same  in  reasonably  safe  condition  for  the  use  of  the  plain- 
tiff while  he  was  so  engaged  in  operating  the  said  machine.34 

(7)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  injury  to  the 
plaintiff,  complained  of  in  his  petition,  was  not  the  result  of  any 
defect  in  the  machine  joiner,  but  was  the  result  of  such  a  risk  or 
danger  as  naturally  arose  or  grew  out  of  the  plaintiff's  employ- 
ment, and  was  naturally  attendant  upon  said  employment,  then 
the  law  is  for  the  defendant  and  the  jury  should  so  find.35 

si  Camp  P.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Ballou,  71         34  Reiser  v.  Southern  P.  M.  &  L. 
111.  421.  Co.  24  Ky.  796,  69  S.  W.  1086   (the 

32  Sinton   v.    Butler,    40   Ohio   St.      plaintiff  was   an  infant). 

158.  35  Reiser  v.  Southern  P.  M.  &  L. 

33  Reiser  v.  Southern  P.  M.  &  L.      Co.  24  Ky.  796,  69  S.  W.  1086. 
Co.  24  Ky.  796,  69  S.  W.  1086. 


§    535  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  526 

(8)  If  you  find  that  a  minor  employe  did  not  understand  all 
the  dangers  and  hazards  of  the  situation  in  which  he  was  placed 
by  the  foreman,  and  that  it  was  a  dangerous  and  hazardous  situa- 
tion in  which  to  place  a  boy  of  his  age,  judgment  and  experience, 
then  it  was  the  duty  of  the  foreman  to  instruct  him  in  respect 
thereto,  that  he  might  conduct  himself  so  as  to  guard  against 
such  peril.36 

§  535.  Care  of  injured  party  may  be  inferred. — In  considering 
the  question  of  negligence  it  is  competent  and  proper  for  the  jury 
in  connection  with  the  other  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case 
to  infer  the  absence  of  fault  on  the  part  of  the  deceased,  from 
the  general  and  known  disposition  of  men  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves and  to  keep  out  of  the  way  of  difficulty  and  danger.37 

§  536.  Infant — Degree  of  care  required. — (1)  The  rule  that 
refuses  damages  to  an  individual  whose  negligence,  however 
slight,  has  in  any  manner  contributed  to  produce  the  injury  for 
which  he  sues,  presupposes  that  he  has  reached  an  age  when  he 
has  sufficient  intelligence  to  know  the  existence  of  danger,  and 
sufficient  thought  to  protect  himself  from  its  consequences.  This 
rule,  therefore,  does  not  and  cannot  apply  to  an  infant  of  two 
years  or  less;  and  if  an  infant  of  that  age  is  found  alone  in  a 
place  where  he  is  exposed  to  danger,  and  in  a  situation  where  he 
can  easily  be  seen,  it  is  the  duty  of  every  person  approaching  him 
to  use  all  the  care  and  caution  that  such  person  may  command  to 
avoid  injury  to  him ;  and  if  such  person  fail  to  use  such  care  and 
caution,  and  injury  results  to  the  infant  from  the  want  of  such 
care  and  caution,  such  person  is  guilty  of  negligence  and  would 
be  liable  to  the  infant  for  the  injuries  so  caused,  had  such  infant 
survived  such  injury.38 

(2)  The  conduct  of  an  infant  is  not  of  necessity  to  be  judged 
by  the  same  rules  which  govern  that  of  an  adult;  while  it  is 
the  general  rule  in  regard  to  an  adult  or  grown  person  that  to 
entitle  him  or  her  to  recover  damages  for  an  injury  resulting  from 
the  fault  or  negligence  of  another,  he  or  she  must  have  been  free 
from  fault,  such  is  not  the  rule  in  regard  to  an  infant  of  tender 
years.  The  care  and  caution  required  of  a  child  is  according  to 

se  Rolling    Mill    Co.    v.    Corrigan,          37  Baltimore    &    O.    R.    Co.    v.    S. 
46  Ohio  St.  290,  20  N.  E.  466;  Thomp.      &c.   60  Md.  452. 
on  Neg.   978.  ss  Walters  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

R.  Co.  41  Iowa,  75;  see,  Illinois,  &c. 

R.  Co.  v.  Slater,  129  111.  91,  99. 


527  CARE  REQUIRED  OF  CHILDREN.  §  536 

its  maturity  and  capacity  wholly,  and  this  is  to  be  determined 
by  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  evidence  before  the 
jury,  and  the  law  presumes  that  a  child,  between  the  ages  of 
seven  and  fourteen  years,  cannot  be  guilty  of  contributory  neg- 
ligence, and  in  order  to  establish  that  a  child  of  such  age  is 
capable  of  contributory  negligence  such  presumption  must  be 
rebutted  by  evidence  and  circumstances  establishing  his  maturity 
and  capacity.39 

(3)  The  conduct  of  an  infant  is  not  of  necessity  to  be  judged 
by  the  same  rule  which  governs  that  of  an  adult.     While  it  is 
a  general  rule  in  regard  to  an  adult  or  grown  person,  that  to 
entitle  him  to  recover  damages  for  any  injury  resulting  from  the 
fault  or  negligence  of  another  he  must  have  been  free  from  fault, 
such  is  not  the  rule  in  regard  to  an  infant  of  tender  years.     The 
care  and  caution  required  of  a  child  is  according  to  his  maturity 
and  capacity  wholly ;  and  this  is  to  be  determined  by  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  and  the  evidence  before  the  jury.40 

(4)  If  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  death  of 
the  child  resulted  from  the  want  of  ordinary  care  and  caution  on 
the  part  of  a  driver  in  the  employment  of  the  defendant,  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover;  provided  the  jury  find  that  the 
accident  causing  her  death  could  not  have  been  avoided  by  the 
exercise  of  such  care  and  caution  by  the  child  as  ought,  under 
all  the  circumstances,  to  have  been  reasonably  expected  from  one 
of  her  age  and  intelligence,  or  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care 
and  caution  on  the  part  of  the  father  of  the  child,  or  of  the  person 
accompanying  the  child  at  the  time  of  the  accident.41 

(5)  It  is  the  duty  of  an  infant  employe  to  use  ordinary  care 
and  prudence,  just  such  care  and  prudence  as  a  boy  of  his  age  of 
ordinary  care  and  prudence  would  use  under  like  or  similar  cir- 
cumstances.    You   should  take   into   consideration   his   age,   the 
judgment   and   knowledge  he  possessed.     If  not  understanding 
all  the  dangers  and  hazards  of  the  situation  in  which  he  was 
placed  by  the  foreman,  and  you  find  it  was  a  dangerous  and 
hazardous  situation  in  which  to  place  a  boy  of  his  age,  judgment 
and  experience,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  foreman  to  instruct  him 

so  Richmond  Tr.  Co.  v.  Wilkinson      R.  Co.  v.  Quayle,  95  Va.  747,  30  S.  E. 
(Va.),  43  S    E.  623.  391. 

40  Washington,  A.  &  Mt.  V.  Elec.          41  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  30 

Md.  48. 


§    537  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  528 

in  reference  thereto,  that  he  might  conduct  himself  so  as  to 
guard  against  such  peril;  and  if  he  was  injured  by  reason  of 
the  neglect  or  carelessness  of  the  defendant,  and  by  reason  of 
his  youth  and  want  of  judgment  as  to  the  perils  of  his  position, 
did  some  act  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty  as  he  understood  it, 
which  also  contributed  to  the  injury,  and  which  he  did  not  know 
to  be  likely  to  injure  him  and  had  not  been  properly  advised 
and  instructed  therein  by  the  foreman,  he  is  entitled  to  recover.42 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the 
plaintiff  permitted  his  decedent,  D,  a  boy  about  nine  years  of 
age,  to 'go  from  his  home  at  W    after  or  to  get  his  elderberries, 
but  did  not  know  that  he  was  going  to  ride  on  a  handcar,  he,  the 
plaintiff,  is  not  by  reason  of  such  permission  guilty  of  contribu- 
tory  negligence,    and   the    defendant    cannot   be   relieved   from 
liability  solely  because  the  plaintiff  thus  permitted  his  said  son 
to  go  from  home.43 

(7)  It  does  not  necessarily  follow,  because  a  parent  negligently 
suffers  a  child  of  tender  age  to  cross  a  street,  that  therefore  the 
child  cannot  recover.     If  the  child,  without  being  able  to  exer- 
cise any  judgment  in  regard  to  the  matter,  yet  does  no  act  which 
prudence  would  forbid  and  omits  no  act  that  prudence  would 
dictate,  there  has  been  no  negligence  which  was  directly  contrib- 
utory to  the  injury.     The  negligence  of  the  parent  in  such  a  case 
would  be  too  remote.44 

§  537.  Children— Care  of  defendant  toward  them.— (1)  The 
defendant  was  under  no  obligation  to  the  plaintiff  to  keep  its  lum- 
ber yard  in  safe  or  proper  condition  for  plaintiff  to  play  thereon. 
The  yards  were  its  property  and  it  was  entitled,  as  to  plaintiff, 
to  use  them  for  piling  lumber  and  to  pile  the  same  in  such  form 
as  it  found  convenient,  with  due  regard  for  the  safety  of  such 
persons  only  as  might  properly  use  the  yards.  It  was  under  no 
obligations  to  so  pile  or  place  its  bridge  ties  as  to  prevent  injury 
to  a  child  climbing  upon  them,  or  to  so  pile,  fasten  or  brace  the 
same  that  the  child  could  not,  in  trying  to  climb  thereon,  pull 
one  or  more  of  them  down  upon  herself,  nor  can  it  be  held  negli- 
gent for  failing  to  so  pile,  brace  or  secure  them,  if  the  injured 

42  Rolling    Mill    v.    Corrigan,    46      St.  L.  R.  Co.  41  W.  Va.  411,  23  S.  E. 
Ohio  St.  283,  20  N.  E.  466.  593. 

43  Davidson  v.  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &         44  Wiswell  v.  Doyle,  160  Mass.  44, 

35  N.  E.  107. 


529  CARE  TOWARD  CHILDREN — NEGLIGENCE  PRESUMED.  §    539 

person  was  at  the  time  thereon  without  its  knowledge  or  invita- 
tion.45 

(2)  The  defendant  was  under  no  obligation  to  keep  watch  over 
its  premises,  in  order  to  exclude  children  therefrom.  If  the 
watchman  of  defendant  discovered  plaintiff  with  others  playing 
in  the  yard  shortly  before  the  accident  and  requested  them  to 
leave,  and  plaintiff  thereupon  withdrew  from  the  premises,  but 
thereafter  returned  without  the  knowledge  of  defendant's  watch- 
man or  person  in  charge  of  its  property,  for  the  purpose  of  play- 
ing in  the  yard,  and  while  so  doing  was  injured,  without  such 
watchman  having  knowledge  of  her  being  then  present;  and 
while  playing  there  pulled  down  upon  herself  or  caused  to  fall 
a  tie,  or  portion  of  a  pile  of  ties,  upon  which  she  was  climbing, 
defendant  would  not  be  liable  to  plaintiff  for  any  injury  so 
received.46 

§  538.  Negligence  may  be  inferred — When. — (1)  When  the  fact 
has  been  established  that  a  passenger  in  a  railroad  car  has  been 
injured  without  his  fault  by  the  car  in  which  he  was  riding  being 
thrown  from  the  track  and  upset,  the  law  will  presume  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  railroad  company,  unless  the  evidence 
shows  there  was  no  negligence.47 

§  539.  Negligence  will  not  be  presumed. — (1)  The  burden  of 
proof  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  he  was  injured  by  the  de- 
fendant's negligence,  either  in  not  providing  safe  and  suitable  cars, 
or  in  not  properly  inspecting  and  taking  care  of  them.  A  mere 
statement  that  a  person  was  injured  while  riding  on  a  railway, 
without  any  statement  of  the  character,  manner  or  circumstances 
of  the  injury,  does  not  raise  a  presumption  of  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  railway  company.  But,  if  the  character,  manner  or  cir- 
cumstances of  the  injury  are  also  stated,  such  statement  may 
raise,  on  the  one  hand,  a  presumption  of  such  negligence,  or,  on 

45  Missouri,    K.    &    T.    R.    Co.    v.  227;  Pittsburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
Edwards,  90,  Tex.  69,  36  S.  W.  430.  son,  56  111.   138;    Sullivan  v.   Phila- 
But   see   Penso  v.    McCormick,    125  delphia,  &c.  R.  Co.  30  Pa.  St.  234; 
Ind.  116,  25  N.  E.  156.  Baltimore,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Worthing- 

46  Missouri,    K.    &    T.    R.    Co.    v.  ton,  21  Md.  275;   Yonge  v.  Kinney, 
Edwards,  90  Tex.  69,  36  S.  W.  430.  28   Ga.    1;    New    Orleans   R.    Co.    v. 
But   see   Penso   v.    McCormick,    125  Allbritton,    38    Miss.    242;    Higgins 
Ind.  116,  25  N.  E.  156.  v.  Hannibal,  &c.  R.  Co.  36  Mo.  418; 

47  Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Stokes    v.    Saltonstall,    13    Pet.    (U. 
Williams,  74  Ind.  464,  citing  Edger-  S.),  181. 

ton  v.   New   York  R.   Co.   39   N.   Y. 


§    539  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  530 

the  other,  a  presumption  that  there  was  no  such 'negligence.  If 
the  plaintiff  was  in  fact  injured  while  sitting  in  her  proper  place, 
by  the  falling  of  the  upper  berth  upon  her  head,  while  said  berth 
ought  to  have  remained  in  place  above,  such  fact  raises  a  pre- 
sumption in  this  case  of  negligence  for  which  the  defendant  is 
liable.  If  you  find  that  there  was  no  defect  in  the  road,  or  in  the 
car  or  in  the  mechanism  used,  yet  if,  upon  the  evidence  in  the 
case,  you  find  it  reasonable  to  presume  that  the  accident  happened 
by  reason  of  the  upper  berth  not  having  been  properly  fastened 
in  its  place,  or  by  reason  of  the  persons  having  charge  of  the 
car  having  failed  to  observe  that  it  had  become  loosened,  if  such 
insecure  condition  would  have  been  observed  by  proper  diligence, 
you  have  a  right  to  so  presume,  and  you  would  then  find,  the 
defendant  guilty  of  negligence.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  in  such 
case  you  find  it  equally  reasonable  to  presume  that  the  fastening 
of  the  berth  was  loosened  by  some  other  person  not  in  the  employ- 
ment of  the  company,  and  such  insecure  condition  would  not  be 
observed  by  proper  diligence  on  the  part  of  the  persons  having 
charge  of  the  car,  you  have  the  right  to  so  presume,  and  in  that 
case  would  find  that  the  plaintiff  had  failed  to  make  out  a  case 
of  negligence  against  the  defendant.  The  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  damages  for  injuries  traceable  to  the  defendant's  fault,  but 
not  for  injury  caused  by  his  own  act.48 

(2)  Negligence  as  to  the  defendant  is  not  to  be  presumed ;  but 
the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiffs  to  satisfy  the  jury  by  a 
preponderance  of  evidence  that  the  defendants  are  chargeable 
with  negligence.49 

(3)  If  under  all  the  evidence  submitted  in  the  cause  you  shall 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  plaintiffs  have  not  succeeded  in 
establishing  the  fact  of  negligence  against  the  defendant  company 
by  satisfactory  evidence  and  fairly  preponderating,  bearing  in 
mind  that  the  mere  fact  of  the  explosion  of  this  boiler  is  not  of 
itself  evidence  of  negligence,  then  the  defendant  company  is  en- 
titled to  the  verdict.50 

(4)  Negligence  is  never  to  be  presumed,  and  the  fact  that  an 
accident  occurred  on  October  8,  1896,  would  not  justify  the  jury 

48  Railroad    Co.    v.    Walrath,    38         ™  Baran  v.  Reading  Iron  Co.  202 
Ohio    St.    462.  Pa.   St.  280,  51  Atl.  979. 

40  Baran  v.  Reading  Iron  Co.  202 
Pa.  St.  279,  51  Atl.  979. 


531  NEGLIGENCE  PRESUMED — WHAT  NOT  NEGLIGENCE.  §    540 

in  inferring  i'rom  the  fact  that  an  explosion  took  place,  that  it  was 
caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  defendant,  for  the  reason  that  it 
might  have  occurred  without  any  fault  of  the  defendant  what- 
ever.51 

(5)  The  defendants  were  at  the  time  of  the  explosion,  and  be- 
fore, in  the  exercise  of  a  lawful  right  in  using  and  operating  steam 
boilers  on  their  own  premises  in  the  'management  of  this  industry. 
Other  facts  establishing  the  fault  or  negligence  of  the  owners, 
the  defendants,  besides  the  mere  fact  of  the  explosion  itself,  are 
necessary  to  be  proved  in  order  to  fix  a  liability  for  damages.52 

(6)  The  mere  fact  of  the  explosion  of  this  particular  boiler  on 
the  evening  of  October  8,  1896,  standing  by  itself  and  independent 
of  other  facts,  is  no  evidence  of  the  company's  negligence  or 
want,  of  proper  care  in  the  use  of  the  boiler.    It  will  be  presumed, 
until  the  contrary  appears,  that  this  company  had  a  care  and  due 
regard  for  the  preservation  of  their  own  property,  the  safety  of 
their  own  employees  and  others,  as  well  as  of  themselves.53 

(7)  The  mere  fact  that  an  explosion  occurred,  which  caused  the 
death  of  the  infant  in  this  case,  is  not  enough  to  establish  negli- 
gence of  the  defendant  company.     There  must  be  additional  and 
affirmative  proof  of  the  particular  negligence  which  caused  the 
explosion  in  this  case.54 

§  540.  What  does  not  amount  to  negligence. — (1)  It  is  not  nec- 
essarily an  act  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  to  suffer 
a  momentary  arrest  of  motion  of  the  cars  in  bringing  the  train 
to  the  station  and  to  its  proper  and  convenient  location.  If  such 
temporary  arrest  of  motion  is  incident  to  the  careful  management 
of  a  mixed  train  like  the  one  in  question,  then  to  suffer  it  would 
not  be  an  act  of  negligence.55 

(2)  If  the  evidence  shows  the  defendant  to  have  moved  the 
train  to  the  station  in  the  mode  usual  on  well  regulated  roads  of 
the  country,  and  practiced  by  good  conductors  and  engineers,  the 
observing  of  such  usual  mode  cannot  be  deemed  an  act  of  negli- 
gence.56 

si  Baran  v.  Reading  Iron  Co.  202  54  Baran  v.  Reading  Iron  Co.  202 
Pa.  St.  280,  51  Atl.  979.  Pa.  St.  280,  51  Atl.  979. 

52  Baran  v.  Reading  Iron  Co.  202  <",  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co. 
Pa.  St.  280,  51  Atl.  979.  27  Wis,  161. 

sa  Baran  v.  Reading  Iron  Co.  202  so  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co. 
Pa.  St.  279,  51  Atl.  9-79.  27  Wis.  161. 


§    541  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  532 

(3)  It  is  not  enough  to  say  or  find  that  there  is  some  evidence 
of 'negligence  on  defendant's  part.  A  scintilla  of  evidence,  or  a 
mere  surmise  that  there  may  have  been  negligence  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant,  will  not  warrant  the  jury  in  finding  a  verdict 
for  the  plaintiffs.  There  must  be  evidence  upon  which  the  jury 
can  reasonably  conclude  that  there  was  negligence.57 

§  541.  Negligence  the  proximate  cause  of  injury. — (1)  Negli- 
gence may  be  the  proximate  cause  of  an  injury  of  which  it  was 
not  the  sole  or  immediate  cause.  If  the  defendant  negligently  en- 
croached upon  and  maintained  obstructions  in  the  highway  at 
the  crossings,  which,  concurring  with  the  movements  of  a  passing 
train,  produced  the  collision  resulting  in  the  death  of  the  dece- 
dent, then  such  negligence  would  be  a  proximate  cause  of  such 
collision  within  the  meaning  of  that  term  as  used  in  these  instruc- 
tions.58 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  croton  oil  was  by  de- 
fendant administered  to  the  plaintiff  in  dangerous  quantity,  as  is 
alleged,  then  you  will  consider  whether  or  not  it  was  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  plaintiff's  sickness  and  injury,  as  alleged;  and  if 
you  find  that  it  was  not  the  proximate  cause  thereof,  or  if  the 
plaintiff  was  sick  at  the  time  of  administering  the  croton  oil,  if 
any  was  administered,  and  the  same  did  not  increase  the  sickness 
or  pain,  or  the  duration  thereof,  then  you  should  find  for  the 
defendant.59 

(3)  No  remote  or  speculative  damages  can  be  allowed  in  this  ac- 
tion, but  only  such  as  are  the  natural  and  proximate  effect  of  the 
defendant's  acts.60 

§  542.    Instructions  submitting  question  of  negligence. — (1)   If 

the  plaintiff  did  not  receive  the  injuries  complained  of  by  any 
contributing  act  of  negligence  or  fault  of  her  own,  but  was  in- 
jured at  the  time  complained  of  by  the  carelessness  and  negligence 
or  fault  of  the  defendant's  servants,  or  one  of  them,  committed  in 
the  general  scope  of  employment  as  such  servants  or  servant, 

57  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.  59  Rabe  v.  Summerbeck,  94  Iowa, 

27  Wis.  161.  659,  63  N.  W.  458. 

ss  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Me-  eo  Blesch  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

Intosh,  140  Ind.  272,  38  N.  E.  476.  Co.  48  Wis.  172,  2  N.  W.  113. 


533  SUBMITTING  NEGLIGENCE  TO  JURY.  §  542 

the  defendant  is  liable  for  such  damages  as  she  may  have  sus- 
tained by  the  injuries  thus  received.81 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was 
employed  to  work  for  the  firm  of  H  &  N,  as  stated  in  the  declara- 
tion, and  that  while  he  was  engaged  in  the  duties  of  such  employ- 
ment he  was  injured  and  sustained  damages  as  complained  of  in 
the  declaration;  that  said  firm  of  H  &  N  were  negligent  in  the 
respect  charged  in  the  declaration;  that  the  said  injury  to  the 
plaintiff  was  caused  by  said  negligence  of  the   defendants   as 
charged  in  the  declaration,  and  that  the  plaintiff,  at  the  time  of 
the  injury,  Avas  in  the  exercise  of  due  care  and  caution  for  his 
own  safety,  then  you  should  find  for  the  plaintiff.62 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  is 
guilty  of  the  acts  of  negligence  charged  in  the  declaration,  and 
that  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff  complained  of  resulted  therefrom, 
while  he  was  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  for  his  own  safety, 
the  defendant  is  liable,  and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  verdict.63 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  that  the 
plaintiff,  on  or  about  the  nineteenth  day  of  May,  1893,  was  right- 
fully in  an  elevator  in  the  possession  of  and  operated  by  the  de- 
fendant and  located  in  the  defendant's  building,  for  the  purpose 
of  being  carried  thereby  from  one  of  the  upper  floors  of  the  de- 
fendant 's  said  building  to  the  ground  floor  thereof ;  and  if  the  jury 
further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  while  the  plaintiff  was  so  in 
said  elevator,  and  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  and  ordinary  care 
on  his  part,  the  said  elevator,  owing  to  the  negligent  and  faulty 
construction  thereof,  or  owing  to  the  negligence  or  carelessness 
on  the  part  of  the  servant  of  the  defendant  in  operating  the  same, 
fell,  and  if  you  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  injury 
to  the  plaintiff  complained  of  was  caused  by  the  fall  of  said  ele- 
vator, then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiff.64 

(5)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  has  been 
guilty  of  negligence  as  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration,  and 
that  such  negligence  caused  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff  complained 
of  in  the  declaration,  and  that  before  and  at  the  time  of  such  in- 

ei  Louisville,   N.   A.    &   C.   R.   Co.  ™  St.  Louis  N.   S.  Yards  v.   God- 

v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  562,  14  N.  E.  572.  frey,  198  111.  294,  65  N.  E.  90. 

62  Heldmaier    v.     Cobbs,     195    111.  64  Hartford  Deposit  Co.  v.  Sollitt, 

172,    179,    62    N.    E.    853.  (held    not  172  111.  224,  50  N.  E.  178. 
bound  to  anticipate  defense). 


§    543  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  534 

jury  the  plaintiff  was  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  for  her 
personal  safety,  then  your  verdict  will  be  for  the  plaintiff.05 

(6)  The  question  of  whether  or  not  the  defendant  is  guilty  of 
negligence  as  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration,  is  for  your 
determination  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  proven  in  the 
case.66 

§  543.  Plaintiff 's  contributory  negligence. — ( 1 )  The  doctrine  of 
imputed  negligence  does  not  prevail  in  Ohio,  and  if  you  find  that 
G.  died  through  the  wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default  of  the 
defendant,  by  himself  or  his  agent,  then  the  plaintiff  is  not 
deprived  of  the  right  of  action  in  this  case  by  reason  of  contribu- 
tory negligence  on  the  part  of  the  husband  or  any  one  else,  unless 
such  person  was  acting  as  agent  of  the  deceased  at  the  time.67 

(2)  When  one  is  placed  by  the  negligence  of  another  in  a  situa- 
tion of  terror,  his  attempt  to  escape  danger,  even  by  doing  an  act 
which  is  in  itself  dangerous  and  from  which  injury  results,  is  not 
contributory  negligence,  such  as  will  prevent  him  from  recover- 
ing.6* 

(3)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  guilty 
of  negligence  in  attempting  to  saw  the  corner  out  while  holding 
several  of  the  smaller  pieces  together  with  his  hands,  instead  of 
sawing  the  corner  out  of  the  solid  piece  of  wood  before  it  was 
ripped  into  smaller  pieces,  and  if  you  further  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  such  negligence  was  the  cause  of  his  injury,  then 
you  should  find  the  defendant  not  guilty.69 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  it  was  necessary  for 
H,  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty,  to  project  his  head  from  the  car 
at  K  station,  but  that  he  put  his  head  out  before  it  was  actually 
necessary  on  account  of  the  distance  of  the  train  from  the  passen- 
ger platform,  this  would  not  prevent  the  plaintiff  from  recover- 
ing if  otherwise  entitled,  if  you  believe  that  the  acts  of  the  defend- 
ant's  servants  in  charge  of  the  train  were  such  as  would  reason- 
ably induce  the  said  H,  situated  as  he  was,  to  believe  that  he  was 

es  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Roach,  180  es  Mitchell  v.  Charleston  L.  &  P. 

111.  174,  54  N.  E.  212.  Co.  45  S.  C.  146,  31  L.  R.  A.  582. 

es  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Roach,  180  69  Mallen  v.  Waldowski,  203  111. 

111.  174,  54  N.  E.  212.  89,  67  N.  E.  409.  Held  not  assum- 

67  Davis  v.  Guarnieri,  45  Ohio  St.  ing  that  the  plaintiff  was  guilty  of 

478,  15  N.  E.  350.  negligence. 


535  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE  OF  PLAINTIFF.  §    543 

at  the  usual  place  for  ejecting  his  head  in  performance  of  his 
duty.70 

(5)  The  law  did  not  require  defendant  to  anticipate  or  presume 
that  plaintiff  might  be  negligent.     Defendant  might  lawfully  pre- 
sume the  contrary,  and  might  act  upon  the  assumption  that  plain- 
tiff would  observe  all  due  and  proper  precaution,  according  to 
the  circumstances  surrounding  him.71 

(6)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  ditch  was  dangerous, 
that  the  defendant  had  been  guilty  of  permitting  it  to  become  and 
remain  in  such  condition,  still  if  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  was 
guilty  of  negligence  in  the  manner  in  which  he   attempted  to 
cross,  and  that  his  negligence  contributed  to  the  accident,  and 
that  the  accident  would  not  have  occurred  if  the  plaintiff  had 
exercised   reasonable   care,   then  the  plaintiff   cannot   recover.72 

(7)  Where  one  knows  of  danger  which  threatens  injury  to  him- 
self, or  where  one  voluntarily  places  himself  in  a  dangerous  place, 
as  in  a  public  street  where  horses  and  vehicles  pass,  and  he  can 
avoid  such  danger  by  reasonable  exertion,  his  negligent  failure 
to  do  so  will  prevent  him  from  recovering  damages  for  an  injury 
so  incurred.73 

(8)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  in- 
jured by  coming  in  contact  with,  defendant's  wire,  and  that  by  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care  h.e  could  have  avoided  such  contact, 
then  the   plaintiff  is  not   entitled   to   recover   anything   in   this 

action.74 

• 

(9)  To  stand  in  a  public  street,  knowing  that  it  is  where  wag- 
ons and  horses  are  liable  to  pass,  and  especially  to  stand  in  such  a 
place  at  night  and  to  pay  no  heed  to  the  danger  of  so  standing 
and  to  take  no  care  to  avoid  the  danger  of  such  a  place,  is  not 
exercising  reasonable  care  to  protect  one's  self  from  the  danger 
of  such  a  place.75 

(10)  The  question  of  whether  the  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  negli- 
gence which  contributed  to  his  injury,  and  without  which  the  ac- 
cident would  not  have  occurred,  is  for  the  jury,  and  must  be  de- 

70  Houston    &    T.    C.    R.    Co.    v.  73  Evans    v.    Adams    Ex.    Co.    122 
Hampton,  64  Tex.  429.  Ind.  365,  23  N.  E.  1039. 

71  Curtis  v.   Detroit  &  M.  R.   Co.  74  Mitchell  v.  Charleston  L.  &  P. 
27  Wis.   160.  Co.  45  S.  Car.  146.  31  L.  R.  A.  582. 

72  City  of  Austin  v.  Ritz,  72  Tex.  75  Evans    v.    Adams    Ex.    Co.    122 
401,  9   S.  W.   884.  Ind.  365,  23  N.  E.  1039. 


§    544  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  536 

termined  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  shown  by  the  tes- 
timony.76 

§  544.  Plaintiff  and  defendant  both  negligent. — (1)  If  the  de- 
fendant or  its  agents  could  by  ordinary  care  have  avoided  the 
consequences  of  the  plaintiff's  negligence  or  want  of  caution,  or 
by  the  direct  act  of  its  agent  caused  the  act  which  produced  the 
injury,  he  would  then  be  entitled  to  recover.77 

(2)  In  this  case  the  defendant  is  responsible  to  the  plaintiff  for 
any  injury  he  may  have  received,  if  the  defendant's  negligence  or 
the  negligence  of  its  agents  or  servants  was  the  primary  and  prox- 
imate cause  of  the  injury,  although  there  may  have  been  negli- 
gence also  on  .the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  unless  it  appears  that  under 
the  circumstances,  he  could  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  have 
avoided  the  consequences  of  the  negligence  of  the  defendants  or 
its  agents.78 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  both  the  plaintiff  and 
the   servant   of  the   defendant    operating   its    car   were   equally 
guilty  of  negligence  which  directly  contributed  to  the  accident 
and  injury  complained  of,  then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the 
defendant.79 

(4)  Although  the  defendant  did  not  exercise  the  degree  of  care 
required  of  it,  yet,  if  the  plaintiff  was  also  at  fault,  and  his  fault 
contributed  directly  to  produce  the  injury,  he  cannot  recover. 
His  right  to  recover,  however,  is  not  affected  by  his  having  con- 
tributed to  the  injury,  unless  he  was  in  fault  in  so  doing.80 

(5)  Notwithstanding  the  jury  shall  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  defendant  was  guilty  of  negligence,  yet  if  they  shall  fur- 
ther believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  also  guilty 
of  negligence,  and  that  the  accident  was  directly  caused  partly  by 
the  defendant's  negligence  and  partly  by  the  plaintiff's  negli- 
gence, then  the  verdict  of  the  jury  must  be  for  the  defendant, 
without  regard  to  whose  negligence  was  the  greater.81 

(6)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  both  the  plaintiff  and 

76  St.  Louis  N.   S.   Yards  v.  God-  ™  Tillman    v.    St.    Louis    Tr.    Co. 
frey,  198  111.  294,  65  N.  E.  90.  (Mo.  App.)   77  S.  W.  321. 

77  Houston,  T.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gor-  so  Iron  R.  Co.  v.  Mowery,  36  Ohio 
bett,  49  Tex.  571;  Richmond,  P.  &  P.  St.   418. 

Co.  v.  Allen   (Va.)   43  S.  E.  356.  »i  Philadelphia,   W.    &   B.    R.   Co. 

78  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gor-       v.  Anderson,  72  Md.  522,  20  Atl.  2. 
bett,  49  Tex.  576. 


537  BOTH  PARTIES  NEGLIGENT.  §    544 

the  servant  of  the  defendant  operating  its  car  were  guilty  of  negli- 
gence which  directly  contributed  to  the  accident  and  injury  com- 
plained of,  then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant,  and  it 
makes  no  difference  whose  negligence  was  the  greater.  But  if  the 
defendant  or  its  agents  could  by  ordinary  care  have  avoided  the 
consequences  of  the  plaintiff's  negligence  or  want  of  care,  the 
plaintiff  would  then  be  entitled  to  recover,  notwithstanding  the 
negligence  of  the  plaintiff.82 

(7)  The  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  notwithstanding  there  may 
have  been  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  or  its  agents 
which  have  contributed  to  the  accident,  if  he,  by  the  want  of  ordi- 
nary care,  and  by  his  own  voluntary  acts,  so  far  himself  contrib- 
uted to  the  accident,  that  but  for  this  fact  it  would  not  have  hap- 
pened.83 

(8)  If  the  jury  are  satisfied  that  the  tenant,  G,  having  discov- 
ered the  presence  of  gas  in  an  unusually  large  quantity  in  the 
house,  or  in  a  room  of  the  house,  did  not  take  reasonable  means  and 
precautions  to  remove  and  exclude  the  gas,  or,  not  knowing  what 
such  precautions  were,  did  not  notify  the  servants  of  the  defend- 
ant that  gas  was  escaping,  or  make  some  reasonable  effort  to 
notify  them  that  gas  was  escaping  into  the  house,  and  if  he  reck- 
lessly brought  the  flame  of  the  candle  into  contact  with  the  gas 
and  air  of  the  room,  his  want  of  care  will  prevent  recovery  on  the 
part  of  the  plaintiff  in  this  case,  although  the  jury  may  believe 
that  the  defendant  was  negligent.84 

(9)  If  the  plaintiff  knew  the  dangerous  condition  of  the  roof  of 
the  room,  and  continued  in  the  service  in  the  room  or  remained 
therein,  he  cannot  recover  in  this  case.85 

(10)  If  the  plaintiff  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  could  have 
ascertained  that  the  part  of  the  roof  which  fell   and   injured 
him  was  in  an  unsafe  condition  and  liable  to  fall,  and  exposed 
himself  to  the  danger  by  going  thereunder,  he  cannot  recover  in 
this  case.86 

(11)  If  the  defendant  in  this  case  neglected  to  furnish  props  at 

82  Tillman    v.    St.    Louis    Tr.    Co.  «s  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gor- 

(Mo.    App.)    77    S.    W.    321;    Phila-  bett,  49  Tex.  576. 

delphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Ander-  s*  Bartlett  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co. 

son,  72  Md.  522,  20  Atl.  2;  Houston,  122  Mass.   213. 

T.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gorbett,  49  Tex.  ^  Coal     Co.     v.     Estievenard,     53 

571;  Iron  R.  Co.  v.  Mowery,  36  Ohio  Ohio  St.  56,  40  N.  E.  725. 

St.  418;  Richmond  P.  P.  Co.  v.  Allen  ««  Coal  Co.  v.  Estievenard,  53  Ohio 

(Va.),  43  S.  E.  356.  St.  56,  40  N.  E.  725. 


§    544  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  538 

the  room  in  which  the  plaintiff  worked,  and  the  roof  of  the  room 
was  in  a  dangerous  condition  and  the  plaintiff  knew  its  condition, 
then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  in  this  case.87 

(12)  Under  the  most  careful  circumstances  mining  coal  is  at- 
tended with  danger,  and  persons  engaged  therein  are  presumed  to 
incur  the  risks  incident  thereto,  and  if  the  plaintiff  in  this  case 
knew,  or  had  the  means  of  knowing,  that  a  part  of  the  roof 
of  the  room  in  which  he  worked  was  unsafe  and  liable  to  fall 
he  cannot  recover  in  this  case.8* 

(13)  If  the  plaintiff,  at  the  time  he  was  injured,  was  acting  by 
his  own  will  and  his  own  judgment,  uncontrolled  by  any  one  con- 
nected with  the  mine,  and  if  it  was  his  duty  to  have  determined 
whether  or  not  the  roof  of  the  mine  was  safe  to  work  under,  and 
if  the  plaintiff  was  injured  by  his  own  misjudgment  or  negligence, 
he  cannot  recover  in  this  action,  and  your  verdict  should  be  for 
the   defendant/9 

(14)  If  a  part  of  the  roof  of  the  room  in  which  the  plaintiff 
worked  was  unsafe  and  liable  to  fall,  and  props  were  needed  for 
its  support,  and  the  defendants  neglected  to  furnish  the  props 
when  needed,  and  the  plaintiff  had  the  means  of  knowing  the 
roof  was  in  that  unsafe  condition,   and  remained  in  the  room 
or  otherwise  exposed  himself  to  the  danger  from  the  fall  of  the 
roof,  when  he  could  have  left  the  room,  then  the  plaintiff  can- 
not recover  in  this  case.90 

(15)  If  a  part  of  the  roof  of  the  room  in  which  the  plaintiff 
worked  was  unsafe  and  liable  to  fall,  and  props  were  needed  for 
its  support,  and  the  defendant  neglected  to  furnish  the  props  when 
needed,  and  the  plaintiff  "knew  the  roof  was  in  that  unsafe  condi- 
tion, and  remained  in  the  room  or  otherwise  exposed  himself  to 
the  danger  from  the  fall  of  the  roof,  when  he  could  have  left  the  ' 
room,  the  plaintiff  cfannot  recover  in  this  case.91 

(16)  If  the  defendant  in  this  case  neglected  to  furnish  props  at 
the  room  in  which  the  plaintiff  worked,  and  the  roof  of  the  room 
was  in  a  dangerous  condition,  and  the  plaintiff  had  the  means  of 

ST  Coal  Co  v.  Estievenard,  53  .so  Coal  Co.  v.  Estievenard,  53 

Ohio  St.  55.  40  N.  E.  725.  Ohio  St.  55,  40  N.  E.  725.  But  see 

ss  Coal  Co.  v.  Estievenard,  53  Davis  Coal  Co.  v.  Polland,  158  Ind. 

Ohio  St.  55,  40  N.  E.  725.  &07. 

fin  Coal  Co  v.  Estievenard,  53  »i  Coal  Co.  v.  Estievenard,  53 

Ohio  St.  57,  40  N.  E.  725.  Ohio  St.  55,  40  N.  E.  725. 


539         INJURY  FROM  ACCIDENT  OR  NATURAL  CAUSE.       §  545 

knowing  that  the  roof  was  in  a  dangerous  condition,  then  the 
plaintiff  cannot  recover  in  this  case.u- 

§  545.  Injury  resulting  from  accident  or  natural  cause. — (1) 
Although  the  jury  may  believe  that  the  injuries  to  the  plaintiff's 
property  occurred  at  a  time  when  the  defendant  was  guilty  oi 
negligence,  in  not  keeping  their  bulk-head,  ice-breaker  or  other 
works  in  repair,  nevertheless,  if  the  jury  also  believe,  from  the 
evidence,  that  the  defendant  could  not  have  prevented  such  in- 
jury by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  then  the  defendant  is  not 
liable  for  such  injuries.93 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  weight  of  the  testimony  that  the  sole 
cause   of  the   loss  was   an   extraordinary  flood— of   course,   the 
cemetery  company  would  not  be  responsible  for  that — your  ver- 
dict should  be  for  the  defendant.     If,  however,  the  weight  of  the 
evidence  satisfies  you  that  the  loss  was  the  result  of  two  concur- 
rent acts,  an  extraordinary  flood  and  some  negligence  of  the  said 
company  in  assisting  in  producing  the  loss,  then  the  said  com- 
pany would  be  liable.94 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  frost  or  extreme 
cold  was  not  the  sole  cause  of  the  breaking  of  said  rail,  but 
only  contributed  thereto,  and  the  railroad  track  where  said  rail 
broke  was  in  an  unsafe  and  dangerous  condition,   that  might 
have  been  remedied  or  guarded  against  by  the  exercise  by  de- 
fendant's  employees   of  the   highest   degree   of   care   and   skill 
then  practicable  and  then  known  to  track  repairers,  and  that 
such  unsafe  and  dangerous  condition  of  said  railroad  track  of 
defendant   at  said  point   also   contributed  to   cause  the   break- 
ing of  said  rail  jointly  with  the  said  frost  and  extreme  cold, 
then  the  law  is  for  the  plaintiff,  and  he  is  entitled  to  compen- 
satory damages.95 

(4)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  immediate  cause  of 
the  alleged  disaster  was  the  want  of  the  proper  construction 
of  said  bridge  over  W  river,  either  as  to  size,  material,  piers, 
or  the  adjustment  thereof,  then  you  should  find  for  the  plain-, 
tiff,  unless  you  should  further  find  that  the  size  and  construc- 

92  Coal    Co.    v.    Estievenard,     53  94  Helbing    v.    Allegheny    Ceme- 
Ohio  St.  56,  40  N.  E.  725.  tery  Co.  201  Pa.  St.  172,  50  Atl.  970. 

93  sterling  Hydraulic  Co.  v.  Wil-  93  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox, 
liams,  66  111.  400.  74  Ky.   (11  Bush),  506. 


§    545  NEGLIGENCE  GENERALLY.  540 

tion  of  said  bridge  were  right  and  proper  for  the  use  intended, 
and  that  the  material  in  said  bridge  had  been  properly  tested, 
by  tests  known  to  men  skilled  in  such  material,  or  could  not 
be  so  tested  and  preserve  the  strength  of  said  material,  and 
said  disaster  was  caused  by  a  defect  in  said  material  which 
could  neither  be  foreseen  nor  provided  against  by  human  fore- 
sight and  care,  then  you  should  find  for  the  defendant.96 

(5)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  accident  was  occa- 
sioned by  a  condition  of  things  which  the  company  could  neither 
foresee  nor  provide  against,  then  you  should  find  for  the  de- 
fendant.97 

(6)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  action  complained 
of  was  occasioned  by  a  condition  of  things  which  the  defendant 
company   could   neither  foresee  nor   provide   against,   then   the 
plaintiff    cannot    recover.     So,    if   you    find    from    the    evidence 
that  the  size  and  construction  of  the  bridge  in  question  were 
right  and  proper  for  the  use  intended,   and  that  the  material 
of    the    bridge    had    been    properly    tested    by    tests    known 
to  men  skilled  in  such  material,  or  could  not  be  so  tested  and 
preserve   the  strength  of  said  material,   and  the   said   disaster 
was  caused  by'  a  defect  in  the  material   of  the  bridge  which 
could  neither  be  foreseen  nor  provided  against  by  human  fore- 
sight and  care,  then  you  should  find  for  the  defendant.98 

(7)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  such  injury  as  the 
plaintiff  claims  he  has  sustained  could  not  have  resulted  without 
leaving   such   marked   traces   of   deformity    as   would   manifest 
itself  to  medical   experts,  so   as  to   enable  them   to   detect  the 
cause   of  his  present  physical   condition,   aside   from  the   mere 
wasted    and    shrunken    condition    of   the    muscles    of   his    right 
arm  and  shoulder,  and  -you  further  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  wasted  and  shrunken  condition  may  have  resulted  from 
simple  disease  without  injury,  and  no  such  nor  any  traces  of 
deformity  can  be  discovered  as  would  account  for  the  wasting 
of  the  muscles,  then  you  are  bound  to  attribute  it  to  disuse.99 

§  546.    Negligence  in  the  use  of  electricity. — (1)    The  degree  of 

96  Bedford,  S.  O.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  **  Bedford,  S.  O.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v. 

Rainbolt,  99  Ind.  556.  Rainbolt,  99  lad.  551. 

»7  Beedford,  S.  O.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  n»  Allison  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

Rainbolt,  99  Ind.  551.  42  Iowa,  282. 


541  NEGLIGENCE  IN   USING  ELECTRICITY.  §    546 

care  which  the  law  requires  in  order  to  guard  against  injury 
to  others  varies  greatly,  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
case;  and  if  the  jury  believe  that  electricty  was  the  power 
used  by  the  defendant  in  its  business,  and  is  a  highly  danger- 
ous agency  to  life,  unless  exercised  with  constant  and  extreme 
care,  then,  to  such  extent,  a  high  degree  of  care  in  its  super-- 
vision, management  and  use  is  required  of  defendant,  and  a 
failure  on  its  part  to  exercise  such  high  degree  of  care  would 
be  negligence.100 

(2)  If  you  believe  that  the  defendant  company  was  notified  by 
telephone  that  there  was  trouble  with  its  wires,  and  failed  to 
take   immediate   steps   to   investigate   such   trouble   and   rectify 
the  same,  if  trouble  existed,  and  if  a  sufficient  time  between 
the  notice  to  the  defendant  of  the  trouble  to  its  wires  and  the 
accident  to  the  plaintiff  for  its  investigation  and  attention  had 
elapsed,    and   thereafter,    by   reason   of   the   failure   of  the    de- 
fendant to  attend  to  its  said  wires,  such  wire  or  wires  charged 
with  electricity  hung  suspended  over  the  scene  of  the  accident 
so  as  to  become  dangerous  to  persons  on  the  street,  then  the 
defendant  would  be  guilty  of  negligence.     I  charge  you  that, 
which,  in  plain  words,  is  that  if  the  company  was  notified  that 
its  wires  were  down,  and  did  not  take  steps  in  a  reasonable 
length  of  time  to  repair  them,  it  would  be  guilty,  if  an  acci- 
dent occurred,  in  not  repairing  their  wires  in  a  reasonable  length 
of  time.101 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
was  negligent,  according  to  the  definitions  given  above,  and  that, 
in  consequence  of  such  negligence,  the  plaintiff  accidently  came 
in   contact   with   wires   charged   with   electricity,   operated   and 
controlled   by    defendant,    and   was   injured   thereby,    then   the 
plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  recover.102 

(4)  There  is  no  evidence  of  any  other  cause  of  the  death  of  the 
plaintiff's  intestate  except  from  the  electricity  coming  from  the 
wire  of  the  defendant;  therefore,  if  the  jury  find  from  the  evi- 
dence that  the  death  of  the  intestate  was  caused  by  the  current 

100  Mitchell  v.  Charleston  L.  &  P.          102  Mitchell  v.  Charleston  L.  &  P. 
Co.  45  S.  Car.  146,  22  S.  E.  769.  Co.  45  S.  Car.  146,  22  S.  E.  769. 

101  Mitchell    v.    Charleston    L.    & 
P.  Co.  45  S.  Car.  146,  22  S.  E.  769. 


§    547  NEGLIGENCE    GENERALLY.  542 

of  the  electricity  passing  into  his  body  from  the  charged  wire  of 
the  defendant,  the  jury  will  find  that  the  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  death  of  the  plaintiff's 
intestate.103 

§547.  Electric  wires  out  of  repair. — (1)  The  defendant  was 
entitled  to  a  reasonable  time,  after  the  fall  of  the  wire,  to  repair 
it,  or  remove  it  out  of  the  way  of  persons  using  the  street, 
and  if  you  find  that  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff  occurred  before 
the  expiration  of  such  reasonable,  time,  then  the  plaintiff  is  not 
entitled  to  recover  anything  in  this  action.104 

(2)  The  law  does  not  require  impossibilities  of  any  person,  nat- 
ural or  artificial,  nor  does  it  require  that  the  defendant  should 
have  ready  for  service  at  every  moment  and  every  point  of  expos- 
ure, an  adequate  force  to  overcome  a  sudden  fracture  of  wire  or 
any  other  like  casualty  in  the  shortest  possible  time.  All  it  can  be 
required  to  do  in  this  connection  is  to  maintain  an  efficient  sys- 
tem  of  oversight,   and  to   be   prepared   with  a   competent   and 
sufficient  force  ready  to   furnish,   within   a  reasonable   time,   a 
proper  remedy   for   all   such   casualties,    defects   and   accidents, 
as   from   experience   there   was   any   reasonable    ground   to    an- 
ticipate might  occur.105 

(3)  Although  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this 
cause  that  the  defendant  company  was  guilty  of  negligence  in  the 
manner  of  constructing  or  maintaining  its  electric  wire  over  and 
above  the  track  of  the  railroad  company  in  question,  still  the 
plaintiff  had  no  right  to  attempt  to  pass  from  one  car  to  another 
while  the  cars  were  passing  under  the  said  wire,  if  in  so  doing 
he  increased  the  danger  of  an  accident  from  the  said  wire,  and 
if,  from  the  evidence,  the  jury  believe  that  the  plaintiff  did  at- 
tempt to  pass  from  one  car  to  another  while  passing  under  said 
wire,  and  by  so  doing  did  increase  the  danger  and  chance  of  the 
accident,  he  cannot  recover  in  this  case,  and  the  jury  must  find 
for  the  defendant.106 

(4)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  accident  com- 
plained of  by  the  plaintiff  was  caused  solely  by  hidden  or  latent 

103  Mitchell  v.  Electric  Co.  129  N.  105  Mitchell  v.  Charleston  L.  &  P. 
Car.  173,  39  S.  E.  801.  Co.  45  S.  Car.  146,  22  S.  E.  769. 

104  Mitchell  v.  Charleston  L.  &  P.  ioe  Danville  St.   Car  Co.   v.  Wat- 
Co.  45  S.  Car.  146,  22  S.  E.  769.  kins,  97  Va.  717,  34  S.  E.  884. 


543  ELECTRIC  WIRES  OUT  OF  REPAIR.  §  547 

defect — not  apparent  to  the  eye — in  the  trolley  wire  of  the  de- 
fendant, and  that  the  defendant  could  not  have  discovered  or 
detected  it  by  any  reasonable  examination  by  the  defendant 
or  its  agents,  and  the  jury  further  find  that  the  defendant 
company  employed  such  proper  and  suitable  contractors  to  erect 
the  trolley  wire  and  over-head  construction  at  the  place  of  the 
accident ;  and  that  such  contractors  used  suitable  material  and 
a  proper  and  skillful  method  of  over-head  construction  of  the 
place  of  the  accident,  then  defendant  has  performed  its  duty 
to  the  passenger  in  this  regard,  and  the  verdict  must  be  for 
the  defendant,  even  though  the  jury  further  find  that  the  plain- 
tiff, without  fault  on  his  part,  did  receive  injuries  by  reason 
of  the  breaking  and  falling  of  said  trolley  wire.107 

io7  Baltimore    City    P.    R.    Co.    v.      Nugent  86  Md.  351,  38  Atl.  779. 


CHAPTER  XL. 


NEGLIGENCE    OP   CARRIERS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

548.  Negligence     of     carrier     pre-      569. 

sumed — Burden. 

549.  High  degree  of  care  required      570. 

of  carriers. 

550.  Carrier    liable,     though     neg-      571. 

ligence   only   slight. 

551.  Care    of    passenger — Ordinary      572. 

care. 

552.  Carrier    bound    to    carry    sick      573. 

person. 

553.  Drunkenness  of  passenger  not      574. 

negligence. 

554.  Injury  to  postal  clerk  in  mail      575. 

train. 

555.  Injury  to  passenger  on  freight       576. 

train.  577. 

556.  Ordering    or    putting    passen- 

ger off  moving  train.  578. 

557.  Willful   ejection  of  passenger 

from  train.  579. 

558.  Plaintiff   a    trespasser,    not   a 

passenger.  580. 

559.  Children    trespassers,    getting 

on  train.  581. 

560.  Passenger   assisting  in   push- 

ing car.  582. 

561.  Passenger  getting  off  moving 

train.  583. 

562.  Plaintiff  negligent   in   getting      584. 

off  train. 

563.  Passenger   injured   in   leaving      585. 

train. 

564.  Duty  of  carrier  to  stop  train.       586. 

565.  Passenger  entitled  to  reason- 

able time  to  get  off.  587. 

566.  Platform    unsafe  —  Passenger 

getting  off.  588. 

567.  Injury  to  passenger  approach- 

ing or  getting  on  train.  589. 

568.  Passenger    negligent    in    get- 

ting on  train.  590. 

544 


Passenger  falling  off  plat- 
form— No  liability. 

Passenger  riding  upon  plat- 
form of  car. 

Assisting  passenger  —  By 
agent  of  carrier. 

Ticket  not  essential  to  be- 
come passenger. 

Mistake  of  conductor  in  tak- 
ing ticket. 

Putting  off  passenger  for 
want  of  ticket  or  fare. 

Putting  off  disorderly  passen- 
ger. 

Passenger   on   wrong   train. 

Passenger  may  rely  on  direc- 
tions of  carrier's  agents. 

Passenger  injured  while 
changing  cars. 

Liability  when  car  owned  by 
another. 

Liability  for  injury  from  boil- 
er explosion. 

Injury  from  accident — No  li- 
ability. 

Passenger  guilty  of  contribu- 
tory negligence. 

Burden  of  proof  generally. 

Carrier  not  insurer  of  passen- 
ger's safety. 

Carrier  liable  for  loss  or  in- 
jury of  baggage. 

Carrier's  liability  for  baggage 
limited. 

Goods  lost  or  delayed  by  car- 
rier— Liability. 

Carrier  not  liable  for  dam- 
age to  goods. 

Liability  in  shipment  of  live 
stock. 

Freight  rates  of  carrier  under 
federal  statute. 


NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIER — BURDEN.  §  549 

§  548.  Negligence  of  carrier  presumed — Burden. — (1)  When 
injury  or  damage  happens  to  a  passenger  (on  a  railroad)  by  a 
collision,  or  by  any  other  accident  occurring  on  the  road,  the 
prima  facie  presumption  is  that  it  occurred  by  the  negligence 
of  the  railroad  company,  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the 
company  to  establish  that  there  has  been  no  negligence  what- 
soever, and  that  the  damage  has  been  occasioned  by  inevitable 
casualty,  or  by  some  cause  which  human  care  and  foresight 
could  not  prevent.1 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  while 
a  passenger  on  one  of  the  defendant's  cars,  and  while  exercising 
ordinary  care,  was  shocked  and  knocked  off  said  car  and  injured 
by  coming  in  contact  with  the  end  of  a  broken  trolley  wire  used 
by  defendant  in  the  operation  of  their  railway,  then  their  ver- 
dict must  be  for  the  plaintiff,  unless  they  shall  further  find  that 
by  the  exercise  of  that  high  degree  of  care  required  by  reason  of 
the  well  known  dangerousness  of  the  agency  employed,  the  de- 
fendant could  not  have  prevented  the  injury  complained  of.2 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was 
a  passenger  on  one  of  defendant's  cars,   and  while   exercising 
reasonable  care  and  diligence  with  respect  to  his  own  safety, 
the   car  started  with  a  sudden  and  violent  jerk,   causing  the 
injury  now  being  inquired  into,  then  the  burden  is  thrown  upon 
the  defendant  to  show,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury,  that  the 
horses  hitched  to  the  car  were  suitable  for  the  service  in  ques- 
tion, or  that  the  accident  was  not  due  to  the  horses,  and  that 
the  servant  of  defendant  managing  the  car  exercised  the  ut- 
most care,  skill  and  foresight  in  the  management  of  the  same, 
or  that  the  accident  occurred  by  reason  of  some  cause  not  un- 
der the  control  of  defendant,  or  its  servants  and  employes;  and 
unless   the    defendant   has   so   satisfied   the   jury,   their   verdict 
should  be  for  the  plaintiff.3 

§  549.  High  degree  of  care  required  of  carriers. — (1)  While  a 
common  carrier  of  passengers  is  not  an  insurer  of  their  lives, 
still,  in  consideration  of  the  great  danger  to  human  life  conse- 

1  Shenandoah     Val.     R.     Go.     v.          s  Dougherty   v.    Missouri    R.    Co. 
Moore,  83  Va.  828,  3  S.  E.  796.  97  Mo.  647,  8  S.  W.  900. 

2  Baltimore  City  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Nu- 
gent, 86  Md.  350,  38  Atl.  779. 


§  549  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  546 

quent  upon  the  neglect  of  duty  upon  the  part  of  the  carrier, 
the  law  exacts  of  it  the  exercise  of  the  highest  practicable  care 
for  the  safety  of  its  passengers  in  the  operation  of  its  cars  and 
stopping  and  starting  its  cars  to  enable  passengers  to  get  on 
and  off  the  same,  and  for  any  failure  to  exercise  such  care 
and  for  slight  neglect  of  its  duty  in  this  respect,  resulting  in 
an  accident  or  injury,  it  is  liable  to  a  passenger  who  is  her- 
self without  fault  for  an  injury  sustained  as  the  proximate  re- 
sult of  such  negligence.4 

(2)  A  common  carrier  of  passengers,  such  as  a  street  car  com- 
pany, is  bound  to  use  the  highest  degree  of  care  for  the  safety  of 
its  passengers  and  persons  attempting  to  become  passengers  on  its 
cars.5 

(3)  Negligence,  when  applied  to  carriers  of  passengers,  means 
the  absence  in  the  performance  of  a  duty  imposed  by  law  for  the 
protection  of  others,  of  that  high  degree  of  care,  in  acting  or 
refraining  from  acting,  which  very  cautious,  prudent  and  com- 
petent persons  usually  exercise  under  like  circumstances.6 

(4)  Kailway  companies,  in  transporting  passengers  upon  their 
trains   operated   and   managed   by  their   employes,   must,   while 
thus   transporting   such   passengers,   exercise   a   high   degree   of 
care  in  order  to  avoid  accident  or  injury  to -such  passengers,  and 
the  failure  to  exercise  such  care  as  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence, 
under  like  circumstances  would  use,  is  negligence.7 

(5)  The  right  of  the  plaintiff  to  recover  in  this  case  will  be  sub- 
mitted to  you  from  two  aspects,  viz.:     (1)    Was  S  at  the  time 
a  passenger  on  defendant's  train?  or   (2)  was  he  a  trespasser? 
The  law  imposes  upon  the  defendant  company  the  duty  of  ex- 
ercising the  highest  degree  of  care  towards  him  if  he  was  a 
passenger  for  pay  on  defendant's  cars  at  the  time;  but  if  he 
was  a  trespasser  on  the  defendant's  train,  the  law  imposes  only 
the  duty  of  ordinary  care  for  his  safety  after  discovering  that 
lie  was  such  trespasser.     Now,   if  from  all  the  facts   and  cir- 
cumstances before  you,  you  find  that  at  the  time  S  was  killed 
he  was   a   passenger  on  defendant's   cars,   and  that  his   death 

*  Indianapolis      St.      R.      Co.      v.  643;      Missouri,   K.   &  T.   R.   Co.   v. 

Brown  (Ind.),  69  N.  E.  408.  White,  22  Tex.  Cv.  App.  424,  55  S. 

s  Tillman    v.    St.    Louis    Tr.    Co.  W.   593. 

(Mo.  App.),  77  S.  W.  320.  7  Gulf,  C,  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 

«  Houston  &  T.  C.  K.  Co.  v.  Dot-  son,  79  Tex.  371,  15  S.  W.  280. 
son,  15  Tex.  Cv.  App.  73,  38  S.  W. 


547  HIGH  DEGREE  OF  CARE  REQUIRED.  §  549 

was  caused  or  occasioned  by  the  carelessness  of  those  in  charge 
of  the  train  at  the  time;  that  is,  if  you  find  that  the  head-end 
collision  which  resulted  in  S's  death  was  brought  about  through 
the  carelessness  and  negligence  and  want  of  proper  care  on  the 
part  of  those  operating  the  trains  at  the  time,  then  the  de- 
fendant company  would  be  liable  in  this  case.  If  you  find 
and  believe  that  S  at  the  time  was  a  trespasser  on  defendant's 
train,  that  he  at  the  time  was  riding  on  what  is  commonly  known 
as  the  "blind  baggage,"  endeavoring  to  travel  without  paying 
for  his  passage;  and  you  further  find  and  believe  that  a  per- 
son of  ordinary  prudence  and  caution  would  not  have  been  in 
such  position,  and  would  not  have  acted  as  S  did  at  the  time 
he  boarded  the  train,  then,  if  you  find  this  to  be  the  case,  the 
defendant  company  would  not  be  liable,  unless  you  further 
find  and  believe  that  the  servants  and  agents  of  the  defendant 
company  knew  of  his  position  before  the  accident,  and  could 
have  prevented  the  accident  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care.8 

(6)  It  is  the  duty  of  common  carriers  to  do  all  that  human  care, 
vigilance   and   foresight   can   reasonably   do   under  the   circum- 
stances and  in  view  of  the  character  of  the  mode  of  convey- 
ance adopted,  reasonably  to  guard  against  accidents  and  con- 
sequential injuries,  and  if  they  neglect  so  to  do,  they  are  to  be 
held  strictly  responsible  for  all  consequences  which  flow  from 
such  neglect;  that  while  the   carrier  is  not  an  insurer  of  the 
absolute   safety    of   the   passenger,    it   does,    however,    in   legal 
contemplation,  •  undertake  to  exercise  the  highest  degree  of  care 
to  secure  the  safety  of  the  passenger,   and  is  responsible  for 
the   slightest   neglect   resulting   in   injury   to   the   passenger,   if 
the  passenger  is,  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  exercising  ordinary 
care  for  his  or  her  safety;  and  this  care  applies  alike  to  the 
safe   and  proper  construction  and  equipment  of  the  road,  the 
employment  of  skillful  and  prudent  operatives,  and  the  faith 
ful  performance  by  them  of  their  respective  duties.9 

(7)  Common  carriers  of  persons  are  required  to  do  all  that  hu- 
man care,  vigilance  and  foresight  can  reasonably  do,  consistent 
with  the  character  and  mode  of  conveyance  adopted,  and  the  prac- 

s  Southerland  v.  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co.         »  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Byrum, 
(Tex.  Cv.  App.)  40  S.  W.  195.  153  111.  131,  133,  38  N.  E.  578. 


§  549  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  548 

ticable  prosecution  of  the  business  to  prevent  accidents  to  passen- 
gers riding  upon  their  trains  or  alighting  therefrom.10 

(8)  If  the  plaintiff  was  a  passenger  upon  the  defendant's  road 
in  one  of  the  defendant's  coaches,  as  alleged  in  the  complaint, 
the  defendant's  obligation  was  to  carry  her  safely  and  properly; 
and   if  the   defendant   entrusted  this   duty   to   the   servants   of 
the  company,  the  law  holds  the  defendant  responsible  for  the 
manner  in  which  they  execute  it.     The   carrier  is   obliged  to 
protect  its  passengers  from  improper  and  unnecessary  violence 
at  the  hands  of  its  own  servants.     And  it  is  the   established 
law  that  a  carrier  is  responsible  for  the  negligence  and  wrong- 
ful conduct  of  its  servants,  suffered  or  done  in  the  line  of  their 
employment  whereby  a  passenger  is  injured.11 

(9)  A  carrier  of  passengers  for  pay  is  responsible  for  injuries 
sustained  by  a  passenger  through  the  neglect,  recklessness  and 
carelessness  of  the  servants  of  such  carrier,  while  they  are  engaged 
in  the  general  scope  of  their  employment,  whether  the  act  was  or 
was  not  authorized  by  the  carrier.12 

(10)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  railroad  company  to  convey  its  passen- 
gers safely,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  employes  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany to  exercise  care  and  diligence  in  the  performance  of  their 
respective  duties,  and  any  omission  or  failure  to  discharge  fully 
all  the  obligations  incumbent  upon  said  employes  is  negligence 
and  if  a  passenger  suffers  injury  by  such  negligence,  the  rail- 
road company  is  liable  therefor.13 

'(11)  The  degree  of  care  which  defendant  and  its  employes  were 
bound  to  exercise  towards  plaintiff  (if  you  find  from  the  evidence 
he  paid  his  fare  as  a  passenger  at  any  time  during  his  said  trip  on 
the  car,  as  he  alleges)  was  this:  Defendant  was  bound  to  run 
and  operate  its  cars  with  the  highest  degree  of  care  of  a  very  pru- 
dent person,  in  view  of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  at  the 
time  of  the  alleged  injury.14 

(12)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  on 
or  about  the  16th  day  of  February,  1880,  the  defendant  was  con- 

10  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Byrum,  12  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C  R  Co. 
153  111.  134,  38  N.  B.  578;  Chicago,  v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  560,  14  N.  E.  572 
&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bundy,  210  111.  47.  "international  &  G.  N.  R.  Co. 

n  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Eckford,  71  Tex.  274.  8  S.  W.  679. 
v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  560,  14  N.  E.  572.  ^  O'Connell  v.  St.  Louis,  C.  &  W. 

R.  Co.  106  Mo.  483,  17  S.  W.  494 


549  HIGH  DEGREE  OF  CARE  REQUIRED.  §  549 

trolling  and  operating  a  train  of  ears  on  a  railroad  in  this  coun- 
try, and  that  the  defendant  received  the  plaintiff  on  its  cars 
as  a  passenger,  for  hire,  then  the  court  instructs  the  jury  that 
the  defendant  was  bound  to  make  up  its  train,  couple  its  cars 
and  engines  in  such  a  careful,  skillful  and  prudent  manner 
as  to  carry  the  plaintiff  with  reasonable  safety  as  such  passen- 
ger.15 

(13)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was 
at  the  time  of  the  event  in  question  a  passenger  on  one  of  defend- 
ant's cars,  then  the  defendant  owed  to  the  plaintiff  the  duty  of 
exercising  the  utmost  care  and  vigilance  to  carry  him  over  its  road 
safely,  and  is  responsible  to  the  plaintiff  for  any  neglect  or  want 
of  proper  care  which  the  jury  may  find  from  the  evidence,  if  they 
so  find,  causing  the  injury  in  question  arising  from  the  manage- 
ment of  the  car  and  horses  by  the  defendant's  servants  or  em- 
ployes, or  from  the  use  of  skittish  or  unsuitable  horses  causing 
the  injury  in  question.16 

(14)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  railroad  company  to  use  due  care,  not 
only  in  conveying  its  passengers  upon  their  journey,  but  also  in 
all   preliminary   matters,   such   as  their  reception   into   the   car 
and   their   accommodation   while   waiting   for   it;   and   whether 
bound  to  render  assistance  in  taking  passengers  aboard  its  cars 
or  not,  it  is  liable  for  the  consequences  of  negligence  in  giving 
directions  to  passengers  as  to  the  mode  of  entering.17 

(15)  When  the  carrier  of  passengers  by  railway  does  not  re- 
ceive passengers  into  the  car  at  the  platform  erected  for  that  pur- 
pose, but  suffers  or  directs  passengers  to  enter  at  out  of  the  way 
places,  it  is  its  duty  to  use  the  utmost  care  in  preventing  accidents 
to  passengers  while  entering  the  car.18 

(16)  It  is  claimed  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  that  the  track  was 
out  of  repair  in  consequence  of  the  defendant's  neglect  to  remove 
decayed  and  unsound  ties,  and  supply  them  with  sound  ones :  that 
it  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  take  due  care  to  see  that  the 
ties  in  use  are  not  permitted  to  decay  to  such  extent  as  to  endan- 
ger the  safety  of  its  passengers,  and  omission  of  this  duty  is 
a  negligent  failure  to  keep  the  road  in  proper  repair.     It  is 

is  Hannibal   &   St.   J.   R.    Co.   v.  «  Allender  v.   C.   R.   I.   &  P.   R. 

Martin,     111     111.     219,     225.     Held  Co.  43  Iowa,  277. 

proper  and  not  assuming  facts.  is  Allender   v.   C.   R.    I.   &  P.   R. 

iG  Dougherty    v.    Missouri    R.    R.  Co.  43  Iowa,  277. 
Co.  97  Mo.  656,  8  S.  W.  900. 


§    550  NEGLIGENCE  OF   CARRIERS.  550 

for  you  to  say,  in  the  light  of  the  evidence,  whether  or  not 
the  defendant  was  guilty  of  negligence  in  regard  to  the  ties  at 
the  accident  in  question.19 

§  550.    Carrier  liable,  though  negligence  only  slight. — (1)    The 

law,  in  tenderness  to  human  life  and  limb,  holds  railroad  com- 
panies liable  for  the  slightest  negligence,  and  compels  them  to 
repel  by  satisfactory  proofs  every  imputation  of  such  negli- 
gence. When  carriers  undertake  to  convey  passengers  by  the 
powerful  but  dangerous  agency  of  steam,  public  policy  and 
safety  require  that  they  be  held  to  the  greatest  possible  care 
and  diligence.  Any  negligence  or  default  in  such  case  will  make 
such  carrier  liable.20 

(2)  If  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff  was  occasioned  without  her 
fault,  by  the  least  negligence  or  want  of  skill  or  prudence  on  the 
part  of  the  defendant  or  its  employes  in  charge  of  the  train,  the 
company  is  liable.21 

(3)  A  common  carrier  of  passengers  is  bound  to  use  the  utmost 
care  and  diligence  for  the  safety  of  passengers,  and  it  is  liable  for 
an   injury  to   a   passenger   occasioned   by  the   slightest   neglect 
against  which  prudence  and  foresight  might  have  guarded.22 

(4)  The  greatest  care  and  diligence  are  required  of  a  railroad 
company  as  a  common  carrier  of  passengers  conveyed  by  means 
of  steam-cars.    If  a  passenger  receives  an  injury  without  his  fault, 
by  the  least  negligence  or  want  of  skill  on  the  part  of  such  carrier 
or  its  employes  in  charge  of  the  train,  against  which  prudence 
and  foresight  might  have  guarded,  the  law  holds  the  carrier  liable 
for  such  injury.    And  in  this  case  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  plaintiff,  without  any  fault  on  his  part,  was  injured  as 
charged  in  his  declaration,  by  the  slightest  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant company,  then  he  is  entitled  to  recover  for  such  injury.23 

(5)  It  is  the  duty  of  stage  proprietors,  who  run  a  line  of  coaches 
for  the  conveyance  of  passengers,  to  provide  good  coaches,  har- 
ness  and   horses,    and   good,   skillful   and   careful   drivers,    and 
should  they  fail  to  do  so,  and  their  passengers  are  injured  by 

i»  Andrews  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  22  Reynolds  v.  Richmond  &  M.  R. 

P.  R.  Co.  86  Iowa,  681,  53  N.  W.  399.  Co.  92  Va.  401,  23  S.  E.  770. 

20  Shenandoah     V.      R.      Co      v.  23  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.   Co. 
Moore,  83  Va.  827,  3  S.  E.  796.  27  Wis.  158;  Shenandoah  V.  R.  Co. 

21  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.   Co.  v.   Moore,  83  Va.  823,  3  S.  E.   796; 
27  Wis.  158.  Reynolds  v.  Richmond  &  M.  R.  Co. 

92  Va.  401,  23  S.  E.  770. 


551  CARRIER  LIABLE  FOR  SLIGHT  NEGLIGENCE.  §    551 

such  failure,  the  proprietors  are  responsible.  They  are  not  only 
to  furnish  good  coaches,  harness,  horses  and  skillful  and  care- 
ful drivers,  but  they  are  to  keep  them  in  good  repair,  and  are 
to  see  that  their  drivers  drive  with  the  utmost  skill  and  pru- 
dence. Carriers  of  passengers  for  hire  are  bound  to  exert  the 
utmost  skill  and  prudence  in  conveying  their  passengers,  and 
are  responsible  for  the  slightest  negligence  or  want  of  skill  either 
in  themselves  or  their  servants.  They  are  bound  to  use  such 
care  and  diligence  as  a  most  careful  and  vigilant  man  would 
observe,  in  the  exercise  of  the  utmost  prudence  and  foresight.2* 

§  551.  Care  of  passenger — Ordinary  care. — (1)  The  degree  of 
care  required  of  a  passenger  is  not  the  highest  degree  of  care, 
but  only  the  ordinary  care  which  ordinarily  prudent  people  are 
accustomed  to  exercise.25 

(2)  If  the  plaintiffs,  in  taking  the  train  in  question,  acted  as 
persons  of  common  sense  and  ordinary  prudence  and  intelligence 
usually  act  in  like  cases,  then  there  was  no  such  negligence  on 
their  part  as  would  prevent  a  recovery  by  them  in  this  action.26 

(3)  The  plaintiff,  as  a  passenger,  was  not  required  by  law  to 
exercise  extraordinary  care  or  manifest  the  highest  degree  of  pru- 
dence to  avoid  injury.    All  the  law  required  of  him  while  traveling 
as  a  passenger  was,  that  he  should  exercise  ordinary  care  and  pru- 
dence for  his  safety,  such  as  ordinarily  careful  persons  would  ex- 
ercise under  the  same  circumstances  as  those  shown  in  evidence.27 

(4)  The  question  of  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff  exercised  ordi- 
nary care  for  her  personal  safety  before  and  at  the  time  of  the  oc- 
currence of  the  injury  complained  of,  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be 
determined  by  you  from  the  evidence.28 

(5)  The  plaintiff,  as  a  passenger,  was  not  required  by  law  to  ex- 
ercise extraordinary  care  or  manifest  the  highest  degree  of  pru- 
dence to  avoid  injury.     All  the  law  required  of  him  while  trav- 
eling as  a  passenger  was  that  he  should  exercise  ordinary  care 
and  prudence  for  his  safety,  such  as  ordinarily  careful  persons 

24  Sales   v.   Western   Stage   Co.   4  27  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  McNulty, 
Iowa,  547.  166  111.  203,  205,  46  N.  E.  784. 

25  Philadelphia,   W.   &  B.  R.   Co.  ™  Chicago   C.    R.    Co.    v.    Roach, 
v.  Anderson,  72  Md.  521,  20  Atl.  2.  180  111.  174,  54  N.  E.  212. 

26  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co. 
27  Wis.  159. 


§  552  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  55? 

would  exercise  under  the  same  circumstances.  And  whethei 
the  plaintiff  did  or  did  not  exercise  ordinary  care  for  his  per- 
sonal safety  before  and  at  the  time  of  the  occurrence  of  the  in^ 
jury  complained  of,  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  by 
you  from  the  evidence  before  you.29 

(6)  The  jury  are  instructed  by  reason  of  its  convenience  to  the 
public  as  a  carrier  of  passengers,  and  because  of  the  inability  of 
its  cars  to  turn  out,  that  a  street  railway  company  is  invested  with 
the  right  of  way  over  other  vehicles  over  and  upon  the  portion 
of  the  street  occupied  by  its  tracks,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
driver  of  such  vehicles  to  turn  out  and  allow  its  cars  to  pass, 
and  to  use  care  not  to  obstruct  and  delay  the  same,  and  if  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  while  neglecting  such 
duty  and  failing  thereby  to  use  ordinary  care  for  his  own  safety, 
was  injured,  then  he  cannot  recover  in  this  case.30 

(7)  Though  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff  informed  the  conductor  that  she  wanted  to  get  off  at 
Ninth  street,  and  although  the  car  stopped  before  reaching  Ninth 
street,  yet,  if  the  jury  believe  that  such  stop  was  not  made  for  pas- 
sengers to  alight,  but  for  the  gripman  to  await  the  signal  from  the 
watchman  to  cross  Ninth  street,  and  if  the  plaintiff  was  told  not 
to  get  off  at  that  place,  but  she  did  get  off,  and  in  so  doing 
was  thrown  down  and  injured,  then  she  cannot  recover  in  this 
action,   and  your  verdict  will  be  for  the  defendant.31 

§  552.  Carrier  bound  to  carry  sick  persons. —  (1)  A  common  car- 
rier of  passengers  is  bound  to  carry  and  transport  for  hire  per- 
sons who  are  sick,  weak,  debilitated  or  predisposed  to  disease, 
as  well  as  those  who  are  healthy  and  robust;  and  if  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  received  the  injuries  com- 
plained of,  or  any  of  them,  in  the  manner  alleged  in  the  com- 
plaint, and  that  at  the  time  of  receiving  said  injuries,  or  any 
of  them,  the  plaintiff  was  predisposed  to  malarial,  scrofulous 
or  rheumatic  tendencies,  so  that  thereby  without  the  fault  of 
the  plaintiff  her  present  condition,  whatever  you  may  find  that 

29  West  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  McNulty,  so  North    Chicago    E.     R.   Co.    v. 

166  111.   205,  46  N.  E.  784;    Chicago  Penser,  190  111.  67,  70,  60  N.  E.  78. 

C.  R.  Co.  v.  Roach,  180  111.  174,  54  si  Jackson  v.  Grand  Ave.  Ry.  Co. 

N.   E.  212;    Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  118  Mo.  216,  24  S.  W.  192. 
R.  Co.  27  Wis.  159. 


553  PASSENGER   DRUNK — INJURING   POSTAL    CLERK.  §    554 

to  be,  has  directly  resulted,  then  you  are  instructed  that  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  to  the  full  extent  of  whatever 
you  may  find  her  present  condition  to  be.32 

§  553.  Drunkenness  of  passenger,  not  negligence. — (1)  Intoxi- 
cation on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  if  the  jury  believe  that  the 
plaintiff  was  intoxicated,  is  not,  as  a  general  rule,  in  itself,  a& 
a  matter  of  law,  such  negligence  or  evidence  of  such  negli- 
gence as  will  bar  his  recovery  in  this  action.  The  law  refuses 
to  impute  negligence  as,  of  course,  to  a  plaintiff  from  the  bare 
fact  that  at  the  moment  of  suffering  the  injury  he  was  intox- 
icated. Intoxication  is  one  thing  and  negligence  sufficient  to 
bar  an  action  for  damages  quite  another  thing.  Intoxicated 
persons  are  not  removed  from  all  protection  of  law.  If  the 
plaintiff  used  that  degree  of  care  incumbent  upon  him  to  use, 
under  the  circumstances  of  this  case,  then  his  intoxication,  if 
you  believe  from  the  evidence  he  was  intoxicated,  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  accident.  When  contributory  negligence  is  one 
of  the  issues,  as  in  this  case,  it  must  appear  that  the  plaintiff 
did  not  exercise  ordinary  care,  and  that,  too,  without  refer- 
ence to  his  inebriety.  The  question  is  whether  or  not  the  plain- 
tiff's conduct  came  up  to  the  standard  of  ordinary  care — not 
whether  or  not  the  plaintiff  was  drunk.33 

(2 )  If  you,find  from  the  evidence  that  the  deceased  on  the  night 
of  June  third  and  the  morning  of  June  fourth  had  used  intox- 
icating drink,  as  testified  to  by  conductor  P  and  witnesses  Y 
and  H,  but  shall  further  find  that  he  was  not  drunk  when  he 
crossed  the  defendant's  track  at  W,  such  use  of  intoxicating 
drink  is  not  evidence  from  which  the  jury  may  infer  the  want 
of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  on  his  part.34 

§  554.  Injury  to  postal  clerk  on  mail  car. — (1)  If  you  find  from 
the  evidence  that  B,  the  plaintiff's  decedent,  was  a  postal  agent 
in  charge  of  the  United  States  mail,  being  carried  by  the  de- 
fendant company  on  its  railroad,  and  that  the  car  in  which 
said  B  and  the  said  mail  were  being  carried,  ran  off  the  railway 

32  Louisville,   N.   A.  &  C.  R.   Co.         34  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  &c. 
v.  Falvey,  104  Ind.  426,  3  N.  E.  389.       60  Md.  452. 

33  Denver  Tramway  Co.   v.   Reid, 
4  Colo.  App.  53,  35  Pac.  269. 


§  555  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  554 

track,  thereby  killing  the  said  B  without  any  fault  on  his  part, 
such  facts  would  make  a  prima  facie  case  of  negligence,  and 
would  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  a  verdict,  unless  you  find  that 
the  defendant  and  those  from  whom  it  procured  its  cars  had 
used  due  care  in  constructing  such  cars,  and  had  from  time 
to  time  carefully  inspected  the  same  to  see  if  they  remained 
in  proper  order,  and  had  failed  to  find  any  defects  in  the  same 
which  contributed  to  said  injury.35 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  on  the  20th  day  of 
August,  or  at  any  time  within  one  year  next  before  the  25th  day 
October,  1887,   a  train   of  cars  operated  by  the  defendant,  its 
agents,  servants  or  employes,  was  wrecked,  and  that  at  the  time 
of  such  wreck  the  plaintiff  was  traveling  upon  said  train  of  cars 
as  postal  or  mail  clerk  in  the  employment  of  the  United  States 
government  and  in  charge  of  the  mail  matter  of  said  train,  then 
he  would  be  entitled  to  recover  of  the  defendant  for  such  injuries 
as  he  may  have  received,  provided  they  are  the  injuries  set  forth 
in  his  petition,  resulting  from  the  negligence  (if  there  was  neg- 
ligence)   of    the    servants,    agents    or    employes  of    the  defend- 
ant, not  to  exceed  the  amount  of  either  kind  of  injury  alleged 
in  the  different  averments  in  the  plaintiff's  petition.36 

(3)  If  the  plaintiff  was  riding  in  the  mail  car,  composing  a  part 
of  said  train,  and  in  his  proper  place  in  said  car,  then  the  fact,  if 
such  be  a  fact,  that  it  was  a  more  dangerous  place  in  which  to 
travel  than  other  cars  composing  said  train,  would  in  no  way  af- 
fect the  right  of  plaintiff  to  recover  in  this  cause.37 

§  555.  Injury  to  passenger  on  freight  car. — (1)  If  the  jury  find 
that  previous  to  and  on  the  night  in  question  the  train  in  ques- 
tion had  been  and  was  carrying  passengers  and  receiving  fare, 
and  if  the  jury  shall  believe  from  all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances that  the  persons  in  consequence  of  this  went  there  to 
take  said  train,  they  were  neither  trespassers  nor  outlaws.  And 
if  said  persons  were  conducting  themselves  in  a  prudent  and 
proper  manner  in  attempting  to  get  aboard  the  train,  and  the 
boy  in  question  was  injured  in  consequence  of  the  want  of 

ss  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Voight,  37  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
122  Ind.  288,  23  N.  E.  774.  son,  79  Tex.  375,  15  S.  W.  280. 

36  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
son, 79  Tex.  374,  15  S.  W.  280. 


555      INJURY  TO  PASSENGER — PUTTING  PASSENGER  OFF.    §  55G 

ordinary   skill   and   care    on   the   part    of   the  employes  of   the 
defendant,  then  the  defendant  is  liable.38 

(2)  If  you  should  find  from  the  testimony  that  the  night  freight 
train  in  question  was  usually  made  up  and  started  from  the 
place  where  it  stood  when  the  party  having  charge  of  the  plain- 
tiff attempted  to  go  on  board,  and  that  the  defendant  com- 
pany, its  agents  or  servants,  had  previous  to  and  about  that 
time  carried  such  passengers  in  this  night  train  to  and  from  M 
as  went  aboard  on  their  own  accord,  or  upon  application  to 
some  person  having  charge  of  the  train,  collecting  from  such 
person  the  usual  fare  of  passengers,  and  further  find  that  the 
caboose  on  the  night  in  question,  and  at  the  time  the  party 
having  charge  of  the  plaintiff  went  aboard,  was  open  for  pas- 
sengers, you  will  be  warranted  in  finding  a  verdict  for  plain- 
tiff, if  you  still  further  find  the  absence  of  negligence  upon  the 
part  of  said  party  in  the  care  bestowed  upon  the  boy,  and  the 
existence  of  negligence  at  the  time  upon  the  part  of  the  em- 
ployes of  the  defendant  having  charge  of  the  train.39 

§  556.  Ordering  or  putting  passenger  off  moving  train. — (1) 
If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  a  pas- 
senger on  defendant's  train  for  K,  and,  on  arriving  there,  the 
conductor  or  agent  called  out  the  name  of  the  station  and  di- 
rected the  plaintiff  to  get  off  said  train  without  first  stopping 
it,  and  that  the  platform  at  that  station  was  unsafe  and  of  in- 
sufficient length  for  the  safe  landing  of  passengers,  and  that 
the  plaintiff  got  off  the  train  under  the  directions  of  the  de- 
fendant's conductor,  agent  or  employe,  and,  in  doing  so,  was 
injured,  on  account  of  not  stopping  said  train  in  time,  or  on 
account  of  such  unsafe  or  insufficient  platform,  the  defendant 
is  liable.40 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  or- 
dered or  directed  by  the  defendant's  conductor  or  employes  to 
get  off  the  train,  and  told  to  hurry  up,  and  such  orders  and 
directions  would  cause  a  man  of  ordinary  reason  to  believe 
that  he  must  leave  the  train,  or  submit  to  the  inconvenience 

ss  Lucas  v.  Milwaukee  &  S.  P.  R.  40  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Co.  33  Wis.  51.  Cantrell,  37  Ark.  522. 

39  Lucas  v.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co.  33  Wis.  50. 


§  557  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  556 

of  being  carried  past  the  station,  and  that  the  plaintiff  in  get- 
ting off  the  train  was  injured,  the  defendant  is  liable,  provided 
that  they  find  that  the  act  of  getting  off  the  train  was  a  care- 
ful and  prudent  act,  and  not  a  rash  and  careless  exposure  to 
peril  and  hazard.41 

(3)  Before  the  jury  can  find  for  the  plaintiff,  on  the  ground 
that  the  agent  or  other  employe  of  the  defendant  directed  or  ad- 
vised  the   plaintiff  to   get   off  the   train,   they   must   find   from 
the   evidence  that  such   directions   or   advice   were   given   at   a 
time  and  in  a  manner  that  would  have  induced  the  belief  in 
the  mind  of  a  man  of  ordinary  reason  that  such  agent  meant 
and  itended  that  he  should  get  off  at  the  time  and  under  the 
circumstances  existing  at  the  time  he  did  get  off.42 

(4)  If  the  fact  be  that  defendant's  conductor,  having  charge  of 
the  train  upon  which  plaintiff  was  a  passenger,  seized  hold  of 
her  while   the  train   was   in   motion   and   was  moving   on,   and 
pulled  her  from  the  platform  of  the  coach  by  the  exercise  of 
physical   force,   and   thereby   caused   her  to   strike   the    ground 
or  other  hard  substance  below,  whereby  she  was  injured,  she 
would  not  be  guilty  of  contributing  to  injuries  received  there- 
by.43 

(5)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  injury  to  the 
plaintiff  would  have  been  prevented  if    the     defendant    or    its 
employes     had    used     reasonable     care     and     caution     in     the 
place  and  manner  in  which  the  plaintiff  was  put  off  the  train, 
and  that  it  did  not  use  such  care  and  caution,  under  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  they  will  find  for  the  plaintiff  the 
full  amount  of  her  injury  and  damage  that  may  be  shown  by 
the   evidence.44 

§  557.  Willful  ejection  of  passenger  from  train. — (1)  The  gist 
of  this  action  is  the  alleged  wrongful  ejection  of  the  plaintiff  from 
the  defendant's  car.  He  cannot  recover  upon  proof  of  mere 
negligence.  The  cause  of  action  alleged  by  the  plaintiff  is  not 
for  negligence,  and  does  not  require  proof  of  plaintiff's  free- 
dom from  negligence.  The  plaintiff's  only  right  of  recovery 

41  St    Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.          43  Louisville,   N.   A.   &  C.  R.   Co. 
Cantrell,  37  Ark.  522.  v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  562,  14  N.  B.  572. 

42  St.  Louie,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.         44  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66 
Cantrell,  37  Ark.  523.  Miss.  312,  6  So.  207. 


557  EJECTING  PASSENGER TRESPASSER.  §  558 

under  his  complaint  is  for  willful  injury,  if  proven.  A  willful 
injury  is  that  which  flows  from  an  injurious  act  purposely  com- 
mitted with  the  intent  to  commit  injury.  In  determining  whether 
the  injury,  if  any,  was  committed  willfully,  you  may  consider 
with  the  other  circumstances  of  the  case  the  manner  of  the  con- 
ductor, the  force,  if  any,  used  by  him  and  the  effect  of  his 
acts,  together  with  the  presumption  that  every  person  intends 
the  natural  and  probable  consequences  of  his  wrongful  acts; 
and  an  unlawful  intent  may  be  inferred  from  the  conduct  which 
shows  a  reckless  disregard  of  consequences  and  a  willingness 
to  inflict  injury  by  purposely  and  voluntarily  doing  the  act, 
with  the  knowledge  that  some  one  is  in  a  situation  to  be  un- 
avoidably injured  thereby.45 

§  558.  Plaintiff  a  trespasser — Not  a  passenger. — (1)  Before  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  in  this  action,  it  must  appear  by 
a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  at  the  time  of  the 
injury,  if  any,  he  was  a  passenger  on  the  defendant's  train  of 
cars,  and  not  a  trespasser.  If  he  was  a  trespasser  he  cannot 
recover,  and  you  should  find  for  the  defendant 46 

(2)  The  plaintiff  cannot  recover  as  a  passenger  of  the  defendant 
without  showing  that  he  occupied  that  relation.4'" 

(3)  Although  the  jury  may  believe  that  A,  the  plaintiff,  had  no 
business  or  right  to  be  on  defendant's  train,  and  was  a  trespasser 
thereon,  yet,  if  they  further  believe  that  he  was  given  no  reason- 
able opportunity  to  get  off  the  train  without  exposing  himself  to 
danger,  but  was  forced  to  leave  the  train  while  the  same  was  in 
motion,  by  reason  of  force  exercised  by  the  employes  of  said 
company,  or  any  of  them,  within  the  scope  of  their  employment, 
and  that  in  so  leaving  he  received  the  injuries  complained  of, 
they  must  find  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff.48 

(4)  If  it  appear  that  H  was  not  a  passenger  at  the  time  of  the/ 
injury,  the  defendant  is  only  bound  to  the  use  of  ordinary  care, 
and  is  responsible  only  for  gross  negligence.     Ordinary  care  is 
that  degree  of  care  which  a  prudent  man  would  exercise  about 
his  own  affairs.49 

45  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Willoe-  48  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  An- 

by,  134  Ind.  567,  33  N.  E.  627.  derson,  93  Va.  651,  25  S.  E.  947. 

4e  Pfaffenback   v.    Lake   S.    &   M.  49  Huelsenkamp    v.    Citizens     R. 

S.  R.  Co.  142  Ind.  251,  41  N.  E.  530.  Co.  37  Mo.  540. 

*7  Lucas   v.    Milwaukee  &   St.   P. 
R.  Co.  33  Wis.  50. 


§    559  NEGLIGENCE  OF   CARRIERS.  558 

(5)  If  it  appear  that  H  was  not  a  passenger,  and  that  he  did  not 
in  any  manner,  by  his  own  negligence,  contribute  to  the  injury, 
still  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  unless  it  appear  that  the  injury 
and  death  were  caused  by  the  gross  negligence  of  defendant  or  its 
agents.50 

§  559.  Children  trespassers — Getting  on  cars. — (1)  If  the  plain- 
jtiff,  at  the  time  of  the  injury  complained  of,  was  a  child  of 
tender  age  of  seven  years,  and  was  riding  upon  the  defendant's 
car  in  the  city  of  R  while  the  same  was  in  motion,  and  that 
the  defendant's  servants  in  charge  of  said  car  knew  of  his 
presence  on  the  car  and  ordered  him  to  get  off,  it  was  their 
duty  to  have  reduced  the  speed  of  the  car  before  ordering  the 
plaintiff  to  leave  it,  to  such  a  rate  of  speed  as  the  plaintiff 
might  depart  from  the  car  with  safety,  notwithstanding  the  jury 
may  believe  that  the  plaintiff  was,  at  the  time,  a  trespasser 
upon  the  defendant's  car.  But  in  order  to  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff, the  jury  must  believe  that  the  order  of  the  conductor  was 
given  in  such  a  manner  as  to  frighten  or  intimidate  the  plain- 
tiff to  such  an  extent  as  to  cause  him  to  jump  from  the  car 
while  it  was  in  motion,  taking  into  consideration  the  age  and 
capacity  of  the  plaintiff.51 

(2)  If  the  jury  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  em- 
ployes of  the  defendant  knew,  or  could  have  known  by  the  exer- 
cise of  ordinary  care,  the  plaintiff  was  on  said  car,  in  a  dangerous 
situation  or  position,  considering  his  age  and  experience  and  un- 
derstanding, then  it  was  their  duty  to  slow  up  sufficiently  to  permit 
the  plaintiff  to  leave  said  car  in  safety,  if  the  same  was  in  motion, 
and  if  the  said  car  had  not  been  started,  not  to  start  the  same 
until  the  plaintiff  had  gotten  to  a  place  of  safety ;  and  if  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  injury  complained  of  resulted 
to  the  plaintiff  from  the  failure  of  said  employes  in  either  one  of 
these  particulars,  they  must  find  for  the  plaintiff,  provided  they 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  exercised  such  a 
degree  of  care  and  caution  as  under  the  circumstances  might 
reasonably  be  expected  from  one  of  his  age  and  experience.52 

so  Huelsenkamp  v.  Citizens'  R.  52  Richmond  Tr.  Co.  v.  Wilkin- 
Co.  37  Mo.  540.  son  (Va.),  43  S.  B.  623. 

si  Richmond    Tr.    Co.   v.   Wilkin- 
son (Va.),  43  S.  E.  624. 


559  CHILDREN    TRESPASSERS    ON    TRAINS.  §    559 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from,  the  evidence  that  the  motorman  or 
conductor  knew  or  could  have  known  by  the  exercise  of  reason- 
able care  that  when  the  car  was  about  to  start  off  on  its  return 
trip  that  the  plaintiff  occupied  a  dangerous  position  for  a  child 
of  tender  years,  then  it  was  the   duty  of  the   said  conductor 
and  motorman  not  to  start  the  car  while  the  plaintiff  was  so 
occupying  said  position;  and  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  they  did  so,  negligence  may  be  imputed  to  the  defendant, 
if  the  jury  believe  that  the  accident  was  occasioned  by  such 
negligence;  provided  the  jury  shall  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  plaintiff  exercised  such  a  degree  of  care  and  caution 
as,  under  the  circumstances,  might  reasonably  be  expected  from 
one  of  his  age  and  intelligence.53 

(4)  If  the  jury  shall  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 
was  injured  by  jumping  from  a  moving  train  of  the  defendant 
whilst  being  propelled  through  the  streets  of  the  city  of  A,  at 
the  unlawful  rate  of  speed  of  from  ten  to  twelve  miles  per  hour, 
and   that   the   plaintiff's    act   of   jumping   from   the   train   was 
caused  by  the  orders  of  the  defendant's  motorman  or  conductor 
in  charge  of  the  train,  then  they  may  find  for  the  plaintiff; 
provided  the  jury  shall  believe  that  the  plaintiff,  by  reason  of 
his  age  and  want  of  judgment  and  discretion,  was  unable  to 
exercise  sufficient  care  and  caution  to  resist  the  orders  of  the 
defendant's   said   motorman.54 

(5)  Although  the  jury  may  find  from  the  evidence  that  at  the 
time  of  the  accident  to  the  plaintiff  defendant 's  train  was  running 
at  a  greater  rate  of  speed  than  five  miles  an  hour,  that  would 
not  justify  a  recovery  in  this  case  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  unless 
the  jury  further  find  that  the  plaintiff,  taking  into  consideration 
his  age  and  experience  and  understanding,  by  reason  of  the  threat- 
ening- language   of  the   motorman,   had   reasonable   ground   for 
believing  that  the  motorman  intended  to  inflict  physical  violence 
upon  the  plaintiff  or  to  eject  him  from  the  car,  or  so  terrorized 
the  plaintiff  as  to  compel  him,  against  his  will,  to  jump  from 
the  car.55 

53  Richmond    Tr.    Co.   v.   Wilkin-          55  Washington,  A.  &  Mt.  V.  Elec- 
son  (Va.),  43  S.  E.  624.  trie  R.  Co.  v.  Quayle,  95  Va.  745,  30 

s*  Washington,  A.  &  Mt.  V.  Elec.       S.  E.  391. 
R.  Co.  v.  Quayle,  95  Va.  747,  30  S. 
E.  391. 


§    560  NEGLIGENCE  OF   CARRIERS.  560 

(6)  Although  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
motorman  called  to  the  plaintiff  and  his  companions  to  get  off 
the  car,  yet,  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  in  this  action,  the 
jury  must  believe  that  said  call  of  the  motorman  was  of  such  a 
threatening  character  as  to  justify  the  belief  in  the  mind  of  the 
plaintiff,  taking  into  consideration  his  age,  that  the  motorman 
intended  to  do  him  bodily  harm  or  to  eject  him  from  the  said  car 
while  it  was  in  motion,  and  the  plaintiff,  through  fear  of  such 
threat,  jumped  from  the  car  and  was  injured ;  and  that  the  jury 
must  further  believe  that  it  was  within  the  scope  of  the  duty  of 
said  motorman  to  order  the  plaintiff  to  get  off  said  car.56 

(7)  If  plaintiff  at  the  time  of  the  injury  was  a  child  of  the  ten- 
der age  of  thirteen  years,  and  was  riding  upon  the  defendant 's  car 
in  the  city  of  A,  whilst  the  same  was  traveling  at  a  fast  rate  of 
speed,   then  it  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant's  motorman  in 
charge  of  said  train  to  have  reduced  the  speed  of  said  train, 
before  ordering  the  plaintiff  to  leave  the  same,  to  such  a  rate  of 
speed  as  that  the  plaintiff  might  depart  from  the  train  with  safety, 
notwithstanding  the  jury  may  believe  that  the  plaintiff  was  at 
the  time  a  trespasser  upon  the  defendant's  car.57 

§560.  Passenger  assisting  in  pushing  car. —  (1)  If  the  plaintiff 
was  requested  by  the  driver  of  the  car  to  assist  in  pushing  it 
back,  and  he  did  so  assist  and  in  doing  so  was  injured  by  the 
negligence  or  carelessness  of  the  driver  of  the  car  on  which  he 
had  been  riding,  or  of  another  car,  he  can  recover  if  such  assist- 
ance was  apparently  necessary.  Or  if  there  was  an  actual  neces- 
sity for  him  to  assist  the  driver  in  pushing  back  the  car,  and  he 
did  so  assist,  and  while  doing  so  was  injured  by  the  negligence 
of  the  driver  of  either  this  car  or  another,  he  can  recover, 
whether  he  was  requested  by  the  driver  to  do  so  or  not.58  . 

§  561.  Passenger  getting  off  a  moving  train. — (1)  If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  cause  that  the  defendant's  train 
did  not  stop  at  the  station  at  K  long  enough  to  enable  the  plain- 
tiff, A,  to  leave  the  car  and  reach  the  platform  while  the  train 

oe  Washington,  A.  &  Mt.  V.  Elec-  trie  R.  Co.  v.  Quayle,  95  Va.  747,  30 

trie  R.  Co.  v.  Quayle,  95  Va.  744,  30  S.  E.  391. 

S.  E.  391.  ss  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Bolton,  43  Ohio 

ST  Washington,  A.  &  Mt.  V.  Elec-  St.  226,  1  N.  E.  333. 


561  PASSENGER  GETTING  OFF  MOVING  TRAIN.         §  561 

was  stationary,  and  that  she  stepped  off  therefrom  on  the  plat- 
form while  the  train  was  in  motion,  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury 
to  say  whether  she  was  guilty  of  negligence,  as  above  denned, 
and  barred  thereby  from  a  recovery  for  the  injuries  received.59 

(2)  A  passenger  upon  a  railroad  train  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable 
time  to  leave  or  alight  from  the  car  in  which  he  is  riding  when 
a  train  is  stopped  for  that  purpose,  and  when  reasonable  time  is 
not  in  fact  given  in  which  to  alight  in  safety,  if,  in  attempting  to 
do  so,  injuries  result  to  him,  he  is  entitled  to  recover  from  the 
railroad  company  for  such   injuries,   unless  in   doing  so  he   is 
guilty    of    criminal   negligence,    as    elsewhere    defined   in   these 
instructions,  or  unless  in  doing  so  he  is  violating  some  express 
rule    or    regulation    of    said    railroad    actually    brought    to    his 
notice.60 

(3)  If,  from  the  evidence  in  this  case,  you  find  that  defendant's 
train  did  not  stop  at  the  station  at  E  long  enough  to  enable  the 
plaintiff  to  leave  the  car  in  which  she  was  riding,  and  reach  the 
platform  while  the  train  was  standing  and  before  it  was  again 
started,  and  that  she  was  thrown  or  precipitated  therefrom,  or 
that  she  stepped  therefrom  onto  the  depot  platform  after  the 
train  was  started  and  was  in  motion,  it  is  for  you  to  say,  upon 
consideration  of  all  the  evidence  upon  that  question,  whether 
she  was  guilty  of  criminal  negligence  as  elsewhere  defined  in 
these  instructions.61 

(4)  Should  you  find  that  defendant's  train  did  not  stop  at  E 
station  long  enough  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  alight  from  the  car 
in  which  she  was  riding,  and  that  she  was  not  guilty  of  such 
gross  or  criminal  negligence  as  here  defined  in  attempting  to 
alight  while  the  train  was  in  motion,  you  should  next  determine 
from  the  testimony  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff,  at  the  immediate 
time   of   the   injury   in    question,    was    guilty   of   violating    any 
express  rule  or  regulation  of  the  defendant  company  for  the 

59  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  statute  relating  to  criminal  negli- 
Atkins,  46  Ark.  430.  gence. 

so  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Choi-  01  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Chol- 
lette,  33  Neb.  148,  49  N.  W.  1114.  lette,  33  Neb.  148,  49  N.  W.  1114. 
This  instruction  is  based  upon  a  This  instruction  is  based  upon  a 

statute  denning  criminal  negligence. 


§    5G2  NEGLIGENCE  OF   CARRIERS.  502 

safety  of  passengers  upon  its  trains  and  whether  she  had  actual 
notice  of  such  rule  or  regulation.02 

(5)  Should  you  find  from  the  testimony  that  the  train  on  which 
the  plaintiff  was  riding  did  not  stop  at  the  E  station  a  sufficient 
time  to  permit  plaintiff  to  alight  therefrom,  and  that  she  after- 
wards attempted  to  step  or  leap  therefrom  while  said  train  was 
in  motion,  you  should  next  determine  whether  she  was,  in  trying 
to  alight  while  the  train  was  in  motion,   guilty  of  such  gross 
or  criminal  negligence  as  is  defined  in  the  last  paragraph.63 

(6)  If  the  plaintiff  alighted  from  said  car  while  the  same  was  in 
motion  and  going  at  such  rate  of  speed  that  a  person  of  ordinary 
care  and  prudence  would  not  have  alighted  under  the  circum- 
stances,  then   she   was    guilty   of  contributory   negligence,    and 
cannot  recover  in  this  cause,  whether  the  defendant  was  negli- 
gent or  not,  and  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  she  did  so 
alight,  then  your  verdict  will  be  for  the  defendant.6* 

(7)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  not 
thrown  from  the  car,  but  that  he  attempted  to  get  off  the  car 
while  it  was  in  motion  and  fell  into  the  street,  then  he  cannot 
recover  damages,  and  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.65 

§  562.  Plaintiff  negligent  in  getting  off  train. — (1)  If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  attempted  to  step 
from  the  platform  of  the  coach  of  defendant  to  the  platform  art 
B.,  while  the  train  of  defendant  was  in  motion,  and  that  under 
the  circumstances  of  this  case,  the  train  being  in  motion,  the  age, 
sex  of  plaintiff,  and  other  surrounding  circumstances,  the  attempt 
to  get  from  the  train  was  hazardous,  and  not  one  that  a  person 
of  ordinary  prudence  under  similar  situation  or  circumstances 
would  have  made,  they  will  find  for  the  defendant.66 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  defendant's  train  stopped 
a  sufficient  length  of  time  to  enable  plaintiff  to  leave  it,  and  fur- 
ther find  that  plaintiff  neglected  to  leave  it  while  so  stopped,  but 
carelessly  and  negligently  jumped  from  it  after  it  was  put  in 

62  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Choi-  65  Omaha   St.    R.    Co.    v.    Boeson 

lette,  33  Neb.  147,  49  N.  W.  1114.  (Neb.),  94  N.  W.  619. 

83  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Choi-  es  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66 

lette,  33  Neb.  146,  49  N.  W.  1114.  Miss.  314,  6  So.  207. 

64  Jackson  v.  Grand   Ave.  R.  Co. 
118  Mo.  216,  24  S.  W.  192. 


563  PASSENGER    NEGLIGENT    GETTING    OFF.  §    562 

motion,  and  that  by  reason  of  so  leaving  the  train  the  injury,  if 
any,  was  causetl,  then  he  would  not  be  entitled  to  recover.67 

(3)  If,  from  the  evidence,  you  believe  that  the  defendant's  ser- 
vants were  guilty  of  negligence  in  starting  the  train  too  soon 
as  alleged,  yet  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 
was  also  guilty  of  negligence  at  the  time  and  in  the  manner  of 
his  leaving  the  train,  and  that  he  would  not  have  sustained  any 
injury  (if  you  believe  he  did  sustain  such  injury)    if  he  had  not 
himself  been  guilty  of  negligence  which  directly  contributed  to 
the  alleged  injury,  then  you  will  find  for  the  defendant,  although 
you  may  believe  that  the  train  did  not  stop  long  enough  for  the 
plaintiff  to  get  off.68 

(4)  The  fact,  if  you  find  it  to  be  a  fact,  that  the  defendant's 
train  did  not  stop  at  the  station  long  enough  to  enable  the  plaintiff 
to  alight  therefrom,  would  not  of  itself  excuse  the  plaintiff  or 
justify  her  stepping  from  the  train  while  in  motion.69 

(5)  Should  you,  however,  find  that  the  plaintiff  had  a  reason- 
able and  sufficient  time  to  alight  from  said  train  and  reach  the  de- 
pot platform  in  safety  while  said  train  was  at  rest,  then  the  defend- 
ant would  not  be  liable  in  the  action,  and  you  should  so  find.70 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  was  a 
passenger  on  the   train   of  defendant  from   F  to  B,   and   that 
defendant  in  transporting  the  plaintiff  used  due  and  proper  care 
for  her  safety  and  gave  her  reasonable  time  at  B  to  alight  from 
defendant's   train,   and   that  the   injury   complained   of  by  the 
plaintiff  was  not  occasioned  by  the  negligence  of  defendant,  its 
servants  or  employes,  they  will  find  for  defendant.71 

(7)  If  the  jury  find  that  the  defendant's  cars  passed  the  plat- 
form of  the  station  where  the  plaintiff,  a  passenger,  was  to  have 
gotten  off,  and  stopped  some  distance  beyond  said  platform,  and 
the  said  plaintiff  then  and  there,  voluntarily,  and  without  any  di- 
rection or  command  of  any  of  the  persons  in  charge  of  said  train 
got  off  the  car  with  the  assistance  of  the  conductor  and  brake- 

6?  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Row-  ™  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Choi- 
land,  90  Tex.  365,  38  S.  W.  756.  lette,  33  Neb.  146,  49  N.  W.  1114. 

"8  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Row-  71  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66 

land,  90  Tex.  366,  38  S.  W.  756.  Miss.  312,  6  So.  207. 

69  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Chol- 
lette,  33  Neb.  148,  49  N.  W.  1114. 


§  562  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  564 

man,  and  was  not  injured  in  thus  getting  off,  the  plaintiffs  are 
not  entitled  to  recover.72 

(8)  Even  though  you  should  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff  was   guilty  of  contributory  negligence  in   getting   off 
said  car,  and  that  her  negligence  contributed  to  the  accident; 
yet,  if  you  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  conductor, 
after  he  discovered  the  plaintiff's  peril,  by  the  exercise  of  proper 
care  and  caution  could  have  avoided  the  mischief  which  hap- 
pened, and  failed  to  do  so,  the  plaintiff's  negligence,  if  any,  will 
not  excuse  the  defendant,  and  in  such  case  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  recover.73 

(9)  The  actionable  negligence  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  petition 
is  that  the  conductor  of  the  defendant 's  car,  upon  which  the  plain- 
tiff was  a  passenger,  caused  the  car  to  stop  on  the  south  side  of 
L.  avenue  for  the  purpose  of  permitting  the  plaintiff  to  alight 
therefrom,  and  that  while  the  plaintiff  was  in  the  act  of  alighting 
the  defendant  carelessly,  negligently  and  suddenly  started  said 
car  whereby  the  plaintiff  was  thrown  to  the  street  and  injured. 
The  burden  of  proof  as  to  the  act  of  negligence  charged  as  above 
rests  upon  the  plaintiff  throughout  the  case,  and  before  you  are 
warranted  in  returning  a  verdict  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  you 
must  find  by  the  preponderance  or  greater  weight  of  the  evidence 
that  the  plaintiff's  injuries  were  caused  by  the  act  of  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  defendant  as  above  stated,  and  unless  you  so 
find  your  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendant.74 

(10)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  it  was  reasonably 
prudent,  for  the  safety  of  the  traveling  public,  that  the  defendant 
should  stop  or  slow  down  its  cars  before  reaching  Ninth  street 
and  await  the  signal  of  the  watchman,  then  it  became  the  duty  of. 
the  defendant  to  make  such  stop  or  slow  down;  and  passengers 
riding  on  defendant's  cars  must  take  the  responsibility  of  inform- 
ing themselves  of  the  methods  so  to  be  observed  in  operating 
defendant's  road  at  that  point;  and  plaintiff  had  no  right  to 
undertake  to  alight  at  that  point,  and  if  she  did  so,  it  was  at  her 
own  risk  and  she  cannot  recover,  unless  the  jury  shall  further 

72  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Leap-          -*  Peck     v.     St.     Louis     Tr.     Co. 
ley,  65  Md.  573,  4  Atl.  891.  (Mo.),  77  S.  W.  736. 

TS  Richmond,  P.  &  P.   Co.  v.  Al- 
len (Va.),  43  S.  E.  356. 


565  PASSENGER    INJURED    IN    GETTING    OFF.  §    563 

find  from  the  evidence  that  the  car  had  come  to  a  full  stop,  and 
that  said  car  was  started  up  again  while  plaintiff  was  alighting 
therefrom,  with  actual  knowledge  of  the  conductor  that  she  was 
so  alighting  at  the  time.75 

(11)  Although  you  may  believe  that  the  plaintiff  got  off  from 
the  car  at  the  north  side  of  Division  street,  when  the  usual  place 
for  alighting  was  on  the  south  side  of  Division  street,  that  fact 
alone  would  not  justify  you  in  finding  her  guilty  of  such  negli- 
gence as  would  bar  a  recovery  in  the  case,  unless  you  believe  and 
find  that  it  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury.76 

(12)  The  jury  are  instructed,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  if  you  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  got  off  the  defendant's 
car  at  an  improper  place,  or  in  an  improper  manner,  and  if  you  fur- 
ther believe  that  such  action  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  was  a 
want  of  ordinary  care  which  contributed  to  the  injuries  complain- 
ed of,  then  your  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendant.77 

(13)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff's  injuries, 
if  any  she  has  sustained,  were  caused  by  her  leaving  the  defend- 
ant's car  before  it  had  stopped  still  and  while  it  was  in  motion,.and 
that  but  for  such  attempt  on  her  part  to  alight  from  said  car 
while  it  was  in  motion  she  would  not  have  sustained  any  injury, 
then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  and  your  verdict  must  be  for 
the  defendant.78 

$  563.  Passenger  injured  in  leaving  train. — (1)  It  was  the  duty 
of  the  railroad  company  to  use  that  high  degree  of  care  to  avoid 
injury  to  the  plaintiff,  when  she  was  about  to  alight  from  its 
train  at  M  on  the  occasion  in  question,  which  very  prudent, 
cautious  and  competent  persons  usually  exercise  under  the  same 
or  similar  circumstances  as  those  then  existing.  It  is  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  defendant's  em- 
ployes were  guilty  of  the  acts  of  which  plaintiffs  complain,  and 

™  Jackson  v.   Grand   Ave.  R.  Co.  off   the  car   on   the   north,   instead 

118  Mo.  217,  24  S.  W.  192.  of  the  south  side  of  the  street. 

76  North    C.    St.    R.    Co.    v.    El-  77  North     C.     St.    R.    Co.    v.    El- 

dridge,   151    111.    542,   546,   38  N.    E.  dridge,  151  111.  542,  548,  38  N.  E.  246. 

246.    Held  proper  to  meet  the  argu-  ™  Perk     v.     St.     Louis     Tr.     Co. 

ment  of  counsel   that  the  plaintiff  (Mo.),  77  S.  W.  736. 
was  guilty  of  negligence  in  getting 


§  563  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  566 

whether  such  acts  show  that  said  employes  failed  to  use  the 
degree  of  care  above  defined  or  not.79 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  night  on 
which  the  plaintiff  was  injured  was  intensely  dark,  and  the  vision 
of  the  plaintiff  was  further  obstructed  by  a  fierce  snowstorm  that 
was  raging  at  the  time,  and  that  the  defendant  failed  to  light  the 
station  or  stopping  place  at  Q,  and  that  in  consequence  of  the 
defendant's  failure  to  so  light  the  station  or  stopping  place  at 
Q,  the  plaintiff,  in  attempting  to  alight  from  the   defendant's 
train,  fell  and  was  injured,  without  fault  on  her  part,  then  the 
jury  must  find  for  the  plaintiff.80 

(3)  If  the  plaintiff  in  this  case  was  accepted  as  a  passenger  on 
the  defendant's  train,  and  paid  his  fare,  and  in  reaching  the 
station  of  his  destination,  and  upon  attempting  to  get  off  the 
train  he  was  thrown  down  and  injured,  and  this  was  caused  by 
the  negligence  or  the  failure  of  duty  upon  the  part  of  the  defend- 
ant, its  agents  or  servants,  he  is  then  entitled  to  recover,  unless 
by  his  own  negligence  or  want  of  care  he  so  contributed  to  the 
accident  as  to  deprive  him  of  any  remedy.81 

(4)  The  plaintiff  had  a  right,  after  the  name  of  the  station  was 
announced,  to  infer  that  the  first  stop  of  the  train  at  the  platform 
was  at  the  station,  and  when  the  train  came  to  a  full  stop,  if  the 
jury  believe  it  did  come  to  a  full  stop,  opposite  the  platform  of 
the  station,  and  the  conductor  had  stepped  off  his  train  with  his 
lantern  immediately  preceding  said  stopping,  if  any,  the  plaintiff 
was  warranted  in  believing  the  proper  time  had  arrived  for  him 
to  leave  the  train,  unless  the  jury  believe  he  was  warned  or 
directed  not  to  alight  then;  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  said  train  came  to  a  full  stop  opposite  the  platform 
of  this  station,  and  the  plaintiff,  in  the  exercise  of  such  care  as 
a  prudent  person  would  have  used,  undertook  to  leave  the  train, 
and  through  the   sudden  starting  of  the   same   was  jerked   or 
thrown  therefrom,  or  fell  upon  the  platform,  and  between  it  and 
the  cars,  and  was  injured  as  charged  in  the  petition,  your  finding 
and  verdict  must  be  for  the  plaintiff.82 

T0  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Dot-  si  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gor- 

son,  15  Tex.  Cv.  App.  73,  38  S.  W.  bett,  49  Tex.  575. 

643.  82  Leslie  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 

so  Alexandria    &     F.     R.     Co.     v.  R.  Co.  88  Mo.  53. 
Herndon,  87  Va.  197,  12  S.  E.  289. 


567  PASSENGER    INJURED    IN    GETTING    OFF.  §    563 

(5)  The  plaintiff  in  this  case  claims  that  her  dress  was  held  in 
some  way  on  the  platform  of  the  defendant's  car,  and  that  the  con- 
ductor negligently  started  the  car  while  it  was  so  held.    If  her 
dress  was  held  upon  the  platform  or  step  by  some  object  or  force, 
that  is  a  separate  and  independent  fact,  and  if  you  find  the  evi- 
dence justifies  you  in  finding  such  to  be  the  fact,  you  may  do  so 
without  determining  how  or  by  what  it  was  held.83 

(6)  The  plaintiff  was  not  bound  to  apprehend  any  carelessness 
upon  the  part  of  the  defendant.     She  had  a  right  to  rely  upon 
the  defendant  having  its  platform  in  good  condition,  and  free 
from  obstacles  of  an  unusual  character  upon  which  her  dress 
might  catch.     She  was  not  bound  to  apprehend  that  the  con- 
ductor might  start  the  car  while  her  body  was  in  contact  with  it, 
or  until  she  was  free  from  it  and  had  reached  a  position  of  safety. 
She  was  not  bound  to  apprehend  that  the  defendant  might  do 
anything  that  would  place  her  in  jeopardy.     On  the  contrary, 
she  had  a  right  to  place  full  reliance  on  the  defendant  doing  its 
full  duty  towards  her,  and  exercising  the  high  degree  of  care 
which  the  law  requires  of  it.84 

(7)  The  jury  are  instructed  that  this  case  is  to  be  determined 
upon  the  facts  in  evidence,  and  not  upon  any  theory  advanced  to 
explain  circumstances;  that  is  to  say,  that  before  the  plaintiff 
shall  be  entitled  to  a  verdict  for  any  amount,  the  evidence  must 
satisfy  the  minds  of  the  jury  that  the  defendant,  its  agents  or 
employes   had  carelessly    and    negligently    maintained     or    per- 
mitted some  obstruction  to  be  on  or  upon  the  platform  or  steps 
of  said  car  whereby  the  dress  of  the  lady  in  the  act  of  leaving 
the  car  would  be  caught.     The  evidence  must  prove  this  fact; 
and,  if  it  does  not,  and  the  defendant,  its  agents  or  employes  not 
being  otherwise  negligent  in  the  discharge  of  their  duty,  and  the 
plaintiff  herself,  in  leaving  said  car  carelessly  neglected,  in  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care,  to  handle  or  take  care  of  her  dress 
skirts,  and  such  negligence  or  carelessness  of  the  plaintiff  was  the 
proximate   cause   of  her  injury,   she  cannot  recover,   and  your 
verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.85 

ss  Patterson  v.  Inclined  P.  R.  Co.          85  Patterson  v.  Inclined  P.  R.  Co. 
12  Ohio  Cir.  280.  12  Ohio  Cir.  280. 

s*  Patterson  v.  Inclined  P.  R.  Co. 
12  Ohio  Cir.  280. 


§    56-i  NEGLIGENCE    OF    CARRIERS.  568 

§  564.  Duty  of  carrier  to  stop  train. — (1)  It  is  the  duty  of  a 
railroad  company  at  each  station  where  passengers  get  on  and  off 
the  train  at  night  to  have  the  passway  into  and  out  of  the  cars 
so  arranged  and  lighted  as  to  enable  passengers  getting  on  and 
off,  and  using  reasonable  care  and  diligence,  to  do  so  with  safety.80 

(2)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant's  employes  to  stop  the 
train  a  sufficient  and  reasonable  length  of  time  to  allow  the  plain- 
tiff to  get  off  the  train,  and  whether  or  not  the  train  did  stop  such 
a  length  of  time  you  must  decide  from  all  the  evidence  before 
you.87 

(3)  And  the  train  must  be  brought  to  a  complete  halt  the 
length  of  time  necessary,   and  not   merely   checked  up   in   its 
speed.88 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  all  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the 
plaintiff  became  and  was  a  passenger  upon  a  car  of  the  defendant, 
and  that  her  fare  had  been  paid  to  the  conductor,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  gave  to  the  conductor  on  such  car  reasonable  notice  of 
her  desire  to  get  off  said  car  at  the  corner  of  Ninth  and  Rey- 
nolds streets,  as  alleged  in  her  declaration,  it  then  and  there 
became  and  was  the  defendant's  duty  to  stop  said  car  at  said 
place,  upon  arriving  at  the  same,  a  sufficient  length  of  time  to 
enable  the  plaintiff  to  alight  therefrom  in  safety ;  and  if  the  jury 
further  believe  from  all  the  evidence   that  the  defendant  there- 
after ran  its  said  car  to  the  said  corner  of  Ninth  and  Reynolds 
streets  and  was  then  and  there  in  the  act  of  slowing  up   or 
stopping  said  car,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  then  and  there  exer- 
cising all  due  care  and  caution  for  her  own  safety,  and  that 
while  so  exercising  such  care  and  caution  she  was  preparing  to 
alight  from  said  car  when  it  should  come  to  a  stop,  and  that 
such  act  or  acts  by  her,  of  preparing  to  alight  at  the  time,  under 
all  the  circumstances  and  in  the  manner  shown  by  the  evidence, 
were  not  negligence  or  carelessness  on  her  part,  and  that  the 
defendant  then  and  there  did  not  stop  the  said  car  so  that  the 
plaintiff   could    safely    alight    therefrom,    but    suddenly    started 
said  car  in  such  manner  that  it  thereby  then  and  there  threw 

86  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gor-  ss  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gor- 
bett,  49  Tex.  575.  bett,  49  Tex.  575. 

ST  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Row- 
land, 90  Tex.  365,  38  S.  W.  756. 


569  DUTY  TO  STOP  TRAIN.  §  565 

the  plaintiff  to  the  ground,  and  that  such  starting  of  the  car  was 
negligence  011  the  part  of  the  defendant,  and  that  the  plantiff 
was  thereby  injured  as  charged  in  her  declaration,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  was  during  all  the  time  in  the  exercise  of  due  care  and 
caution  for  her  own  safety,  then  the  defendant  would  be  liable 
to  the  plaintiff  for  such  injury,  and  in  such  case  you  will  find 
for  the  plaintiff.89 

§  565.    Passenger  entitled  to  reasonable  time  to  get  off. — (1)  A 

passenger  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable  time  to  leave  the  car  in 
which  he  has  been  riding.  When  a  train  is  stopped  for  that 
purpose,  and  when  reasonable  time  is  not  in  fact  allowed  to  get 
off  in  safety  (of  which  the  jury  are  the  judges),  and  in  attempt- 
ing to  do  so,  without  fault  on  his  part,  injuries  result  to  him,  he 
is  entitled  to  recover  for  such  injuries.90 

(2)  A  reasonable  time  to  get  off,  as  mentioned  in  these  instruc- 
tions, is  such  time  as  it  usually  requires  for  passengers  to  get  off 
arid  on  the  train  at  that  station  in  safety.91 

(3)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  on  the  twenty-third 
day  of  June,  1902,  the  defendant  was  operating  the  car  mentioned 
in  the  evidence  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  passengers  for  hire ; 
and  if  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  on  said  day  the  plain- 
tiff was,  by  the  defendant's  servants  in  charge  of  its  car,  received 
as  a  passenger  thereon ;  that  she  paid  her  fare ;  that  the  car 
stopped  at  her  destination  to  allow  her  to  get  off;  that  whilst 
she  was  in  the  act  of  getting  off  the  defendant's  servants  in 
charge  of  said  car  caused  or  suffered  it  to  start  before  she  had 
reasonable  time  to  get  off,  and  that  thereby  the  plaintiff  was 
thrown  from  said  car  and  injured;  and  if  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  exercising  ordinary  care  at  the 
time,  then  she  is  entitled  to  recover.92 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was 
not  afforded  a  reasonable  time  to  alight  on  defendant's  plat- 
form by  the  defendant  or  its  employes,  and  before  she  had  time 
to  reach  the  platform  safely  the  train  was  negligently  started, 
and  thereby  caused  the  plaintiff  to  fall  off  said  platform,  and 

sa  Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoeff-  »i  Little  R.  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

ner,  175  111.  634,  51  N.  E.  884.  Atkins,  46  Ark.  430. 

oo  Little  R.  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  92  Hannon  v.  St.  Louis  Tr.  Co. 

Atkins,  46  Ark.  430.  (Mo.  App.),  77  S.  W.  159. 


§  565  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  570 

by  reason  of  said  fall  she  has  received  injury,  they  will  find 
for  the  plaintiff  to  the  amount  of  the  damages  as  may  appear 
from  the  evidence  to  have  been  sustained  by  her.93 

(5)  It  was  the  duty  of  defendant's  servants  and  employes,  on 
the  occasion  in  question,  to  stop  the  train  long  enough  for  plain- 
tiff, by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care   and  diligence,   consider- 
ing her  age,   sex  and  physical  condition,  to   get  off  the   train 
safely  before  it  was  started,  or  suffered  to  start;   and  if  the 
jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  plaintiff,  as  soon  as 
the  train  stopped,  got  up  from  her  seat  and  walked  at  once, 
and  as  fast  as  she  reasonably  could,  out  on  the  platform  and 
down  the  step  on  the  car,  without  stopping  on  the  way;  that 
she  did  all  the  law  required  of  her,  so  far  as  diligence  on  her 
part  in  getting  off  the  train  was  concerned ;  and  if,  under  such 
circumstances,  the  defendant's  servants  or  employes  started  the 
train  while  she  was  proceeding  to  alight,  still  using  due  and  rea- 
sonable haste  in  getting  off  the  train,  such  starting  of  said  train 
was  an  act  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  defendant,  and  a  breach 
of  its  duty  to  plaintiff  as  a  passenger  on  its  road.9* 

(6)  If  the  defendant  or  its  officers  knew  of  any  inability  of  the 
plaintiff  to  alight  from  the  train  in  the  usual  time,  it  was  bound 
to  give  her  such  reasonable  time  to  get  off  and  be  clear  of  dan- 
ger in   getting   off  as  the   circumstances   required,   and   if  you 
find  from  the  evidence  that  such  were  the  facts,   and  that  it 
did  not  afford  the  plaintiff  a  reasonable  time  to  alight  as  afore- 
said, you  will  find  in  her  favor  for  all  the  injury  and  damage 
suffered  by  her  that  may  be  shown  by  the  evidence.95 

(7)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
company,  through  their  agents,  employes  and  servants,  whilst  the 
train  of  the  company  was  at  the  depot,  in  the  act  of  discharging 
passengers,  negligently  and  violently  started  its  train  from   a 
stand-still  without  notice  or  warning  to  its  passengers,  the  de- 
fendant company  is  responsible  for  all  injury  resulting  to  a  pas- 
senger from  such  act.96 

es  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66  ^  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66 

Miss.   312,  6  So.  207.     See  Gulf,  C.  Miss.  311,  6  So.  207. 

&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Rowland,  90  Tex.  96  Southern  R.   Co.   v.   Smith,    95 

365,  38  S.  W.  756.  Va.  189,  28  S.  E.  173. 

»*  Hickman    v.    Missouri    Pac.    R. 
Co.  91  Mo.  435,  4  S.  W.  127. 


571  PLATFORM    UNSAFE PASSENGER    GETTING    OFF.  §    566 

§  566.  Platform  unsafe — Passenger  getting  off. — (1)  If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  at  the  time  of  the  plaintiff's 
being  injured  there  was  no  platform  or  other  proper  landing- 
place  at  the  train's  stopping-place  at  D,  and  that  the  defend- 
ant's servants  did  not  assist  the  plaintiff  to  alight,  and  for  want 
of  such  platform  or  landing-place  and  assistance  in  alighting 
the  plaintiff  was  injured  without  fault  on  her  part,  then  the 
jury  must  find  for  the  plaintiff.97 

(2)  If  a  barrier  or  guard  is  reasonably  necessary  to  prevent  per- 
sons, who  are  themselves  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  and  reason- 
able care,  from  falling  from  the  platform  to  their  injury,  then  a 
barrier  should  be  placed  upon  it,  or  a  guard  should  be  placed  to 
warn  people  of  danger.     Such  lights  as  are  necessary  to  render 
the  use  of  the  platform  and  the  passage  over  it  to  the   cars 
reasonably  safe  should  be  upon  the  platform  at  the  time  of  the 
arrival  of  trains,  and  during  the  time  the  train  remains  at  the 
station.08 

(3)  The  defendant  is  bound  to  provide  safe  and  sufficient  plat- 
forms for  the  landing  of  passengers,  of  sufficient  length  to  afford 
safe  egress  to  passengers  from  an  ordinary  train." 

(4)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  have  its  platform  reason- 
ably sufficient  and  safe  in  all  respects  to  be  used  by  such  per- 
sons as  may  have  lawful  occasion  to  use  it.     It  is  not  neces- 
sary that  it  should  be  perfectly  and  absolutely  safe;  so  great 
a  degree  of  perfection  is  usually  impracticable;  but  it  must  be 
reasonably  safe  and  sufficient  for  .all  persons  using  it,  who  are 
themselves  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  and  reasonable  care.     If 
a  barrier  or  guard  is  reasonably  necessary  to  prevent  persons, 
who  are  themselves  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  and  reasonable 
care,  from  falling  from  the  platform  to  their   injury,   then   a 
barrier  should  be  placed  upon  it,  or  a  guard  should  be  placed 
to   warn  people   of   danger.     Such   lights   as   are   necessary  to 
render  the  use  of  the  platform  and  the  passage  over  it  to  the 
cars  reasonably  safe  should  be  upon  the  platform,  at  the  time  of 
'the  arrival  of  trains  and  during  the  time  the  trains  remain  at  the 
station.100 

97  Alexandria  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  »»  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

Herndon,  87  Va.  196,  12  S.  E.  289.  Cantrell,  37  Ark.  523. 

»s  Quaife  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  "o  Quaife  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 

Co.  48  Wis.  516,  4  N.  W.  658.  R.  Co.  48  Wis.  516,  4  N.  W.  658. 


§  567  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  572 

§  567.  Injury  to  passenger  approaching  or  getting  on  train. 
(1)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  train  had  not 
come  to  a  full  stop,  but  that  the  stop  during  which  the  plain- 
tiffs attempted  to  go  on  board  was  one  which  resulted  from 
checking  the  speed  of  the  train  in  bringing  it  up  to  the  sta- 
tion, yet  if  the  passengers  were  directed  to  go  on  board  by 
^the  men  in  charge  of  the  train,  the  plaintiffs  had  a  right  to 
assume  that  the  train  was  ready  for  their  reception,  and  can- 
not be  charged  with  negligence  in  following  that  direction;  pro- 
vided the  train,  where  they  attempted  to  enter,  was  actually 
still  at  the  time;  and  if  the  cars  were  not  ready  for  the  re- 
ception of  passengers,  it  was  a  clear  act  of  negligence  in  the 
company's  servant  to  tell  them  to  go  on  board.101 

(2)  When  a  railroad  company  receives  passengers  from  a  space 
between  parallel  tracks  it  is  bound  to  provide  such  safeguards 
as  will  protect  passengers  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  from 
injury  from  a  passing  train,  and  if  it  fails  to  do  this,  whether 
its   negligence   consists   in   its   failure   to   provide   proper   plat- 
forms, or  failure  to  notify  passengers  who  have  gone  between 
its  tracks  to  enter  its  cars  on  the  approach  of  a  train  on  a 
track  parallel  to  that  on  which  a  passenger  train  is  standing, 
and  an  injury  results  from  said  failure  to  one  of  its  passengers 
who  is  about  to  .enter  its  car  without  contributory  negligence  on 
the  part  of  said  passenger  the  company  is  liable  therefor.102 

(3)  When  the  carrier  of  passengers  by  railway  does  not  receive 
passengers    into    the    car    at    the    platform    erected    for    that 
purpose,   and   suffers   or   directs   passengers   to     enter    at    out 
of  the  way  places,  it  is  its  duty  to  use  the  utmost  care  in  pre- 
venting  accidents   to   passengers   while   entering.     And   if   you 
find   in   this   case   that   the   defendant's   agents   were   negligent 
within  the  meaning  of  this  instruction,   and  that  the  plaintiff 
was  injured  thereby,  still  the  question  remains  whether  or  not 
the  plaintiff  on  her  part   contributed   by  her   own   negligence 
to  the  injury,  and  if  you  find  that  she  did  so  contribute,  she 
cannot  recover.     If  she  did  not  contribute,  she  can  recover.103 

101  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.          ios  Allender  v.   C.   R.   I.  &  P.   R. 
27  Wis.  160.  Co.  43  Iowa,  280. 

102  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.   v.  Sue,  25 
Neb.  779,  41  N.  W.  801. 


573  INJURY  ON  APPROACHING  TRAIN.  §  567 

(4)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  it  was  necessary  for 
the  deceased  in  order  to  take  the  W  accommodation  train,  then  on 
the  south  track  of  the  defendant's  road  at  W,  if  the  jury  so 
find,  to  cross  the  north  track  of  the  defendant's  road,  and  that 
said  W  train  was  engaged  in  receiving  and  discharging  pas- 
sengers, all  of  whom  were  compelled  to  cross  said  north  track 
in  going  either  to  or  from  said  train,  and  if  the  jury  find  from 
the  evidence  that  passengers  were  passing  and  did  pass  across 
the  said  north  track,  then  the  deceased  had  the  right  to  con- 
sider that  these  circumstances  amounted  to  an  implied  invitation 
on  the  part  of  the  defendant  to  the  deceased  to  cross  the  said 
north  track  and  to  imply  assurance  that  it  would  be  safe  for 
him  to  do  so.104 

(5)  If  the  train,  in  being  brought  up  to  the  station,  came  to  a 
stop  in  such  a  manner  as  to  induce  the  belief  on  the  part  of 
the  passengers  in  waiting  on  the  platform  that  it  had  stopped 
for  the  reception  of  passengers,  and  then,  when  the  passengers 
acting  on  this  belief  were  going  aboard,  started  again  without 
caution  or  signal  given,  that  would  constitute  an  act  of  neg- 
ligence on  the  part  of  the  defendants;  and  it  would  make  no 
difference  whether  in  so  starting  the  train  it  was  intended  to 
proceed  to  the  next  station,  or  merely  to  locate  it  more  con- 
vi«ntly  at  the  same  station.105 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was 
at  the  time  of  the  occurrence  in  question  a  passenger  on  one  of 
the  cars  of  the  defendant's  street  railroad,  exercising  reasonable 
care  and  diligence,  and  that  the  car  started,  before  plaintiff  took 
his  seat,  with  a  sudden  and  violent  jerk,  that  by  reason  thereof 
the  plaintiff  lost  his  balance,  and  his  hand  was  thrown  against 
and  through  one  of  the  windows  of  the  car,  cutting  and  injuring 
it,  then  and  in  that  case  the  defendant  is  liable  to  the  plaintiff 
for  the   damage   caused  by  and  resulting  from  said  injury  to 
plaintiff,  unless  the  jury  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  defendant,  its  agents,  servants  and  employes  managing  said 
car  were  not  guilty  of  any  negligence  or  want  of  care  in  the  man- 
agement of  said  car  causing  the  injury,  and  the  burden  of  show- 

104  Baltimore   &   O.   R.   Co.   v.   S.          105  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co. 
&c.   60  Md.  452.  27  Wis.  161. 


§  567  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  574 

ing  such  care  and  want  of  diligence  is  upon  the  defendant  to 
prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury.106 

(7)  Although  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  if  the 
plaintiff  had,   on   entering  the  car,   taken  hold  of  a  strap,   or 
taken   a   seat  nearer  the   door  than  the   one   he   attempted  to 
take,  the  accident  would  not  have  happened,  yet  if  the  jury  fur- 
ther  believe  from  the  evidence  that  he  acted  with  reasonable 
and  ordinary  care  in  not  taking  hold  of  a  strap  or  in  moving 
further  forward,  and  as  a  prudent  man  under  similar  circum- 
stances would   ordinarily   act,   then  he  was  using  all  the   care 
and  diligence  imposed  by  law  upon  him.107 

(8)  Even  though  the  jury  believe  the  defendant  company  was 
to  blame  in  starting  the  car  in  which  plaintiff  was  standing, 
with  a  violent  and  unusual  jerk,  and  before  plaintiff  had   an 
opportunity  of  taking  his  seat,  yet  if  the  jury  also  find  that 
plaintiff  was  informed  by  the  conductor    striking    the    bell,    or 
in  any  other  way  knew  or  had  reason  to  expect  the  car  was 
about  to  start,  then  it  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  have 
protected  himself  by  the  most  prudent  means  within  his  reach 
against  the  starting  of  the   car.     And  if  you  find  that  straps 
were  provided  in  said  car  for  the  use  or  convenience  of  pas- 
sengers, by  which  the  plaintiff,  after  the  warning  of  the  con- 
ductor's bell,  might  have  supported  himself  while  the  car  was 
being  started,  and  that  he  failed  so  to  do,   and  by  reason  of 
such  failure  he  was  injured,  then  you  will  find  the  issues  for 
the  defendant.108 

(9)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  at 
the  time  of  the  injury  in  question  went  upon  the  defendant's 
car  as  a  passenger,  and  there  was  a  vacant  seat,  then  and  in 
that  case  it  was  the  bound  en  duty  of  defendant,   its  servants 
and    employes    either    to  not   start    the    car   until    he  had   time 
to  get  a  seat,  or  if  it  started  it  before,  to  use  the  utmost  care 
to  start  it  smoothly  and  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  throw  him 
off  his  feet.     And  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the   car  was  started   before  the   plaintiff  had  reasonable   time 

ice  Dougherty   v.   Missouri   R.   R.          ios  Dougherty   v.    Missouri   R.   R. 
Co.  97  Mo.  655,  8  S.  W.  900.  Co.  97  Mo.  659,  8  S.  W.  900. 

lor  Dougherty   v.  Missouri  R.  Co. 
97  Mo.  659,  8  S.  W.  900. 


575  INJURY    ON    APPROACHING    TRAIN.  §    567 

to  take  his  seat,  and  with  a  sudden  and  violent  jerk  which 
might  have  been  avoided,  causing  said  injury,  the  jury  will 
find  for  the  plaintiff,  unless  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that 
said  jerk  was  produced  by  some  cause  not  under  the  control 
of  defendant  or  its  agents,  servants  or  employees.109 

(10)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  that  the 
plaintiff,  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  infliction  of  the  injury  sued 
for  in  this  case,  was  carefully  walking  on  the  passenger  plat- 
form of  the  defendant,  prepared  by  it  at  Chapin  for  the  use 
of  passengers,  and  that  so  walking  the  plaintiff  was  using  or- 
dinary care,  and  did  not,  by  his  carelessness  or  want  of  care, 
contribute  to  the  infliction  of  said  alleged  injury,  and  if  they 
further  find,   from  the   evidence   in   the   ease,   that   the   agents 
of  the  defendant  were  guilty  of  gross  carelessness  in  unloading 
timber  from  a  box  car,  and  thereby  carelessly  and  negligently 
struck   the   plaintiff   with   said   timber,   then   the    defendant    is 
legally  liable  in  this  case,  and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  ver- 
dict.    And   if  the   jury   find   for   the   plaintiff,   they   will   take 
into   consideration  the   nature    and   extent   of  the   wound,   the 
pain  and  suffering,  if  any,  the  loss  of  time  and  costs  incurred 
in  treating  said  wound,  if  any  has  been  proven  in  the  case, 
and  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence  in  the 
case,    give   to   the   plaintiff   such   damages   as   will    compensate 
him,  in  the  opinion  of  the  jury,  for  such  injury,  not  to  exceed 
the  amount  claimed  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration.110 

(11 )  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  at  the  time  of  the 
alleged  injury  to  the  plaintiff  said  plaintiff  was  legally  and  right- 
fully upon  the  passenger  platform  of  the  defendant  at  Chapin,  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  time  of  departure  of  a  train,  and 
while  passing  along  on  said  platform  the   agents   or  servants 
of  the  defendant,  without  any  notice  or  warning  to  passengers, 
threw  out  of  a  box  car,  on  the  said  passenger  platform,  a  large 
and  heavy  stick  of  timber  on  his  forehead,  and  thereby  knocked 
said  plaintiff  down  and  seriously  injured  him;  and  if  they  fur- 
ther  find   from   the   evidence   that   said   plaintiff   at   that   time 
was  using  ordinary  care   and   did  not   cause  the  infliction   of 

109  Dougherty   v.   Missouri  R.   R.          "°  Toledo,   W.    &   W.    R.    Co.    v. 
Co.  97  Mo.  657,  8  S.  W.  900.  Maine,  67  111.  299. 


§  568  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  576 

said  alleged  injury  by  his  negligence,  and  that  the  agents  of 
the  defendant  did  not  use  reasonable  care  in  discharging  said 
timber,  then  the  defendant  is  liable  in  this  case  for,  whatever 
injury  resulted  to  the  plaintiff  from  said  alleged  injury,  not 
to  exceed  the  sum  claimed  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration.111 

(12)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  it  was  the  direct 
and  usual  way,  in  getting  on  or  off  defendant's  trains  on  the 
south   track   to   or   from   the   junction   sidewalk   on   the   north, 
for  passengers  to  cross  over  defendant's  north  track,  and  that 
defendant  invited  and  allowed  passengers  to  so  cross  over  its 
north  track,  in  getting  on  or  off  its  trains  on  the  south  track 
at  said  junction  to  or  from  the  sidewalk  on  the  north,  then 
they   are   instructed   that   the   plaintiff's   right   as   a    passenger 
entitled   him   tg   the   same   degree    of   extraordinary    care    and 
vigilance  for  his  safety,  on  the  part  of  the   defendant,   while 
he  was  passing  from  his  train  over  defendant's  north  track  to 
the  junction  sidewalk  on  the  north  as  while  being  transported 
as  a  passenger  over  defendant's  line..112 

(13)  If  H  voluntarily  took  and  placed  himself  in  a  dangerous 
and  improper  position  on  the  car,  when  he  might  have  taken  a 
more  safe  place  or  position,  and  his  death  was  caused  by  reason  of 
his  having  placed  himself  in  such  a  dangerous  position,  then  the 
plaintiff  cannot  recover.113 

§  568.  Passenger  negligent  in  getting  on  train. — (1)  If  the  con- 
ductor warned  the  passengers  to  keep  away  from  the  train, 
it  was  the  plaintiff's  duty  to  have  heeded  such  warnings,  and 
if  she  attempted  to  board  the  train  before  it  had  apparently 
reached  its  location  at  the  platform,  and  when  it  was  apparent 
that  it  had  not  reached  said  location,  she  was  guilty  of  negli- 
gence, and  cannot  recover.114 
• 

§  569.  Passenger  falling  off  the  platform— No  liability.— (1) 
If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  injury  complained 
of  by  the  plaintiff  in  this  action  was  caused  by  a  fall  from  the 
platform  at  B,  to  the  ground,  and  not  by  reason  of  a  fall  in 

in  Toledo.  W  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  us  Huelsenkamp  v.  Citizens'  R. 

Maine,  67  111.  299.  Co.  37  Mo.  537. 

112  Btirbridge  v.  Kansas  City  Ca-  "*  Curtis  v.  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co. 

ble  R.  Co.  36  Mo.  App.  678.  27  Wis.  162. 


577  PASSENGER   FALLING    OFF    PLATFORM.  §    570 

getting  from  the  car  on  said  platform,  they  will  find  for  the 
defendant.115 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  got  off  of 
defendant's  train  at  B,  and  was  safely  delivered  on  the  platform 
at  said  station,  where  passengers  on  the  road  of  defendant  were 
accustomed  to  alight,  and  in  turning  round  she  stepped  off  the 
end  of  said  platform,  then  an  injury  received  from  such  a  fall 
is  without  fault  on  the  part  of  defendant,  and  they  will  find  for 
defendant.116 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  after  plaintiff  had 
safely  gotten  on  the  platform  at  B  the  train  started,  and  that, 
owing  to  her  age,  debility  or  other  cause,  she  was  startled  by 
the  starting  thereof,  and  in  consequence  made  a  false  step  and 
fell  from  the  platform  and  was  injured,  the  defendant  was  not 
responsible   therefor,   and   they   will   find   for  the   defendant.117 

(4)  If,  on  the  other  hand,  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
conductor  of  said  defendant  railway  company  in  charge  of  said 
train  did  not  push  and  kick  the  plaintiff,  causing  him  to  fall 
from  said  train,  or  if  you  find  from  the   evidence  that  some 
person  other  than  said  conductor  of  the  defendant  railway  com- 
pany in  charge  of  said  train  pushed  and  kicked  the  plaintiff 
after  the  plaintiff  had  boarded  said  train,  and  thereby  caused 
him  to  fall  from  said  train,  then  in  either  of  said  events  you 
will   find  for  the  defendant  railway   company.118 

§  570.  Passenger  riding  upon  platform  of  car. — (1)  A  passen- 
ger upon  a  railroad  train,  after  said  train  has  stopped  at  a  regular 
station,  has  a  right  to  go  upon  the  platform  of  said  coach  in 
which  said  passenger  may  be,  and  within  the  time  allowed  by 
the  rules  of  the  company  for  the  stopping  of  said  train  at  said 
station,  so  that  said  passenger,  being  upon  said  platform,  does 
not  interfere  with  the  proper  management  of  said  train  or  with 
passengers  alighting  therefrom  or  getting  thereon,  and  that  it 
is  not  per  se  negligence  so  to  do,  and  that  the  mere  fact  of  a 
passenger  being  upon  the  platform  under  such  circumstances 

us  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66  i"  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66 
Miss.  313,  6  So.  207.  Miss.  313,  6  So.  207. 

"6  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66  us  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Terns 
Miss.  312,  6  So.  207.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  77  S.  W.  231. 


§  570  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  578 

does  not  constitute  negligence  upon  the  part  of  said  passen- 
ger.119 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  under  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case  there  was  a  reasonable  necessity,  either 
real  or  apparent,  for  the  plaintiff  to  travel  on  the  platform  of 
the  car,  and  that  he  made  such  effort  to  obtain  accommodations 
inside   of  the   car  as   an   ordinarily   prudent   man   would   ha've 
made  under  similar  circumstances,  then  he  was  not   guilty  of 
negligence  by  reason  of  standing  on  the  platform.120 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  while  the  train  was  in 
motion  the  plaintiff,  for  his  own  convenience,  left  the  inside  of  the 
car  in  which  he  had  been  riding  and  went  upon  the  platform  for 
the   purpose   of  riding  there   or   of  passing  into   the   next   car 
in  search   of  a  seat,  you  are   instructed  that  the   plaintiff  as- 
sumed all  risk  of  falling  or  being  thrown  from  the  train  by 
reason  of  the  motion  or  oscillation  thereof,  whether  caused  by 
speed,  curves,  frogs  or  switches,  and  in  that  case  you  must  find 
for  the  defendant.121 

(4)  If  you  find  that  at  and  prior  to  the  time  in  question  there 
existed     an     express     rule     or     regulation     of     the     defendant 
company    that    passengers    should    not    stand    upon  the   plat- 
form   of    the    cars    while   the  train   was  in  motion,   and   that 
such  rule  or  regulation  was  actually  before  that  time  brought 
to  the  plaintiff's  knowledge  by  means  of  notices  posted  upon 
the   doors  of  the  defendant's  cars,   and  if  she  went  upon  the 
platform  of  the  moving  train  in  violation  of  such  express  rule 
or   regulation   and   attempted   to   step   therefrom   to   the    depot 
platform,  she  could  not  recover  in  this  case ;  but  if  she  was  in 
the   act  of  leaving  the   train  at  the   time  it  started,   then  the 
standing  upon  said  platform  would  not  be  a  violation  of  such 
rule  or  regulation,   although  the  train  may  have  been  in  mo- 
tion.122 

§  571.    Assisting  passenger — By  carrier's  agents. — (1)  Whether 
it  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant's  agent  to  have  assisted  the 

119  Southern  R.   Co.  v.   Smith,  95      See    Chesapeake    &    O.    R.    Co.    v. 
Va.  189,  28  S.  E.  173.    See  St.  Louis,      Clowes,  93  Va.  196,  24  S.  E.  833. 

B.  &  S.  Co.  v.  Hopkins,  100  111.  App.  121  Chesapeake    &    O.    R.    Co.    v. 

567.  Clowes,  93  Va.  195,  24  S.  E.  833. 

120  Highland  Ave.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  122  Omaha    &    R.    V.    R.    Co.    v. 
Donovan,    94    Ala.    300,    10    So.    139.  Chollette,    33    Neb.    147,    49    N.    W. 

1114. 


579  ASSISTING   PASSENGER — TICKET    UNNECESSARY.  §    572 

plaintiff  in  getting  on  the  car  is  a  question  for  you  to  consider 
and  determine  from  the  evidence  in  the  case;  and  for  this  pur- 
pose it  is  proper  for  you  to  consider  the  train  and  the  car, 
their  distance  from  the  platform  and  depot,  the  facility  with 
which  access  could  be  had,  the  sex,  age  and  inexperience  of 
the  plaintiff,  if  these  matters  were  known  to  the  defendants' 
agents,  and  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  surrounding  the 
case.123 

(2)  A  railroad  company  is  not  responsible  for  the  willful  tres- 
pass or  unlawful  acts  of  its  agents,  or  for  acts  done  clearly  out- 
side of  the  scope  of  their  employment;  but  where  a  brakeman 
on  a  train  undertakes  to  direct  and  assist  passengers  in  getting  on 
and  off  the  cars,  in  the  absence  of  proof  to  show  that  this  was  out- 
side of  the  scope  of  his  duties,  there  would  be  no  presumption  that 
such  was  the  fact.124 

(3)  The  defendant  was  under  no  obligation  or  duty  to  the  plain- 
tiff on  account  of  her  age  or  feeble  condition,  to  assist  her  off  the 
train,  or  to  stop  longer  at  the  station  than  was  usual,  to  enable 
her  to  get  off  unless  she  had  notified  the  conductor  or  some  em- 
ployee on  the  train  of  her  condition.125 

§  572.  Ticket  not  essential  to  become  passenger. — (1)  To  be- 
come a  passenger,  and  entitled  to  protection  as  such,  it  is  not  nec- 
essary that  a  person  shall  have  entered  a  train  or  paid  his 
fare,  but  he  is  a  passenger  as  soon  as  he  comes  within  the  con- 
trol of  the  carrier  at  the  station  through  any  of  the  usual  ap- 
proaches, with  the  intent  to  become  a  passenger,  and  the  court 
therefore  further  instructs  the  jury  that  if  they  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  B,  on  the  second  day  of  July,  1888, 
went  to  the  defendant's  depot  at  the  town  of  C  by  one  of  the 
usual  routes  thereto,  for  the  purpose  and  with  the  intention 
of  taking  the  next  train,  and  stepped  upon  the  platform  of 
said  depot  with  the  intention  and  purpose  of  becoming  such 
passenger,  the  plaintiff  then  became,  in  contemplation  of  law, 
a  passenger  of  the  defendant,  provided  she  came  to  said  depot 
and  platform  within  a  reasonable  time  before  the  time  for  the 

123  Allender  v.   C.  R.   I.   &  P.   R.          125  Little  R.   &   Ft.   S.   R.   Co.  v. 
Co.  43  Iowa,  277.  Atkins,  46  Ark.  432. 

124  Houston    &    T.    C.    R.    Co.    v. 
Gorbett,  49  Tex.  576. 


§  573  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  580 

departure  of  said  train,  whether  or  not  she  had  purchased  a 
ticket  from  the  defendant  or  its  agent.120 

(2)  Although  when  the  occurrence  inquestion  happened  the 
plaintiff  had  not  paid  his  fare,  and  by  reason  of  said  event  got  off 
without  paying,  yet  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
he  went  on  the  car  as  a  passenger  with  the  intention  of  paying 
his  fare  when  called  upon,  then  he  was  a  passenger,  and  the  de- 
fendant owed  to  him  the  same  duties  as  if,  in  fact,  he  had  paid 
his  fare.127 

§  573.  Mistake  of  conductor  in  taking  ticket. — (1)  It  is  the  duty 
of  carriers  of  passengers  to  provide  agents  and  servants  who 
can  and  will  properly  protect  the  interests  of  the  passengers, 
and  not  by  want  of  skill,  lack  of  knowledge,  a  want  of  care, 
take  from  passengers  rights  for  which  they  have  contracted 
and  paid.  A  passenger  has  a  right  to  act  upon  the  conduct 
and  directions  of  the  agents  of  the  company.  If  the  conductor 
of  a  train  of  cars  takes  from  a  passenger  a  coupon  of  a  ticket, 
which  said  ticket  entitles  him  to  passage  from  one  station  on 
said  road  to  another  and  return,  and  by  mistake  or  otherwise 
takes  the  coupon  which  entitles  the  passenger  to  return  pas- 
sage, when  he  should  have  taken  the  one  entitling  the  passen- 
ger to  passage  going,  this  would  be  neglect  of  the  company,  and 
the  pasenger  would  have  a  right  to  rely  on  the  act  of  the  con- 
ductor in  taking  one  coupon  of  his  ticket,  and  he  would  be 
entitled  to  use  the  other  end  of  his  coupon  on  his  return  pas- 
sage.128 

§574.    Putting  off  passenger  for  want  of  ticket  or  fare. — (1)  If 

you  find  from  the  evidence  before  you  that  the  ticket  in  ques- 
tion was  a  third-class  or  emigrant  ticket  which  had  been  sold 
at  a  reduced  rate  to  a  person  in  San  Francisco  other  than  the 
plaintiff,  and  that  said  ticket,  by  its  terms,  was  not  transfer- 
able, and  the  purchaser  thereof  in  San  Francisco,  in  part  con- 
sideration of  such  sale  at  a  reduced  price,  agreed  that  it  should 
not  be  transferable,  and  you  further  find  that  the  plaintiff  pur- 
chased it  in  Omaha  from  some  person  other  than  the  defendants 

126  Barker  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.  128  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Bray,  125 
57  W.  Va.  430,  41  S.  E.  148.  Ind.   232,  25  N.   E.   439.     Held  cor- 

127  Dougherty   v.   Missouri   R.   R.  rect  when  taken  in  connection  with 
Co.  97  Mo.  658,  8  S.  W.  900.  other  instructions. 


581  PUTTING   PASSENGER  OFF,   NO   TICKET.  §    574 

or  their  authorized  agent,  and  offered  and  attempted  to  use  it 
as  entitling  him  to  a  passage  from  Omaha  to  Chicago  on  the 
defendant's  road,  and  refused  to  pay  his  fare  on  the  defend- 
ant's road  and  did  not  pay  his  fare,  then  the  defendants  were 
not  under  obligation  to  allow  the  plaintiff  to  ride  upon  said 
ticket,  and  upon  refusal  to  pay  fare  had  a  right  to  require  the 
plaintiff  to  leave  the  train,  and  he  cannot  recover  damages 
based  on  the  fact  that  he  was  so  compelled  to  leave  the  train.129 

(2)  If  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  on 
the  first  day  of  May,  1868,  purchased  at  New  York  a  through 
ticket  from  that  place  to  B    over  the  New  Jersey  railroad  and 
the  P.  W.  &  B.  R.  railroad,  and  on  that  day  proceeded  on  his 
journey  as  far  as  P    on  the   last  named  road,   where  he   left 
the  train,  and  if  the  jury  shall  further  find  that  after  passing 
the  then   conductor  of  the  train  took  up   said  through  ticket 
and  gave  the  plaintiff  a  check  in  lieu  thereof,  which  has  been 
introduced  in  evidence ;  and  if  "the  jury  shall  further  find  that 
the  plaintiff  on  the  sixth  day  of  May  got  upon  the  defendant's 
train  for  B    at  H    and  the  then  conductor  refused  to  take  said 
check,   but   informed  the   plaintiff   that  he   must   pay   his   fare 
to  B    or  he  would  be  obliged  to  stop  the  cars  and  put  him  off, 
and  that  the  defendant  refused  to  pay  said  fare,  and  the  plain- 
tiff was  then  put  off,  then  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover 
in  this  case,  provided  the  jury  shall  find  that  no  more  force 
than  was  necessary  was  used  in  putting  the  plaintiff  off  the 
train,  even  if  the  jury  shall  further  find  that  on  arriving  at  P. 
on  the  train  on  the  said  first  day  of  May,  the  plaintiff  inquired 
from  a  man  at  the  window  of  the  ticket  office  of  the  defend- 
ant at  that  place  whether  said  check  would  be   good  to  take 
him  to  B  another  day,  and  was  told  by  said  man  that  it  would.130 

(3)  Railroad  companies  have  the  right  to  demand  and  receive 
legal  rates  of  fare  from  persons  traveling  on  their  trains;  and, 
in  the  event  of  the  refusal  of  a  passenger  to  pay  his  fare  or 
show  a  ticket,  conductors  of  a  train  have  a  right  to  eject  such 
a  passenger  from  the  train,  without  using  any  more  force  or 
violence  than  may  be  necessary  to  overcome  any  unlawful  re- 

129  Post  v.   Chicago  &   N.  W.  R.          i30  McClure   v.    Philadelphia,    W. 
Co.  14  Neb.  112,  15  N.  W.  225.  &  B.  R.  Co.  34  Md.  534. 


§    575  NEGLIGENCE    OF    CAllIilERS.  582 

sistance  which  such  passenger  may  offer.  It  is  the  duty  of 
the  conductor  to  bring  the  train  to  a  full  stop  before  compel- 
ling the  party  to  be  ejected  to  step  from  the  train,  and  exercise 
such  ordinary  care  in  ejecting  him  as  an  ordinarily  prudent 
man  would  exercise  under  similar  circumstances  as  connected 
with  this  case.  In  this  state  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  train 
should  be  at  a  station  in  order  to  justify  the  ejection  of  a  per- 
son refusing  to  pay  fare,  but  a  conductor  has  the  right  to  eject 
such  a  person  between  stations  at  points  where  the  situation 
of  the  ground  is  such  as  not  to  expose  the  person  ejected  to 
special  risks  of  danger.131 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  K,  the  plaintiff, 
took  a  seat  on  the  train  from  M  to  R  on  the  twenty-fourth  day  of 
January,  1887,  and  refused  to  pay  the  usual  fare  or  to  furnish 
the  conductor  the  usual  ticket  entitling  him  to  a  seat  from 
M  to  R ,  but  claiming  a  seat  by  virtue  of  a  special  contract 
with  the  defendant  company,  which  he  failed  to  exhibit  to  the 
conductor,  and  was  in  consequence  thereof  expelled  from  the 
train  by  the  conductor,  using  no  unnecessary  force  to  put  him 
off,  then  they  must  find  for  the  defendant.132 

§  575.  Putting  off  disorderly  person. — (1)  If  you  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  on  the  eleventh  day  of  November, 
1901,  while  a  passenger  on  one  of  the  defendant's  cars  near 
M.  street  used  violent,  boisterous  and  profane  language,  or  was 
guilty  of  disorderly  conduct,  in  the  presence  of  other  passen- 
gers, who  were  then  and  there  on  said  car,  then  it  became  and 
was  the  duty  of  the  defendant's  conductor  to  remove  the  plain- 
tiff from  the  car,  and  use  such  force  as  was  necessary  for  that 
purpose.133 

(2)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  behave  in  a  quiet  and  or- 
derly manner  while  a  passenger  on  the  train  of  the  defendant, 
and  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  conductor  to  sustain  order  on 
said  train,  and  if  the  plaintiff  was  acting  in  a  disorderly  man- 
ner on  said  train,  the  conductor  could  eject  him  from  said  train ; 

131  Brown  v.  Chicago,  R.  I..  &  P.          "3  Ickenroth  v.  St.  Louis  Tr.  Co. 
R.  Co.  51  Iowa,  235,  1  N.  W.  487.  (Mo.  App.),  77  S.  W.  163. 

132  Knopf  v.  Richmond,   F.   &  P. 
R.  Co.  85  Va.  773,  8  S.  E.  787. 


583  DISORDERLY    PASSENGER ON    WRONG    TRAIN.  §    576 

and  if  the  jury  find  that  the  plaintiff,  while  a  passenger  on  said 
train,  was  acting  in  a  disorderly  manner  and  was  threatened 
with  expulsion  from  said  train  by  the  conductor,  and  that  on 
account  of  the  companionship  of  the  plaintiff  with  other  per- 
sons, who  were  also  disorderly  and  riotous,  the  conductor  could 
not  properly  make  the  attempt  to  expel  the  plaintiff  from  the 
train,  as  the  plaintiff  and  his  companions  stated  that  they  would 
resist  any  attempt  to  expel  them  from  the  train,  that  then  the 
conductor  was  justified  in  requesting  the  first  police  officer  whom 
he  could  find  to  arrest  the  plaintiff;  and  if  the  jury  find  that 
the  police  officer  at  the  "W  depot  was  the  first  police  officer 
the  conductor  saw,  and  that  the  conductor  used  due  diligence 
in  procuring  a  police  officer,  and  that  the  conductor  directed 
the  police  officer  to  arrest  the  plaintiff  for  said  disorderly  con- 
duct, that  the  defendant  is  not  liable  for  this  arrest,  and  the 
verdict  of  the  jury  must  be  for  the  defendant.134 

§  576.  Passenger  on  wrong  train. — (1)  The  proof  shows  that 
the  railroad  company  runs  two  daily  trains  between  points  named 
in  plaintiff's  ticket,  and  the  regulation  that  one  of  these  trains 
shall  not  stop  at  all  stations  is  a  reasonable  regulation  and  one 
they  had  a  right  to  make.  A  passenger  who  travels  on  said 
road  with  notice  of  such  regulation  cannot  get  on  a  through 
train  and  demand  to  be  carried  to  a  point  at  which  said  through 
train  does  not  stop,  even  if  he  has  a  ticket  to  such  point,  un- 
less he  goes  on  the  train  by  direction  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany's agents.  If  the  person  who  acted  as  agent,  and  sold 
tickets,  directed  the  plaintiff  to  get  on  the  through  train,  he 
had  a  right  to  get  on  said  train  and  travel  upon  it ;  but  if, 
after  getting  on,  he  was  at  a  regular  station  notified  that  the 
train  would  not  stop  at  E ,  it  was  his  duty  then  to  get  off 
and  take  the  proper  train,  for  if  the  railroad  agent  at  J ,  his 
point  of  departure,  made  a  mistake,  the  railroad  had  a  right 
to  correct  the  mistake  at  any  regular  stopping  station  for  that 
train.  If,  then,  he  was  informed  at  P  of  the  mistake,  it  was 
his  duty  to  get  off,  and  if  he  did  not  do  so,  the  conductor  had 
a  right  to  put  him  off  in  a  proper  manner.135 

134  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Cain,  is--.  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hassell, 
81  Md.  87,  31  Atl.  801.  62  Tex.  258. 


§  577  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  584 

§  577.    Passenger  may  rely  on  directions  of  carrier's  agents. 

(1)  A  passenger  is  warranted  in  obeying  the  directions  of  the  ser- 
vants and  agents  of  the  carrier,  when  given  within  the  scope  of 
their  duty,  unless  such  obedience  leads  to  a  known  peril  which  a 
prudent  person  would  not  encounter.130 

(2)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  passenger  on  a  car  to  follow  the  reason- 
able instructions  of  those  in  charge  of  the  car  in  regard  to  moving 
from  one  part  of  the  car  to  another,  unless  it  is  apparent  to  the 
passenger  that  the  moving  would  be  attended  with  danger;  and  a 
passenger  may  rightfully  assume  that  the  servants  in  charge  of 
the  car  are  familiar  with  the  operations  of  the  car,  and  that 
they   have   a   reasonable   knowledge   of  what  is  safe   and   pru- 
dent for  the  passengers  in  giving  such  instructions.     Therefore, 
if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  one  of  the  servants  of  the 
defendant   directed  the   plaintiff  to   move   to   that   part   of  the 
car  where  the  accident  occurred,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  plain- 
tiff so  to  do,  unless  it  was  known  and  apparent  to  her  that  it 
would  be  unsafe  for  her  to  do  so.     And  in  the  absence  of  ap- 
parent danger,  she  had  a  right  to  assume  that  it  was  safe  for 
her  to  move  to  and  stand  at  the  place  where  the  defendant's 
servant  directed  her  to  move  to  in  the  car.     And  if  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  it  was  an  unsafe  place  for  the  plain- 
tiff to  stand,   and  that  without  her  fault  she  was  injured  by 
reason  of  her  moving  to  and  standing  at  such  place,  then  your 
verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiff.137 

(3)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  passenger  to  follow  the  reasonable  di- 
rections   given   by   the    agent   in   charge    of   the    railway   train 
in  respect  to  passing  from  one  car  to  another  while  the  same 
is  in  motion  for  the  purpose  of  finding  a  seat,  but  if  the  pas- 
senger himself  knows   that  the   movement   would   be   attended 
with  danger,  it  would  not  in  such  case  be  his  duty  to  obey  the 
conductor.138 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from   a  fair  preponderance   of    the 
evidence  that  the  plaintiff  obeyed    the    defendant's  /conductor 
in   charge   of  the   train  upon   which   she   was   a  passenger,   in 
getting   off  the    train,   and  if  she    was  not  then    apprised    of 

i3G  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.          «s  Lcmisville  &  N.   A.  R.   Co.  v. 
v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  561,  14  N.  E.  572.       Kelly,  92  Ind.  374. 

137  Prothero    v.    Citizens'    St.    R. 
Co.  134  Ind.  440,  33  N.  E.  765. 


585  INJURED  WHILE  CHANGING  CARS.  §    579 

any  peril  that  she  would  encounter  thereby,  ^  she  would  not 
be  guilty  of  contributing  to  any  injury  received  by  her  in  thus 
alighting  from  the  train.130 

§  578.  Passenger  injured  while  changing  cars. — (1)  If  the  jury 
find  from  the  evidence  that  on  the  fourth  day  of  June,  1880,  H 
was  a  passenger  on  the  cars  of  the  defendant  with  a  ticket 
entitling  him  to  a  ride  from  H  to  F;  that  he  took  the  train 
at  II  and  rode  thereon  to  W,  where  it  became  necessary  for 
him  to  change  cars;  and  if  they  find  from  the  evidence  that 
in  alighting  from  the  train  on  which  he  was  and  passing  over 
certain  tracks  of  the  defendant's  road  to  take  the  train  on 
which  he  was  to  continue  his  journey  he  was  killed  by  the  loco- 
motive and  cars  of  a  freight  train  of  the  defendant,  operated 
by  the  defendant's  agent  on  its  road,  and  if  they  find  from  the 
evidence  that  the  killing  of  H  resulted  directly  from  the  want 
of  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  upon  the  part 
of  the  agents  of  the  defendant,  and  not  from  the  want  of  or- 
dinary care  and  prudence  of  the  deceased  contributing  to  the; 
accident,  then  the  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to  recover.140 

§  579.  Liability  when  car  owned  by  another. — (1)  If  the  jury 
find  from  the  evidence  that  the  ear  in  which  the  plaintiff  was 
injured  was  not  the  car  or  the  actual  property  of  the  defend- 
ant, but  was  the  property  of  another  corporation,  and  if  they 
further  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  car  composed  a  part 
of  the  train  in  which  the  plaintiff  and  other  passengers  were 
to  be  transported  upon  their  journey,  and  the  plaintiff  was 
injured  while  in  that  car  without  any  fault  of  his  own  and  by 
reason  either  of  the  defective  construction  of  the  car,  or  by 
some  negligence  on  the  part  of  those  having  charge  of  the  car, 
then  the  defendant  is  liable.141 

(2)  In  this  case  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  defendant  actually 
owned  the  cars  or  the  engine  forming  the  train  on  which  the  plain- 
tiff was  a  passenger  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  injury  testified 
about  or  not,  but  if  the  jury  believe,  from  all  the  evidence  in  the 

139  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.          141  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Roy,  102 
v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  561,  14  N.  E.  572.       U.  S.  455. 

140  Baltimore   &   O.   R.   Co.   v.   S. 
60  Md.  455. 


§    580  NEGLIGENCE    OF    CARRIERS.  586 

case,  that  the  plaintiff  had  purchased  a  ticket  for  her  conveyance 
as  a  passenger  over  the  railroad  of  the  defendant,  and  had  been 
received  by  the  defendant  in  a  car  run  and  operated  by  the 
said  defendant,  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  her  as  a  passenger, 
and  that  while  so  a  passenger  on  a  car  run  and  operated  by 
the  defendant,  by  the  carelessness  and  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant, and  without  any  fault  or  negligence  on  her  part,  the 
plaintiff  was  injured  in  manner  and  form  as  alleged  in  the 
declaration  in  the  case  or  some  count  thereof,  then  the  jury 
should  find  the  defendant  guilty,  and  assess  the  plaintiff's  dam- 
ages at  such  amount  .as,  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances 
in  evidence,  they  believe  she  has  sustained,  not  exceeding  ten 
thousand  dollars.142 

§  580.  Liability  for  injury  from  boiler  explosion. — If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendants  were  negligent 
in  the  transportation  of  passengers  from  S  to  P  and  from 
P  to  S  before  and  during  the  month  of  August,  1866,  that  dur- 
ing the  same  period  of  time  W  &  Co.  employed  the  plaintiff 
to  carry  their  express  matter  between  said  place  and  paid  the 
defendants  to  transport  the  same  for  a  certain  sum  of  money 
per  month,  and  that  the  plaintiff  and  said  defendant  entered 
upon  said  arrangements  and  were  engaged  in  the  same  dur- 
ing said  period  of  time,  and  that  it  was  understood  and  agreed 
between  the  defendants  and  W  &  Co.  that  the  plaintiff,  as 
their  messenger,  should  be  transported  with  their  said  express 
matter  from  S  to  P  and  from  P  to  S  during  said  period  of 
time,  and  that  the  defendants  made  such  transportation  by 
cars  propelled  by  steam  and  a  steamer,  and  that  said  cars  started 
from  the  town  of  P;  that  while  thus  engaged,  the  plaintiff 
during  said  period  of  time  came  to  said  cars,  at  the  depot  of 
the  defendants,  for  the  purpose  of  going  to  S ;  that  he  was 
standing  on  the  platform  of  the  defendants  near  said  cars  for 
the  purpose  of  stepping  into  a  car  of  the  defendants  (and  that 
said  platform  was  usually  used  by  passengers  departing  or  ar- 
riving by  said  cars)  when  the  boiler  of  the  locomotive  attached 
to  said  cars  exploded  through  the  negligence  or  carelessness 

us  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  v.  suming  that  the  plaintiff  was  a 
Martin,  111  111.  226.  Held  not  as-  passenger. 


587  INJURY  FROM  ACCIDENT.  §  581 

of  the  engineer  employed  by  the  defendants,  who  was  then 
in  charge  of  said  locomotive,  and  the  plaintiff  was  injured  there- 
by (the  plaintiff  not  being  guilty  of  any  negligence  contributing 
to  his  injury),  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  for  such 
injury.143 

§581.  Injury  from  accident— No  liability. — (1)  If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that-  the  injury  to  plaintiff  in  this  suit 
happened  to  her  by  mere  accident,  without  any  fault  on  the 
part  of  defendant  or  its  employees,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot 
recover  in  this  action,  and  they  will  find  for  the  defendant 144 

(2)  A  railroad  company,  in  the  conduct  and  management  of  its 
trains,  is  required  to  employ  skillful  and  competent  agents,  and 
to  use  such  means   and  foresight  in  providing  for  the  safety 
of   passengers,   as   persons   of  the    greatest   care   and   prudence 
usually  exercise  in  similar  cases;  and  should  an  injury  result 
to  a  passenger  from  a  failure  to  use  such  a  degree  of  care  and 
prudence,  the  company  will  be  responsible  for  such  injury,  un- 
less it  appears  that  the  passenger  so  injured,   by  the  use   of 
ordinary   care   and   prudence    (that   is,   the   ordinary   care   and 
prudence  usually  exercised  by  persons  of  ordinary  caution  in 
his  condition  and  circumstances),   could  have   avoided  the   in- 
jury.   But  a  railroad  company  is  not  responsible  for  an  injury 
to  a  passenger  which  is  the  result  of  a  mere  accident  or  casual- 
ty, where  there  is  no  want  of  care  or  skill  on  the  part  of  the 
company  or  its  agents.145 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant's 
train   of  cars   in  which  plaintiff  was  being  carried  as   a   pas- 
senger on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventh  day  of  December, 
1872,  was  thrown  from  the  track,  causing  the  injury  to  plaintiff  in 
the  petition  complained  of,  wholly  because  of  a  fresh  and  contem- 
poraneous break  in  an  iron  rail  or  piece  of  an  iron  rail  of  de- 
fendant's  track,   and  under  the   train   on  which   plaintiff   was 
a  passenger,  and  that  such  fresh  break  was  caused  wholly  by 

I"  Yeomans   v.   C.    S.    N.    Co.    44  burgh,  &c.  R.  Co.  157  Ind.  305,  61 

Cal.  81.   (As  to  the  carrier's  power  N.  E.  678.) 

to   contract    against   such    liability  1*4  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66 

to  an  express  messenger,  see  Louis-  Miss.  316,  6  So.  207. 

ville,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Keefer,  146  Ind.  145  Houston    &    T.    C.    R.    Co.    v. 

21,  44  N.  E.   796;    Russell  v.  Pitts-  Gorbett,  49  Tex,  576, 


§  582  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARK1ERS.  588 

frost  or  extreme  cold,  and  that  such  cause  was  one  which  the 
highest  degree  of  practicable  care,  skill  and  caution  consistent 
with  operating  the  road  at  all  could  not  have  provided  against, 
and  that  said  train  was  not  thrown  from  the  track  because 
of  the  mode  of  construction  and  repair  of  said  track,  and  not 
because  of  any  fault  or  neglect  whatever  of  defendant,  its  agents 
or  servants,  then  the  jury  should  find  for  defendant  as  to  the 
injuries  to  the  person  of  plaintiff  in  the  petition  complained  of.146 

§  582.  Passenger  guilty  of  contributory  negligence. — (1)  Not- 
withstanding the  jury  may  find  that  the  plaintiff  was  guilty 
of  negligence,  and  that  such  negligence  contributed  to  the  in- 
jury of  which  she  complains,  yet  still,  if  the  agents  of  the  de- 
fendant were  aware  of  such  negligence  in  time,  by  the  use 
of  ordinary  care  and  prudence,  to  have  avoided  the  effect  of 
such  negligence  on  her  part,  but  did  not  do  so,  then  such  neg- 
ligence on  her  part  is  not  such  contributory  negligence  as  to 
constitute  a  defense  to  this  action.147 

(2)  Even  though  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  plaintiff  received  the  injuries  complained  of  by  reason  of  his 
jumping  from  the  defendant's  car  at  the  time  of  the  wreck,  yet  if 
the  jury  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was 
so  stunned  and  bewildered  by  the  shock  of  the  collision  as  to 
render  said  plaintiff  unconscious  of  what  he  was  doing,  then  the 
jury  are  instructed  that  said  jumping  was  not  such  negligence  as 
to  prevent  plaintiff  from  recovering  damages,  any  more  than  if  he 
had  received  said  injuries  complained  of  while  in  defendant's 
car,  although  the  jury  may  further  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  no  injury  would  have  been  received   by  him  if  he   had 
remained  in  the  car.148 

(3)  If  the  jury  should  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plain- 
tiff jumped  from  the  defendant's  car  at  the  time  of  the  wreck, 
yet  if  they  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  said  plaintiff 
did   so   under   a   well-grounded   fear  of   danger  to   his   life    or 
limbs,  the  plaintiff  is  as  much  entitled  to  recover  in  this  ac- 
tion, so  far  as  his  jumping  is  concerned,  as  if  he  had  received 

us  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  i«  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

11  Bush   (Ky.)  506.  Kenzie,  81  Va.  78.    See,  Galena,  &c. 

i«  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  Co.  v.  Fay,  16  111.  558. 
v.  Hogeland,  60  Md.  150. 


589  PASSENGER'S  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE.  §  582 

the  injuries  complained  of  while  in  defendant's  car,  although 
they  may  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  if  he  had  re- 
mained in  the  car  he  would  not  have  been  injured.140 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  in 
alighting  from  the  train,  failed  to  exercise  the  ordinary  care  and 
caution  which  a  prudent  man  would  usually  exercise  under  like, 
circumstances,  and  that  such  neglect  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff 
contributed  proximately  to  the  injury  suffered  by  him,  then  the 
plaintiff  is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  and  he  cannot  re- 
cover in  this  suit.150 

(5)  Should  you  find  that  plaintiff  did  not  have  a  sufficient  time 
to  alight  from  the  said  train  as  above  explained,  but  that  she 
was  guilty  of  gross  or  criminal  negligence  in  alighting  while 
the  train  was  in  motion,  you  will  find  for  the  defendant.151 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  train  of  cars 
upon  which  the  plaintiff  had  taken  passage  had  stopped  a  suffi- 
cient time  for  the  plaintiff  to  have  left  them  upon  the  platform 
where  passengers  leaving  the  defendant's  cars  usually  land,  and 
had  again  started  on  their  course  and  had  passed  the  platform 
provided  by  the  defendant  for  passengers  to  get  out  of  the  cars 
upon,  and  that  the  plaintiff  then  left  the  platform  of  the  car 
rather  than  be  carried  by,  he  was   guilty  of  carelessness,  and 
cannot  recover  in  this  action.152 

(7)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  use  ordinary  care  as 
hereinbefore  defined,  as  to  her  own  protection  in  alighting  from 
defendant's  car,  and  if  she  was  guilty  of  negligence  contribut- 
ing to   the   injuries   of  which   she   complains,   then   she   cannot 
recover.     That  is  to  say,  if  the  defendant,  by  its  servants,  was 
guilty  of  negligence,  and  the  plaintiff  was  also  guilty  of  neg- 
ligence, contributing  to  her  injuries,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot 
recover  in  this  action.153 

(8)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  in  seeking  to  alight  from  the 
cars  of  the  defendant  company,  to  wait  until  such  cars  came  to 
a  full  stop,  or  were  moving  so  slowly  that,  under  all  the  circum- 

i«  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Me-  Chollette,  33  Neb.  146,  49  N.  W. 
Kenzie,  81  Va.  78.  1114. 

iso  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  152  Davis  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
v.  Eckford,  71  Tex.  276,  8  S.  W.  679.  Co.  18  Wis.  188. 

isi  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  T.SS  Denver  Tramway  Co.  v. 

Owens,  20  Colo.  112,  36  Pac.  848. 


§  583  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  590 

stances,  including  the  time  of  night,  her  sex  and  condition,  it  was 
safe  for  her  to  step  off;  and  if  she  sought  to  alight  from  the  car 
before  such  time,  although  unless  she  did  so  she  might  be  carried 
beyond  the  point  where  she  desired  to  get  off,  she  was  negligent 
and  cannot  recover  in  this  case.15* 

(9)  The  facts  of  this  case  are  for  you  to  determine.  The  value 
of  the  testimony  is  for  you.  If  the  plaintiff  without  any  fault  of 
his  own  was  injured  by  the  fault  of  the  defendant's  motorman 
as  charged,  then  he  can  recover,  and  if  he  can  recover,  he  can 
recover  according  to  the  measure  of  damages  I  have  given  you. 
If,  however,  he  in  the  smallest  degree  himself  contributed  to 
the  injury,  he  cannot  recover.  Moreover,  he  cannot  recover, 
if,  however  innocent  the  plaintiff  was,  the  motorman  did  nothing 
wrong.  If  the  motorman  did  his  duty  simply,  and  in  conse- 
quence of  some  other  set  of  circumstances  not  known  to  us  the 
accident  happened,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.  It  requires 
negligence  in  the  defendant  and  freedom  from  negligence  in 
the  plaintiff,  both,  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover.155 

§  583.  Burden  of  proof  generally. — (1)  The  proof  must  show 
affirmatively  that  the  plaintiff  was  a  passenger  upon  the  road  of 
the  defendant,  and  as  such  passenger  was  injured  by  the  acts 
and  negligence  of  the  defendant  and  its  employes;  the  proof 
must  also  show  that  the  plaintiff  was  induced  to  believe  from  the 
acts  or  words  of  the  employes  of  the  defendant,  that  it  was  in- 
tended the  plaintiff  should  alight  from  the  train  at  the  time  and 
place  when  and  where  he  had  alighted  from  said  train  of  cars.159 

(2)  It  is  not  sufficient  in  this  case  for  the  plaintiff  to  prove  the 
injuries  alone,  but  it  devolves  upon  her  to  show  negligence  on 
the  part  of  the  defendant,  and  that  unless  they  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  defendant,  its  servants  or  employes,  were  negli- 
gent in  delivering  the  plaintiff  at  B,  they  will  find  for  defend- 
ant.157 

(3)  Although  the  burden  of  proving  that  the  plaintiff  contrib- 
uted to  the  injury  complained  of  is  upon  the  defendant,  yet  if  the 

154  Denver      Tramway      Co.      v.  iso  International  &  G.  N.   R.  Co. 
Owens,  20  Colo.  112,  36  Pac.  848.  v.  Eckford,  71  Tex.  275,  8  S.  W.  679. 

155  Fitzpatrick   v.   Union   Tr.   Co.  "7  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66 
206  Pa.  St.  335,  55  Atl.  1050.  Miss.  313,  6  So.  207. 


591  BURDEN  OF  PROOF — CARRIER  NO  INSURER.        §  585 

jury  shall  believe  from  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  whether  such 
evidence  was  introduced  by  plaintiff  or  defendant,  that  there  is 
a  preponderance  of  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  guilty  of 
any  negligence  which  contributed  directly  to  producing  the 
injury  complained  of,  then  the  burden  of  proof  is  satisfied  and 
the  verdict  of  the  jury  must  be  for  the  defendant.158 

§  584.  Carrier  not  an  insurer  of  passenger's  safety. — (1)  The 
duty  of  a  carrier  is  to  safely  carry  passengers.  It  is  true  that  a 
carrier  of  passengers  is  not  an  insurer  of  the  safety  of  those 
whom  it  undertakes  to  carry  against  all  the  risks  of  travel,  but, 
nevertheless,  there  rests  upon  such  carrier  this  general  duty  of 
safely  carrying.159 

(2)  Railroad  companies  are  not  insurers  of  their  passengers 
and  are  not  liable  for  injuries  which  such  passengers  may  receive 
while  being  carried,  unless  the  carrier  is  guilty  of  negligence 
which  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury  received,  and  the 
passenger  was  free  from  negligence  which  may  have  contributed 
proximately  to  the  injury  of  which  he  complains.160 

(3)  The  defendant  is  not  an  insurer  of  the  safety  of  its  passen- 
gers, and  if  the  jury  shall  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  de- 
fendant had  provided  reasonable  facilities  for  the  transportation 
of  such  passengers  as  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  apply  to  be 
carried  from  Old  Point  on  the  occasion  in  question,  and  that 
the  cars  are  such  as  are  in  general  use  and  in  good  order  and 
condition;  that  the  track,  switches  and  frog  at  the  point  where 
the  plaintiff  was  injured  were  in  proper  order  and  condition, 
and  that  the  employes  in  charge  of  the  train  were  experienced 
and  competent  men,  and  that  the  train  in  question  was  carried 
safely  from  Old  Point  to  R,  no  negligence  can  be  imputed  to 
the  defendant.161 

§  585.  Carrier  liable  for  loss  or  injury  to  baggage. — (1)  A 
railroad  company  may  become  liable  as  a  common  carrier  by  con- 
tract for  transportation  of  passengers  and  baggage  over  other 

iss  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  Dotson,  15  Tex.  Cv.  App.  73,  38  S. 

v.  Anderson,  72  Md.  522,  20  A.  2.  W.  643. 

iss  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  "i  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 

v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  561,  14  N.  E.  572.  Clowes,  93  Va.  194,  24  S.  B.  833. 

160  Houston    &    T.    C.    R.    Co.    v. 


§  585  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  592 

railroads  forming  with  its  own  a  continuous  line;  and,  where  it 
does  so  contract,  its  liability  is  the  same  for  losses  occasioned 
by  its  negligence  while  the  baggage  is  upon  such  other  road  as 
when  it  is  upon  its  own  road.102 

(2)  When  a  railroad  company  takes  baggage  for  a  passenger 
its  liability  is  of  the  highest  sort.    It  agrees  to  carry  the  baggage 
safely,  and  insures  against  all  sorts  of  risks,  except  the  act  of 
God  or  the  public  enemy.   But  when  the  baggage  is  landed  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  owner  to  call  immediately,  or  as  soon  as  the  throng 
and  hurry  incident  to  the  arrival  and  departure  of  trains  has 
subsided,  and  get  his  property.    But  if  he  fails  to  thus  call  and 
the  agent  of  the  company  takes  charge  of  it,  then  the  respon- 
sibility will  be  changed.     It  will  be  the  responsibility  of  a  ware- 
houseman instead  of  that   of  a  common  carrier.     The  liability 
will  be  to  take  such  care  of  the  property  as  an  ordinarily  pru- 
dent man  would  of  his  own  property  under  like  circumstances. 
All  the   defendant  is  required  to  do  is  to  take  ordinary   care 
under  the  circumstances,  such  as  men  usually  exercise  in  their 
own  concerns.     The  defendant  is  not  liable  for  the  theft  of  the 
property,  unless  it  is  the  result  of  the  want  of  proper  care.163 

(3)  In  the  absence  of  a  special  contract  limiting  the  liability  of 
the  defendant,  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  it  is  liable  for 
loss  of  the  plaintiff's  baggage,  you  will  assess  as  damages  the 
value  of  the  trunk  and  such  of  its  contents  as  you  find  were  the, 
wearing  apparel  of  herself  or  her  child,  or  their  necessary  or 
usual   appendages   or   accompaniments   of  herself   and   child   as 
travelers,  with  interest  from  the  time  of  demand  to  the  first  day 
of  the  present  term  of  this  court.164 

(4)  The  burden  of  proving  any  qualification  of  the  liability  of 
the  defendant  as  a  carrier  rests  upon  it.     The  notice  to  be  of 
any  force  must  amount  to  actual  notice.     At  all  events,  to  exon- 
erate the  defendant  as  a  carrier  from  its   general  liability,   it 
must  be  shown  at  least  by  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  or 
others  acting  for  her,  assented  to  the  demands  of  the  notice, 
or  with  a  knowledge  of  it  acquiesced  in  it  by  making  no  remon- 
strance.165 

162  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  164  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 

Campbell,  36  Ohio  St.  653.  Campbell,  36  Ohio  St.  647. 

IBS  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Miller,  35  165  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 

Ohio  St.  543.  Campbell,  36  Ohio  St.  .655. 


593  CARRIER   LOSING   BAGGAGE — LIABILITY.  §    587 

§586.  Carrier's  liability  for  baggage  limited. —  (1)  A  carrier 
may  restrict  or  limit  the  amount  of  its  liability  by  a  special  con- 
tract accepted  on  the  part  of  the  owner  of  the  baggage ;  and  this 
may  be  done  by  notice  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  owner  of 
the  baggage  before  or  at  the  delivery  to  the  carrier,  if  assented  to 
by  the  owner.166 

(2)  And  in  determining  whether  or  not  the  conditions  and  lim- 
itations were  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  plaintiff  and  those  act- 
ing for  her,  you  will  look  to  all  the  evidence  in  the  case ;  as  to  the 
manner  of  the  delivery  of  the  ticket  and  the  check,  whether  any 
thing  was  said  or  done  calling  attention  to  them  or  not ;  whether 
they  were  or  were  not  read  at  the  time  of  or  before  the  receipt.167 

§  587.   Goods  lost  or  delayed  by  carrier — Liability. — (1)   If  the 

defendant  was  guilty  of  any  unreasonable  delay  in  the  delivery 
of  the  turkeys,  and  it  was  the  result  of  its  own  negligence  or 
want  of  care  and  diligence  in  that  behalf,  then  it  is  liable  for 
whatever  damages  the  plaintiff  has  sustained,  if  any.  The  de- 
fendant being  a  common  carrier,  it  cannot,  by  its  bill  of  lading 
given  for  shippers,  or  in  any  other  way,  exempt  itself  from  lia- 
'bility  for  loss  or  damage  arising  from  failing  to  deliver  the 
goods  shipped  within  a  reasonable  time,  or  at  the  time  stipulated 
by  it  for  delivery,  if  there  is  any  such  time,  if  the  failure  be 
the  result  of  its  own  negligence  or  that  of  its  agent  or  servant.168 

(2)  No  conditions  in  a  bill  of  lading  can  bind  the  shipper,  un- 
less where  it  is  averred  and  proven  by  the  carrier  that  the  shipper 
knew  of  such  conditions,  and  assented  to  them  at  or  prior  to  the 
time  of  shipment,  and  such  assent  must  be  proven  by  the  carrier. 
The  law  will  not  presume  such  assent.     And  whether  there  was 
a  bill  of  lading  for  the  turkeys  and  the  plaintiff  knew  of  and 
assented  to  the  conditions,  is  a  question  for  your  determination, 
and  the  burden  is  on  the  defendant  to  prove  these  facts.169 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  was  a 
common  carrier,  and  as  such  carrier  received  the  money  in  ques- 
tion, to  be  carried  and  delivered  to  the  plaintiff  at  Kankakee, 
and  that  the  defendant  delivered  said  money  to  one  Edmunds 

!66  Baltimore    &    O.    R.     Co.     v.          168  American  Ex.  Co.  v.  Hawk,  51 
Campbell,  36  Ohio  St.  655.  Ohio  St.  572. 

i<"  Baltimore    &    O.     R.     Co.    v.          iso  American  Ex.  Co.  v.  Hawk,  51 
Campbell,  36  Ohio  St.  655.  Ohio  St.   572.     See,   Illinois.,  &c.  R. 

Co.  v.  Cobb,  &c.  Co.  72  111.  148.  154, 
bill  of  lading  prima  facie  evidence. 


§    588  NEGLIGENCE    OF    CARRIERS.  594 

on  a  writing  purporting  to  be  an  order  of  the  plaintiff,  and 
that  said  order  was  a  forgery,  then  the  defendant  was  guilty 
of  gross  negligence,  and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  the 
amount  of  said  money.170 

§  588.  Carrier  not  liable  for  damage  to  goods. — (1)  If  the 
jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  held  the  leather 
for  shipment  by  its  usual  and  customary  route  for  shipping 
freight  to  P,  and  that  such  arrangement  for  shipment  was  rea- 
sonably prudent,  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  defendant  exercised  reasonable  care  and  diligence  in  keeping 
it  for  shipment,  then  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover,  and 
the  jury  must  find  for  the  defendant.171 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  at 
the  time  of  delivering  the  package  in  question  to  the  defendant's 
agent  received  a  receipt  for  said  package  wherein  it  was  ex- 
pressly stipulated  that  the  defendant  would  not  be  responsible 
for  the  same  beyond  the  station  of  the  defendant  nearest  to  M, 
and  the  plaintiff's  attention  was  called  to  or  he  knew  of  such 
underwritten  limitation  at  the  time,  and  that  when  it  reached 
that  point. the  defendant  was  to  deliver  the  package  to  others, 
and  that  S  was  the  nearest  point  on  the  route  of  the  defendant 
to  M,  and  that  the  defendant  carried  said  package  safely  and  in 
good  order  to   S,  and  there  delivered  it  to  the  United   States 
Express  Company  in  good  order  to  complete  the  transportation, 
then  the  defendant  was  not  liable  any  further,  and  the  issues 
must  be  found  for  the  defendant.172 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  if  the  plaintiff  sus- 
tained any  damages  by  any  of  the  trees  becoming  wholly  worthless 
before  they  arrived  and  were  tendered  to  the  plaintiff  at  A,  if 
in  fact  they  were  so  tendered,  and  while  they  were  being  trans- 
ported to  that  place,   or  by  any  of  said  trees  being  partially 
damaged   by    reason    of   delay   in   transportation    while    in   the 
defendant's  hands,  then  you  will  estimate  such  damages  as  the 
evidence  shows  the  plaintiff  to  have  sustained,  if  any,  and  return 
a  verdict  for  such  amount;  but  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence 

ITO  American    M.    U.    Ex.    Co.    v.          i«  Snider   v.    Adams   Ex.   Co.    63 
Milk,  73  111.  224,  226.  Mo.  376. 

i7i  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Gid- 
ley,  119  Ala.  525,  24  So.  753. 


595  DAMAGE    TO    GOODS    AND    LIVE    STOCK.  §    589 

that  only  a  portion  of  said  trees  were  damaged,  and  that  within 
a  reasonable  time  after  the  trees  arrived  at  A  they  were  ten- 
dered to  the  plaintiff,  then  it  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to 
accept  said  trees,  and  if  you  believe  that  such  tender  was  made 
to  the  plaintiff,  then  he  can  only  recover  damages  for  such  trees 
as  are  shown  to  have  been  totally  worthless,  and  damages  for 
such  other  trees  as  were  damaged  at  the  time,  if  any  were 
damaged.173 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  trees 
in  question  were  tendered  to  plaintiff  after  their  arrival  at  A,  and 
that   if  plaintiff  had  received   them  he   could   have   preserved 
them,  or  any  part  of  them,  by  the  use  of  proper  care  and  atten- 
tion, it  was  his  duty  to  have  done  so,  and  if  he  suffered  loss  on 
account  of  such  failure  to  preserve  said  trees,  he  cannot  recover 
for  such  loss.174 

(5)  In  order  to  hold  the  defendant  liable  for  the  special  dam- 
ages claimed,  that  is,  the  price  which  different  persons  had  con- 
tracted to  pay  for  the  said  trees  on  delivery  at  Alba,  sought  to 
be  recovered  in  this  case,  the  facts  of  the  sale  of  said  trees  by 
the  plaintiff  should  have  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
defendant  company  at  the  time  the  trees  were  delivered  to  it  for 
shipment,  and  unless  you  find  that  the  defendant  was  so  notified, 
or  knew  at  the  time  the  trees  came  into  its  hands  of  the  special 
circumstances  which  would  make  a  quicker  delivery  necessary, 
you  should  not  allow  the  plaintiff  the  special  damages  claimed 
by  him,  unless  from  the  nature  and  character  of  the  freight,  the 
defendant  was  charged  with  knowing  that  a  quicker  and  speedy 
delivery  thereof  was  important  and  necessary.175 

§  589.  Liability  in  shipment  of  live  stock. — (1)  If  the  jury  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  received  from  the 
plaintiff,  on  December  second,  1871,  his  cattle  and  hogs  for  trans- 
portation to  and  delivery  at  Buffalo,  New  York,  and  that  at  the 
time  of  the  receipt  of  the  stock  the  road  of  the  defendant,  and  its 
connecting  lines  running  to  Buffalo,  were  so  crowded  with  freight 

ITS  st.    Louis    S.    W.    R.    Co.    v.      Gates,  15  Tex.  Cv.  App.  135,  38  S. 
Gates,  15  Tex.   Cv.   App.   135,  38  S.      W.  648. 
W.  649.  "5  St.    Louis    S.    W.    R.    Co.    v. 

IT*  St.    Louis    S.    W.    R.  Co.    v.      Gates,  15  Tex.  Cv.  App.   135,  38  S. 

W.  649. 


§  589  NEGLIGENCE  OF  CARRIERS.  596 

that  they  were  unable  to  furnish  cars  within  the  usual  time  for 
the  transportation  of  the  plaintiff's  stock,  then  such  crowded 
condition  of  said  road  or  roads  would  furnish  no  excuse  for  the 
defendant  if  the  plaintiff's  stock  were  not  delivered  at  Buffalo, 
New  York,  in  a  reasonable  time,  if  the  jury  believe  the  defendant 
was  so  bound  to  deliver.176 

(2)  A  railroad  company  engaged  in  the  business  of  transporting 
live  stock  assumes  all  the  responsibilities  of  a  common  carrier. 
In  the  absence  of  any  special  contract  limiting  its  liability  it 
insures  against  all  loss  except  that  caused  by  the  act  of  God  or 
the  public  enemy.  It  may  limit  its  liability  by  a  special  con- 
tract with  the  shipper  or  consignor  of  the  property,  but  such 
special  contract  can  never  relieve  the  railroad  company  from 
liability  for  its  own  negligence.177 

(3^)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiffs  in 
this  case  entered  into  a  written  contract  with  the  defendant  to 
transport  said  stock  in  question  (which  was  consigned  to  Media, 
Lancaster  and  Philadelphia,  Pa.)  to  the  terminus  of  its  road,  and 
there  to  deliver  it  to  the  connecting  carrier,  and  that  it  was  agreed 
between  plaintiffs  and  said  defendant  in  said  contract  that  in 
case  of  loss  and  damage  whereby  any  legal  liability  or  responsi- 
bility should  or  might  be  incurred  by  the  terms  of  said  contract, 
that  that  company  alone  should  be  held  responsible  therefor  in 
whose  actual  custody  the  live  stock  might  be  at  the  happening 
of  such  loss  or  damage,  and  if  the  jury  further  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  the  northern  terminal  of  the  defendant's  railroad 
is  in  H,  Maryland,  and  that  it  safely  and  in  a  reasonable  time 
delivered  the  said  stock  there  to  the  C  V  railroad,  and  that 
the  damage,  if  any,  occurred  after  it  had  been  so  delivered  to 
the  connecting  carrier,  then  they  will  find  for  the  defendant, 
unless  they  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiffs  or  their 
agents  did,  within  a  reasonable  time  after  said  delay  or  damage, 
if  any,  make  demand  upon  the  said  defendant  for  satisfactory 
proof  that  said  delay  or  damage  did  not  occur  while  the  said 
stock  was  in  its  possession.178 

"a  Toledo,    W.    &   W.    R.    Co.    v.          ITS  Norfolk     &     W.     R.     Co.     v. 
Lockhart,  71  111.  630.  Reeves,  97  Va.  291,  33  S.  E.  606. 

177  Kansas   City  R.   Co.   v.   Simp- 
son, 30  Kas.  647,  2  Pac.  821. 


597  FREIGHT    RATES    UNDER    STATUTE.  §    590 

§  590.  Freight  rate  of  carrier  under  federal  statute. — If  the 
jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  company  filed 
with  the  interstate  commerce  commission  its  tariff  rates  on  hay 
and  that  said  tariff  rates  so  filed  covered  the  tariff  rate  on  hay 
from  the  station  of  Gale,  in  Indian  Territory,  to  the  city  of  St. 
Louis,  and  that  said  tariff  rate  on  hay  was  printed  and  publicly 
posted  at  said  station  of  Gale  for  the  information  and  inspection 
of  the  public,  and  that  in  accordance  with  such  tariff  rate  so 
filed  with  the  said  interstate  commerce  commission,  and  so 
printed  and  posted,  the  rate  on  hay  was  fixed  and  established 
at  twenty-five  cents  per  hundred  with  a  minimum  weight  of 
twenty  thousand  pounds  per  car,  and  that  such  tariff  rate  was 
on  file  with  the  said  interstate  commerce  commission  at  the  time 
the  hay  in  controversy  was  shipped,  and  that  there  had  been  no 
reduction  in  said  tariff  rate  for  a  period  of  three  days  before  the 
shipment  of  the  hay  in  controversy  was  made,  and  if  the  jury 
further  find  that  the  defendant  company  only  collected  from  the 
plaintiff  an  amount  of  money  not  exceeding  the  rate  of  twenty- 
five  cents  per  hundred,  with  a  minimum  of  twenty  thousand 
pounds  per  car,  then  the  jury  must  find  for  the  defendant.179 

ITS  Missouri,   K.   &   T.   R.   Co.    v.      Bowles,  1  Indian  Ter.  250,  40  S.  W. 

901. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 


NEGLIGENCE  OF  CITIES  AND  TOWNS. 


Sec. 
591. 


to 


Sidewalks — Duty     of    city 
keep  them  in  repair. 

592.  Sidewalk  presumed  reasonably 

safe. 

593.  Plaintiff  knowing  unsafe  con- 

dition. 

594.  Care     of    plaintiff    when    he 

knows   danger. 

595.  Notice    to    city    of    defect    or 

danger   necessary. 

596.  Notice  of  unsafe  condition  may 

be    inferred. 

597.  City  must  take  notice  of  un- 

safe condition. 

598.  Injury  from  accident;    no  lia- 

bility. 

599.  Elements    necessary    to   a    re- 

covery. 

600.  Drains,  left  in  dangerous  con- 

dition. 


Sec. 

601.  Bridges,   shall   be   kept  in   re- 

pair. 

602.  Grades  and  embankments  ob- 

structing natural  flow  of  wa- 
ter. 

603.  Ice,   sleet,   snow,   on   sidewalk 

— Liability. 

604.  Signs    overhanging    sidewalks 

— Damages. 

605.  Building    permits    to   obstruct 

streets. 

606.  Streets  and  highways,  shall  be 

safe  for  travel. 

607.  Considerations     in     assessing 

damages. 

608.  Matters  of  evidence — Incompe- 

tent evidence. 

609.  Claims  against  city,  mode   of 

allowing. 


§591.    Sidewalks — Duty  of  city  to  keep  them  in  repair.— (1) 

It  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  use  reasonable  diligence  to 
keep  the  sidewalk  in  question  in  a  reasonably  safe  condition,  and 
if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  failed 
to  perform  such  duty,  and  that  by  reason  of  its  negligence  in  that 
regard  the  said  sidewalk  was  permitted  to  remain  out  of  repair 
and  in  a  dangerous  condition,  by  reason  whereof  the  plaintiff, 
while  exercising  reasonable  care  on  her  part,  received  the  injury 
complained  of,  then  the  defendant  is  liable.  And  the  court 
further  instructs  the  jury  that  if  they  find  from  the  evidence 
that  the  plaintiff  was  herself  guilty  of  some  negligence,  but  that 

598 


599  KEEPING   SIDEWALKS    REPAIRED.  §    591 

the  defendant  was  guilty  of  gross  negligence  contributing  to  such 
injury,  and  that  the  plaintiff's  negligence  was  slight  as  compared 
with  the  negligence  of  the  defendant,  still  she  may  be  entitled  to 
recover.1 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  most  direct 
route  for  the  plaintiff  in  going  to  and  from  his  home  to  his  place 
of  business  was  over  South  Eiver  street  in  said  city  of  Aurora, 
then  the  fact,  if  shown  by  the  evidence,  that  the  sidewalk  on  said 
street  over  which  the  plaintiff  passed  was  defective,  and  had 
been  in  a  defective  condition  for  some  years  previous  to   the 
alleged  injury,  would  not  oblige  him  to  take  another  sidewalk 
less  convenient.2 

(3)  The  law  does  not  impose  upon  the  city  of  Indianapolis  the 
duty  of  keeping  its  gas  lights  lighted  during  all  hours  of  the 
night,  nor  is  the  city  liable  for  injuries  which  a  person  may 
receive  while  going  over  or  along  its  streets,  even  though  such 
injuries  may  have  been  caused  by  the  failure  of  the  city  to  have 
its   lamps  lighted,   if  this  is  the   only   act   of   omission   proved 
against  the  city.     But  if  there  is  a  defect  in  a  sidewalk  or  gutter- 
crossing  liable  to  be  dangerous  to  traveler's  passing  along  or 
over  the  same  in  the  nighttime,  though  using  ordinary  care,  then 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  city  to  guard  the  same  in  some  way,  and  if 
there  are  no  lights  then  barriers  or  some  other  precautions  must 
be  used.     You  have  a  right,  therefore,  to  consider  the  circum- 
stance of  the  absence  of  lights  in  the  vicinity  of  the  gutter-cross- 
ing in  question  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  accident,  if  it  is  a  fact 
that  there  were  no  lights  in  connection  with  the  other  facts  and 
circumstances  proved,  both  as  bearing  upon  the  question  whether 
or  not  the  defendant  was  guilty  of  negligence,   as  well  as  in 
determining  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff  herself  was  free  from 
negligence.3 

(4)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  injury  com- 

i  City  of  Chicago  v.  Stearns,  105  negligence  is  no  longer  the  law  in 

111.  554.     This  instruction  is  not  ob-  Illinois.      If    the    plaintiff    by    his 

jectionable  as  being  in  conflict  with  negligence  contributed  to  his  injury 

the    rule   that   the   city    shall    have  he  cannot  recover, 

actual  or  constructive  notice  of  the  -  City   of  Aurora  v.   Hillman,   90 

defective  sidewalk  before  it  can  be  111.  68. 

held  liable.  3  City    of    Indianapolis    v     Scott, 

The      doctrine      of      comparative  72  Ind.  200. 


§    591  NEGLIGENCE   OF    CITIES   AND    TOWNS.  600 

plained  of  was  suffered,  and  that  it  was  occasioned  by  a  fall  upon 
the  sidewalk,  as  charged  in  the  petition  of  the  plaintiff,  and  that 
the  sidewalk  at  the  place  where  the  fall  occurred  was  in  an 
unsafe  and  dangerous  condition  for  the  passage  of  travelers  on 
foot,  and  that  the  accident  occurred  in  consequence  of  such  un- 
safe condition  of  the  sidewalk,  and  that  the  plaintiff  could  not 
have  known  and  guarded  against  the  damages  'by  the  use  of  ordi- 
nary care  and  prudence,  then  the  jury  will  find  for  the  plaintiff, 
if  they  find  that  the  negligence  of  plaintiff  did  not  contribute 
to  the  injury.4 

(5)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  city  to  make  and  keep  its  sidewalks  rea- 
sonably safe  for  public  travel,  and  that  if  it  fails  in  the  discharge 
of  this  duty  it  is  liable  to  persons  sustaining  injuries  because  of 
such  failure.     And  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
the  sidewalk  in  question  where  the  plaintiff  fell  and  sustained 
the  injuries  complained  of  in  his  declaration,  was  not  in  such 
reasonable   repair,    then   they    must    find   for   the    plaintiff   the 
damages  they  believe  him  to  have  sustained,  unless  they  shall 
also  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,   by  his   own 
negligence  or  want  of  ordinary  care  and  caution,  so  far  contrib- 
uted to  the  misfortune  that  but  for  such  negligence  or  want  of 
ordinary  care  and  caution  on  his  part  the  misfortune  would  not 
have  happened.5 

(6)  The  defendant  is  bound  to  use  reasonable  care  and  precau- 
tion to  keep  and  maintain  its  streets  and  sidewalks  in  good  and 
sufficient  repair  to  render  them  reasonably  safe  for  all  persons 
passing  on  or  over  the  same ;  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  the  defendant  failed  to  use  all  reasonable  care  and  pre- 
caution to  keep  its  sidewalks  in  such  repair,  and  the  injury  com- 
plained of  resulted  from  that  cause,  as  charged  in  the  declaration, 
and  that  the  plaintiff  sustained  damage  thereby  without  negli- 
gence on  his  part,  then  he  is  entitled  to  recover  in  this  suit.6 

(7)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  defendant  city  to  keep  its  sidewalks  in 
safe  condition  and  free  from  defects  and  obstructions  dangerous 
to  persons  passing  along  the  same  with  ordinary  care ;  and  the 

*  Rice  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  40         6  Moore  v.  City  of  Richmond,  85 
Iowa,   639.  Va.  541,  8  S.  E.  387. 

5  Gordon    v.    City    of    Richmond, 
83  Va.  438,  2  S.  E.  727. 


601  KEEPING    SIDEWALKS    REPAIRED.  §    592 

defendant  is  liable  to  a  person  who  sustains  injury  without  fault 
on  his  part,  by  reason  of  its  neglect  to  do  so.7 

(8)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  corporation  to  keep  the  streets  of  the 
city  in  repair,  and  this  includes  the  sidewalks  for  persons  on  foot 
as  well  as  the  roadways,  and  it  is  no  answer  to  a  complaint  for 
injury  caused  by  a  defect  in  the  sidewalk,  that  there  was  a  suffi- 
cient space  thereon  by  which  a  safe  passage  might  have  been 
made,   unless   the   injury   might   have  been   avoided   by   proper 
prudence  on  the  part  of  the  person  injured,  or  unless  negligence 
can  be  imputed  to  him  as  contributing  to  cause  the  injury.8 

(9)  The  city  of  I  is  not  an  insurer  nor  a  warrantor  of  the  condi- 
tion of  its  streets  and  sidewalks,  nor  is  every  defect  therein,  though 
it  may  cause  the  injury  sued  for,  actionable.     It  is  sufficient  to 
relieve  it  from  liability  if  the  streets  and  sidewalks  were  in  a 
reasonably  safe  condition  for  travel  as  well  by  night  as  by  day. 
If,  in  this  case,  it  is  shown  by  the  evidence  that  at  the  place  where 
the  plaintiff  met  with  his  injury  the  sidewalk  was  in  a  reason- 
ably safe  condition  for  travel,  your  verdict  should  be  for  the 
defendant.9 

(10)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  defendant  city  to  keep  its  sidewalks  in 
safe  condition  and  free  from  defects  and  obstructions  dangerous 
to  persons  passing  along  the  same  with  ordinary  care;  and  the 
defendant  is  liable  to  a  person  who,  without  fault  on  his  part, 
sustains  injury  by  reason  of  its  neglect  to  do  so.     But  the  city 
is  not  an  insurer  nor  a  warrantor  of  the  condition  of  its  side- 
walks and  streets,  nor  is  every  defect  therein  actionable,  though 
it  may  cause  injury.     It  is  sufficient  to  relieve  the   city  from 
liability  if  the  streets  and  sidewalks  were  in  a  reasonably  safe 
condition  for  travel  as  well  by  night  as  by  day.     If,  in  this  case, 
it  is  shown  by  the  evidence  that  at  the  place  where  the  plaintiff 
met  with  his  injury  the  sidewalk  was  in  a  reasonably  safe  condi- 
tion for  travel,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  and  the  verdict  should 
be  for  the  defendant.10 

§  592.    Sidewalk  presumed  reasonably  safe.— The    court    in, 

7  Gordon  v.  City  of  Richmond,  9  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Gaston, 
83  Va.  438,  2  S.  E.  727.  58  Ind.  224. 

s  City  Council  v.  Wright,  72  Ala.  10  Gordon  v.  City  of  Richmond, 
411.  83  Va.  438,  2  S.  E.  727;  City  of  In- 

dianapolis v.  Gaston,  58  Ind.  224. 


§    593  NEGLIGENCE    OF    CITIES   AND   TOWNS.  602 

structs  the  jury  that  a  person  passing  over  a  sidewalk  or  street 
is  not  bound  to  exercise  more  than  reasonable  care  and  caution 
in  respect  to  his  own  safety.  Until  he  is  charged  with  notice  to 
the  contrary,  he  has  a  right  to  presume  the  same  to  be  in  a  rea- 
sonably safe  condition.11 

§  593.  Plaintiff  knowing  unsafe  condition. — (1)  If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  knew  of  the  defect,  if  any,  that 
is  a  circumstance  which  you  should  consider  together  with  all  the 
other  circumstances  in  evidence,  in  determining  the  question 
whether  with  such  knowledge  the  plaintiff  exercised  ordinary 
care  in  proceeding  on  the  walk  known  to  him  to  be  dangerous, 
or  whether  in  proceeding  he  used  ordinary  care  to  avoid  injury.12 

(2)  If  the  plaintiff  knew  the  opening  or  cellar  way  was  in  the 
sidewalk,  and  he  attempted  to  pass  the  place  where  it  was,  when 
in  consequence  of  the  darkness  of  the  night  he  could  not  see  it,  he 
has  no  legal  reason  to  complain  of  the  injury  he  received  on 
account  of  the  fact  that  the  opening  or  cellar  way  was  there.     In 
such  case  he  must  be  regarded  as  having  taken  the  risk  upon 
himself,  and  this,  too,  although  at  the  time  the  fact  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  opening  was  not  present  in  the  plaintiff's  mind.13 

(3)  In  determining  whether  the  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  a  want 
of  care  in  going  upon  the  sidewalk  you  will  take  into  consideration 
the  defective  condition  of  the  walk  at  and  prior  to  the  time  of 
the  injury,  as  alleged  by  her  in  her  petition,  and  which  allegation 
binds  her  on  this  branch  of  the  case ;  her  condition,  including  her 
pregnancy,  and  her  agility  or  feebleness  owing  to  said  condition 
or  other  cause  and  her  knowledge  or  want  of  knowledge  of  the 
walk,  and  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  as  established  by  the 
evidence ;  and  if  you  believe,  considering  the  knowledge  that  the 
plaintiff  had  of  the  walk,  if  any,  her  ability  to  walk  upon  this 
kind  of  a  walk  at  the  time  and  the  necessities  of  the  case,  that  is, 
the  need  of  her  going  upon  the  walk,  that  she  could  without 
unreasonable  precaution  have  taken  another  way  and  thus  avoided 
exposing  herself  to  the  danger  of  walking  upon  this  walk  in  the 

11  City   of  Beardstown   v.    Smith,         "  Bruker  v.  Town  of  Covington, 
150  111.  173,  37  N.  E.  211.  69  Ind.  35. 

12  City  of  South  Bend  v.  Hardy, 
98   Ind.    585. 


603  KNOWLEDGE  OF   UNSAFE   CONDITION.  §    594 

condition  it  is  alleged  to  have  been  in  at  the  time.  If  a  reason- 
ably prudent  person  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  caution 
would  not  in  her  condition  have  attempted  with  her  knowledge 
of  the  walk,  if  any,  to  have  gone  upon  the  walk,  then  she  is  not 
entitled  to  recover.14 

§  594.  Care  of  plaintiff  when  he  knows  danger. — (1)  If  the 
plaintiff  knew  that  the  defendant  or  others  were  making  or  had 
made  an  excavation  where  the  injury  was  received,  then  the  law 
would  require  more  care  on  his  part  to  avoid  injury  than  if  he 
knew  nothing  about  it.  When  a  person  knows  of  an  excavation, 
the  law  requires  of  him  to  exercise  such  reasonable  care  as  an 
ordinarily  prudent  and  cautious  person  would  use  under  like 
circumstances,  and  if  this  is  done  and  injury  .results  the  person 
is  without  fault.15 

(2)  The  plaintiff  must  satisfy  the  jury  that  she  was  in  the  exer- 
cise of  due  care  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  injury ;  and  if  a  want  of 
due  care  on  her  part  contributed  in  any  degree  to  the  injury  she 
cannot  recover,  though  it  would  not  have  occurred  e*xcept  for 
the  omission  of  the  town  to  perform  its  duty.    A  knowledge  of  the 
condition  of  the  way  and  its  alleged  defects  would  not  be  conclu- 
sive that  the  plaintiff  did  not  exercise  due  care ;  but  where  a 
person  has  knowledge  of  the  defects  or  reason  to  apprehend  any 
danger,   a  much  greater  degree  of  care  and  circumspection  is 
properly  required  of  such  person ;  and  if,  with  her  knowledge, 
the  plaintiff  did  not  exercise  due  care  and  prudence,  either  in 
entering  upon  the  way  or  in  proceeding  thereon  after  she  had 
entered,  she  cannot  recover.     And  whether  with  her  knowledge, 
and  under  all  the  circumstances,  the  plaintiff  is  in  the  exreise  of 
due  care,  is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine.16 

(3)  If  plaintiff  by  his  own  negligence  approximately  contrib- 
uted to  his  own  injury,  then  the  defendant  is  not  liable  in  this  suit. 
In  determining .  the  question  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
plaintiff,  it  will  be  proper  for  the  jury  to  take  into  consideration 
the  hour  of  the  night  the  injury  was  received,  the  business  call- 
ing the  plaintiff  to  S's  saloon,  and  darkness  of  the  night  and 

i*  Munger  v.  Waterloo,  83  Iowa,  i«  Whitford  v.  Inhabitants,  119 
562,  49  N.  W.  1028.  Mass.  571. 

is  Town  of  Elkhart  v.  Ri  ter,  66 
Ind.   136. 


§    595  NEGLIGENCE   OF    CITIES   AND   TOWNS.  604 

all  the  facts  and  circumstances  connected  with  his  visiting  said 
saloon,  and  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff  was  under  the  influence 
of  intoxicating  liquor.17 

(4)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  drove  up  to 
the  ditch  on  T  street,  arid  that  he  saw,  or  could  by  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  care  and  prudence  have  seen  the  same,  and  that  he 
could  then    have    turned    back    and   proceeded   upon   another 
route,  or  that    he    could    have   driven    safely    directly    across 
the  ditch,  and  instead  of  turning  back  or  driving  directly  across, 
he  turned  to  the  right  and  attempted  to   cross  in  a  diagonal 
course,  and  his  vehicle  was  upset  into  the  ditch  and  he  was  dis- 
abled, then  before  you  can  find  for  the  plaintiff  you  must  find 
from  the  evidence  that  he  acted  with  ordinary  prudence  and  care, 
and  that  he  was  guilty  of  no  contributory  negligence.18 

(5)  There  is  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  had  passed  over  the 
walk  frequently.    She  did  not  testify  that  she  had  observed  or  no- 
ticed the  dangerous  condition  of  the  walk,  these  loose  planks  and 
so  on  before  this  time ;  but  whether  she  had  noticed  it — whether 
she  ought  to  have  noticed  it — is  for  you  to  determine.     She  was 
not  bound  to  the  exercise  of  extraordinary  care,  but  she  was 
bound  to  use  such  care  as  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence,  situated 
as  she  was  under  like  circumstances  would  use,  and  if  she  neg- 
lected to  use  such  care  then  it  would  be  negligence.19 

§  595.  Notice  to  city  of  defect  or  danger  necessary. — (1)  If  at 
the  time  of  the  injuries  complained  of,  the  defendant  had  a  con- 
tract with  any  person  to  furnish  it  with  lumber  by  the  year  or  oth- 
erwise and  to  deliver  the  same  to  the  city,  and  such  person  did,  in 
fact,  under  such  contract  deliver  said  lumber  and  pile  the  same 
in  the  street,  then  the  act  of  such  person  or  persons  in  delivering 
the  same  was  not  the  act  of  the  city,  and  the  city  would  not  be 
liable  for  any  negligence  of  such  person  in  placing  the  same  in 
the  street,  unless  it  had  notice  thereof,  either  express  or  im- 
plied.20 

(2)   If  the  lumber  mentioned  in  the  complaint  was  not  placed  in 

IT  Cramer  v.  City  of  Burlington,  i»  Fee  v.  Columbus  Borough,  168 
39  Iowa,  512.  Pa.  383,  31  Atl.  1076. 

is  City  of  Austin  v.  Ritz,  72  Tex.  20  City  of  Evansville  v.  Senhenn, 
401,  9  S.  W.  884.  151  Ind.  42,  41  L.  R.  A.  728,  733, 

47  N.  E.  634,  51  N.  E.  88. 


605  NOTICE   OF    UNSAFE    CONDITION.  §    59G 

the  street  by  the  city,  but  was  placed  there  by  some  one  else,  to 
be  used  in  the  construction  or  repair  for  a  building  or  for  any 
other  purpose,  then  the  city  is  not  liable  for  any  accident  result- 
ing therefrom,  unless  it  had  notice,  either  express  or  implied, 
that  the  same  was  in  the  street,  and  that  the  same  was  in  an 
unsafe  and  dangerous  condition.21 

(3)  To  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  against  the  city  in  this 
case,  the  evidence  should  show  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  one 
or  the  other  of  the  following  facts,  viz.,  that  the  city  had  actual 
notice  of  the  defect  in  the  sidewalk  which  caused  her  injuries, 
or  that  such  sidewalk  had  remained  in  such  defective  condition 
for  an  unreasonable  length  of  time  prior  to  the  accident,  and  if 
neither  of  these  facts  has  been  shown  by  the  testimony  in  the 
case,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  in  this  action.22 

(4)  In  order  to  charge  the  defendant  with  negligence  it  must 
appear  from  the  evidence  not  only  that  the  sidewalk  was  defec- 
tive at  the  time  of  the  alleged  injury,  but  it  must  further  appear 
that  such  defect  was  actually  known  to  the  city  or  some  of  its 
officers,  whose  duty  it  was  to  repair  such  defects  or  report  the 
same  to  the  defendant,  or  that  the  defect  had  existed  for  such  a 
length  of  time  prior  to  the  alleged  injury  that  the  city,  if  exer- 
cising ordinary  diligence,  would  or  should  have  known  of  the 
defect.23 

§  596.  Notice  of  unsafe  condition  may  be  inferred. — (1)  No- 
tice of  the  defect  in  the  street  crossings  or  sidewalks  may  be  rea- 
sonably inferred  where  it  is  of  such  a  character  or  has  continued 
for  such  a  length  of  time  as  that  the  officers  of  the  city,  charged 
with  the  supervision  of  its  street  crossings  or  sidewalks,  might  and 
probably  would  have  discovered  it,  if  they  had  used  ordinary 
care  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties.24 

(2)  If  the  sidewalk  was  properly  constructed  and  afterward  be- 
came out  of  repair,  then  defendant  would  not  be  liable  unless 
you  find  it  had  notice  of  such  defect.  But  actual  notice  need 
not  be  proved  in  all  cases.  It  may  be  inferred  from  the  notoriety 

•21  City  of  Evansville  v.  Senhenn,          23  City  of  South  Omaha  v.  Wrzen- 

151    Ind.    42,   41   L.    R.    A.    728,    733,  sinski  (Nob.),  92  N.  W.  1045. 
47  N.  E.  634,  51  N.  E.  88.  24  City   of    Indianapolis   v.    Scott, 

22  City    of    Chicago    v.    Langlass,  72  Ind.  109. 
66  111.  363. 


§    596  NEGLIGENCE   OF    CITIES   AND   TOWNS-.  GOG 

of  the  defect  or  danger,  from  its  continuance  for  such  a  length  of 
time  as  to  lead  to  the  presumption  that  the  proper  officers  did, 
in  fact,  know  or  with  proper  diligence,  might  have  known  the 
same.25 

(3)  In  the  absence  of  express  notice  to  the  defendant  city  or  its 
officers,  of  the  defects  which  caused  the  injury  sustained  by  the 
plaintiff,  he,  the  plaintiff,  cannot  recover  unless  it  is  shown  from 
the  evidence  that  the  time  the  sidewalk  was  out  of  repair  (if  you 
find  from  the  evidence  that  it  was  out  of  repair)   was  so  long 
that  the   defendant   or   its   officers   should  have   known   it   and 
reported  it  before  the  accident,  or  that  the  officers  of  the  city 
were  guilty  of  negligence  in  not  knowing  of  it  and  in  not  repair- 
ing it  before  the  accident.26 

(4)  Actual  notice  need  not  be  shown  in  all  cases.    Notice  may 
be  inferred  from  the  notoriety  of  the  defect,  or  from  its  being  so 
visible  and  apparent  and  having  continued  for  such  length  of 
time,  as  that,  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  observation  and  care, 
the  proper   officers   of  the   city   ought  to   have   known   of   and 
remedied  or  removed  the  defect  or  obstruction.     The  evidence 
in  this  case  fails  to  show  actual  notice  of  the  defect  or  obstruc- 
tion complained  of,  if  the  same  existed,  to  the  defendant  or  its 
officers,  but  if  the  evidence  shows  that  such  defect  or  obstruction 
had  existed  for  such  length  of  time,  was  so  visible  and  apparent 
as  that  the  officers  and  servants  of  the  defendant  ought,  in  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  observation  to  have  known  of  and 
remedied  or  removed  the  same  before  the  time  of  the  accident  in 
question,  this  would  be  sufficient  to  show  that  the  defendant  was 
negligent  in  permitting  such  defects  or  obstructions  to  remain 
at  the  time  of  the  accident;  but  unless  the  evidence  does  show 
that  said  defects  or  obstructions  were  caused  by  the  negligence 
of  the  defendant  in  constructing  the  culvert  at  the  place  in  ques- 
tion, as  before  explained,  or  that  the  same  was  of  such  notoriety  or 
had  existed  for  such  a  length  of  time  and  were  visible  and  appar- 
ent before  the  accident,  as  that  the  officers  and  servants  of  the 
defendant,   in  the   exercise   of   ordinary   care   and   observation, 
ought  to  have  known  of  and  remedied  or  removed  said  defects 

25  Rice  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  40         26  Kansas    City    v.    Bradbury,    45 
Iowa,  639.  Kas.  385,  25  Pac.  889. 


607  CITY    MUST    TAKE   NOTICE.  §    597 

or  obstructions,  the  defendant  cannot  be  charged  with  negligence 
on  account  thereof,  and  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  in  this  case.27 

§  597.  City  must  take  notice  of  unsafe  condition. — (1)  It  is  not 
enough  to  exonerate  the  city  from  liability  on  account  of  rotten 
and  insecure  gutter  crossings  to  show  that  they  were  originally 
well  constructed  and  safe.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  city  not  only 
to  make  its  gutter  crossings  safe  in  the  first  instance,  but  to  use 
ordinary  care  to  see  that  they  are  kept  safe.  The  city  is  charge- 
able with  knowledge  of  the  natural  tendency  of  timber  to  rot 
and  decay  by  lapse  of  time  and  exposure  to  the  elements,  and  it 
is  its  duty  to  use  ordinary  care  to  detect  and  guard  against  the 
same;  and  if  injury  results  by  reason  of  rotten  and  insecure 
timbers  in  a  gutter  crossing,  it  is  no  excuse  that  the  city  officers, 
charged  with  the  supervision  of  its  streets  and  sidewalks  did 
not  know  that  the  timbers  of  such  gutter  crossing  were  rotten 
and  insecure,  if  by  ordinary  care  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties 
such  officers  might  have  discovered  the  condition  thereof  in  time 
to  have  repaired  the  same  before  such  injury.28 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  in- 
jured by  a  defect  in  the  sidewalk  of  the  defendant,  as  alleged  in 
the  plaintiff's  declaration,  and  if  you  further  believe  that  for  sev- 
eral years  prior  to  and  at  the  time  of  such  injury,  with  knowledge 
and  approval  of  the  superintendent  of  streets,  a  book  was  kept 
at  the  police  station  in  the  city  of  Joliet,  in  which  policemen  were 
directed  to  note  defects  in  sidewalks,  and  that  the  policemen  of 
said  city  were  charged  with  the  duty  of  examining  and  reporting 
to  their  departments  defects  in  sidewalks  observed  by  them,  for 
the  benefit  of  the  superintendent  of  streets,  and  that  at  that  time 
the  superintendent  of  streets  was  accustomed  to  resort  to  said 
books  and  to  the  reports  of  said  policemen  for  information  con- 
cerning defects  in  sidewalks,  and  that  one  or  more  policemen 
in  the  employ  of  the  defendant  noticed  the  defect  in  the  sidewalk 
so  long  before  the  time  of  the  injury  that  there  was  time,  in  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care,  to  report  and  repair  said  defect,  then 
such  notice  to  the  city  of  Joliet,  and  the  failure  to  remedy  the 

"  Hazard     v.     City     of     Council         28  City   of   Indianapolis   v.    Scott, 
Bluffs,  87  Iowa,  54,  53  N.  W.  1083.      72  Ind.  199. 


§    598  NEGLIGENCE   OF    CITIES   AND   TOWNS.  608 

defect  within  a  reasonable  time  after  such  notice,  would  consti- 
tute negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant.29 

(3)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  mode  or  man- 
ner in  which  the  sidewalk  in  question  was  originally  built,  and 
thereafter  continued,  was  so  unskillful,  negligent  and  improper 
as  to  render  it  unsafe  and  hazardous  for  persons  to  pass  along 
the  same,  the  said  defendant  was  bound  to  take  notice  of  its  con- 
dition, and  was  liable  in  damages  to  any  person  using  ordinary 
care  who  sustained  personal  injury  in  consequence  of  the  unsafe 
condition  of  said  sidewalk.30 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  sidewalk 
where  the  plaintiff  was  injured  was  uneven,  out  of  repair  or  fit 
condition  for  any  reason,  and  dangerous  to  persons  passing  along' 
the  same  with  ordinary  care,  and  that  the  defendant,  or  its  officers 
or  agents  knew,  or  ought  to  have  known,  of  its  condition,  and  that 
the  plaintiff,  in  passing  along  the  said  sidewalk  with  such  care  as 
an  ordinarily  prudent  man  would  have  observed,  fell  thereon  by 
reason  of  its  defective  condition,  and  was  injured,  then  they  must 
find  for  the  plaintiff.31 

(5)  If  plaintiff  fell  by  reason  of  loose  planks  or  other  defects 
in  the  walk,  and  if  the  defects  had  been  there  long  enough  so 
that  the  officers  of  defendant  either  actually  knew  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  walk  or  should  have  known  its  condition  by  the  exer- 
cise of  ordinary  care,  and  the  plaintiff  was  free  from  any  negli- 
gence on  her  part,  she  would  be  entitled  to  recover.32 

§  598.  Injury  from  accident — No  liability. — (1)  If  the  jury 
find  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  cellar  doors  in  the 
sidewalk,  in  front  of  the  premises  occupied  by  the  defendant, 
were  constructed  and  maintained  in  a  reasonally  safe  condition 
for  passing  over  and  upon  said  doors,  and  if  they  further  find 
that  said  doors,  or  either  of  them,  were  opened  at  or  before  the 
time  of  the  injury  complained  of  by  the  plaintiff,  by  some  person 
not  in  the  employ  or  service  of  the  defendant,  without  the 
knowledge  or  consent  of  the  defendant,  or  which,  by  the  exer- 

29  City  of  Joliet  v.  Looney,  159  si  Gordon  v.  City  of  Richmond, 

111.  473,  42  N.  E.  854.  83  Va.  438,  2  S.  E.  727. 

so  Alexander  v.  Town  of  Mt.  Ster-  32  Fee  v.  Columbus  Borough,  168 

ling,  71  111.  369.  Pa.  St.  384,  31  Atl.  1076. 


609  ESSENTIALS    TO    WARRANT    RECOVERY.  §    599 

else  of  ordinary  care,  the  defendant  could  not  have  known,  then 
the  jury  will  find  for  the  defendant.33 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  gutter  crossing  in 
question,  at  the  time  in  question,  and  in  its  then  condition,  and 
without  lights,  if  there  were  no  lights,  was  reasonably  safe  for  a 
person  crossing  on  foot,  and  in  the  use  of  ordinary  care,  then  the 
plaintiff  cannot  recover,  even  though  she  did  step  or  fall,  as  she 
claims,  into  the  adjacent  gutter,  for,  as  before  stated,  the  plain- 
tiff must  prove,  not  only  that  she  received  the  injuries  com- 
plained of,  but  she  must  also  prove  that  the  city  was  guilty  of 
negligence  as  charged,  and  that  such  negligence  directly  con- 
tributed to  produce  such  injuries.34 

§  599.  Elements  necessary  to  a  recovery. — (1)  Before  the 
plaintiff  can  recover  in  this  action  it  must  appear,  by  a  preponder- 
ance of  the  evidence  (1)  that  the  plaintiff's  intestate,  S,  was  killed 
as  a  result  of  a  defect  or  excavation  in  the  sidewalk  on  J  street  in 
the  defendant  city,  as  alleged  in  the  declaration,  and  that  such 
excavation  was  left  in  an  unsafe  condition;  and  (2)  that  the  de- 
fendant city,  or  its  officers,  were  negligent  in  permitting  said  side- 
walk to  remain  in  said  unsafe  condition  at  the  time  said  S  is  al- 
leged to  have  been  killed.  To  charge  the  defendant  with  negli- 
gence it  must  appear  that  the  proper  officers  of  the  city  had  no- 
tice of  the  unsafe  condition  of  the  sidewalk  in  time  to  have  pre- 
vented the  killing  of  S  by  falling  into  said  excavation,  or  that 
by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  and  ordinary  care  and  diligence 
they  could  have  known  of  the  unsafe  condition  of  said  sidewalk 
in  time  to  have  prevented  such  killing.  By  reasonable  and  ordi- 
nary care  and  diligence  is  meant  that  degree  of  care  and  pru- 
dence which  an  ordinarily  careful  and  prudent  man  would  rea- 
sonably be  expected  to  use  under  similar  circumstances.35 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  said  crossing  was  not 
so  reasonably  safe  for  ordinary  travel  as  aforesaid  at  the  time  of 
the  alleged  injury,  by  reason  of  an  opening  between  the  stones  in 
said  crossing  erected  for  and  used  as  stepping  stones  therein;' 
and  further  find  that  the  defendant  had  notice  of  such  defect  in 

33  Fehlhauer  v.  City  ol  St.  Louis  35  Kansas  City  v.  Birmingham, 
(Mo.),  77  S.  W.  848.  45  Kas.  214,  25  Pac.  569. 

s*  City   of   Indianapolis   v.    Scott, 
72  Ind.  200. 


§    600  NEGLIGENCE   OF   CITIES  AND   TOWNS.  610 

such  crossing,  or  that  the  same  had  existed  for  a  time  prior  to  the 
time  of  said  alleged  injury,  reasonably  sufficient  to  have  enabled 
the  defendant  to  have  ascertained  the  fact  and  remedied  said  de- 
fect, and  further  find  that  on  the  night  of  said  day  last  aforesaid 
the  said  plaintiff's  wife,  while  walking  over  said  crossing,  and 
while  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  caution,  fell  into  said 
opening  and  was  thereby  injured,  and  that  her  said  fall  and  in- 
jury were  caused  by  said  alleged  defect  in  said  crossing,  then 
they  must  find  for  said  plaintiff.30 

§600.  Drains  left  in  dangerous  condition. — (1)  It  is  the  duty 
of  the  defendant  to  provide  for  the  health  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  city  by  the  construction  of  all  necessary  and  proper  drains.  It 
is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine,  from  the  evidence, 
whether  the  drain  on  S  street,  covered  at  the  crossings  of  the 
streets  and  alleys,  but  left  uncovered  in  the  intervening  spaces, 
and  without  any  barrier  to  prevent  travelers  falling  into  the 
same,  was  such  a  construction  as  that  the  persons  using  said  street 
could,  with  ordinary  care,  avoid  receiving  injury  therefrom.37 

(2)  If  the  proof  should  satisfy  you  that  the  drain  was  one  dan- 
gerous to  persons  passing  and  using  ordinary  care,  but  should  sat- 
isfy you  also  that  the  injury  in  question  resulted  from  the  want  of 
ordinary  care  on  behalf  of  the  plaintiff,  the  plaintiff  cannot  re- 
cover for  the  injury  thus  received  through  plaintiff's  want  of 
ordinary  care.    In  considering  the  question  of  the  use  of  care  on 
the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  you  will  have  regard  to  the  age  of  the 
plaintiff,  and  not  exact  the  same  degree  of  care  on  the  part  of  a 
child  of  nine  or  ten  years  as  would  be  exacted  of  and  exercised 
by  a  person  of  mature  years  and  discretion.38 

(3)  If  the  drain  was  a  reasonably  proper  one  in  its  manner  of 
construction,  and  the  leaving  it  uncovered  and  unfenced  between 
the  crossings  of  the  streets  and  alleys  was  not  reasonably  liable 
to  result  in  injury  to  persons  passing  and  using  ordinary  care  to 
be  expected  from  those  who  usually  travel  streets  in  the  city,  the 
defendant  would  not  be  liable,  and  you  should  return  your  ver- 
dict for  the  defendant.39 

as  Davenport  v.  City  of  Hannibal,  38  City  of  Galveston  v.  Posnain- 

108  Mo.  479,  18  S.  W.  1122.  sky,  62  Tex.  123. 

37  City  of  Galveston  v.  Posnain-  39  City  of  Galveston  v.  Posnain- 

sky,  62  Tex.  122.  sky,  62  Tex.  122. 


611  BRIDGES  KEPT  IN  REPAIR.  §  601 

(4)  The  law  requires  of  one  riding  in  the  daytime  such  atten- 
tion to  the  road  over  which  he  is  about  to  pass  as  to  see  large 
holes  that  are  conspicuous  and  obvious  and  in  plain  sight,  unless 
some  good  and  sufficient  reason  excuses  the  inattention.40 

§  601.  Bridges  shall  be  kept  in  repair. — (1)  The  board  of  com- 
missioners are  chargeable  with  knowledge  of  the  tendency  of  tim- 
bers to  decay,  and  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  commissioners  to  use 
ordinary  care  in  providing  against  the  timbers  in  a  bridge  becom- 
ing unsafe  because  of  the  decay  incident  to  age  and  long  use. 
They  are  not  bound,  however,  to  do  more  than  use  ordinary  care 
and  diligence;  and  if  they  act  writh  ordinary  care  and  diligence 
there  is  no  liability1.41 

(2)  The  board  of  supervisors  is  charged  by  law  with  the  duty 
of  supervising  and  keeping  the  county  bridges  in  repair.    If  the 
members  of  the  board  did  not  possess  the  requisite  skill  to  dis- 
charge the  duty  of  inspection,  then  it  was  the  duty  of  the  board 
to  appoint  or  provide  some  one  possessing  such  skill,  and  to  have 
all  county  bridges  under  their  care  examined  as  frequently  as 
men  of  ordinary  prudence  and  care  would  deem  necessary  for 
the  safety  of  the  traveling  public,   and  as  experience   demon- 
strated the  necessity  of  examination,  and  if  the  board  failed  to 
do  this  such  failure  would  be  negligence.42 

(3)  To  show  an  acceptance  by  the  public,  binding  upon  the  city, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  show  any  formal  action  of  the  council  to 
that  effect.    If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  city  of  M 
expended  money  in  the  repair  of  the  bridge,  and  assumed  and 
exercised  control  and  supervision  of  the  same,  and  that  it  was 
upon  a  public  thoroughfare  in  the  city,  this  is  evidence  tending 
to  show  an  acceptance  and  assumption  of  the  bridge  by  the  city.43 

(4)  Even  if  such  bridge  was  in  a  public  street,  it  must  be  con- 
ceded that  it  was  built  by  private  individuals,  and  was  maintained 
by  private  individuals,  and  that  the  city  had  refused  to  consider 
the  bridge  a  public  structure,  and  although  built  in  the  public 
street,  if  it  was  simply  and  solely  an  appendage  to  H's  mills,  and 

40  Hill  v.  Inhabitants  of  Seekonk,  Indianaf  Board  of  Allman,  142  Ind. 
119  Mass.   88.  573. 

41  Apple   v.    Board,    &c.    127    Ind.  42  Ferguson   v.    Davis   County,   57 
555,  27  N.  E.  166.     Counties  are  not  Iowa,   611,  10  N.  W.   906. 

now  liable  for  injuries   caused   by         43  Shartle     v.     Minneapolis,     17 
defective  bridges,  under  the  law  of     Minn.  292. 


§    602  NEGLIGENCE    OF    CITIES   AND   TOWNS.  612 

only  useful  as  connected  with  the  said  mills  and  to  the  public  only 
as  dealing  with  said  mills,  and  was  not,  during  the  time  it  has 
stood  there,  and  up  to  the  time  of  the  accident,  useful  to  the  public 
travel  along  said  street  to  and  from  places  other  than  H's  mills, 
then  the  city  would  not  be  liable  for  the  injuries  suffered  by  the 
plaintiff  through  the  falling  of  said  bridge.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  said  bridge  stood  in  the  public  highway,  and  appeared  to 
be  a  part  thereof,  and  the  approaches  from  the  traveled  part  of 
the  street  led  directly  thereto,  and  it  appeared  to  any  one  travel- 
ing along  the  highway  to  be  a  part  of  the  street  in  ordinary  use, 
and  if  it  had  been  and  was  in  actual  use  and  utility  generally  to 
the  traveling  public  and  used  by  the  general  traveling  public, 
then  the  city,  if  it  had  erected  at  or  near  the  bridge  no  visible 
sign  or  monument  warning  the  public  that  such  bridge  was  not 
a  part  of  the  street,  was  under  a  duty  so  long  as  it  permitted  the 
bridge  to  remain  in  and  as  a  part  of  the  street,  subject  to  general 
use  and  utility,  to  keep  the  same,  or  see  that  the  same  was  kept, 
in  reasonable  repair,  so  that  it  would  be  reasonably  safe  and  con- 
venient for  public  travel.44 

§602.  Grades  and  embankments  obstructing  natural  flow  of 
water. —  (1)  If  said  embankment  was  raised  above  the  established 
grade  of  the  street  it  was  an  obstruction  for  which  the  defendant 
is  responsible,  though  it  did  not  directly  create  or  make  the  ob- 
struction or  authorize  it  to  be  done,  and  if  said  embankment  was 
and  is  an  obstruction  to  the  natural  flow  of  the  water  upon  and 
across  said  street,  and  causes  the  water  to  dam  up  and  flow  back 
upon  the  adjacent  premises  to  the  injury  of  the  owner,  the  de- 
fendant is  liable,  if,  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  the  premises  were 
as  high  as  the  grade  of  the  street,  and  if  defendant  in  grading 
and  working  its  streets  obstructs  the  natural  flow  of  surface 
water,  and  by  reason  of  its  failure  to  provide  necessary  channels 
for  carrying  off  the  water,  it  is  caused  to  flow  in  increased  quan- 
tities upon  the  adjacent  premises  to  the  injury  of  the  owner,  for 
such  injury  the  defendant  is  liable,  if  no  fault  of  the  owner  con- 
tributed thereto.45 

(2)     The  city,  as  a  public  corporation,  has  a  right  to  establish 

4*  Detwiler  v.  City  of  Lansing,  45  Damour  v.  Lyons  City,  44  lo- 
95  Mich.  486,  55  N.  W.  361.  wa,  281. 


613  SIDEWALKS    COVERED   WITH   ICE.  §    603 

grades  for  streets,  and  to  fill  up  the  streets  to  correspond  with  the 
grade  established,  and,  if  the  work  is  done  in  a  careful  and  skillful 
manner,  the  city  will  not  be  liable  for  injuries  to  property  which 
are  the  necessary  result  of  the  careful  and  skillful  grading  of  the 
streets.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  city,  in  grading  the  streets,  did 
the  work  in  an  unskillful  and  improper  manner,  by  making  im- 
proper or  insufficient  gutters,  by  reason  of  which  the  water  was 
caused  to  flow  from  the  street  upon  the  premises  of  plaintiff,  he 
will  be  entitled  to  recover,  if  you  find  the  injuries  complained  of 
resulted  from  such  alleged  unskillful  construction  of  the  street.46 
§  603.  Ice  sleet,  snow  on  sidewalks — Liability.  As  a  general 
rule,  the  mere  fact  that  snow  or  sleet  had  fallen  upon  the  side- 
walk from  the  clouds,  and  thereby  rendered  the  sidewalk  slip- 
pery and  difficult  to  pass  over,  would  not  make  the  city  liable 
therefor,  even  though  such  ice  and  snow  should  remain  upon  the 
walk  for  an  unreasonable  length  of  time  after  the  officers  of  the 
city,  whose  duties  required  them  to  look  after  such  matters,  had 
notice  of  its  existence,  or  after  they,  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable 
care  in  performing  their  duties,  ought  to  have  known  of  its  ex- 
istence; but  this  rule  relates  only  to  the  natural  conditions  re- 
sulting from  rain  or  sleet  falling  and  freezing  upon  the  walk,  or 
snow  accumulating  upon  the  walk  from  natural  causes.  Where, 
after  such  ice  or  snow  has  thus  accumulated,  and  if  by  reason  of 
persons  traveling  over  the  same,  or  if  from  other  causes,  as  from 
ice  or  snow  thawing  and  flowing  down  upon  the  walk  from  other 
lands,  the  surface  of  the  snow  or  ice  upon  the  walk  becomes 
rough  or  rigid,  or  rounded  in  form,  or  lies  at  an  angle  or  slant- 
ing to  the  plain  surface  of  the  walk,  so  that  it  becomes  difficult 
and  dangerous  for  persons  traveling  on  foot  to  pass  over  the  same, 
when  exercising  ordinary  care,  or  if  the  walk  is  constructed  in 
such  manner  as  not  to  permit  the  natural  flow  of  the  water  and 
thawing  snow  from  lands  adjoining,  but  dams  the  same  upon  the 
walk  and  holds  the  same  there  until  it  freezes,  and  the  walk  be- 
comes dangerous,  by  reason  thereof,  to  persons  using  ordinary  care 
in  attempting  to  pass  over  the  same,  or  by  reason  of  snow  or  ice 
having  accumulated  on  the  walk  from  natural  causes,  the  flowing 
water  and  snow  from  adjoining  lands  are  damned  up  and  held 
40  Ellis  v.  Iowa  City,  29  Iowa,  230. 


§    604  NEGLIGENCE   OF    CITIES   AND   TOWNS.  614 

upon  the  walk,  and  frozen  there,  and  by  reason  thereof  mak- 
ing the  walk  dangerous  for  persons  using  ordinary  care  in 
passing  over  the  same  on  foot,  then  the  city  becomes  liable 
for  injuries  caused  by  such  obstruction,  provided  the  person 
injured  did  not  contribute  to  his  injury  by  negligence  on 
his  part  and  the  obstruction  has  existed  for  an  unreasonable 
length  of  time  after  the  same  became  known  to  the  city  author- 
ities, or  ought  to  have  been  known  to  them  in  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  care.47 

§  604.  Signs  overhanging  sidewalk— Damage.— It  is  the  duty 
of  the  city  to  use  ordinary  care  to  prevent  the  construction  or 
maintenance  of  signs  which  overhang  the  sidewalks,  unless  the 
same  are  constructed  and  suspended  with  ordinary  care  and  skill, 
considering  the  dangers  of  such  structures  to  the  public  who 
travel  thereunder  upon  the  sidewalks.  A  failure  of  the  city  to 
exercise  this  degree  of  diligence  and  care  would  be  such  negli- 
gence as  would  make  it  liable  for  damages  which  might  result 
therefrom.48 

§  605.  Building  permits  to  obstruct  streets. — When  the  city  is- 
sues a  building  permit  authorizing  any  one  to  use  and  obstruct 
the  streets,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  corporate  authorities  to  see  to  it 
that  the  persons  thus  given  authority  to  use  the  streets  shall  prop- 
erly guard  and  protect  such  obstructions;  and  if  the  city  negli- 
gently fails  to  perform  its  duty  in  this  respect  it  shall  be  held  re- 
sponsible to  any  one  who,  while  in  the  exercise  of  due  care,  may 
be  injured  by  reason  of  such  obstruction.49 

§  606.  Streets  and  highways  shall  be  kept  safe  for  travel. — (1) 
The  opening  and  repairing  of  streets  is  a  matter  of  discretion  in 
the  city  government,  but  when  it  undertakes  to  open  or  construct 
streets  and  travel  ways  it  must  so  construct  them  as  to  render 
their  use  reasonably  safe  to  such  persons  as  are  naturally  expected 
to  use  such  ways,  using  such  care  as  such  persons  ordinarily  exer- 
cise.50 

(2)   A  traveler  on  a  public  street  is  held  to  the  exercise  of  only 

47  Huston     v.     City     of     Council  49  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Doherty, 
Bluffs,  101  Iowa,  33,  69  N.  W.  1130.  71    Ind.    6. 

48  Gray    v.    City    of   Emporia,    43  50  Galveston     v.     Posnainsky,     62 
Kas.  706,  23  Pac.  944.  Tex.  122. 


615  HIGHWAYS    SAFE — ASSESSMENT   OF   DAMAGES  §    607 

ordinary  care.  Slight  negligence,  which  does  not  amount  to  a 
want  of  ordinary  care,  will  not  defeat  a  recovery  for  an  injury  re- 
ceived in  consequence  of  a  defect  in  a  public  street  or  highway, 
provided  the  evidence  shows  that  the  city  authorities  were  guilty 
of  negligence  in  permitting  the  defect  to  exist,  and  that  the  trav- 
eler was  injured  thereby,  and  was  using  ordinary  care  to  avoid 
the  injury.51 

(3)  A  town  is  not  bound  to  work  and  prepare  for  public  travel 
the  whole  of  the  land  within  the  limits  of  the  way,  but  only  such 
portions  as  are  reasonably  necessary  for  that  purpose.   And  a  town 
is  not  necessarily  chargeable  with  damage  arising  from  every  de- 
fect existing  within  the  located  limits  of  a  highway.    Nor  would 
it  be  liable  for  obstructions  or  defects  in  portions  of  the  highway 
not  a  part  of  the  traveled  path,  and  not  so  connected  with  it  that 
they  would  affect  the  safety  or  convenience  of  those  traveling  on 
the  highway  and  using  the  traveled  path ;  nor  would  the  town  be 
legally  liable  when  an  injury  was  sustained  by  a  party  using  the 
road  for  the  purpose  of  passing  from  his  own  land,  although  it 
was  caused  by  a  defect  within  the  limits  of  the  highway,  if  it  was 
outside  the  part  of  the  road  used  for  public  travel.52 

(4)  The  town  is  not  bound  to  prepare  for  abutters  the  means 
of  passing  from  their  estates  to  the  adjoining  highway,  or  of 
crossing  from  that  part  of  the  highway,  not  appropriated  to 
travel,  to  that  part  which  is  so  appropriated.53 

§  607.  Considerations  in  assessing  damages. — (1)  If  you  find 
the  defendant  guilty,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  her 
actual  damages  which  she  has  sustained  as  the  direct  or  proximate 
result  of  such  injury,  such  as  her  loss  of  time,  her  pain  and  suf- 
fering, her  necessary  and  reasonable  expenses  in  medical  and 
surgical  aid  and  nursing,  as  the  same  may  appear  from  the  evi- 
dence in  the  case.  And  if  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that 
the  said  injury  is  permanent  and  incurable,  they  should  take  this 
into  consideration  in  assessing  the  plaintiff's  damages.54 

(2)  If  you  find,  under  the  evidence  and  the  rules  of  law  I  have 
given  you,  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  it  will  be  your 

si  Moore  v.  City  of  Richmond,  53  Whitford  v.  Inhabitants,  119 

85  Va.  542,  8  S.  E.  387.  Mass.  570. 

52  Whitford  v.  Inhabitants,  119  5*  City  of  Chicago  v.  Stearns,  105 

Mass.  570.  111.  554,  557. 


§    608  NEGLIGENCE    OF    CITIES   AND   TOWNS.  616 

duty  to  assess  the  amount  of  damages  which,  in  your  judgment, 
he  should  recover.  In  estimating  this  amount,  you  may  take  into 
consideration  expenses  actually  incurred,  loss  of  time  occasioned 
by  the  immediate  effect  of  the  injuries,  and  physical  and  mental 
suffering  caused  by  the  injuries.  In  addition,  you  may  consider 
the  professional  occupation  of  the  plaintiff,  and  his  ability  to  earn 
money,  and  he  will  be  entitled  to  recover  for  any  permanent  re- 
duction of  his  power  to  earn  money  by  reason  of  his  injuries ;  and 
the  amount  assessed  should  be  such  a  sum  as,  in  your  judgment, 
will  fully  compensate  him  for  the  injuries,  or  any  of  them,  thus 
sustained.55 

(3)  If  you  find  for  the  plaintiff,  then,  in  estimating  her  dam- 
ages, if  any,  you  should  take  into  consideration  the  nature  of  her 
injuries,  the  length  of  time  she  has  been  disabled  in  consequence 
thereof,  if  she  has  been  so  disabled,  and,  if  she  is  not  yet  cured, 
whether  it  is  probable  that  a  permanent  cure  can  be  effected,  and, 
if  so,  how  long  it  will  be  before  such  cure  can  be  effected,  her 
physical  and  mental  sufferings,  if  any,  consequent  upon  such  in- 
juries, and  award  her  such  a  sum  as,  in  your  judgment,  will  fully 
compensate  her  for  the  injuries  which  you  find  are  the  natural 
and  direct  result  of  the  negligence  complained  of.56 

§  608.    Matters  of  evidence — Incompetent  evidence. — (1)     It 

was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  exercise  ordinary  care  and  dili- 
gence in  traveling  along  the  sidewalk  to  avoid  accidents,  and  this 
care  and  diligence  increases  or  diminishes  with  the  circumstances 
of  the  case  for  instance,  if  the  night  was  dark  when  traveling  on 
the  sidewalk,  it  would  be  a  duty  to  exercise  more  care  and  cau- 
tion than  in  open  day;  and  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that 
plaintiff  did  not  exercise  care  and  caution  commensurate  with 
the  surrounding  circumstances,  and  such  want  of  care  materially 
contributed  to  the  injury,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.57 

(2)  Evidence  of  the  existence  of  loose  boards  other  than  the 
one  upon  which  the  plaintiff  tripped  is  not  competent  for  your  con- 
sideration for  any  purpose  except  as  it  may  tend  to  show  the  want 
of  the  exercise  of  due  care  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  which 

ss  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Gaston,         57  Kansas    City   v.    Bradbury,    45 
58  Ind.  224.  Kas.  384,  25  Pac.  889. 

56  City   of    Indianapolis   v.    Scott, 
72  Ind.  201. 


617  MATTERS   OF   EVIDENCE  — CLAIMS   AGAINST    CITY.  §    609 

would  have  led  to  the  discovery,  on  its  part,  of  the  fact  that  the 
board  upon  which  the  plaintiff  tripped  was  loose  at  the  time  of 
the  injury.58 

(3)  The  condition  of  the  set-off  prior  to  the  injury  cannot 
be  considered  by  ydu  in  determining  whether  or  not  the  city 
has  been  negligent,  if  you  should  find  the  set-off  complained  of  as 
dangerous,  was,  on  the  evening  of  the  alleged  injury,  barricaded 
or  protected  so  as  to  be  reasonably  safe  to  persons  walking  on 
the  sidewalk  there,  in  the  exercise  of  due  care,  or  such  care  as  an 
ordinarily  prudent  man  would  exercise,  taking  into  consideration 
the  kind  of  night  it  was.59 

§  609.  Claims  against  city — Mode  of  allowing. — (1)  It  is  pro- 
vided in  substance  by  the  charter  of  the  city  of  C  that  all  claims 
against  the  city  shall  be  audited  and  allowed  by  the  common  coun- 
cil, and  that  a  statement  of  the  claim  shall  be  made  by  the  claim- 
ant and  filed  with  the  common  council,  and  verified  by  the  oath  of 
the  claimant,  before  it  is  allowed,  and  that  it  shall  be  a  conclusive 
answer  to  any  suit  brought  by  the  claimant  to  enforce  such  claim 
that  it  had  not  been  presented  to  the  council.  In  my  judgment, 
that  part  of  the  charter  is  applicable  to  this  case.  It  is  conceded 
by  the  plaintiff  that,  before  commencing  this  suit,  he  did  not  pre- 
sent any  claim  to  the  common  council  for  a  return  or  payment 
back  to  him  of  this  tax,  as  provided  by  the  charter,  and,  conse- 
quently, for  this  reason  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  in  this  action, 
and  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.60 

ss  Kansas    City    v.    Bradbury,    45         eo  Crittenden  v.  City  of  Mt.  Clem- 
Kas.  385,  25  Pac.  889.  ens,    86   Mich.    227,   49    N.   W.    144. 

59  Cramer  v.   City  of  Burlington, 
42    Iowa,    322. 


CHAPTER  XLIL 

MASTER    AND    SERVANT. 

Sec.  Sec. 

610.  Care  of  master  for  safety  of      619.     Servant  continuing  in  service 

servant.  after    knowledge    of   danger. 

611.  Rules  for  conduct  of  servants.      620.     Servant  continuing  after  mas- 

612.  Master  must  advise  servant  of  ter's  promise  of  repair. 

danger.  621.     Servant  does  not  assume  risks 

613.  Not  a  fellow  servant— Liabil-  of  negligence. 

ity.  622.     Servant    may    assume    appli- 

614.  Injury    caused    by   fellow-ser-  ances   to   be  safe. 

vant.  623.     Servant  injured   when   not  at 

615.  Injury  from  wilful  act  of  ser-  his  place. 

vant.  624.    Brakeman     injured     coupling 

616.  Burden    on   plaintiff   to    show  cars — Liability. 

negligence.  625.    Question    of    negligence   sub- 

617.  Servant  assumes  risks  incident  mitted  to  jury. 

to  employment.  626.    Servant   discharged   for  cause 

618.  Servant  knowing  of  danger  is  — No   liability. 

negligent. 

§  610.  Care  of  master  for  safety  of  servant. — (1)  The  meas- 
ure of  care  which  should  have  been  taken  by  the  defendant  com- 
pany to  avoid  a  responsibility  for  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff  is  that 
which  a  person  of  ordinary  care,  prudence  and  caution  would  use 
if  his  own  interests  were  to  be  affected,  or  the  whole  of  the  risk 
were  his  own.  It  is  such  care  as  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence 
would  exercise  under  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  occur- 
rence at  the  time  of  the  injury.1 

(2)  The  defendant  was  under  no  greater  obligation  to  care  for 
the  safety  of  the  plaintiff  than  he  was  to  take  care  of  himself; 
while  the  company  was  under  obligation  to  use  care  for  the  safety 

i  McVey   v.    St.    Clair   Co.    49    W.  Va.  420,  38  S.  E.  648. 

618 


619  MASTER'S  CARE  FOR  SERVANT.  §  G10 

of  the  plaintiff,  he  was  under  a  like  obligation  to  use  ordinary 
care  for  his  own  safety,  and  to  observe  the  machinery  with  which 
he  operated.2 

(3)  The  defendant  was  not  bound  to  use  the  highest  skill,  the 
greatest  foresight,  and  the  most  extraordinary  care  in  procuring 
the  very  best  appliances ;  but  rather  those  appliances  which  were 
reasonably  best  calculated  to  answer  the  end  proposed.3 

(4)  The  measure  of  care  required  of  the  defendant  company  to 
avoid  liability  for  injury  to  the  plaintiff,  is  that  which  a  person 
of  ordinary  care,  prudence  and  caution  would  use  if  his  own  in- 
terest were  to  be  affected  or  the  whole  of  the  risk  were  his  own. 
It  is  such  care  as  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  would  exercise 
under  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  occurrence  at  the  time 
of  the  injury.    The  defendant  was  not  bound  to  use  extraordinary 
care  and  the  greatest  foresight  in  procuring  the  very  best  appli- 
ances, but  rather  those  appliances  which  were  reasonably  best 
calculated  to  answer  the  end  proposed.    The  defendant  was  under 
no  greater  obligation  to  care  for  the  safety  of  the  plaintiff  than 
he  was  to  care  for  himself.     While  the  defendant  company  was 
under  obligation  to  use  care  for  the  safety  of  the  plaintiff,  he  was 
under  a  like  obligation  to  use  ordinary  care  for  his  own  safety, 
and  to  observe  the  machinery  with  which  he  operated* 

(5)  The  law  as  to  the  master  is,  that,  in  supplying  materials,  ap- 
pliances and  machinery,  he  is  held  to  ordinary  care,  and  if  un- 
avoidable accidents  growing  out  of  hidden  defects,  or  accidents 
or  injuries  arising  out  of  the  use  of  machinery  where  the  means 
of  knowledge  as  to  the  dangerous  character  and  condition  of  such 
machinery  are  equal  on  both  sides ;  that  is  to  say,  where  the  em- 
ploye has  equal  knowledge  with  the  master  as  to  the  condition 
and  character  of  the  machinery  he  operates,  then  there  can  be  no 
recovery  by  the  servant.5 

(6)  If  you  find  that  the  staging  or  runaway  on  which  plaintiff 
was  injured  was  constructed  before  he  was  sent  up  there  to  work, 
then  it  is  immaterial  as  to  who  or  which  one  of  defendant's 

2  McDonald    v.    Norfolk,    &c.    R.  Central   R.   Co.   44   Iowa,   136;    Mc- 

Co.  95  Va    104    27  S.  E.  821.  Donald   v.    Norfolk,   &C.    R.    Co.    95 

s  Cooper    v.    Central    R.    Co.    44  Va.  104,  27  S.  E.  821. 

Iowa,  136.  5  Heltonville   Mfg.    Co.   v.   Fields, 

*  McVey    v.    St.    Clair   Co.    49   W.  138   Ind.   62,   36   N.   E.   529. 
Va.'420,    38    S.    E.    648;    Cooper   v. 


§    610  MASTER  AND   SERVANT.  620 

employes  constructed  it,  as  it  would  then  be  the  duty  of  the 
defendant  in  such  case  to  have  exercised  reasonable  care  tq 
have  prepared  there  a  staging  or  runway  that  was  reasonably 
safe  for  plaintiff  to  work  upon.0 

(7)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  exercise  ordinary  and 
reasonable  care  to  provide  a  reasonably  safe  place  for  the  plain- 
tiff to  do  the  work  which  he  was  engaged  to  perform,  and  if  you 
find  that  plaintiff  was  employed  by  the  defendant  and  directed 
to  go  on  top  of  the  elevator  in  question  and  do  the  work  he  was 
engaged  in  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  then  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
defendant  to  have  exercised  ordinary  and  reasonable  care  propor- 
tionate to  the  danger,  in  providing  for  him  a  reasonably  safe  stag- 
ing or  platform  on  which  to  do  the  work;  and  if  you  find  that 
defendant  failed  in  this,  by  omitting  to  have  the  boards  or  planks 
composing  the  staging  or  runway  nailed  or  otherwise  properly 
secured  and  that  in  consequence  thereof  the  plaintiff,  without 
fault  on  his  part,,and  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  was  injured, 
then  he  is  entitled  to  recover  in  this  action,  and  you  will  so 
find.7 

(8)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
employed  the  plaintiff's  intestate  as  a  brakeman  on  one  of  its 
passenger  trains,  it  became  and  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to 
provide  the  said  McD  with  reasonably  safe  cars  and  couplings 
for  the  performance  of  the  work  required  of  him  as  such  brake- 
man, and  that  if  the  defendant  failed  to  perform  its  duty  in  this 
regard,  and  did  not  provide  the  said  McD  with  reasonably  safe 
and  suitable  cars  and  couplings,  and  that,  as  a  result  of  such 
failure  of  the  defendant  to  perform  said  duty  by  providing  said 
McD  with  reasonably  safe  and  suitable  cars  and  couplings,  he 
was  caught  between  two  of  defendant's  cars,  while  he  was  trying, 
to  couple  them  together  in  the  preformance  of  his  duty  as  said 
brakeman,  and  injured  as  alleged,  they  should  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff, unless  they  further  believe  that  he  .was  himself  guilty  of 
negligence  which  proximately  contributed  to  his  death.8 

(9)  It  was  the  duty  of  defendant  to  use  all  reasonable  precau- 
tions for  the  safety  of  its  employes,  and  among  other  things  it  was 

e  Doyle  v.   Missouri,   &c.   Co.   140         &  McDonald's    Adm'r    v.    Norfolk, 
Mo.    1,    41    S.    W.    257.  &c.  R.  Co.  95  Va.  99,  27  S.  E.  821. 

7  Doyle  v.   Missouri,   &c.   Co.   140 
Mo,  1,  41  S.  W.  256. 


621      RULES  GOVERNING  SERVANTS — ADVISING  OF  DANGER.   §  612 

bound  to  furnish  suitable  machinery — materials  sound,  safe — 
and  to  keep  it  in  such  condition  as  would  not  endanger  their 
safety,  such  as  was  least  likely  to  do  or  cause  injury.9 

§  611.  Rules  for  conduct  of  servants. — (1)  The  defendant  rail- 
road company  has  the  right  to  make  such  rules  and  regulations  for 
the  conduct  of  its  servants  and  agents  while  engaged  in  its  service 
as  in  its  judgment  are  reasonable  and  proper,  or  would  conduce 
to  the  safety  and  comfort  of  its  employes ;  and  all  servants  while 
engaged  in  such  service  with  a  knowledge  of  such  rules  and  regu- 
lations, are  bound  to  act  in  conformity  therewith ;  and  if  injuries 
are  sustained  by  them  while  acting  in  violation  thereof,  no  recov- 
ery can  be  had  of  the  company  therefor,  if  such  violation  was 
the  cause  of  or  materially  contributed  to  the  injury.10 

(2)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  use  ordinary  care  and 
prudence  in  making  and  publishing  to  its  employes  sufficient  and 
necessary  rules  for  the  safe  running  of  its  trains,  and  for  gov- 
ernment of  its  employes,  and  as  great  a  degree  of  care  for  their 
safety,  taking  into  consideration  their  hazardous  employment, 
as  could  be  procured  by  ordinary  care  and  prudence,  and  the 
more  hazardous  the  employment  the  greater  is  the  degree  of 
care  required  by  the  law.11 

§  612.  Master  must  advise  servant  of  danger. — (1)  Before 
using  a  highly  dangerous  explosive  it  is  the  duty  of  the  master  to 
ascertain  and  make  known  to  his  servants  the  dangers  to  be 
reasonably  apprehended  from  its  use  and  the  proper  method 
of  manipulating  it  with  reasonable  safety,  and  the  ignorance  of 
the  master  as  to  the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  from  its  use,  or 
the  proper  methods  of  manipulating  it,  will  furnish .  no  excuse 
when  the  master,  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence,  could 
have  obtained  such  knowledge.12 

(2)  If  R,  the  defendant,  knew  or  if  he  had  good  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  rigid  or  forcible  resistance  would  be  offered  to  him  and 
his  parties  by  parties  whom  he  knew  or  believed  to  be  there,  on 
that  ground  or  in  the  vicinity,  it  was  his  duty  to  inform  the 
plaintiff  B  of  the  nature  of  the  employment,  to  disclose  to  him 

9  Cooper    v.    Central    R.    Co.    44         «  Cooper  v.   Central,   &c.   R.   Co. 
Iowa,  136.  44  Iowa,  138. 

10  Woolsey  v.  Lake  Shore,  &c.  R.          12  Bertha  Zinc   Co.   v.   Martin.   93 
Co.  33  Ohio  St.  227.  Va.  794,  22  S.  E.  869. 


§    613  MASTER  AND   SERVANT.'  622 

that  knowledge,  so  that  B  might  act  understandingly,  and  take 
the  chances,  if  he  chose  to  do  so.  If  the  defendant  had  such 
knowledge  and  concealed  it  from  the  plaintiff,  then  he  is  liable.13 

§613.  Not  a  fellow  servant—Liability.— (1)  If  the  plaintiff, 
being  a  night  watchman  of  defendant,  was  at  the  time  of  the  ex- 
plosion at  the  place  of  explosion,  and  was  sent  there  in  charge  of 
the  engine  which  pulled  the  car  on  which  was  the  boiler  that  after- 
wards exploded,  by  direction  of  S,  the  regular  engineer  in  charge 
of  said  engine,  and  you  further  find  that  under  the  custom 
and  usage  of  defendant's  road  management,  the  plaintiff  was 
expected  or  required  to  obey  said  directions,  and  did  obey  said 
S's  directions,  then  if  the  plaintiff  was  injured  by  said  explosion 
while  at  a  proper  place  in  carrying  out  said  directions,  by  the 
acts  of  negligence  of  defendant  as  charged,  the  defendant  would 
be  liable.14 

(2)  A  section  master  of  a  railroad  company,  in  charge  of  a  par- 
ticular section  of  the  company's  road,  with  a  force  of  hands  under 
him,  to  take  care  of  and  preserve  said  section,  is  not  merely  a 
coemploye  with  said  hands,  on  an  equal  footing  with  them,  but 
the  relation  between  the  section  master  and  those  working  un- 
der him  is  that  which  exists  between  a  superior  and  a  subor- 
dinate, and  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  the  particular  depart- 
ment to  which  the  section  master  is  engaged,  he  is  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  company,  and,  therefore,  if  one  who  is  employed 
by  the  section  master  to  work  under  him  on  his  section  is  injured 
by  the  negligence  of  the  section  master,  whilst  engaged  in  and 
about  said  employment,  the  company  cannot  escape  liability  for 
said  injury  upon  the  ground  that  the  injured  party  was  the  coem- 
ploye of  the  section  master;  but  the  jury  are  further  instructed 
that  this  will  not  prevent  the  company  from  showing,  if  it  can, 
that,  on  other  grounds  or  for  other  reasons,  it  is  not  liable  to  the 
injured  party  for  the  injuries  he  has  sustained.15 

'  §  614.  Injury  caused  by  fellow  servant.— (1)  If  the  jury  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  L  was  the  engineer,  and  M  the  plain- 
tiff was  a  brakeman  on  the  same  train,  working  under  the  same 
conductor,  deriving  their  authority  and  compensation  from  the 

is  Baxter  v.  Roberts,  44  Cal.  191.         «  Tyler  v.  Chesapeake,  &c.  R.  Co. 
i*  East    L.    &c.    R.    oo.    v.    Scott,      88  Va.  392,  13  S.  E.  975. 
71  Tex.  705,  10  S.  W.  298. 


623  FELLOW    SERVANT    CAUSING   INJURY.  §    616 

same  source,  and  were  engaged  in  the  same  general  business  of 
running  the  train  on  which  they  were  working,  and  one  not  in 
authority  over  the  other,  they  were  .fellow  servants,  and  each 
took  the  risk  of  the  other's  negligence.16 

(2)  If  the  plaintiff  was,  at  the  time  of  the  explosion,  engaged  in 
the  management  of  an  engine  of  defendant  on  its  railroad,  then 
the  engineer  on  the  pile  driver  and  plaintiff  would  be  fellow 
servants,  and  for  an  injury  resulting  to  plaintiff  from  careless- 
ness or  negligence  of  such  engineer,  plaintiff  cannot  recover.17 

(3)  The  defendant  was  not  an  insurer  of  the  life  or  safety  of  the 
plaintiff  while  he  was  at  work  for  it;  and  if  you  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  this  fall  was  an  accident  for  which  no  one  was 
to  blame,  or  that  it  was  the  result  of  the  carelessness  or  negligence 
of  the  plaintiff  or  of  some  fellow  servant,  then  your  verdict 
should  be  for  defendant.18 

§  615.  Injury  from  willful  act  of  servant. — If  the  jury  believe 
that  the  motorman  in  charge  of  the  defendant's  car  after  he 
had  seen  the  plaintiff's  carriage  and  had  -  completely  stopped  his 
car,  wantonly  and  maliciously  and  to  gratify  some  private  pur- 
pose and  not  because  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  again 
start  said  car,  in  pursuance  of  his  employment  again  started 
said  car  and  ran  into  the  plaintiff's  carriage  and  frightened  the 
plaintiff's  horse  and  caused  the  accident,  then  the  defendant 
is  not  responsible  for  such  acts  on  the  part  of  the  motorman,  and 
the  verdict  of  the  jury  must  be  for  the  defendant.19 

§  616.  Burden  on  plaintiff  to  show  negligence.— (1)  The  mere 
fact  that  there  may  have  been  decayed  ties  in  the  roadbed  at  the 
point  of  the  accident  does  not  authorize  you  to  find  for  plain- 
tiff. You  must  further  believe  that  the  decayed  condition  of 
the  ties,  if  they  were  decayed,  was  the  cause  of  the  wreck  and 
that  defendant  knew,  or  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care, 
might  have  known  of  the  decayed  condition  of  the  ties,  and 

is  McDonald    v.    Norfolk,    &c.    R.  71  Tex.  705    10  S.  W.  298.     See  Jar- 

Oo.  95  Va.  104,  27  S.  E,  821.     As  to  vis  v.  Hitch,  161  Ind.  217,  67  N.  E. 

the  changes  made  in  this  rule  by  1057. 

the  Employer's  Liability  acts  in  va-         18  Doyle    v.    Missouri,    K.    &    T. 

rious  states,  see  Pittsburgh,  &c.  R.  T.  Co.  140  Mo.  1,  41  S.  W.  257. 
Co.   v.  Montgomery,  152  Ind.   1,  49         i»  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Pierce, 

N.    E.    582;    Indianapolis   Union    R.  89   Md.    497,    43  Atl.    940.     But  see 

Co.   v.    Houlihan,    157   Ind.   494,   60  Indianapolis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Boettch- 

N.  E.  943.  er,  131  Ind.  82,  88,  28  N.  E.  551. 

"  East   L.    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Scott, 


§    61?  MASTER   AND    SERVANT.  624 

that  the  wreck  was  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  ties  were  de- 
cayed, and  unless  you  so  believe,  you  will  find  for  the  defendant 
on  this  issue.  You  are  not  authorized  to  find  for  the  plaintiff 
from  the  fact  alone  that  the  ties  were  rotten  at'  the  point  where 
the  wreck  occurred.20 

(2)  The  only  charge  of  negligence  made  in  the  petition  against 
this  defendant  which  you  are  to  consider,  is  concerning  the  re- 
moval of  the  brake  staffs  from  the  flat  cars  which  were  loaded 
with  steel,  and  it  devolves  upon  the  plaintiff  to  prove  that  the 
removal  of  said  brake  staffs  was  an  act  of  negligence.     The  jury 
cannot  presume  that  it  was  a  negligent  act  from  the  fact,  if  it 
be  a  fact,  that  the  cars  escaped  from  the  side  track  on  to  the 
main  track,  and  there  collided  with  B's  train.21 

(3)  To  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  in  this  action,  the  plaintiff 
must  show  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury,  or  else  it  must  other- 
wise appear  in  the  evidence  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury,  that 
the  deceased  was  injured  by  the  negligence  of  the  defendant, 
whilst  the  deceased  was  observing  ordinary  care  on  his  part  to 
avoid  injury,  or  did  not  by  his  own  negligence  contribute  to  the 
injury.22 

(4)  Whenever  a  claim  for  damages  is  asserted  the  injury  must 
be  shown  by  the  plaintiff  to  have  been  caused  by  the  negligence 
of  the  defendant,  and  the  happening  of  the  accident,  without 
additional  proof  that  it  was  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant, is  not  sufficient  to  establish  the  liability  of  defendant.23 

§  617.  Servant  assumes  risks  incident  to  employment. — (1)  If 
it  be  conceded  that  the  switching  of  cars  from  the  main  track  to  a 
side  track  while  the  train  is  in  motion  is  a  dangerous  mode 
of  doing  business  and  ought  to  be  regarded  as  evidence  of 
negligence,  still  all  employes  who  entered  the  service  of  the 
company  with  full  knowledge  that  such  was  the  practice,  or  ac- 
quired such  knowledge  afterwards,  and  remained  in  the  service 
without  the  least  objection  thereto,  and  fully  acquiesced  therein, 
must  be  regarded  as  having  consented  to  the  practice  or  as  having 

20  Gorham  v.  Kansas  C.  &  S.  R.          22  Way  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  40 
Co.  113  Mo.  411,  20  S.  W.  1060.  Iowa,   344. 

21  Browning    v.    Wabash    W.  R.          23  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
Co.   124  Mo.  65,  27  S.  W.  644.  nett,  88  Va.  540,  14  S.  E.  372. 


625  SERVANT    ASSUMES   RISKS.  §    617 

waived  any   objection   thereto   and  therefore   as   having  taken 
the  risk  upon  themselves.24 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  testimony  that  the  plaintiff  was  an 
experienced  railroad  man,  both  as  engineer  and  conductor,  at  the 
time  of  the  accident,  and  that  he  permitted  the  train  under  his 
charge  to  be  run  at  an  unusual  and  reckless  rate  of  speed,  and 
that  said  unusual  and  reckless  rate  of  speed  of  the  train  was  the 
proximate  cause  of  the  accident,  and  that,  but  for  such  rate  of 
speed,  the  accident  would  not  have  happened,  notwithstanding 
defects  (if  there  were  any)  of  the  track  or  cars  or  manner  of 
loading  the  cars  of  the  defendant,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  re^ 
cover,  and  your  finding  will  be  for  defendant.25 

(3)  The  plaintiff  in  the  performance  of  his  duties  as  conductor 
of  the  train  of  the  defendant,  assumed  all  the  usual  and  ordinary 
risks  incident  to  his  business,  and  if  injured  by  any  accident  aris- 
ing from  these  risks,  the  ^defendant  is  not  liable  to  him  therefor ; 
if  you  believe  from  the  testimony  that  the  plaintiff  created  an 
extraordinary  risk  for  himself  by  permitting  the  train  to  run  at 
an  unusually  rapid  rate  of  speed  and  was  injured  on  that  account, 
your  finding  will  be  for  defendant.26 

(4)  The  plaintiff,  by  entering  the  employment  of  the  defendant, 
and  engaging  in  the  work  upon  the  top  of  the  elevator,  assumed 
the  ordinary  risks  and  dangers  incident  thereto,  not  only  so  far 
as  they  were  known  .to  him,  but  also  so  far  as  they  could  have 
been  known  to  him  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  upon  his 
part;  and  if  ypu  believe  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  at  and 
prior  to  the  time  of  the  fall  knew  the  condition  of  the  runway, 
and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  constructed  and  laid,  or  that  he 
could  have  known  its   condition  and  the  manner  in   which  it 
was  laid  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  upon 
his  part,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  and  your  verdict  should 
be  for  the  defendant.27 

(5)  When  R  the  plaintiff  sought  employment  at  the  hands  of 
the  defendant  he  was  held  to  an  implied  representation  that  he 
was  competent  to  perform  the  duties  of  the  position  he  sought  and 
competent  to  apprehend  and  avoid  all  danger  that  might  be  dis- 

24  Lake  Shore,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Knit-  26  Gorham  v.  Kansas  C.  &  S.  R. 
tal,  33   Ohio  St.   471.  Co.  113  Mo.  413.  20  S.  W.  1060. 

25  Gorham  v.  Kansas  C.  &  S.  R.  27  Doyle  v.   Missouri,  &c.   T.   Co. 
Co.  113  Mo.  413,  20  S.  W.  1060.  140  Mo.  1,  41  S.  W.  257. 


§    618  MASTER  AND   SERVANT.  626 

covered  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence,  and  for 
the  purposes  of  this  case,  the  plaintiff  is  to  be  treated  as  a  brake- 
man  and  switchman  of  ordinary  experience  and  skill.28 

(6)  The  law  presumes  the  compensation  paid  a  person  em- 
ployed as  a  brakeman  on  a  railroad  is  in  part,  a  consideration 
for  the  risks,  hazards  and  dangers  ordinarily  incident  to  that 
service.29 

(7)  When  the  plaintiff  entered  the  service  of  the  defendant 
company,  the  law  presumes  that  he  contracted  with  reference  to 
the  risks  and  hazards  incident  to  the  business  of  his  employment 
as  the  company  conducted  it  at  the  time  he  entered  it,  and  that 
his  compensation  was  adjusted  accordingly.30 

§  618.    Servant  knowing  of  danger  is  negligent. — (1)  If  the 

alleged  dangers  and  improper  condition  of  the  track  and  the  sit- 
uation of  the  car  on  the  side  track  was  plain  to  be  seen  by  R  the 
plaintiff,  or  if  he  ought,  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  person,  to  have 
seen  or  known  of  it,  then  there  can  be  no  recovery,  and  if  he  had 
reasonable  opportunity  to  see  or  know  of  the  situation  as  touch- 
ing the  alleged  condition  of  the  tracks  and  car  on  the  side 
track,  then  he  is,  in  law,  held  to  such  knowledge;  or  if  on  or 
before  the  occasion  of  the  injury  he  had  knowledge  or  reason-r 
able  means  of  knowledge  as  a  man  of  ordinary  prudence  of  the 
condition  of  the  track  and  car  on  the  side  track,  and  incurred 
the  danger  with  such  knowledge  or  means  of  knowledge,  then 
there  can  be  no  recovery.31 

(2)  It  was  the  plaintiff's  duty  to  be  careful,  and  to  guard 
against  accidents;  and  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff  knew  the  manner  in  which  the  board  upon  which  he 
claims  to  have  stepped  was  laid,  or  if  the  condition  of  the  board 
was  apparent,  and  plaintiff  by  looking  and  using  ordinary  care, 
could   readily  have   discovered  the   danger,   then  your   verdict 
should  be  for  the   defendant.82 

(3)  The  defendant  was  under  no  obligation  to  keep  the  loose 
boards  picked  up  and  it  was  plaintiff's  duty  to  observe  when 

2«  Pennsylvania     Co.     v  .   McCor-  si  Pennsylvania     Co.     v.     McCor- 

mack,  131  Ind.  250,  30  N.  E.  27.  mack,  131  Ind.  250,  30  N.  E.  27. 

20  Way  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  40  32  Doyle    v.    Missouri,    K.    &    T. 

Iowa,   344.  T.  Co.  140  Mo.  1,  41  S.  W.  257. 

30  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ampey, 
93  Va.  114,  25  S.  E.  226. 


627  SERVANT   KNOWING   DANGER.  §    618 

and  upon  what  he  was  stepping,  and  if  his  fall  was  due  to  his, 
stepping  upon  a  loose  board  near  the  runway,  or  where  he 
was  working,  then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.33 

(4)  If  the  plaintiff  knew  that  the  cross  ties  in  defendant's  road- 
bed were  rotten,  if  they  were  rotten,  or  if  the  condition  of  the 
ties  were  such  that  an  ordinarily  observant  person  would  have 
known  before  the  accident,   and  he   continued  in  the   employ- 
ment of  said  company  after  becoming  possessed  of  such  knowl- 
edge, then  he  cannot  recover  if  the  condition  of  the  ties  was 
the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury.34 

(5)  If  the  plainitff  knew  that  the  inside  rail  of  defendant's 
road  was  higher  than  the  outside  one,  if  such  was  the  fact,  or  if 
the   same  was   of  that   character  that  an   ordinarily   observant 
person   would  have   known,   and  he   continued  in   the   employ- 
ment of  defendant  or  entered  thereon  with  knowledge  of  the 
fact,  he  cannot  recover,  if  the  height  of  the  rail  was  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  injury.35 

(6)  If  the  plaintiff  knew  of  the  defective  condition  of  the 
brakes,  if  they  were  defective,  or  could  have  known,  if  they  were 
of  such  a  character,  as  an  ordinarily  observant  person  would  have 
known,    and   the    condition   of   the   brakes    caused   the   wreck, 
plaintiff  cannot  recover.30 

(7)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant's 
shipping  room  at  or  about  the  elevator  hole  mentioned  in  the 
evidence  was  dark  and  unlighted,  and  if  the  jury  further  find 
from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff,  before  his  injury  knew  that 
said  room  was  dark  and  unlighted  and  that  there  was  some 
risk  or  danger  of  falling  into  the  elevator  hole  by  reason  of 
said     condition     of  said     room,  while  undertaking    to    use    the. 
elevator  in  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  his  employment,  and 
if  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  defendant  was  main- 
taining said  elevator  opening  in  said  floor  without  causing  the 
same   to    be   effectually   barred   or   closed  by   railing,    gate    or 
other   contrivance   for  the   prevention   of  accidents   therefrom; 
and  if  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  knew 
before  his  injury  that  defendant  was  maintaining  said  elevator 

ss  Doyle  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  T.  35  Gorham  v.  Kansas  C.  &  S.  R. 
Co.  140  Mo.  1,  41  S.  W.  257.  Co.  113  Mo.  412,  20  S.  W.  1060. 

34  Gorham  v  Kansas  C.  &  S.  R.  3e  Gorham  v.  Kansas  C.  &  S.  R. 
Co.  113  Mo.  412,  20  S.  W.  1060.  Co.  113  Mo.  412,  20  S.  W.  1060. 


§    619  MASTER   AND   SERVANT.  628 

opening  without  such  guard  or  protection  being  closed,  yet  if 
the  jury  further  find  from  the  evidence  that  said  condition  of 
said  room  and  elevator  opening  and  the  danger  arising  there- 
from were  not  such  as  to  threaten  immediate  injury  to  plaintiff 
while  in  the  defendant's  service  in  the  discharge  of  the  duty 
of  his  employment,  and  was  not  such  that  a  person  of  ordinary 
prudence  while  exercising  care  and  caution  would  not  have 
undertaken  to  have  remained  in  defendant's  service  and  dis- 
charge the  duties  of  his  employment,  then  the  fact  alone  that 
plaintiff  continued  in  defendant's  service  under  the  circum- 
stances will  not  of  itself  defeat  the  action.37 

§  619.  Servant  continuing  in  service  after  knowledge  of 
danger. — (1)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that 
the  proximity  of  said  platform  to  the  track  and  to  the  cars 
as  they  passed  was  plain  and  apparent,  and  the  liability  to 
injury  therefrom  was  manifest,  and  that  deceased  knew  of  such 
proximity,  or,  by  the  exercise  of  care  to  avoid  injury  to  him- 
self, might  have  known,  and  with  such  knowledge  or  oppor- 
tunity of  knowledge,  remained  in  defendant's  employ,  and 
continued  to  work  in  the  vicinity  thereof  without  objection 
or  protest,  and  without  promise  of  amendment,  then  plaintiff 
cannot  recover  in  this  action.38 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  knew 
or  had  the  same  means  of  knowing  as  his  employer,  of  the. 
danger  to  which  he  would  be  exposed  in  performing  services 
at  said  place,  and  further  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plain- 
tiff failed  to  exercise  that  degree  of  care  that  a  man  of  ordinary 
prudence  would  have  used  under  the  circumstances,  to  avoid 
injury  from  such  danger,  and  that  by  reason  of  his  omission 
to  observe  that  measure  of  caution,  he  was  injured,  he  cannot 
recover;  unless,  however,  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
at  the  time  plaintiff  -was  hurt  he  was  a  youth  of  immature 
judgment  and  inexperienced  in  the  business  in  which  he  was 
employed  and  that  the  perils  of  his  undertaking  were  not 
communicated  or  known  to  him,  and  that  by  reason  of  such  im- 
maturity of  judgment  and  inexperience  and  want  of  informa- 

37  Wendler  v.  People's  H.  F.  Co.          ss  Perigo  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  52 
165  Mo.  539,  65  S.  W.  737.  Iowa,  277,  3  N.  W.  43, 


629  SERVANT   KNOWING   DANGER   CONTINUES.  §    619 

tion  as  to  the  perils  of  the  employment  he  was  incapable  of  un- 
derstanding the  nature  and  extent  of  the  hazard  to  which  he  was 
subjected;  in  which  event  in  order  to  prevent  a  recovery  by 
him  you  must  believe  that  he  failed  to  exercise  that  degree  of 
care  that  persons  of  his  age,  undeveloped  judgment  and  want  of 
information  would  ordinarily  use  under  such  circumstances. 

From  what  has  been  stated  you  will  perceive  that  it  is  not 
the  mere  fact  of  the  plaintiff's  minority  at  the  time  he  was 
hurt  that  would  relieve  him  from  the  care  required  of  an  adult, 
but  such  immaturity  of  judgment,  inexperience  and  lack  of  in- 
formation as  has  been  denned  to  you  would  be  necessary  to  re- 
lieve him  from  that  degree  of  care.39 

(3)  Although  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  H 
was  not  a  capable  man  to  run  the  mine  machine  referred  to  in 
the  evidence  in  this  cause,  and  did  not  run  such  machine  in  a 
capable  manner  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  B,  yet,   if  they 
believe   from  the  evidence    that    the    said  B  had    knowledge  of 
the  danger  of  said  machine  when  in  motion,  and   could  have 
avoided  the  injury  to  himself  by  the  use  of  ordinary  care  upon 
his  part,  he,  the  said  B  would  be  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence and  the  jury  should  find  for  the  defendant.40 

(4)  If  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  A,  the  plain- 
tiff, entered  the  employ  of  the  defendant  as  a  freight  brakeman 
on  or  about  the  eleventh  day  of  June,  1890,  and  continued  there 
in  that  capacity  until  his  injury  on  August  twenty-fifth,  1890,  and 
during  all  that  time  was  passing  through  the  tunnel  mentioned, 
generally  twice  a  day,  and  often  more  frequently,  and  that  it  re- 
quired only  a  few  days  to  become  acquainted  with  the  tunnel 
and  the   conditions  of  work  therein,   and   after  such   opportu- 
nity  of  knowing  the   same   he   continued   in   such   employment 
as  aforesaid,  then  he   took  the  risk   of  such   employment   and 
the   plaintiff    cannot    recover   in   this    action   even   though    the' 
jury  shall  further  find  that  the  accident  by  which  he  lost  his 
life  was  caused  by  the  defective  construction  of  the  tunnel  or 
lack  of  ventilation  of  the  same.41 

39  Texas    &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brick,  83         *i  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Mary- 
Tex.    598.  land,  75  Md.  153,  23  Atl.  310. 

40  McVey  v.   St.   Clair  Co.   49  W. 
Va.    420.   38   S.   B.   648. 


§    620  MASTER   AND   SERVANT.  630 

(5)  If  you  find  that  said  boiler  exploded  because  of  defects  in 
material  and  plaintiff  knew  of  such  defects  before  the  explo- 
sion or  might  have  known  of  the  same  by  the  use  of  observation 
in  the  course  of  his  employment,  and  by  placing  himself  near 
the  same,  was  injured  by  the  explosion,  or  if  such  boiler  ex- 
ploded in  consequence  of  incompetency  of  the  engineer  and 
plaintiff  knew  of  such  incompetency  before  the  explosion,  then 
he  cannot  recover.42 

§620.    Servant  continuing  after  master's  promise  to  repair. 

(1)  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that  if  they  believe,  from  the 
evidence,  that  the  plaintiff,  while  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
care  and  caution  for  his  own  personal  safety,  was  injured  in 
consequence  of  •  the  defective  condition  of  the  machinery  used 
by  the  defendants  as  alleged  in  the  second  count  of  the  decla- 
ration, if  they,  the  jury,  believe  from  the  evidence,  that  the 
same  was  so  defective;  and  if  they  further  believe,  from  the 
evidence,  that  the  plaintiff  repeatedly,  and  shortly  before  re- 
ceiveing  such  injury,  called  the  attention  of  the  defendant's 
superintendent  to  said  defects,  if  any,  and  that  said  superin- 
tendent there  had  authority  to  remedy  said  defects,  if  any, 
and  that  thereupon  said  superintendent  repeatedly,  and  shortly 
before  the  injury,  promised  said  plaintiff,  that  said  defects, 
if  any,  should  be  remedied,  and  that  said  plaintiff,  relying 
upon  such  promises  remains  in  the  employ  of  said  defendants 
until  the  injury,  as  aforesaid;  and  if  the  jury  further  believe, 
from  the  evidence,  that  the  danger  from  such  defective  ma- 
chinery, if  any,  was  not  so  imminent  that  no  prudent  person 
would  have  undertaken  to  perform  the  service  required  of  the 
plaintff,  then  by  so  remaining  for  a  reasonable  time  thereafter 
the  plaintiff  would  not  assume  the  risks  incident  to  such  de- 
fective machinery,  if  the  same  was  defective  during  such  rea- 
sonable time.43 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  deceased, 
Charles  Castaine,  while  in  the  exercise  of  due  care  and  cau- 
tion, was  killed  in  consequence  of  the  defective  condition  of 
the  engine  used  by  the  defendant,  as  alleged  in  the  declaration, 
and  if  they  further  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  said 

42  East  Line,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,         43  Taylor  v.  Felsing,  164  111.  333, 
71  Tex.  704,  10  S.  W.  298.  45  N.  E.  161. 


631  MASTER'S  PROMISE  TO  REPAIR.  §  G21 

Castaine,  shortly  before  his  death,  called  to  the  attention  of 
the  superintendent  and  foreman,  carpenters  of  the  defendant, 
the  said  defects  and  that  said  persons,  or  either  of  them,  "then 
.had  authority  to  remedy  said  defects,  and  that  said  persons,  or 
either  of  them,  thereupon  promised  the  said  Castaine  that  said 
defects  should  be  remedied,  and  that  said  Castaine  relying  upon 
such  promise,  remained  in  the  employ  of  the  defendant,  until  he 
was  killed  as  aforesaid,  then  the  jury  must  find  for  the  plaintiff.4* 
(3)  If  the  drawbar  was  defective  and  the  plaintiff  had  knowl- 
edge of  it  and  made  objection  thereto  and  was  induced  to 
remain  in  the  defendant's  employment  by  promise  or  assurance 
of  its  repair,  and  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  before  its 
repair,  and  and  not  having  waived  the  objection,  he  was  in- 
jured by  reason  of  such  defect,  and  he  did  not  contribute 
to  the  injury  by  his  own  fault  or  negligence,  he  will  be  enti- 
tled to  recover,  but  in  such  case  greater  care  will  be  required 
of  him  than  if  he  had  not  known  of  the  defect.45 

§  621.    Servant   does   not   assume   risks   of  negligence. — (1) 

While  a  servant  in  accepting  employment,  assumes  the  ordinary 
risk  incident  to  it,  he  does  not  assume  those  occasioned  by  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  master:  and  while  the  plaintiff  in  this  case  as- 
sumed the  ordinary  risks  incident  to  the  work  he  was  called 
upon  to  perform,  he  did  not  assume  those,  if  there  were  any 
such,  arising  from  negligence  of  the  defendant.46. 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  was  rightfully 
at  the  place  of  the  explosion  and  you  further  find  that  he  left 
his  engine  and  went  to  the  boiler  that  exploded,  and  you  find 
that  he  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  said  boiler  was  in  danger 
of  explosion,  and  in  so  going  near  it  he  did  what  was  usual 
in  such  a  cage  on  the  part  of  trainmen,  and  there  was  no  ap- 
parent danger  in  so  doing,  and  was  such  an  act  of  a  man  of 
ordinary  prudence  and  caution  would  commit,  then  the  same 
would  not  defeat  his  right  to  recover  if  he  was  otherwise  enti- 
tled to  recover,  under  the  evidence  and  instructions  Werein 
given.47 

«  Missouri  Furnace  Co.  v.  Abend,  *«  Doyle  v.   Missouri,   &c.   T.   Co. 

107  111.  49.     Held  not  assuming  that  140  Mo.  I,  41  S.  W.  257. 

the  deceased  was  in  the  exercise  of  47  East  Line,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott, 

due   care   and    diligence.  71  Tex.  705,  10  S.  W.  298. 

ts  Belair  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.   43   Iowa,  671. 


§    622  MASTER   AND    SERVANT.  632 

(3)  If  the  jury  shall  believe  from  the  evidence  that  at  the  time 
of  the  collision,  which  resulted  in  the  injuries  to  the  plaintiff 
of  which  he  complains  in  this  action,  E,  as  section  master  of 
the  defendant  company  on  that  part  of  said  company's  road 
on  which  the  collision  occurred,  was  on  the  hand-car  involved 
in  said  collision,  and  in  the  control  and  management  of  the 
same,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  then  and  there  on  said  hand- 
car by  permission  of  said  E,  and  without  knowing  that  it  was 
contrary  to  the  rules  of  the  defendant  company  for  him  to  be 
on  said  hand-car,  and  that  the  injuries  sustained  by  the  plain- 
tiff in  said  collision  resulted  from  the  gross  negligence  of  the 
defendant  company,  or  of  its  agents  or  any  of  them,  whilst 
the  plaintiff  was  on  said  hand-car,  then  the  court  instructs 
the  jury  that  the  defendant  company  is  liable  to  the  plaintiff 
in  this  action  for  said  injuries.48 

§  622.    Servant  may  assume  appliances  to  be  safe. — (1)  An 

employe  or  servant  has  the  right  to  assume  in  the  absence  of 
knowledge  to  the  contrary,  that  the  appliances  which  he  is 
called  upon  to  use  in  the  performance  of  his  work,  are  reason- 
ably safe,  and  if  there  are  latent  defects  of  which  he  has  no 
knowledge,  or  which  are  not  obvious  to  him  while  using  ordi- 
nary care  and  observation,  then  he  does  not  assume  the  risk 
attendant  thereon.49 

(2)  A  railroad  company  is  required  to  use  ordinary  care  in  con- 
structing and  maintaining  its  roadway,  switches,  and  appli- 
ances in  such  a  manner  and  condition  that  its  servant  can  do 
and  perform  all  the  labor  and  duties  required  of  him  with 
reasonable  safety,  and  a  servant  has  a  right  to  presume  that 
the  company  has  in  these  respects  done  its  duty,  and  a  servant 
does  not  assume  risks  flowing  from  his  employer's  negligence 
in  these  duties,  nor  is  there  imposed  upon  him  any  duty  of 
watchfulness  and  care  to  discover  defects  in  the  roadway  or 
switches,  when  he  has  no  notice  of  danger  and  when  not  so 
glaring  and  apparent  as  to  be  open  to  the  observation  of  ordi- 
narily prudent  men,  and  when  not  specially  directed  thereto 
by  his  employer,  and  he  will  not  be  presumed  to  know  of 

48  Tyler   v.    Chesapeake   &   O.   R.          «  Doyle  v.   Missouri,   &c.   T.    Co. 
Co.  88  Va.  391,  13  S.  E.  975.  140  Mo.  1,  41  S.  W.  256. 


633'  SERVANT   ASSUMING   APPLIANCES    SAFE.  §    623 

danger  therein  when   of  such   character  that  they  might  well 
escape  the  observation  of  a  prudent  person.50 

(3)  The  plaintiff  had  a  right  to  assume  and  rely  and  act  upon 
the   assumption  that  the   defendant  had  used  reasonable   care 
in   furnishing    a    reasonably   safe   scaffolding,   staging    or  plat- 
form, upon  which  he  was  required  to  pass  in  the  duties  of  his 
employment,  if  he  was  so  required  to  pass;  and  that  plaintiff 
was  not  required  to  search  or  inspect  such  staging,  scaffolding 
or  platform  for  defects  therein  that  were  not  obvious  and  ap- 
parent.51 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  it  is  dangerous 
to  thaw  frozen  dynamite  by  an  open  fire,  and  that  the  method 
of  thawing  dynamite  by  an  open  fire  is  not  reasonably  safe, 
and  that  such  dangers  could  be  avoided  or  greatly  reduced  by 
the  use   of  appliances   and  methods,   which  were   within   easy 
reach   of  the   master,  and  that  the   existence   of  such   danger 
and   the   means   of   avoiding   it   or   greatly   reducing   it,   were 
known   to  the  master,   or  by  the  exercise   of  reasonable   care 
and  diligence  on  his  part  could  have  been  known  to  him,  that 
it  was  a  duty  that  the  master  owed  his  servants  to  adopt  such 
methods  and  use  such  appliances  as  were  reasonably  safe,  and 
any   other  methods   which   were   not   reasonably   safe   will   not 
excuse  the  master  for  injuries  to  the  servant  resulting  there- 
from.52 

§  623.  Servant  injured  when  not  at  his  place. — (1)  If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  injured  in  the  manner 
as  alleged,  and  that  at  the  time  of.  the  injury  he  was  in  the 
employ  of  the  defendant  as  night  watchman,  and  that  his  du- 
ties as  such  were  performed  at  a  different  place  from  that  at 
which  the  injury  occurred,  then  before  plaintiff  can  recover, 
he  must  show  that  he  was  properly  at  the  place  where  the  in- 
jury occurred,  and  that  his  presence  there  was  in  the  perform- 
ance of  a  service  for  defendant.53 

(2)  If  the  evidence  should  show  that  the  .plaintiff  was  in- 
jured by  such  explosion  as  alleged,  yet  if  it  also  appears  that 
plaintiff  at  the  time  of  such  injury  was  away  from  the  place  at 

so  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  McCor-  •"  Bertha  Zinc  Co.  v.  Martin,  93 

mack,  131  Ind.  250,  30  N.  E.  27.  Va.  794,  22  S.  E.  869. 

si  Doyle  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  T.  ™  East  L.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott, 

Co.  140  Mo.  1,  41  S.  W.  257.  71  Tex.  705,  10  S.  W.  298. 


§    624  MASTER  AND   SERVANT.  634 

which  his  duties  required  him  to  be  (if  you  find  that  he  was  in 
defendant's  employment)  and  that  he  voluntarily  placed  himself 
in  a  position  of  danger  and  in  consequence  thereof  received  the 
injuries  complained  of,  then  he  could  not  recover,  no  matter 
whether  such  boiler  was  defective  or  the  engineer  in  charge  was 
incompetent  or  not.54 

§  624.    Brakeman  injured  while  coupling — Liability. — (1)  If 

you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  while  in  the  em- 
ploy of  the  defendant  as  freight  brakeman  and  in  the  discharge  of 
his  duties  as  such  brakeman,  attempted  to  couple  together  two 
freight  cars  on  the  defendant's  road,  and  in  so  doing  used  that 
care  and  caution  for  his  own  safety  that  the  ordinarily  careful 
man  would  have  exercised,  and  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  side-track  where  the  cars  were,  was  slanting  and  sid- 
ling, and  as  a  result  thereof  not  a  reasonably  safe  place  to  work, 
then  and  in  that  case,  if  you  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that 
the  plaintiff  was  injured  as  charged  in  the  declaration  as  a 
result  thereof,  and  that  the  unsafe  condition  of  the  track,  if 
you  believe,  from  the  evidence,  it  was  so  unsafe,  was  caused 
by  the  defendant  not  exercising  reasonable  care  to  provide  a 
reasonably  safe  track,  it  will  be  your  duty  to  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff.55 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  at  the  time  of  the 
injury  to   the   plaintiff  there   was   trouble   with   the    couplings 
which  the  plaintiff  was  attempting  to  make,  and  that  the  con- 
ductor J,  knew  the  fact,  and  that  said  conductor,  ordered  him 
to  make  the  coupling  with  his  hand  and  was  told  by  the  plaintiff 
that  he  would  do  so,  but  that  he,  the  said  conductor,  must  have 
the  train  come  back  "very  light";  that  the  conductor,  instead 
of  signaling  the  engineer  to  come  back  gently,  gave  the  signal 
to  come  in  the  usual  way  when  couplings  are  to  be  made,  and 
that  the  said  injury  occurred  in  consequence  of  his,  the  said 
conductor's,  giving  the  signal  as  he  did,  and  not  in  giving  the 
signal  to  come  back  gently,  they  must  find  a  verdict  for  the 
plaintiff.56 

(3)  The  jury  are  instructed,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  it  was  the 

54  East  Line,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,         SG  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ampey, 
71  Tex.  704,  10  S.  W.  298.  93  Va.  112,  25  S.  E.  226. 

55  Malott    v.    Hood,    201    111.    206, 

66    N.    E.    247. 


635  BRAKEMAN  INJURED NEGLIGENCE  SUBMITTED  TO  JURY.   §  625 

duty  of  the  plaintiff,  before  attempting  to  uncouple  the  car 
in  question,  to  use  ordinary  and  reasonable  care  to  ascertain 
whether  it  was  safe  to  do  so  or  not  while  the  train  was  in  mo- 
tion; and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  that  it  was 
not  safe  for  the  plaintiff  to  uncouple  said  car  at  the  time  he 
attempted  it,  and  that  the  plaintiff,  knew,  or  might  by  the  exer- 
cise of  ordinary  care  have  known,  that  it  was  not  safe  to  attempt 
it,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  and  the  verdict  should  be 
for  the  defendant.57 

§  625.    Question  of  negligence  submitted  to  jury. — (1)  If  the 

jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  main  and  side  tracks  of 
the  defendant's  road  at  B  were,  on  July  13,  1888,  on  a  grade  that 
descended  eastward  and  that  defendant's  division  road  master 
at  or  about  said  first-named  day,  negligently  caused  the  brake 
staffs  to  be  taken  off  of  nine  or  more  flat  cars  and  the  same  to 
be  loaded  with  iron  or  steel  rails  and  then  set  in  upon  said 
B  side  track  without  any  brakes  set,  or  that  could  be  set  or 
other  reasonable  or  safe  means  or  appliances  for  securing  them 
in  their  places,  or  for  stopping  them  if  put  in  motion,  so  that 
said  cars  could  not  be  safely  coupled  up  or  handled,  and  were 
liable  to  move  or  be  easily  put  in  motion  and  to  escape  onto 
defendant's  other  side  or  main  track  and  obstruct  the  same, 
and  that  in  direct  consequence  of  said  negligent  acts  of  defend- 
ant's servants  and  agents  (if  they  find  them  negligent)  said  cars 
did  escape  from  said  side  track  onto  defendant's  main  line 
and  collided  -with  train  number  twenty-seven,  whereby  plaintiff 's 
husband,  without  any  negligence  on  his  part  contributing  thereto, 
was  killed,  then  the  jury  will  find  for  plaintiff.58 

(2)  In  determining  the  questions  of  negligence  in  this  case  the 
jury  should  take  into  consideration  the  conduct  of  both  parties 
at  the  time  of  the  alleged  injury,  as  disclosed  by  the  evidence: 
and  if  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  injury 
complained  of  was  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  defendant's 
servants,  as  described  in  the  declaration,  and  if  the  jury  further 
believe,  from  the  evidence  in  the  case,  that  the  plaintiff  was 

57  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner,         ^s  Browning  v.  Wabash  W.  R.  Co. 
108  111.  538,  553.     Held  error  to  re-      124  Mo.  55,  27  S.  W.  644. 
fuse  this  instruction  under  the  evi- 
dence. 


§    62G  MASTER   AND   SERVANT.  636 

without  fault,  and  was  exercising  ordinary  care  and  prudence 
in  the  discharge  of  his  duties  as  conductor  of  the  dummy  train, 
then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  in  this  case  such  dam 
ages  as  the  jury  may  believe,  from  all  the  evidence,  he  is  entitled 
to  receive,  as  compensation  for  all  the  damages  received  and 
suffered  by  said  plaintiff  in  the  premises,  provided  the  jury  find, 
from  the  evidence,  that  the  plaintiff  was  injured  as  described 
in  the  declaration.59 

§  626.     Servant  discharged  for  cause — No  liability. — (1)  If  the 

plaintiff  without  excuse  conducted  himself  generally  toward  his 
superior  officer  and  coemployes  in  such  a  way  as  to  interfere 
with  the  harmonious  transaction  of  business  and  to  render  it 
injurious  to  the  interest  of  the  defendant  to  retain  him  in  its 
service,  then  the  defendant  had  the  right  to  discharge  him  and 
he  is  not  entitled  to  recover.60 

(2)  Although  a  good  cause  for  the  discharge  of  the  servant  ex- 
isted at  the  time  of  his  discharge,  and  was  not  known  to  the 
master  at  the  time,  nevertheless  he  may  avail  himself  of  this 
cause  as  a  defense  to  this  action.61 

(3)  If  the  plaintiff  without  excuse  conducted  himself  generally 
toward  his  superior  officer  and  employes  in  such  a  way  as  to 
interfere  with  the  harmonious  transaction  of  business  and  to 
render  it  injurious  to  the  interests  of  his  employer,  the  defend- 
ant, to  retain  him  in  its  service,  then  the  defendant  had  the 
right  to  discharge  him,  and  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  re- 
cover; and  although  the  defendant  may  not  have  known  that  a 
good  cause  for  discharge  existed  at  the  time  of  discharging  the 
plaintiff,  yet  if  in  fact  such  good  cause  actually  did  exist  at 
the  time  of  such  discharge,  it  is  nevertheless  a  proper  defense.62 

so  Chicago   &   E.    R.    Co.   v.    Hoi-  Co.    v.    Eynon,    95    Va.    153,    27    S. 

land,  122  111.  470,  13  N.  E.  145.  This  E.    935. 

instruction   does  not  authorize  the  62  Equitable   E.    Asso.    v.    Fisher, 

jury    to    give    exemplary    damages.  71   Md.    436,   18   Atl.    808;    Crescent 

so  Equitable   E.    Asso.    v.    Fisher,  Horse-Shoe  &   I.   Co.   v.  Eynon,  95 

71   Md.   436,   18  Atl.    808.  Va.  153,  27  S.  E  935. 

6i  Crescent    Horse    Shoe    &    Iron 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 


NEGLIGENCE    OF   RAILROADS. 


Sec. 

627.  Care  required  of  plaintiff. 

628.  Care   of   plaintiff — Exceptions. 

629.  The  same — Instructions  for  de- 

fendant. 

630.  Care  of  defendant  in  running 

trains. 

631.  Great  care  of  defendant,  when. 

632.  Contributory    negligence,     de- 

fined. 

633.  Burden  of  proof  as  to  contrib- 

utory   negligence. 

634.  Plaintiff's    contributory   negli- 

gence. 

635.  Contributory  negligence  of  de- 

ceased. 

636.  Both   parties   guilty  of   negli- 

gence. 

637.  The  plaintiff  not  a  trespasser, 

638.  Question    of    negligence    sub- 

mitted  to   jury. 

639.  Question  of  contributory  neg- 

ligence for  the  jury. 

640.  Speed    of    train,    running    at 

high   rate. 

641.  Failure    to   sound    whistle   or 

ring  bell. 

642.  Wrongfully  blowing  whistle. 

643.  Flagman    at    crossing — Neces- 

sity. 

644.  Railroad     company     violating 

ordinances. 


Sec. 

645.  Fire  escaping  from  engine  and 

burning   property. 

646.  Killing  stock  from  failure  to 

fence  track. 

647.  Essential    facts    necessary    to 

cover. 

648.  Accident— No  liability. 

CASES   OF  DEATH. 

649.  Measure  of   damages   to   next 

of  kin. 

650.  Damages    restricted    to   piecu- 

niary  loss. 

651.  Damages — Instructions  for  de- 

fendant. 

MEASURE       OF       DAMAGES — GENERALLY. 

652.  Consider  permanency  of  inju- 

ry, health,  business,  expense, 
time. 

653.  Consider  age,  pain,  mental  an- 

guish. 

654.  Considerations    in    mitigation 

of  damages. 

CUSTOMS    AND    USAGES. 

655.  Customs,  usages,  rules  relating 

to    railroad. 


§  627.  Care  required  of  the  plaintiff. —  (1)  There  is  no  law  re- 
quiring a  man  in  the  lawful  use  of  a  public  street  approaching  a 
railroad  crossing,  to  stop  his  vehicle  before  crossing  it,  but  he 
is  bound  to  use  such  care,  under  all  the  circumstances  as  a  man 

637 


§    627  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  638 

of  ordinary  prudence  would  have  exercised  under  like  circum- 
stances, and  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  H  exercised 
such  care  at  the  time  of  and  preceding  the  injury,  he  was  not 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence.1 

(2)  The  plaintiff  was  bound  to  use  ordinary  care  under  the  cir- 
cumstances shown  to  have  existed  in  this  case.     He  was  bound 
to  approach  the  railroad  carefully  and  to  look  and  listen  for 
the  approach  of  trains;  and  if  the  evidence  shows  that  he  did 
do  this  with  that  degree  of  care  that  an  ordinarily  prudent  person 
would  have  exercised  under  all  the  circumstances  and  was  unable 
to  hear  or  see  the  train  approaching,  until  it  was  too  late  to 
avoid  the  collision,  then  he  is  not  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence.2 

(3)  It  is  the  duty  of  every  person  when  going  upon  or  across  a 
railroad  track  to  look  in  each  direction  to  see  if  cars  are  ap- 
proaching, and  a  failure  to  do  so  amounts  to  a  want  of  ordi- 
nary care.3 

(4)  If  it  affirmatively  appears  from  the  evidence  that  the  plain- 
tiff did  not  use  due  care  to  discover  the  approach  of  cars  upon 
the  defendant's  track  before  he  attempted  to  cross  the  same, 
he  cannot  recover  for  any  alleged  negligence  of  the  defendant.4 

(5)  The  deceased  was  bound  to  use  the  same  care  in  protecting 
himself  that  the  defendant  company  was  bound  to  use  in  seeing 
that  no  person  came  to.  injury  by  the  management  of  its  cars 
and  engines.     That  is,  he  was  bound  to  use  such  care  and  pru- 
dence as  a  reasonable,  prudent  man  would  use  in  protecting  him- 
self against  any  injury.     It  was  his  duty  to  use  his  senses,  in 
approaching  the  railway  track,  to  discover  whether  or  not  there 
was  an  approaching  train  or  locomotive  which  might  injure  him ; 
to  make  such  reasonable  use.  of  his  eyes  and  other  senses  as  a 
reasonable  and  prudent  man  would  make,  and  if  by  the  use  of 
his  senses  he  could  have  avoided  the  danger,  then  he  cannot 
recover  from  the  company.    But  if  he  exercised  such  care  as  a 
reasonable  and  prudent  man  would  exercise,  and  if  the  defendant 
was  guilty  of  neglect  in  the  running  of  the  engine  and  the  de- 

1  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Horton,  132          a  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Goddard, 
Ind.  194,  31  N.  E.  45.  '  72  111.   569:    Chicago,  &c.  R.   Co.  v. 

2  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Horton,  132      Hatch,  79  111.  137. 

Ind.  194,  31  N.  E.  45.  4  Indianapolis    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Tay- 

lor,  158  Ind.   279,   63   N.  E.   456. 


639  CARE  REQUIRED  OF  PLAINTIFF.  §  628 

ceased  was  killed  by  reason  of  that,  then  the  company  is  re- 
sponsible.5 

(6)  If  you  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  at  the 
time  he  was  injured  was  walking  up  the  main  track  of  the  rail- 
road and  was  not  using  the  county  road  as  a  crossing  to  reach  the 
caboose,  the  fact  no  signal  was  given  by  the  engineer  in  charge  of 
the  engine,  of  the  moving  of  the  engine  and  cars  attached,  toward 
the  crossing,  would  not  be  such  neglect  as  would  render  the 
company  liable  for  the  injury,  unless  the  conductor  or  engineer 
in  charge  of  the  train  or  engine  knew,  at  the  time  the  engine 
was  being  backed,  that  the  plaintiff  was  on  the  track  and  they 
then  failed  to  give  him  warning  by  signal  or  otherwise  of  the 
approach  of  the  train  in  the  same  direction  on  the  same  track.8 

(7)  Evidence  of  the  general  habit  of  M  when  crossing  the  rail- 
roads may  be  taken  into  consideration  by  the  jury  together  with 
all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence  in  determining  the  de- 
gree of  care  used  by  the  deceased  while  attempting  to  cross 
the  defendant's  railroad  track  at  the  time  of  the  killing,  and 
that  it  was  not  necessary  that  the  plaintiff  should  show  by  an 
eye-witness  as  to  M's  care  and  caution  exercised  at  the  time  of 
the  killing  in  order  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover,  provided 
you  believe  from  the  evidence  and  all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances  in   evidence    that   they   were    exercising    ordinary   care 
and  caution  for  their  own  safety  at  the  time  of  attempting  to 
cross  said  railroad  track.7 

(8)  The  fault  or  negligence  on  the  part  of  plaintiff  which 
would  preclude  him  from  recovery,  if  there  was  negligence  both 
upon  his  part  and  upon  the  part  of  the  company,  its  agents  or 
employes,  is  not  the  least  degree   of  fault   or  negligence,   but 
it  must  be  such  a  degree  as  to  amount  to  a  want  of  ordinary 
care  on  his  part,  under  all  the  circumstances,  at  the  time  of 
the  injury.8 

§  628.  Care  of  plaintiff — Exceptions. — (1)  The  general  rule 
that  a  person  in  crossing  over  a  railroad  track  at  a  public  crossing 
must  use  his  senses  as  to  sight,  is  subject  to  the  following  excep7 
tion:  That  where  the  view  of  the  track  is  obstructed,  and 

s  Railway  Co.  v.  Schneider,  45  f  McNulta  v.  Lockridge,  137  111. 

Ohio  St.  688.  275,  27  N.  E.  452. 

s  Railroad  Co.  v.  Depew,  40  Ohio  «  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr 

St.  124.  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  42  S.  W.  126. 


§    629  NEGLIGENCE  OF   RAILROADS.  640 

hence,  where  the  injured  party,  not  being  able  to  see,  is  obliged 
to  act  upon  his  judgment  at  the  time;  in  other  words,  where 
compliance  with  the  rule  is -impracticable  or  unavailing.0 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendants, 
at  the  crossing  where  the  accident  occurred  have  suffered  to  re- 
main on  their  land  high  embankments  on  the  side  of  the  road  or 
street,  so  as  to  exclude  to  a  traveler  a  view  of  their  track  when 
about  to  go  upon  said  track,  the  traveler  is  excused  from  look- 
ing, and  the  failure  to  look  cannot  be  imputed  to  him  as  negli- 
gence, but  it  throws  upon  him  additional  care  in  listening,  and 
to  take  such  other  precautions  for  his  safety  as  may  be  reason- 
ably necessary.10 

§  629.  The  same — Instructions  for  defendant. — (1)  The  plain- 
tiff was  bound  to  use  reasonable  care  on  her  part  to  avoid  injury 
to  which  the  defendant's  negligence,  if  any,  may  have  exposed 
her.  Reasonable  care  may  be  defined  to  be  that  degree  of  care 
which  a  prudent  person  would  have  exercised  under  the  circum- 
stances in  which  the  plaintiff  found  herself  at  that  time.  By 
this  test,  was  the  plaintiff  free  from  negligence  herself?  Might 
she,  situated  as  she  was,  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  prudence 
have  avoided  injury  to  herself  notwithstanding  the  negligent 
conduct  of  the  defendant,  if  any?  If  so,  she  cannot  recover 
if  she  failed  to  exercise  such  care.  In  considering  this  ques- 
tion, all  the  evidence  bearing  upon  the  points  indicated  in  the 
foregoing  instruction,  as  to  the  defendant's  negligence,  is  proper 
to  be  considered  also.  If  in  the  light  of  all  these  circumstances 
in  evidence,  a  reasonably  prudent  person,  exercising  her  facul- 
ties of  sight  and  hearing,  would  have  seen  or  heard  and  avoided 
the  danger;  or  if  the  danger  was  apparent  and  easily  avoidable 
to  a  person  exercising  reasonable  care,  as  before  defined,  the 
plaintiff  cannot  recover,  if  she  negligently  failed  to  avoid  it. 
and  must  suffer  the  conseqeunces  of  her  own  carelessness.11 

(2)  The  fact  that  the  train  was  behind  time,  and  was  running 
faster  than  its  usual  speed,  at  the  crossing  to  make  up  time,  did 
not  excuse  the  plaintiff  or  her  father  from  exercising  the  care  and 

»  Kimball  v.  Friend's  Adm.  95  "  Prothero  v.  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co. 
Va.  126,  27  S.  E.  901.  134  Ind.  435,  33  N.  E.  765. 

10  Kimball  v.  Friend,  95  Va.  128, 
27  S.  E.  901. 


641  CARE  REQUIRED  OF  PLAINTIFF.       .      §  629 

caution  required  of  them,  when  the  train  was  on  time  and  run- 
ning at  its  usual  rate  of  speed  at  that  crossing.12 

(3)  If  there  were  any  obstructions  to  the  sight  or  hearing  in 
the  direction  of  the  approaching  train,  as  the  plaintiff  and  her 
father  neared  the  crossing,  the  obstructions  required  increased 
care  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  and  her  father  on  approaching 
the  crossing.     In  such  case  the  care  must  be  in  proportion  to 
the  increase  of  the  danger  that  may  come  from  the  use  of  the 
highway  at  such  a  place.13 

(4)  The  rights  and  duties  of  persons  occupying  the   public 
streets  are  reciprocal,  and  although  it  is  the  duty  of  a  street 
car  company  operating  its  cars  upon  such  a  street  to  use  due 
and  ordinary  care  for  the  safety  of  persons  using  such  street, 
yet  it  is  also  the  duty  of  such  persons  to  use  the  same  with 
due  and  ordinary  care  for  their  own  safety ;  and  if  you  believe, 
from  the  evidence,  that  the  plaintiff  in  this  case  failed  to  use 
the  care  which  a  reasonably  prudent  person  would  have  used 
under  similar  circumstances,  to  avoid  the  injury  for  which  this, 
suit  is  brought,  then  he  cannot  recover.14 

(5)  The  issues  you  are  sworn  to  try  in  this  case  are  as  fol- 
lows:    Was  the  electric  car  which  collided  with  the  wagon  in 
question  carelessly  and  improperly  driven  or  managed  by  the 
servant  or  servants  of  the  defendant?    Was  the  said  electric  car 
traveling  at  an  unnecessarily  high  or  dangerous  rate  of  speed? 
Did  the  servant  or  servants  of  the  defendant  negligently  fail  to 
ring  a  gong  or  bell  at  the  time  and  place  in  question  ?  Did  the  ser- 
vant   or    servants    of    the    defendant    in    charge    of  said  car 
know  that  W  was  in    a    position    of    peril,    in    time    to  have 
stopped  the  car,  in  time  to  have  avoided  the  collision  by  the 
use  of  reasonable   care   on  their  part?     Could  the   servant  or 
servants  of  the  defendant  in  charge  of.  the  electric  car,  by  the 
use  of  reasonable  care  have  seen  that  W  was  in  a  position  of 
peril  in  time  to  have  stopped  the  said  car  before  the  collision? 
Was  W  at  and  just  before  the  time  of  the  collision,  using  or- 
dinary care  and  caution  for  his  own  safety?     If  you  conclude 

12  Cincinnati,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  How-  N.  E.  892.  See  Kimball  v.  Friend's 

ard,  124  Ind.  287,  24  N.  E.  892.  Adm'r,  95  Va.  126,  27  S.  E.  901. 

is  Cincinnati,  I.  &  St.  L.  &  C.  i*  North  Chicago,  &.C.  R.  Co.  v. 

R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  124  Ind.  290,  24  Penser,  190  111.  67,  72,  60  N.  E.  78. 


§    629  •  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  64£ 

that  the  greater  weight  of  the  evidence  does  not  show  that  W 
was  using  such  care  and  caution  for  his  own  safety  you  need 
not  concern  yourselves  with  the  other  issues,  because  in  no 
event  can  the  plaintiff  be  entitled  to  recover  a  verdict  unless 
it  has  been  shown  by  the  greater  weight  of  the  evidence  that 
such  care  and  caution  was  used  by  W.  If  you  do  find  from 
the  greater  weight  of  the  evidence  that  such  care  and  caution 
was  used  by  W,  you  will  examine  the  evidence  bearing  upon  the 
other  issues,  and  if  you  do  not  find  the  greater  weight  of  the 
evidence,  taken  as  a  whole,  will  warrant  you  in  answering  one 
or  more  of  them  in  the  affirmative,  you  should  find  the  de- 
fendant not  guilty.15 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  ordinary  care 
on  the  part  of  the  deceased,  for  his  own  safety  required  him, 
before  driving  to  or  upon  the  track  parallel  with  the  track  upon 
which  he  had  been  driving,  at  the  time  and  place  in  question 
and  under  all  the  circumstances  in  evidence,  to  look  and  ascer- 
tain  whether   or  not   a   car  was   approaching   along  the   north 
bound  track,  and  not  to  drive  upon  said  track  without  so  looking, 
and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  W,  if  he  had  looked, 
could  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  have  ascertained  whether  or 
not  a  car  was  approaching  along  the  said  north-bound  track,  and 
if  the  jury  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  W  did  not  so 
look  and  ascertain  whether  or  not  the  ear  was  so  approaching  and 
that  he  was  injured  in  consequence  and  because  of  his  failure,  if  he 
did  so  fail  to  look  anil  ascertain,  then  the  jury  should  find  the  de- 
fendant not  guilty.16 

(7)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  said  R  to  have  exercised  such  a  de- 
gree of  care  and  prudence  in  crossing  said  tracks,   and  in  looking 
and  listening,  as  an  ordinarily  careful  and  prudent  boy  of  like  age 
and  intelligence  would  have  exercised  under  like  circumstances. 
And  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  said  R  failed  to  ex- 
ercise such  a  degree  of  care  and  prudence  in  going  on  or  crossing 
the  tracks,  then  you  should  find  that  he  was  guilty  of  negligence.17 

(8)  Where  a  railway  company  maintains  an  electric  gong  at  its 
crossing  as  a  precaution  to  protect  persons  crossing,  the  traveler  is 

is  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Donnell          "  Ruschenberg  v.  Southern  Elec. 
208  111.  276.  R.  Co.  161  Mo.  86,  61  S.  W.  626. 

is  Chicago  C.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Donnell, 
208    111.    275. 


643  CARE   IN    RUNNING   TRAINS.  §  ,630 

not  bound  to  exercise  so  high  a  degree  of  care  as  he  would  except 
for  such  precautions  on  the  part  of  the  company,  still  he  is,  never- 
theless, bound  to  use  his  senses  and  do  all  which  a  prudent  man. 
under  the  circumstances  would  do  to  avoid  the  danger.18 

§  630.  Care  of  the  defendant  in  running  trains.  (1)  It  was  the 
duty  of  the  defendant's  employees,  who  were  controlling  the  enr 
gine  and  train  of  cars  on  the  morning  of  October  19,  1892,  to 
have  exercised  ordinary  care  and  diligence  in  keeping  a  look-, 
out  to  avoid  injuries  of  the  said  F  and  to  warn  him  of  ap- 
proaching danger,  as  well  as  to  have  exercised  great  care  and 
diligence  in  avoiding  the  injury  to  him  after  having  seen  him  in 
danger.19 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  from  the   evidence  that  the  defendant 
was  at  the  time  of  the  happening  of  the  alleged  injury,  of  which 
the  plaintiff   complains,   the   owner  of  a  railroad  with  several 
tracks    running    through    the    city    of  C    and  across  the  streets 
thereof,  and  was  engaged  in  moving  trains  propelled  by  steam 
thereon,  then,  in  the  management  of  said  trains,  the  defendant 
was  bound  to  use  such  care  and  caution  to  prevent  injury  to 
persons  traveling  along  said  streets,  where  they  are  crossed  by 
said  tracks,  as  prudent  and  discreet  persons  would  have  used  and 
exercised  under  like  circumstances';  and  if  they  find  that  on  the 
night  of  the  twenty-seventh  of  July,  1879,  the  plaintiff,  while  cross- 
ing the  railroad  of  the  defendant  on  W  street,  in  said  city,  was 
run  over  by  the  cars  of  the  defendant  and  injured,  as  stated  in 
the  testimony,  and  that  such  injury  was  caused  by  the  negli- 
gence of  the  defendant  or  its  agents  in  charge  of  said  cars,  and 
that,    by   the    exercise    of    ordinary    care    and    caution   by   the 
defendant  or  its  agents,  the  accident  causing  such  injury  could 
have  been  avoided,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  if  the 
jury  further  find  that  the  plaintiff  was,  at  the  time  of  the  acci- 
dent, using  due  care  and  caution  on  his  part.20 

(3)  The  degree  of  care  to  be  exercised  by  a  railroad  company 
must  necessarily  depend  upon  the  location  of  the  track  and  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.     In  a  place  not  frequented  by  the 
public,  either  by  right  or  permission,  expressed  or  implied,  of  the 

is  Kimball  v.  Friend,  95  Va.  130,         20  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Kean 
27  S.  E.  901.  65  Md.  396,  5  Atl.  325. 

19  Baltimore     &     O.     R.     Co.     v. 
Few's  Ex'r,  94  Va.  83,  26  S.  E.  406. 


§    G30  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  644 

company,  and  in  locations  where  the  people  are  not  constantly 
passing  about,  and  where  they  cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to 
be,  persons  in  charge  of  a  train  are  not  required  by  law  to  be  on 
the  lookout  for  them.  In  such  cases,  the  company  is  entitled  to  the 
exclusive  use  of  the  tracks,  and  the  persons  in  charge  of  the 
train  are  only  required  to  avoid  injury  to  them,  if  they  can  do 
so  upon  becoming  aware  of  their  peril.  But  when  the  place 
is  within  the  city  limits,  in  the  yard  of  a  company,  or  yard  used 
by  several  companies  together,  or  with  tracks  in  close  proxim- 
ity to  each  other,  and  employees  of  companies  whose  tracks 
are  in  close  proximity  are  engaged  jn  the  discharge  of  their 
duties,  the  safety  of  human  life  requires  a  different  rule ;  and 
in  this  case,  if  you  find  that  deceased  was  an  employee  of  one 
of  said  roads,  in  the  line  of  his  duty;  and  the  employees  of  de- 
fendant were  not  on  the  lookout  for  such  persons,  and  had  their 
engine  in  possession  or  under  the  control  of  an  incompetent 
person,  if  it  was,  and  running  at  a  dangerous  and  unlawful 
rate  of  speed,  if  it  was,  and  the  injury  was  inflicted  by  reason 
of  the  want  of  proper  care  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  if  it 
was,  the  defendant  would  be  guilty  of  negligence.21 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  and  from  a  view  of 
the  place  where  the  accident  is  alleged  to  have  taken  place,  that 
the  view  of  an  approaching  train  was  obstructed  by  an  embank- 
ment or  otherwise,  and  that  ordinary  care  would  have  required 
other  precautions  than  those  employed,  and  that  the  defendants 
did  not  use  such  other  precautions,  then  they  must  conclude  that 
the  defendants  were  guilty  of  negligence;  and  if  they  believe 
further  from  the  evidence  that  F,  the  plaintiff,  did  not  know 
that  the  engine  was  nearing  the  crossing,  so  as  to  endanger  his 
passing  over  it,  but  acted  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  man  would 
act  under  the   circumstances,  they  must  find  for  the   plaintiff 
such  damages  as  are  proper,  not  exceeding  the  amount  claimed 
in  the  declaration.22 

(5)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  defendants  servants  in  the  run- 
ning  and   handling   of   the   said    east-bound   engine   and   train 
of  cars,  to  have  exercised  that   degree   of  care  and  prudence 
which  an  ordinarily  careful  and  prudent  person  engaged  in  like 

21  McMarshall  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.          22  Kimball  v.  Friend,  95  Va.  1*29, 
Co.  80  Iowa,  759,  45  N.  W.  1065.  27  S.  E.  901. 


645  CARE   IN    RUNNING   TRAINS.  §    630 

business,  would  have  exercised  under  like  circumstances;  and 
a  failure  to  exercise  such  a  degree  of  care  and  prudence  would 
render  the  defendant  guilty  of  negligence  in  that  respect.28 

(6)  If  you  find  that  the  defendant,  for  an  unreasonable  and 
unnecessary  length   of  time,   kept   and  maintained  its   crossing 
of   the   highway   in   an  unsafe    condition,   then  it   Was   bound, 
in   operating   its   railroad,   to   exercise   proper   care   to   prevent 
the  injury  of  a  person  placed  in  danger  by  that  wrong,  in  his 
lawful  use  of  the  highway.24 

(7)  It  was  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  construct  and  main- 
tain its  tracks  in  the  street  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  reasonably 
safe  to  travel  thereon  by  means  of  a  buggy  or  other  vehicle 
drawn  by  the  ordinary  horse  having  the  ordinary  disposition, 
allowing  for  the   ordinary  incidents  of  caprice   or  fright,   and 
driven  by  an  ordinarily  careful  and  prudent  person.25 

(8)  You  are  to  consider  that  the  necessity  of  running  rail- 
road  cars   with   regularity  and  uniformity  is  not  a  matter  of 
convenience    merely.      The    business    cannot    be    done    at    all, 
unless    calculations   are   made   upon    the    movements    of   trains. 
The  risks  attending  upon  a  disturbance  of  that  regularity  are 
risks  of  human  life,  and  not  mere  business  delays.     It  would 
be  in  the  highest  degree  dangerous  to  make  the  movements  of 
the  cars  vary  with  the  wind  and  weather.26 

(9)  The  engineer  and  fireman  in  managing  the  train  are  at 
liberty,  and  it  is  their  duty  to  run  their  train  as  nearly  on  time 
as  possible;  and  in  case  of  a  way  freight,  whose  length  of  stops 
at    the    stations   is    necessarily   irregular,    they   are    not    to    be 
considered  negligent  by  their  use  of  natural  and  reasonable  means 
to  make  time.27 

(10)  The  defendant  railway  had  the  right  to  run  its  trains  over 
its  road  at  any  hour  of  the  day  or  night,  and  the  fact  that  the 
train  in  question  was  an  extra  train,  or  not  running  on  schedule 
time,  could  not  constitute  negligence.28 

23  Sohmitt  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.         26  Hagan  v.  Chicago,  D.  &  C.  G. 
20  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  219.  T.    J.    R.    Co.    86    Mich.    624,    49    N. 

24  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Me-      W.   509. 

Intosh,  140  Ind.  271,  38  N.  E.  476.          27  Hagan  v.   Chicago,  &c.   R.   Co. 

25  Gray  v.  Washington  W.  P.  Co.      86  Mich.  624,  49  N.  W.  509. 

30  Wash.  665,  71  Pac.  207.  28  Graybill  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co. 

112    Iowa,    743,    84    N.    W.    946. 


§    631  XEGLIGEXCE   OF    RAILROADS.  646 

§  631.  Great  care  required  of  defendant  in  running  trains. 
(1)  If  the  season  at  which  the  fire  occurred  was  unusually  dry, 
the  railroad  company,  defendant,  was  bound  by  law  to  take  extra 
precautions  against  fire;  and  if  it  did  not  do  so,  this  fact  may 
be  considered  in  determining  the  question  of  negligence.29 

(2)  A  railroad  company,  running  and  operating  its  trains  on  the 
streets  of  a  city,  must  use  greater  care  and  diligence  to  prevent 
injuries  to  persons  and  property,  than  is  required  of  them  in  run- 
ning and  operating  their  trains  in  less  frequented  and  populous  lo- 
calities; and  so,  in  certain  localities  in  the  town,  greater  precau- 
tions may  be  necessary  than  in  others;  for  example,  if  the  train 
is  being  carried  around  a  corner,  objects  or  persons  on  the  other 
side  of  which  are  hidden  from  view,  it  is  required  of  them  to 
resort    to    special   precautions,    depending   upon   the   particular 
locality  and  the  circumstances  to  avoid  accidents,  and  any  neg- 
lect of  such  precautions  as  are  proper,  under  the  peculiar  sur- 
roundings and  circumstances  of  the  locality,   constitutes  negli- 
gence,  for  which   the   railroad   company  is   liable   in   damages, 
unless  the  plaintiff's  intestate,  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care 
on  his  part,  could  have  prevented  the  accident;  and  courts  do 
not  hold  a  person  who  is  faced  with  a  sudden  danger  to  the 
same  degree  of  judgment  and  presence  of  mind  as  would  other- 
wise be  required  of  him ;  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  rail- 
road company  to  prove  such  absence  of  ordinary  care  on  the 
part  of  the  plaintiff's  intestate.30 

(3)  A  railroad  company,  operating  its  trains  on  the  thorough- 
fare of  a  village,  must  use  greater  care  than  in  less  frequented 
localities;  and  any  neglect  of  any  precautions  proper  in  the  pecu- 
liar circumstances  of  the  locality,  constitutes  negligence.31 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence  that  the  approach  to 
the  crossing  where  F  as  killed  was  extra  dangerous,  then  it  was 
the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  use  extra  care  to  prevent  accidents  to 
travelers,  and  to  use  reasonable  precautions  to  warn  and  protect 
travelers  against  approaching  trains,  the  degree  of  care  required 

2»  Pittsburg,   C.   &   St.   L.   R.   Co.  dianapolis  Street  R.   Co.  v.   Taylor 

v.  Noel,  77  Ind.   116.     Held  proper  (Ind.),  72  N.  E.  —  (Decided  Jan.  3, 

in    the    absence    of    a    request    for  1905.) 

more  specific  instruction.  31  Florida,  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox- 
so  Kimball  v.  Friend,  95  Va.  127,  worth,   41   Fla.   8,  25   So.   338.     See 

27  S.  E.  901;   Cleveland,  &c.  R.  Co.  Note  30. 

v.  Miles,  162  Ind.  646.     But  see  In- 


647  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE  DEFINED.  §    633 

of  the  defendants,  as  well  as  the  plaintiff,  being  measured  by  the 
dangerous  character  of  the  crossing.  And,  as  to  whether  such  rea- 
sonable precautions  were  used  or  adopted  by  defendants,  is  a 
question  for  the  jury  to  determine.32 

(5)  You  will  recollect  that  this  railroad  was  on  the  public 
street,  and  prima  facie  all  persons  have  a  right  to  be  on  the 
street  for  all  lawful  purposes ;  and  the  fact  that  this  is  a  pub- 
lic street  and  that  all  persons,  old  and  young,  adults  and  infants, 
have  a  right  to  be  on  the  same,  ought  to  impose  upon  the  driver 
and  conductor  of  a  street  car  vigilance  in  looking  out  for  dangers 
and  guarding  against  accidents  and  injuries  to  persons  and 
things.33 

§  632.  Contributory  negligence  denned. — (1)  Contributory 
negligence  is  such  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  as  helped 
to  produce  the  injuries  complained  of,  and  if  the  jury  find,  from 
a  preponderance  of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  that  the  plaintiff 
was  guilty  of  any  negligence  that  helped  to  bring  about  or  pro- 
duce the  injuries  complained  of,  then,  and  in  that  case,  the 
plaintiff  cannot  recover.34 

(2)  The  basis  of  this  action  is  "negligence,"  which  is  defined  by 
the  law  to  be  the  omitting  to  do  something  that  a  reasonably  pru- 
dent person  would  do,  or  the  doing  of  something  that  such  person 

would  not  do.  Under  the  circumstances  of  this  case,  and  as  applied 
to  the  case,  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  by 
its  employes,  has  omitted  to  do  something  that  a  reasonably  pru- 
dent person  would  do  or  has.  done  something  that  such  person 
would  not  do,  you  would  be  warranted  in  finding  that  the  defend- 
ant is  guilty  of  negligence ;  and  if  you  find  that  H  or  W  or  the  dri- 
ver of  the  vehicle  in  question,  has  done  something,  or  omitted  to  do 
something  which  directly  contributed  to  the  collision  and  injury, 
then  you  will  be  warranted  in  finding  such  person  or  persons 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence.35 

(3)  Contributory  negligence  is  the  failure  to  use  that  ordinary 
care  and  diligence  that  would  be  expected  of  an  ordinarily  pru- 
dent person  under  like  circumstances  to  avoid  injury.    Thus,  even 

3-'  Kimball  v.  Friend,  95  Va.  128,  34  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

27  S.  E.  901.  Young,  153  Ind.  170,  54  N.  E.  791. 

33  Etherington  v.  Prospect,  &c.  R.  ^  Hart  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  &c.  R. 

Co.  88  N7.  Y.  642.  Co.  109  Iowa,  637,  80  N.  W.  662. 


§    633  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  648 

though  you  may  find  that  the  defendant  was  negligent,  still,  if 
you  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  B  did  not 
exercise  that  ordinary  care  and  diligence  to  prevent  injury  to  him- 
self that  would  be  expected  of  an  ordinarily  prudent  person,  situ- 
ated as  he  was,  you  should  find  for  the  defendant.36 

(4)  Contributory  negligence  is  such  negligence  on  the  part  of 
,the  plaintiff  as  helped  to  produce  the  injuries  complained  of, 
1  and  if  the  jury  find  from  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  in  the 
case,  that  the  plaintiff  was  guiltyof  any  negligence  that  helped  to 
bring  about  or  produce  the  injuries  complained  of,  then,  in  that 
case,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.  To  state  the  matter  in  other 
words,  contributory  negligence  is  the  failure  to  use  that  ordi- 
nary care  and  diligence  that  would  be  expected  of  an  ordinarily 
prudent  person  under  like  circumstances  to  avoid  injury.  Thus, 
even  though  you  may  find  that  the  defendant  was  negligent,  still, 
if  you  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  did  not 
exercise  that  ordinary  care  and  diligence  to  prevent  injury  to  him- 
self that  would  be  expected  of  an  ordinarily  prudent  person,  situ- 
ated as  he  was,  you  should  find  for  the  defendant.37 

§  633.    Burden  of  proof  as  to  contributory  negligence. — (1)  The 

burden  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  show,  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
evidence,  that  she  and  her  father  vigilantly  used  their  eyes  and 
ears  to  ascertain  if  a  train  of  cars  was  approaching,  and  if  this 
has  not  been  shown  to  you  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence, 
the  plaintiff  canot  recover.38 

(2)  When  a  person  crossing  a  railroad  track  is  injured  by  col- 
lision with  a  train,  the  fault  is  prima  facie  his  own,  and  he  must 
show  affirmatively  that  his  fault  or  negligence  did  not  contribute 
to  the  injury  before  he  is  entitled  to  recover  for  such  injury.89 

(3)  To  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  under  either  the  first  or 

36  Galveston,   H.   &   S.   R.   Co.   v.      Co.  v.  Howard,  124  Ind.  287,  24  N.  E. 
Bonnett   (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  38  S.  W.      892. 

813.  39  Cincinnati,  I.  St.  L.  &  C.  R.  Co. 

37  Baltimore    &    O.    S.    R.    Co.    v.  v.   Howard,   124  Ind.  284,  24  N.   E. 
Young,  153  Ind.  170,  54  N.  E.  791;  892.     This  is  no  longer  the  law  in 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ben-  Indiana,   the  rule  as  to  burden  of 
nett  (Tex.  Cv.  App.),  38  S.  W.  813.  proof  having  been  changed  by  st-at- 

ss  Cincinnati,   I.    St.    L.    &   C.    R.      ute,  Southern  Indiana  R.  Co.  v.  Pey- 
ton, 157  Ind.   690,  61  N.  E.   722. 


649  BURDEN    OF    PROOF CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  §    63$ 

third  paragraphs  of  the  complaint  it  must  appear  from  a  fair  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence  not  only  that  the  injuries  complained 
of  were  caused  by  the  negligent  acts  or  some  of  the  negligent  acts 
of  the  agents,  servants  or  employes  of  the  defendant,  but  that  he 
was  himself  free  from  all  negligence  contributing  directly  to 
said  injuries.40 

(4)  The  plaintiff  must  show  that  the  negligence  of  the  defend- 
ant, or  its  employes,  caused  the  injury  complained  of,  and  that 
the  plaintiff  in  no  way  directly  contributed  to  the  injury.41 

(5)  A  traveler  approaching  a  railroad  crossing  must  look  and 
listen ;  that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  look  in  one  direction,  but  that  he  is- 
under  the  duty  to  look  in  directions  from  which  engines  and 
cars  may  approach,  and  that  it  is  his  duty  to  exercise  a  higher 
degree   of   care   where   the   crossing   is   dangerous,   than   where 
it  is  not,  and  that  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff's   intestate   in   this    case   could   have   seen   the    engine, 
with  which  he  collided,  approaching,  by  looking,  and  so  have 
avoided  the  collision,  the  presumption  is  that  he  did  not  look,, 
or,  if  he  did  look,  did  not  heed  what  he  saw;  and  the  burden  of 
proof  in  such  case  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  he  did  look 
and  listen;  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  he 
omitted  to  look  and  listen,  they  must  find  a  verdict  for  the 
defendant  receivers,  unless  they  further  believe  that,  after  per- 
ceiving the  negligence   of  the  plaintiff's  intestate,  they   could 
have  avoided  the  effect  of  such  negligence  by  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  care.42 

(6)  The   burden   of  proof  is   on  the  plaintiff  to   show  by  a 
preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  he  vigilantly  used  his  eyes 
and  ears  to  ascertain  if  a  train  of  cars  was  approaching,  and  if 

.  this  has  not  been  shown  to  you  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evi- 
dence, the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.  And  the  plaintiff  must  also 
prove  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the  negligence 
of  the  defendant  or  its  servants  or  employes  caused  the  injury 

«>  Chicago,    St.    P.    &    R.    Co.    v.  *-  Kimball  v.  Friend,  95  Va,  131, 

Spilker,  134  Ind.  401,  33  N.  E.  280,  27  S.  E.  901.    The  rule  as  to  burden 

34  N.  E.  218.     See  note  39.  of  proof  has  been  changed  in  Indi- 

•41  Locke   v.    S.    C.    &    P.    R.    Co.  ana.    See  note  30. 
46  Iowa,  113.    See  Note  39. 


§    C34  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  650 

complained  of,  and  that  he,  the  plaintiff,  in  no  way  directly  con- 
tributed to  the  injury.43 

§  634  Plaintiff's  contributory  negligence. — (1)  To  entitle  the 
plaintiff  to  recover  in  this  action,  the  jury  must  find  from  the 
evidence  that  the  accident  or  injury  complained  of  was  caused 
altogether  and  entirely  by  the  negligence  and  want  of  due  care 
by  the  defendant  or  its  servants  and  employes,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  did  not  directly  contribute  to  the  said  accident  by  neg- 
ligence or  by  want  of  prudence  and  ordinary  care  on  her  part.44 

(2)  One  who  is  injured  by  the  mere  negligence  of  another  can- 
not recover  any  compensation  for  his  injury,  if  he,  by  his  own 
ordinary  negligence   or  willful  wrong,   contributed  to   produce 
the  injury  of  which  he  complains ;  so  that,  but  for  his  concurring 
and   co-operating  fault,   the  injury  would   not   have   happened 
to  him,  except  when  the  direct  cause  of  the  injury  is  the  omis- 
sion of  the  other  party,  after  becoming  aware  of  the  injured 
party's  negligence  to  use  a  proper  degree  of  care  to  avoid  the 
consequences  of  such  negligence.45 

(3)  Ordinary  prudence  and  common  sense  suggest  to  every  one 
who  is  aware  of  the  character  and  operation  of  electric  street  cars 
that  it  is  dangerous  to  pass  in  front  of  them  at  a  short  distance 
while  in  motion,  and  one  who  does  so  without  looking  and  lis- 
tening, when,  if  he  had  looked  and  listened,  he  could  have  discov- 
ered the  car,  is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  and  cannot  re- 
cover ;  and  if  you  find  that  had  the  plaintiff  looked  and  listened  he 
could   have  discovered  the  car,   and  thus  have   avoided   the    ac- 
ident  and  injury,  and  that  he  failed  to  do  so,  your  verdict  must  be 
for  the  defendant.46 

(4)  If  the  plaintiff  thought  that  he  had  time  to  cross  the  track 
of  the  defendant — if  he  was  attempting  to  cross  the  track — before 
the  car  of  the  defendant  would  reach  him,  and  did  not  have 
sufficient  time  to  do  so,  then  it  was  error  in  judgment  on  the 

«  Cincinnati,    I.    St.   L.    &   C.   R.  **  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Ow- 

Co.  v.  Howard,  124  Ind.  287,  24  N.  ings,  65  Md.  505,  5  Atl.  329. 

E.  892;   Locke  v.  S.  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  ^  Cooper    v.    Central    R.    Co.    44 

46  Iowa,  113;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  Iowa,  138. 

v.  Owings,  65  Md.  505,  5  Atl.  329;  *e  Traver  v.   Spokane   St.   R.   Co. 

Cooper  v.   Central  R.   Co.  44  Iowa,  25  Wash.   244,   65  Pac.   284;    Union 

138.    The  rule  as  to  burden  of  proof  Traction  Co.  v.  Vandercook,  32  Ind. 

has  been  changed  in  Indiana.     See  App.  621. 
note  39. 


651  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE.  §  634 

part  of  plaintiff,  and  he  cannot  recover,  and  your  verdict  should 
be  for  the  defendant.47 

(5)  The  defendant  company,  at  the  place  where  the  accident 
happened  and  the  collision  occurred,  had  the  preference  and  the 
superior  right  to  the  use  of  the  track ;  and  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  plaintiff  not  to  obstruct  the  use  of  said  track  or  the  opera- 
tion of  the  cars  thereon ;  and  it  was  his  duty  to  turn  out  to  allow 
such  street  car  to  pass,  if  he  was  driving  upon  the  track ;  and  it 
was  his  duty  to  remain  off  the  track,  and  not  attempt  to  cross 
the  same  in  front  of  a  moving  car,  except  at  a  safe  distance  there- 
from ;  and  a  failure  in  either  of  these  respects  constitutes  contrib- 
utory negligence  and  defeats  recovery,  and  entitles  defendant  to 
a  verdict.48 

(6)  If  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  any  act  of  negligence  which  di- 
rectly contributed  to  his  injury,  or  was  guilty  of  any  lack  of  or- 
dinary care  on  his  part,  whether  the  act  be  an  active  one  or  an 
omission  to  do  what  he  ought  to  have  done  under  the  circumstan- 
ces, and  such  lack  of  care,  act  or  omission  contributed  to  the  acci- 
dent, and  without  which  the  accident  would  not  have  occurred, 
then  you  cannot  go  further  and  apportion  the  accident  cr  injury, 
but  the  plaintiff's  contributory  negligence  in  such  case  defeats 
recovery,  and  your  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendant.49 

(7)  Notwithstanding  you  should  find  that  the  defendant  was 
guilty  of  negligence  in  the  operation  of  its  car,  yet,  if  you  further 
find  that  the  accident  or  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff  would  not 
have    happened,    except    for   the    negligence    or  failure    to   use 
ordinary   care   unon  the   part   of  the   plaintiff,   then   your   ver- 
dict must  be  for  the  defendant.50 

(8)  Before  you  can  find  for  the  plaintiff,  therefore,  you  must 
find  the  defendant  to  have  been  guilty  of  negligence  as  alleged 
in  the  complaint.     Another  principle  of  law  proper  to  be  men- 
tioned in  this  connection  is,   that  if  the  plaintiff  was  himself 
guilty  of  negligence  which  materially  contributed  to  the  injury 
complained  of,  he  cannot  recover.51 

47  Traver  v.   Spokane   St.  R.   Co.         so  Traver  v.    Spokane   St.   R.   Co. 
25  Wash.  244,  25  Pac.  284.  25  Wash.  243,  25  Pac.   284. 

43  Traver   v.    Spokane   St.  R.   Co.          si  Traver   v.   Spokane   St.   R.   Co. 
25  Wash.  243,  25  Pac.  284.  25  Wash.  239,  25  Pac.   284. 

*9  Traver   v.    Spokane   St.  R.    Co. 
25  Wash.  243,  25  Pac.  284. 


§    635  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  652 

,  §  635.  Contributory  negligence  .of  deceased. — (1)  This  case 
presents  three  questions  of  fact,  among  others,  for  the  considera- 
tion of  the  jury:  First  was  the  death  of  A  caused  by  injuries  re-, 
ceived  by  her  on  the  fifth  day  of  August,  1891,  and  brought  about 
by  the  locomotive  and  cars  of  the  defendant  coming  in  collision 
with  the  vehicle  in  which  the  deceased  was  riding  on  said  day 
as  alleged  in  the  complaint?  second,  were  such  injuries  to  said 
deceased  produced  by  the  negligence  of  the  defendant,  its  ser- 
vants or  employes?  third,  did  the  negligence  of  the  deceased 
woman  contribute  to  such  injuries  and  death  ?52 

(2)  If  the  train  was  backing  under  the  shed  without  display- 
ing the  light  from  the  front  end  of  the  leading  car  and  without 
having  a  flagman  stationed  thereon,  and  was  backing  without  due 
care,  and  the  intestate  knew  it  and  placed  himself  in  a  position 
of  danger,  his  negligence  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  in- 
jury,— he   had   the   last   chance   to   avoid   the   injury, — and  this 
being  so,  he,  and  not  the  defendant,  would  be  responsible  for 
his  death.    On  the  contrary,  if  plaintiff  was  standing  on  or  near 
the  track,  he  was  not  called  upon  to  look  out  for  a  backing  train 
which  displayed  no  light  and  had  no  flagman,  if  you  should  so 
find,  on  the  front  of  the  leading  car,  for  it  was  th£  duty  of  the 
defendant,  as  before  explained,  to  display  the  light  and  have  a 
flagman  at  his  post,  he  not  being  bound  to  expect  a  violation  of 
duty.    If,  therefore,  plaintiff  was  standing  on  or  near  the  track, 
and  the  defendant  backed  its  train  under  the  shed  without  the 
light  on  the  front  end  of  the  leading  car,  or  in  a  conspicuous 
place  thereon,  or  without  a  flagman  thereon,  and  if  the  jury 
should  further  find  that  P  did  not  discover  the  train  in  time 
to   escape,  then  the  defendant  was  negligent  and,  such  negli- 
gence was  the   cause   of  the  injury.53 

(3)  If  the  deceased  was  hard  of  hearing  and  walked  on  the  de- 
fendant 's  track  without  looking  back,  or  having  looked  back,  still 
continued  to  walk  on  the  track,  such  conduct  on  his  part  was 
gross  negligence,  and  makes  out  a  case  of  contributory  negligence 
against  him  which  will  defeat  all  rights  of  recovery  in  this  action 
unless  it  is  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  that  at. 

52  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Me-         53  Purnell  v.  Raleigh  &  I.  R.  Co. 
Intosh,  140  Ind.  263,  38  N.  E.  476;       122  N.  Car.  839,  29  S.  E.  953. 
Indianapolis,   &c.    R.    Co.   v.    Stout, 
53  Ind.  -143. 


'653  BOTH    PARTIES    NEGLIGENT.  §    636 

and  about  the  time  of  the  near  approach  of  the  train,  he  used  the 
diligence  and  care  necessary  to  extricate  himself  from  the  peril 
in  which  he  had  placed  himself  by  his  own  voluntary  act.64 

(4)  The  defendant's  servants  in  charge  of  the  engine  which 
struck  the  deceased  had  the  right  to  assume  that  he  was  rational, 
and  would  exercise  care  and  caution  and  keep  himself  out  of  dan- 
ger until  they  saw  something  in  his  conduct  which  would  be  incon- 
sistent with  such  assumption.    If  he  was  walking  on  a    line  par- 
allel with  the  track,  and  so  far  removed  therefrom  as  to  be  free 
from  danger  of  collision,  they  had  the  right  to  assume  that  he 
would  remain  at  such  safe  distance,  until  he  manifested  a  purpose 
to  place  himself  in  dangerous  proximity  to  it.55 

(5)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  L  the  husband 
of  the  plaintiff,  was  guilty  of  any  negligence  which  contributed 
to  the  injury  resulting  in  his  death,  then  the  jury  must  find  a  ver- 
dict for  the  defendant,  although  they  may  further  believe  that 
the  plaintiff's  husband  was  killed  by  the  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant as  charged  in  the  petition.56 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  that  the  deceased, 
might,    in    the    exercise     of    ordinary    care,    have    seen    the 
danger,  and  avoided  it,  and  that  he  did  not  do  so,  and  that 
the  omission  of  the  deceased  to  do  so  contributed  to  the  result, 
then  he  was  guilty  of  such  negligence  as  will  prevent  a  recovery, 
unless  the  injury  was  produced  by  willful  or  intentional  acts 
of  the  defendant  or  its  agents.57 

(7)  If    the    jury    believe    from    the  evidence  that  the  injury 
and  death  of  plaintiff's  intestate  was  due  to  the  failure  of  de- 
ceased to  look  back  while  on  the  track,  and  the  failure  of  the  ser- 
vants of  defendant  to  keep  a  proper  lookout  ahead,  and  that 
both  these  causes  combined  caused  the  death  of  plaintiff's  intes- 
tate, then  it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  find  a  verdict  for  the  de- 
fendant.58 

§  636.    Both  parties  guilty  of  negligence. — (1)  If  you  believe, 
from  the  evidence  in  this  case,  that  both  the  plaintiff  and  the 

s*  Frazer  v.  South  &  N.  A.  R.  Co.  57  Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    God- 

81  Ala.   190,  1  So.   85.  dard,  72  111.  569. 

ss  Chicago,  R.   I.   &  P.  R.   Co.   v.  38  Frazer  v.  South  &  N.  A.  R.  Co. 

Austin,   69   111.   429.  81  Ala.  190,  1  So.  85. 

5«  Le  May  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
105  Mo.  370,  16  S.  W.  1049. 


§    636  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  654* 

agents  and  servants  of  the  defendant  were  guilty  of  gross  negli- 
gence contributing  to  the  injury  complained  of  in  this  case, 
then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.59 

(2)  If  the  injuries  complained  of  were  the  joint  result  of  plain- 
tiff's carelessness  and  lack  of  vigilance  for  his  own  safety,  and 
of  the  failure  of  defendant's  servants  in  charge  of  said  train  to 
,give  signals  of  'approach  to  said  crossing,  then  the  verdict  must 
be  for  the  defendant.    If  both  parties  were  careless,  neither  can 
recover  from  the  other  on  account  thereof.60 

(3)  If  the  injuries  complained  of  were  the  joint  result  of  the 
plaintiff's  carelessness  and  lack  of  vigilance  for  his  own  safety, 
and  of  the  failure  of  the  defendant's  servants  in  charge  of  the 
train  to  give  signals  of  approach  to  the   crossing  in  question, 
then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,     If  you  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence in  this  case  that  both  the  plaintiff  and  defendant's  agents 
or  servants  were  guilty  of  negligence  contributing  to  the  injury 
complained  of,  then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant.61 

(4)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  traveler  approaching  a  crossing  on  grade 
over  a  railroad  track  to  look  and  listen,  and  for  this  purpose  it 
is  his  duty  to  stop  before  crossing  the  track,  if  the  circumstances 
are  such  as  to  make  it  necessary  to  stop  in  order  to  properly  look 
and  listen;  and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff's  intestate   was  killed    by    the    engine    of    defendant 
while  attempting  to  cross  the  track  of  said  company,  and  that  at 
the  time  he  was  so  killed  he  was  riding  upon  a  bicycle,  and  that 
he  approached  the  crossing  over  said  tracks  through  a  cut  which 
obstructs  the  view  of  the  track  until  the  plaintiff  got  within  a 
reasonably  short  distance  of  the  track;  and  that  the  plaintiff 
could  not,  without  stopping  his  bicycle  before  reaching  the  cross- 
ing, look  carefully  up  and  down  the  track,  and  if  they  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff's  intestate  did  not  stop  when 
in  view  of  the  track  and  listen  and  look  in  both  directions,  then 
the  jury  are  instructed  that  he  was  guilty  of  contributory  neg- 
ligence, and  cannot  recover  in  this  action,  though  the  jury  may 

59  Chicago    &    N.    W.    R.    Co.    v.          ei  Kennedy  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J 

'Dunleavy,  129  111.  150,  22  N.  E.  15.  R.  Co.  105  Mo.  273,  15  S.  W.  983,  16 

GO  Kennedy  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  S.  W.  837;  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

R.  Co.  105  Mo.  273,  15  S.  W.  983,  16  v.  Dunleavy,  129  111.   150,  22  N.   E. 

S.  W.  837.  15. 


655  PERSON    NOT    TRESPASSER.  §    637 

believe  that  the  defendant  may  have,  also,  been  guilty  of  negli- 
gence.62 

(5)  The  presence   of  railroad  tracks   is   a     proclamation   of 
danger    to    any    one    attempting    to    cross    them,    and    that    it 
is  not  only  the  duty  of  the  person  about  to  cross  railroad  tracks 
to  vigilantly  use  his  eyes  and  ears  and  to  look  in  every  direc- 
tion, and  to  listen  to  make  sure  that  the  crossing  is  safe,  and  that 
this  duty  is  not  performed  by  plaintiff's  looking  from  a  point 
where  the  view  is  obstructed,  but  the  duty  is  a  continuous  one, 
and  must  be  performed  at  any  point,  and  if  the  plaintiff  fails 
to  perform  this  duty,  and  by  performing  it  might  have  seen 
the  danger  in  time  to  avoid  it,  such  failure  is  contributory  neg- 
ligence on  the  plaintiff's  part,  and  she  cannot  recover,  notwith- 
standing the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  de- 
fendant  is    also    guilty   of   negligence,   unless   the    defendant's 
agents  might,  after  perceiving  the  negligence  of  the  plaintiff, 
have  stopped  the  engine  in  time  to  avert  the  accident.63 

(6)  It  is  not  sufficient  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  recover,  if  it  ap- 
pears that  he  stopped  at  a  distance  of  two  hundred  feet  from  the 
crossing,  and  being  then  unable,  on  account  of  a  snow  squall, 
to  see  the  train  which  he  had  heard  whistle,  started  his  horses 
and  drove  at  a  trot  onto  the  track,  without  again  looking  for 
the  train.    If,  under  such  circumstances,  he  drove  onto  the  track 
and   injury   ensued,   he'  was   guilty   of   contributory  negligence 
and  cannot  recover,  even  though  the  jury  find  that  the  defend- 
ant was  also  negligent  in  not  giving  proper  signals  for  the  cross- 
ing.64 

§  637.  The  plaintiff  not  a  trespasser. — (1)  If  you  shall  find 
that  the  defendant  company  and  another  company  were  each 
rightfully  in  the  joint  use  and  occupation  of  the  transfer  track, 
and  the  father  of  the  plaintiff  then  in  -the  employment  of  the 
other  company,  duly  authorized,  was  engaged  in  repairing  a  car 
upon  the  track;  that  the  plaintiff  brought  to  him  his  dinner, 
and  that  while  engaged  in  repairing  said  car,  shortly  there-, 
after,  the  father  requested  the  plaintiff  child  to  render  him 

es  Kimball  v.  Friend,  95  Va.  132,         64  Grand    T.    R.    Co.   v.    Cobleigh, 
27    S.    E.    901.  78    Fed.    786. 

es  Atlantic  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Iron- 
monger, 95  Va.  628,  29  S.  E.  319. 
See,  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hatch, 
79  111.  137. 


§    637  NEGLIGENCE  OF   RAILROADS.  656 

necessary  temporary  assistance  to  enable  him,  the  said  father, 
to  perform  the  work  of  repairing  the  car,  if  he  was  thus 
authorized  to  employ  the  plaintiff,  then  the  plaintiff  was  right- 
fully upon  the  track.00 

(2)  The  jury  are  the  triers  of  the  fact  as  to  whether  or  not  D 
was  a  licensee  on  the  defendant 's  right  of  way.  If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  deceased  D,  when  he  received  his  in- 
juries was  traveling  along  the  foot  path  or  way  over  defendant's 
land,  which  had  been  long  used  as  a  walkway  leading  to  a  cross- 
ing over  defendant's  track  by  himself  and  certain  other  individ- 
uals, occupants  of  an  adjoining  lot  or  close,  or  by  the  general 
public,  with  the  knowledge  of  the  defendant  company  and  with- 
out any  objection  on  its  part,  then  the  jury  must  find  that  said 
D  was  not  a  trespasser  while  traveling  said  path,  but  that  he  was 
a  licensee  and  not  wrongfully  traveling  said  path.66 

(3)  If  the   jury  believe   from   the   evidence   that   the   plain- 
tiff's husband  and  others  were  in  the  habit  of  using  the  track 
of  defendant's  railway  next  to  the  M  river,  and  on  which  plain- 
tiff's husband  was  at  the  time  he  was  killed,  in  towing  said 
boat  up  the  river,  and  had  been  in  the  habit  of  doing  so,  con- 
tinually,  for  a  long  time  prior  to  the   day  in   question,  with- 
out objection  or  protest  on  the  part  of  defendant  or  under  such 
circumstances,  when  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  it  might 
have  been  known  that  they  were  using  said  track ;  and  that  from 
the  nature  of  the  ground  rising  between  said  track  and  the  M 
river,  there  was  no  other  place  where  those  towing  boats  up  the 
river  could  reasonably  be  expected  to  go,  then  the  court  instructs 
the  jury  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  a  trespasser  in  being  upon 
said  track  at  the  time  he  was  run  against  and  killed.67 

(4)  Although  the  defendant  varied  from  the  usual  manner  of 
using  the  track  in  question,  yet  if  the  plaintiff  was  not  there  as 
an  employe  of  the  company,  but  was  there  wrongfully,  he  cannot 
complain  of  the  negligence  of  the  company,  unless  the  defend- 
ant's agents  knew  that  he  was  there,  and  willfully  injured  him.68 

05  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Gallaghei,  «T  Le  May  v.  Missouri,  &c.  R.  Co. 

40  Ohio  St.  637.  105  Mo.  368,  16  S.  W.  1049. 

OB  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  De  GS  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Gallagher, 

Board,  91  Va.  702,  22  S.  E.  514.  40  Ohio  St.  637. 


S57  JURY   DETERMINE   NEGLIGENCE.  §   638 

§  638.  Question  of  negligence  submitted  to  the  jury. — (1)  It 
was  the  duty  of  the  defendant's  switching  crew  to  exercise  ordi- 
nary care  in  so  doing  their  work  as  to  avoid  injuring  the  plain- 
tiff while  running  his  engine  upon  the  defendant's  track,  and  if 
the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  the  engine  which  struck 
and  collided  with  plaintiff's  engine  at  the  crossing  was  not 
managed  and  controlled  with  ordinary  care  by  the  defendant's 
crew  in  charge  of  the  same,  and  the  plaintiff's  injury  was  the 
direct  result  of  the  negligence  of  such  crew  in  managing  and 
controlling  said  colliding  engine  while  he  was  in  the  exercise 
of  ordinary  care  for  his  own  safety,  the  defendant  is  liable  and 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  verdict.69 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  that  on  or  about  the  thirteenth  day  of 
August,  1884.  the  plaintiff  was  injured  by  the  locomotive  or  cars 
of  the  defendant  while  operated  by  its  agents  on  its  road  and 
that  such  injury  resulted  directly  from  the  want  of  ordinary  care 
and  prudence  of  the  agents  of  the  defendant  and  not  from  the 
want  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff 
directly  contributing  to  the  injury,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  recover.70 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 
while  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  was  injured  by  or  in  con- 
sequence of  the  negligence  of  the  defendant,  as  charged  in  the 
declaration  or  either  one  of  the  counts  thereof,  then  you  should 
find  the  defendant  guilty.71 

(4)  If  in  this  case  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff,  while  using  such  reasonable  care  for  his  own  safety, 
was  injured  in  the  manner  as  charged  in  the  declaration  and 
that  such  injury  was  occasioned  by  the  negligence  of  the  defend- 
ant or  of  its  agents  in  charge  of  the  train  of  cars  mentioned  in 
the  evidence,  and  as  charged  in  the  declaration,  then  the  jury 
should  find  the  defendant  guilty.72 

(5)  If  the  plaintiff  did  not  receive  the  injuries  complained  of, 
by  any  contributory  act  of  negligence  or  fault  of  her  own,  but 
was  injured  at  the  time  complained  of  by  the  carelessness  and 
negligence  or  fault  of  the  defendant's  servants,  or  one  of  them, 

69  St.  Louis  N.  S.  Yards  v.  God-  141  111.  624,  31  N.  E.  406. 

frey,  198  111.  295,  65  N.  E.  90.  72  Chicago  &  A.   R.   Co.  v.   Gore, 

TO  Philadelphia,   W.    &  B.   R.   Co.  202  111.  188,  66  N.  E.  1063.     Held  not 

v.  Hogeland,  66  Md.  150,  7  Atl.  105.  assuming  negligence. 

71  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher, 


§    639  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  G58 

committed  in  the  general  scope  of  employment  as  such  servant 
or  servants  the  defendant  is  liable  for  such  damages  as  she  may 
have  sustained  by  the  injuries  thus  received.73 

§  639.    Question  of  contributory  negligence  for  jury. — (1)     If 

you  should  believe  that  the  plaintiff  might  have  avoided  the  acci- 
dent by  driving  directly  across  the  track  instead  of  undertaking 
•to  turn,  he  would  not  necessarily  be  guilty  of  contributory  neg- 
ligence in  that  respect,  provided  you  find  that  an  ordinarily 
careful  and  prudent  man,  under  the  excitement  and  particular 
circumstances  surrounding  the  plaintiff  at  the  time,  might  have 
adopted  the  course  pursued  by  him.  His  conduct  in  that  regard 
is  not  necessarily  to  be  judged  by  the  facts  as  they  now  appear 
before  the  jury,  as  the  same  are  subjected  to  the  cool,  calm 
consideration  that  you  will  be  able  to  give  them  in  the  light 
of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  as  they  are  now  made  to  ap- 
pear, but  he  is  entitled  to  have  them  considered  as  they  appeared 
to  him  at  the  time;  and,  if  an  ordinarily  careful  and  prudent 
man  might  have  acted  as  the  plaintiff  acted,  with  his  view  of  the 
circumstances  as  they  then  appeared  to  him,  you  will  be  justi- 
fied in  finding  that  he  was  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence 
by  turning  back,  rather  than  by  going  directly  across  the  track.74 

(2)  If  the   jury  find   from    the   evidence   that  the   car   was 
running  at  a  moderate  rate  of  speed,  and  that  the  bell  or  gong 
had   been  sounded,   and  that  the  plaintiff  suddenly  and   with- 
out warning,  and  under  circumstances  which  were  ijot  reason- 
ably to  be  expected,  drove  upon  or  attempted  to  cross  the  track 
of  the  defendant  in  close  proximity  to  the  car  of  the  defendant, 
and  at  a  time  when  it  was  not  prudent  to  do  so ;  then,  and  in  that 
event,  the  plaintiff  would  not  be  exercising  ordinary  care  and 
prudence.75 

(3)  If  you  shall  find  that  the  defendant  was  operating  its  car 
at  a  high  rate  of  speed,  yet,  if  you  shall  further  find  that  the 
plaintiff  T,  by  his  negligence  and  want  of  ordinary  care  contrib- 
uted to  the  accident  in  any  appreciable  degree,  your  finding  must 
be  for  the  defendant.76 

73  Louisville  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.         "  Traver   v.   Spokane   St.   R.   Co. 
Wood,   113   Ind.    562,   14  N.   E.    572,      25  Wash.  242,  68  Pac.  284. 

16  N.  E.  197.  76  Traver   v.   Spokane  St.   R.   Co. 

74  Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  R.  Co.  25      25  Wash.  242,  68  Pac.  284. 
Wash.  241,  65  Pac.  284. 


659  JURY   DETERMINE   CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  §    639 

(4)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  ac- 
cident complained  of  was  in  any  degree  owing  to  the  want  of  due 
care  and  caution  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  directly  contributing 
to  said  accident,  then  their  verdict  must  be  for  defendant.77 

(5)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  accident  com- 
plained of  was  caused  by  the  want  of  ordinary  care  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant  in  the  running  of  its  cars,  and  shall  also  find 
that  the  want  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  on  the  part  of  the 
plaintiff,  directly  contributed  thereto,  then  the  plaintiffs  are  not 
entitled  to  recover.78 

(6)  If  you  find  from  all  the  evidence  before  you  that  the 
accident  complained  of  was  in  any  degree  owing  to  the  want  of 
due  care  and  caution,  that  is,  ordinary  care  and  prudence,  on  the 
part  of  the  plaintiff,  directly  contributing  thereto,  then  the  plain- 
tiff cannot  recover  and  your  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendant-79 

(7)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  know- 
ing the  position  of  the  railroad  track  and  that  trains  were  run- 
ning frequently  thereon,  approached  the  crossing,  without  look- 
ing in  the  direction  from  which  the  train  was  coming — and  with- 
out stopping  his  team  to   listen  for  an  approaching  train — so 
quickly  that  he  was  unable  to  stop  his  horses  before  going  upon 
the  track,  and  in  consequence  thereof  the  collision  occurred,  the 
plaintiff  cannot  recover  in  this  action.80 

(8)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was 
well  acquainted  with  the  crossing  and  the  road  leading  thereto, 
and  further  believe  that  at  the  point  twenty-six  feet  from  the 
crossing  he  could  have  have  stopped  his  team,  and  from  that  point, 
if  he  had  looked,  could  have  seen  the  train  approaching,  and  thus 
have  averted  the  accident,  the  verdict  must  be  for  defendant.81 

(9)  It  was  the  duty  of  plaintiff,  while  approaching  said  rail- 
road track  and  before  driving  upon  the  same,  to  use  his  eyes  and 
ears,  to  look  and  listen  for  an  approaching  train ;  and  if  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  if  he  had  so  looked 
and  listened,  could  have  thereby  seen  or  heard  the  train  in  time 
to  have  avoided  collision  with  it  and  and  the  injuries  complained 

77  Philadelphia,  W.   &   B.   R.   Co.  Baltimore  &  O.   R.   Co.   v.   Owings, 
v.  Anderson,  72  Md.  521,  20  Atl.  2.  65  Md.  505,  5  Atl.  329. 

78  Baltimore     &     O.     R.     Co.     v.  so  Raines  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 
Owings,  65  Md.  505,  5  Atl.  329.  41  Iowa,  231. 

79  Philadelphia,   W.    &   B.   R.   Co.  S1  Kennedy  v.   Hannibal  &  St.  J. 
v.  Anderson,  72  Md.  521,  20  Atl.  2;  R.  Co.  105  Mo.  274,  15  S.  W.  983,  16 

S.  W.  837. 


§    640  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  660 

of,  then  your  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendant,  notwithstanding 
the  jury  may  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  defendant's 
servants  failed  to  give  signals  by  bell  or  whistle  of  the  tram's 
approach.62 

(10)  If  by  reason  of  any  miscalculation  of  the  plaintiff  as 
to  the  proximity  of  a  train,  he  concluded  to  drive  upon  the 
crossing  without  further  efforts  to  ascertain  certainly  whether 
he  could  safely  do  so,  the  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendant.83 

(11)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  ladders  on 
freight  cars  are  placed  there  for  the  use  of  the  brakemen,  in  the 
discharge  of  their  duties,  then  it  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to 
have  noticed  any  visible  defect  in  the  ladder  and  to  have  report- 
ed it  to  the  company;  and,  therefore,  if  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence,  that  there  was  a  defect  in  the  round  of  the  ladder 
and  that  it  was  a  visible  defect,  and  if  the  jury  further  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  did  not  report  the  defect 
to  the  company,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  on  account  of 
such  defect.84 

(12)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  any  element 
of  danger  connected  with  the  defendant's  trailer  by  which  the 
plaintiff  was  injured  was  not  a  hidden   or  concealed   danger, 
but  was  open  to  the  observation  and  could  be  comprehended 
by  a  boy  of  average  intelligence,  of  the  age  of  the  plaintiff; 
and  if  you  further  believe  that  the  trailer,  when  left  on  the 
track    by  the  defendant's    employes  the   day  of   the    accident, 
was  held  by  brakes  of  the  ordinary  kind,  and  that  the  brakes 
were  set  in  a  manner  to  hold  the  cars  where  they  were  unless 
some  one  should  loosen  the  brakes  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.88 

§  640.  Speed  of  trains — Running  at  high  rate. — (1)  If  you 
shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defandant's  servants  in 
charge  of  the  train  that  killed  B,  gave  signals  by  whistling  once 
and  no  more  at  such  distance  if  it  exceeded  one  hundred  rods  from 
-  street,  that  said  B  would  naturally  think  that  he  could 
safely  cross  the  track  before  the  train  arrived  at  said  street, 

82  Kennedy  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  84  Toledo,    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Ingra- 

R.  Co.  105  Mo.  274,  15  S.  W.  983,  16  ham,  77  111.  313. 

S.  W.  837.  so  George  v.   Los  Angeles  R.   Co. 

sa  Kennedy  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  126  Cal.  357,  46  L.  R.  A.  829,  58  Pac. 

R.  Co.  105  Mo.  274,  15  S.  W.  983,  16  819. 
S.   W.   837. 


661  SPEED  OF  TRAIN,  HIGH  RATE.  §  640 

if  he  heard  such  whistle,  and  that  he  did  hear  it,  and  should 
further  find  that  no  bell  was  rung,  and  that  said  train  was 
going  at  a  greater  rate  of  speed  than  men  of  ordinary  care  and 
prudence  in  like  employment  would  have  run  it,  under  like 
circumstances  and  conditions,  and  that  said  B,  as  a  reasonable 
man,  was  thereby  deceived  and  led  to  believe  that  he  could  cross 
the  tracks  of  the  defendant's  railroad  in  safety,  and  that  if  at- 
tempting under  these  circumstances  to  cross  said  tracks  without 
fault  or  negligence  on  his  part,  he  was,  on  account  of  careless- 
ness upon  the  part  of  the  servants  of  the  defendant  in  operating 
said  train  at  an  unusual  and  dangerous  rate  of  speed,  struck 
and  killed,  then  the  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  recover  i± 
such  carelessness  was  the  sole  cause  of  his  injuries.80 

(2)  If  said  train  was  being  run  by  the  employes  of  the  defend- 
ant at  a  high  and  dangerous  rate  of  speed,  such  speed  being  so 
high  and  dangerous  as  to  become  a  negligent  management  of  the 
train,  and  that  such  accident  resulted  in  consequence  thereof, 
then  the  jury  will  find  the  issues  for  the  plaintiff.87 

(3)  The  jury  are  instructed  that  railway  companies  are  permit- 
ted by  law  to  run  their  passenger  trains  at  such  high  rate  of 
speed  as,  under  all  the  surrounding  circumstances  and  conditions 
of  track,  etc.,  shall  comport  with  the  rule  of  law  which  requires 
them  to  exercise  a  high  degree  of  care  for  the  safety  of  passen- 
gers, and  whether  a  given  rate  of  speed  is  dangerous  or  not  is 
to  be  determined  by  the  surrounding  circumstances,  such  as  con- 
dition of  the  track,  fencing  of  right  of  way,  the  management  of 
the  train,  as  shown  by  the  evidence,  and  it  must  be  such  degree 
of  danger  as  is  not  ordinarily  incident  to  railway  travel.88 

(4)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  accident  by 
which  the  plaintiff  sustained  the  injuries  complained  of  was  the 
result  of  the  fast  running  of  the  train,  and  that  the  train  was  so 
running  against  the  orders  of  defendant's  superior  officers  and 
against  the  regulations  made  in  that  respect  by  defendant,  then 

86  Schweinfurth   v.    Cleveland,    C.  rate  of  speed  for  a  passenger  train 
C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  60  Ohio  St.  225,  was  a  dangerous  and  negligent  rate, 
54  N.  E.  89.  rendering  the  defendant  liable. 

87  Indianapolis,   B.   &  W.   R.    Co.  S8  Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
v.  Hall ,  106  111.  371,  374.  Held  prop-  Hall,  106  111.  371,  375. 

er  and  not  stating  that  a  given  high 


§  641  ':NEGLIGEXCE  OF  RAILROADS.  662 

in  that  event  the  plaintiff  will  not  be  entitled  to  recover  more 
than  his  actual  damages  in  this  suit.89 

(5)  Though  a  railroad  company  and  the  public  have  equal 
rights  at  the  intersection  of  the  track  of  the  former  with  a  public 
highway,  those  operating  a  train  upon  the  railroad  are  under  no 
obligation  to  slacken  the  speed  of  such  train,  or  to  bring  the 
same  to  a  stop,  when  they  notice  a  person  crossing  or  about  to 
cross  the  track  at  its  intersection  with  the  highway;  but  they 
may   presume   that   such   person   will   himself   take   all   proper 
precautions  to  avoid  injury.90 

(6)  If  a  person  be  seen  upon  the  track  of  defendant's  electric 
street  railway,  who  is  apparently  capable  of  taking  care  of  him- 
self, the  motorman  may  assume  that  such  person  will  leave  the 
track  before  the  car  reaches  him;  and  this  presumption  may  be 
indulged  in  so  long  as  the  danger  of  injuring  him  does  not  become 
imminent ;  and  it  is  not  necessary  for  a  motorman  to  slacken  the 
speed  of  the  car  until  such  danger  becomes  imminent.91 

(7)  If  the  plaintiff,  T,  was  not  in  imminent  peril  at  the  time 
he  drove  upon  the  track  or  attempted  to  cross  the  track  of  the 
defendant,  the  motorman  had  a  right  to  presume  that  he  would 
pass  on,  over  and  off  the  track,  out  of  the  way ;  and  the  motorman 
was  not  guilty  of  negligence  in  failing  to  stop  the  car,  in  either 
of  the  events  just  mentioned,  until  the  peril  of  the  plaintiff  be- 
came imminent.92 

§  641.  Failure  to  sound  whistle  or  ring  bell. — (1)  It  was  the 
duty  of  the  engineer  or  those  in  charge  of  the  train,  on  approach- 
ing a  highway,  to  sound  the  whistle  on  the  engine  at  least  eighty 
rods  before  reaching  said  crossing,  and  if  they  failed  to  do  so 
and  an  accident  and  injury  occurred  therefrom,  this  would  be 
negligence  on  the  part  of  said  railway  company;  and  if  you 
believe  from  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant by  its  employes  running  the  train  from  which  said  accident 
occurred,  failed  to  sound  said  whistle,  and  by  reason  of  such 
failure  said  accident  occurred  without  negligence  on  the  part  of 

8»  Texas  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  75  »i  Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  R.  Co. 

Tex.  161,  12  S.  W.  482.  25  Wash.  244,  65  Pac.  284. 

90  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker,  02  Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  R.  Co.  25 

113  Ind.  201,  15  N.  E.  234.  Wash.  244,  65  Pac.  284. 


663  SOUNDING   WHISTLE,    RINGING    BELL.  §    641 

the  plaintiff,  then  in  that  case,  you  should  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff.93 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
started  a  train  in  the  city  of  Peoria  without  ringing  a  bell  or 
sounding  a  whistle,  and  if  they  further  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence, that  Fred  Clark  was  attempting  to  cross  the  defendant's 
track  on  which  said  train  was  started,  and  that  by  reason  of 
there  being  no  bell  rung  or  whistle  sounded,  such  train  or  car 
of  that  train  struck  him  while  so  attempting  to  cross  said  track, 
then  the  defendant  was  guilty  of  culpable  negligence;  and  if 
you  further  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  death  of  said 
Clark  was  the  result  of  such  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant, and  that  said  Clark  was  not  guilty  of  negligence  con- 
tributing  to   the   injury,   then   you  should  find  the'  defendant 
guilty.94 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  agents  or  serv- 
ants   of   the    defendant   in    charge    of   the    engine   in ,  question 
failed  to  ring  a  bell  or  sound  a  whistle,   continuously,   for  a 
distance  of  eighty  rods,  before  reaching  the  crossing,  and  that 
James  Molohan  and  Mary  Molohan,  while  attempting  to   pass 
over  the  railroad  track  at  said   crossing,   were   exercising   due 
care  and  caution  for  their  own  safety,   and  were  struck  and 
killed  at  said  crossing  by  an   engine  then  in   charge   of   such 
agents  or  servants,  and  that  such  killing  was  the  direct  con- 
sequence or  result  of  the  failure  of  said  agents  or  servants  to 
so  ring  a  bell  or  sound  a  whistle,  then  the  jury  should  find  for  the 
plaintiff.95 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  F  approached 
the  crossing  where  he  met  his  death,  as  an  ordinarily  prudent 
man  would  do,  traveling  as  he  was  on  a  bicycle,  and  that  the 
electric   gong   did  not  sound  to  warn  him  of  the  approaching 
engine  when  he  was  about  to  cross,  and  that  if  said  electric 
gong  had  sounded,  it  would  have  warned  him  of  the  approach- 
ing engine  in  time  to  escape,  and  that  no  other  sufficient  warning 

»3  Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  9*  Peoria  &  P.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Clay- 
Martin,  82  Ind.  482.  Statutory  pro-  berg,  107  111.  644,  650.  Held  not 
visions  exist  requiring  the  bell  to  singling  out  facts  and  not  objec- 
be  rung  or  whistle  to  be  blown  as  a  tionable  as  to  the  word  "culpable.  ' 
warning  of  the  approach  of  a  train  95  McNulta  v.  Lockbridge,  137  111. 
of  cars  at  any  crossing.  274,  27  N.  E.  452. 


§    641  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  664 

of  the  approaching  engine  was  given,  and  that  the  embankments 
were  such  as  to  prevent  his  seeing  the  engine  in  time  to  escape, 
and  he  lost  his  life  thereby,  and  that  he  listened  for  the  approach 
of  the  train,  and  failed  to  hear,  they  must  find  for  the  plaintiff.90 

(5)  The  failure  to  ring  the  bell  or  give  other  warning  of  the  ap- 
proach of  the  train  to  the  crossing,  if  such  failure  there  was,  does 
not  in  itself  constitute  negligence  and  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  re- 
cover; but  such  circumstances  can  only  be  considered  by  you  in 
connection  with  others  as  tending  to  prove  negligence  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant  company.97 

(6)  The  statute  requiring  the  bell  to  be  rung,  or  the  whistle 
to  be  blown  at  crossings,  is  intended  for  the  protection  of  those 
passing  over  the  track  at  such  crossings,  and  not  for  those  using 
the  track  elsewhere;  and  said  statute  is  complied  with,  when 
either  the  bell  is  rung  or  the  whistle  blown.98 

(7)  It  is  made  the  duty,  by  law  of  railroad  companies,  to 
cause  the  bell  on  their  trains  to  be  rung  and  the  steam  whistle 
to  be  blown  when  approaching   a  public   crossing.     If  in  this 
case    you    find    that    the    engineer    or    fireman    complained    of 
sounded  the  whistle  or  rang  the  bell,  or  did  both  as  signals 
that  the  train  was  about  to  back  toward  a  street  or  other  public 
crossing,  and  said  noise  gave  fright  to  the  plaintiff's  team  and 
caused  him  to  be  injured,  the  fact  that  said  noise  frightened 
the  team  would  not  render  defendant  liable  for  the  injury,  un- 
less such  engineer  or  fireman  saw  and  realized,  or  had  to  reason  to 
know  that  such  noise  would  cause  fright  to  the  team  and  result 
probably  in  injury.99 

(8)  The  defendant  railroad  company  is  not  bound  to  whistle 
or  ring  the  engine  bell  when  approaching  a  private  or  farm 
crossing;   and,   further,  that  said   defendant  railroad   company 
may  regulate  the  speed  of  trains  approaching  private  crossings 
as  it  may  desire  by  its  own  regulations;  but,  nevertheless,  the 
jury  are  instructed  that  said  defendant  railroad  company,  know- 
ing that  said  private  crossings  are  likely  to  be  used  by  persons 

so  Kimball  v.  Friend,  95  Va.  128,  St.  R.  Co.  41  W.  Va.  415,  23  S. 

27  S.  E.  901.  E.  593. 

97  Geist  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R,  Co.  62  99  Hargis  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R. 

Neb.  322,  87  N.  W.  43.  Co.  75  Tex.  20,  12  S.  W.  953. 

»8  Davidson    v.    Pittsburg,    C.    C. 


665  BLOWING   WHISTLE   WRONGFULLY — FLAGMAN.  §   642 

passing  over  and  upon  the  railroad  track,  are  bound,  when  ap- 
proaching said  crossings,  to  keep  a  proper  lookout,  and  to  use 
all  reasonable  precautions  when  approaching  said  private  or  farm 
crossing,  to  prevent  injury  to  any  one  on  or  approaching  said 

crossings.100 

§  642.  Wrongfully  blpwing  whistle.— (1)  If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff,  on  the  day  and  at  the  place 
in  question,  and  immediately  before  and  at  the  time  of  the  acci- 
dent in  question,  was  in  the  exercise  of  the  care  and  caution 
for  his  own  safety,  which  a  reasonably  prudent  and  careful  man 
under  the  same  circumstances,  would  have  exercised;  and  if  the 
jury  further  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  engineer  or 
fireman  of  the  engine  in  question  saw  the  plaintiff's  position 
at  the  head  of  his  team  within  thirty  feet  of  the  track  over 
which  said  engine  was  then  passing,  and  then  negligently  or 
wantonly  caused  the  whistle  of  said  engine  to  be  sounded  in  a 
short,  sharp,  shrill  and  unusual  manner,  and  the  steam  to  escape 
from  said  engine  in  a  reckless  or  negligent  manner;  and  if  the 
jury  further  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  sounding  of 
said  whistle,  as  aforesaid,  or  escaping  of  said  steam,  as  afore- 
said, frightened  the  team  of  the  plaintiff  so  that  said  team 
thereupon  ran  away  and  injured  the  plaintiff,  then  the  plaintiff 
should  recover.101 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  received 
physical  injuries,  such  as  are  alleged  in  the  petition,  by  reason 
of  his  team  becoming  frightened  and  throwing  him  to  the  ground 
or  by  dragging  him,  and  you  further  find  that  said  team  be- 
came frightened  by  reason  of  the  noise  made  by  the  employes 
of  defendant  in  blowing  the  whistle  or  ringing  the  bell,  or  caus- 
ing steam  to  escape  from  an  engine  of  defendant  in  their  charge ; 
and  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  said  employe  or  employes 
of  defendant  caused  such  noise  for  the  purpose  and  with  the 
intention  of  frightening  said  team,  or  knowing  or  having  reason 
to  believe  that  such  noise  would  frighten  said  team,  then  plain- 
tiff would  be  entitled  to  recover  such  sum  as  actual  damages  as 

100  Morgan  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  159         101  Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    v. 
Mo.   271,  60  S.  W.  195.  Yorty,  158  111.  323,  42  N.  E.  64. 


§    643  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  666 

the  evidence  may  show  him  entitled  to  under  the  instructions 
hereinafter  given.102 

(3)  If,  however,  you  do  not  find  that  said  employe  or  em- 
ployes made  said  noise  with  the  intent  to  frighten  plaintiff's 
team,  and  you  do  not  find  that  they  knew  or  had  reason  to  believe 
that  said  noise  would  frighten  said  team  and  probably  cause  in- 
jury to  the  plaintiff  or  others  in  said  wagon,  then  you  will  find 
for  defendant.103 

(4)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  drove  his  team 
across  the  defendant's  railroad  at  a  public  crossing,  and  that  an 
engine  of  defendant  was  standing  near  such  crossing,  and  you  fur- 
ther find  that  plaintiff's  team  was  afraid  of  such  engine  and  be- 
came frightened  in  crossing  in  front  of  said  engine ;  and  after 
crossing  said  railroad  plaintiff  voluntarily  stopped  his  team  and 
wagon,  and  said  team  became  quiet,  and  the  engineer  or  other 
employe  then  bl&w  the  whistle  and  rang  the  bell  as  signals  to 
move  such  engine,  believing  from  plaintiff's  act  in  stopping  his 
team  that  no  injury  would  arise  from  such  signals  or  necessary 
escaping   steam,   and   plaintiff's   team   took   fright   and  injured 
him,  then  defendant  would  not  be  liable.104 

§  643.  Flagman  at  crossing — Necessity. — (1)  There  was  no 
absolute  duty  imposed  by  law  on  the  defendant  to  maintain  either 
gates  or  a  flagman  at  the  crossing  in  question,  and  if  you  believe, 
from  the  evidence,  that  there  were  no  gates  or  flagman  there 
at  the  time  of  the  alleged  injury,  that  is  not  of  itself  evidence 
of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant.  The  plaintiff  does 
not  allege  or  claim  any  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant 
in  regard  to  this.  Evidence  as  to  whether  there  were  gates 
or  a  flagman  at  the  crossing  in  question  at  the  time  of  the 
alleged  injury  was  admitted  by  the  court,  and  should  be  con- 
sidered by  the  jury,  not  as  tending,  of  itself,  to  establish  negli- 
gence, but  solely  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  general  con- 
dition of  things  at  the  locality  of  said  crossing  at  the  time  of  the 
alleged  injury,  so  as  to  assist  the  jury  to  determine,  from  all 
the  evidence  and  circumstances  in  the  case,  and  under  the 

102  Hargis  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R.  103  Hargis   v.    St.    Louis,   A.   &   T. 

Co.  75  Tex.  20    12  S.  W.  953.     See  R.  Co.  75  Tex.  20,  12  S.  W.  953. 

also,  Indianapolis  Union  R.   Co.   v.  ™*  Hargis  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R. 

Boettcher,  131  Ind.  82,  28  N.  E.  551.  Co.  75  Tex.  21,  12  S.  W.  953. 


667  RAILROADS   VIOLATING    ORDINANCES.  §    644 

instructions  of  the  court,  whether  the  defendant  was  guilty  of 
negligence,  as  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration.105 

(2)  The  defendant  was  not  required  by  law  to  station  a  flaghian 
at  the  road  crossing,  near  which  the  accident  complained  of  is  tes- 
tified to  have  occurred;  and  the  jury  cannot  infer  negligence  on 
the  part  of  the  defendant,  because  the  defendant  did  not  keep  a 
watchman  or  flagman  at  or  near  said  crossing,  or  because  said 
defendant  did  not  have  any  person  at  or  near  the  place  of  said 
accident,  to  warn  persons  of  danger  in  attempting  to  cross  the 
railroad  track  at  that  place,  or  to  prevent  them  from  attempting 
to  cross  at  said  point.100 

(3)  Although  you  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  it  was 
necessary  to  have  a  flagman  at  N  and  W  streets,  and  that  a  flag- 
man was  so  kept  to  notify  or  signal  for  cars  to  cross  or  to  stop, 
still,  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  car  stopped  south  of 
N  street,  and  while  it  was  so  stopped  plaintiff  started  to  alight 
from  said  car,  and  the  conductor  saw  her  attempting  to  alight 
while  said  car  was  stopped,  it  was  his  duty  to  cause  said  car  to 
remain  standing  until  plaintiff  had  a  reasonable  time  to  alight, 
notwithstanding  the  flagman  may  have  signaled  for  the  car  to 
cross.107 

§  644.  Railroad  company  violating  ordinances. — (1)  If  you 
find  from  the  evidence  that  the  view  of  the  approaching  train  was 
obstructed  by  buildings,  trees  and  cars  on  the  defendant's  rail- 
road at  such  crossing,  to  a  traveler  on  such  street  from  the 
north,  and  at  the  time  of  the  injury  a  valid  ordinance  of  the 
city  of  Warsaw  was  in  force  limiting  the  rate  of  speed  of 
defendant's  trains  to  five  miles  an  hour  in  said  city,  and  that  the 
train  which  injured  the  plaintiff  was,  at  the  time  of  the  injury, 
running  at  the  rate  of  ten  or  fifteen  miles  an  hour,  then  the 
defendant  was  guilty  of  negligence.  And  if  you  find  from^the 
evidence  that  such  negligence  produced  the  plaintiff's  injury, 
without  any  negligence  on  his  part  contributing  to  the  injury, 
then  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  plaintiff.105 

105  New  York.  C    &  St.  L.  R.  Co.         107  Jackson  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co. 
v.    Luebeck,    157    111.    595,    602,    41      118  Mo.  212,  24  S.  W.  192. 

N.  E.  897;   Chicago  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.         ios  Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Horton, 
Lane,  130  Til.  116.  123.  22  N.  E.  513.      132  Ind.  193,  31  N.  E.  45. 

106  Baltimore     &     O.     R.     Co.     v. 
Owings,   65  Md.   505,   5   Atl.   329. 


§    644  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  668 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  an  ordinance  of  the 
city  of  L  required  the  defendant,  when  moving  any  car,  cars  or  lo- 
comotives propelled  by  steam  power  within  the  limits  of  the  city/ 
to  cause  the  bell  of  the  engine  to  be  constantly  sounded,  and  when 
backing  any  freight  car,  cars  or  locomotive  propelled  by  steam 
power  near  the  city  limits  to  have  a  man  stationed  on  the  top  of 
the  car  at  the  end  of  the  train  farthest  from  the  engine  to  give 
danger  signals,  and  further  required  that  no  freight  train  should 
at  any  time  to  be  moved  within  city  limits  without  being  well 
manned  with  experienced  brakemen  at  their  posts,  so  stationed  as 
to  see  the  danger  signals  and  to  hear  the  signals  from  the  engine, 
then  any  neglect  or  failure  by  the  defendant,  its  agents,  servants 
or  employes,  to  comply  with  any  or  all  of  the  above  require- 
ments, was  of  itself  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant; 
and  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that,  as  a  rsult  of  such 
negligence  or  failure  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  its  agents, 
servants  or  employes,  the  plaintiff  was  injured,  you  will  give 
a  verdict  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  unless  you  ,also  believe  from 
the    evidence   that    plaintiff   wai   himself   guilty    of   negligence 
which  contributed  directly  to  cause  of  his  injuries.109 

(3)  If  the  defendant  was  engaged  in  the  business  of  transport- 
ing passengers  for  hire  from  one  point  to  another  within  the  city 
of  St.  L,  on  or  about  the  fifth  day  of  June,  1893,  then  by  the  ordi- 
nance read  in  evidence,  it  became  the  duty  of  the  gripman  in 
charge  of  the  gripcar  to  keep  a  vigilant  watch  for  persons  on  foot, 
especially  for  children,  either  on  its  track  or  moving  toward  it; 
and  on  the  first  appearance  of  danger  to  such  person  or  child, 
it  was  the  duty  of  the  gripman  to  stop  the  car  in  his  charge 
in  the    shortest    time    and    space    possible    under  the   circum- 
stances.110 

(4)  If  you  find  -that  the   car  which   struck  the   plaintiff's 
buggy  at  the  time  of  or  just  previous  to  the  collision  was  being 
run  at  a  greater  rate  of  speed  than  eight  miles  an  hour,  which 
is  the  limit  under  the  ordinance  of  the  city  of  S,  you  would  be 
justified  in  finding  the  defendant  guilty  of  negligence  in  run- 
ning the  car  at  such  rate  of  speed;  and,  if  you  further  find  that 
such  negligence   caused  the  injury  complained   of,  you  should 

109  Dahlstrom  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.         no  Hogan  v.  Citizens  R.  Co.  150 
&  S.  R.  Co.  108  Mo.  533,  Ib  S.  W.      Mo.  44,  51  S.  W.  473. 
919. 


669  FIRE    ESCAPING    AND    BURNING    PROPERTY.  •§    645 

find  for  the  plaintiff,  unless  he  was  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence.111 

§  645.  Fire  escaping  from  engine  and  burning  property. — (1) 
The  rule  for  the  measure  of  damages,  if  there  is  a  right  of 
recovering,  is  the  difference,  if  any,  between  the  fair  market 
value  of  the  land  burned  over,  belonging  to  the  plaintiff,  imme- 
diately before  the  fire,  and  its  fair  market  value  immediately 
afterwards.112 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  property 
of  the  plaintiff  was  burned  in  consequence  of  the  failure  of 
the   defendant   company  to  use   the  best   appliances   and  safe- 
guards, in  the  nature  of  ash-pans  &nd  spark  arresters  on  their 
engines,  and  such  as  are  generally  adopted  by  and  used  upon 
the  modern  leading  railroads  in  this  country,  the  defendants  are 
liable  for  any  loss  occasioned  by  any  such  omission.113 

(3)  If  from  the  evidence  the  jury  find  that  defendant's  engine 
set  out  the  fire  alleged,  and  also  that  the  same  engines  set  out  sev- 
eral successive  fires  on  the  same  trip,  and  on  the  same  day,  then 
the  fact  of  the  repeated  setting  out  of  such  fires  will  be  evidence 
tending  to  show  that  the  defendant's  engine  was  not  properly 
constructed  as  to  its  appliances  for  the  prevention  of  the  escape 
of  fire,  or  that  the  same  was  not  properly  used  at  the  time,  or  that 
it  was  not  in  repair,  and  as  such,  must  be  considered  by  you  in 
making  up  your  verdict,  and  in  determining  as  to  whether  or 
not  this  fire  occurred  through  the  fault  or  negligence  of  defendant 

or  its  employes!.114 

(4)  If  you  believe  that  the  plaintiff  allowed  hay  or  other 
rubbish  to   accumulate   on  or  about  his  property,  or  left  any 
cracks  or  openings  in  his  building  through  which  fire  from  a 
passing  locomotive   could  readily   communicate   to   the  hay  or 
other  inflammable  matter  inside  such  building,  and  that  the  fire 
was  first   communicated  to  the  scattered  hay  or  other  inflam- 
mable rubbish  so  left  exposed,  or  to  the  hay  or  other  inflammable 
matter  exposed  through  the  cracks  or  openings  of  the  buildings, 
and  you  further  believe  that  the  doing  or  permitting  these  things 

in  Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  R.  Co.  us  Kimball    &   F.    v.   Borden,    97 

25  Wash.  241,  65  Pac.  284.  Va.  478,  34  S.  E.  45. 

»2  Chicago,    I.    &    L.    R.    Co.    v.  114  Slossen  v.  Burlington,   &c.   I 

Brown,  157  Ind.  547,  60  N.  E.  346.  Co.  60  Iowa,  217,  14  N.  W.  244. 


§    646  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  670 

on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  were  what  an  ordinarily  prudent  man 
would  not  have  done  under  the  same  or  like  circumstances, 
then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  because  of  his  negli- 
gence'.115 

(5)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant's  engine   was   furnished   with   a   spark   arrester   and   other 
appliances  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  escape  of  fire  or 
sparks,  of  a  good  character,  and  such  as  was  in  general  use  at 
the  time  by  well  regulated  railroads  and  that  such  appliances 
were  in  good  condition  and  that  the  defendant  was  not  guilty  of 
negligence  in  operating  its  engine  and  train,  but  that  fire  never- 
theless escaped  and  fell  upon  the  plaintiff's  premises  and  set  it 
on  fire,  the  jury  ought  to  find  for  the  defendant.116 

(6)  The  court  charges  the  jury  that  if  they  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  one  of  the  defendant's  engines  threw  sparks  upon 
the  plaintiff's  shed,  or  directly  against  it,  and  that  the  sparks  so 
thrown  themselves  set  fire  to  the  shed  and  that  the  burning  shed 
communicated  the  fire  to  the  plaintiff's  other  property;  and  fur- 
ther that  such  engine  was  furnished  with  a  spark  arrester  and 
other  appliances  of  approved  character  to  prevent,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, throwing  sparks  and  was  properly  handled  by  the  engineer, 
and  that  such  spark  arrester  and  other  appliances  were  in  good 
condition,  then  they  ought  to  find  a  verdict  for  the  defendant.117 

§646.  Killing  stock  from  failure  to  fence  track.— (1)  The  first 
paragraph  of  the  plaintiff's  complaint  is  based  upon  a  statute  of 
the  state  which  requires  railroad  companies  operating  roads 
in  this  state  to  securely  fence  in  the  tracks  of  their  roads.  A 
railroad  company  operating  a  railroad  in  this  state  is  required 
to  securely  fence  in  its  track,  and  where  this  is  not  done,  the 
railroad  company  so  operating  the  road  is  liable  for  all  damages 
done  to  stock  by  its  locomotives  and  cars  while  being  operated 
upon  its  road  without  regard  to  the  question  whether  such  injury 
was  the  result  of  willful  misconduct  or  negligence,  or  the  result 
of  unavoidable  accident.118 

us  Atchison,    T.    &   S.    F.    R.    Co.          n?  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Sul- 
v.  Ayers,  56  Kas.  181,  42  Pac.  722.          livan  Timber  Co.  (Ala.),  35  So.  331. 

us  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Sul-          us  Louisville,  N.   A.  &  C.  R.  Co. 
livan  Timber  Co.  (Ala.),  35  So.  330.      v.  Grantham,  104  Ind.  357,  4  N.  E. 
See,  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pennell,      49. 
110  Til.  435;   Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
McClelland,  42  111.  355. 


671  KILLING   STOCK,    FAILURE   TO    FENCE.  §    646 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff's  cattle 
were  killed  by  the  locomotive,  cars  or  other  carriages  used  on 
the  defendant's  railroad  in  or  running  into  or  through  Madison 
county,  Indiana,  and  that  such  railroad  was  not  securely  fenced 
in  and  such  fence  was  not  properly  maintained  by  the  defendant 
where  at  the  point,  the  cattle  entered  upon  said  road,  then  you 
should  find  for  the  plaintiff  and  assess  his  damages  at  the  value 
of  the  cattle  so  killed.119 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  engine 
driver,  by  the  use  of  ordinary  skill  and  prudence,  could  have 
seen  the  cows  spoken  of  by  the  witnesses,  or  that  he  did  see  the 
cows,  and  that  he  might,  without  danger,  by  the  use  of  ordinary 
care,  have  stopped  the  train  before  striking  the  cows,  and  did 
not,  that  this  would  be  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant.120 

(4)  Even  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  any  hogs  en- 
tered the  plaintiff's  field  and  did  damage  to  his  crop,  as  com- 
plained of  in  the  petition,  still,  if  you  also  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  there  was  a  space  of  ground  lying  between  the  fence 
which  the  defendant  had  erected  along  the  east  side  of  the  track, 
and  another  fence  which  was  upon  the  west  side  of  the  plaintiff's 
enclosure,  and  that  said  strip  of  ground  was  open  to  a  public  high- 
way at  the  south  end,  so  that  hogs  and  other  stock  could  pass  from 
the  public  road  into  said  strip  of  ground,  and  that  it  was  necessary, 
for  hogs  to  pass  through  or  under  both  of  said  fences,  and  across 
said  intervening  strip  of  ground  in  order  to  get  from  defendant's 
inclosure  along  its  track  into  the  plaintiff's  field,  then  the  plaintiff 
cannot  recover  in  this  action,  and  your  verdict  must  be  for  the 
defendant.121 

(5)  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  defendant  should  have  erected 
its  fence  upon  the  line  of  its  way.     It  had  the  right  to  locate 
the  fence  at  any  place  between  the  edge  of  its  track  and  the  line 
of  its  right  of  way.    Therefore  if  you  should  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  there  was  a  strip  of  ground  between  the  railroad 
fence  and  the  plaintiff's  fence,  and  that  a  part  of  the  same  was 
included  within  the  line  of  the  railroad  right  of  way,  but  outside 

119  Cleveland,   C.   C.   &   I.   R.   Co.      constitute   negligence,   and  not   en- 
v.  Bates,  91  Ind.  290.  croaching   on   the   province   of   the 

120  Toledo,    P.    &    W.    R.    Co.    v.      jury. 

Bray,  57  111.  514.     Held  not  telling          121  Kingsbury   v.    Missouri,    K.    & 
the  jury  that  a  certain  state  of  facts      T.  R.  Co.  156  Mo.  384,  57  S.  W.  547. 


§    646  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  672 

of  the  railroad  fence,  and  that  such  strip  of  ground  opened  at 
the  south  end  upon  a  public  highway,  and  that  hogs  passed 
through  or  over  said  strip  of  ground,  and  thence  under  or 
through  plaintiff's  fence,  and  even,  although  in  passing  over 
said  strip  of  ground  they  may  have  passed  over  the  uninclosed 
portion  of  the  right  of  way,  still,  that  does  not  entitle  the 
plaintiff  to  recover,  and  under  such  circumstances,  if  you  so 
find,  your  verdict  should  be  for  defendant.122 

(6)  If  the  horse  in  question  got  onto  the  defendant's  railway 
track  from  a  highway  crossing,  at  a  point  where  the  defendant 
had  a  side-track  crossing  the  highway,  on  which  it  received  and 
discharged  freight,  and  which  it  had  constructed  and  used  for  the 
convenience  of  the  public  and  in  the  transaction  of  its  business 
with  them,  them  the  defendant  was  not  required  to  fence  in  or  in- 
close its  track  at  that  point,  and  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover.123 

(7)  The  law  does  not  require  the  defendant  to  fence  its  road  at 
stations  or  sidings  where  freight  is  received  and  discharged,  and 
the  defendant  is  not  liable  in  an  action  like  this  for  stock  that 
may  go  upon  the  track  at  such  point  and  get  killed.124 

(8)  The  rules  of  law  as  to  diligence  and  negligence  apply  to 
stock  owners  as  well  as  to  railroad  companies.  Hence,  if  hogs  were 
prohibited  by  law  from  running  at  large  in  the  township  where  the 
plaintiff's  hogs  were  kept  by  him,  and  were  killed  by  the  defend- 
ant's railroad  train,  the  law  required  from  the  plaintiff  the  same 
degree  of  diligence  to  keep  his  hogs  from  escaping,  that  it  required 
from  the  railroad  company  to  avoid  killing  them  when  they  got 
in  front  of  its  train ;  and  if  the  plaintiff  failed  to  use  that  degree 
of  diligence  to  keep  his  hogs  from  escaping,  he  cannot  recover 
in  this  action.126 

If  you  find  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  guards  in 
question  were  not  such  guards  as  were  approved  by  the  railroad 
commissioner,  or  that  they  were  not  placed  down  as  required 
by  the  railroad  commissioner,  under  his  plans  and  specifications 
submitted  here,  then  you  would  find  the  defendant  liable  under 
further  instructions  that  I  will  give  you.  Or,  if  you  find  that 

122  Kingsbury  v.   Missouri,   K.   &  12*  Indiana,   B.   &  W.   R.    Co.   v. 
T.  R.  Co.  156  Mo.  385,  57  S.  W.  547.  Sawyer,  109  Ind.  344,  10  N.  E.  105. 

123  Indiana,    B.    &   W.    R.    Co.   v.  125  Leavenworth,   T.   &   S.   W.   R. 
Sawyer,  109  Ind.  344,  10  N.  E.  105.  Co.   v.   Forbs,  37  Kas.  448,  15  Pac. 

595. 


673  FACTS  NECESSARY  TO  RECOVERY.  §  647 

they  were  such  guards,  and  were  so  placed,  as  required  by  the 
plans  and  specifications  approved  by  the  commissioner  of  rail- 
roads, but  that  the  company  had  negligently  failed  to  keep  such 
guards  in  repair,  then  you  will  find  them  liable.  When  I  say 
''keep  them  in  repair,"  I  mean  in  good  and  sufficient  repair, 
so  they  would  serve  the  purpose  for  which  they  were  placed 
there.  I  do  not  mean  that,  if  you  find  they  were  in  that  condi- 
tion, they  would  be  liable;  but  you  must  further  find  that  this 
injury  was  occasioned  because  of  such  defect,  if  you  find  it.  In 
other  words,  if  you  find  that  the  guards  in  question  are  such  as 
are  approved,  and  further  find  that  the  company  negligently 
failed  to  keep  the  same  in  repair,  (that  is,  negligently  permitted 
them  to  fill  up  between  the  slats  with  cinders,  ballast  or  dirt,) 
and  that  these  cattle  went  upon  the  railroad  track,  over  these 
guards  so  out  of  repair,  and  that  the  injury  was  occasioned  by 
such  want  of  repair,  then  the  defendant  would  be  liable.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  you  do  not  find  these  things  to  be  true,  then 
they  would  not  be  liable;  that  is,  if  you  find  that  the  guards 
were  in  repair,  the  company  would  not  be  liable,  or,  if  you  find 
that  the  injury  was  not  occasioned  because  of  the  want  of  re- 
pair, then  the  company  would  not  be  liable.126 

§  647.  Essential  facts  necessary  to  a  recovery. — (1)  The  facts 
necessary  to  be  established  by  the  plaintiff  by  a  preponderance 
of  all  the  evidence,  to  entitle  him  to  recover,  are  first,  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  defendant  in  the  matter  complained  of; 
second,  plaintiffs'  freedom  from  fault  or  negligence  in  the  matter 
complained  of;  and  third,  damage  to  the  plaintiff  proximately 
caused  by  the  defendants'  negligence;  and  a  failure  to  establish 
any  of  these  by  a  preponderance  of  all  the  evidence  will  preclude 
a  recovery.127 

(2)  It  appears  that  the  plaintiff  was  struck  and  injured  by  the 
engine  of  the  defendant  while  in  the  act  of  crossing  the  railroad 
track  and  rescuing  a  little  child  from  danger  and  saving  its 
life.  To  hold  the  company  responsible  in  damages  for  such  in- 
jury in  such  case,  it  must  be  shown  first,  that  the  child  was  in 
danger  of  being  run  over  and  injured  by  an  approaching  engine, 
and  that  such  danger  was  caused  or  created  by  the  negligence 

326  Hathaway  v.  Detroit,  T.  &  M.         127  Baltimore   &   O.   S.   R.   Co.   v. 
R.  Co.  124  Mich.  610,  83  N.  W.  598.      Young,  153  Ind.  168,  54  N.  E.  791. 


§    648  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  674 

of  the  railroad  company;  and  second,  that  in  making  the  effort 
to  rescue  the  child  the  plaintiff  was  not  guilty  of  contributory 
negligence.  These  are  questions  of  fact  which  it  is  your  duty  to 
determine  from  the  evidence  in  the  case.128 

(3)  The  first  question  then  for  you  to  determine  is  this:  Did 
the  water  which  flowed  down  the  side  of  this  hill  in  time  of  rain- 
fall, and  the  thawing  of  snow,  flow  down  through  a  natural  and 
well-defined  channel,  or  did  it  not?  If  it  did,  the  defendant  had 
no  right  to  change  the  flow  of  that  water  so  as  to  produce  injury 
to  the  plaintiff.  If  it  did  not  nVv  down  through  a  natural  well- 
defined  channel,  but  discharged  itself  generally  upon  the  right 
of  way  of  the  defendant,  then  the  defendant  could  provide  for 
its  discharge  from  that  right  of  way  in  such  a  manner  as  it  saw 
fit.129 

§  648.  Accident— No  liability.— (1)  It  is  the  duty  of  both  the 
railroad  company  and  of  those  operating  its  trains,  and  of  per- 
sons traveling  along  the  public  highway,  to  use  reasonable  care 
and  ordinary  prudence  to  avoid  collision  at  any  -point  where 
the  company's  road  and  such  public  highway  may  cross  each 
other,  and  if  a  collision  should  occur  at  any  such  crossing,  and 
any  injury  should  happen  from  such  collision,  and  neither  party 
should  be  guilty  of  negligence  in  causing  such  collision,  then  no 
action  could  be  maintained  by  reason  of  such  an  injury.  It 
would  be  an  accident  for  which  the  law  gives  no  remedy.130 

(2)  If  the  jury  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  engi- 
neer in  control  of  the  extra  passenger  train  was  keeping  the  proper 
lookout  which  it  was  his  duty  to  keep,  that  he  saw  the  hand 
car  as  soon  as  it  could  be  seen  under  the  circumstances,  and  ap- 
plied all  the  means  within  his  power  as  quickly  as  they  could 
be  applied  under  the  circumstances,  and  that  he  continued  to 
use  all  the  means  within  his  power  which  a  prudent  man  with 
the  requisite  skill  and  in  the  use  of  ordinary  care  would  have 
used  under  the  circumstances,  and  that  the  appliances  for  stop- 
ping and  controlling  the  train  were  in  good  order,  then  they  will 
find  for  the  defendant.131 

128  Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Langen-  iso  Gulf,    C.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co.    v. 
dorf,  48  Ohio  St.  321,  28  N.  E.  172.  Greenlee,  70  Tex.  557,  8  S.  W.  129. 

129  Fossum   v.   Chicago,   M.   &   St.  isi  Davidson    v.    Pittsburg,    C..  C. 
P.    R.    Co.   80   Minn.    12,    82   N.   W.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  41  W.  Va.  416,  23  S. 
979.  E.  593. 


675  ACCIDENT,    NO    LIABILITY.  §    648 

(3)  Unless  the  jury  are  satisfied  from  the  evidence  that  the 
person  or  persons  in  charge  of  the  extra  passenger  train  failed  to 
stop  the  train  as  soon  as  a  prudent  man  of  the  requisite  skill  and 
in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  would  have  done  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, and  unless  they  further  believe  that  D's  death  was 
caused  by  that  failure,  they  will  find  for  the  defendant.132 

(4)  If  the  jury,  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  engineer 
was  looking  out  for  a  flag  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  road, 
at  a  place  shortly  beyond  where  the  deceased  was  injured,  and 
just  before  he  was  struck,  and  that  the  engineer  did  not  see  the 
deceased  on  the  track  or  know  he  was  there  until  too  late  to  stop, 
then,  under  the  evidence  in  this  case,  the  negligence  of  the  engi- 
neer, if  such  there  was,  was  not  such  gross,  wanton,  intentional 
wrong  as  will  make  the  defendant  liable,  provided  the  jury  find 
the   deceased   walked   down    or   on   the   track   without   looking 
back.133 

(5)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that 
while  the  defendant  and  its  servants  were  (if  they  were)  exercis- 
ing ordinary  care,  the  plaintiff,  at  the  time  and  place  of  the  injury, 
suddenly  and  unexepectedly,  and  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
defendant,  drove  his  wagon  across  and  upon  defendant's  track 
and  thereby  placed  himself  in   a  position  of  danger,   then,   in 
order  to  charge  the  defendant  with  a  duty  to  avoid  injuring 
him,  the  plaintiff  must  show,  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evi- 
dence in  the  case,  that  the  circumstances  were  of  such  char- 
acter   that    the    defendant's    servant    or    servants    had    an    op- 
portunity   to    become    conscious    of    the    facts    giving    rise    to 
such  duty,  and  a  reasonable  opportunity  in  the  exercise  of  or- 
dinary care   and  caution,   to   perform   such   duty.     And  if  the 
jury  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  facts  as  shown 
by  the  evidence  did  not  charge  the  defendant  and  its  servants 
with  a  duty  as  thus  defined,  or  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence, that  the  defendant  and  its  servants  did  not  have  a  rea- 
sonable opportunity,  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  to  perform 
such  duty  as  thus  defined,  then  they  should  find  the  defendant 
not  guilty.     And  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in   the 
case,   that   the   plaintiff   suddenly   and   unexpectedly   drove   his 

132  Davidson  v.  Pittsburg,  &c.  R.         ™3  Frazer  v.  South  &  North  Ala. 
Co.  41  W.  Va.  416,  23  S.  E.  593.  R.  Co.  81  Ala.  190,  1  So.  85. 


§    649  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  676 

wagon  across  and  upon  the  defendant's  track  in  front  of  the  car 
of  the  defendant  which  occasioned  the  injury,  and  that  the  ser- 
vant or  servants  of  the  defendant  in  charge  of  such  car  did  all 
that  could  be  done,  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  to  avoid 
injuring  and  damaging  him,  then  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover 
in  this  case,  and  the  jury  should  find  the  defendant  not  guilty.134 

Cases  of  Death. 

§  649.  Measure  of  damages  to  next  of  kin. — (1)  If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  B,  the -deceased,  was  the  husband 
of  the  plaintiff  in  this  suit,  and  that  the  said  B  was  rightfully 
upon  the  defendant's  engine  by  the  invitation  and  direction  of 
the  conductor  and  manager  of  the  same,  and  that  he  was  using 
ordinary  care  for  his  safety,  and  was,  by  and  through  the  care- 
lessness and  negligence  of  the  defendant's  servants  in  running 
and  handling  the  said  engine,  thrown  therefrom  to  the  ground, 
and  run  over  by  a  car  and  injured,  from  which  injuries  the 
said  B  afterwards  died,  then  the  jury  will  find  for  the  plaintiff, 
and  assess  her  damages  at  such  sum  as  they  believe,  from  all  the 
evidence,  she  has  sustained,  not  exceeding  ten  thousand  dol- 
lars.135 

(2)  The  jury  are  instructed  that  in  estimating  the  pecuniary 
injury,  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  widow  and 
minor  children  of  said  deceased,  have  sustained  any  injury  for 
which  the  defendant  is  liable,  they  have  a  right  to  take  into 
consideration  the  support  of  the  said  widow  and  minor  children 
of  the  deceased,  and  the  instruction,  and  physical,  moral  and 
intellectual  training,  of  the  minor  children  of  the  deceased,  and 
also  the  ages  of  the  said  minor  children,  and  the  pecuniary  con- 
dition of  the  said  minor  children  and  widow  of  the  deceased, 
in  determining  the  amount  of  damages,  if  they  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  the  said  deceased  left  a  widow  and  minor  chil- 
dren.136 

is*  Chicago  U.  Tr.  Co.  v.  Browdy,  guilty   of  negligence.     See   post   n. 

206  111.  617.  139. 

iss  Lake    S.    &    M.    S.    R.    Co.    v.         ise  Illinois   C.   R.   Co.   v.   Weldon, 

Brown,    123    111.    182,   14   N.   E.    197.  52   111.   294,   citing  Tilly  v.    Hudson 

This    instruction    does    not    assume  River  R.  Co.  29  N.  Y.  252. 
that  the  defendant's  servants  were 


677  DAMAGES    TO    NEXT   OF    KIN.  §    649 

(3)  If  the  jury  find  for  the  plaintiff,  they  will  assess  her  dam- 
ages at  such  a  sum  as  in  their  judgment  will  be  a  fair  and  just 
compensation  to  her  for  the  loss  of  her  husband,  not  exceeding 
the  sum  of  ten  thousand  dollars.137 

(4)  If  you  should  consider  that  the  defendant  was  in  default 
in  this  case,  then  of  course  you  would  have  to  consider  the  ques- 
tion of  compensation.    As  has  been  staged  to  you  by  both  counsel 
originally  there  was  no  right  of  action  to  a  survivor  in  a  case'  of 
this  character.    The  person  Avho  was  injured  had  a  right  to  dam- 
ages for  pain  and  suffering  and  anguish  which  he  had  endured. 
The  legislature,  however,  have   changed  the  old   common  law, 
and  the  representative,  the  widow,  now  has  a  right  to  bring  a 
suit  for  the  pecuniary  loss  which  she  sustained.     Now  of  course 
in  all  these  cases  nobody  pretends  that  these  companies  act  ma- 
liciously.    They  operate   entirely  through  their  agents,   and  if 
their  agents  are  negligent,  they  are  undoubtedly  obliged  to  suf- 
fer for  it  just  as  an  individual  would  be.     Just  as  a  man  driv- 
ing your  carriage,  if  he  negligently  should  run  into  some  one  else, 
you  would  be  responsible  for  what  he  did,  because  he  was  your 
servant,  and  your  agent  and  performing  the  duty  for  which  you 
had  employed  him.     Therefore  there  ought  to  be  a  reasonable 
compensation.138 

(5)  The  law  makes  it  the  duty  of  every  operator  and  owner  of 
a  coal  mine  to  securely  fence  the  top  of  the  shafts  by  gates  prop- 
erly protecting  the  shaft  and  the  entry  thereto,  and  if  such  oper- 
ator fails  willfully  to  so  fence  the  shaft,  and  by  reason  of  such 
failure,  a  person  employed  about  the  mine  is  killed,  the  owner  or 
operator  is  liable  to  the  widow  of  the  person  so  killed  for  damages 
not  to  exceed  the  sum  of  ten  thousand  dollars.139 

(6)  The  law  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  owner,  agent  or  oper- 
ator of  every  coal  mine  to  keep  a  supply  of  timber  constantly 
on   hand,    of  sufficient   lengths   and   dimensions   to   be   used   as 
props  and  cap-pieces  and  to  deliver  the  same  as  required  with 
the  miner's  empty  car,  so  that  the  workmen  may  at  all  times 
be  able  to  properly  secure  said  workings  for  their  own  safety, 
and  if  such  operator  willfully  fails  so  to  do,  and  by  reason  of 

137  Browning   v.    Wabash    W.    R.  139  Catlett  v.   Young,   143   111.   74, 

Co.  124  Mo.  65,  27  S.  W.  644.  32  N.  E.  447.     Ten  thousand  dollars 

las  Connor  v.  Electric  Tr.  Co.  173  is  the  statutory  limit  now. 
Pa.  St.  605,  34  Atl.  i38. 


§    649  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  678 

such  failure  a  person  employed  about  the  mine  is  killed,  the 
owner  or  operator  is  liable  to  the  widow  of  the  person  killed  for 
damages  not  exceeding  the  sum  of  ten  thousand  dollars.140 

(7)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  on  the  twenty- 
second  day  of  January,  1898,  Frank  Duffy  came  to  his  death, 
while    in    the    exercise    ordinary    care    for    his    own    safety, 
in  the  manner  and   by  th£   means  set   forth  in   the   plaintiff's 
amended  declaration,  and  if  the  jury  further  believe,  from  the 
evidence,  that  the  death  of  the  said  Frank  Duffy  was  caused  by 
the  negligence  of  the  defendant,  as  charged  in  said  declaration ; 
and  if  the  jury  further  believe,   from  the    evidence,   that   the 
said  Frank  Duffy  left  surviving  him  a -widow  and  children,  as 
stated  in  said  declaration,  and  that  such  widow  and  children, 
by  the  death  of  the  said  Frank  Duffy,  have  been  and  are  de- 
prived of  their  means  of  support,  then,  in  law,  the  plaintiff  is 
entitled  to  recover.141 

(8)  If  you  find  for  the  plaintiff,  you  will  look  to  the  evi- 
dence in  determining  the  amount  of  damages  you  will  allow. 
In    arriving    at    a    conclusion,    you    will    look    to    the    evidence 
as  to  the   age  of  the  plaintiff's  husband,  the  probable   length 
of  his  life,  the  amount  he  earned  or  would  probably  earn  during 
his  life,  and  you  will  also  consider  his  state  of  health.142 

(9)  This  case  is  to  be  tried  in  the  same  manner  and  governed 
by  the  same  principles  of  law,  as  if  the  deceased  had  not  died  of 
the  injuries  and  had  commenced  an  action  for  the  recovery  of 
damages  for  the  injuries;  or,  in  other  words,  that  this  action  can 
be  sustained  under  such  state  of  facts  only  as  would  have  entitled 
the  deceased,  had  he  lived,  to  have  maintained  an  action  and 
recover   damages    for   the   injuries   which    caused   his    death.143 

(10)  That  in  making  the  calculation  as  to  the  amount  the  plain- 
tiff would  be  entitled  to  recover,  you  Avould  have  a  right  and  it 
would  be  proper  for  you  to  consider  whether  or  not  the  capacity 
of  the  plaintiff's  husband  to  labor  and  earn  money  would  have 
decreased  by  reason  of  advancing  years,  and  if  you  believe  under 

"o  Mt.    Olive   Coal   Co.    v.   Rade-  142  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Pittman,  73 

macher,  190  111.  540,  60  N.  E.  888;  Ga.  331. 

Catlett  v.  Young,  143  111.  74,  32  N.  143  Darling  v.   Williams,   35   Ohio 

E.  447.  St.  58. 

14i  Economy    L.    Co.    v.    Stephen, 
187  111.  137,  58  N.  E.  359. 


679  DAMAGES  TO  NEXT  OF  KIN.  §    649 

the  evidence  that  it  would  have  decreased  in  the  same  proportion 
as  you  believe  his  capacity  to  labor  and  earn  money  would  have 
diminished,  in  the  same  proportion  would  it  be  proper  and  right 
that  your  finding  and  verdict  would  be  diminished.144 

(11)  This  case  is  to  be  tried  in  the  same  manner  and  governed 
by  the  same  principles  of  law  as  if  the  deceased  had  not  died  of  the 
injuries  complained  of,  and  had  himself  commenced  an  action  to 
recover  damages  for  his  injuries ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  this  ac- 
tion can  be  sustained  only  under  such  state  of  facts  as  would  have 
entitled  the  deceased  to  have  maintained  an  action  and  recovered 
damages  for  such  injuries,  had  he  lived.     If  you  find  for  the 
plaintiff  you  will  look  to  the  evidence  in  determining  the  amount 
of  damages  you  will  allow,  and  in  arriving  at  a  conclusion  you 
have  a  right  to  take  into  consideration  the  ability  of  the  de- 
ceased to  labor  and  earn  money,  and  whether  or  not  the  capacity 
of   the    deceased    to    labor    and    earn    money    would    have    de- 
creased by  reason  of  advancing  years;  and  you  have  the  right 
to  consider  the  age  of  the  deceased,  the  probable  length  of  his 
life,  his  health  and  the  amount  he  earned  or  would  probably  earn 
during  his  life.    You  have  also  the  right  to  take  into  considera- 
tion the  support  of  the  widow  and  minor  children  of  the  de- 
ceased, the  instruction  and  proper  training  of  any  such  minor 
children,  their  ages,  and  the  pecuniary  circumstances  and  con- 
dition of  such  widow  and  minor  children,  if  the  deceased  left 
a  widow  and  minor  children,  and  you  will  assess  the  damages  at 
such  a  sum  as  in  your  judgment,  from  the  evidence,  will   be 
a  just,  fair  and  reasonable  compensation  to  such  widow  and  minor 
children  not  exceeding  the  sum  of  ten  thousand  dollars.145 

(12)  If  the  jury  find  that  J,  the  deceased,  was  related  to  the 
equitable  plaintiff  as  alleged  in  the  declaration,  and  that  on  the 
first  day  of  April,  1893,  the  deceased  and  R  were  engaged  in 
a  fight  near  the  defendant's  store,  and  that  the  defendant  came 
out  of  his  store  and  seeing  the  fight  ran  up  to  within  a  short  dis- 
tance of  J,  the  deceased,  and  fired  his  pistol  toward  him  and 
shot  and  killed  him,  the  verdict  must  be  for  the  plaintiff,  unless 

14*  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Pittman,  73  Welden,    52    111.    2&4;    Browning   v. 

Ga.  330.  Wabash  W.   R.   Co.   124  Mo.   65,   27 

145  Darling  v.   Williams,   35   Ohio  S.   W.   644;    Connor  v.   Electric  Tr. 

St.  58;    Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Pittman,  Co.  173  Pa.  St.  605,  34  Atl.  238. 
73  Ga.  331;   Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 


§    650  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  680 

the  jury  believe  by  preponderating  proof  that  the  shooting  was 
done  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  deceased  from  killing 
R  or  inflicting  upon  him  great  bodily  harm,  and  that  the  cir- 
cumstances at  the  time  of  the  shooting  were  such  as  to  warrant 
a  reasonable  belief  in  his  mind  in  the  exercise  of  his  judgment 
that  there  was  no  other  reasonably  possible — or  at  least  probable 
— means  of  preventing  such  injury;  and  that  his  act  was  neces- 
sary.146 

§  650.  Damages  restricted  to  pecuniary  loss. — (1)  If  the  jury 
find  from  the  evidence,  and  under  the  instructions  of  the  court, 
that  the  defendant  corporation  is  guilty  of  the  wrongful  act,  neg- 
lect or  default,  as  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration,  and  that 
the  same  resulted  in  the  death  of.  the  deceased,  then  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  recover  such  damages  as  the  jury  may  deem, 
from  the  evidence  or  proof,  a  fair  and  just  compensation,  there- 
for, having  reference  only  to  the  pecuniary  injuries  resulting 
from  said  death,  to  the  plaintiff  and  next  of  kin,  not  exceeding 
the  amount  stated  in  the  declaration.  Grief  or  sorrow  for  the  de- 
ceased or  any  pain  caused  to  the  next  of  kin  by  the  manner  of  hia 
death,  is  not  to  be  considered  by  the  jury,  and  the  pecuniary  value 
of  the  life  of  the  deceased  to  the  next  of  kin  himself  surviving,  is 
all  for  which  damages  can  be  assessed.147 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  B,  the  deceased, 
was  rightfully  on  the  defendant's  engine,  as  alleged  in  the  decla- 
ration in  this  cause,  and  that  while  he  was  on  said  engine  he 
was  using  ordinary  care  on  his  pare  for  his  personal  safety,  and 
was,  by  and  through  the  carelessness  of  the  defendant's  ser- 
vants in  running  and  handling  said  engine,  thrown  from  said 
engine,  and  injured,  from  which  said  injuries  the  said  B  died,  then 
the  jury  should  find  for  the  plaintiff,  and  give  her  such  damages 
as  they  deem  a  fair  and  just  compensation,  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  resulting  from  such  death  to  the  wife  and 
next  of  kin  of  the  said  deceased,  not  exceeding  ten  thousand 
dollars.148 

i4«  Tucker  v.  S.  use  of  Johnson,  148  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

89  Md.  472,  43  Atl.  778,  44  Atl.  1004.      Brown,  123  111.  182,  14  N.  E.  197. 

147  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Marshall, 
119  111.  404,  10  N.  E.  220. 


681  DAMAGES   RESTRICTED.  §    650 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  Edna  I.  Van  Pelt, 
while  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  for  her  safety  and  without 
fault  or  negligence  on  her  part  lost  her  life  by  and  through  the 
negligence  of  the  defendant,  as  charged  in  the  declaration,  and 
that  said  Edna  I.  Van  Pelt  left  her  surviving  next  of  kin,  then 
you  should  find  the  defendant  guilty,  and  assess  the  plaintiff's 
damages  at  such  sum  as  you  believe,  from  the  evidence,  will  be 
a  fair  and  just  compensation,  based  upon  the  pecuniary  loss, 
if  any,  resulting  from  the  death  of  the  said  Edna  I.  Van  Pelt 
to  her  said  next  of  kin,  not  exceeding  the  sum  claimed  in  the 
plaintiff's  declaration.149 

(4)  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that  if  they  find  a  verdict  for 
the  plaintiff  they  are  not  confined,  in  assessing  the  damages,  to 
the  pecuniary  value  of  the  services  of  the  deceased  to  her  next 
of  kin  until  she  would  have  arrived  at  the  age  of  eighteen.    But 
the  jury  may  consider  the  pecuniary  benefits  which  the  next  of 
kin  may  have  derived  from  said  deceased,  had  she  not  been  killed, 
at  any  age  of  her  life.150 

(5)  If  the  jury  should  find  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  and 
under  the  instructions  of  the  court,  that  the  defendant  is  guilty  of 
the  wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default,  as  charged  in  the  plaintiff's 
declaration  and  that  the  same  resulted  in  the  death  of  Patrick 
Dowd,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  in  this  action,  for 
the  benefit  of  the  widow  and  next  of  kin  of  such  deceased,  such 
damages  as  the  jury  may  deem,  from  the  evidence,  a  fair  and 
just  compensation  thereof,  having  reference  only  to  the  pecuniary 
injuries  from  such  death  to  such  widow  and  next  of  kin,  not 
exceeding  the  amount  claimed  in  the  declaration.151 

(6)  If  the  jury  should  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant is  guilty  of  the  wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default,  as  is  charged 
in  the  plaintiff's  declaration,  and  that  the  same  resulted  in  the 
death  of  P,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  in  this  ac- 
tion, for  the  benefit  of  the  next  of  kin  of  said  deceased,  such 
damages  as  the  jury  may  deem,  from  the  evidence,  a  fair  and 
just  compensation  with  reference  to  the  pecuniary  injuries  re- 
no  Calumet    St.    R.    Co.    v.    Van          isi  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 

Pelt,  173  111.  71,  50  N.  E.  678.  Dowd,  115  111.  659,  4  N.  E.  368.  Held 

iso  Baltimore   &   O.   S.   R.    Co.   v.      to  relate  solely  to  the  measure  of 
Then,  159  111.  535,  538,  42  N.  E.  971.      damages. 


§    650  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  682 

suiting  from  such  death  to  such  next  of  kin  not  exceeding  ten 
thousand  dollars."2 

(7)  If  you  find  the  issues  for  the  plaintiff,  then  you  should 
assess  the  plaintiff's  damages  at  such  sum  as  you  believe  from 
the  evidence  to  be  a  proper  pecuniary  compensation  for  damages 
to  her  surviving  husband  and  next  of  kin  occasioned  by  her 
death,  not  exceeding  ten  thousand  dollars.153 

(8)  If  you  find  for  the  plaintiff,  you  will  estimate  the  damages 
to  which  he  is  entitled;  and  in  so  doing,  you  will  not  allow  any- 
thing for  pain  and  suffering  of  the  deceased,  nor  wounded  feelings 
nor  grief  of  his  relatives,  nor  anything  by  way  of  exemplary  dam- 
ages or  punishment  of  defendant,  nor  infer  any  fortuitous  circum- 
stances whereby  the  income  or  fortune  of  the  deceased  might  be 
increased  or  improved  had  he  lived.    This  suit  is  brought  only  to 
recover  a  pecuniary  loss,  namely,  what  the  estate  of  the  deceased 
had  lost  in  consequence  of  his  untimely  death,  and  no  more.  And, 
in  determining  what  amount  you  will  allow,  you  should  take 
into  consideration  the  age  of  the  deceased,  his  occupation,  the 
wages  he  was  receiving,  the  condition  of  his  health,  his  ability, 
if  any,  to  earn  money,  his  expenditures  and  habits  as  to  indus- 
try, sobriety  and  economy,  the  amount  of  property  which  he  had 
accumulated  at  the  time  of  his  death,  if  any,  the  probable  dura- 
tion of  his  lifetime,  and  all  these  in  connection  with  all  the  evi- 
dence before  you,  throwing  light  on  this  question  and  determine 
therefrom  the  probable  pecuniary  loss  to  the  estate  caused  by 
his  death  and  allow  the  plaintiff  such  sum  and  such  only  as 
will  compensate  the  estate  for  such  loss.154 

(9)  If  under  all  the  evidence  the  jury  find  for  the  plaintiff,  the 
proper  measure  of  damages  is  the  pecuniary  loss  suffered  by  her 
and  her  two  children ;  and  that  loss  is  what  her  husband  would 
have  probably  earned  by  his  labor  in  his  business  during  his  life- 
time, and  which  would  have  gone  for  the  benefit  of  the  plaintiff 
and  her  two  children,  taking  into  consideration  his  age,  ability, 

152  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  iss  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R. 
Payne,  59  111.  534,  541.  Held  not  Co.  v.  Baddeley,  150  111.  335,  36  N. 
withdrawing  from  the  jury  all  con-  E.  965. 

sideration  of  the  conduct  of  the  de-         is*  Spaulding  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  & 
ceased.  K.  C.  R.  Co.  98  Iowa,  219,  67  N.  W. 

227. 


683  DAMAGES    RESTRICTED.  §    650 

and  disposition  to  labor,  and  his  habits  of  living  and  expendi- 
ture.155 

(10)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  and  under  the  instructions 
of  the  court  that  the  defendant  corporation  is  guilty  of  the  wrong- 
ful act,  neglect  or  default  as  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  declara- 
tion and  that  such  wrongful  act  resulted  in  the  death  of  the 
deceased,  then  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  such  damages 
as  the  jury  may  deem,  from  the  evidence,  to  be  a  fair  and  just 
compensation,  having  reference  only  to  the  pecuniary  injuries 
resulting  to  the  plaintiff  and  next  of  kin,  from  the  death  of  the 
deceased.    In  estimating  the  damages,  if  any,  you  will  not  allow 
anything  for    pain  and  suffering  of  the  deceased,  nor  grief  nor 
wounded  feelings  of  his  relatives,  nor  anything  by  way  of  exem- 
plary damages  or  punishment  of  the  defendant.     And  in  deter- 
mining what  amount  you  will  allow,  you  should  take  into  con- 
sideration the  age  of  the  deceased,  his  occupation,  business  ca- 
pacity, habits,  experience,  the  condition  of  his  health,  the  prob- 
able duration  of  his  life,  the  wages  he  was  receiving,  if  any  at 
the   time   of  his   death,   and   his   probable   earnings   during   his 
probable  duration  of  life.     You  have  also  the  right  to  take  into 
consideration  the  support  of  the  widow  and  minor  children  of 
the  deceased,  if  he  left  a  widow  and  minor  children;  also  the 
instruction   and   proper   training    of   any   such   minor   children, 
their  ages,  and  the  pecuniary  circumstances  of  such  widow  and 
minor  children,  and  you  will  assess  the  damages  at  such  sum 
as  in  your  judgment,  from  all  the  evidence  before  you,  will  be 
fair  and  reasonable  compensation  for  the  loss  sustained  by  the 
said  next  kin  of  the  deceased,  not  exceeding  ten  thousand  dol- 
lars.156 

(11)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff 

«5  Huntingdon    &    B.    T.    R.    v.  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  98  Iowa,  219, 

Decker.  84  Pa.  St.  422.  67  N.  W.  227;   Huntington  &  B.  T. 

ise  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Marshall,  R.  v.   Decker,   84  Pa.   St.   422;    Mc- 

119  111.  404,  10  N.  E.  220;   Lake  S.  Donald  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  95 

&   M.   S.   R.   Co.   v.  Brown,   123   111.  Va.    100,    27    S.    E.    821;    Davis    v. 

182,   14   N.   E.   197;    Chicago,   M.   &  Guarnieri,  45  Ohio  St.  478,  15  N.  E. 

St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dowd,  115  111.  659,  350;   Nelson  v.  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R. 

4  N.  E.  368;  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  Co.    104    Mich.    587    (how    to    find 

L.   R.   Co.   v.  Bradley,   150  111.   335,  the  present  value);  62  N.  W.  993. 
26  N.  E.  965;  Spaulding  v.  Chicago, 


§    650  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  684 

is  entitled  to  recover,  in  estimating  the  damages  the  jury  should 
find  the  sum  with  reference : 

First.  To  the  pecuniary  loss  of  the  widow  and  child,  at  a 
sum  equal  to  the  probable  earnings  of  the  deceased,  considering 
his  age,  business,  capacity,  experience,  habits,  energy,  and  per- 
severance during  his  probable  life. 

Second.  In  ascertaining  the  probability  of  life  reference  may 
be  had  to  the  scientific  tables  on  that  subject. 

Third.  They  may  consider  the  loss  of  his  care,  attention,  and 
society  to  his  widow  and  child. 

Fourth.  They  may  add  such  sum  as  they  deem  fair  and  just 
by  way  of  solace  and  comfort  to  his  widow  for  the  sorrow,  suffer- 
ing, and  mental  anguish  occasioned  by  his  death,  provided  they 
do  not  find  over  ten  thousand  dollars.157 

(12)  In  ascertaining  the  amount  of  damages  plaintiff  is  enti- 
tled to  recover  in  this  case,  if  any,  the  jury  will  take  into  consid- 
eration : 

First.  By  fixing  the  same  at  such  sum  as  would  probably 
be  equal  to  the  earnings  of  the  deceased,  taking  into  consideration 
the  age,  business,  capacity,  and  experience  and  habits,  health, 
energy  and  perseverance  of  the  deceased,  during  what  would 
probably  have  been  his  lifetime  if  he  had  not  been  killed. 

Second.  By  adding  thereto  the  value  of  his  services  in  the 
superintendence,  attention  to  and  care  of  his  family,  of  which 
they  have  been  deprived  by  his  death. 

Third.  The  physical  pain  of  the  deceased,  as  well  as  the 
mental  suffering  of  the  surviving  members  of  his  family. 

Fourth.  The  loss  to  his  family  in  reference  to  his  moral  and 
intellectual  training.158 

(13)  In  assessing  damages  you  are  to  estimate  the  reasonable 
probabilities  of  the  life  of  the  deceased  G  and  give  the  equitable 
plaintiffs  such  pecuniary  damages  as  you  may  find  that  they  have 
suffered  or  will  suffer  as  the  direct  consequence  of  the  death 
of  the  said  G;  that  for  his  children  these  prospective  damages 

157  McDonald  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.          1G8  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Few, 
Co.  95  Va.  100,  27  S.  E.  821;   Com.      94  Va.  85,  26  S.  E.  406. 
Club  v.  Hilliker,  20  Ind.  App.  239, 
50  N.   E.   578. 


685  DAMAGES   RESTRICTED.  §    650 

may  be  estimated  to  their  majority ;  and  as  to  the  widow  of  such 
probability  of  life  as  you  may  find  reasonable  under  the  cir- 
cumstances.139 

(14)  The  plaintiff's  damages,  if  any,  should  be  a  fair  and  just 
compensation  for  the  pecuniary  injury  resulting  to  the  husband 
and  children  from  the  death  of  the  wife.     In  no  case  can  the^ 
jury,  in  estimating  such  damages,  if  any,  consider  the  bereave-^ 
ment,  mental   anguish,   or  pain  suffered  by  the   living   for  the 
dead.     The  damage  is  exclusively  for  a  pecuniary  loss,  not  a 
solace.     The  reasonable  expectation  of  what  the  husband  and 
children  might  have  received  from  the  deceased,  had  she  lived, 
is  a  proper  subject  for  the  consideration  of  the  jury,  if  they 
find  for  the  plaintiff.     What  the  husband  and  children  might 
reasonably  expect  to  receive  by  reason  of  the  services  of  the 
wife  in  a  pecuniary  point  of  view  is  to  be  taken  into  account 
in  determining  the  amount  of  damages,  if  you  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff.    It  should  be  said  that  it  is  the  present  worth  as  a  gross 
sum  in  money  for  the  loss  of  the  services  of  the  wife,  that  the 
jury    are     to     find     if    they    find     a    loss.     It    is    that     same 
which     put     in     money     is     a     compensation     for     what     you 
find     this     woman     would     reasonably     have     saved     for     her 
family.       Of     course,     in      determining      this,     these      things 
are    all    to    be    considered;    that    is,    the    age,    health,    prob- 
ability of  length  of  life,  or  death    if    she  had    not    died    from 
taking  the  drug.160 

(15)  The  measure  of  damages  in  this  case  is  the  present  value 
of  the  amount  of  money  which  the  plaintiff  and  the  minor  chil- 
dren would  have  received  from  the  deceased  during  the  contin- 
uance of  her  life,  had  she  lived.     The  present  value  of  a  sum  of 
money  payable  in  the  future  is  what  that  sum  is  worth  if  paid 
presently — paid  now.    For  example,  the  present  value  of  one  dol- 
lar at  six  per  cent,  at  the  end  of  one  year  is  found  by  dividing 
one  dollar,  by  one  dollar  and  six  cents;  and  the  present  value 
of  one  dollar  at  the  end  of  to  years  is  found  by  dividing  one  dol- 
lar by  one  dollar  and  twelve  cents.161 

159  President,   M.   Co.   of  B.   &  R.          16°  Davis  v.  Guarnieri,  ±5  Ohio  St. 
Turnpike  R.  v.  State,  71  Md.  576,  18      478,  15  N.  E.  350. 
Atl.    884.  161  Nelson  v.  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R. 

Co.  104  Mich.  587,  62  N.  W.  993. 


§    651  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS,  G86 

§  651.  Damages — Instructions  for  defendant. — (1)  You  are 
instructed  that  in  considering  the  damages  in  this  case,  it  is  your 
duty  to  dismiss  from  your  minds  all  consideration  of  the  grief, 
sorrow  and  mental  affliction  of  the  widow  and  children  of  the 
deceased;  to  dismiss  from  your  minds  all  personal  feeling  and 
sympathy  which  may  have  been  aroused  by  the  recital  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  casualty,  and  consider  only  the  pecuniary 
injury.162 

(2)  If  you   believe   from   the   evidence   that   the   capacity  of 
the  plaintiff's   husband   would   be   decreased   by   reason   of  ad- 
vancing  years,    then   it   would   be   your   duty   to    diminish   the 
amount  that  you  may  find  for  the  plaintiff  accordingly.163 

(3)  The  Carlisle  tables  have  been  offered  in  evidence,  but  you 
are  not  to  regard  such  tables  as  proving  that  plaintiff  is  to  recover 
for  forty  and  three-fourths  years  of  life.     You  are  to  bear  in 
mind  that  W  was  liable  to  die  at  any  time,  and  that  there  was 
no  certainty  that  he  ever  would  have  lived  until  he  was  twenty- 
one  years  old.    You  are  not  to  presume  that  he  would  be  diligent 
in  acquisition  01  property  or  successful  in  saving  what  he  might 
acquire.184 

Measure  of  Damages. 

§  652.  Consider  permanency  of  injury,  health,  business,  ex- 
pense, time. — (1)  If  you  find  for  the  plaintiff  you  will  be  required 
to  determine  the  amount  of  her  damages.  On  this  subject  the 
court  instructs  you  that  in  estimating  the  damages,  you  will 
consider  her  bodily  pain  and  suffering  occasioned  by  the  in- 
juries or  sickness,  if  any,  resulting  from  such  injury;  and  in 
case  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  has  not  yet  recovered  from 
such  injury,  or  that  by  such  injury  she  has  to  any  extent 
been  permanently  disabled,  then  you  should  take  such 
facts  into  consideration  in  estimating  her  damages  to 
which  you  may  add  such  amount  as  you,  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  sound  discretion,  may  think,  from  the  evidence,  will 
be  just  compensation  for  anxiety  and  distress  of  mind  as  are 

162  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  KM  Andrews  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
Harwood,  80  111.  91.  P.  R.  Co.  86  Iowa,  684,  53  N.  W. 

ins  Georeia  R.  Co.  v.  Pittman,  73      399. 
Ga.   325. 


687  DAMAGES    FOR   PERMANENT   INJURY.  §    652 

fairly  and  reasonably  the  plain  consequences  of  the  injury  com- 
plained of.165 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  for  the  plaintiff  they  will  fix  the  damages 
at  such  sum,  not  exceeding  ten  thousand  dollars,  as  would  be  a 
fair  compensation  to  the  estate  for  the  destruction  of  the  power 
of  the  deceased  to  earn  money;  and  in  fixing  such  damages  the 
jury  should  take  into  consideration  the  age  of  the  deceased  at 
the  time  of  his  death,  and  the  probable  duration  of  his  life.166 

(3)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  recover,  then  you  will  be  required  to  determine  the  amount 
of  damages  he  has  sustained,  if  any.     And  in  estimating  the 
damages,  you  will  take  into  consideration  the  plaintiff's  bodily 
pain  and  suffering,  if  any,  occasioned  by  the  injury  complained 
of,  sickness  resulting  from  the  injury,  if  any,  mental  anguish 
suffered  and  endured  by  him  on  account  of  said  injury,  if  any; 
his  age,  his  health  and  condition  before  the  injury  complained 
of,  and  the  effect  on  his  health;  and  in  case  you  find  that  the 
plaintiff  to  recover,   and  under  such  circumstances,   if  you  so 
such  injury  he  has  to  any  extent  been  permanently  disabled, 
then  you  should  take  these  matters  into  consideration  in  estima- 
ting his  damages.    You  should  also  consider  the  plaintiff's  neces- 
sary   and    reasonable    expenses  incurred,   if  any,    for    medical 
and  surgical  aid  or  treatment,  his  loss  of  time,  if  any,  the  money 
he  is  or  was  making  by  his  business  or  labor,  the  effect,  if  any, 
of  the  injury  in  the  future  upon  the  plaintiff  in  attending  to  his 
affairs  generally  in  pursuing  his  business  or  calling,  and  allow  him 
such  damages  as  in  your  opinion,  from  all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances in  evidence,  will  be  a  fair  and  just  compensation  for  the 
injury  he  has  sustained.167 

IBS  Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Holland,  122  111.  470, 

v.  Sponier,  85  Ind.  171.  13  N.  E.  145;  North  C.  St.  R.  Co. 

lee  Smith  v.  Middleton,  112  Ky.  v.  Shreve,  171  111.  441,  49  N.  E.  534; 

592,  56  L.  R.  A.  484.  Tudor  Iron  Works  v.  Weber,  129 

IGT  Pittsburg,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  111.  539,  21  N.  E.  1078;  Eureka 

v.  Sponier,  85  Ind.  171;  Philadelphia  Block  Coal  Co.  v.  Wells  (md.  App.), 

&  W.  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  72  61  N.  W.  236;  Gorham  v.  Kansas 

Md.  520,  20  Atl.  2;  Washington  A.  City  &  S.  R.  Co.  113  Mo.  410,  20  S. 

&  Mt.  V.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Quayle,  95  W.  1060;  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West, 

Va.  748,  30  S.  E.  391;  Louisville,  66  Miss.  313,  6  So.  207;  Southern 

N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  95  Va.  190,  28 

Ind.  429,  3  N.  E.  389,  4  N.  E.  908;  S.  E.  173;  Stanley  v.  Cedar  R.  & 

Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Brunker,  M.  C.  R.  Co.  119  Iowa,  526,  93  N. 

128  Ind.  551,  26  N.  E.  178;  Chicago  W.  493;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 


§    652  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  688 

(4)  If  the  jury  shall  find  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  then  in 
estimating  the  damages  they  are  to  consider  his  health  and  con- 
dition before  the  injury  complained  of  as  compared  with  his  pres- 
ent condition  in  consequence  of  said  injury,   and  whether  the 
same  is  in  its  nature  permanent,  and  how  far,  if  at  all,  it  is  cal- 
culated to  disable  him  from  engaging  in  employment  for  which, 
in  the  absence  of  such  injury,  he  would  have  been  qualified,  and 
also  the  physical  and  mental  suffering,  if  any,  to  which  he  was 
subjected  by  reason  of  such  injury  and  to  allow  him  such  dam- 
ages as  in  the  opinion  of  the  jury  will  be  a  fair  and  just  compen- 
sation for  the  injury  he  has  sustained.168 

(5)  If  the   jury  shall   find   a   verdict   for   the   plaintiff,   then 
in  estimating  damages  they  are  to  consider  the  health  and  con- 
dition of  the  plaintiff  before  the  injury  complained  of  as  com- 
pared with  his  present  condition  in  consequence  of  said  injury, 
and  whether  the  same  is  in  its  nature  permanent;  and  if  the 
jury  further  believe  that  the  plaintiff's  internal  affliction  is  the 
natural  and  proximate  consequence  of  the  injury  sustained  by 
the  defendant's  negligence,  then  they  are  entitled  to  consider 
the  same  in  awarding  damages,  even  if  they  believe  that  at  the 
time  of  the  accident  the  plaintiff  had  a  tendency  or  predisposi- 
tion to  the  disease  or  trouble  from  which  he  now  suffers.*89 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
company  is  liable  in  this  action,  then  in  estimating  damages  they 
should  take  into  account  the  bodily  injury,  if  any,  sustained  by 
the  plaintiff,  the  pain  undergone,  the  effects. on  the  health  of 
the  sufferer  according  to  its  degree  and  its  probable  duration 
as  being  temporary  or  permanent,  and  the  pecuniary  loss  sus- 
tained by  the  plaintiff,  through  his  inability  to  attend  to  his 
business   affairs   after   his   arrival   at    the     age    of    twenty-one 
years.170 

(7)  If  you  find  under  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 

Warner,  108  111.  545;   Cicero  St.  R.  ies  Philadelphia  &  W.  B.  R.  Co.  v. 

Co.  v.  Brown,  193  111.  274,  61  N.  E.  Anderson,    72    Md.    520,    20    Atl.    2. 

1093;  Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoeff-  See  Mellor  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co, 

ner,  175  111.  642,  51  N.  E.  884;  Wris-  105  Mo.  455,  S.  W.  849. 

ley   Co.   v.   Burke,    203    111.    259,   67  i«»  Baltimore  &  L.  T.  Co.  v.  Cas- 

N.   E.   818;    Chicago,  R.   I.   &  P.  K  sell,  66  Md.  421. 

Co.   v.   Otto,   52   111.   417;    Smith   v.  i™  Washington,  A.  &  Mt.  V.  Elec. 

Middleton,  112  Ky.  592,  56  L,.  R.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Quayle,  95  Va.  748,  30  S. 

484.  B.  391. 


689  DAMAGES   FOR  PERMANENT   INJURY.  §    652 

to  recover,  it  will  be  your  duty  to  assess  the  amount  of  damages 
which,  you  in  your  judgment,  think,  from  the  evidence,  she 
should  recover.  And  in  estimating  the  amount  you  may  take 
into  consideration  any  expenses  actually  incurred,  loss  of  time, 
if  any,  occasioned  by  the  immediate  effects  of  her  injuries  and 
physical  and  mental  suffering  caused  by  and  growing  out  of 
her  injuries.  And  in  addition  you  may  consider  the  professional 
occupation,  if  any,  of  the  plaintiff  and  her  ability  to  earn  money ; 
and  she  will  be  entitled  to  recover  for  any  permanent  reduc- 
tion if  any,  of  her  power  to  earn  money  by  reason  of  her  injuries, 
and  the  amount  assessed  should  be  such  a  sum  as,  in  your  judg- 
ment, will  fully  compensate  her  for  the  injuries  or  any  of  them, 
thus  sustained.171 

(8)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  in- 
jured by  the  wrongful  negligent  act  of  the  defendants,  the  rail- 
road's agents  and  servants,  and  while  the  plaintiff  himself  was 
acting  with  reasonable  prudence,  then  in  assessing  his  damages, 
the  jury  should  take  into  account  the  peril  if  any  there  was, 
to  the  plaintiff's  life;  the  suffering  of  body  and  mind,  if  any 
there  was;  the  fact,  if  it  is  a  fact,  as  shown  by  the  evidence, 
that   the   injury   he   suffered   is   permanent;    the    extent   of   it; 
how  far,  if  at  all,  the  injury  renders  him  less  capable  and  fit 
to  pursue  his  calling  and  business;  any  loss  of  time  shown,  its 
value  if  shown;  any  expenses  incurred;  and  so  considering  said 
elements,  the  jury  should   assess  such  damages  within  the  de- 
mand of  the  complaint  as  will  reasonably  and  justly  compensate 
the  plaintiff  for  his  injuries.172 

(9)  If  the  jury  find  the  issues  for  the  plaintiff,  then  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  recover  such  actual  damages  as  the  evidence 
may  show  he  has  sustained    as  the  direct  or    proximate  result  of 
such  injury,  taking  into  consideration  his  loss  of  time,  his  pain 
and  suffering,  his  necessary  and  reasonable  expenses  in  medical 
and  surgical  aid,  and  nursing,  so  far  as  the  same  may  appear 
from  the  evidence  in  the  case;  and  if  the  jury  find  from  the 
evidence,  that  the  said  injury  is  permanent  and  incurable,  they 
should  also  take  this  into  consideration  in  assessing  the  plain- 

171  Louisville,  N.  A.   &  C.  R.  Co.          i«  Terre    Haute    &    I.    R.    Co.    v. 
v.  Palvey,  104  Ind.  429,  3  N.  E.  389,      Brunker,  128  Ind.  551,  26  N.  E.  178. 

4  N.  E.  908. 


§    652  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  690 

tiff's  damages;  and  the  jury  are  instructed  that  the  fact  that 
the  plaintiff  is  married  and  that  his  wife  is  living,  cannot 
be  considered  by  the  jury  in  determining  the  amount  of  damages 
to  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  in  this  case.173 

(10)  If  you  find  the  issues  for  the  plaintiff  in  this  case,  then 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  such  actual  damages  as  the  evi- 
dence may  show  she  has  sustained  as  the  direct  or  approximate 
result  of  such  injury,  taking  into   consideration  her  pain  and 
suffering  so  far  as  the  same  may  appear  from  the  evidence  in 
the  case ;  and  if  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  said  injury 
is  permanent  and  incurable,  they  should  take  this  fact  into  con- 
sideration in  assessing  the  plaintiff's  damages.174 

(11)  If,  under  the  evidence  in  the  case  and  the  instructions  of 
the  court,  you  find  the  defendant  guilty,  then  in  estimating  the 
plaintiff's  damages,  if  any  are  proved,  you  have  the  right  to 
take  into  consideration  not  only  the  loss,   expenses  and  imme- 
diate damage  arising  from  the  injuries  received  at  the  time  of 
the  accident,  but  also  the  permanent  loss  and  damage,  if  any  is 
proved,  arising  from  any  disability  resulting  to  the  plaintiff  from 
the  injury  in  question  which  renders  him  less   capable   of  at- 
tending to  his  business  than  he  would  have  been  if  the  injury 
had  not  been  received.175 

(12)  If  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  and  the  law  given  you  in 
these  instructions,  you  find  for  the  plaintiff,  you  may  take  into 
consideration  the  bodily  pain  and  suffering  caused  by  the  injury 
if  any  has  been  shown,  and  the  pain  and  suffering  which  will 
result  therefrom  in  the  future,  if  you  find  from  the   evidence 
that  such  will  be  the  result;  also  the  probability  of  the  injuries 
she  has  received  being  permanent,  and  the   extent,  if  any,   to 
which    the    injury   has    incapacitated   her   for   labor;    also    the 
reasonable  expanses  paid  or  incurred  for  the  services  of  a  sur- 
geon or  physician,  made  necessary  by  such  injuries,  and  assess 
her   damages   at   such   sum   as   you   may  believe   from   all   the 
evidence,  will  compensate  her  for  the  injury  so  sustained.     You 

ITS  Chicago  &  E.   R.   Co.  v.  Hoi-         "»  Tudor  Iron  Works  v.   Weber, 
land,  122  111.  470,  13  N.  E.  145.  129  111.  539,  21  N.  E.  1078. 

174  North  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Shreve, 
171  111.  441,  49  N.  E.  534. 


691  CONSIDERATIONS   IN    ESTIMATING   DAMAGES.  §    653 

should    allow    no    speculative    damages,    but    only   such   as    are 
compensatory.170 

(13)  If  you  find  for  the  plaintiff  in  this  cause,  it  will  be  your 
duty  to  assess  his  damages.    The  damages  should  be  assessed  on 
the  basis  of  compensation  for  the  injuries  sustained.    In  doing  so, 
you  should  take  into  consideration  the  question  as  to  whether 
the  plaintiff  is  temporarily  or  permanently  injured;  the  question 
of  his  physical  and  mental  suffering;  the  loss  of  time,  if  any, 
occasioned  by  his  injury;  the  expense,  if  any,  incurred  in  em- 
ploying a  physician  or  surgeon  to  treat  his  injuries;  the  expense 
incurred,  if  any,  in  nursing,  and  should  award  him  such  damages 
as  will  compensate  him  for  his  injuries,  in  any  sum  not  exceed- 
ing ten  thousand  dollars.177 

(14)  To  justify  the  assessment  of  damages  for  future  or  per- 
manent disability,  it  must  appear  that  continued  or  permanent 
disability  is  reasonably  certain  to  result  from  the  injury  com- 
plained of.178 

§  653.  Consider  age,  pain,  mental  anguish. — (1)  If  you  find 
for  plaintiff,  you  will  in  assessing  his  damages,  take  into  consider- 
ation, his  age,  and  condition  in  life,  the  injury  sustained  by 
him,  if  any,  and  physical  pain  and  mental  anguish  suffered  and 
endured  by  him  on  account  of  said  injury,  if  any,  his  loss  of  time, 
if  any,  such  damages,  if  any,  as  you  believe  from  the  evidence 
he  will  sustain  in  the  future  as  the  direct  effect  of  such  injury, 
such  sums  as  he  has  paid  out  for  medical  attention  on  account 
of  said  injury,  if  any,  together  with  all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances in  evidence  in  the  case,  anc!  assess  the  damages  at  such 
sum  as  from  the  evidence  you  may  deem  proper,  not  exceeding 
fifteen  thousand  dollars,  the  amount  sued  for.179 

(2)  In  arriving  at  the  amount  of  damages  to  be  allowed  in  this 
case,  if  you  allow  any,  you  are  not  restricted  to  any  procrustean 
rule  in  the  mode  of  estimating  the  value  of  a  life.  The  age  of  a 
man,  the  health  he  enjoys,  the  money  he  is  making  by  his  labor, 

"6  Pomerene  Co.  v.  White  (Neb.),          «s  Ohio   &   M.   R.    Co.    v.    Cosby, 
69  N.  W.  234.  107  Ind.  35.  7  N.  E.  373. 

177  Eureka     Block     Coal     Co.     v          179  Gorham  v.   Kabsas  City  &   S. 
Wells    (Ind.    App.),    61    N.    W.    236.      R.  Co.  113  Mo.  410,  20  S.  W.  1060. 
Held  not  objectionable  as  allowing 
the  jury  to  go  outside  of  the  evi- 
dence in  assessing  damages. 


§    653  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  692 

his  habits,  are  data  from  which  the  jury  may  argue  how  long 
he  will  probably  live  and  work,  and  what  his  life  is  worth  to 
his  wife  in  its  pecuniary  value.  This  is  true  generally,  and  this 
is  the  rule  laid  down  by  which  you  are  to  estimate  the  damages, 
if  you  find  any.180 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiff  received 
injuries  caused  by  the  negligence  of  defendant,  its  servants  or 
employees,   that  it  is   competent  for  them,  in  ascertaining   the 
damages  to  which  plaintiff  is  entitled,  to  take  into  consideration 
her  physical  condition  prior  to  said  injury,  her  age,  capacity  for 
labor,   and  the   fact   as   to   whether  she   was   self-sustaining   or 
being  supported  by  others.181 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
was  guilty  of  negligence  upon  the   occasion  mentioned  in  the 
plaintiff's  declaration,  and  that  as  a  result  of  that  negligence 
the  said  plaintiff  was  injured,  they  can  take  into  consideration  not 
only   the   bodily   pain   and   suffering   of   the   plaintiff,    and   the 
expenses  she  has  been  put  to,  but  in  addition  may  allow  such 
damages  as  may  reasonably  seem  to  them  fit,   for  the  mental 
suffering  and  nervous  shock  which  has  resulted  or  may  result 
from  the  said  negligent  act  of  said  defendant.182 

(5)  If  you  find  for  the  plaintiff,  you  should  allow  him  such  sum, 
not  to  exceed  the   amount  claimed  by  him  in  his  petition,   as 
from  the  evidence  will  reasonably  compensate  him  for  the  pain 
and  suffering,  if  any,  or  loss  of  time,  if  any,  or  both  suffered, 
or  that  will  be  suffered  by  him  because  of  his  injuries,  if  any, 
by  him   sustained  by  reason  of  colliding  with  the   car   of  the 
defendant  at  the  intersection  mentioned,  on  or  about  the  third 
day  of  May,  1899.183 

(6)  In  determining  the  amount  of  damages  the  plaintiff  is  en- 
titled to  recover,  if  any,  the  jury  have  a  right  to  and  should,  take 
into  consideration  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence  be- 
fore them,  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  plaintiff's  physical  in- 
juries, if  any,  testified  about  by  the  witnesses  in  the  case,  her  suf- 
fering in  body  and  mind,  if  any,  resulting  from  such  injuries,  and 

iso  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  isz  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

76  Ga.  775.  95  Va.  190,  28  S.  E.  173. 

isi  Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  66  iss  Stanley  v.  Cedar  R.  &  M.  C. 

Miss.  313,  6  So.  207.  R.  Co.  119  Iowa-,  526,  93  N.  W.  493. 


693  CONSIDERATIONS    IN    ESTIMATING    DAMAGES.  §    653 

also,  such  prospective  suffering  and  loss  of  health,  if  any,  as  the 
jury  may  believe,  from  all  the  evidence  before  them  in  the  case, 
she  has  sustained  or  will  sustain  by  reason  of  such  injuries.184 

(7)  If,  under  the  evidence  and  instructions  of  the  court,  the 
jury  find  the  defendant  guilty,  then,  in  estimating  the  plaintiff's 
damages,  it  will  be  proper  for  the  jury  to  consider  the  effect  of 
the  injury  in  future  upon  the  plaintiff,  the  use  of  his  arm,  and 
his  ability  to  attend  to  his  affairs  generally,  in  pursuing  any 
ordinary  trade  or  calling,  if  the  evidence  shows  that  these  will 
be  affected  in  the  future,  and  also  the  bodily  pain  and  suffering 
he  has  sustained,  and  all  damages,  present  and  future,  which, 
from  the  evidence,  can  be  treated  as  the  necessary  and  direct  re- 
sult of  the  injury  complained  of.185 

(8)  If  under  the  evidence  and  instructions  of  the  court,  you 
find  the  defendant  guilty,  then,  in  assessing  the  plaintiff's  dam- 
ages, if  any  such  damages  as  are  alleged  in  her  declaration  are 
proved,  you  have  a  right  to  take  into  consideration  the  nature, 
extent  and  character  of  the  injury  sustained  by  her,  so  far  as 
the  same  is  shovn  by  the  evidence,  if  any  such  are  so  shown,  the 
pain  and  suffering  undergone  by  her  in   consequence   of  such 
injury,  if  any  such  is  shown  by  the  evidence,  and  assess  damages 
in  such  sum  as  in  your  judgment  will  compensate  the  plaintiff 
for  such  injury  and  pain  and  suffering.186 

(9)  If  under  the  evidence,  and  instructions  of  the  court,  the 
jury  find  the  defendant  guilty,  then  in  estimating  the  plaintiff's 
damages,  it  will  be  proper  for  the  jury  to  consider  the  effect  of 
the  injury  in  the  future  upon  the  plaintiff,  if  any  is  shown  by  the 
evidence,  the  use  of  his  foot  and  leg,  his  ability  to  attend  to 
his  affairs,  generally  in  pursuing  any  ordinary  trade  or  calling, 
if  the  evidence  shows  that  these  will  be  affected  in  the  future; 
and   also   the   bodily  pain   and  suffering   he   sustained,   if   any, 
and  all   damages  present  and  future,  if  any,   which   from   the 

is*  Hannibal   &   St.   J.   R.   Co.   v.  the  latter  clause  did  not  submit  a 

Martin,   111  111.  227.     Held  not  as-  question  of  law  to  the  jury, 
suming  that  the  party  is  entitled  to         iss  Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoeff- 

recover  damages.  ner,  175  111.  642,  51  N.  E.  884.  Held 

is5  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner,  not  objectionable  as  permitting  the 

108  111.  545.     Held  proper  and  that  jury  to  go  outside  of  the  evidence 

in  assessing  damages. 


§    654  NEGLIGENCE   OF   RAILROADS.  694 

evidence,  can  be  treated  as  the  necessary  and  direct  result  of 
the  injury  complained  of.187 

(10)  If  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  and  under  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  court,  the  jury  shall  find  the  issue  for  the  plaintiff, 
and  that  the  plaintiff  has  sustained  damages  as  charged,  in  the 
declaration,  then  to  enable  the  jury  to  estimate  the  amount  of 
such  damages,  it  is  not  necessary  that  any  witness  should  have 
expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  amount  of  such  damages,  but 
the  jury  may  themselves  make  such  estimate  from  the  facts  and 
circumstances  proven  by  the  evidence,  and  by  considering  them 
in  connection  with  their  knowledge,  observation  and  experience 
in  the  business  affairs  of  life.188 

§  654.     Considerations  in  mitigation  of  damages. — (1)  It  was 

the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  use  ordinary  care,  diligence  and  judg- 
ment, in  securing  medical  or  surgical  aid  after  she  received  the 
injuries  complained  of,  if  she  did  receive  any;  and  if  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  she  failed  to  use  such  ordinary  care, 
diligence  and  judgment  in  procuring  timely  medical  or  surgical 
aid ;  and  if  you  further  find  from  the  evidence  that  by  reason  of 
such  failure  her  condition  is  now  different  and  worse  than  it 
would  have  been  if  she  had  used  such  ordinary  care,  diligence 
and  judgment  in  the  premises,  then,  if  you  find  for  the  plaintiff, 
you  should  take  this  into  account  in  making  up  your  verdict 
and  should  not  allow  any  damages  for  ailments  or  diseases,  if 
any,  that  may  have  resulted  from  r:uch  failure.189 

(2)  And  so  too  it  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  use  ordinary 
care  to  cure  and  restore  herself,  and  if  you  find  from  the  evi- 
dence that  the  plaintiff  failed  to  use  such  ordinary  care  in  the 
premises,  but  that  she  unnecessarily  exposed  herself  in  inclement 
weather  or  otherwise,  after  receiving  the  injuries,  if  any  'she 
did  receive  in  said  accident  and  thereby  increased  and  aggra- 
vated such  injuries  and  enhanced  their  effects,  you  will  take 
these  facts  into  account  in  arriving  at  your  verdict,  if  you  find 
for  the  plaintiff,  and  should  not  allow  any  damages  to  the  plain- 
is?  Wrisley  Co.  v.  Burke,  203  111.  189  Louisville  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co. 
259,  67  N.  E.  818.  v.  Falvey,  104  Ind.  424,  3  N.  E.  389, 

iss  North    Chicago   St.    R.    Co.    v.      4  N.  E.  908. 
Fitzgibbons,   180   111.    466,   54  N.   E. 
483. 


695  CUSTOMS,  USAGES,  RULES.  §  655 

tiff  for  any  ailments,  injuries  or  diseases  or  their  aggravation 
from  which  the  plaintiff  has  been  or  may  be  suffering  by  reason 
of  such  exposure  and  from  which  she  would  not  otherwise  be 
suffering.190 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  is  enti- 
tled to  damages,  but  believe  that  only  nominal  damages  would  be 
all  the  plaintiff  should  have,  because  of  mitigating  circumstances, 
if  you  believe  the  evidence  shows  mitigating  circumstances,  then 
you  are  authorized  to  award  him  only  nominal  damages.191 

§  655.  Customs,  usages,  rules  relating  to  railroads. — (1)  By 
the  term  "general  custom"  is  meant  the  general  way  of  doing 
some  particular  thing, — the  usual  way  of  doing  such  thing.  To  es- 
tablish a  general  custom  in  reference  to  any  particular  thing, 
or  way  or  manner  of  doing  such  thing,  it  must  be  made  to  ap- 
pear from  the  evidence  that  such  custom  was  generally  and 
uniformly  extended  to  all  persons,  under  like  circumstances 
and  conditions  and  that  the  same  is  notorious,  that  is,  well 
understood.  So  if,  in  the  case  at  bar,  it  does  not  appear  from 
the  evidence  that  all  persons  holding  tickets  or  passes  from 
points  west  of  P  to  H  were  allowed  to  take  their  choice  of  line, 
either  by  A  or  O  to  H,  then  the  general  custom  in  question  in 
this  case  :s  not  established.192 

(2)  The  railroad  tracks  and  right  of  way  of  the  defendant,  at 
and  about  where  the  accident  complained  of  is  shown  by  the  plead- 
ings and  evidence  to  have  happened,  was  the  property  of  the 
defendant,  and  if  the  jury  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  a 
pathway  to  either  side  of  the  defendant's  said  tracks  had  been 
made  by  persons  traveling  the  same,  and  shall  further  find  that 
said  pathway  continued  across  said  tracks,  and  that  persons  had 
used  the  same  as  a  near  approach  to  the  store  building  and  sta- 
tion used  by  defendant  for  twenty-five  years  or  more,  and  with 
knowledge  of  and  without  objection  from  the  defendant  or 
its  agents,  that  such  user  by  persons,  however  numerous  and 
for  however  long  a  time,  conferred  no  right  upon  the  plaintiffs 
or  other  persons  to  use  such  pathway  across  said  tracks,  and 

i9o  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.          i»i  Birmingham   Ry.   L.   &  P.   Co. 
v.  Falvey,  104  Ind.  425,  3  N.  E.  389,      v.  Mullen  (Ala.),  35  So.  702. 
4  N.  E.  908.  192  Milroy    v.    Chicago,    M.    &    St. 

P.  R.  Co.  98  Iowa,  193,  67  N.  W.  276. 


§    655  NEGLIGENCE   OF    RAILROADS.  696 

imposed  upon  the  defendant  and  its  servants  no  duty  to  exercise 
greater  care  in  the  management  and  running  of  its  trains  at 
such  pathway,  than  at  other  points  on  or  along  its  road  where 
there  were  no  established  crossings.193 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  rule  or  notice 
of  the  defendant  read  in  evidence,  relating  to  the  use  of  tracks,  by 
crews  of  the  plaintiff's  company  in  entering  the  defendant's  yard, 
was  habitually  violated  with  the  knowledge  and  acquiescence 
of  the  defendant  or  was  not  enforced  as  to  the  switching  crew 
with  which  the  plaintiff  worked,  then  the  jury  should  disregard 
such  notice  or  rule  in  considering  the  whole  case.194 

193  Baltimore     &     O.     R.     Co.     v.          i»*  St.  Louis  N.  S.  Yards  v.  God- 
Owings,  65  Md.  505,  5  Atl.  329.  frey,  198  111.  294,  65  N.  E.  90. 


CHAPTER  XLTV. 
REAL  ESTATE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

ADVERSE  POSSESSION  OF  LAND.  672.    Damages     from     piling     dirt, 

filth. 

656.  Possession  must  be  open  and      673.    Damages  in  destroying  fences. 

notorious.  674.     From    diverting    flow    of    sur- 

657.  Actual   possession   essential.  face  water. 

658.  Possession   shown   by   acts   of     675.     Dam  injured  by  bridge  wash- 

ownership,  ing  out  through   negligence. 

659.  Possession — Acts  of  ownership 

not  sufficient. 

660.  Intention      must     accompany 

661.  Notice   to   legal  owner  essen-     . 


oen     ™        •  f  677.    Measure   of    damages    for    in- 

662.  Claiming    land    by    color    of  jury  to  crQps 

663.  Occu|ying  land  without  color  ™    Submitting   facts   tc 

BOUNDARY    LINES.  DAMAGES   BY   NUISANCE.. 

664.  Boundary  line  fixed  by  agree-  679.    Residence,     health,     business, 

ment.  injury   to. 

665.  Locating  the  boundary  line.  680.    Plaintiff  must  prove  nuisance, 

666.  Meander    line    as    the    boun-  injury    insufficient. 

dary.  681.     Purchasing    property    in    fac- 

667.  By  high-water  mark.  tory   locality,   no   liability. 

668.  Accretions     along     rivers   —  682.    Using    premises    as    a    pest- 

Ownership.  house- 

DAMAGES   TO  REALTY.  EMINENT    DOMAIN CONDEMNATION. 

669.  Owner  permitting  property  to  683.    Highest   and   best  use   in   es- 

be   damaged.  timating   damages. 

670.  Excavations  on  adjacent  prem-  684.    Damages   based    upon   market 

isesi — Liability.  value. 

671.  Damages     from     change     of  685.    Considerations  in  determining 

grade.  value. 

697 


§    656  REAL    ESTATE.  698 

Sec.  Sec. 

686.  Value  of  lots  fronting  on  nav-  TAXES  ON  REALTY. 

igable  streams. 

687.  Benefits     shall     be     deducted      689.    Land  unlawfully  sold  for  taxes 

from   damages.  — Certificates  void. 

688.  Witnesses    magnifying   values      690.    Listing  land  on  books  for  as- 

Credibility.  sessment. 

691.     Forfeitures    are    odious    and 
must  be  strictly  proved. 


Adverse  Possession  of  Land. 

656.  Possession  must  be  open  and  notorious. — (1)  Adverse 
possession  sufficient  to  defeat  a  legal  title  must  be  hostile  in  its 
inception  and  continue  uninterruptedly  for  ten  years.  It  must 
also  be  open,  notorious,  adverse  and  exclusive,  and  must  be  held 
during  all  of  such  time  under  a  cjaim  of  ownership  by  the  occu- 
pant, and  all  of  these  facts  must  be  proved  by  a  preponderance 
of  the  evidence.1 

(2)  In  order  to  divest  the  title  to  the  land  described  in  plain- 
tiff's declaration  out  of  the  plaintiff  and  vest  it  in  the  defendant 
by  reason  of  his  adverse  possession,  that  possession  must  be  actual, 
visible,    notorious    and    hostile,    continuous    and    uninterrupted, 
under  a  claim  of  title  for  a  period  of  -     -  years  next  preceding 
the  commencement  of  this  suit.2 

(3)  If  the  defendants  and  those  under  whom  they  claim  have 
adverse  possession  of  so  much  of  the  premises  mentioned  and 
described  in  the  petition  as  is  covered  by  the  building  of  the 
defendants,  and  said  possession  was  open,  notorious  and  hostile, 
under  claim  of  title,  and  continuous  for  more  than  ten  years  prior 
to  the  institution  of  this  suit,  then  the  plaintiffs  cannot  recover 
the  portion  of  said  premises  so  covered  by  said  building.3 

(4)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  entered 
into  the  occupancy  and  possession  of  the  premises  in  question, 
claiming  the  title  thereto  exclusive  of  and  hostile  to  any  other 
right,  and  that  such  claim  of  title  was  made  in  good  faith,  the  de- 
fendant believing  that  he  had  a  good  title  to  the  land  as  the  owner 
thereof,  and  further  find  that  such  occupancy  and  possession  was 

1  Hoffine  v.  Ewings,  60  Neb.  731,      See  Davenport  v.  Sebring,  52  Iowa, 
84  N.  W.  93.     See  McAvoy  v:  Gas-      "64. 

sioy,  60  N.  Y.  S.  827.  3  Dalton  v.  Bank,  &c.  54  Mo.  106. 

2  Dalby    v.    Snuffer,    57    Mo.    294. 


699  ADVERSE  POSSESSION  OF  LAND.  §    656 

actual  and  continued,  uninterrupted  and  notorious  and  hostile  to 
any  other  right  or  title  to  said  land  for  a  period  of  twenty  years 
prior  to  the  commencement  of  this  action,  and  that  during  all 
that  time  the  defendant  so  claimed  title  to  said  land,  that  would 
constitute  adverse  possession  and  would  bar  plaintiff's  right  to 
recover  in  this  action,  and  your  verdict  in  such  case  would  and 
should  be  for  the  defendant.4 

(5)  If  at  the  date  this  suit  was  commenced  the  defendant  had 
been  in  peaceful  and  exclusive  possession  of  the  land  up  to  the 
north  line  of  the  disputed  strip  and  cultivated  and  claimed  it  as 
his  own,  and  such  claim  of  ownership  has  been  open,  notorious  and 
adverse  to  all  the  world  for  more  than  -     -  years,  then  his  pos- 
session and  claim  has  ripened  into  a  good  title,  and  if  you  so 
find  your  verdict  will  be  for  the  defendant.     To  be  adverse,  how- 
ever, the  holding  or  possession  of  the  defendant  must  have  been 
with  the  intention  of  insisting  upon  his  right  to  the  land  in  con- 
troversy as  against  all  others  an'd  not  by  mere  mistake  as  to  the 
location  of  the  line  as  fixed  by  the  government  survey.5 

(6)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  S  cleared  and  culti- 
vated the  land  east  of  the  old  levee,  beginning  at  an  old  stone  in 
the  southeast  corner  of  the  lot  number  seven  of  the  D  tract,  and 
running  eastwardly  at  right  angles  to  said  old  levee  toward  the 
Mississippi  river,  and  that  he  and  those  under  whom  he  claims 
title  have  been  in  open,  public,  notorious  and  adverse  possession 
thereof,  claiming  title  thereto  for  more  than  ten  years  prior  to 
the  institution  of  this  suit,  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover 
any  part  of  the  land  so  occupied  nor  any  part  of  the. accretion 
thereto.6 

(7)  If  the  plaintiff's  possession  of  the  premises  in  dispute  was 
open,  notorious,  exclusive  and  adverse,  comporting  with  the  usual 
management  of  a  farm  by  its  owner,  though  a  portion  was  wood- 
land and  uncultivated,   and  though  not  wholly  surrounded  by 
fences  or  rendered  inaccessible  by  other  obstructions,  it  would 
constitute   a   disseizin   of  the  true   owner  unaffected  by   other 
facts.7 

*  Bartlett  v.   Secor,   56  Wis.  520,          e  Beene  v.  Miller,  149  Mo.  233,  50 
14  N.  W.  714.  S.   W.   824. 

s  Heinz  v.  Cramer,  84  Iowa,  497,         ?  Gardner  v   Gooch,  48  Me.  489. 
51  N.  W.  173. 


§    657  REAL    ESTATE.  700 

(8)  When  a  party  claims  to  have  acquired  title  to  the  lands  of 
another  by  having  held  possession  a  length  of  time  sufficient  to 
bar  the  owner  from  retaking  possession,  he  must,   to  succeed, 
show  that  his  possession  is  of  that  exclusive,  permanent,  open, 
hostile  and  adverse  character  as  to  put  the  owner  in  the  position 
of  failing  to  assert  his  rights,  knowing  or  having  reason  to  know 
.they  were  encroached  upon  for  the  full  period  of  -   — years.8 

(9)  To  defeat  the  claim  of  the  plaintiffs  in  this  action  upon  the 
defense  of  adverse  possession  the  jury  must  find  from  the  evi- 
dence that  the  defendants  in  person  or  by  their  tenants  have 
for  more  than  twenty  years  prior  to  May  thirty-first,  1889,  held 
actual,  exclusive,  continuous,  open,  notorious  and  adverse  posses- 
sion of  the  said  premises,  and  they  cannot  extend  their  possession 
by  tacking  it  to  the  prior  possession  of  any  person  who  during 
such  prior  possession  did  not  claim  any  title  or  right  to  the  prem- 
ises.9 

§  657.  Actual  possession  is  essential. — (1)  If  you  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendants  and  those  under  whom  they 
claim  have  had  possession  of  the  land  in  dispute  for  more  than 
twenty  years  prior  to  the  commencement  of  this  suit  under  claim 
of  title,  and  adversely  to  all  other  claims  of  title,  you  must  find 
for  the  defendants.10 

(2)  If  T  and  his  representative  took  actual  possession  of  the 
tract  of  laud  in  question  by  fencing  up  the  whole  of  it,  and  held 
such  possession  claiming  to  be  the  owner  thereof  in  fee,  for  more 
than  twenty  years  prior  to  the  entry  of  the  defendants  or  those 
under  whom  they  claim,  such  possession  vested  the  fee  in  said 
T's  representatives.11 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  and 
those  through  whom  he  obtained  possession  of  the  property  sued 
for,  had  had  a  continuous  possession  thereof  for  twenty  years  next 
before  the  commencement  of  this  suit,  claiming  the  same  as  their 
own,  then  you  should  find  for  the  defendant  as  against  each  of 
the  plaintiffs,  who  has  not  proved  herself  or  himself  either  under 
twenty-one  years  of  age  or  a  married  woman  at  the  commence- 
ment of  such  possession ;  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  each 

8  Hoohmoth  v.  Des  Grand  Champs,          10  Wiggins  v.  Holley,  11  Ind.  5. 
71  Mich.  520,  39  N.  W.  737.  n  Farrar  v.  Heinrich,  86  Mo.  527. 

o  Holtzman  v.  Douglas,  168  U.  S. 
285,  18  Sup.  Ct.  65. 


701  POSSESSION,    HOW    SHOWN.  §    658 

of  the  plaintiffs  claiming  to  have  been  under  such  age,  or  a 
married  woman  at  the  commencement  of  such  possession,  to  prove 
it  affirmatively;  and  until  it  be  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
jury,  the  contrary  thereof  should  be  presumed  by  you.12 

§  658.  Possession  shown  by  acts  of  ownership. — (1)  If  you  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  upon  receiving  and  re- 
cording the  deed  from  E  to  him  dated  September  twenty-eighth, 
1833,  entered  upon  the  land  therein  described  and  continued  to 
have  a  visible  possession,  occupancy  and  improvement  of  only 
a  portion  thereof,  such  occupation  and  improvement,  uncon- 
trolled by  other  acts,  were  a  disseizin  of  the  true  owner  as  to  the 
whole  of  said  land  described  in  the  deed,  though  E  might  not 
have  had  title  thereto.13 

(2)  To  constitute  possession  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  land 
should  be  enclosed  with  a  fence,  or  that  the  same  should  be  cul- 
tivated, resided  upon  or  that  buildings  should  be  erected  thereon. 
It  is  sufficient  if  the  acts  of  ownership  are  of  such  a  character  as 
to  openly  and  publicly  indicate  an  assumed  control  or  use  such 
as  are  consistent  with  the  character  of  the  premises  in  question. 
If  you  find  in  the  spring  of  1868,  or  the  summer  of  that  year, 
B,  after  getting  his  deed,  began  the  exercise  of  such  acts  of 
ownership  and  control  as  are  usual  by  owners  of  timber  lots 
when  used  to  supply  a  farm  in  the  neighborhood  with  timber, 
and  his  acts  were  of  such  an  adverse,  open,  notorious  and  hostile 
nature  as  to  clearly  indicate  that  he  asserted  exclusive  control 
over  it,  and  that  he  continued  to  do  so  up  to  the  time  of  his  sale 
to   H,    and   that   afterwards   H   continued   with  like   acts,   you 
would  be  justified  in  finding  that  the  defendants  had  been  in 
such  possession  as  to  bar  any  claim  of  title  on  the  part  of  the 
plaintiff,  and  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendants.14 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  that  the  land 
in  controversy  or  any  considerable  part  thereof  was  susceptible  of 
a  definite  occupation  or  possession,  that  is,  that  said  land  or  any 
part  of  it  was  fit  for  pasture  or  cultivation  without  clearing  or 
cutting  away  the  timber  thereon — then,  in  order  to  constitute  the 
possession  of  the  plaintiff,  or  that  of  those  under  whom  he  claims. 

12  Dessaunier  v.   Murphy,   33  Mo.          n  Murray    v.    Hudson,    65    Mich. 
191.  673,  32  N.  W.   889. 

is  Gardner  v.   Gooch,  48  Me.  488. 


§    658  REAL    ESTATE.  702 

adversely,  you  must  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  that 
the  plaintiff  or  his  grantor,  M,  either  in  person  or  by  their 
tenants,  built  permanent  structures  on  said  land,  or  actually 
inclosed  or  cultivated  it  or  some  part  of  it  for  the  period  of  ten 
years  prior  to  the  institution  of  this  suit,  and  that  it  is  not  suffi- 
cient in  such  a  case  that  the  plaintiff  or  his  grantor,  M,  paid 
the  taxes  on  said  land,  kept  off  trespassers,  cut  off  timber,  erected 
temporary  structures  and  pastured  stock  thereon  under  a  claim 
of  ownership.15 

(4)  Neither  physical  occupation,  cultivation  nor  residence  is 
necessary  to  constitute  actual  adverse  possession  when  the  prop- 
erty is  so  situated  as  not  to  admit  of  any  permanent  useful  im- 
provement and  the  continued  claim  of  the  property  has  been  evi- 
denced by  open,  visible,  continuous  acts  of  ownership,  known  to 
and  acquiesced  in  by  the  real  owner,  or  so  far  notorious  as  to  be 
presumed  to  be  within  his  knowledge.16 

(5)  For  the  purpose  of  constituting  adverse  possession  by  a 
person  claiming  title  to  land  not  founded  upon  some  written  in- 
strument or  some  judgment  or  decree,  the  land  shall  be  deemed  to 
have  been  possessed  and  occupied  in  the  following  cases  only:  (1) 
when  it  has  been  protected  by  a  substantial  inclosure;  (2)  when 
it  has  been  usually  cultivated  and  improved.17 

(6)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  H,  not 
less  than  ten  years   prior  to   the   commencement   of  this   suit, 
entered  into  possession  of  the  land  in  controversy  and  cultivated 
or  fenced  the  same,  or  erected  improvements  of  any  kind  thereon, 
or  did  any  other  acts  of  such  a  character  as  to  clearly  show  that 
he  was  occupying  said  land  and  claiming  it  the  same  as  his  own, 
and  during  all  of  said  time  continued  to  so  occupy  said  land 
claiming  during  all  of  said  time  to  be  the  owner  thereof,  and 
never  during  any  of  said  period  of  time  abandoned  the  land, 
but  during  all  of  the  time  of  said  ten  years  continued  openly, 
notoriously,  adversely  and  exclusively  to  occupy  and  claim  to 
be  the  owner  of  said  land,  then  you  are  instructed  that  said  acts 
on  the  part  of  the  defendant  H  would  constitute  adverse  pos- 
session within  the  meaning  of  the  law  and  would  entitle  the 

is  Cook  v.   Farrah,   105   Mo.   502,         "  Bartlett  v.   Secor,  56  Wis.  520, 
16  S.  W.  692.  14  N.  W.  714. 

ie  Merwin  v.  Morris,  71  Conn.  564, 
42  Atl.  855. 


703  POSSESSION,    HOW    SHOWN.  §    660 

defendant  to  a  verdict.  But  if  the  defendant,  H,  has  failed  to 
establish  any  of  said  acts  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence 
your  verdict  should  be  for  the  -plaintiff.18 

§  659.  Possession — Acts  of  ownership  not  sufficient. — (1)  It  is 
not  sufficient  to  constitute  possession  that  the  said  K  should  have 
occasionally  used  the  property  in  dispute  for  the  purpose  of  a 
printing  office  during  a  period  of  time  equal  to  ten  years  or  more, 
but  such  possession,  in  order  to  bind  the  true  owner,  must  have 
been  continuous  and  unequivocal.19 

(2)  The  mere  piling  up  of  wood  or  lumber  or  rails  or  offal  upon 
a  tract  of  land  or  lot,  unaccompanied  by  any  other  act  denoting 
ownership,  is  not  such  possession  of  the  land  or  lot  as  would 
constitute  notice  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  such  tract  of  land 
or  lot,  unless  such  piling  of  wood  or  lumber  should  constitute, 
in  the   estimation  of  the  jury,   an   open,   visible   and   exclusive 
possession  of  the  lot  in  the  person  piling  such  wood  or  lumber.20 

(3)  An  occasional  use  of  the  land  in  question,  such  as  the  occa- 
sional cutting  of  grass  or  fire  wood,  will  not  be  sufficient  to  con- 
stitute or  establish  adverse  possession.21 

(4)  If  the  plaintiff  cut  the  grass  upon  a  natural  fresh  meadow, 
and  carried  the  hay  away  and  converted  it  to  his  own  use  annu- 
ally for  any  period  of  time,  however  long,  without  any  other  pos- 
session of  the  land  on  which  it  grew,  or  any  claim  of  title  to  the 
land,  such  acts  alone  would  not  constitute  an  adverse  possession 
against  the  true  owner  of  the  soil.22 

§  660.  Intention  must  accompany  possession. — (1)  Such  pos- 
session must  be  under  a  claim  of  title  or  right  to  the  land  occu- 
pied ;  or,  in  other  words,  the  fact  of  possession  and  intention  with 
which  it  was  commenced  and  held  are  the  only  tests.  If  therefore 
the  intention  of  claiming  the  title  of  the  land  against  the  true 
owner  is  wanting,  the  possession  will  not  be  adverse,  and  however 
long  continued  will  not  bar  the  owner's  right  to  recover.23 

(2)  If  the  defendants  during  the  time  they  have  held  the  land 
in  dispute  only  claimed  to  own  the  improvements  made  thereon 

is  Hofflne  v.  Ewings,  60  Neb.  731,  21  Mer\\in  v.  Morris,  71  Conn.  564, 
84  N.  W.  93.  42  Atl.  855. 

is  Mertens  v.  Keilman,  79  Mo.  416.          22  Gardner  v.  Gooch,  48  Me.  489. 
20  Truesdale  v.  Ford,  37  111.  210.  23  Davenport  v.  Sebring,  52  Iowa, 

366,  3  N.  W.  403. 


§061  REAL    ESTATE.  704 

then  no  length  of  possession  will  give  them  title  to  the  land; 
and,  in  considering  this  case,  you  will  take  into  consideration 
the  acts  and  declarations  of  the  defendants  and  their  statements 
of  the  claim  made  by  them,  and  if  the  evidence  introduced  satis- 
fies you  that  the  claim  of  the  defendants  was  a  claim  for  improve- 
ments only,  then  you  must  find  i'or  the  plaintiffs.24 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendants  pur- 
chased the  land  in  controversy  from  the  railroad  company,  by 
an   assignment    of   a    contract    of   purchase    from    one    S,    and 
thereby  derived  the  first  claim  they  ever  made  to  the  land  in 
question,  and  afterwards  sued  and  obtained  the  purchase  money 
paid  for  said  land  by  their  assignor,  S,  or  themselves,  by  reason 
of  an  alleged  want  of  title  in  said  railroad  company,  then  such 
action  on  the  part  of  the  defendants  amounts  to  an  abandonment 
of  all  rights  claimed  or  acquired  by  the  defendants  in  and  to 
the  title  to  the  land  in  question  up  to  the  time  of  receiving  such 
repayments  of  the  purchase  money,  and  their  claim  of  title  now 
made  must  commence  from  the  date  of  the  receipt  of  such  pur- 
chase money,  if  you  find  such  claim    has    been    made    by    the 
defendants.25 

(4)  The  question  of  abandonment  is  one  of  fact  and  intention. 
Ceasing  to  cultivate  a  common  field  and  a  removal  elsewhere  do 
not  make  an  abandonment;  but  to  constitute  an  abandonment 
by  the  party  occupying  the  premises  it  must  be  shown  that  he 
quit  the  property  with  the  intention  of  making  no  further  claim 
to  the  same,  and  the  burden  of  showing  the  abandonment  rests 
upon  the  party  who  alleges  it.26 

§  661.  Notice  to  the  owner  essential. — (1)  You  cannot  pre- 
sume that  the  owner  of  the  land  in  question,  in  going  along  the 
highway  where  the  fence  is  shown  to  be  nearly  on  the  line,  and 
seeing  a  fence  extending  north,  has  thereby  notice  that  the  fence 
incloses  any  portion  of  the  land.  On  the  contrary,  he  is  justified 
in  assuming  that  his  neighbor  is  only  inclosing  what  he  is  en- 
titled to.27 

24  Davenport  v.  Sebring,  52  Iowa,  26  Taylor   v.    Laden,   33    Mo.    205. 
366,    3    N.    W.    403.      See   Heinz   v.  27  Hockmoth       v.       Des       Grand 
Cramer,  84  Iowa,  499,  51  N.  W.  173.  Champs,    71    Mich.    520,    39    N.    W. 

25  Davenport  v.  Sebring,  52  Iowa,  737. 
364,  3  N.  W.  403. 


705  COLOR  OF   TITLE.  |    662 

(2)  The  defendant,  to  make  out  a  title  by  adverse  possession, 
must  show  that  such  possession  was  adverse  in  its  inception,  and 
where  the  entry  is  under  the  title  of  the  legal  owner  the  holder 
cannot  controvert  that  title  without  an  express  disclaimer  or  its 
equivalent,  and  the  assertion  of  an  adverse  title  with  notice  to 
the  owner.28 

(3)  The  owner  need  not  move  to  retake  possession  till  he  learns 
or  ought  to  know  that  his  lands  are  taken  possesion  of.29 

§  662.  Claiming  land  by  color  of  title.— (1)  The  party  who 
relies  on  adverse  possession  of  land  under  color  or  claim  of  title  to 
defeat  the  legal  right  of  the  owner  of  the  land  must  show: 
first,  his  color  or  claim  of  title  and  that  it  covers  the  land  or  a 
part  of  the  land  in  controversy;  second,  that  he  entered  under 
said  claim  or  color  of  title  upon  said  land  or  some  part  thereof; 
third,  that  his  entry  was  hostile  and  adverse  to  the  party  having 
the  legal  title,  and  was  actual,  visible  and  exclusive ;  and  fourth, 
must  have  so  continued  hostile,  actual,  visible,  unbroken  under 
said  color  or  claim  of  title  for  ten  years  before  the  commence- 
ment of  the  action  to  dispossess  him.30 

(2)  If  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  entered  into  possession  of  the 
land  in  dispute  under  the  document  introduced  in  evidence  as  ex- 
hibit A,  purporting  to  be  signed  by  R  under  a  claim  of  owner- 
ship, and  if  you  find  that  he  has  personally,  or  by  his  tenants, 
continued  in  possession  thereof  for  more  than  twenty  years,  then 
you  must  find  that  he  is  presumed  to  have  obtained  a  grant  from 
the  state.31 

(3)  If,  as  claimed  by  the  plaintiff,  you  shall  find  that  the 
predecessors  of  the  defendants  in  the  claim  of  alleged  title  have 
admitted  the  title  to  be  in  the  predecessors,  or  any  of  them,  and 
you  so  find  the  title  established,  then  it  is  not  necessary  that  it 
shall  appear  that  any  possession  has  been  exercised  on  the  part 
of  the  owner.32 

28  Maxwell  v.  Cunningham,  50  W.  si  Maxwell     v.     Cunningham,     50 
Va.  298,  40  S.  E.  499.  W.  Va.   298,   40   S.   E.   499. 

29  Hockmoth       v.       Des       Grand  32  Merwin  v.  Morris,  71  Conn.  564, 
Champs,    71    Mich.    520,    39    N.    W.  42  Atl.  855. 

737. 

so  Maxwell     v.     Cunningham,     50 
W.   Va.   298,   40   S.    E.   499. 


§    663  REAL    ESTATE.  706 

§663.  Occupying  land  without  color  of  title. — (1)  Color  of 
title  and  claim  of  title  are  not,  in  their  strict  sense,  synonymous 
terms.  To  constitute  color  of  title,  a  paper  title — that  is,  a  deed 
or  other  instrument  purporting  to  convey  title  is  requisite ;  but  a 
claim  of  title  may  exist  wholly  in  parol,  and  may  be  manifested 
by  acts  as  well  as  by  words,  and  if  you  find  from  the  evidence 
that  the  defendant  S  built  a  house  or  houses,  and  barn,  and  other 
buildings,  dug  a  well  or  wells,  planted  an  orchard,  and  otherwise 
improved  and  cultivated  the  premises  in  controversy,  this  is  com- 
petent evidence  tending  to  show  claim  of  title  on  part  of  the  de- 
fendant upon  which  an  adverse  possession  may  be  predicated, 
and  which,  if  continued  for  a  period  of  twenty  years  or  more, 
would  bar  the  plaintiff  from  maintaining  this  action.33 

(2)  Where  a  person  enters  upon  land  without  a  deed  or  other 
paper  title  containing  .specific  descriptions  of  the  land  by  metes 
and  bounds,  or  without  color  of  title  to  the  premises,  claiming  to 
hold  the  same  adversely,  his  possession  only  extends  to  that  part 
of  the  land  actually  improved  and  occupied  by  him ;  and  his  entry 
in  such  case  upon  a  part  of  the  premises  does  not  give  him  ad- 
verse possession  to  uninclosed  and  unimproved  woodland.34 

(3)  The  plaintiff's  adverse  possession  would  become  perfect 

with  the  lapse  of years,  even  if  he  originally  had  no  shadow 

of  title,  provided  such  adverse  possession  was  so  open  that  any 
other  person  could  bring  suit  to  eject  the  plaintiff.35 

§  664.  Boundary  line  fixed  by  agreement. — (1)  It  is  perfectly 
competent  for  parties  owning  adjoining  tracts  of  land  to  settle 
by  agreement  where  the  division  line  shall  be;  and  if  the  jury 
shall  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  and  defendant 
owned  adjoining  tracts  of  land,  and  any  question  or  dispute  had 
arisen  as  to  where  the  line  now  in  controversy  was,  and  the 
plaintiff  and  defendant  agreed  upon  the  line  and  established  it 
as  between  themselves,  then  in  that  case  it  is  wholly  immaterial 
where  a  survey  would  put  the  line.  Each  party  is  bound  by  his 
agreement,  and  in  determining  whether  there  was  such  an  agree- 
ment and  fixing  of  the  line,  it  Is  competent  for  the  jury  to  take 

ss  Bartlett  v.  Secor,  56  Wis.  520,  sr  Beeoher  v.  Ferris,  112  Mich. 
14  N.  W.  714.  584,  70  N.  W.  1106. 

34  Humphries  v.  Huffman,  33  Ohio 
St.  97. 


707  FIXING    BOUNDARY    LINE.  §    665 

into  consideration  acts  and  statements  of  the  parties  at  the  time, 
the  acts  done  by  each,  and  the  fixing  and  adjustment  of  fences 
and  improvements  by  them  under  such  agreement,  if  any  such 
acts  or  statements  are  proven.36 

(2)  Before  you  can  find  for  the  defendant  on  the  issue  that  the 
survey  in  the  lane  dividing  the  plaintiff's  and  the  defendant's 
fields  has  been  agreed  upon  as  the  division  or  boundary  line 
between  the  southeast  quarter  of  the  southeast  quarter  of  sec- 
tion twenty-eight  and  the  northeast  quarter  of  the  northeast 
quarter  of  section  thirty-three,  you  must  be  satisfied  from  the 
evidence  that  there  was  a  mutual  agreement  between  the  owners 
of  the  land  to  that  effect. 

The  fact  that  F,  the  former  owner,  in  section  thirty-three, 
erected  the  south  line  of  fence  along  the  lane  and  cultivated  the 
lands  on  the  south  side  of  such  lane,  will  not  of  itself  alone  be 
sufficient  to  prove  such  consent  and  agreement.  You  are  further 
instructed  that  in  determining  whether  the  line  which  divides 
the  plaintiff's  and  the  defendant's  property  has  or  Has  not  been 
agreed  upon  between  the  former  owners  of  adjacent  property 
as  the  division  or  boundary  line,  it  is  proper  that  you  take  into 
consideration  the  long  acquiescence  of  adjoining  owners  to  such 
line  of  division.37 

§  665.  Locating  the  boundary  line. — (1)  In  questions  of 
boundary,  natural  objects  called  for,  marked  lines  and  reputed 
boundaries  well  established,  should  be  preferred  in  ascertaining 
the  identity  of  a  tract  of  land  to  the  courses  and  distances  of 
the  calls  of  the  grant.38 

(2)  If  there  is  any  excess  in  quantity  of  land  in  the  W  survey, 
such  excess  is  not  to  be  considered  by  you,  whether  the 
same  be  great  or  small,  unless  it  enables  or  assists  you  to  deter- 
mine the  true  location  of  the  south  boundary  line  of  that 
survey.  You  are  required  to  find  the  true  location  of  the  line  of 
survey  as  originally  run  and  located  on  the  ground,  retracing  the 
footsteps  of  the  original  survey ;  and  it  does  not  matter  whether  a 

36  Cutler  v.   Oallison,  72   111.   116;          ss  Reusens  v.  Lawson,  91  Va.  237 
Henderson    v.    Dennis,    177    111.    547.      21  S.   E.   347. 
551. 

sTColeman  v.  Drane,  116  Mo.  387, 
22   S.  W.   801. 


§    66(5  REAL    ESTATE.  708 

greater  or  less  quantity  of  land  than  called  for  in  the  grant  be 
included  within  the  lines  as  originally  run.39 

(3)  In  your  deliberations  to  determine  the  location  of  the  land 
described  in  the  Nixon  patent,  and  whether  or  not  it  is  included 
in  the  Davis  survey,  you  will  search  for  the  footsteps  of  the 
surveyor  in  locating  the  Davis  survey,  and  in  this  search  you 
will  be  guided  first,  by  natural  objects ;  second,  artificial  objects, 
and  then  by  course  and  distance ;  yet,  in  this  case,  you  will  inves- 
tigate all  the  evidence  and  follow  the  actual  survey  of  said  Davis 
as  it  was  made,  if,  in  fact,  made  by  the  surveyor,  to  decide  said 
location  of  said  land  described  in  said  Nixon  patent  with  refer- 
ence to  the  said  Davis  survey.40 

§  666.  Meander  line  as  the  boundary. — (1)  If  you  find  from 
the  evidence  in  this  case  that  there  existed  at  the  time  of  the  gov- 
ernment survey  and  plat  of  the  meander  line  of  the  reservation  a 
quantity  of  upland  between  the  meander  line  and  the  channel 
of  Wild  Hose  creek  covered  with  a  natural  growth  of  vegetation, 
and  such  tract  of  land  was  equal  to  or  greater  in  area  than  the 
adjacent  lots  lying  north  of  the  meander  line  and  claimed  by  the 
plaintiff,  then  you  may  consider  this  fact  as  a  circumstance  tend- 
ing to  show  that  the  meander  line  was  intended  as  the  south 
boundary  of  the  lots  claimed  by  the  plaintiff,  regardless  of  the 
location  of  the  creek.  The  court  instructs  you  that  a  meander 
line  is  a  line  run  by  a  surveyor  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
the  sinuosity  of  the  stream  and  the  area  of  the  lots;  and  where 
such  line  in  fact  meanders  the  stream,  under  the  laws  of  this 
state,  the  boundary  of  the  lots  described  would  be  the  center  of 
the  channel  of  the  stream,  and  not  the  meander  line  as  run  on 
the  shore.  If,  however,  you  find  from  the  evidence  in  this  case 
that  there  is  a  wide  and  material  divergence  between  the  meander 
line  as  run  by  the  surveyor  and  the  north  bank  of  the  stream,  as 
it  existed  at  the  time  of  the  survey,  then  I  instruct  you,  as  a 
matter  of  law,  that  the  meander  line  as  run  by  the  surveyor  upon 
the  ground,  and  not  the  stream,  should  be  taken  as  the  southern 
boundary  of  the  lots  described  in  the  plaintiff's  complaint.41 

39  Branch    v.    Simons    (Tex.    Cv.          «  Barnhart   v.    Ebrhart,    33    Ore. 
App.)  48  S.  W.  40.  279,  54  Pac.  195. 

40  Mayfield   v.   Williams,   73   Tex. 
508,  11  S.  W.  530. 


709  MEANDER   LINE,    HIGH    WATER   MARK.  §    667 

§  667.  By  high- water  mark. — (1)  The  question  as  to  what  in 
law  constitutes  ordinary  high-water  mark  is  the  leading  question 
in  this  case.  It  therefore  becomes  necessary  to  define  what  the 
law  regards  as  ordinary  high-water  mark.  It  does  not  mean  the 
height  reached  by  unusual  floods,  for  these  usually  soon  disap- 
pear. Neither  does  it  mean  the  line  ordinarily  reached  by  the 
great  annual  rises  of  the  river,  which  cover  in  places  lands  that 
are  valuable  for  agricultural  purposes,  since  the  waters  brought 
by  these  annual  rises  do  not  usually  remain  permanently  or  for 
any  great  length  of  time,  and  crops  may  be  raised  on  the  soil  as 
the  water  subsides.  Nor  yet  does  it  mean  meadow  land  adjacent 
to  the  river,  which,  when  the  water  leaves  it,  is  adapted  to  and 
can  be  used  for  grazing  or  pasturing  purposes.42 

.  (2)  Trees  may  be  included  under  the  general  head  of  vegeta- 
tion, but  trees  which  grow  and  flourish  best  in  the  immediate  vi- 
cinity of  running  streams  that  are  subject  to  overflow,  and  which 
shoot  up  in  places  as  the  water  recedes,  and  which  can  withstand 
the  effect  of  water  encompassing  the  lower  part  of  their  trunks 
without  injury,  and  for  a  longer  period  than  other  kinds  of  trees, 
should  not  necessarily  be  classed  as  the  kind  of  vegetation  to 
which  the  law  refers  as  marking  the  limit  of  ordinary  high  water 
in  cases  of  the  character  such  as  the  one  now  on  trial,  unless  the 
soil  on  which  they  grow  is  adapted  to  and  can  be  used  for  agri- 
cultural purposes,  or  so  far  removed  from  the  effect  of  high  water 
as  to  become  permanent.  You  are  to  say  from  the  evidence 
before  you  whether  or  not  the  trees  mentioned  and  located  in  the 
testimony  as  growing  upon  the  particular  portion  of  the  land, 
the  character  of  which  is,  in  this  action,  the  subject  of  dispute, 
are  or  are  not  growing  on  soil  upon  which  crops  may  be  raised 
or  grass  grown  suitable  for  meadow  or  pasturage,  or  are  so 
unaffected  by  high  water  as  to  become  permanent.  It  is  for  you 
to  say  whether  the  soil  upon  which  these  trees  grow  and  their 
location  in  respect  to  the  river  can  be  used  for  agricultural  pur- 
poses, such  as  the  cultivation  of  crops  or  as  meadow  or  not.  So 
much  of  it  as  you  may  find  susceptible  of  cultivation  and  the 
growing  of  crops  would  be  above  ordinary  high-water  mark,  and 
not  part  of  the  river  bed,  as  would  also  the  groups  of  trees  which 

42  Welch  v.  Browning,  115  Iowa,  690,  87  N.  W.  430. 


§    668  REAL    ESTATE.  710 

have  stood  for  many  years  unaffected  by  high  water,  and  are 
permanently  fixed  in  the  ground.43 

§  668.  Accretions  along  rivers — Ownership. — (1)  Under  the 
law  of  this  state  persons  owning  land  on  or  bounded  by  the  Mis- 
sissippi river  own  to  the  water's  edge,  and  when  the  water  re- 
cedes gradually  and  land  is  made  thereby,  the  owner  of  the  land 
bounded  by  the  river  is  owner  of  the  land  so  made,  and  such 
owner's  right  to  such  land  remains  equal  to  his  river  front,  and 
such  riparian  rights  cannot  be  encroached  upon  by  adjoining 
owners  so  running  their  boundary  lines  as  to  diminish  such  river 
front  or  accretions.44 

(2)  The  term  accretion  means  portions  of  the  soil  added  to  that 
already  in  possession  of  the  owner  by  a  gradual  deposit  caused 
by  a  change  in  the  bed  of  the  river,  and  such  accretion  belongs 
to  the  owner  of  the  land,  and  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the 
accretions  were  formed  before  or  after  the  ownership  has  accrued 
and  that  ownership  may  be  acquired  by  adverse  possession  as 
well  as  by  deed.45 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  land  and 
premises  described  in  the  plaintiff's  petition  and  of  which  the  de- 
fendants were  in  possession  at  the  time  of  the  institution  of  this 
suit,  were  and  are  not  within  the  boundary  line  of  survey  1922, 
nor  are  any  part  thereof  nor  are  any  accretion  thereto,  but  that 
they  are  within  the  original  boundary  line  of  Island  73,  in  Mis- 
souri river,  and  the  accretions  thereto,  and  that  the  defendants 
held  and  hold  the  possession  wrongfully  from  the  plaintiff,  then 
they  will  find  for  the  plaintiff.46 

(4)  Although  the  jury  may  believe  that  Island  73,  section  six, 
township  forty-four,  range  one,  west,  at  any  time  washed  away 
entirely  or  in  part  after  the  same  was  surveyed  and  patented  by 
the  United  States  government,  yet  if  they  further  find  that  the 
land  in  controversy  is  a  reformation  of  said  island  on  the  bed  of 
the  river  where  such  island  formerly  existed,  then  the  plaintiff 

43  Welch  v.  Browning    115  Iowa,          ^  Beene   v.   Miller,   149   Mo    234, 
690,   87  N.  W.   430.  50  S.  W.  824. 

44  Beene   v.   Miller,   149   Mo.    234,          «  Buse  v.  Russell,  86  Mo.  212. 
50  S.  W.  824.    See  Dashiel  v.  Harsh- 
man,  113  Iowa,  283,  85  N.  W.  85. 


DAMAGE    TO    REALTY. 


§    G70 


is  entitled  to  recover  in  this  action  if  it  be  shown  that  the  defend- 
ant unlawfully  detained  the  same.47 

(5)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  a  slough  or  arm 
of  the  Missouri  River  ran  between  Island  73  and  survey  1922,  at 
the  time  of  making  the  United  States  survey,  and  that  since  that 
time  the  same  has  been  filled  up  so  as  to  connect  the  island  with 
the  main  land  and  make  the  island  and  survey  one  continuous 
tract  of  land,  then  the  adjacent  owners  of  Island  73  and  survey 
1922  are  entitled  to  the  accretions  to  their  respective  lands,  but 
if  the  slough  merely  filled  up  from  the  bottom  or  by  deposits  with- 
in the  bed  of  said  slough,  and  said  accretions  did  not  form  on  the 
one  side  or  the  other,  then  the  center  of  the  slough  as  it  was 
before  the  water  deserted  it  is  the  boundary  between  said  survey 
and  said  islands.48 


Damages  to  Realty. 

§  669.    Owner  permitting  his  property  to  be  damaged. — (1)  A 

person  can  in  no  case  recover  for  damages  to  his  business  or  prop- 
erty which  he  permits  to  go  on  knowing  that  it  is  going  on,  and 
without  making  every  reasonable  effort  and  taking  active  steps 
to  prevent  it  or  have  it  stopped.  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  plaintiffs  knew  their  premises  were  being  damaged,  and 
that  they  permitted  the  damages  to  continue  when  by  their  own 
efforts  the  damage  might  have  been  stopped  or  prevented,  then 
the  defendants  are  not  liable  for  the  damage  so  caused,  and  the 
plaintiffs  cannot  recover  in  this  suit  for  any  such  damages.49 

§  670.  Excavations  on  adjacent  premises — Liability. — (1)  If 
you  shall  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  house  in  question  was 
in  a  ruinous  and  dilapidated  condition  before  the  witness  A  com- 
menced work  upon  premises  of  the  defendant  adjoining  it  on  the 
east,  and  shall  not  find  that  by  reason  of  such  work  it  became 
more  ruinous  and  dilapidated,  to  an  extent  which  impaired  its 
rental  value,  then,  under  the  pleadings  and  all  the  proof  in  the 

47  Buse  v.  Russell,  86  Mo.  213.  «  Hartford    D.    Co.    v.     Calkins, 

48  Buse  v.  Russell,  86  Mo.  209.  186  111.  104,  57  N.  E.  863. 


§    671  REAL    ESTATE.  712 

cause,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  and  your  verdict  must  be  for 
the  defendant.50 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  east  and  south 
walls  of  the  house  in  question  were  in  a  bad  condition  before 
the    commencement   of   the    digging   by   the   witness   A,    under 
the  foundation  wall  of  the  defendant's  house,  and  that  the  set- 
tling and  cracking  thereof  were  caused  by  their  own  inherent  de- 
fects, and  not  by  the  digging  by  the  defendant  of  his  cellar  in 
the  year  —  — ,  then  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover  for  any 
injury,  to  her  property  caused  by  such  settling  and  cracking.51 

(3)  If  you  shall  find  that  the  work  done  upon  the  defendant's 
premises,  by  which  the  house  in  question  is  alleged  to  have  been 
injured,  was  done  by  -     -  under  the  written  contract  offered  in 
evidence,  and  shall  further  find  that  a  reasonable  time  before  any 
excavation  below  the  foundation  of  said  house  was  made  the 
plaintiff  was  notified  or  had  actual  knowledge  that  such  excava- 
tion was  about  to  be  made,  then,  under  the  pleadings  and  the  evi- 
dence in  the  cause,  the  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendant. S2 

(4)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  in  this 
case  removed  land  adjoining  the  plaintiff's  land  in  the  manner 
charged  in  the  complaint,  then  the  measure  of  damages  would  be 
the  diminution  in  value  of  the  plaintiff's  land.53 

(5)  There  is  incident  to  land  in  its  natural  condition  a  right  to 
support  from  the  adjoining  land ;  and  if  land  not  subject  to  arti- 
ficial pressure  sinks  or  falls  away  in  consequence  of  the  removal 
of  such  support,  the  owner  is  entitled  to  damages  to  the  extent  of 
the  injury  sustained.    The  measure  of  damages  in  such  case  is  not 
the  cost  of  restoring  the  land  to  its  former  condition  or  situation, 
or  of  building  a  wall  to  support  it,  but  it  is  the  diminution  in 
value  of  the  plaintiff's  land  by  reason  of  the  acts  of  the  party  re- 
moving the  support.54 

§  671.    Damages  from  change  of  grade. — (1)  If  the  plaintiff 
sustained  any  damages  by  reason  of  change  of  grade  it  occurred 

so  Bonaparte  v.  Wiseman,  89  Md.          53  Moellering   v.    Evans,    121    Ind. 
12,   42   Atl.   918.  197,  22  N.  E.  989. 

si  Bonaparte  v.  Wiseman,  89  Md.          54  Moellering   v.   Evans,    121    Ind. 
12,   42   Atl.   918.  195,  22  N.  E.  989. 

52  Bonaparte  v.  Wiseman,  89  Md. 
12,  42  A.  918. 


713  DAMAGE   BY    CHANGING   GRADE.  §    673 

at  the  time  the  change  was  made,  and  in  determining  the  measure 
of  damages  by  the  differences  between  the  value  of  improvements 
before  the  change  of  grade,  and  the  value  of  the  improvements 
after  the  change,  you  are  to  consider  the  values  at  that  time.  If 
you  find  for  the  plaintiff  in  that  regard,  and  having  assessed  a 
reasonable  and  just  compensation  therefor,  you  will  then  consider 
the  question  of  interest  on  the  amount  of  damages  found  for  the 
plaintiff,  and  on  that  question,  if  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  is  en- 
titled to  damages,  then  he  should  be  allowed  interest  thereon  from 
the  date  of  his  damages  to  his  improvements  up  to  the  first  day 
of  this  term.55 

(2)  It  is  for  you  to  say,  taking  into  consideration  all  the  evi- 
dence on  the  subject,  whether,  under  the  circumstances,  a  retain- 
ing wall  was  reasonably  necessary  to  protect  the  plaintiff's  build- 
ings and  improvements,  and,  if  a  wall  was  necessary,  then, 
whether  the  wall  which  was  constructed  was  such  a  retaining 
wall  as  was  reasonably  necessary.  And  if  you  find  that  the 
wall  was  reasonably  necessary,  and  the  wall  constructed  was 
a  reasonable  one  for  the  purpose,  then  the  plaintiff  should  re- 
cover the  fair  and  reasonable  cost  of  such  wall.  And  if,  on  this 
question  as  to  a  retaining  wall,  you  find  for  the  plaintiff,  then 
he  will  be  entitled  to  recover  interest  on  the  fair  and  reasonable 
cost  of  the  retaining  wall  from  the  time  of  its  completion 
up  to  the  first  day  of  the  present  term.56 

§  672.  Damages  from  piling  filth,  dirt.— (1)  If  you  find  from 
the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  the  true 
measure  of  damages  for  permanent  injury  is  the  cost  of  removing 
the  coal  dirt,  unless  the  expense  of  removal  of  the  same  exceeds 
the  value  of  the  entire  property,  in  which  case  the  value  of  the 
property  is  the  limit  of  the  measure  of  damages,  and  in  no  event 
can  there  be  a  recovery  in  excess  of  the  value  of  the  entire 
property  for  a  permanent  injury.57 

§  673.  Damages  in  destroying  fences. — (1)  In  assessing  the 
actual  damages  sustained  by  plaintiffs,  if  any,  the  jury  should  al- 

55  Cincinnati     v.  Whetstone,     47         "  Stevenson    v.     Elbervale    Coal 
Ohio  St.  199,  24  N.  E.  409.  Co.  201  Pa.  St.  121,  50  Atl.  818. 

56  Cincinnati     v.  Whetstone,     47 
Ohio  St.  199,  24  N.  E.  409. 


§    674  REAL    ESTATE.  714 

low  such  sum  as  would  reasonably  be  sufficient  to  pay  for  ma- 
terial and  labor  required  to  rebuild  plaintiffs'  fence  and  gates,  and 
place  them  in  as  good  condition  as  they  were  before  they  were  torn 
down;  and  in  addition  thereto  they  should  allow  reasonable  com- 
pensation for  the  injury  to  the  use  of  plaintiffs'  goods  arising  out 
of  the  defendants'  acts  for  such  time  as  would  reasonably  be  re- 
quired to  rebuild  such  fence  and  repair  said  gates.58 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiffs,  they  should  as- 
sess the  actual  damages  sustained  by  plaintiffs  by  reason  of  the 
taking  down  and  removing  of  the  fence  and  gates,  and  if  the  jury 
further  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  act  of  the  defendants  in 
taking  down  and  removing  plaintiffs'  fence  and  gates  was  mali- 
cious, they  may  assess  in  favor  of  plaintiffs  and  against  defendants 
by  way  of  exemplary. damages,  in  addition  to  the  actual  damages, 
such  sum  as  the  jury  may  believe  under  all  the  circumstances  to 
be  a  just  and  reasonable  punishment  for  the  malicious  act.59 

§674.  From  diverting  flow  of  surf  ace  water. — (1)  The  defend- 
ant had  the  right  to  build  its  roadbed  where  it  did,  and  if  neces- 
sary to  its  proper  construction  and  use,  to  throw  up  the  embank- 
ment shown  to  have  been  made ;  but,  in  so  doing,  it  was  required 
by  law  to  construct  all  the  necessary  culverts  and  sluices  required 
by  the  natural  lay  of  the  land  to  prevent  surface  water  from 
being  diverted  from  its  natural  and  usual  course,  and  thrown 
upon  land  where  it  would  not  otherwise  have  gone.60 

(2)  If  you  find  that  plaintiff's  said  land,  within  the  time  here- 
inbefore stated,  was  permanently  injured,  or  any  of  his  crops 
within  said  time  destroyed  or  injured  by  water  flowing  thereon, 
and  said  embankment  and  culverts  on  defendant's  roadbed,  by  di- 
verting water  from  its  natural  and  usual  course,  contributed  to 
such  damage,  destruction  or  injury,  but  that  the  same  was  caused 
in  part  by  water  falling  and  running  on  said  land  regardless  of 
said  embankment,  then  defendant  would  be  liable  for  only  such 
proportion  of  said  injury  as  was  caused  by  said  embankment, 
and  if  you  so  find,  and  find  for  plaintiff,  you  will  allow  damages 
herein  for  only  such  proportion  of  the  damage  covered  by  said 
embankment  and  culverts.61 

ss  McBeth  v.  Trabue,  69  Mo.  650.         01  Austin  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.   An- 
5»  McBeth  v.  Trabue,  69  Mo.  650.      derson,  79  Tex.  429,  15  S.  W.  484. 
co  Austin  &  N.  W.  R    Co.  v.   AJI- 
derson,  79  Tex.  428,  15  S.  W.  484. 


715  DIVERTING    FLOW    OF    WATER,   DAM   INJURED.  §    675 

(3)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  construct- 
ed said  embankment  and  culverts,  and  that  between  said  twenty- 
second  day  of  September,  1886,  and  the  twenty-second  day  of  Sep- 
tember, 1888,  during  ordinary  rains,  surface  water  was  thereby 
diverted  from  its  usual  and  ordinary  course  and  caused  to  now 
over  and  upon  plaintiff's  land,  and  destroyed  or  injured  plain- 
tiff's crop  or  crops  of  corn  or  cotton,  if  any  he  had  growing  there- 
on, then  you  will  find  for  the  plaintiff  the  reasonable  value  of  the 
crop  so  destroyed,  if  any  was  destroyed,  at  the  time  and  place  of 
its  destruction;  and  such  further  sum  as  will  fairly  compensate 
him  for  the  injury,  if  any  thereby  caused,  to  any  of  said  crops  not 
destroyed ;  allowing  for  only  such  injury  as  was  caused  by  said 
embankment  and  culvert  causing  water  to  flow  on  said  land  which 
otherwise  would  not  have  flowed  there.82 

§  675.  Dam  injured  by  bridge  washing  out  through  negli- 
gence.—  (1)  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that,  if  they  find  that  on 
the  third  day  of  August,  1885,  the  plaintiffs  were  the  owners  of 
the  property  situated  on  Deer  Creek,  described  in  the  deed  from 
P  offered  in  evidence,  with  buildings  and  mill-dam  as  part  there- 
of, and  which  has  existed  for  over  thirty  years,  and  that  up  to  the 
year  1883  the  stream  was  crossed  by  the  county  road  at  a  ford 
below  the  dam,  and  that  about  that  year  the  defendants  changed 
the  location  of  the  county  road  so  as  to  cross  the  stream  by  an 
iron  bridge  set  upon  abutments  connected  by  wing  walls  with  the 
banks  on  either  side  of  the  stream,  and  if  the  jury  shall  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  said  abutments,  or  either  of  them,  were 
improperly  and  insecurely  erected  for  the  purposes  for  which  they 
were  designed,  and  that,  in  building  said  abutments,  they  were 
not  built  as  high  or  with  such  space  between  as  was  reasonably 
necessary  in  times  of  freshet,  and  that,  owing  to  such  defective 
construction  (if  they  find  such)  or  insufficient  space  provided  for 
venting  the  water  one  of  said  abutments  gave  way,  and  the  bridge 
was  carried  off  on  the  third  day  of  August,  1885,  and  was  lodged 
upon  the  plaintiffs'  mill-dam,  and  that  thereby  said  mill-dam  was 
washed  out  and  injuries  sustained  by  the  said  mill  and  by  the 
washing  away  of  their  buildings,  then  the  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to 

62  Austin  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  79  Tex.  428,  15  S.  W.  484. 


§    676  REAL    ESTATE.  716 

recover  the  losses  occasioned  thereby  and  sustained  by  them  in 
the  destruction  of  their  property  and  business,  notwithstanding 
the  jury  may  be  of  the  opinion  that  the  water  at  the  time  was 
higher  than  usual  in  times  of  freshet.63 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  that  the  bridge  above  Millford  was  carried 
away  by  a  flood  on  the  third  day  of  August,  1885,  and  in  passing 
down  the  stream  carried  away  plaintiffs'  dam,  then  plaintiffs  are 
entitled  to  recover  such  sum  as  will  compensate  them  for  the  in- 
jury sustained  and  loss  suffered,  provided  the  jury  also  find  that 
the  location,  construction  or  condition  of  the  bridge  was  negli- 
gent, and  that  the  carrying  away  of  the  bridge  was  in  conse- 
quence of  such  location,  construction  or  condition,64 


Damage  ~by  Animals. 

§676.    Horses  and  cattle  destroying  crops,  liability. — (1)  If 

you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  fence,  through  or  over  which 
the  stock  of  the  defendant  entered  on  the  land  of  the  plaintiff, 
was  a  partition  fence,  dividing  the  lands  of  the  parties  to  this  suit, 
and  that  the  defendant's  stock  crossed  over  said  fence  at  a  place 
where  it  was  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  maintain  said  fence,  then 
the  defendant  would  not  be  liable  in  this  case,  unless  the  plaintiff 
has  shown  by  the  testimony  of  skillful  men  that  the  fence  was 
such  as  good  husbandmen  generally  keep.65 

(2)  If  you  find  that  the  plaintiff  could,  by  the  use  of  ordinary 
care,  have  prevented  the  horses  and  cattle  from  eating  and  de- 
stroying his  hay  and  corn,  he  cannot  recover  for  such  hay  and 
corn  thus  destroyed,  which  by  ordinary  diligence  he  might  have 
prevented.  The  plaintiff,  after  he  knew  the  horses  and  cattle  of 
others  were  destroying  his  hay  and  corn,  should  have  used  rea- 
sonable caution  to  have  prevented  further  injury,  such  as  fencing 
his  stacks,  and  fencing  his  corn  beyond  the  reach  of  such  stock, 
provided  he  could  reasonably  have  done  so.66 

es  County  Com'rs  of  Hartford  Co.         ^  Hinshaw  v.  Gilpin,  64  Ind.  116. 
v.  Wise,  71  Ind.  43.  ee  Little  v.  McGuire,  38  Iowa,  562. 

e*  County  Comrs.  of  Hartford  Co. 
T.  Wise,  71  Ind.  43. 


717  DAMAGE  BY  ANIMALS,  INJURY  TO  CROPS.         §  G78 

(3)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant's  fence, 
with  the  exception  of  one  or  two  small  gaps,  was  sufficient  to  have 
turned  the  stock,  and  find  that  the  plaintiff  knew  of  these  gaps, 
and  that  the  stock  would  come  through  such  gaps,  and  after  know- 
ing such  facts,  and  knowing  that  the  stock  did  come  through  said 
gaps,  and  if  you  find  that  the  plaintiff,  with  the  exercise  of  ordi-f 
nary  care,  could  have  prevented  said  stock  from  thus  trespassing, 
and  did  not  do  so,  he  cannot  recover  for  the  damage  which  he 
might  have  thus  prevented.67 

(^)  A  man  has  no  right  to  carelessly  look  on  at  the  destruc- 
tion  of  his  property.  It  is  his  duty  to  use  reasonable  care  to 
prevent  such  destruction;  and  if  he  fails  to  use  ordinary  care 
he  cannot  recover  for  the  injury  which,  by  ordinary  care,  he 
might  have  prevented.68 

§  677.    Measure   of  damages  for  injury  to  crops. — (1)  The 

measure  of  plaintiff's  damage  for  the  loss  or  injury  to  the  grass 
for  the  years  1886  and  1887,  if  you  find  that  he  has  sustained 
any  damages  in  that  regard,  will  be  the  actual  damage  done  to 
the  grass  and  crop  for  these  years  by  the  defendant's  cattle;  that 
is  the  difference  between  the  actual  market  value  of  the  crop 
upon  the  land  for  those  years  as  it  was,  and  what  its  market 
value  would  have  been  had  the  plaintiff's  cattle  not  been  driven 
or  herded  or  pastured  upon  the  land.  To  state  it  in  other  words, 
the  question  for  you  to  determine  from  the  evidence,  in  fixing  the 
amount  of  damages,  if  any,  on  this  claim,  is,  how  much  less  was 
the  actual  rental  value  of  the  land  for  the  grass  crop  of  these 
years  by  reason  of  the  defendant's  cattle  having  been  driven  or 
herded  upon  the  land  than  it  would  have  been  had  the  cattle 
not  been  driven  or  herded  upon  the  land?  If  you  find  that  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  in  this  case  you  will  ascertain 
whether  he  has  sustained  any  damages  by  reason  of  any  perma- 
nent injury  to  the  growth  of  grass  on  said  land.  The  plaintiff's 
damages  upon  this  claim,  if  he  is  entitled  to  recover  any,  will  be 
such  only  as  injuriously  affect  the  market  value  of  the  land.69 

§  678.    Submitting  facts  to  the  jury  on  injury  to  crops.— (1) 

The  plaintiff  claims  that  his  crop  was  destroyed  by  defendant's 

6T  Little  v.  McGuire,  38  Iowa,  561.          69  Harrison  v.  Adamson,  86  Iowa, 
es  Little  v.  McGuire,  38  Iowa,  562.      695,   53   N.   W.   334. 


§    679  REAL    ESTATE.  718 

cattle.  It  is  important  that  you  determine  whether  the  crop  was 
destroyed  by  defendant's  cattle;  whether  plaintiff's  fence  was  a 
lawful  fence,  four  and  a  half  feet  high,  with  spaces  sufficiently 
close ;  was  the  fence  four  and  a  half  feet  high,  and  such  as  is  gen- 
erally, in  this  country,  recognized  as  a  good  fence?  This  is  a 
matter  entirely  in  your  discretion.  You  will  then  inquire  whether 
defendant's  cattle  broke  into  plaintiff's  field  and  destroyed  his 
crop;  and  if  you  find  that  the  fence  was  such  a  one  as  comes 
within  the  meaning  of  the  law,  and  such  a  one  as  is  recognized  as 
a  good  common  fence  in  the  country,  and  the  defendant's  cattle 
broke  through  the  inclosure,  the  defendant  is  liable  for  all  dam- 
ages resulting  from  such  breach.  In  such  case,  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  defendant  to  keep  his  cattle  up,  and  not  suffer  them  to  run 
at  large  to  the  danger  of  his  neighbor's  property;  and  if  property 
was  destroyed  he  would  be  responsible.  No  man  has  the  right  to 
suffer  to  run  at  large  animals  of  a  dangerous  kind,  either  to  the 
person  or  property  of  another;  and  if  he  does,  he  is  responsible 
for  all  damages  which  result  from  the  acts  of  such  animals.  But 
if  the  fence  was  not  a  reasonable  one,  such  as  would  be  calculated 
to  protect  the  property,  the  crop,  and  the  loss  was  the  conse- 
quence of  the  negligence  of  plaintiff,  and  that  by  ordinary  care 
and  prudence  he  could  have  protected  the  crops,  it  was  his  duty 
to  do  so ;  and  if  he  failed  to  do  so,  and  the  fence  was  such  as  the 
custom  of  the  country  and  the  law  would  not  recognize  as  a  law- 
ful fence,  he  would  not  be  entitled  to  recover ;  the  loss  would  be  a 
consequence  of  his  own  negligence  and  fault.70 


Damages  by  Nuisance. 

§  679.  Residence,  health,  business,  injury  to. — (1)  If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  personal  enjoyment  of  the  plaintiffs 
in  their  residence  has  been,  and  will  be,  materially  and  essentially 
lessened  by  either  the  noise,  smoke,  dirt,  dust,  cinders,  horses, 
mules  or  teams,  caused  by  the  running  and  using  of  said  mill,  then 
the  allegations  of  the  complaint  have  been  sustained.71 

(2)  The  defendants  are  entitled  to  use  their  property  for  any 

TO  McManus    v.     Finan,    4    Iowa,         71  Owen   v.   Phillips,   73   Ind.   287. 
285.  See  "Nuisance"  under  criminal  law. 


719  DAMAGE   BY    NUISANCE.  §    680 

lawful  purpose  or  business,  though  it  may  be  in  a  slight  degree 
inconvenient  or  unpleasant  to  the  owners  of  the  adjoining  proper- 
ty, and,  to  entitle  the  adjoining  owners  to  suppress  such  works, 
they  must,  show  such  business  is  injurious  to  life  or  health,  or 
emits  such  noisome  smells  as  would  render  the  plaintiff's  property 
unfit  for  occupation.72 

(3)  If  the  defendants  are  guilty  of  maintaining  a  nuisance  by 
obstructing  the  public  highway,  as  claimed,  and  if  the  jury  find 
that  the  effect  thereof  was  to  prevent  the  free  ingress  and  egress 
to  the  plaintiff's  place  of  business,  and  that  this  caused  to  the 
plaintiff  a  loss  of  trade  and  custom  in  his  business  as  a  merchant, 
then  the  defendant  would  be  liable  therefor.73 

§  680.  Plaintiff  must  prove  a  nuisance ;  mere  injury  insuffi- 
cient.—  (1)  The  plaintiff  cannot  recover  unless  the  jury  should 
be  satisfied  from  the  evidence  that  the  leadworks,  or  shot-tower, 
as  conducted  by  the  defendants,  was  either  a  common  or  private 
nuisance.74 

(2)  The  mere  fact  that  the  plaintiff's  wife,  or  himself,  or  his 
children,  suffered  from  lead  or  arsenical  poisoning,  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  recover;  but  the  plaintiff  must 
prove  that  such  poisoning  was  caused  by  the  operation  of  either 
the  shot-tower  or  the  leadworks  by  the  defendants.75 

(3)  In  determining  this  case,  the  jury  should  remember  that 
the  plaintiff  does  not  claim  that  either  the  leadworks  or  the  shot- 
tower  was  run  by  defendants  in  a  negligent  manner;  and  should 
the  jury  think  that  the  said  works,  run  in  an  ordinarily  careful 
and  skillful  manner,  would  not  be  a  nuisance,  either  public  or 
private,  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover,  even  though  the  jury 
should  also  think  that,  by  some  carelessness  or  negligence  of  de- 
fendant's employes  at  the  time  of  the  fire,  or  at  some  other  time, 
the  plaintiff  or  his  family  were  hurt.76 

(4)  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show,  first, 
that  the  defendants  were  guilty  of  maintaining  a  private  nui- 
sance in  the  operating  of  a  shot-tower  or  leadworks;  and  second, 
that,  as  a  result  from  such  operation,  he,  the  plaintiff,  suffered 

72  Price  v.  Grautz,  118  Pa.  St.  406,  "  Price  v.  Grautz,  118  Pa.  St.  406, 
11  Atl.  794.  11  Atl.   794. 

73  Park  v.  Chicago  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.  76  Price  v.  Grautz,  118  Pa.  St.  407, 
43    Iowa,    636.  11  Atl.  794. 

74  Price  v.  Grautz,  118  Pa.  St.  406, 
11  Atl.  794. 


§    G81  REAL    ESTATE.  720 

injury,  and  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  to  prove  both 
of  these  propositions  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  would  pre- 
vent a  recovery.77 

§  681,    Purchasing  property  in  factory  locality,  no  liability. — 

(1)  If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that,  at  the  time  the  plain- 
tiff acquired  the  property  mentioned  in  the  evidence,  and  erected 
thereon  the  improvements  mentioned  in  the  evidence,  there  was  al- 
ready erected  and  in  operation  on  the  adjacent  lot  a  fertilizer  fac- 
tory which  would  use  the  same  agents  and  from  which  were  emit- 
ted the  like  gases  and  emanations  that  were  used  in  and  emanated 
from  the  factory  of  the  defendant,  and  producing  like  effects ;  and 
that  said  factory  afterwards  passed  into  the  possession  of,  and 
was  operated  by,  the  defendant,  as  it  had  been  operated  before, 
and  if  they  shall  further  find  that  when  plaintiff  acquired  and  im- 
proved his  said  property,  and  prior  thereto,  there  was  established 
and  operated  in  the  same  locality  factories  similar  to  that  of  the 
defendant,  from  which  like  emanations  producing  like  results 
proceeded;  and  that  said  factories  employed  large  numbers  of 
men  and  produced  merchandise  of  great  value ;  and  that  the  plain- 
tiff was  aware  of  the  existence  of  said»factories,  and  that  he  so 
acquired  and  improved  his  said  property ;  and  if  they  shall  further 
find  that  the  factory  of  defendant  was  in  a  suitable  and  proper 
place,  with  a  view  to  the  convenience,  welfare  and  comfort  of  the 
public ;  and  if  they  shall  further  find  that  the  damage  and  injury 
suffered  by  the  plaintiff  were  only  such  as  are  incident  to  the 
proximity  of  such  a  business  as  that  of  the  defendant  in  that  lo- 
cality, and  were  not  unreasonable  or  excessive  in  view  of  the 
location  and  all  of  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  then  plaintiff  is 
not  entitled  to  recover  in  this  action.78 

§  682.  Using  premises  as  a  pest  house.— The  measure  of  dam- 
ages in  a  case  of  this  kind  will  be  what  you  believe,  from  the  evi- 
dence, would  be  the  fair  and  reasonable  rental  value  of  that  prop- 
erty for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  taken  and  used.  It  is  what 
damages  the  property  sustained  by  reason  of  having  been  used 
for  a  pest  house.  And  you  must  arrive  at  the  measure  of  damages 
— ascertain  the  measure  of  damages — from  the  evidence,  not  from 

"  Price  v.  Grautz,  118  Pa.  St.  405,         ™  Susquehana   F.   Co.    v.   Malone, 
11  Atl.  794.  73  Md.  268,  20  Atl.  900. 


721  EMINENT  DOMAIN,ESTIMATING  DAMAGES.  §    683 

any  preconceived  notions  of  your  own,  but  from  the  evidence 
brought  out  upon  the  trial,  and  from  that  come  to  your  conclu- 
sion.79 

Eminent  Domain — Condemnation. 

§  683.  Highest  and  best  use  in  estimating  damages. — (1)  The 
owner  of  the  land  is  entitled  to  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  the 
same  for  the  highest  and  best  use  to  which  it  is  adapted,  and  if 
you  find  from  all  the  evidence  that  a  large  portion  of  the  Milroy 
farm  is,  by  the  proposed  railroad,  cut  off  from  the  water  supply, 
and  the  several  parts  rendered  inconvenient  of  access,  so  that  the 
whole  farm  is  depreciated  in  market  value  and  damaged  for  all 
time,  then  you  should  take  such  facts  into  consideration  in  esti* 
mating  the  damages.80 

(2)  That  in  fixing  the  amount  of  compensation  to  be  paid  to  the 
defendants,  severally,  you  should  take  into  consideration  the  use 
for  which  the  property  is  suitable  and  to  which  it  is  adapted, 
having  regard  for  its  situation  and  the  business  wants  of  that  lo- 
cality, or  such  as  may  reasonably  be  expected  in  the  near  future, 
so  far  as  the  same  appears  from  the  evidence,  and  so  far  as  the 
same  affects  the  market  value  on  September  14,  1896. 81 

(3)  The  true  measure  of  compensation  for  the  property  to  be 
condemned  is  the  market  value  of  the  same,  but  reference  may  be 
had,  not  merely  to  the  uses  to  which  the  land  is  actually  applied, 
but  its  capacity  for  other  uses,  so  far  as  the  same  may  be  shown 
in  evidence,  may  also  be  considered.82 

(4)  In  determining  the  fair  cash  market  value  of  the  property 
sought  to  be  condemned  in  this  case,  you  have  a  right  to  take  into 
consideration,  and  should  take  into  consideration,  all  the  pur- 
poses for  which  said  property  is  adapted  and  is  used,  or  may 
be  used,  so  far  as  such  adaptation  and  uses  are  shown  by  the 
evidence  or  by  your  view  of  the  said  premises,  so  far  as  the 
same  may  have  affected  the  market  value  on  September  14,  1896.83 

79  Brown    v.    Pierce    County,    28  si  Rock   I.   &  P.   R.   Go.  v.   Leisy 

Wash.  345,  68  Pac.  872.  Brewing  Co.  174  111.   550,  51  N.   E. 

so  Galesburg   &    G.    E.    R.    Co.    v.  572. 

Milroy,    181   111.   243,   246,    54   N.   E.  §2  Chicago,  E.   &  L.   S.  R.   Co.   v. 

939.     See    Rock   I.    &   P.   R.    Co.   v.  Catholic  Bishop,  &c.  119  111.  528,  10 

Leisy  Brewing  Co.   174   111.    549,   51  N.  E.  372. 

N.  E.  572.  ss  Rock   I.   &  P.   R.   Co.   v.   Leisy 


§    684  UEAL    ESTATE.  722 

(5)  The  jury  are  instructed  that  they  are  to  ascertain  irom  the 
evidence,  after  their  own  view  of  the  property  sought  to  be  taken, 
and  also  the  damages,  if  any  have  been  proven,  to  the  property 
from  which  the  strip  is  to  be  taken.  And  if  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  property  occupied  by  the  ice  company,  in 
its  present  condition,  has  a  special  capacity,  as  an  entirety,  for  the 
purposes  of  ice-freezing,  cutting  and  transporting,  and  as  an  en- 
tirety is  devoted  to  such  purposes,  and  that  the  value  of  such  tract 
will  be  depreciated  and  lessened  by  the  taking  of  the  strip  in 
question,  then  the  owners  of  the  property  are  entitled  to  recover 
a  sum  equal  to  such  depreciation  in  value.84 

§  684.  Damages  based  upon  market  value. — (1)  The  damages 
allowed  to  the  plaintiff  must  not  in  any  case  exceed  the  market 
value  of  his  premises  when  the  railroad  was  constructed.85 

(2)  The  measure  of  these  damages  is  the  difference  between 
the  annual  value  of  plaintiff's  premises  with  the  railroad  con- 
structed and  operated  as  it  was,  and  what  such  annual  value 
would  have  been  had  not  the  railroad  been  on  said  street  during 
that  time;  and  that  in  determining  such  diminution  in  the  an- 
nual  value  they  may  consider  the  manner  in  which  the  road 
was  built  along  said  street  in  front  of  said  premises,  the  manner 
in  which  and  the  extent  to  which  it  was  used  and  occupied 
at  that  place  by  defendant's  cars  and  locomotives,  the  situation 
of  the  premises  in  reference  to  that  portion  of  the  road  and 
the  effect  which  defendant's  occupation  and  use  of  that  por- 
tion of  the  road  had  upon  the  reasonable  use  and  enjoyment 
of  the  premises  and  of  the  improvements  thereon.86 

(3)  In  no  event  must  the  damages  exceed  the  sum  which  would 
be  obtained  by  determining  the  difference  between  the  annual 
rental  value  of  the  property  with  the  railroad  constructed  and 
operated  as  it  was,  and  what  that  value  would  have  been  if  there 
had  been  no  railroad  on  P  Street  during  that  time.87 

Brewing  Co.   174  111.   547,  51  N.  E.  85  Blesch  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

572.     Verdict   should   not  be  based  Co.   48  Wis.  172,  2  N.  W.  113. 

on   facts   observed    in   viewing   the  8G  Blesch  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

place:  Pittsburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Swin-  Co.  48  Wis.  170,  2  N.  W.  113. 

ney,  59  Ind.  100;   Heady  v.  Vevay,  "  Btesch  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

&c.  Co.  52  Ind.  117.  Co.  48  Wis.  171,  2  N.  W.  113. 

s*  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Wash- 
ington Ice  Co.  117  111.  233,  7  N.  E. 
523. 


723  MARKET    VALUE    BASIS    OF    DAMAGES.  §    685 

(4)  At  the  time  of  the  construction  of  the  road  plaintiff  had 
a  vested  private  right  of  free  access  to  and  egress  from  his  said 
lots  and  the  buildings  thereon,  over  and  along  Pearl  street  in 
front  of  the  lots,  "as  the  same  was  and  would  have  continued 
to  be  according  to  the  mode  of  its  original  use  and  appropriation 
by  the  public;"  that  this  was  a  right  of  property  which  could 
not  be  materially  impaired  or  destroyed  without  plaintiff's  con- 
sent, except  upon  payment  to  him   of  due  compensation;  and 
therefore,  if  defendant's  road  changed  the  mode  of  the  original 
use  of  the  highway,  or  if  it  was  thereby  appropriated  by  the 
public  to  new  vehicles  and  methods  of  transportation,  so  as  to 
materially  impair  plaintiff's  said  right,  he  was  entitled  to  recover 
such  damages  as  would  compensate  him  for  the  injury.88 

(5)  If  defendant's  said  right  of  property  was  materially  im- 
paired, the  jury  must  allow  him  the  damages  resulting  therefrom 
from  the  date  of  the  building  of  the  road  in  front  of  his  premises 
until  the  commencement  of  the  action.89 

§  685.  Considerations  in  determining  market  value. — (1)  If 
you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff's  farm  consisted  of 
about acres  of  improved  lands,  and  the  right  of  way  of  de- 
fendant cut  the  same  in  such  a  manner  as  to  injure  the  value  of 
the  same  by  throwing  it  open  and  dividing  it  into  pieces,  you  are 
at  liberty  to  consider  such  circumstances  and  the  effect  upon  the 
land,  if  any,  by  reason  of  the  location  upon  the  land  of  the  rail- 
road, and  of  the  inconvenience  directly  caused  by  the  railway, 
in  determining  the  effect  the  same  would  have  upon  the  market 
value  of  the  lands,  and  it  is  the  depreciation  in  the  market  value 
of  the  premises  which  is  the  true  measure  of  damages,  and  which 
you  are  to  allow  for,  and  not  the  matters  which  would  cause 
such  depreciation.90 

(2)  If  the  construction  and  operation  of  the  defendant's  road 
in  front  of  the  plaintiff's  premises  has  depreciated  their  annual 
value,  the  jury  cannot  apportion  the  damages  for  these  injuries 
according  to  the  width  of  the  strip  actually  taken  and  occupied, 
but  must  award  damages  to  compensate  the  plaintiff  for  the  whole 
amount  of  injuries  sustained.91 

ss  Bleseh  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co.  52  Iowa,  616,  3  N.  W. 

Co.  48  Wis.  170,  2  N.  W.  113.  648. 

89  Blesch  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  »i  Blesch  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.  48  Wis.  170,  2  N.  W.  113.  Co.  48  Wis.  171.  2  N.  W.  113. 

so  Hartshorn  v.  Burlington,  C.  R. 


§    685  REAL    ESTATE.  724 

(3)  The   plaintiff   had    a   right    to    put    any   lawful    improve- 
ments on  the  property  after  the  railroad  was  built  on  his  land, 
in  the  street;  and  if,  after  such  improvements  were  made,  they 
are  to  be  considered  in  determining  the  subsequent  rental  value 
of  the  premises.92 

(4)  In  this  case  it  is  proper  for  you  to  take  into  consideration 
the  proximity  of  this  land  to  and  its  contact  with  the  city  of  -   — . 
And  it  is  proper  for  you  to  take  into  consideration  any  fact  which 
may  tend  to  add  a  value  to  that  land.     If  any  part  of  it  was  then 
valuable  as  building  lots,  and  that  fact  added  a  value  to  the  land, 
it  is  proper  for  you  to  take  that  into  consideration,  and  if  the  loca- 
tion and  construction  of  the  defendant's  railroad  across  this  land 
destroyed  it  in  part,  or  took  away  any  part  of  this  land  which 
might  have  had,  or  had  value  for  that  purpose,  it  is  proper  for 
you  to  take  that  fact  into  consideration.    It  is  not  proper  for  you, 
in  determining  the  value,  or  the  amount  of  damages  sustained  by 
the  plaintiff,  to  take  the  estimate  of  any  one  as  to  how  many  lots 
might  be  laid  out  upon  the  premises,  and  what  these  lots  might 
have  sold  for  in  the  event  of  their  being  sold.    That  would  be  fix- 
ing a  measure  of  damages  not  as  of  the  date  of  entry,  but  as  of  a 
future  time,  but  your  duty  is  to  fix  the  measure  of  the  damages 
sustained  by  the  plaintiff  at  the  time  of  the  entry,  and,  as  we  have 
said,  anything  that  then  added  value  to  the  land,  and  any  injury 
then  sustained,  must  be  taken  into  consideration  by  you.93 

(5)  The  interruption  of  plaintiff  in  the  use  and  cultivation  of 
his  land,  or  any  inconvenience  he  may  have  been  put  to  in  its  cul- 
tivation and  use  sis  a  live  stock  farm,  or  otherwise,  according  to 
his  peculiar  taste  in  farming,  since  the  appropriation  of  the  right 
of  way,  if  any,  cannot  be  considered  by  the  jury  as  forming  an  ele- 
ment of  damages  in  his  favor,  and  your  inquiry  must  be  confined 
to  the  marketable  value  of  plaintiff's  land  before  and  after  the 
right  of  way  was  appropriated,  taking  into  account,  in  this  con- 
nection, the  number  of  acres  taken  for  the  right  of  way,  the  man- 
ner of  its  location,  the  way  his  land  is  cut  by  the  railroad,  and  the 
like,  so  as  to  be  able  to  estimate  the  true  market  value  of  his  land, 
affected  by  the  location  of  the  railroad  before  and  after  such  loca- 
tion ;  the  difference  in  the  market  value  of  the  land  affected  by 

92  Blesch  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.          ^  Reiber  v.   Butler  &  P.   R.   Co. 
Co.  48  Wis.  171,  2  N.  W.  113.  201   Pa.   49,  50  Atl.   311. 


725  LOTS    FRONTING   ON    STREAMS,    VALUE.  §    686 

the  appropriation  of  the  strip  for  the  right  of  way  before,  and 
then  again  after  the  right  of  way  is  asserted,  will  form  or  consti- 
tute his  true  measure  of  damages.94 

(6)  In  assessing  the  damages  to  the  market  value  of  the  prop- 
erty not  taken,  you  should  not  take  into  consideration  anything 
as  an  element  of  damages  which  is  remote,  or  imaginary,  or  un- 
certain, or  speculative,  even  though  mentioned  or  testified  about 
by  the  witnesses;  but  the  only  elements  which  you  should  take 
into  consideration,  as  tending  to  reduce  the  market  value,  are 
those  elements  which  are  appreciable  and  substantial,  and  which 
will  actually  lessen  the  market  value  of  said  property.95 

§  686.  Value  of  lots  fronting  on  navigable  streams. — (1)  That 
the  owners,  severally,  of  the  lots  fronting  on  the  Illinois  river,  and 
here  sought  to  be  condemned,  own  to  the  middle  thread  of  the 
stream,  subject  only  to  the  right  of  the  public  to  use  the  navigable 
portions  thereof  for  the  purposes  of  navigation.  Such  owners 
have  also  the  exclusive  right  to  any  and  all  ice  forming  on  said 
river  in  front  of  their  lots,  respectively,  to  the  middle  thread  of 
the  stream,  and  may  themselves  cut  and  remove  the  same,  or  sell 
such  ice  to  another  with  the  exclusive  right  to  harvest  it.96 

(2)  The  jury  are  further  instructed  that,  as  owners  of  lands 
fronting  upon  and  bounded  by  a  navigable  stream,  the  defendants 
in  this  case,  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  public  in  such  navigable 
stream,  own  their  several  lots  to  the  middle  of  the  stream,  and 
the  said  defendants,  as  such  lot  owners,  have  the  right  to  use  and 
enjoy  their  several  lots  by  building  docks  and  wharves  thereon, 
or  by  filling  in  the'  same  with  earth  or  other  solid  material  to 
any  extent  whatever,  so  long  as  they  do  not  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  navigation  by  the  public  in  such  stream.97 

(3)  That  the  owner  of  lands  or  lots  fronting  upon  a  navigable 
stream,  and  of  which  lands  or  lots  such  stream  forms  one  of  the 
boundary  lines,  has  a  lawful  right  to  erect  docks  and  wharves 

• 

conforming  to  such  boundary  line,  in  and  along  said  stream,  con- 
forming, however,  to  the  regulations  of  the  proper  public  authori- 
se Hartshorn  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  96  Rock  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Leisy 
&  N.  R.  Co.  52  Iowa,  616,  3  N.  W.  Brewing  Co.  174  111.  551,  51  N.  E. 
648.  572. 

95  Kiernan  v.  Chicago,  Santa  Pe  97  Rock  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Leisy 
&  C.  R.  Co.  123  111.  188,  195,  14  N.  Brewing  Co.  174  111.  547,  51  N.  E. 
E.  18.  572. 


>}    687  REAL    ESTATE.  726 

ties  for  the  protection  of  the  public  rights  in  such  stream;  and 
such  owner  may  so  place  such  docks  and  wharves  as  to  have  the 
benefit  of  the  navigable  part  of  such  stream,  but  not  interfering 
with  the  public  rights  of  navigation.08 

(4)  That  if  you  find  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the 
lots  in  question,  or  any  of  them,  are  susceptible  of  enlargement 
and  extension  by  filling,  thus  giving  increased  areas  for  any  use 
to  which  the  property  may  be  put,  then  you  have  a  right  to 
take  that  into  account  in  arriving  at  your  verdict,  and  give  such 
fact  the  weight  which,  in  your  judgment,  it  is  entitled  to  re- 
ceive, so  far  as  the  same  affected  their  market  value  on  September 
14,  1896." 

(5)  The  defendants  in  this  case  are  each  entitled  to  the  fair 
cash  value  on  the  fourteenth  day  of  September,  1896,  of  their 
respective   lots   sought   to   be   taken,   regardless   of   the    causes 
which  gave  them  value  at  that  time.     If  the  jury  believe  from 
the   evidence   in   the   case,   including  their  own  view,   that  the 
value  of  said  lots,  or  any  of  them,  on  that  day,  was  owing,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  to  the  projection  by  the  plaintiff  of  the  improve- 
ment to  its  railroad  facilities,  for  which  it  seeks  to  condemn  said 
lots,  still  the  owners  of  said  lots  are  entitled  to  the  fair  cash  mar- 
ket value  of  said  lots  as  they  then  stood.100 

§  687.  Benefits  shall  be  deducted  from  damages. — (1)  If  the 
plaintiff  enjoyed  any  peculiar  benefits  from  the  railroad  being  on 
this  street,  such  benefits  must  be  deducted  from  his  damages ;  but 
that  benefits  common  to  the  whole  community  are  not  to  be 
considered.101 

§  688.  Witnesses  magnifying  value— Credibility.— (1)  That  if 
you  believe  from  the  entire  testimony,  and  from  your  inspection 
of  the  premises,  that  any  witness  has  magnified  or  exaggerated 
the  value  of  the  land  taken  or  the  damages  to  the  land  not  taken, 
on  account  of  nis  interest  in  the  suit,  or  his  prejudice,  or  want  of 
knowledge,  or  experience,  or  truthfulness,  then  you  have  the 

as  Rock  I.   &  P.   R.   Co.  v.  Leisy  10°  Rock  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Leisy 

Brewing  Co.   174  111.   550,   51  N.   E.  Brewing  Co.   174  111.   549,  51  N.   E. 

572.  572. 

9»  Rock  I.   &  P.   R.   Co.   v.  Leisy  101  Blesch  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

Brewing  Co.   174   111.   550,  51  N.   E.  Co.   48  Wis.   172,  2   N.   W.   113. 
572. 


727  TAXES    OX    REALTY.  g    690 

right,  and  it  is  your  duty,  to  disregard  the  evidence  of  such  wit- 
ness in  so  far  as  the  same  is  unjustly  magnified  or  unjustly  in- 
creased, either  as  to  the  value  of  the  land  taken  or  the  damages 
to  the  property  of  the  defendant  not  taken.102 


Taxes  on  Realty. 

§  689.  Land  unlawfully  sold  for  taxes — Certificate  void. — (1) 
If  you  find  that  the  purchaser  and  holder  of  the  certificate  prior 
to  the  time  of  the  alleged  sale  made  a  private  bargain  with  the 
treasurer  by  which  he  was  to  take  the  lands,  and  that,  in  pursu- 
ance of  such  private  arrangement,  a  certificate  was  made  out  to 
him,  without  said  lands  ever  having  been  offered  publicly,  so  that 
competition  was  or  could  have  been  had,  and  that  it  was  essen- 
tially and  entirely  private,  there  then  was  no  public  sale,  or  such 
a  sale  as  would  convey  to  the  alleged  purchaser  the  title  to  the 
same.  And  if  you  find  the  facts  to  be  that  there  was  no  sale,  and 
that  the  defendants  had  title  to  the  land  at  the  time'  of  the  alleged 
sale,  or  that  their  grantor  did,  then  you  will  find  for  the  defend- 
ants.103 

(2)  Upon  the  question  of  the  title  of  the  defendants,  you  are 
instructed  that  it  is  sufficient  if  you  find  that  they  were  in  posses- 
sion of  tfye  same,  and  as  a  matter  of  right  were  entitled  to  such 
possession,  with  such  an  interest  and  right  as  could  be  enforced, 
even  though  the  same  may  have  been  defective  by  reason  of  the 
loss  of  a  deed  or  other  defect.  If  they  or  their  grantors  were,  in 
fact,  the  owners  of  the  land,  it  is  sufficient,  even  though  their 
claim  of  title  is  shown  to  have  been  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  sale 
deficient.104 

§  690.  Listing  land  on  books  for  assessment. — (1)  If  a  person 
has  his  land  charged  upon  the  land  books  in  a  large  tract  that 
covers  all  his  smaller  tracts,  it  is  not  necessary  for  him  to  have 
it  charged  to  him  in  the  smaller  tracts;  and  no  forfeiture  can 

i°2  Kiernan  v.  Chicago  Santa  Fe         ios  Chandler   v.    Keeler,   46   Iowa, 
&  C.  R.  Co.  123  111.  188,  197,  14  N.      599. 

E.  18.  104  Chandler   v.    Keeler,   46   Iowa, 

598. 


§    091  REAL    ESTATE.  728 

accrue  to  those  small  tracts  by  reason  of  their  not  being  so 
charged  as  small  tracts  if  they  are  included  in  the  large  tracts. 
In  other  words,  coterminous  tracts  of  land  belonging  to  the 
same  person,  for  the  assessment  and  payment  of  taxes,  are  the 
same  as  one  tract,105 

§  691.    Forfeitures  are  odious  and  must  be  strictly  proved. — 

(1)  Forfeitures  are  deemed  odious  in  law,  and  will  never  be  pre- 
sumed, but  must  be  strictly  proved  by  the  party  relying  on  the 
same.  And  before  the  defendants  can  have  the  benefit  of  the 
forfeiture  claimed  by  them,  or  any  of  them,  for  a  failure  of  the 
plaintiffs,  or  those  under  whom  they  claim  to  have  had  the  land 
in  controversy  placed  upon  the  land  books  in  R.  county,  and  pay 
the  taxes  thereon  for  five  successive  years  after  the  year  1869, 
the  defendants  must  clearly  prove  that  the  said  land,  or  any 
part  thereof  in  controversy,  has  not  been  upon  the  land  books 
for  those  years,  neither  in  large  tracts  nor  small  ones.106 

105  Maxwell    v.    Cunningham,    50          ioe  Maxwell    v.    Cunningham,    50 
W.  Va.  301,  40  S.  E.  499.  W.  Va.   301,  40  S.  E.  499. 


CHAPTER  XLV. 


WILLS. 


Sec. 

692.  Person  making  will  may  dis- 

inherit relatives. 

693.  Statutory  requirements  in  at- 

testing wills. 

694.  Mental  capacity  to  make  will, 

essential. 

695.  Sound  mind  and  memory  de- 

fined. 

696.  Maker    of    will    presumed    of 

sound  mind. 

697.  Insane  delusions,   lucid   inter- 

vals. 

698.  Insanity    is    disease   of   brain 

affecting   the   mind. 

699.  Mental  weakness  will  not  dis- 

qualify. 


701. 


T02. 
703. 
704. 
705. 


706. 


Unsoundness  of  mind  of  per- 
manent nature. 

Considerations  in  determin- 
ing mental  state. 

Testimony  of  medical  experts 
on  mental  state. 

Considerations  in  determin- 
ing validity  of  will. 

"Undue  influence"  used  in 
procuring  will. 

Advising  person  to  make  will 
is  not  improper. 

Will  presumed  genuine — Not 
forgery. 


§  692.  Person  making  will  may  disinherit  relatives. — (1)  Every 
person  being  twenty-one  years  of  age  and  upwards,  and  of  sound 
mind  and  memory,  has  a  right  to  make  a  disposition  of  his  estate 
by  will,  and  to  so  divide  his  property  as  to  divest  those  Who  would 
otherwise  inherit  it  as  his  legal  heirs  of  their  interest  therein. 
Generally  the  object  of  a  last  will  and  testament  is  to  enable  a 
testator  to  divide  and  distribute  his  property  as  to  him  may  seem 
best,  and  no  next  of  kin,  no  matter  how  near  they  may  be,  can  be 
said  to  have  any  legal  or  natural  right  to  the  estate  of  a  testator 
which  can  be  asserted  against  the  will  of  the  latter.  The  law  of 
this  state  has  placed  every  person's  estate,  over  twenty-one  years 
of  age,  wholly  under  the  control  of  the  owner,  and  to  be  devised 
and  distributed  by  the  latter  as  he  may  freely  choose  and  direct 

729 


§  692  WILLS.  730 

jn  the  last  will  and  testament  made  by  him.  Neither  children  nor 
grandchildren  have  any  natural  rights  to  the  estate  of  their 
mother  or  grandmother  which  can  be  asserted  against  any  dispo- 
sition of  said  estate  which  said  mother  or  grandmother  may  choose 
to  make  by  will.1 

(2)  A  person  competent  to  make  a  will  may  disinherit  all  his 
children,  and  bestow  all  his  property  upon  strangers,  or  he  may 
give  his  property  to  one  or  more  of  his  children  and  disinherit  the 
others,  or  he  may  bequeath  more  of  his  property  to  some  than  to 
others  of  his  children,  and  the  motive  for  so  doing  cannot  be  ques- 
tioned, and  the  hardship  of  the  case  can  have  no  other  weight  fur- 
ther than  a  circumstance,  tending,  with  other  testimony,  to  show 
the  insanity  of  the  testator.  It  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  to 
determine,  from  the  evidence  in  the  case,  whether  L  made  an 
unequal  or  unnatural  disposition  of  his  estate ;  if  he  did  so,  the 
weight  to  be  given  to  that  fact  must  be  determined  from  a  con- 
sideration of  the  circumstances  in  the  case. 

In  determining  the  true  character  of  the  will  in  question,  in 
reference  to  the  parties  to  this  suit,  it  will  be  proper  for  you  to 
consider  the  pecuniary  circumstances  of  the  respective  parties  at 
the  time  the  will  was  made.  If,  upon  a  full  consideration  of  all 
the  circumstances  connected  with  the  making  of  this  will,  you  find 
that  the  testator  has  made  a  rational  and  reasonable  disposition  of 
his  property,  no  presumption  of  unsoundness  of  mind  can  be 
drawn  from  the  fact  that  he  bestowed  a  larger  share  of  his  prop- 
erty upon  the  defendants  than  upon  the  plaintiffs.  It  is  proper 
for  the  jury  to  consider,  with  this  part  of  the  case,  any  declaration 
which  may  have  been  made  by  the  testator  prior  to  the  making  of 
the  will,  in  regard  to  the  disposition  he  intended  to  make  of  his 
property.  And  if  it  should  be  found  that,  when  he  was  in  good 

1  Taylor  v.   Cox,   153   111.   228,   38  version  or  remainder,  which  he  or 

"N.    E.   656.     Held   proper   where   it  she    hath,    at   the   time    of   his    or 

does   not   appear   that   the   testator  her   death    shall    have,    of,    in    and 

had   any  creditors.     The  statute  of  to  any  lands,   tenements,   heredita- 

Illinois  provides  "that   every   male  ments,  annuities,  or  rents  charged 

person    of    the   age    of    twenty-one  upon    or   issuing   out   of   them,    or 

years,  and  every  female  of  the  age  goods    and    chattels,    and    personal 

of   eighteen   years,   being   of  sound  estate    of   every    description    what- 

mind  and  memory,  shall  have  pow-  soever,   by   will   or   testament." 
er   to   devise   all   the   estate,    right.          111.   Stat.   Chap.  148,  §  1,  "Wills." 
title  and  interest  in  possession,  re- 


731  DISTINGUISHING   RELATIVES   BY   WILL.  §    693 

health,  in  writing  or  otherwise,  he  declared  his  intention  to  dis- 
pose of  his  property  substantially  in  the  same  manner  it  is  dis- 
posed of  in  the  will  in  suit,  it  is  an  important  fact  to  be  considered 
in  determining  the  validity  of  this  will  and  as  tending  to  its  sup- 
port.2 

(3)  The  owner  of  property,  who  has  the  capacity  to  attend  to  his 
ordinary  business,  has  the  lawful  right  to  dispose  of  it,  either  by 
deed  or  by  will,  as  he  may  choose,  and  it  requires  no  greater 
mental  capacity  to  make  a  valid  will  than  to  make  a  valid  deed. 
And  if  such  owner  chooses  to  disinherit  his  heir,  or  leave  his  prop- 
erty to  some  charitable  object,  he  has  a  legal  right  to  do  so,  and 
such  disposition  of  his  property  is  valid,  whether  it  be  reasonable 
or  unreasonable,  just  or  unjust;  and  the  reasonableness,  or  jus- 
tice, or  propriety  of  the  will  are  not  questions  for  the  jury  to  pass 
upon.  If,  therefore,  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that, 
when  he  executed  the  paper  in  dispute,  Isaac  Foreman  had  capac- 
ity enough  to  attend  to  his  ordinary  business,  and  to  know  and 
understand  the  business  he  was  engaged  in,  then  he  had  the  right 
and  the  capacity  to  make  such  will,  and  the  jury  should  find  the 
paper  in  dispute  to  be  the  will  of  said  Foreman.  The  court  in- 
structs the  jury  that,  even  if  they  find  from  the  evidence  that 
Isaac  Foreman  had,  during  some  portions  of  his  life,  eccentricities 
or  peculiarities,  or  even  an  insane  delusion,  or  partial  insanity  on 
the  subjects  of  religion,  or  masonry,  or  education,  or  any  other 
subject,  yet  if  they  find  from  the  evidence  that,  at  the  time  he 
made  the  will  in  question,  he  had  sufficient  mind  and  memory  to 
understand  his  ordinary  business,  and  that  he  knew  and  under- 
stood the  business  he  was  engaged  in,  and  intended  to  make  such 
a  will,  the  jury  should  find  said  will  to  be  the  will  of  said  Isaac 
Foreman.3 

§  693.  Statutory  requirements  in  attesting"  wills. — (1)  In  this 
state  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  any  person  of  full  age  and 
sound  mind  may  execute  a  will,  which,  to  be  valid,  must  be  in 
writing,  witnessed  by  two  competent  witnesses,  and  signed  by 

2  Lamb    v.    Lamb,    105    Ind.    460,  to  the  effect  of  evidence  of  eccen- 
5  N.  E.  171.  tricities  and  delusions  on  testamen- 

3  American    Bible    Soc.    v.    Price,  tary  capacity,  see  Wait  v.  Westfall, 
115   111.   623,  633,   5  N.   E.   126.     As  161  Ind.  648,  68  N.  E.  271. 


§  G93  WILLS.  732 

the  testator,  or  by  some  person  in  his  presence,  and  by  his  ex- 
press direction.4 

(2)  The  statute  requires  that  a  will,  to  be  valid,  must  be  in 
writing,  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  some  one  in  his  presence,  with 
his  consent,  and  attested  and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by  two  or 
more  competent  witnesses.    An  attesting  witness  is  one  who  sub- 
scribes his  name  to  the  will  as  a  witness  to  its  execution  at  the 

i 

request  of  the  testator.  Such  request  by  the  testator  is  a  part  of 
the  testamentary  act,  and  must  be  performed  by  the  testator.  A 
person  who  signs  or  subscribes  his  name  to  a  will  without  being 
requested  to  do  so  by  the  testator  is  a  mere  volunteer,  and  not  an 
attesting  witness,  in  contemplation  of  law.  You  are  to  determine 
from  the  evidence  whether  or  not  at  least  two  of  the  witnesses 
whose  names  are  signed  to  the  will  as  witnesses  signed  the  same 
at  the  request  of  the  testator.  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that 
any  two  of  said  witnesses  subscribed  their  names  to  the  will  as 
witnesses  at  the  request  of  the  testator,  and  in  his  presence,  then 
the  will  is  duly  attested  as  required  by  law;  but  if  you  find  that 
at  least  two  of  said  subscribing  witnesses  did  not  sign  their  names 
to  said  will  at  the  request  of  the  testator,  then  said  will  was,  and 
is,  not  duly  executed,  and  in  that  event  you  should  find  for  the 
plaintiff.5 

(3)  Any  person  of  full  age  and  sound  mind  may  execute  a  will, 
which,  to  be  valid,  must  be  in  writing,  witnessed  by  two  compe- 
tent witnesses,  and  signed  by  the  testator  or  by  some  person  for 
him  in  his  presence,  and  by  his  express  direction.    An  attesting 
witness  is  one  who  subscribes  his  name  to  the  will  as  a  witness  to 
its  execution  at  the  request  of  the  testator.     Such  request  of  the 
testator  is  a  part  of  the  testamentary  act,  and  must  be  performed 
by  the  testator.    A  person  who  signs  or  subscribes  his  name  to  a 
will  without  being  requested  to  do  so  by  the  testator  is  a  mere 
volunteer,  »and  not  an  attesting  witness  in  contemplation  of  law.0 

(4)  Relative  to  the  witnessing  or  attestation  of  the  alleged  will 
in  question,  the  court  instructs  the  jury  that  the  statute  of  Illinois 
provides  that  all  wills  shall  be  attested,  in  the  presence  of  the 
testator,  by  two  or  more  credible  witnesses;  and  if  you  believe 

4  Matter  of  Convey  Will,  52  Iowa,         e  Matter  of  Convey  Will,  52  Iowa, 
198,  2   N.   1084.  198.    2   N.   W.    1084;    Bundy  v.   Mc- 

5  Bundy  v.  McKnight,  48  Ind.  505.       Knight,  48  Ind.  505. 


733  ATTESTING   WILLS,    REQUIREMENTS.  §    693 

from  the  evidence  that  William  Drury  signed  the  alleged  will  in 
question  in  the  presence  of  Arthur  W.  Mannon  and  Richard  H. 
Roberts,  and  after  he  so  signed  the  same  they  took  said  will  to  a 
writing  desk  a  short  distance  from  the  foot  of  the  bed,  and  within 
the  range  of  the  testator's  vision,  and  that  the  said  William  Drury 
was  sitting  on  the  bed,  and  they  there  subscribed  their  names  to 
the  attestation  clause  of  said  alleged  will  in  full  and  uninter- 
rupted view  of  the  said  testator,  then  this  is  sufficient  attestation 
of  the  will  in  question,  and  a  full  compliance  with  the  law  on  the 
subject.7 

(5)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  at  the  time  of  the  al- 
leged attestation  of  William  Drury 's  alleged  will,  now  in  dispute, 
that  the  alleged  witnesses  were  in  the  same  room  with  said  William 
Drury,  and  only  a  few  feet  from  him,  with  the  view  between  him 
and  them  uninterrupted,  and  they  within  the  range  of  his  vision ; 
and  if  you  further  believe  from  the  evidence,  and  the  then  sur- 
rounding circumstances  proven  on  the  trial,  in  connection  with 
the  alleged  attestation  of  said  alleged  will,  that  said  William 
Drury,  taking  into  account  his  then  condition  or  state  of  health, 
and  his  then  position  as  shown  by  the  evidence,  either  saw,  or 
could  have  seen,  if  he  had  wished  to,  and  had  looked  in  the  proper 
direction,  the  alleged  witnesses  themselves,  and  enough  of  the  act 
then  being  done  by  them  to  know  on  his  part  (from  what  he  so 
saw,  or  might  have  seen  if  he  had  wished,  and  from  what  he  knew 
of  the  then  surrounding  circumstances)  that  the  alleged  witnesses 
were    then  signing    their    names  as  witnesses  to    his,  William 
Drury 's,  will,  then  upon  that  question  you  should  find  the  alleged 
will  in  question  to  have  been  properly  attested.8 

(6)  To  make  a  legal  attestation  to  a  will  the  test  is,  was  there 
an  uninterrupted  view  between  the  alleged  testator  and  the  sub- 
scribing witnesses,  and  were  the  witnesses  within  the  range  of  the 
alleged  testator's  vision  (his  then  condition  as  to  health  and  pos- 
ture being  considered)  when  the  alleged  attesting  was  done?  Was 
the  alleged  will  then  present,  and  could  the  alleged  testator,  in 
his  then  condition  and  posture,  have  seen  if  he  had  wished  to,  and 
had  looked  in  the  proper  direction,  enough  of  the  persons  of  the 

T  Drury    v.    Cormell,    177    111.    43,         «  Drury  v.  Connell,  177  111.  43,  52 
52  N.  E.  368.  N.  E.  368. 


§  694  WILLS.  734 

alleged  witnesses,  and  enough  of  the  act  then  being  done  by  them, 
to  know  on  his  part  (from  what  he  could  have  seen  if  he  had 
wished  to,  and  from  what  he  knew  of  the  then  surrounding  cir- 
cumstances) that  the  alleged  witnesses  were  then  signing  their 
names  as  witnesses  to  the  alleged  testator's  proposed  will.9 

(7)  While  the  presumption  of  the  law  is  that,  where  a  will  is 
signed  by  the  attesting  witnesses  in  the  same  room  with  the 
testator,  that  it  is  signed  in  his  presence,  yet  that  is  only  a  pre- 
sumption ;  and  where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  witnesses  were 
in  such  position  that  the  testator  could  not  see  the  paper,  nor  see 
the  witnesses  when  signing  it,  the  presumption  of  law  is  over- 
come.10 

§  694.  Mental  capacity  to  make  will  essential. — (1)  It  is  only 
requisite  that  a  testator,  at  the  time  of  making  his  will,  should  be 
of  such  sound  mind  and  memory  as  to  enable  him  to  know  and 
understand  the  business  in  which  he  is  engaged.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary that  he  should  be  in  the  full  possession  of  his  reasoning 
faculties.11 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  Isaac  Foreman, 
at  the  time  he  signed  the  paper  in  dispute,  had  mind  and  memory 
sufficient  to  transact  his  ordinary  business,  and  that  when  he 
made  the  will  he  knew  and  understood  the  business  he  was  en- 
gaged in,  then  the  jury  should  find  said  paper  writing  to  be  the 
will  of  said  Foreman.12 

(3)  Aside  from  the  requisite  formalities  in  the  making  of  a 
will,  the  law  defines  the  requisite  soundness  or  mental  capacity 
of  the  testator  in  this  wise:    A  will  is  not  valid  unless  the  tes- 
tator not  only  intends  of  his  own  free  will  to  make   such   a 
disposition,  but  is  capable  of  knowing  what  he  is  doing  and  of 
understanding  to  whom  he  gives  his  property,  and  in  what  pro- 
portions, and  whom  he  is  depriving  of  it  as  heirs  or  as  devisees 
under  the  will  he  makes.13 

(4)  In  order  to  make  a  valid  will  it  is  necessary  that  the 
decedent  should  be  of  sound  mind  at  the  time  of  the  making  of 
the  will ;  that  he  was  capable  of  comprehending  his  property  in- 

s  Drury    v.    Conn  ell,    177    111.    43,  Redf's  Wills,  64;   Converse  v.  Con- 

46,    52    N.    E.    ?68.  verse,  21  Vt.  168. 

10  Drury    v   Connell,    177    111.    43,  12  American   Bible   Soc.   v.    Price, 
52   N.   E.    368.  115  111.  623,  633,  5  N.  E.  126. 

11  Dyer  v.  Dyer,  87  Ind.  18,  citing  is  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich. 

364. 


735  CAPACITY  TO  MAKE  WILL.  §  694 

terests  and  determining  what  disposition  he  desired  to  make  of 
such  interests,  and  of  making  sucn  disposition.  And  by  this  it  is 
not  meant  that  he  must  possess  the  intellectual  vigor  of  youth,  or 
that  usually  enjoyed  by  him  while  in  perfect  health.  It  is  enough 
that,  as  above  stated,  he  was  capable  of  comprehending  his  prop- 
erty interests  of  which  he  was  possessed,  and  of  determining  what 
disposition  he  desired  to  make  of  such  property,  and  of  making, 
such  disposition.1* 

(5)  In  order  to  make  a  valid  will  it  is  only  necessary  that  a  man 
shall  have  mental  capacity  sufficient  for  the  transaction  of  the 
ordinary  affairs  of  life,  and  possessing  this,  though  he  may  be 
feeble  in  mind  and  body  from  sickness  or  old  age,  he  has  the  legal 
right  to  dispose  of  his  property  just  as  he  pleases,  without  con- 
sulting either  his  family  or  his  acquaintances.    And  if  the  jury  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that,  when  he  executed  the  paper  in  dis- 
pute, Isaac  Foreman  knew  what  he  was  doing,  and  executed  it  as 
his  will,  understanding  its  nature  and  effect,  and  that  at  the  time 
he  had  sufficient  mind  and  memory  to  transact  his  ordinary  busi- 
ness, such  as  buying  or  selling  or  renting  property,  or  collecting 
or  paying  out  money,  or  settling  accounts,  then  the  jury  should 
find  the  paper  in  dispute  to  be  the  last  will  and  testament  of  said 
Isaac  Foreman.15 

(6)  It  is  only  requisite  that  the  testator,  at  the  time  of  making 
his  will,  should  be  of  such  sound  mind  and  memory  as  to  enable 
him  to  know  and  understand  the  business  in  which  he  is  engaged. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  he  should  be  in  the  full  possession  of  his 
reasoning  faculties.     It  is  only  necessary  that  the  testator  shall 
have  mental  capacity  sufficient  for  the  transaction  of  the  ordinary 
affairs  of  life,  and,  possessing  this,  though  he  may  be  feeble  in 
mind  and  body  from  sickness  or  old  age,  he  has  the  legal  right  to 
dispose  of  his  property  just  as  he  pleases,  without  consulting 
either  his  family  or  acquaintances.    And  in  this  case,  if  you  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  F,  at  the  time  he  signed  the  paper 
in  dispute,  had  mind  and  memory  sufficient  to  transact  his  ordi- 
nary business,  and  that,  When  he  made  the  will,  he  knew  and  un- 
derstood the  business  he  was  ensraged  in,  then  you  should  find 
said  paper  writing  to  be  his  will.16 

i*  Webber   v.    Sullivan,    58   Iowa,      115  111.  633,  5  N.  E.  126.    See  Trisb 
265,    12    N.    E.    319.  v.   Newell,  62   111.  202. 

is  American   Bible   Soc.    v.   Price,         ie  Dyer  v.  Dyer,  87  Ind.  18;  Web- 


§  695  WILLS.  736 

§  695.  "Sound  mind  and  memory"  denned. — (1)  The  law  re- 
quires that  a  person,  in  order  to  make  a  valid  will,  should  be  of 
sound  and  disposing  mind  and  memory.  What  we  mean  by 
soundness,  in  this  respect,  is  not  that  the  mind  should  be  in  its 
full  vigor  and  power,  but  that  its  faculties,  its  machinery,  should 
be  in  working  order,  so  to  speak,  with  an  active  power  to  col- 
lect and  retain  the  elements  of  the  business  to  be  performed, 
for  a  sufficient  time  to  perceive  their  obvious  relation  to  each 
other.17 

(2)  A  party  competent  to  make  a  valid  will  should  possess  a 
mind  capable  of  exercising  judgment,  reason  and  deliberation — 
a  mind  capable  of  weighing  the  consequences  of  his  will  and  its 
effects  to  a  certain  degree  upon  his  estate  and  family;  and  all 
persons  devoid  of  such  reason  are  incompetent  to  make  a  valid 
will.18  (3)  The  expression  "sound  mind  and  memory,"  as  used 
in  the  statute,  means  nothing  more  than  the  words  "sound  and 
disposing  mind."19 

(4)  The  term  "sound  mind"  in  the  statute  does  not  mean  that 
the  testator  shall  have  the  same  command  of  his  mental  faculties 
that  he  may  have  when  in  health.  The  law,  recognizing  that  wills 
are  often  made  in  extremis,  when  the  bodily  powers  are  broken 
and  the  mental  faculties  are  enfeebled,  only  requires  that  the  tes- 
tator shall  retain  so  much  of  his  mental  power  as  will  enable  him 
to  understand  his  relations  to  those  who  would  be  the  natural  ob- 
jects of  his  bounty,  and  the  property  he  wishes  to  distribute,  and 
the  manner  in  which  he  intends  to  distribute  it.20 

(5)  A  person  of  sound  mind  or  memory,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  law,  is  one  who  has  full  knowledge  of  the  act  she  is  engaged  in 
and  of  the  property  she  possesses,  an  intelligent  understanding  of 
the  disposition  she  desires  to  make  of  it,  and  of  the  persons  she 
desires  shall  receive  her  property,  and  the  capacity  to  recollect 
and  apprehend  the  nature  of  the  claims  of  those  who  are  excluded 
from  participating  in  her  bounty.     It  is  not  necessary  that  she 
should  have  sufficient  capacity  to  make  contracts  to  do  business 
generally,  or  to  engage  in  complex  and  intricate  business  matters ; 

ber  v.  Sullivan.  58  Iowa,  265,  12  N.  is  Bates  v.  Bates,  27  Iowa,  115. 

W.    319;    American    Bible    Soc.    v.  19  Yoe  v.  McCord,  74  111.  40. 

Price,    115    111.    633,    5   N.    E.    126;  20  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich. 

McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich.  366.  365. 

IT  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich. 
367. 


SOUND   MIND   AND    MEMORY.  §    696 

and  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  that,  at 
the  time  of  making  the  will  in  controversy,  the  deceased,  G,  had 
such  a  knowledge  as  above  defined,  and  possessed  such  under- 
standing of  the  disposition  she  desired  to  make  of  her  property 
and  of  the  persons  she  desired  to  receive  the  same,  and  had  capac- 
ity to  recollect  and  apprehend  the  nature  of  the  claims  of  those 
who  were  excluded  from  participating  in  her  bounty,  then  she 
would  be  of  sound  mind  and  memory  within  the  meaning  of  the 
law,  even  though  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that 
she  was  physically  weak,  and  did  not  have  the  mental  capacity 
sufficient  to  make  contracts  to  do  business  generally,  or  to  engage 
in  complex  and  intricate  business  matters.  But  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  you  find  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that,  at  the 
time  of  making  the  will  in  controversy,  the  deceased,  G,  had  any 
such  knowledge  as  above  defined  in  this  instruction,  and  did  not 
possess  such  understanding  as  to  the  disposition  she  desired  to 
make  of  her  property  and  of  the  persons  she  desired  to  receive  the 
same ;  and  did  not  have  capacity  to  recollect  and  apprehend  the 
nature  of  the  claims  of  those  who  were  excluded  from  participat- 
ing in  her  bounty,  then  she  would  not  be  of  sound  mind  and 
memory  within  the  meaning  of  the  law.21 

§  696.  Maker  of  will  presumed  of  sound  mind. — (1)  The  legal 
presumption  is  in  favor  of  sanity,  and,  on  the  issue  of  sanity  or 
insanity,  the  burden  is  upon  him  who  asserts  insanity  to  prove  it. 
Hence,  in  a  doubtful  case,  unless  there  appears  a  preponderance 
of  proof  of  mental  unsoundness,  the  issue  shall  be  found  the  other 
way,  and  in  favor  of  the  execution  of  the  will.22 

(2)  When  a  will  is  proved,  including  soundness  of  mind  and 
memory  on  the  part  of  the  testator,  by  the  testimony  of  two 
subscribing  witnesses,  and  unsoundness  of  mind  is  alleged  as  a 
ground  for  setting  the  will  aside,  the  fact  of  insanity,  or  of 
unsoundness  of  mind,  must  be  established  with  reasonable  cer- 
tainty; the  evidence  of  insanity  should  preponderate  or  the  will 
must  be  considered  as  valid.  If  there  is  only  a  bare  balance 
of  evidence,  or  a  mere  doubt  only  of  the  sanity  of  the  testator, 

21  Hudson    v.    Hughan,    56    Kas.       Iowa,    166,    17    N.    456;    Barnes    v. 
159,  42  Pac.  701.  Barnes,  66  Me.  300   (burden). 

22  Stephenson    v.    Stephenson,    62 


§  696  WILLS.  738 

the  presumption  in  favor  of  sanity,  if  proved  as  above  stated, 
must  turn  the  scale  in  favor  of  the  sanity  of  the  testator.23 

(3)  If.  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  said  instru- 
ment of  writing  is  consistent  in  its  provisions  and  rational  on  its 
face,  the  presumption  is  that  the  said  B  was  of  sound  mind  at  the 
time  of  the  execution  of  the  same,  and  the  burden  shifts  to  the 
contestants  to  show  that  he  was  not  of  sound  mind  at  that  time.24 

(4)  The  legal  presumption  arises  by  law  in  favor  of  the  sanity 
of  all  men,  and,   although  this  presumption  is  not   conclusive, 
still  the  jury  should  consider  it  in  hearing  the  evidence  in  the 
case  of  which  for  particular  purposes  it  forms  a  part.25 

(5)  A  will  proved  or  admitted  to  have  been  executed  and  at- 
tested, as  prescribed  by  law,  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  made 
by  a  person  of  sound  mind;  but  if  testimony  is  shown  which 
counterbalances  that  presumption,  the  party  seeking  to  support 
such  will  must  establish  by  affirmative  evidence  that  the  tes- 
tator was  of  sound  mind  wheoi  he  executed  the  will.26 

(6)  The  law  presumes,  and  it  is  your  duty  to  presume,  that 
every  man  who  has  arrived  at  the  years  of  discretion  is  of  sound 
mind  and  memory,  and  capable  of  transacting  ordinary  business, 
and  capable  of  disposing  of  his  property  by  will  or  otherwise, 
until  the  contrary  is  shown;  and  the  court  instructs  you  that,  in 
the  first  instance,  it  is  your  duty  to  hold  that  C,  at  the  time  he  ex- 
ecuted the  will  offered  in  evidence,  was  of  sound  mind  and  mem- 
ory, and  to  so  hold  until  you  believe,  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
evidence,  that  he  was  otherwise.27 

(7)  When    a    will    is    proved,    including    soundness    of    mind 
and  memory  on  the  part  of  the  testator,  by  the  testimony  of 
two    subscribing    witnesses,    and    unsoundness    is    alleged    as    a 
ground  for  setting  the  will   aside,   the   fact   of  the  insanity  or 
unsoundness  of  mind  must  be   established  by  a  preponderance 
of  the   evidence;   the   evidence   of  insanity   or   unsoundness   of 

23  Sackett     Instructions,     p.     592,  Coffman,    12    Iowa,    491;    Cotton   v. 

citing:    Jarman   Wills,    5    Am.    Ed.  Ulmer,  45  Ala.  378. 

104;     Redfern    Wills,     31-50;     Per-  2-4  Bramel  v.  Bramel,  19  Ky.  L.  R. 

kins    v.     Perkins,     39  N.     H.     163;  72,  39  S.  W.  521. 

Brooks  v.  Barrett,  7  Pick.   (N.  Y.)  25  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich 

94;    Turner   v.    Cook,    36   Ind.    129;  366. 

Dickie  v.  Carter,  42  111.  376;   Terry  20  Bates   v.    Bates,    27   Iowa,    114. 

v.    Buffington,    11    Ga.    337;    In    re  27  Craig  v.  Southard,  162  111.  213, 

44   N.  E.  393. 


739  INSANE  DELUSIONS,   LUCID  INTERVALS.  §    697 

mind  should  preponderate,  or  the  will  must  be  taken  as  valid. 
If  there  is  only  a  bare  balance  of  evidence,  or  a  mere  doubt  only 
of  the  sanity  of  the  testator,  or  of  his  unsoundness  of  mind,  the 
presumption  in  favor  of  sanity,  if  proven  as  above  stated,  must 
turn  the  scale  in  favor  of  the  sanity  of  the  testator.28 

§  697.  Insane  delusions,  lucid  intervals. — (1)  An  insane  de- 
lusion is  a  fixed  and  settled  belief  in  facts  not  existing,  which  no 
rational  person  would  believe.  Such  delusions  may  sometimes 
exist  as  to  one  or  more  subjects.  And  if  the  jury  believe,  from 
the  evidence  in  this  case,  that  Isaac  Foreman  was  laboring  under 
such  insane  delusions  upon  subjects  connected  with  the  testa- 
mentary disposition  of  his  property  and  the  natural  objects  of 
his  bounty  when  he  made  the  will  in  question,  and  was  thereby 
rendered  incompetent  to  comprehend,  rationally,  the  nature  and 
effect  of  the  act,  and  that,  but  for  such  delusions,  he  would  not 
have  made  the  will  as  he  did,  then  the  jury  should  find  against 
the  validity  of  the  will.29 

(2)  There  is  an  essential  difference  between  the  apparently 
lucid,  intervals  in  delirium,  and  in  general  insanity.  In  delirium, 
the  apparent  return  to  reason  may  be  real  and  unquestionable, 
while  those  which  seem  to  occur  in  insanity  are  delusive,  the  pa- 
tient being  as  really  laboring  under  the  powers  of  the  malady  as 
in  the  more  distinctly  marked  periods  of  its  progress;  but  testa- 
mentary incapacity  does  not  necessarily  presuppose  the  existence 
of  insanity  in  its  technical  sense.  Weakness  of  intellect,  whether 
arising  from  extreme  old  age,  from  disease  or  great  bodily  in- 
firmity, from  intemperance,  or  from  all  these  causes  combined, 
and  when  such  weakness  disqualifies  the  testator  from  knowing 
or  appreciating  the  nature  and  effect  of  consequences  of  the  act 
he  is  engaged  in,  renders  such  testator  incapable  of  making  a 
valid  will.30 

§  698.  Insanity  is  disease  of  brain  affecting  the  mind. — Insan- 
ity is  a  disease  of  the  brain  affecting  the  mind  to  such  an  extent 

28  Taylor  v.  Pegram,  151  111.  117,  115  111.  623,  632,  5  N.  E.  126.     See 
37  N.  E.   837;    Hollenback  v.   Cook,  Wait  v.   Westfall,   161   Ind.   648,   68 
180  111.  65,  70,  54  N.  E.  154;  Wilber  N.  E.  238,  as  to  the  effect  of  evi- 
v.   Wilber,   129    111.    392,    396,   21   N.  dence  of  delusions. 

E.  1076;  Graybeal  v.  Gardner,  146  so  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich. 
111.  337,  346,  34  N.  E.  528.  366. 

29  American   Bible  Soc.   v.   Price, 


§  699  ,   WILLS.  740 

as  to  destroy  a  man's  capacity  to  attend  to  his  ordinary  business, 
or  to  know  and  understand  the  business  he  was  engaged  in  when 
making  a  will.  And  unless  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that 
Mr.  Foreman's  brain  was  diseased  to  such  an  extent  that  he  did 
not  have  mind  and  memory  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  transact 
his  ordinary  business,  such  as  renting  his  land,  settling  accounts, 
buying  and  selling  property,  and  to  know  and  understand  the 
business  he  was  engaged  in  at  the  time  he  made  the  will  in  dis- 
pute, the  jury  should  find  that  said  will  is  the  will  of  said  Fore- 
man.31 

§  699.  Mental  weakness  or  eccentricities  will  not  disqualify.  (1) 
Even  if  the  jury  are  satisfied  that  the  mental  powers  of  P  had 
become  enfeebled  or  disturbed  by  disease  at  the  time  he  made 
the  alleged  will,  still,  if  they  find  from  the  evidence  that  he  did 
fully  understand  and  intend  to  make  the  disposition  which  he 
made  of  his  property,  then  the  will  must  stand,  as  touching  the 
question  of  mental  soundness  or  capacity.32 

(2)  If  in  the  present  case  you  should  find  from  the  evidence 
that  P,  on  the  day  he  made  the  alleged  will,  was  delirious  or  that 
his  mental  faculties  were  otherwise  obscured  by  the  disease  from 
which  he  was  suffering,  still  this  would  not  necessarily  prevent 
his  having  sufficient  capacity  to  make  a  will.     Delirium  or  obscu- 
ration of  the  mental  faculties  by  disease  must  be  so  complete  and 
so  becloud  the  mind,  that  the  testator  does  not  understand  the 
nature  of  the  business  in  which  he  is  engaged,  or  does  not  under- 
stand at  the  time  of  making  the  instrument,  substantially  the  act, 
the  extent  of  his  property,  his  relations  to  others,  who  might  or 
ought  to  be  the  objects  of  his  bounty,  and  the  scope  and  bearing 
of  the  provisions  of  the  will,  and  does  not  possess  the  other  quali- 
fications which  I  have  already  referred  to.33 

(3)  The  impairing  of  the  mental  faculties  by  the  effects  of  acute 
disease  such  as  delirium,  or  the  enfeebling  of  them  from  any  of 
the  causes  incident  to  such  disease,  must  be  to  that  extent  which 
deprives  him  of  the  use  of  his  reason  and  understanding  to  the 
extent  already  intimated,  for  if  this  is  not  the  testator's  situa- 

si  American   Bible   Soc.   v.   Price,         33  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey  27  Mich. 
115   111.   623,   634,   5  N.  E.   126.  365. 

32  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich. 
365. 


741          PERMANENT    INSANITY — DETERMINING    MENTAL    STATE.    §    701 

tion,  although  his  understanding  may  be  to  some  extent  obscured 
and  his  memory  troubled,  yet  he  may  make  his  will.34 

(4)  Eccentricities  or  peculiarities,  or  radical  or  extreme  notions 
or  opinions  upon  religion,  colleges,  education  or  masonry  and 
secret  societies,  will  not  necessarily  render  a  man  incapable  of 
making  a  will;  and  if  the  jury  find  that  in  making  the  will  in 
dispute,  Isaac  Foreman  had  sufficient  mind  and  memory  to  under- 
stand the  businese  he  was  engaged  in  when  he.  made  the  will, 
then  the  jury  should  find  in  favor  of  said  will,  though  said  Fore- 
man may  have  had  eccentricities  and  peculiarities,  or  extreme 
notions  and  opinions  upon  religion,  colleges,  education  or  masonry 
or  secret  societies.35 

§  700.    Unsoundness  of  mind  of  permanent  nature. — The  law 

presumes  that  every  person  is  of  sound  mind  until  the  contrary 
is  proven.  Yet  when  unsoundness  of  mind  of  a  permanent  nature 
has  been  established,  the  presumption  is  that  such  state  of  un- 
soundness exists  or  continues  until  the  contrary  is  shown.38 

§  701.  Considerations  in  determining  mental  state. — (1)  In  de- 
termining the  issues  of  facts  submitted  to  you  under  these  instruc- 
tions you  should  carefully  look  to  all  the  evidence  before  you, 
and  in  doing  so  you  should  take  into  consideration  the  physical 
condition  of  G,  arising  from  her  age,  sickness  or  any  other  cause ; 
the  condition  of  her  mind  at  and  before  the  time  of  the  execution 
of  the  will  in  controversy;  the  execution  of  the  will  and  its  con- 
tents ;  the  execution  of  any  former  will  by  her  and  the  provisions 
thereof;  the  relations  existing  between  her  and  the  parties  re- 
spectively herein  at  and  before  the  execution  of  the  will  in  con- 
troversy; her  family  and  connections;  the  terms  on  which  she 
stood  with  them;  the  claims  of  particular  individuals;  the  condi- 
tion and  relative  situation  of  the  legatees  and  devisees  named  in 
the  will;  the  situation  of  the  testatrix  herself  and  the  circum- 
stances under  which  the  will  was  made ;  and,  in  brief,  every  fact 
or  circumstance  which  tends  to  throw  any  light  on  the  question 
submitted  to  you.31 

(2)  It  is  proper  for  the  jury  to  consider  any  statement  which 

34  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich.  se  Wallis  v.  Luhring,  134  Ind.  450, 
366.  34   N.   B.   231. 

35  American   Bible   Soc.   v.   Price,  «T  Hudson  v.  Hugaan,  56  Kas.  160, 
115  111.  623,  633,  5  N.  E.  126.  42  Pac.   701. 


§  702  WILLS.  742 

may  have  been  made  by  the  testator  before  the  making  of  his  will, 
in  reference  to  what  he  intended  to  d'o  with  his  property.  If  you 
should  find  from  the  evidence  that  when  he  was  in  good  health  he 
stated  his  intention  of  disposing  of  his  property  substantially  as 
it  is  disposed  of  in  the  will,  this  is  an  important  fact  to  be  con- 
sidered by  you  in  determining  the  validity  of  the  will  and  as 
tending  to  its  support.38 

(3)  If  upon  the  whole  evidence  you  believe  James  Entwistle 
was  not  of  sound  mind  and  memory,  as  denned  in  these  instruc- 
tions, then  you  should  find  that  the  purported  will  is  not  the 
will  of  James  Entwistle,  deceased.39 

§  702.  Testimony  of  medical  experts  in  determining  mental 
condition. — The  testimony  of  medical  men  of  experience  in  their 
profession  in  this  class  of  cases,  after  careful  examination  of  the 
testator's  mental  condition,  touching  the  mental  condition  of  the 
deceased  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  will  in  question,  may 
be  by  you  given  more  weight  and  consideration  than  the  testi- 
mony of  non-professional  witnesses.40 

§  703.  Considerations  in  determining  validity  of  will. — There 
is  some  evidence  in  this  case  tending  to  show  that  the  testator  was 
at  one  time  engaged  in  some  litigation  with  the  mother  of  the 
contestant,  and  bore  some  ill  will  or  dislike  toward  her;  and  you 
are  instructed  that  if  the  testator  was  influenced  thereby  to  make 
his  will  as  he  did,  and  at  the  time  was  of  sound  mind,  if  he  did  so 
by  his  own  free  choice  and  agency,  his  will  would  be  valid  and 
should  be  recognized  by  you;  even  if  he  did  it  unjustly  or  with 
mistaken  opinion  as  to  the  matters  involved,  yet  that  would  not 
invalidate  the  will,  but  would  rather  tend  to  explain  why  he  made 
his  will  as  he  did.41 

§  704.    "Undue  influence"  used  in  procuring  a  will. — (1)  That 

ss  Conway    v.    Vizzard,    122    Ind.  40  Blake  v.  Rourke,  74  Iowa,  523, 

268,   23   N.   E.   771.     But   such   dec-  38  N.   W.   392.     But  see  Blough  v. 

larations    cannot   be    considered    in  Parry,   144   Ind.   463,    472,   4   N.    E. 

connection  with  the  issue  of  undue  70;    Jones   v.   Casler,   139   Ind.   482, 

influence.  38  N.  E.  812. 

39  Entwistle    v.    Meikle,    180    111.  «  In  re  Townsend's  Est.   (Iowa), 

9,  28,  54  N.  E.  217;  Slingloff  v.  Bru-  97  N.   W.   1111. 
ner,  174  111.  561,  569,  51  N.  E.  772. 


743  WILL  MADE  BY  UNDUE  INFLUENCE.  §704 

inequality  in  the  distribution  of  property  among  those  who  would 
inherit  if  no  will  had  been  made  is  not  of  itself  evidence  of  undue 
influence  or  unsoundness  of  mind,  yet  it  may  be  considered  as  a 
circumstance  by  the  jury,  together  with  all  the  other  facts  and 
circumstances  shown  by  the  evidence  as  tending  to  establish 
undue  influence  or  unsoundness  of  mind.42 

(2)  If  you  find  that  the  will  was  valid  at  the  time  of  its  execu- 
tion it  remained  valid  and  is  valid  now,  unless  it  has  been  revoked, 
which  is  not  claimed  by  the  contestants.     The  condition  of  the 
mind  of  the  testator,  or  any  undue  influence  exercised  over  him 
after  the  execution  of  the  will  could  not  invalidate  it,  and  no 
such  claim  is  made  in  this  case.     However,  the  law  permits  the 
facts  and  circumstances  occurring  after  the  execution  of  the  will 
to  be  shown  relating  to  the  condition  of  the  testator's  mind,  and 
the  question  of  fraud  and  undue  influence  claimed  to  have  been 
exercised  over  him,  for  the  purpose  of  proving  by  inference  or 
otherwise  that  the  conditions  existed  before  and  at  the  time  of 
the  execution  of  the  will  as  existed  afterwards  on  these  points.43 

(3)  When  undlue  influence  is  alleged  the  real  inquiry  is  this: 
Did  the  testator  make  and  execute  the  alleged  will  in  all  its  pro- 
visions of  his  own  free  will  and  volition  so  that  it  now  expresses 
his  own  wishes  and  intentions,  or  was  the  testator  constrained  or 
induced  through  the  undue  influence,  restraint,  coercion  or  im- 
proper conduct  of  others,  to  act  contrary  to  his  own  desire  and 
intentions  regarding  the  disposition  of  his  property  or  any  part 
of  it.44 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  said  E  at  the  time 
he  executed  the  will  now  in  question,  was  feeble  in  body  and 
mind  from  sickness,  old  age  or  otherwise,  and  that  while  in  this 
condition  his  son  unduly  influenced  him  to  make  said  purported 
will,  and  that  at  said  time  E  was  not  a  free  agent,  but  was  under 
the  undue  influence  of  his  son,  then  you  should  so  find  in  your 
verdict.45 

(5)  In  order  that  the  contestant  may  recover  in  this  case,  there 
are  two  facts  that  must  be  proven  by  her ;  first,  that  undue  influ- 

42  England  v.  Fawbush,  204  111.  44  England  v.  Fawbush,  204  111. 

384,  68  N.  E.  526.  396,  68  N.  E.  526. 

«  Haines  v.  Hayden,  95  Mich.  350,  45  England  v.  Fawbush,  204  111. 

54  N.  W.  911.  394,  68  N.  E.  526. 


WILLS.  744 

ence  was  in  fact  exerted;  second,  that  it  was  successful  in  sub- 
verting and  controlling  the  will  of  the  testator.  Both  of  these 
facts  must  be  proven  by  the  contestant  by  the  weight  of  the  evi- 
dence in  order  to  defeat  the  will.  Upon  the  latter  question, 
evidence  of  the  statements  of  the  testator,  made  either  before  the 
will  was  made  or  after,  and  which  tend  to  throw  light  on  the 
condition  of  mind  are  admissible ;  but  as  to  the  first  question,  the 
evidence  of  such  statements  is  hearsay  and  incompetent  and 
should  not  be  considered  by  you.  Such  declarations  have  been 
admitted  only  for  the  purpose  of  proving  the  condition  of  the 
testator.  They  afford  no  substantive  proof  of  undue  influence, 
and  cannot  be  admitted  for  such  purpose ;  and  before  the  contes- 
tant can  recover  it  is  necessary  that  she  should  prove  that  undue 
influence  was,  in  fact,  actually  exerted  upon  the  testator,  by 
other  evidence  than  his  own  declarations.46 

(6)  Whether  the  free  agency  of  the  testator  is  destroyed  or  con- 
trolled by  physical  force  or  mental  coercion,  by  threats  which 
occasion  fear  or  by  importunity  which  the  testator  is  too  weak  to 
resist  or  which  extorts  compliance  in  the  hope  of  peace,  is  imma- 
terial.    In  considering  the  question,  therefore,  it  is  essential  to 
ascertain  as  far  as  practicable  the  power  of  coercion  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  liability  of  its  influence  on  the  other.     And  where- 
ever,  through  weakness,  ignorance,  dependence,  or  implicit  reli- 
ance of  one  on  the  good  faith  of  another,  the  latter  obtains 
ascendency  which  prevents  the  former  from  exercising  an  un- 
biased judgment,  undue  influence  exists.47 

(7)  It  is  not  necessary  that  there  should  be  confidential  rela- 
tions between  all  the  beneficiaries  and  the  testator.  If  there  is  such 
a  relation  with  one  of  the  family,  and  the  will  is  found  to  have 
been  procured  through  his  undue  influence,  it  operates  against 
all  the  family.48 

(8)  As  bearing  on  the  question  of  undue  influence,  if  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  some  months  before  the  execution  of  the 
will,  when  in  good  health  and  of  unquestioned  soundness  of  mind, 
the  testator  declared  in  the  presence  of  H  that  he  intended  to  do  a 

46  In  re  Townsend's  Est.   (Io.  a),         48  Coghill    v.    Kennedy,    119    Ala. 
97  N.  W.  1111.  641,  24  So.  464. 

47  Coghill    v.    Kennedy,    119    Ala. 
641,   24   So.   464. 


745  ADVISING  ONE  TO  MAKE  WILL.  §    705 

good  part  by  H,  or  pay  him  well  for  attentions  and  kindness 
bestowed,  or  give  him  a  home ;  and  if  you  further  find  from  the 
evidence,  that  the  bequest  of  H  is  in  substantial  compliance  with 
such  declaration,  you  should  consider  this  fact  in  determining 
whether  or  not  H  used  undue  influence  in  procuring  the  bequest 
made  to  him.*9 

§  705.    Advising  person  to  make  will  is  not  improper. — (1)  It  is 

not  unlawful  for  a  person  by  honest  advice  or  persuasion  to  induce 
a  testator  to  make  a  will  or  to  influence  him  in  disposing  of  his 
property  by  will.  Such  advice  or  persuasion  will  not  vitiate  a 
.will  made  freely  from  a  conviction  of  its  propriety.  To  avoid  a 
will  the  influence  which  is  exercised  must  be  undue,  and  this 
means  something  wrongful,  amounting  to  a  species  of  fraud.50 

(2)  Though  the  devisee  may  have  had  improper  intercourse 
with  the  testatrix,  that  of  itself,  however  immoral  such  relation 
may  be,  is  not  sufficient  to  invalidate  a  will  made  in  favor  of  the 
wrongdoer,  if  no  improper  influences  are  shown  to  have  been 
exerted  to  induce  the  making  of  the  will.51 

§  706.  Will  presumed  genuine,  not  forgery. — (1)  In  civil  as 
well  as  in  criminal  actions  the  law  indulges  the  presumption  of  in- 
nocence and  fair  dealing  in  all  transactions ;  and  in  this  particular 
case  the  law  presumes  that  the  signatures  to  the  will  in  contest 
are  genuine  and  not  forged,  and  that  the  defendant  is  innocent 
of  all  criminal  conduct  in  relation  thereto.  In  criminal  charges 
the  presumption  of  innocence  must  be  overthrown  and  guilt 
proven  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  in  order  to  secure  a  conviction ; 
but  in  civil  cases  like  the  present,  involving  a  charge  of  crimi- 
nality, the  rule  of  proof  is  different  and  not  so  strong.  For  the 
plaintiffs  to  recover  upon  the  charge  of  forgery  they  are  not 
compelled  to  prove  the  charge  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  but  the 
law  is  satisfied,  and  you  must  be,  if  the  charge  is  proven  by  a  fair 
preponderance  of  the  evidence;  that  is,  the  evidence  in  favor  of 
the  forgery  must  overcome  the  presumption  of  innocence,  and  all 
countervailing  evidence  of  genuineness.52 

49  Goodbar  v.  Lldikey,  136  Ind.  7,  si  Dickie   v.    Carter,    42    111.    388; 

36   N.   E.   691.     Held   proper  where  Eckert  v.  Flowry,  43  Pa.  St.  46. 

there  is  evidence  tending  to  rebut  52  McDonald     v.     McDonald,     142 

the  charge  of  undue  influence.  Ind.  89,  41  N.  E.  336. 

so  Yoe     v.     McCord,     74     111.     44; 
Dickie  v.  Carter,  42   111.  388. 


§  706  WILLS.  746 

(2)  If  the  evidence  shows  that  the  decedent,  B,  executed  the 
written  instrument  offered  for  probate  by  the  proponents  herein ; 
that  he  requested  Parish  and  Petty  to  attest  the  execution,  which 
they  did  in  the  presence  of  the  testator,  then  such  instrument  is 
not  a  forgery.  If  you  find  that  the  decedent,  B,  signed  said 
instrument,  it  cannot  be  a  forgery.63 

63  Miller  v.  Coulter,  156  Ind.  298,    59  N.  E.  853. 


CHAPTER  XLVL 

CAUTIONARY  INSTRUCTIONS  IN  CRIMINAL   CASES. 

Sec.  Sec. 

707.  Caution  as  to  duty  in  grave     710.    In   Indiana   the  jury   are  the 

cases.  judges. 

708.  Deliberations  of  jurymen  as  to      711.     In     Ohio     the     court      is    the 

verdict.  judge. 

JUDGES    OF    CRIMINAL    LAW.  712'      In      Iowa      tne      court      is      th6 

judge. 

709.  In    Illinois    the   jury    are   the 

judges. 

§  707.  Caution  as  to  duty  in  grave  cases. — (1)  The  duty  of 
counsel  and  the  court  has  now  been  performed.  The  counsel  en- 
gaged in  the  case  have  been  untiring  in  their  efforts  to  bring  before 
you  all  possible  evidence  that  may  aid  you  in  arriving  at  the  truth. 
They  have  ably  assisted  you  in  applying  the  evidence  to  the  facts 
in  contention.  The  court  has  endeavored  to  rightly  advise  you  on 
the  law,  and  now  there  confronts  you  the  final  and  important 
duty  of  pronouncing  upon  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendant. 
I  submit  this  case  to  you  with  the  confidence  that  you  will  faith- 
fully discharge  the  grave  duty  resting  upon  you  without  upon 
the  one  hand  being  moved  by  any  undue  demand  for  conviction 
on  the  part  of  counsel  for  the  state,  or  being  swayed  from  its  right 
performance  by  any  undue  appeal  to  your  sympathies.  You  will 
bear  in  mind  that  neither  the  life  nor  the  liberty  of  the  accused 
may  be  trifled  away,  and  neither  taken  by  careless  or  inconsider- 
ate judgment.  But  if,  after  a  careful  consideration  of  the  law 
and  the  evidence  in  the  case,  you  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  defendant  is  guilty,  you  should  return  your  ver- 
dict accordingly.  Duty  demands  it.  and  the  law  requires  it.  You 

747 


§  708     CAUTIONARY  INSTRUCTIONS  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.      .  748 

must  be  just  to  the  defendant  and  equally  just  to  the  state.  As 
manly,  upright  men,  charged  with  the  responsible  duty  of  assist- 
ing the  court  in  the  administration  of  justice,  you  will  put  aside 
all  sympathy  and  sentiment,  all  consideration  of  public  approval 
or  disapproval,  and  look  steadfastly  and  alone  to  the  law  and 
evidence  in  the  case,  and  return  into  court  such  a  verdict  as  is 
warranted  thereby.1 

(2)  It  is  proper  for  the  court  to  remind  you  that  the  issue  in 
this  case  is  to  the  defendant  of  so  grave  a  nature,  and  to  the  public 
safety  of  such  vital  importance,  that  upon  your  part  there  should 
be  no  error.  The  accused,  if  he  be  innocent,  ought  not  to  be  er- 
roneously convicted,  and  on  the  contrary,  if  he  be  guilty,  he  ought 
not  to  be  erroneously  acquitted.  You  were,  after  careful  effort, 
selected  as  intelligent  and  qualified  jurors,  sworn  to  impartially 
try  and  determine  this  cause,  and  a  true  verdict  render  accord- 
ing to  the  law  and  the  evidence.  If  you  comply  with  your  oaths, 
error  against  either  side  must  be  precluded.  Remember  that  the 
defendant's  life  and  liberty  are  his  most  sacred  and  highest 
rights,  and  can  only  be  forfeited  by  him  for  the  causes,  upon  the 
conditions,  and  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law.  In  considering 
his  rights  do  not  forget  that  by  each  acquittal  of  a  guilty  criminal 
the  safeguard  erected  by  society  for  its  protection  is  weakened ; 
for,  by  the  non-enforcement  of  penalties  affixed  to  criminal  acts, 
contempt  for  the  law  is  bred  among  the  very  class  that  it  is  in- 
tended to  restrain.  The  evidence  has  been  placed  before  you;  an 
exhaustive  discussion  of  the  facts  by  counsel  on  either  side  has 
been  had  in  your  hearing,  and  such  instructions  as  in  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court  would  aid  you  in  arriving  at  a  correct  decision 
have  been  given.2 

§  708.  Deliberations  of  jurymen  in  reaching  a  verdict. — (1) 
Each  juror  acts  for  himself  in  coming  to  a  conclusion,  and  acts  on 
his  own  convictions ;  and  although  it  is  true  that  in  case  any  one 
of  the  jurors  entertains  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  guilt  of  the 
defendant  he  ought  not  to  find  him  guilty,  yet  such  doubt  in  the 
mind  of  one  or  more  of  the  jurors  ought  not  to  control  the  action 

i  Hinshaw  v.  S.  147  Ind.  384,  mur-         2  stout  v.   S.   90   Ind.   13. 
der  case,  47  N.  E.  157. 


749  JUDGES    OF    CRIMINAL   LAW.  §    709 

of  the  other  jurors,  so  as  to  compel  them  to  give  a  verdict  of  ac- 
quittal.3 

(2)  The  jury  are  admonished  that  there  should  be  no  mistrial 
in  this  case,  if  it  be  possible  for  the  jury  to  agree  upon  a  ver- 
dict, if  they  can  do  so  without  violating  their  conscientious  con- 
victions, based  on  the  evidence.    This  case  has  taken  up  a  whole 
week  of  this  term,  and  has  necessarily  been  costly  to  the  state  and 
county,  and  has  forced  the  postponement  of  other  important  cases. 
The  jury  should  therefore  lay  aside  pride  of  opinion  and  judg- 
ment, examine  any  differences  of  opinion  there  may  be  among 
them  in  a  spirit  of  fairness  and  candor,  reason  together,  and  talk 
over  such  differences  and  harmonize  them,  if  this  be  possible,  so 
that  this  case  may  be  disposed  of.4 

(3)  It  is  the  duty  of  each  juryman,  while  the  jury  are  deliberat- 
ing upon  their  verdict,  to  give  careful  consideration  to  the  views 
his  fellow-jurymen  may  have  to  present  upon  the  testimony  in  the 
case.    He  should  not  shut  his  ears  and  stubbornly  stand  upon  the 
position  he  first  takes,  regardless  of  what  may  be  said  by  the  other 
jurymen.    It  should  be  the  object  of  all  of  you  to  arrive  at  a  com- 
mon conclusion,  and  to  that  end  you  should  deliberate  together 
with  calmness.    It  is  your  duty  to  agree  upon  a  verdict  if  pos- 
sible.5 

Judges  of  Criminal  Law. 

§  709.    In  Illinois  the  jury  are  the  judges. — (1)  You  are  the 

judges  of  the  law  as  well  as  the  facts.  But  you  are  instructed  that 
it  is  your  duty  to  accept  and  act  upon  the  law  as  given  you  by  the 
court,  unless  you  can  say  upon  your  oaths  that  you  are  better 
judges  of  the  law  than  the  court ;  and  if  you  can  say  upon  your 
oaths  that  you  are  better  judges  of  the  law  than  the  court,  then 
you  are  at  liberty  to  so  act.6 

(2)  You  are  the  judges  of  the  law  as  well  as  the  facts  of  this 
case,  and  if  you  can  say  upon  your  oaths  that  you  know  the  law 
better  than  the  court  does,  then  you  have  the  right  to  do  so  -,  but, 

s  Fassinow  v.  S.  89  Ind.  237.  "  Davison  v.  P.  90  111.  231.     Note: 

*  Sigsbee    v.    S.    43    Fla.    524,    30  The   statute     of     Illinois     provides 

So.    816:    Myers   v.    S,    43   Fla.    500,  that  "in  all  criminal  cases  the  jury 

31  So.  275.  shall   be   th/e   judges,   the   law   and 

s  Jackson    v.    S.    91    Wis.    253,    64  fact." 
N.   W.   838. 


§  710     CAUTIONARY  INSTRUCTIONS  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.       750 

before  assuming  so  solemn  a  responsibility,  you  should  be  assured 
that  you  are  not  acting  from  caprice  or  prejudice ;  that  you  are 
not  controlled  by  your  will  or  wishes,  but  from  a  deep  and  confi- 
dent conviction  that  the  court  is  wrong  and  that  you  are  right. 
Before  saying  this  upon  your  oaths  it  is  your  duty  to  reflect 
whether,  from  your  study  and  experience,  you  are  better  qualified 
to  judge  the  law  than  the  court.  If  under  all  the  circumstances 
you  are  prepared  to  say  that  the  court  is  wrong  in  its  exposition 
of  the  law,  the  statute  has  given  you  that  right.7 

§  710.    In  Indiana  the  jury  are  the  judges. — (1)  You  are  the 

judges  of  the  law  as  well  as  the  facts  in  this  case.  You  can  take  the 
law  as  given  and  explained  to  you  by  the  court,  but,  if  you  see  fit, 
you  have  the  legal  and  constitutional  right  to  reject  the  same  and 
determine  and  construe  it  for  yourselves.  But  notwithstanding 
you  have  the  legal  right  to  disagree  from  the  court  as  to  what  the 
law  is,  still  you  should  consider  and  weigh  the  instructions  given 
you  as  you  weigh  the  evidence,  and  you  should  disregard  neither 
without  proper  reason.8 

(2)  You  are  the  judges  of  the  law  and  the  evidence,  and  of  what 
facts  are  proved  and  what  facts  are  not  proved.  It  is  the  duty 
of  the  court  to  instruct  you  in  the  law,  but  the  instructions  of  the 
court  are  advisory  only,  and  you  may  disregard  them  and  deter- 
mine the  law  for  yourselves.  Likewise*  the  decisions  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  read  to  you  by  counsel  are  not  binding  upon  you, 
and  you  may  disregard  such  decisions  and  determine  for  your- 
selves what  the  law  is.9 

§  711.  In  Ohio  the  court  is  the  judge  of  the  law. — It  is  the  duty 
of  the  jury  to  receive  the  law  as  it  is  given  them  by  the  court ;  it 
is  the  exclusive  province  of  the  court  to  determine  what  the  law 
is;  and  the  jury  have  no  right  to  hold  the  law  to  be  otherwise  in 
any  particular  than  as  given  to  them  by  the  court.10 

7  Spies  v.  P.  122  111.  83,  12  N.  E.  elson  v.  S.  94  Ind.  431.     See  Bissot 

865;    Mullinix  v.  P.  76  111.  2-15.  See  v.  S.  53  Ind.  408. 

Schnieder   v.    P.    23    111.    25;    S.    v.  »  Fowler  v.  S.  85  Ind.  541,  citing 

Hannibal,   37  La.   Ann.   620.  Keiser  v.   S.   83  Ind.  234.     But  s«e 

s  Blaker  v.  S.  130  Ind.  203,  29  N.  Bridgewater  v.  S.  153  Ind.  560,  566, 

E.    1077;    Anderson   v.    S,    104    Ind.  55  N.  E.  737. 

467    4  N.  E    63,  5  N.  E.  711;    Hud-  10  Robbins   v.    S.    8   Ohio  St.    131, 

167. 


751  JURY  JUDGES  OF  LAW.  §    712 

§712.  In  Iowa  the  court  is  the  judge. — Gentlemen  of 
the  jury :  You  have  taken  a  solemn  oath  to  try  this  cause  accord- 
ing to  the  law  and  evidence  given  you  in  open  court,  and  you  have 
no  authority  to  consider  or  be  controlled  by  anything  else  than 
that  given  you  by  the  court  as  the  law;  and  unless  your  verdict 
accords  with  the  law  .as  given  you  by  the  court,  you  are  guilty  of 
willful  perjury.  It  makes  no  difference  what  you  think  the  law 
ought  to  be,  you  have  no  authority  to  consider  or  be  controlled  by 
anything  else  as  law  than  that  given  you  by  the  court.11 

n  S.    v.    Miller,    53    Iowa,    157,    4      N.  W.  838,  900. 


CHAPTER  XL VII. 

PRESUMPTION    OF    INNOCENCE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

713.  Defendant  is  presumed   inno-      715.   Presumption  continues  through 

cent.  trial. 

714.  Presumption    of    innocence   a 

protection. 

§  713.  Defendant  is  presumed  innocent. — (1)  The  rules  with 
reference  to  the  presumption  of  innocence  and  the  burden  of 
proof  are  among  the  fundamental  principles  of  our  law,  and  must 
be  regarded  throughout  your  consideration  of  the  evidence.1 

(2)  All  presumptions  of  law  independent  of  evidence  are  in 
favor  of  innocence ;  and  every  person  is  presumed  to  be  innocent 
of  the  offense  charged  until  he  is  proven  guilty.     If,  upon  such 
proof,   there   is   a   reasonable   doubt   remaining,   the   accused   is 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  an  acquittal.2 

(3)  The  defendants  are  presumed  to  be  innocent  of  the  offense 
charged;  that,  before  you  can  convict  them,  or  either  of  them, 
the  state  must  overcome  that  presumption  by  proving  such  de- 
fendant or  defendants  to  be  guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. 
If  the  jury  have  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  guilt  of  either  of 
the  defendants,  they  should  acquit  such  defendant;  but  a  doubt, 
to  authorize  an  acquittal,  must  be  a  substantial  doubt,  and  not  a 
mere  possibility  of  innocence.3 

§  714.    Presumption  of  innocence    a  protection. — The  rule  of 

1  S.  v.  Linhoff,  121  Iowa,  632,  636,         3  S.   v.    Peebles    (Mo.),    77    S.   W. 
97  N.  W.   78.  519. 

2  S.  v.  Fahey   (Del.),  54  Atl.  693. 

752 


753  INNOCENCE  PRESUMED   THROUGH   TRIAL.  §    715 

law  which  clothes  every  person  accused  of  crime  with  the  pre- 
sumption of  innocence  and  imposes  on  the  state  the  burden  of  es- 
tablishing his  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  is  not  intended  to 
aid  any  one  who  is  in  fact  guilty  to  escape,  but  is  a  humane  pro- 
vision of  the  law,  intended  so  far  as  human  agencies  can  to  guard 
against  the  danger  of  any  innocent  person  being  unjustly  pun- 
ished.4 

§  715.    Presumption   continues   through  trial. — (1)  The   law 

presumes  the  defendant  to  be  innocent  of  the  crime  charged,  and 
this  presumption  continues  in  his  favor  throughout  the  trial,  step 
by  step;  and  you  cannot  find  the  accused  guilty  of  any  of  the 
crimes  charged  in  the  indictment  until  the  evidence  in  the  case 
satisfies  you  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his  guilt.  And  as  long 
as  any  of  you  have  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  existence  of  any 
one  of  the  several  elements  necessary  to  constitute  the  offense 
or  offenses  charged,  the  accused  cannot  be  convicted.5 

(2)  This  defendant,  like  all  other  persons  accused  of  crime,  is 
presumed  to  be  innocent  until  his  guilt  is  established  to  a  moral 
certainty  and  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  and  this  presumption 
of  innocence  goes  with  him  all  through  the  case  until  the  jury 
shall  have  reached  a  verdict.6 

(3)  The  law  raises  no  presumption  against  the  defendant.    On 
the  contrary,  the  presumption  of  law  is  in  favor  of  his  innocence. 
This  presumption  of  innocence  continues  through  the  trial  until 
every  material  allegation  in  the  information  is  established  by 
evidence  to  the  exclusion  of  all  reasonable  doubt.7 

4  Hawk  v.  S.  148  Ind.  254,  46  N.  more    v.    S.    67    Ind.    306;     Stock- 

E.  127;    Turner  v.   S.   102   Ind.   427,  slager  v.  U.  S.  116  Fed.  599. 

1  N.  E    869;   S.  v.  Medley,  54  Kas.  •  P.  v.  McNamara,  94  Gal.  514,  29 

627,  39  Pac.  227.  Pac.  953;  P.  v.  O'Brien,  106  Cal.  105. 

s  Aszman  v.  S.  123  Ind.  360,  24  N.  39  Pac.  325. 

E.  123;   Line  v.  S.  51  Ind.  175.     See  "  Edwards  v.  S.  (Neb.),  95  N.  W. 

Morrisson  v.  S.  76  Ind.  339;   Dens-  1038;   Van  Syoc  v.  S.   (Neb.),  96  N. 

W.  266. 


CHAPTER  XLVIII. 


REASONABLE  DOUBT. 


Sec. 

FOB    THE    PROSECUTION. 

716.  A     substantial,     well-founded 

doubt. 

717.  A   doubt  for  which  a  reason 

can  be  given. 

718.  Doubt  from  undue  influence. 

719.  Hunting  up  doubts  outside  of 

evidence. 

720.  Reasonable  certainty  only  re- 

quired. 

721.  Doubt   as    to    "each    link"    in 

chain. 

722.  Jurors  are  to  believe  as  men. 

FOR  THE  DEFENSE. 

723.  Every  reasonable  theory  must 

be  excluded. 


Sec. 

724.  Doubt,    though    a    probability 

of  guilt. 

725.  Doubt    confined    to    essential 

facts. 

726.  Doubt    arising   from    part    of 

the   evidence. 


PROBABILITIES. 

727.    A  mere  probability   not  suffi- 
cient. 


ONE   OF  TWO  OR   MORE. 

728.    Uncertain    which    of    two    is 
guilty. 


For  the  Prosecution. 

§  716.  Substantial,  well-founded  doubt. — (1)  A  reasonable 
doubt  is  such  a  doubt  as  arises  from  a  candid  and  impartial  con- 
sideration of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  and  which  would  cause  a 
reasonable  and  prudent  man  to  pause  and  hesitate  in  the  graver 
transactions  of  life;  and  a  juror  is  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  if,  from  a  candid  consideration  of  the  entire  evidence,  he 
has  an  abiding  conviction  of  the  truth  of  the  charge.1 

(2)  A  reasonable  doubt  means,  in  law,  a  serious,  substantial 
and  well-founded  doubt,  and  not  the  mere  possibility  of  a  doubt ; 
and  the  jury  have  no  right  to  go  outside  of  the  evidence  to  search 


Maxfield    v.    S.    54    Neb.    44,    74   N.  W.  401. 

754 


755  REASONABLE  DOUBT  DEFINED.  §  717 

for  or  hunt  up  doubts  in  order  to  acquit  the  defendant,  not  aris- 
ing from  the  evidence  or  a  want  of  evidence.2 

(3)  Before  the  jury  can  convict  the  defendant  they  must  be 
satisfied  of  his  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt;  such  doubt,  to 
authorize  an  acquittal  upon  a  reasonable  doubt  alone,  must  be  a 
substantial  doubt  of  the  defendant's  guilt  with  a  view  of  all  the 
evidence  in  the  case,  and  not  a  mere  possibility  of  his  innocence.3 

(4)  A  doubt,  to  justify  an  acquittal,  must  be  reasonable,  and  it 
must  arise  from  a  candid  and  impartial  investigation  of  all  the 
evidence  in  the  case;  and  unless  it  is  such  that,  were  the  same 
kind  of  doubt  interposed  in  the  graver  transactions  of  life,  it 
would  cause  a  reasonable  and  prudent  man  to  hesitate  and  pause, 
it  is  insufficient  to  authorize  a  verdict  of  not  guilty.4 

(5)  Evidence  is  sufficient  to  remove  a  reasonable  doubt  when  it 
is  sufficient  to  convince  the  judgment  of  ordinarily  prudent  men 
of  the  truth  of  the  proposition  with  such  force  that  they  would 
act  upon  that  conviction  without  hesitation  in  their  own  most 
important  affairs.6 

§  717.  Doubt  for  which  a  reason  can  be  given. — A  reasonable 
doubt  is  a  doubt  for  which  you  can  give  a  reason.  In  other 
words,  if  the  evidence  of  the  defendant's  guilt  satisfies  you  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  leave  you  without  a  doubt  that  he  may  be 
innocent,  for  which  you  can  give  an  intelligent  reason,  then  it 
would  be  your  duty  to  convict.  Such  a  doubt  may  arise  either 
from  affirmative  evidence  tending  to  show  the  defendant's  in- 
nocence, or  from  the  lack  of  evidence  sufficient  to  establish  his 
guilt.6 

§  718.  Doubt  from  undue  sensibility. — (1)  The  doubt  under 
the  influence  of  which  the  jury  should  find  a  verdict  of  not  guilty 
must  be  a  reasonabe  one.  A  doubt  produced  merely  by  undue 
sensibility  in  the  mind  of  any  juror  in  view  of  the  consequences 
of  his  verdict,  is  not  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  a  juror  is  not  al- 

2  Earll   v.    P.    73   111.    334;    Smith  may   arise   from   lack   of   evidence 

v.   P.   74  111.   146.     But  see  Rhodes  as  well  as  upon  a  consideration  of 

v.  S.  128  Ind.  189.  the  evidence. 

a  S.    v.    Darrah,    152    Mo.    522,    54  5  Jarrell  v.  S.  58  Ind.  296;   Toops 

S.   W.   226;    S    y.   Vansant,   80  Mo.  v.  S.  92  Ind.  16;  Stout  v.  S.  90  Ind. 

72.  12. 

*  Willis  v.   S.   43  Neb.  102,  61  N.  «  Wallace    v.    S.    41    Fla.    547,    26 

W.  254.  Held  erroneous  in  Brown  v.  So.   713.     Contra,  Siberry  v.  S.  133 

S.  105  Ind.  3SS,  5  N.  E.  900.  on  the  Ind.  677,  33  N.  E.  681. 
ground    tbat    a    reasonable    doubt 


§    719  REASONABLE    DOUBT.  756 

lowed  to  create  sources  or  materials  of  doubt  by  resorting  to 
trivial  and  fanciful  suppositions  and  remote  conjectures  as  to 
possible  states  of  facts  differing  from  that  established  by  the 
evidence.7 

(2)  A  doubt  produced  by  undue  sensibility  in  the  mind  of  any 
juror  in  view  of  the  consequences  of  his  verdict  is  not  a  reason- 
able doubt.  You  are  not  at  liberty  to  disbelieve,  as  jurors,  if, 
from  the  evidence,  you  believe  as  men;  your  oath  imposes  on 
you  no  obligation  to  doubt  where  no  doubt  would  exist  if  no 
oath  had  been  administered.  If,  after  an  impartial  considera- 
tion of  all  the  evidence,  you  feel  an  abiding  conviction  of  the 
guilt  of  the  defendant,  and  are  satisfied  to  a  moral  certainty 
of  the  truth  of  the  charge  made  against  him,  then  you  are  satis- 
fied beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.8 

§  719.  Hunting  up  doubts  outside  of  evidence. — (1)  In  consid- 
ering this  case  the  jury  are  not  to  go  beyond  the  evidence  to  hunt 
up  doubts,  nor  must  they  entertain  such  doubts  as  are  merely 
chimerical  or  conjectural.  A  doubt,  to  justify  an  acquittal,  must 
be  reasonable,  and  it  must  arise  from  a  candid  and  impartial  in- 
vestigation of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case;  and  unless  it  is  such 
that,  were  the  same  kind  of  doubt  interposed  in  the  graver  trans- 
actions of  life,  it  would  cause  a  reasonable  and  prudent  man  to 
hesitate  and  pause,  it  is  insufficient  to  authorize  a  verdict  of  not 
guilty.  If,  after  considering  all  the  evidence,  you  can  say  you 
have  an  abiding  conviction  of  the  truth  of  the  charge,  you  are 
satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.9 

(2)  In  considering  the  case  the  jury  are  not  to  go  beyond  the 
evidence  to  hunt  up  doubts,  nor  must  they  entertain  such  doubts 
as  are  merely  chimerical  or  conjectural.  A  doubt,  to  justify  an 
acquittal,  must  be  reasonable,  and  it  must  arise  from  a  candid 
and  impartial  investigation  of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case ;  and 
unless  it  is  such  that,  were  the  same  kind  of  doubt  interposed 
in  the  graver  transactions  of  life,  it  would  cause  a  reasonable 

7  "Watt  v.  P.  126  111.  30.  18  N.  E.  lieving  the  jurors  from  the  obliga- 

340;  Spies  v.  P.  122  111.  81,  12  N.  E.  tion  of  their  oath. 

865.  17  N.  E.  898.     See  Dunn  v.  P.  »  Painter  v.   P.   147   111.   444,   467, 

109  -111.  644.  35  N.  E.  64;   S.  v.  Pierce,  65  Iowa. 

s  Willis  v.   S.  43  Neb.   102,  61  N.  90,  21  N.  W.   195.     But  see  Brown 

W.   254.     Such   an   instruction   was  v.  S.  105  Ind.  385,  5  N.  E.  900,  note 

held  erroneous  in  Siberry  v.  S.  133  4,  this  chapter. 
Ind.   677,   686,   33  N.   E.   681,  as  re- 


757  REASONABLE   CERTAINTY — EACH  LINK.  §    722 

and  prudent  man  to  hesitate  and  pause,  it  is  insufficient  to  au- 
thorize a  verdict  of  not  guilty.  If,  after  considering  all  the  evi- 
dence, you  can  say  you  have  an  abiding  conviction  of  the  truth 
of  the  charge,  you  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.10 

§  720.  Reasonable  certainty  only  required. — A  verdict  of 
guilty  can  never  be  returned  without  convincing  evidence.  The 
law  is  too  humane  to  demand  a  conviction  while  a  rational  doubt 
remains  in  the  minds  of  the  jury.  You  will  be  justified,  and  are 
required,  to  consider  a  reasonable  doubt  as  existing  if  the  ma- 
terial facts,  without  which  guilt  cannot  be  established,  may 
fairly  be  reconciled  with  innocence.  In  human  affairs  absolute 
certainty  is  not  always  attainable.  From  the  nature  of  things 
reasonable  certainty  is  all  that  can  be  attained  on  many  subjects. 
When  a  full  and  candid  consideration  of  the  evidence  produces 
a  conviction  of  guilt,  and  satisfies  the  mind  to  a  reasonable  cer- 
tainty, a  mere  captious  or  ingenuous  artificial  doubt  is  of  no 
avail.  You  will  look,  then,  to  all  the  evidence,  and  if  that  satis- 
fies you  of  the  defendant's  guilt  you  must  convict  him.  If  you 
are  not  fully  satisfied,  but  find  that  there  are  only  strong  proba- 
bilities of  guilt,  your  only  safe  course  is  to  acquit.11 

§  721.  Doubt  as  to  "each  link"  in  the  chain. — The  rule  re- 
quiring you  to  be  satisfied  of  the  defendant's  guilt  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt,  in  order  to  warrant  a  conviction,  does  not  require 
that  you  should  be  satisfied,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  of  each 
link  in  the  chain  of  circumstances  relied  upon  to  establish  the 
defendant's  guilt.  It  is  sufficient,  if,  taking  the  testimony  all  to- 
gether, you  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  de- 
fendant is  guilty.12 

§722.    Jurors  are  to  believe  as  men. — You  are  not  at  liberty  \ 
to  disbelieve  as  jurors  if,  from  all  the  evidence,  you  believe    as 

10  Miller   v.    P.    39    111.    457,    463.  S.   v.  Myers,   12  Wash.   77,   40  Pac. 
But  see  Brown  v.  S.   105  Ind.  385,  626;    Hauk   v.    State,   148   Ind.    238, 
5  N  E.  900,  note  4,  this  chapter.  254,  46  N.  E.  127,  47  N.  E.  465.     In 

11  Clark   v.    S.    12   Ohio   495;    See  Sutherlin  v.  S.  148  Ind.  695,  48  N. 
Morgan  v.  S.  48  Ohio  St.  377,  27  N.  E.     246,     the    court    declared     that 
E     710.  under  the  Indiana  law  there  is  no 

12  Bressler  v.  P.  117  111.  422,  437,  difference  in  the  application  of  the 
(held  not  erroneous  where  there  is  doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  wheth- 
direct  evidence);  Gott  v.  P.  187  111.  er   the    evidence    is    direct   or   cir- 
249,  260,  58  N.  E.  293.     See  Carleton  cumstantial. 

v.  P.  150  111.  181,  189,  37  N.  E.  244; 


§    723  REASONABLE    DOUBT.  758 

men.     Your  oath  imposes  on  you  no  obligation  to  doubt  where 
no  doubt  would  exist  if  no  oath  had  been  administered.13 

For  Hie  Defense. 

§  723.  Every  reasonable  theory  must  be  excluded. — (1)  A  rea- 
sonable doubt  is  one  that  excludes  every  reasonable  hypothesis  ex- 
cept that  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant,  and  only  when  no  other 
supposition  will  reasonably  account  for  all  the  conditions  of  the 
case  can  the  conclusion  of  guilt  be  legitimately  adopted.14 

(2)  If  the  jury  are  not  satisfied  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt  to 
a  moral  certainty,  and  to  the  exclusion  of  every  other  reasonable 
hypothesis  but  that  of  defendant's  guilt,  they  should  find  him 
not  guilty,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
the  jury  should  find  a  probability  of  defendant's  innocence;  but 
such  a  doubt  may  arise  even  where  there  is  no  probability  of 
his  innocence  in  the  testimony ;  and  if  the  jury  have  not  an  abid- 
ing conviction  to  a  moral  certainty  of  his  guilt  they  should  acquit 
him.15 

(3)  You  should  acquit  the  defendant  unless  the  evidence  ex- 
cludes every  reasonable  hypothesis  but  that  of  his  guilt.16 

§  724.  Doubt,  though  a  probability  of  guilt. — (1)  A  reasonable 
doubt  may  exist  though  there  is  no  probability  of  the  innocence 
of  the  defendant  from  the  evidence ;  and  if  the  jury  have  not  an 
abiding  conviction  to  a  moral  certainty  of  his  guilt  then  they 
should  find  him  not  guilty.17 

(2)  The  court  charges  the  jury  that  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the 
defendant's  guilt  is  not  the  same  as  a  probability  of  his  inno- 
cence. A  reasonable  doubt  of  the  defendant's  guilt  may  exist 
when  the  evidence  fails  to  convince  the  jury  that  there  is  a 
probability  of  the  defendant's  innocence.18 

§  725.    Doubt  confined  to  essential  facts. — (1)  The  doctrine  of 

is  Hartley   v.    S.   53   Neb.   310,   73  is  Rogers   v.   S.   117   Ala.   192,   23 

N.  W.   744;    Watt  v.  P.   126  111.   30,  So.  82.     See  S.  v.  Clancy,  20  Mont. 

18   N.   E.   340;    Spies   v.   P.    122   111.  498,   52  Pac.  267. 

81,    12    N.    E.    865;    Willis   v.    S.    43  i«  Sherrill    v.    S.     (Ala.),    35    So. 

Neb.    102,   61   N.   W.    254.     But   see  130. 

Siberry  v.   S.   133   Ind.   677,   686,   33  "  Davis    v.    S.    131    Ala.    10,    31 

N.  E.   681;   note  8  this  chapter.  So.  569. 

14  Yarbrough    v.    S.    106    Ala.    43,  is  Stewart  v.   S.   133  Ala.   105,   31 

16   So.    758.  So.   944. 


759  DOUBT   LIMITED  TO   ESSENTIAL  FACTS.  §    727 

reasonable  doubt,  as  a  rule,  has  no  proper  application  to  mere  mat- 
ters of  subsidiary  evidence,  taken  item  by  item,  but  is  applicable 
always  to  the  constituent  essential  elements  of  the  crime  charged, 
and  to  any  fact  or  group  of  facts  which  may  constitute  the  entire 
proof  concerning  any  of  the  constituent  or  elementary  facts 
necessary  to  constitute  guilt.  If,  from  the  whole  evidence,  or  the 
want  of  evidence,  any  material  fact  essential  to  a  conviction  has 
not  been  established  to  your  satisfaction  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  as  explained  in  these  instructions,  the  defendant  should  be* 
acquitted.19 

(2)  One  of  the  material  questions  in  this  case  is,  whether  or  not 
the  wire  in  question  is  the  identical  wire  taken  from  the  electric- 
light  house,  and  the  burden  is  on  the  prosecution  to  prove  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  the  identity  of  the  wire  as  coming  from  the 
electric-light  house.20 

(3)  The  court  instruct  you  that,  unless  you  believe  from  the 
evidence  beyond  every  reasonable  doubt  that  the  witness,  C,  saw 
and  recognized  the  defendant  on  the  night  of  the  killing,  as  stated 
by  him,  you  will  acquit  the  defendant.21 

§  726.  Doubt  arising  from  part  of  evidence. — If  the  jury,  upon 
considering  all  the  evidence,  have  a  reasonable  doubt  about  the 
defendant's  guili  arising  out  of  any  part  of  the  evidence,  they 
must  find  him  not  guilty.22 

§  727.  A  mere  probability  is  not  sufficient. — (1)  It  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  establish  a  probability,  though  a  strong  one,  arising  from 
the  doctrine  of  chances  that  the  fact  charged  is  more  likely  to  be 
true  than  the  contrary ;  but  the  evidence  must  establish  the  truth 
of  the  charge  to  a  reasonable  and  moral  certainty — a  certainty 
which  convinces  and  directs  the  understanding  and  satisfies  the 
reason  and  judgment  of  those  who  are  bound  to  act  upon  it  con- 
scientiously.23 

(2)  Mere  probabilities  are  not  sufficient  to  warrant  a  convic- 
tion ;  nor  is  it  sufficient  that  the  greater  weight  or  preponderance 

is  Hauk  v.  S.  148  Ind.  254,  46  N.  only    evidence    tending   to    connect 

E.  127;  Hinshaw  v.  S.  147  Ind.  379,  the     defendant     with     the     crime 

47   N.    E.    157.  charged. 

20  Bishop   v.    P.   194   111.   365,   369,  22  Hunt  v.   S.   135   Ala.   1,   33   So. 
62  N.  E.   785.  329. 

21  Petty  v.  S.   (Miss.),  35  So.  213.  23  s.    v.    Fahey    (Del.),    54    All. 
The      testimony      of      C.      was      the  693. 


§    728  REASONABLE    DOUBT.  760 

of  the  evidence  supports  the  allegations  of  the  indictment ;  nor  is 
it  sufficient  that,  upon  the  doctrine  of  chances,  it  is  more  probable 
that  the  defendant  is  guilty  than  innocent  To  warrant  a  convic- 
tion the  defendant  must  be  proved  to  be  guilty  so  clearly  and 
conclusively  that  there  is  no  reasonable  theory  upon  which  he 
can  be  innocent  when  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  is  considered 
together,  and  if  the  prosecution  has  failed  to  make  such  proof, 
the  jury  should  find  the  defendant  not  guilty.24 

(3)  In  all  criminal  cases  it  is  essential  to  a  verdict  of  condem- 
nation that  the  guilt  of  the  accused  shall  be  fully  proved;  neither 
a  mere  preponderance  of  evidence  nor  any  weight  of  preponder- 
ant evidence  is  sufficient  for  the  purpose  unless  it  generates  full 
belief  of  the  facts  to  the  exclusion  of  all  reasonable  doubt.25 

(4)  If  the  evidence  in  the  case  leaves  it  indifferent  which  of 
several  hypotheses  arising  and  growing  out  of  the  evidence  in 
the  case  is  true,   or  merely  establishes  some  finite  probability 
in  favor  of  the  hypothesis  of  guilt,  rather  than  another,  such  evi- 
dence cannot  amount  to  legal  proof  of  guilt,  however  great  the 
probability  may  be.26 

§  728.  Uncertain  which  of  two  is  guilty. — (1)  If  it  is  uncer- 
tain from  the  evidence,  in  the  minds  of  the  jury,  which  one  or  two 
or  more  persons  inflicted  the  stab  or  blow,  that  would  operate  to 
acquit  the  defendant  unless  there  is  evidence  that  the  defendant 
aided  or  abetted  the  one  who  actually  did  the  killing.27 

(2)  When  two  persons  had  the  same  opportunity  to  commit  the 
offense  charged,  and  if,  upon  the  whole  evidence,  there  remains 
a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  which  of  the  two  committed  it,  then 
neither  of  them  can  be   convicted.28 

(3)  Before  the  jury  can  convict,  it  must  be  made  to  appear, 
from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  defendant, 
and  not  somebody  else,  committed  the  offense  charged  in  the  in- 
dictment. It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  evidence  may  show  that  the 
defendant  or  some  other  person  committed  such  offense,  nor  that 
the  probabilities  are  that  the  defendant,  and  not  some  one  else, 
committed  such  offense.29 

2-t  Dacey  v.   P.   116  111.   572,  6  N.          27  Campbell   v.   P.   16   111.   19: 
E.  166.  28  Vaughan  v.  Com.  85  Va.  672,  8 

25  Fuller    v.    S.    12    Ohio    St.    435,      S.  E.  584. 

citing:  1  Starkie  Ev.  451.  29  Lyons    v.    P.    68    111.    272,    278. 

26  Petty   v.    S.    (Miss.),    35    S.    E. 
213. 


CHAPTER  XLIX. 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE. 

Sec.  .  Sec. 

729.  Circumstantial      evidence      is     733.    Each,  link  in  chain  of  circum- 

competent.  stances. 

730.  Every    reasonable   hypothesis,      734.    Degree    of    proof    as    to   each 

must  be  excluded.  essential  fact. 

731.  Circumstances  consistent  with      735.    Subsidiary    facts    not    within 

each  other.  the  rule. 

732.  Inconsistent   with   any    othler      736.    Circumstances     of     suspicion 

rational    theory.  not    evidence. 

§  729.  Circumstantial  evidence  is  competent. — (1)  Circum- 
stantial evidence  is  legal  and  competent  evidence  in  criminal 
cases ;  and  if  it  is  of  such  character  as  to  exclude  every  reasonable 
hypothesis  other  than  that  of  the  .guilt  of  the  defendant,  it  is 
sufficient  to  authorize  a  conviction.1 

(2)  It  is  not  necessary  to  prove  the  defendants  guilty  by  testi- 
mony of  witnesses  who  have  seen  the  offense  committed,  but  such 
guilt  may  be  established  by  proof  of  facts  and  circumstances  from 
which  it  may  be  reasonably  and  satisfactorily  inferred.2 

(3)  In  submitting  a  case  depending  entirely  upon  circumstan- 
tial evidence  the  jury  should  not  be  given  loose  rein,  but  should 
have  careful  direction  as  to  the  quantum  of  proof  necessary  to 
justify  a  conviction.3 

(4)  Circumstantial  evidence  is  to  be  regarded  by  the  jury  in  all 
cases.     It  is  many  times  quite  as  conclusive  in  its  convincing 

i  Cunningham  v.   S.  56  Neb.  691,         2  s.   v.    Peebles    (Mo.),   77   S.   W. 
77  N.  W.  60;  Bennett  v.  S.  39  Tex.       520.     See   Lee  v.    S.   156   Ind.    541, 
Cr.   App.   639,   48   S.   W.   61;    Want-      546,  60  N.  E.  299. 
land   v.    S.    145    Ind.    38,   43    N.    E.         3  s.   v.   Brady,   100  Iowa,   191,   69 
931.  N.  W.  290. 

761 


§    729  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  762 

power  as  direct  and  positive  evidence  of  eye  witnesses.  When 
it  is  strong  and  satisfactory  the  jury  should  so  consider  it, 
neither  enlarging  nor  belittling  its  force. '  It  should  have  its 
just  and  fair  weight  with  the  jury;  and  if,  when  it  is  all  taken 
as  a  whole  and  fairly  and  candidly  weighed,  it  convinces  the 
guarded  judgment,  the  jury  should  act  upon  such  conviction. 
You  are  not  to  fancy  situations  or  circumstances  which  do  not 
appear  in  the  evidence,  but  you  are  to  make  such  just  and  reason- 
able inferences  from  circumstances  proven  which  the  guarded 
judgment  of  a  reasonable  man  would  ordinarily  make  under  like 
circumstances.4 

(5)  Some  testimony  has  been  admitted  tending  to  show  that 
Samuel  H.  Marshall,  who  was  jointly  indicted  with  the  defendant 
for  the  murder,  shortly  after  the  alleged  murder  was  committed, 
had  in  his  possession  large  sums  of  money,  which  it  is  claimed 
by  the  state  was  the  property  of  the  deceased.     This  fact,  if  it 
has  been  proved,  is  proper  for  you  to  consider,  together  with  all 
the  other  facts  and  circumstances  proved  on  the  trial,  in  deter- 
mining the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendant;  if  you  further 
find  from  the  evidence  that  said  money,  or  any  part  thereof,  was 
obtained  or  procured  by  said  Marshall  from  the  deceased  as  the 
fruits  of  a  conspiracy  heretofore  entered  into  by  and  between 
the  defendant  and  the  said  Marshall,  or  by  and  between  the 
defendant  Marshall  and  some  other  person  or  persons,  for  the 
robbing  and  murder  of  the  deceased  or  for  the  burglarizing  the 
house  of  the  deceased,  and  said  facts,  if  any  such  facts  have  been 
proved,  must  be  considered  by  you  with  all  the  other  facts  and 
circumstances  proved  in  determining  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
the  defendant;  whether  the  defendant  was  or  was  not  present 
at  the  time  said  Marshall  was  seen  with  said  money,  or  any  part 
thereof,  in  his  possession.5 

(6)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
that   the   defendant    deliberately   and   intentionally   shot    M   in 
manner  and  form  as  charged  as  he  was  passing  along  the  public 
highway,  and  that  from  the  effects  of  such  shooting  the  said  M 
died    as   alleged   in   the   indictment,    it   matters   not   that    such 

4  S.   v.   Elsham,  70  Iowa,   534,   31          $  Musser   v.    S.    157   Ind.    431,    61 
N.  W.  68.  N.  E.  1. 


763  REASONABLE  HYPOTHESES. 

evidence  is  circumstantial  or  made  up  from  facts  and  circum- 
stances, provided  the  jury  believe  such  facts  and  circumstances 
pointing  toward  his  guilt  have  been  proven  by  the  evidence 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.6 

§  730.    Every  other  reasonable  hypothesis  must  be  excluded 

(1)  In  the  application  of  circumstantial  evidence  to  the  determi- 
nation of  this  case  the  utmost  caution  and  vigilance  should  be 
used.  It  is  always  insufficient  when,  assuming  all  to  be  proved 
which  the  evidence  tends  to  prove,  some  other  reasonable  hypothe- 
sis arisng  and  growing  out  of  the  evidence  in  the  cause  than  the 
one  sought  to  be  established  by  the  evidence,  may  be  true.  It 
is  the  result  based  on  the  exclusion  of  every  other  reasonable 
hypothesis  arising  and  growing  out  of  the  evidence  in  the  case 
than  that  sought  to  be  established  by  it,  that  will  authorize  the 
jury  to  act  upon  it,  and  give  the  circumstances  the  force  of  truth 
in  the  particular  case.7 

(2)  When  the  facts  proved  are  susceptible  of  explanation  upon 
no  reasonable  hypothesis  consistent  with  innocence,   and  point 
to  guilt  beyond  any  other  reasonable  solution,  they  are  sufficient 
to  rest  a  conviction  upon,  although  the  crime  charged  is  of  the 
utmost  malignity  and  the  penalty  attached  is  the  highest  known 
to  the  law.8 

(3)  This  is  a  case  where  the  state  seeks  a  conviction  on  circum- 
stantial evidence.  The  defendant  is  presumed  to  be  innocent  until 
the  contrary  is  made  to  appear  by  the  evidence ;  and  in  a  case  of 
this  kind,  in  order  to  convict,  the  circumstances  must  be  so  strong 
as  to  exclude  every  other  reasonable  hypothesis  except  that  of 
the  guilt  of  the  defendant.9 

(4)  When  a  conviction  is  sought  alone  upon  circumstantial  evi- 
dence, the  circumstances  relied  upon,  taken  together,  must  be 
incapable  of  explanation  upon  any  other  rational  hypothesis  but 
that  of  the  defendant's  guilt;  and  if,  after  a  careful  considera- 
tion of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  there  is  in  your  minds  any 
such  reasonable  doubt  of  the  defendant 's  guilt,  you  will  acquit.10 

«  Schoolcraft  v.  P.  117  III.  277,  »  Wantland  v.  S.  145  Ind.  39,  43 

7  N.  E.  649.  Contra:  Otmer  v.  P.  N.  E.  931.  See  also  Mose  v.  S.  36 

76  111.  149.  Ala.  221. 

*  Petty  v.  S.   (Miss.),  35  So.  213.  10  Crutchfield    v.    S.    7   Tex.    App. 

s  Stout  v.   S.   90   Ind.   12.  65;  Hunt  v.  S.  7  Tex.  App.  212. 


§    731  CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE.  76-i 

(5)  You  are  further  instructed  that  where  the  state  seeks  a  con- 
viction upon  circumstantial  evidence  alone,  it  must  not  only  show 
that  the  alleged  facts  and  circumstances  are  true,  but  that  they 
are  absolutely  incompatible  with  any  reasonable  hypothesis  of 
the  innocence  of  the  accused.11 

§  731.    The  circumstances  must  be  consistent  with  each  other. 

(1)  In  order  to  warrant  a  conviction  on  circumstantial  evidence, 
the'  circumstances,  taken  together,  should  be  of  a  conclusive 
nature  and  tendency,  leading  on  the  whole  to  a  satisfactory  con- 
clusion, and  producing  in  effect  a  reasonable  and  moral  certainty 
that  the  accused,  and  no  one  else,  committed  the  offense  charged ; 
and  it  is  an  invariable  rule  of  law  that  to  warrant  a  conviction 
upon  circumstantial  evidence  alone,  such  facts  and  circumstances 
must  be  shown  as  are  consistent  with  the  guilt  of  the  person 
charged,  and  as  cannot,  upon  any  reasonable  theory,  be  true  and 
the  person  charged  be  innocent ;  and  in  this  case,  if  all  the  facts 
and  circumstances  relied  upon  by  the  people  to  secure  a  convic- 
tion can  be  reasonably  accounted  for  upon  any  theory  consistent 
with  the  innocence  of  the  defendant,  then  the  jury  should  acquit 
the  defendant.12 

(2)  The  facts  and  circumstances  shown  in  evidence  and  relied 
upon  for  a  conviction  must  be  consistent  with  each  other  and 
with  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  and  taken  together  must  be  of  a 
conclusive  nature,  producing  a  reasonable  and  moral  certainty 
that  the  defendant  and  no  other  person  committed  the  crime.13 

§  732.  Inconsistent  with  any  other  rational  theory. — (1)  A  few 
facts  or  a  multitude  of  facts  proven,  all  consistent  with  the  sup- 
position of  guilt,  are  not  enough  to  warrant  a  verdict  of  guilty. 
In  order  to  convict  on  circumstantial  evidence,  not  only  the  cir- 
cumstances must  all  concur  to  show  that  the  defendant  com- 
mitted the  crime,  but  they  must  be  inconsistent  with  any  other 
rational  conclusion.14 

(2)  In  order  to  convict  the  defendant  upon  the  evidence  of  cir- 

11  S.   v.  Brady,  100  Iowa,  191,   69  is  Crow  v.  S.  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  295 
N.   W.   290.  39  S.  W.  574. 

12  Marzen  v.   P.   173  111.   61.     See  14  s.  v.  Andrews,  62  Kas.  207,  61 
generally;      S.    v.    Jones,    19    Nev.  Pac.  808.     See  S.  v.  David,  131  Mo. 
365,   11   Pac.   317;    S.   v.   Nelson,   11  380,  33  S.  W.  28;  S.  v.  Hill,  65  Mo. 
Nev.  340.  88. 


765  EACH    LINK   IN    CHAIN.  §    733 

cumstances  it  is  necessary,  not  only  that  all  the  circumstances 
relied  upon  for  a  conviction  concur  to  show  that  he  committed 
the  crime  charged,  but  that  they  are  inconsistent  with  any  other 
rational  conclusion.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  circumstances 
proved  coincide  with,  account' for  and  therefore  render  probable 
the  hypothesis  sought  to  be  established  by  the  prosecution;  but 
they  must  exclude  to  a  moral  certainty  every  other  reasonable 
hypothesis  but  the  single  one  of  guilt,  or  the  jury  must  find  the 
defendant  not  guilty.15 

§  733.  "Each  link"  in  chain  of  circumstance. — (1)  If  you  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  before  you  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
Emma  Moore  came  to  her  death  by  reason  of  a  shot  fired  from  a 
revolver  by  the  hand  of  defendant  substantially  as  charged  in 
the  indictment,  it  matters  not  that  such  evidence  is  circumstan- 
tial, or  made  up  from  the  facts  and  circumstances  surrounding 
the  death  and  the  relations  of  the  defendant  with  her,  provided 
only  that  the  jury  believe  such  facts  and  circumstances  to  be 
proven  by  the  evidence  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  and  to  be 
inconsistent  with  any  other  reasonable  hypothesis  than  that  of 
the  guilt  of  the  defendant.  It  is  not  enough,  however,  that  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  shown  are  consistent  with  the  guilt 
of  the  defendant,  but  they  must  be  of  such  character  that  they 
cannot  be  reasonably  true  in  the  ordinary  nature  of  things  and 
the  defendant  be  innocent.  The  rule  requiring  the  jury  to  be 
satisfied  of  the  defendant's  guilt  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt  in 
order  to  warrant  a  conviction,  does  not  require,  however,  that 
you  should  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  each  link 
in  the  chain  of  circumstances  relied  upon  to  establish  his  guilt. 
It  will  be  sufficient,  if  taking  the  evidence  altogether,  you  are 
satisfied  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  is 
guilty.16 

(2)  The  law  requires  the  jury  to  be  satisfied  of  the  defendant's 
guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  in  order  to  warrant  a  conviction, 
but  does  not  require  that  you  should  be  satisfied  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  of  each  link  in  the  chain  of  circumstances  relied 
upon  to  establish  the  defendant's  guilt.  It  is  sufficient,  if  taking 

is  P.  v.  Anthony,  56  Gal.  400.  «  S.   v.   Lucas   (Iowa),  97  N.    W. 

1007. 


§    734  CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE.  766 

the  testimony  all  together,  you  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  defendant  is  guilty,  as  charged  in  the  indictment.17 

§  734.  Degree  of  proof  as  to  each  essential  fact. — (1)  The  sev- 
eral circumstances  upon  which  the.  conclusion  depends  must  be 
fully  established  by  proof.  They  are  facts  from  which  the  main 
fact  is  to  be  inferred;  and  they  are  to  be  proved  by  competent 
evidence  and  by  the  same  weight  and  force  of  evidence  as  if  each 
one  were  itself  the  main  fact  in  issue.18 

(2)  Where  a  conviction  depends  upon  circumstantial  evidence 
alone,  each  fact  necessary  to  establish  the  guilt  of  the  accused 
must   be   proved   by   competent   evidence   beyond   a   reasonable 
doubt,  and  the  facts  and  circumstances  proved  should  not  only 
be  consistent  with  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  but  inconsistent  with 
any  other  reasonable  hypothesis  than  that  of  his  guilt.19 

(3)  When  the  evidence  against  the  defendant  is  made  up  wholly 
of  a  chain  of  circumstances,  and  there  is  a  reasonable  doubt  as 
to  the  existence  of  one  of  the  facts  essential  to  establish  guilt, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  acquit  the  defendant.20 

(4)  The  rule  of  law  is  that  in  order  that  a  jury  may  be  warrant- 
ed in  finding  the  defendant  guilty  on  circumstantial  evidence,  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  necessary  to  establish  the  conclusion 
of  guilt  must  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  all  such  facts 
and  circumstances  must  be  consistent  with  each  other  and  with 
the  conclusion  sought  to  be  established,  which  is,  that  the  person 
on  trial  committed  the  crime  charged.     All  such  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances must  be  inconsistent  with  any  reasonable  theory  of 
the   innocence   of  the   defendant,    and   such   facts   and   circum- 
stances taken  all  together,  must  be  of  such  conclusive  and  satis- 
factory nature  as  to  produce  in  the  minds  of  the  jurors  a  reason- 
able and  moral  certainty  that  the  person  on  trial,  and  not  some 
other  person,  committed  the  offense  charged.21 

i?  Hodge  v.  Ter.  12  Okla.  108,  69  35  S.  W.  664;  S.  v.  Crabtree,  170  Mo. 

Pac.    1079.      The   evidence    in    this  642,  71  S.  W.  130;  Johnson  v.  S.  18 

case  was   both   direct  and   circum-  Tex.    Cr.   App.    398. 

stantial.     See  also  Hauk  v.   S.   148  20  p.    v.    Anthony,    56    Cal.    397; 

Ind.    238,    46    N.    E.    127,    47   N.    B.  See   P.   v.    Aiken,  66  Mich.    460,   33 

465.  N.  W.  821;   S.  v.  Kruger,  7  Idaho, 

is  Com.     v.     Webster,     5     Gush.  178,    61    Pac.    463.      Contra:    Brady 

(Mass.)   317.     See  Johnson  v.  S.  18  v.    Com.    11   Bush    (Ky.)    285. 

Tex.  App.   398.  21  Galloway  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

i»  Baldez   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),  70  S.  W.  212. 


767  DEGREE  OF  PROOF,  SUBSIDIARY  FACTS.          §  736 

§  735.  Subsidiary  facts  not  within  the  rule. — (1)  The  doctrine 
of  reasonable  doubt  as  a  general  rule  has  no  application  to  subsidi- 
ary evidence  taken  item  by  item.  It  is  applicable  to  the  con- 
stituent elements  of  the  crime  charged  and  to  any  fact  or  facts 
which  constitute  the  entire  proof  of  one  or  more  of  the  constitu- 
ent elements  of  the  crime  charged.  That  is  to  say  all  the  facts 
which  must  have  existed  in  order  to  make  out  the  guilt  of  the 
accused  must  be  established  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  before 
you  can  convict.  But  the  rule  of  reasonable  doubt  does  not 
apply  to  subsidiary  and  evidentiary  facts,  that  is  to  say,  to  such 
facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence,  if  there  be  any  such,  as 
are  not  essential  elements  of  the  crime  charged  and  not  neces- 
sary to  the  proof  thereof,  and  when  considered  together  as  a 
whole,  tend  to  prove  or  disprove  the  existence  of  one  or  more  of 
the  primary  facts  necessary  to  make  out  the  offense.  Subsidiary 
and  evidentiary  facts  may  be  considered  by  you  in  determining 
the  necessary  and  essential  facts  when  established  by  clear  and 
satisfactory  proof.22 

(2)  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  jury  should  believe  that  every 
material  fact  or  circumstance  in  evidence  before  them  shall  be 
proven  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  but  that  it  is  sufficient  if  the 
jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  that  every  material 
allegation  in  the  indictment  or  either  count  thereof,  in  manner 
and  form  as  therein  charged,  has  been  proven  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt.23 

§  736.  Circumstances  of  suspicion  not  evidence. — That  cir- 
cumstances of  suspicion,  no  matter  how  grave  or  strong,  are  not 
evidence  of  guilt,  and  the  accused  must  be  acquitted  unless  the 
fact  of  his  guilt  is  proven  beyond  every  reasonable  doubt  to  the 
exclusion  of  every  reasonable  hypothesis  consistent  with  his  inno- 
cence.24 

22  Hinshaw    v.    S.    147    Ind.    379,          23  Jamison  v.  P.  145  111.  357,  380, 
47   N.   E.   157;    Wade  v.   S.   71    Ind.      34    N.    E.    486. 

535.  24  Henderson  v.  Com.  98  Va.  797 

34  S.  E.  881. 


CHAPTER  L. 

CONFESSIONS,    ADMISSIONS,  FLIGHT. 

Sec.  Sec. 

737.  Confessions   to   be   considered      739.    Admissions   of   deceased. 

like  other  evidence.  740.     Flight   tends    to  prove   guilt. 

738.  Admissions   subject  to  imper-      741.    Flight  is  a  circumstance  only. 

fection.  742.    Defendant  surrendering. 

§  737.  Confessions  to  be  considered  like  other  evidence. — (1) 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  treat  and  consider  any  confessions 
proven  to  have  been  made  by  the  defendant  precisely  as  any 
other  testimony;  and  hence  if  the  jury  believe  the  whole  confes- 
sion to  be  true,  they  will  act  upon  the  whole  as  the  truth.  But 
the  jury  may  believe  that  which  charges  the  prisoner  and  reject 
that  which  is  in  his  favor  if  they  see  sufficient  grounds  in  the 
evidence  or  in  any  inherent  improbability  in  the  statement  itself. 
The  jury  are  at  liberty  to  judge  of  it  like  other  evidence  by  all 
the  circumstances  in  the  case.1 

(2)  If  verbal  statements  of  defendant  have  been  proven  in  this 
case,  you  may  take  them  into  consideration  with  all  the  other 
facts  and  circumstances  proven.  What  the  proof  may  show  you, 
if  anything,  that  the  defendant  has  said  against  himself,  the  law 
presumes  to  be  true  because  against  himself,  but  anything  you 
may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  defendant  said  in  his  own 
behalf,  you  are  not  obliged  to  believe,  but  you  may  treat  the 
same  as  true  or  false,  just  as  you  believe  it  true  or  false,  \vhen 

i  Jackson   v.   P.   18  111.   271. 

768 


769  ADMISSIONS   UNSATISFACTORY   EVIDENCE.  §    739 

considered  with  a  view  to  all  the  other  facts  and  circumstances 
in  the  case.2 

§  738.  Admissions  subject  to  much  imperfection. — (1)  Verbal 
admissions  consisting  of  mere  repetitions  of  oral  statements  made 
a  long  time  before  are  subject  to  much  imperfection  and  mistake, 
for  the  reason  that  the  person  making  them  may  not  have 
expressed  his  own  meaning,  or  the  witness  may  have  misunder- 
stood him,  or  by  not  giving  his  exact  language  may  have  changed 
the  meaning  of  what  was  actually  said,  and  this  is  especially  true 
where  long  time  has  elapsed  since  the  alleged  admissions  were 
made;  such  evidence  should  therefore  be  received  by  you  with 
caution.3 

(2)  Where  a  confession  of  the  prisoner  charged  with  a  crime 
has  been  introduced  in  evidence,  the  whole1  of  the  confession  so 
introduced  and  testified  to  must  be  taken  together,  as  well  that 
part  which  makes  in  favor  of  the  accused  as  that  part  which 
makes  against  him;  and  if  the  part  of  the  statement  which  is  in 
favor  of  the  accused  is  not  disproved  by  other  evidence  in  the 
case  and  is  not  improbable  or  untrue,  considered  in  connection 
with  all  the  other  testimony  in  the  case,  then  that  part  of  the 
statement  is  entitled  to  as  much  consideration  by  the  jury  as  any 
parts  thereof  which  make  against  the  accused.3* 

(3)  In  a  criminal  case,  admissions  and  confessions  of  the  ac- 
cused are  admitted  with  caution,  and  the  court  tells  you  that  it 
is  your  province  to  consider  all  the  circumstances  under  which 
the  alleged  admissions  were  made,  and'  determine  their  exact 
nature,  import  and  meaning.4 

§  739.  Admissions  of  deceased. — The  admissions  of  the  de- 
ceased shortly  before  his  death  will  be  considered  by  the  jury 
with  great  care,  and  all  the  circumstances  in  connection 
therewith,  his  suffering,  whether  he  was  in  such  condition  as  to 
speak  with  mature  consideration  and  due  deliberation,  and 
whether  he  spoke  in  regard  to  his  legal  rights,  or  whether  he 
referred  to  and  meant  that  defendant  was  not  to  blame  for  any 

2  S.  v.  Darrah,  152  Mo.  530,  54  S.          s*  Burnett  v.  P.  204  111.  225. 

W.  226.  *  Flick  v.  Com.  97  Va.  766,  34  S. 

3  McMullen  v.   Clark,  49  Ind.   81.      B.  42.    Contra:  Keith  v.  S.  157  Ind. 
But   see   Keith   v.    S.    157   Ind.   386,      386,  61  N.  E.  716. 

61  N.  E.  716. 


§    740  CONFESSIONS,    ADMISSIONS,    FLIGHT.  770 

willful  intention  to  injure  him  or  cause  said  accident,  and  then 
give  his  admission  such  meaning  as  you  believe  from  all  the 
circumstances  he  intended  it  to  have,  and  give  such  weight  to 
his  statement  or  admission  as  in  your  judgment  it  may  be 
entitled  to.  And  the  admission  of  deceased  will  not  be  conclu- 
sive as  to  what  he  states.  But  you  will  consider  all  the  testi- 
mony in  relation  thereto  as  in  your  judgment  the  whole  evidence 
will  justify.5 

§  740.  Flight  tends  to  prove  guilt. — (1)  If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  defendant,  after  he  was  charged  with  the 
crime  alleged  in  the  indictment,  fled  from  justice,  or  while  under 
recognizance  forfeited  the  same  on  account  of  said  charge,  such 
conduct  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  is  evidence  to  be  con- 
sidered by  the  jury  in  determining  his  guilt  or  innocence.6 

(2)  Flight  raises  the  presumption  of  guilt,  and  if  you  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  after  having  shot  and  killed 
M   as  charged  in  the  indictment,  fled  from  the  country  and  tried 
to  avoid  arrest  and  trial,  you  may  take  that  fact  into  consider- 
ation in  determining  his  guilt  or  innocence.7 

(3)  Flight  is  considered  as  evidence  tending  to  prove  the  guilt 
of  the  accused.     It  is  your  privilege  to  look  on  it  in  that  light. 
You  may  also  look  on  it  as  evidence  of  fear  of  summary  punish- 
ment at  the  hands  of  his  pursuers.      Weigh  it  carefully  and  give 
it  the  effect  it  reasonably  should  have  under  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case.8 

§  741.  Flight  is  a  circumstance  only. — (1)  Evidence  has  been 
offered  tending  to  show  flight  by  the  defendant  from  the  state 
of  Kansas  to  the  state  of  Washington,  at  or  about  the  time  the 
complaint  was  filed  charging  him  with  the  crime  alleged  against 
him  in  the  information.  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the 
defendant  at  or  about  the  time  the  charge  contained  in  the  infor- 
mation was  first  preferred  against  him,  fled  to  a  distant  part  of 
the  country,  and  that  such  flight  was  induced  by  such  charge, 
this  is  a  circumstance  to  be  considered  by  you  in  connection 

s  Cooper    v.    Central    R.    Co.    44         ?  s.  v.  Gee,  85  Mo.  647. 
Iowa,    137.  8  Com.    v.    Berchine,    168    Pa.    St. 

s  S.  v.  Hayes,  78  Mo.  310.  603,  32  Atl.  109. 


771  FLIGHT    ONLY    A    CIRCUMSTANCE.  §    742 

with  all  the  other  evidence  to  aid  you  in  determining  his  guilt 
or  innocence.0 

(2)  Evidence  has  been  introduced  as  to  an  attempted  escape 
from  jail  by  the  defendant  while  in  the  custody  of  the  sheriff  on 
this  charge.    If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  did 
thus  attempt  to  escape  from  custody,  this  is  a  circumstance  to 
be  considered  by  you  in  connection  with  all  the  other  evidence 
to  aid  you  in  determining  the  question  of  his  guilt  or  innocence.10 

(3)  The  flight  of  a  person  immediately  after  the  commission  of 
a  crime,  or  after  a  crime  has  been  committed  with  which  he  is 
charged,  is  a  circumstance  not  sufficient  of  itself  to   establish 
his  guilt,  but  a  circumstance  which  the  jury  may  consider  in 
determining  the  probabilities  for  or  against  him — the  probability 
of  his   guilt   or  innocence.     The  weight  to   which  this   circum- 
stance is  entitled  is  a  matter  for  the  jury  to  determine  in  con- 
nection with  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  shown  in  the  evi- 
dence.11 

§  742.  Defendant  surrendering. — The  fact  that  when  charged 
with  the  commision  of  a  crime  the  defendant  refuses  to 
flee,  but  surrenders  himself  to  the  proper  authorities,  cannot 
be  considered  as  showing  his  innocence  of  the  offense  charged.12 

9  S.   v.   Thomas,   58  Kas.   805,   51         12  Walker    v.    S.     (Ala.),    35    So. 
Pac.    229.      See    S.    v.    Poe    (Iowa),       1012.      See.    also,    Waybright   v.    S. 
98  N.  W.   588.  56  Ind.  125.  Defendant  may  explain 

10  Anderson    v.    S.    104    Ind.    472,      his  flight  and  its  cause.  Batten  v. 
4  N.  E.  63,  5  N.  E.  711.  S.   80  Ind.  401. 

11  P.   v.   Forsythe,   65   Cal.   102,  3 
Pac.  402. 


CHAPTER  LI. 

ALIBI   AS   DEFENSE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

743.  Burden  of  proof.  745.     High    degree    of   proof    in    II- 

744.  Alibi     raising     a     reasonable  linois. 

doubt. 

§743.  Burden  of  proof. — (1)  When  the  state  makes  out  such 
a  case  as  would  sustain  a  verdict  of  guilty,  and  the  defendant 
offers  evidence,  the  burden  is  upon  him  to  make  out  his  defense 
as  to  an  alibi;  and  when  the  proof  is  all  in,  both  that  given, for 
the  defendant  and  for  the  state,  then  the  primary  question  is 
(the  whole  evidence  being  considered),  is  the  defendant  guilty 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt? — the  law  being  that  if,  after  you 
have  considered  the  evidence,  as  well  that  touching  the  alibi  as 
the  criminating  evidence  introduced  by  the  state,  you  have  a 
reasonable  doubt  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  you  should  acquit ; 
if  you  have  not,  you  should  convict.1 

(2)  It  is  not  incumbent  on  the  defendant  to  prove  an  alibi  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt.  Though  the  evidence  introduced  to  es- 
tablish an  alibi  falls  short  of  the  weight  of  moral  certainty  as  to 
the  existence  or  truth  of  the  alibi,  yet  if  he  leaves  in  the  minds  of 
the  jury  such  a  doubt  or  uncertainty  that,  taken  by  itself,  they 
could  not  find  for  or  against  the  alibi,  they  are  bound  to  carry 
such  doubt  into  the  case  of  the  prosecution,  and  to  array  it  there 
as  an  element  of  the  reasonable  doubt,  beyond  which  the  prose- 
cution must  establish  guilt.  The  defendant  is  entitled  as  much 

i  S.    v.    Thornton    (S.    Dak.),    73    N.  W.  196. 

772 


773  ALIBI  CREATING  DOUBT.  §  744 

to  the  benefit  of  such  doubt  as  to  any  other  doubt  raised  by  the 
evidence;  and  if  the  weight  of  the  alibi,  alone  or  added  to  that 
of  any  other,  be  sufficient  to  reduce  belief  in  the  minds  of  the 
jury  as  to  the  defendant's  guilt  to  a  reasonable  doubt,  they  must 
acquit.2 

(3)  The  burden  of  establishing  an  alibi  is  upon  the  defendants 
and  the  evidence  introduced  to  sustain  it  should  outweigh  the 
evidence  introduced  by  the  state  tending  to  show  that  the  defend- 
ants participated  in  the  crime  charged.  They  are  not  bound  to 
establish  such  defense  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt ;  but  if,  upon 
the  whole  case,  the  testimony  raises  in  your  minds  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  defendants  were  present  at  the  place  where  the 
assault  was  committed,  that,  of  course,  would  create  a  reason- 
able doubt  as  to  their  guilt  and  would  entitle  them  to  an  acquit- 
tal.3 

§  744.  Alibi  raising  a  reasonable  doubt. — (1)  One  of  the  de- 
fenses interposed  by  the  defendant  in  this  case  is  an  alibi ;  that  is, 
that  the  defendant  was  at  another  place  at  the  identical  time  the 
crime  was  committed,  if  committed  at  all.  If  in  view  of  all  the 
evidence  you  have  any  reasonable  doubt  as  to  whether  the  de- 
fendant was  at  another  place  from  where  the  crime  was  com- 
mitted at  the  time  of  its  commission,  then  you  should  acquit ;  but 
if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  accused  was  not  so 
far  away  from  the  place  where  the  offense  was  committed,  but 
that  he  could  with  ordinary  exertion  have  reached  the  place 
where  the  offense  was  committed,  then  you  will  consider  that 
fact  as  a  circumstance  tending  to  prove  or  disprove  the  alibi.4 

(2)  If  there  is  any  evidence  before  you  which  raises  in  your 
minds  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  presence  of  the  defendant  at 
the  time  and  place  where  the  crime  is  charged  to  have  been  com- 
mitted, you  must  acquit  him.5 

2  P.    v.    Fong    Ah    Sing,    64    Gal.  derance  of  evidence  by  defendant). 

253,  28  Pac.  233,  11  Am.  Cr.  R.  33.  Contra:   Shoemaker  v.  Ter.  4  Okla. 

See  Shultz  v.  Ter.   (Ariz.),  52  Pac.  118,  43  Pac.  1059;   Parker  v.  S.  136 

352.;   Walters  v.  S.  39  Ohio  St.  215;  Ind.  284,  35  N.  E.   1104. 

Peyton  v.  S.  54  Neb.  188,  74  N.  W.  *  S.   v.   Burton,   27  Wash.   528,   67 

597.  Pac.    1097.      See    McLain    v.    S.    18 

s  S.   v.   Fry,   67   Iowa,   478,   25   N.  Neb.   160,  24  N.   W.   720. 

W.   738.     See  S.  v.   Kline,  54  Iowa,  $  S.   v.   Adair,   160  Mo.   394,   61   S. 

185,  6  N.  W.  184  (requiring  prepon-  W.    187;    Thornton    v.    S.    20    Tex. 


§  7 


ALIBI    AS    A    DEFENSE. 


774 


(3)  You  should  not  convict  the  defendant  unless,  after  consid- 
ering all  the  evidence  introduced  in  this  case,  you  are  satisfied  of 
his  guilt  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt ;  and  if,  after  considering  all 
the  evidence  introduced  by  the  prosecution,  and  all  the  evidence 
introduced  by  the  defense,  you  entertain  a  reasonable  doubt  as 
to  whether  the  defendant,  M,  has  been  identified  as  one  of  the 
persons  present  participating  in  the  offense  charged,  you  should 
find  him  not  guilty.6 

§  745.  High  degree  of  proof  required  in  Illinois. — (1)  In  this 
case  what  is  known  as  an  alibi,  that  is,  that  the  defendants  and 
each  of  them  were  at  another  place  at  the  time  of  the  burning  of 
the  stacks,  so  far  as  the  same  is  relied  on  by  the  defendants,  to 
render  the  proof  of  an  alibi  satisfactory  to  the  jury  the  evidence 
must  cover  the  whole  of  the  time  of  the  setting  of  the  fires,  if  the 
jury  believe  from  the  evidence  said  stacks  were  set  on  fire,  so  as 
to  render  it  impossible  or  very  improbable  that  the  defendants, 
or  any  of  them,  could  have  committed  the  act.7 

(2)  You  are  to  carefully  scrutinize  any  evidence  in  relation  to 
an  alibi.  An  alibi  is  a  defense  that  is  easily  proven  and  hard 
to  disprove.  Therefore,  you  will  be  careful  and  cautious  in 
examining  the  evidence  in  regard  to  the  defense  of  an  alibi.8 


App.  535;  Casey  v.  S.  49  Neb.  403, 
68  N.  W.  643;  Peyton  v.  S.  54  Neb. 
188,  74  N.  W.  597;  Allen  v.  S.  70 
Ark.  337,  68  S.  W.  28. 

e  Mullins  v.  P.  110  111.  43,  alibi 
was  the  defense  in  this  case. 

7  Creed  v.  P.  81  111.  569;  Miller 
v.  P.  39  111.  464.  See  Mullins  v.  P. 


110  111.  43;  Waters  v.  P.  172  111. 
373,  50  N.  E.  148,  this  instruction 
is  not  good  law,  though  sustained, 
s  P.  v.  Tice,  115  Mich.  219,  73 
N.  W.  108.  An  instruction  which 
casts  discredit  on  the  defense  of 
alibi  is  erroneous.  Sater  v.  S.  56 
Ind.  382;  Albin  v.  S.  63  Ind.  598. 


CHAPTER  LIT. 

INSANITY    AS    DEFENSE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

746.  Every   man    presumed   to   be     750.    Will  overcome  by  irresistible 

sane.  impulse. 

747.  Insanity     presumed     to     con-      751.    Reasonable  doubt  of  sanity. 

tinue — When.  752.    Higher    degree    of    proof  re- 

748.  Ability    to     distinguish    right  quired  in  some  states. 

from  wrong.  753.    Mere  weakness  of  mind. 

749.  No  will  power  to  refrain  from      754.    Defense  of  insanity,  examined 

act.  with   care. 

755.    Drunkenness   is   not   insanity. 

§  746.  Every  one  presumed  to  be  sane. — The  law  presumes 
every  man  to  be  sane  until  the  contrary  is  shown,  and  when 
insanity  is  set  up  as  a  defense  by  a  person  accused  of  crime, 
then,  before  the  jury  can  acquit  the  accused  on  the  ground  of 
insanity,  it  must  appear  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  that  at 
the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  act  the  accused  was  not  of 
sound  mind,  but  affected  with  insanity  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
create  an  uncontrollable  impulse  to  do  the  act  charged  by  over- 
riding his  reason  and  judgment.1 

§  747.  Insanity  presumed  to  continue — When.— (1)  A  person  who 
is  insane  only  at  intervals  may,  during  a  lucid  interval,  commit  a 
crime  and  be  responsible  therefor,  if  the  evidence  shows  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  that,  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the 
crime  charged,  the  person  had  sufficient  mental  capacity  and  will 

i  Dacy  v.   P.   116   111.   555,   570,   6      evidence.     S.  v.  McCoy,  34  Mo.  535; 
N.  E.  165,  this  instruction  does  not     S.  v.  Pagels,  92  Mo.  300,  10  N.  W. 
require     the     defendant     to     prove     288. 
insanity  by  a  preponderance  of  the 

775 


§  748  INSANITY  AS  DEFENSE.  776 

power  to  make  him  criminally  responsible  under  the  law.  It  is 
not  a  question  of  whether  he  exercised  sufficient  will  power  or  not, 
but  the  question  is,  did  he  possess  sufficient  will  power  at  the 
time  to  resist  the  impulse  to  commit  the  crime,  and  could  he  have 
resisted  had  he  tried?2 

(2)  When  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  insanity  has  once 
existed  in  the  defendant,  whether  or  not  it  will  be  presumed  to 
continue  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  malady.  If  it  is  of  a  per- 
manent and  chronic  character,  then  it  is  presumed  to  continue  to 
exist  until  the  contrary  appears  from  the  evidence;  but  if  the 
insanity  is  the  result  of  physical  disease,  a  weakened  condition 
of  the  system,  remorse,  disappointment,  shattered  hopes,  jealousy, 
an  excited  condition,  strong  passions,  violent  temper,  or  some 
other  temporary  or  transient  cause,  and  lucid  intervals  appear, 
then  no  presumption  as  to  its  continued  existence  is  indulged, 
and  the  mental  condition  of  the  defendant  at  the  time  of  the 
commission  of  the  crime  charged  is  to  be  ascertained  by  the  jury 
from  all  the  evidence  and  circumstances  of  the  case.8 

(3)  If  from  a  careful  consideration  of  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances shown  by  the  evidence  in  this  case,  you  believe  that  the 
defendant,  D,  was  insane  and  of  unsound  mind  on  the  thirteenth 
day  of  May  last,  at  late  as  twelve  o'clock  on  that  day,  then  the 
presumption  of  law  is  that  that  condition  of  mind  continued  up 
until    after   the    shooting   mentioned,    between    ten    and    eleven 
o'clock   of  that   evening,   as   complained   of  in   the   indictment, 
unless  you  shall  further  believe  from  the  evidence  before  you, 
beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  that  he  had  recovered  from  such 
insane  condition  of  mind  prior  to  the  shooting.4 

§  748.  Ability  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong. — (1)  If  you 
believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  de- 
fendant committed  the  crime  in  manner  and  form  as  charged  in 
the  indictment,  and  at  the  time  of  committing  such  act  was  able  to 
distinguish  right  from  wrong,  you  should  find  him  guilty.5 

2  Wheeler  v.   S.   158   Ind.   700,  63  4  Dacey  v.  P.  116  111.  573,  6  N.  E. 

N.  E.  975.       This  statement  of  the  165. 

law    is    clear    enough    without    de-  5  Dunn    v.    P.    109    111.    635,    643. 

fining  "mental  capacity."      .  See  S.  v.  Pagels,  92  Mo.  300,  10  N. 

a  Wheeler  v.   S.   158   Ind.   701,   63  W.  288. 
N.  E.  975. 


777  TRUE  TEST  OF  INSANITY.  §  749 

• 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the   evidence,   beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  that  at  the  time  of  committing  the  alleged  act  the  de- 
fendant was  able  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong,  then  you  can- 
not acquit  him  on  the  ground  of  insanity.6 

(3)  Was  the  accused  a  free  agent  in  forming  the  purpose  to 
kill?  Was  he  at  the  time  capable  of  judging  whether  his  act  was 
right  or  wrong?  And  did  he  know  at  the  time  that  it  was  an 
offense  against  the  laws  of  God  and  man?7 

(4)  But  the  unsoundness  of  mind,  or  affection  of  insanity,  must 
be  of  such  a  degree  as  to  create  an  uncontrollable  impulse  to  do 
the  act  charged,  by  overriding  the  reason  and  judgment,  and  oblit- 
erating the  sense  of  right  and  wrong  as  to  the  particular  act 
done,  and  depriving  the  accused  of  the  power  of  choosing  between 
them.     If  it  be  shown  the  act  was  the  consequence  of  an  insane 
delusion,   and  caused  by  it,   and  by  nothing   else,  the   accused 
should  be  acquitted.8 

(5)  If,  from  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  you  believe,  beyond  a 
reasonable   doubt,  that  the   defendant   committed  the   crime   of 
which  he  is  accused  in  manner  and  form  as  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment,   and    that    at    the    time    of    the    commission    of    such 
crime  the  defendant  knew  that  it  was  wrong  to  commit  such 
crime,  and  was  mentally  capable  of  choosing  either  to  do  or  not 
to  do,  the  act  or  acts  constituting  such  crime,  and  of  governing 
his  conduct  in  accordance  with  such  choice,  then  it  is  your  duty, 
under  the  law,  to  find  him  guilty,  even  though  you  should  be- 
lieve, from  all  the  evidence,  that  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of 
the  crime  he  was  not  entirely  and  perfectly  sane,  or  that  he  was 
greatly  excited  or  enraged,  or  under  the  influence  of  intoxicating 
liquor.9 

§  749.  No  will  power  to  refrain  from  the  act. — If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  the  mind  of  the  respondent,  at  the  time 
of  the  killing  of  Mamie  Small,  was  diseased;  that  by  reason  of 
such  mental  disease  his  will  power  was  then  impaired ;  that  by 
reason  of  such  impairment  of  his  will  power  so  caused  he  did 
not  then  have  sufficient  will  power  to  refrain  from  committing  the 

s  Dunn  v.    P.    109    111.    635,    643;  7  Blackburn  v.  S.  23  Ohio  St.  165. 

Queenan  v.    Ter.    11    Okla.    261,    71  8  Hopps  v.  P.  31  111.  392. 

Pac.  218;  Homish  v.  P.  142  111.  624,  »  Dunn  v.  P.  109  111.  635,  643. 

32  N.   E.  677. 


§  750  INSANITY  AS  DEFENSE.  778 

• 

act ;  and  that  the  act  was  the  product  of  such  mental  disease,  he 
was  not  responsible  for  the  act,  although  he  then  had  sufficient 
mental  capacity  and  reason  to  enable  him  to  distinguish  between 
right  and  wrong  as  to  the  particular  act  he  was  doing.10 

§  750.  Will  overcome  by  irresistible  impulse. — (1)  If  the  act 
of  G  in  assaulting  the  party,  which  is  admitted  to  constitute  a 
breach  of  the  bond,  was  caused  by  mental  disease  or  unsoundness 
which  dethroned  his  reason  and  judgment  with  respect  to  that 
act — which  destroyed  his  power  rationally  to  comprehend  the  na- 
ture and  consequence  of  that  act,  and  which  overpowering  his 
will  irresistibly  forced  him  to  its  commission,  then  he  is  not 
legally  answerable  therefor.  But  if  you  believe  from  all  the  evi- 
dence and  circumstances  that  he  was  in  possession  of  a  rational 
intellect  and  sound  mind,  and  allowed  his  passions  to  escape  con- 
trol, then,  though  passion  may  for  the  time  being  have  driven 
reason  from  her  seat  and  usurped  it,  and  have  urged  him  with  a 
force  at  the  moment  irresistible  to  desperate  acts,  he  cannot  claim 
for  such  acts  the  protection  of  insanity.11 

(2)  To  be  held  criminally  responsible  a  man  must  have  reason 
enough  to  be  able  to  judge  of  the  character  and  consequences  of 
the  act  committed,  and  he  must  not  have  been  overcome  by  an 
irresistible  impulse  arising  from  disease.12 

§  751.  Reasonable  doubt  of  sanity. — (1)  If,  upon  the  whole 
evidence,  the  jury  find  that  the  defendant,  at  the  time  of  commit- 
ting the  act,  was  not  of  sound  mind,  and  was  unconscious  that  he 
was  committing  a  crime,  they  should  acquit  him.  The  fact  of  the 
soundness  of  mind  at  the  time  the  act  was  committed  is  as  much 
an  essential  ingredient  of  the  crime  of  murder  as  the  fact  of 
killing,  or  of  malice,  or  of  any  other  fact  or  ingredient  of  mur- 
der, and  should  be  made  out  in  the  same  way  by  the  same  party, 
and  by  evidence  of  the  same  kind  and  degree,  and  as  conclusive 
in  its  character  as  is  required  in  making  out  any  other  fact,  in- 
gredient or  element  of  murder.  The  burden  of  proof  in  a  crim- 

10  S.    v.    Knight,    95    Me.    467,    50  "  S.  v.  Geddis,  42  Iowa,  271. 

Atl.   276,   55   L.   R.   A.   373,    (this   is  12  S.    v.    Peel,    23    Mont.    358,    59 

a  well  considered  case  and  sets  out  Pac.   169,   citing  and   quoting  from 

a  full  charge  on  the  law  of  insan-  Dr.  Clevenger's  Med.  Juris,  p.  174. 
ity  in  various  forms.) 


779  REASONABLE  DOUBT  OF  SANITY.  §  751 

inal  case  is  always  upon  the  state,  and  never  shifts  to  the  defend- 
ant; and  the  making  out  of  a  prima  facie  case  against  the  de- 
fendant does  not  shift  the  burden  of  proof  to  the  defendant.  If 
a  prima  facie  case  is  made  out  by  the  state  against  the  defend- 
ant, then,  in  order  to  entitle  the  defendant  to  an  acquittal,  he  is 
only  required  by  evidence  to  establish  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his 
sanity.  If  the  jury  cannot  say  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
the  defendant  was  sane  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  al- 
leged act,  or  cannot  say  whether,  at  the  time,  he  was  sane  or  in- 
sane, they  are  bound  to  acquit  him.13 

(2)  If  the  evidence  in  the  case  is  sufficient  to  raise  a  reason- 
able doubt  as  to  the  sanity  of  the  defendant,  then  the  jury  will 
find  the  defendant  not  guilty.14 

(3)  To  warrant  a  conviction  in  this  case,  it  is  incumbent  on 
the  people  to  establish  by  evidence,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury, 
beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  the  existence  of  every  element  nec- 
essary to  constitute  the  crime  charged.     And  if,  after  a  careful 
and  impartial  examination  of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  bear- 
ing upon  the  question  of  sanity  or  insanity,  the  jury  entertain  a 
reasonable  doubt  of  the  sanity  of  the  defendant  at  the  time  of 
the  alleged  offense,  they  should  give  him  the  benefit  of  such 
doubt  and  acquit  him.15 

(4)  While  the  law  presumes  all  men  to  be  sane,  yet  this  pre- 
sumption may  be  overcome  by  evidence  tending  to  prove  insanity 
of  the  accused  at  the  time   of  the   commission   of  the   alleged 
offense.     When  such  evidence  is  introduced,  then  the  presump- 
tion    of    sanity    ceases,     and    the     prosecution     is     bound     to 
prove  the  sanity  of  the  accused  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.    So, 
in  this  case,  in  which  the  defense  of  insanity  is  interposed,  if  the 
jury,  after  considering  all  the  evidence,  entertain  a  reasonable 
doubt  of  the  sanity  of  the  defendant  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  of- 
fense, then  he  must  be  acquitted.16 

(5)  True  it  is,  the  law  presumes  every  man  to  be  sane  and  re- 
sponsible for  his  acts  until  the  contrary  appears  from  the  evi- 

13  S.  v.  Malm,  25  Kas.  188;   S.  v.  IB  Dacey  v.  P.  116  111.  555,  573,  6 

Nixon,   32   Kas.   213,   4   Pac.    159.  N.  E.  165. 

i*  Jamison  v.  P.  145  111.  357,  381,  i«  Jamison  v.  P.  145  111.  357,  380, 

34   N.   E.   486;    Hopps   v.    P.    31   111.  34  N.  E.  486. 
392;   S.  v.  Mahn,  25  Kas.  186. 


§  752  INSANITY  AS  DEFENSE.  780 

denct.  Still,  if  there  is  any  evidence  in  the  case  tending  to  rebut 
the  presumption  sufficient  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  on  the  is- 
sue of  insanity,  then  the  jury  will  find  the  defendant  not  guilty.17 
(6)  The  law  presumes  that  a  man  is  of  sound  mind  until  there 
is  some  evidence  tending  to  prove  the  contrary.  In  prosecutions 
charging  violations  of  the  criminal  code,  the  accused  is  entitled 
to  an  acquittal  if  the  evidence  engenders  a  reasonable  d»ubt  as 
to  his  mental  capacity  at  the  time  the  alleged  offense  is  charged 
to  have  been  committed.  Evidence  rebutting  or  tending  to  rebut 
the  presumption  of  sanity  need  not,  to  entitle  the  accused  to  an 
acquittal,  preponderate  in  his  favor.  If  the  evidence  raises  in 
your  minds  a  reasonable  doubt  of  sanity  it  is  sufficient.18 

§752.  Higher  degree  of  proof  required  in  some  states. — (1) 
The  plea  of  insanity  is  a  complete  defense  to  the  crime  charged 
if,  from  all  the  evidence  before  you,  you  believe  the  plea  is  sus- 
tained. The  law  presumes  all  men  to  be  sane  until  insanity  shall 
have  been  established  by  competent  evidence  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  jury.  It  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  acquit,  that  the  evi- 
dence on  the  subject  of  insanity  should  satisfy  you  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  that  the  defendant  was  insane ;  it  is  sufficient  if, 
upon  consideration  of  all  the  evidence,  you  are  reasonably  satis- 
fied that  he  was  insane.  If  the  weight  or  preponderance  of  the 
evidence  shows  the  insanity  of  the  defendant,  it  raises  a  reason- 
able doubt  of  guilt.19 

(2)  To  establish  a  defense  on  the  ground  of  insanity  it  must  be 
clearly  proved  that,  at  the  time  of  committing  the  act,  the  accused 
was  laboring  under  such  a  defect  of  reason  from  disease  of  the 
mind  as  not  to  know  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  act  he  was 
doing.20 

§  753.  Mere  weakness  of  mind. — Mere  weakness  of  mind  does 
not  excuse  the  commission  of  crime.  If  one  is  of  sound  mind  he 
is  to  be  held  responsible  for  his  criminal  act,  even  though  his 
mental  capacity  be  weak  or  his  intellect  be  of  an  inferior  order.21 

IT  Dacey  v.  P.  116  111.  573,  6  N.  ™  2  Thompson,  Tr.  §  2525,  citing 

E.  165.  Clark  v.  S.  8  Tex.  App.  350;  Smith 

is  Guetig  v.  S.  66  Ind.  106.  v.  S.  19  Tex.  App.  96. 

10  S.  v.  Bruce,  48  Iowa,  534;  S.  v.  21  Wartena  v.  S.  105  Ind.  450,  5 

McCoy,  34  Mo.  535.  N.  E.  20. 


781  DRUNKENNESS    NOT    INSANITY.  §    755 

§  754.  Defense  of  insanity  to  be  examined  with  care. — The 
defense  of  insanity  is  one  which  may  be,  and  sometimes  is,  re- 
sorted to  in  eases  where  the  proof  of  the  overt  act  is  so  full  and 
complete  that  any  other  means  of  avoiding  conviction  and  escap- 
ing punishment  seems  hopeless.  While,  therefore,  this  is  a  de- 
fense to  be  weighed  fully  and  justly,  and  when  satisfactorily  es- 
tablished, must  recommend  itself  to  the  favorable  consideration 
of  the  humanity  and  justice  of  the  jury,  they  are  to  examine  it 
with  care,  lest  an  ingenuous  counterfeit  of  such  mental  disease  or 
disorder  should  furnish  protection  to  guilt.22 

§  755.  Drunkenness  is  not  insanity. — (1)  Voluntary  intoxica- 
tion is  no  excuse  for  crime  as  long  as  the  offender  is  capable  of 
conceiving  an  intelligent  design ;  he  will  be  presumed,  if  the  case 
is  otherwise  made  out  beyond  a  reasonable  dbubt,  to  have  in- 
tended the  natural  and  probable  consequences  of  his  own  act.23 

(2)  Although  it  is  the  law  in  this  state  that  a  criminal  offense 
consists  in  a  violation  of  a  public  law,  in  the  commission  of  which 
there  must  be  a  union  or  joint  operation  of  act  and  intention,  or 
criminal  negligence,  yet  where,  without  intoxication,  the  law  will 
impute  to  the  act  a  criminal  intent,  as  in  the  case  of  wanton  kill- 
ing without  provocation,  voluntary  drunkenness  is  not  available 
to  disprove  such  intent.24 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the   evidence,   beyond  a   reasonable 
doubt,     each     of     the     following     propositions,     to-wit :     that 
at   or  about   two   hours   before   the   commission   of  the   alleged 
homicide  the  defendant  was  sane,  and  had  the  power  to  abstain 
from  drinking  alcohol ;  that  the  defendant  then  knew  that  the 
drinking  of  alcohol  by  him  would  have  the  effect  to  render  him 
insane  or  crazy;  that  the  defendant,  so  knowing  the  effect  of  al- 
cohol upon  him,  and  being  sane,  and  having  the  power  to  abstain 
from  taking  alcohol,  did  then  and  there  voluntarily  drink  alco- 
hol ;  that  the  alcohol  so  drank  by  the  defendant  then  and  there 
made  him  insane  or  crazy;  that  while  so  insane  or  crazy  from 

22  P.   v.  Donlan,   135   Gal.   489,   67  ing  that  an  instruction  which  tends 

Pac.   761;    P.   v.  Larrabee,   115   Gal.  to  discredit  the  defense  of  insani- 

159,  46  Pac.  922;  P.  v.  Allender,  117  ty    is    erroneous. 

Cal.    81,    48   Pac.    1014.     See   Mcln-  ^  Smurr  v.  S.   88  Ind.  507. 

tosh   v.   S.    151   Ind.   259.     But   see  2*  Upstone  v.  P.  109  111.  169,  176. 
Aszman    v.    S.    123    Ind.    347,   hold- 


§  755  INSANITY  AS  DEFENSE.  782 

the  effects  of  such  alcohol  the  defendant  committed  the  act 
charged  in  the  indictment,  at  the  time  and  place,  and  in  the 
manner  and  form  therein  charged,  then  you  should  find  the  de- 
fendant guilty.25 

(4)  If  you  believe  from  the   evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  defendant,  when  voluntarily  intoxicated,  commit- 
ted the  homicide  charged  in  the  indictment,  under  such  circum- 
stances as  would  have  constituted  such  an  act,  by  one  not  intox- 
icated, murder,  then  you  are  instructed  that  such  intoxication 
would  not  reduce  the  crime  from  murder  to  manslaughter,  nor 
would  such  intoxication  be  any  excuse  or  defense  to  the  act.26 

(5)  Frenzy   arising   solely   from   the    passions    of   anger   and 
jealousy,  no  matter  how  furious,  is  not  insanity.     A  man  with 
ordinary   will   power,    which    is   unimpaired   by   disease,    is    re- 
quired by  law  to  govern  and  control  his  passions.     If  he  yields 
to   wicked   passions,    and   purposely   and   maliciously   slays   an- 
other,  he   cannot   escape  the   penalty  prescribed  by  law,   upon 
the  ground  of  mental  incapacity.     That  state  of  mind  caused  by 
wicked   and  ungovernable  passions,   resulting  not  from  mental 
lesion,  but  solely  from  evil  passions,  constitutes  that  mental  con- 
dition which  the  law  abhors  and  to  which  the  term  malice  is  ap- 
plied.    The  condition  of  mind  which  usually  and  immediately 
follows  the  excessive  use  of  alcoholic  liquors,  is  not  the  unsound- 
ness  of  mind  meant  by  law.     Voluntary  drunkenness  does  not 
even  palliate  or  excuse.27 

25  Upstone  v.  P.  109  111.  169,  177.  conspiracy  and  felonious  intent  not 

-'«  Upston-e  v.  P.  109  111.  169,  177.  consummated,  see  Booher  v.  S.  156 

27  Guetig  v.  S.  66  Ind.  94.     As  to  Ind.  439. 
effect  of  intoxication  in  disproving 


CHAPTER  Lin. 

GOOD   CHARACTER   OF   ACCUSED. 

Sec.  Sec. 

756.  Good    character   of   defendant      758.    Character   of   defendant   pre- 

a  circumstance.  sumed  good. 

757.  Good     character     may    create 

reasonable    doubt. 

§  756.  Good  character  of  defendant  a  circumstance. — (1)  Ev- 
idence has  been  given  to  the  character  of  the  defendant  for  peace 
and  quietude.  This  evidence  should  be  considered  by  you  in  de- 
termining the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendant;  but,  if  you 
should  be  satisfied  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant  as  charged  in  the  indictment,  then, 
in  that  view  of  the  case,  although  you  may  believe  that  he  had 
a  good  character  before  the  alleged  offense  occurred,  if  it  did 
occur,  that  would  not  avail  him  as  a  defense  or  entitle  him  to 
be  acquitted.1 

(2)  The  defendant  has  put  in  evidence  his  general  reputation 
for  peaceableness ;  that  such  evidence  is  permissible  under  the  law 
and  is  to  be  by  the  jury  considered  as  a  circumstance  in  the  case 
But  the  court  further  instructs  the  jury  that  if,  from  all  the  evi- 
dence in  the  case,  they  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
of  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  then  it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  find 
him  guilty,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  heretofore  the  accused 
has  borne  a  very  good  character  for  peaceableness.2 

(3)  Some  evidence  has  been  introduced  by  the  defendants  in  re- 

i  Walker   v.    S.    136   Ind.    669,    36  2  Hirschman    v.    P.    101    111.    568. 

N.   E.   356;    P.   v.    Samsels,   66   Cal.  575.     Held  not  erroneous  as  telling 

99,  4  Pac.  1061.     See  Wagner  v.  S.  the  jury  to  disregard  the  evidence 

107  Ind.  71,  7  N.  E.   896.  of  good  character. 

783 


§    756  GOOD    CHARACTER    OF    ACCUSED.  784 

gard  to  their  character  for  honesty.  This  evidence  should  be  con- 
sidered by  you  as  tending  to  establish  a  defense.  If,  however,  you 
should  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  guilt  of  the 
defendants,  after  a  full  consideration  of  all  the  evidence  in  the 
case,  including  the  testimony  in  regard  to  their  character  for 
honesty,  then  in  the  view  of  the  case,  though  you  might  believe 
that  the  defendants  had  a  good  character  for  honesty  before  the 
alleged  crime,  that  would  not  avail  them  as  a  defense  or  entitle 
them  to  an  acquittal.3 

(4)  In  determining  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendant,  you 
should  take  into  account  the  testimony  in  relation  to  his  character 
for  honesty,  integrity,  and  veracity,  and  you  chould  give  to  such 
testimony  such  weight  as  you  deem  proper,  but  if,  from  all  the 
evidence  before  you,  you  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
as  defined  in  these  instructions,  that  the  defendant  is  guilty,  then 
his  previous  good  character,  if  shown,  cannot  justify,  excuse  pal- 
liate or  mitigate  the  offense,  and  you  cannot  acquit  him  merely 
because  you  may  believe  he  has  been  a  person  of  good  repute.4 

(5)  The  character  of  the  defendant  is  also  a  matter  for  your 
consideration.     The  evidence  as  to  his  character  should  be  given 
such  weight,  in  explanation  of  the  transaction  between  himself 
and  the  deceased,  as  to  you  shall  seem  proper.    But,  if  you  shall 
conclude,  from  all  the  evidence,  that  the  defendant  is  guilty,  you 
should  not  acquit  him  because  you  may  believe  that  he  has  here- 
tofore been  a  person  of  good  repute.5 

(6)  The  defendant  has  a  right  to  show  his  previous  good  char- 
acter as  a  circumstance  tending  to  show  the  improbability  of  his 
guilt.    If,  however,  you  believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable   doubt,  that    the    defendant    committed    the    crime    as 
charged  in  the  indictment,  then  you  should  find  him  guilty,  even 
though  the  evidence  satisfies  your  minds  that  the  defendant,  pre- 
vious to  the  commission  of  the  alleged  crime,  has  sustained  a  good 
reputation  as  a  peaceable  and  law-abiding  citizen.6 

(7)  Whilst  the  jury  may  take  into  consideration  the  previous 
good  character  of  defendant,  together  with  all  the  other  facts  and 
circumstances  of  the  case  adduced  in  evidence,  in  determining 

s  McQueen  v.  S.  82  Ind.  74   (rob-  $  S.  v.  Vansant,  80  Mo.  70. 

bery).  e  s.  v.  Porter,  32  Ore.  135,  49  Pac. 

*  S.    v.    Darrah,    152    Mo.    531,    54  964. 
S.  W.  226. 


785  GOOD  CHARACTER  CREATING  DOUBT.  8  758 

t> 

whether  or  not  defendant  is  guilty  of  the  offense  charged  in  the 
indictment,  yet  if  from  the  whole  testimony,  they  believe  defend- 
ant is  guilty,  then  his  previous  good  character  neither  justifies, 
mitigates,  nor  excuses  the  offense.7 


For  the  Defense. 

§  757.    Good  character  may  create  a  reasonable  doubt. — (1) 

You  are  instructed  that  evidence  of  the  good  character  of  the  de- 
fendant is  competent  to  be  taken  into  consideration  by  you  in  de- 
termining his  guilt  or  innocence.  The  good  character  of  the  ac- 
cused, when  satisfactorily  established,  may,  of  itself,  create  such  a 
reasonable  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  as  will  justify  an  ac- 
quittal.8 

(2)  In  a  case  involved  in  much  doubt,  the  good  character  of  the 
accused,  abundantly  proved,  is  entitled  to  great  weight,  and  may 
of  itself  create  such  a  reasonable  doubt  as  will  justify  an  ac- 
quittal.9 

(3)  Good  character  of  itself  may,  in  connection  with  all  the  evi- 
dence, generate  a  reasonable  doubt  and  entitle  the  defendant  to 
an  acquittal,  though  without  such  proof  of  good  character  you 
would  convict.10 

(4)  The  good  character  of  the  accused,  when  satisfactorily  es- 
tablished by  competent  evidence,  is  an  ingredient  which  ought  al- 
ways to  be  considered  by  the  jury,  together  with  the  other  facts 
and  circumstances  in  the  case,  in  determining  his  guilt  or  inno- 
cence.11 

§  758.  Character  of  defendant  presumed  good. — (1)  The  law 
presumes  that  a  person  charged  with  a  commission  of  a  criminal 
offense  has  a  good  character  or  reputation  until  the  contrary  is 
shown  by  the  evidence ;  and  the  jury  have  no  right  to  consider  the 
omission,  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  to  introduce  evidence  of 

-  S.   v.    Jones,    78   Mo.    283.  ™  Bryant  v.   S.    (Ala.),  23  So.  40. 

s  Aneals    v.    P.    134    111.    415,    25  Booker  v.  S.  76  Ala.   25:    P.  v.  El- 

N.  E.  1022;   Bryant  v.  S.    (Ala.),  23  liott,    163    N.    Y.    11,    57   N.    E.    103. 

So.    40.  "  Felix  v.  S.   18  Ala.   725. 

9  Walsh   v.   P.   65   111.   64;    Aneals 
v.  P.  134  111.  415,  25  N.  E.  1022. 


§    758  GOOD    CHARACTER    OF    ACCUSED.  786 

gaod  character  as  a  circumstance  against  him,  or  as  tending  to 
prove  his  guilt.12 

(2)  Where  a  person  is  charged  with  the  commission  of  a  crime, 
the  failure  to  call  witnesses  to  prove  his  general  good  character 
raises  no  presumption  against  it.13 

12  S.  v.  Tozier,  49  Me.  404;   Dry-  brick,  39  Iowa,  277;  S.  v.  Oilkill,  7 

man  v.  S.  102  Ala.  130,  15  So.  433;  Ired.  L.  (N.  Car.)  251;  P.  v.  White, 

Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  3156;   Underbill  24  Wend.    (N.  Y.)   520;   Dryman  v. 

Cr.  Ev.   §   76.  S.  102  Ala.  130,  15  So.  433;   Under- 

is  S.  v.  Dockstader,  42  Iowa,  436,  hill  Cr.  Ev.  §  76. 
2  Am.  Cr.  R.  469,  citing  S.  v.  Ka- 


CHAPTER  LIV. 

CRIMINAL    OFFENSES— CONSPIRACY. 

Sec.  Sec. 

759.  Conspiracy  defined.  763.    Declarations   of   one   evidence 

760.  Formal     agreement     unneces-  against  all. 

sary.  764.    Principal    and   accessory,    dis- 

761.  All    responsible   for   result   of  tinction   abrogated. 

design.  765.    Aiding  and  abetting. 

762.  Conspiracy    to    commit    rob- 

bery. 

§  759.  Conspiracy  defined. — A  conspiracy  is  a  combination  of 
two  or  more  persons,  by  some  concert  of  action,  to  accomplish 
some  criminal  or  unlawful  purpose,  or  some  purpose  not  in  itself 
criminal,  by  criminal  or  unlawful  means.1 

§  760.  Formal  agreement  unnecessary. — (1)  While  it  is  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  establish  the  existence  of  a  conspiracy,  to  prove 
a  combination  of  two  or  more  persons  by  concert  of  action  to  ac- 
complish a  criminal  or  unlawful  purpose,  yet  it  is  not  necessary 
to  prove  that  the  conspirators  came  together  and  entered  into  a 
formal  agreement  to  effect  such  purpose;  that  such  common  de- 
sign may  be  regarded  as  proved  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  the  parties  to  such  conspiracy  were  actually  pursuing 
in  concert  the  common  design  or  purpose,  whether  acting  sepa- 
rately or  together,  by  common  or  different  means,  provided  that 
all  were  leading  to  the  same  unlawful  result.2 

1  Smith  v.  P.   25  111.  11;    Hardin      Wharton  Cr.  Law,  9th  ed.  §§  1398, 
v.   S.   4  Tex.   Cr.   App.   364.  1399,   1401;    McKee  v.   S.   Ill   Ind. 

2  Musser    v.    S.    157    Ind.    442,    61      378,  383,  12  N.  E.  510;   Kelly  v.  P. 
N.    E.    1,    3    Greenleaf    Ev.    §    93;      55  N.  Y.  S.  565,  14  Am.  R.  342;  P. 

787 


§    7G1  CONSPIRACY.  788 

(2)  Evidence  in  proof  of  a  conspiracy  will  generally  be  circum- 
stantial, and  it  is  not  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  ex- 
istence of  the  conspiracy,  for  the  state  to  prove  that  the  defendant 
and  some  other  person  or  persons  came  together  and  actually 
agreed  upon  a  common  design  or  purpose,  and  agreed  to  pursue 
such  common  design  and  purpose  in  the  manner  agreed  upon. 
It  is  sufficient  if  such  common  design  and  purpose  is  shown  to 
your  satisfaction  by  circumstantial  evidence.3 

(3)  While  the  law  requires  that,  to  find  the  defendants  guilty 
in  this  case,  the  evidence  should  show  that  they  were  acting  in 
concert,  still  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  should  be  positively  proved 
that  they  actually  met  together  and  agreed  to  rob  R.  Such  concert 
of  action  may  be  proved  from  circumstances,  and  if,  from  the  evi- 
dence, the  jury  are  satisfied  that  the  defendants  acted  together, 
each  aiding  in  his  own  way,  it  would  be  sufficient.4 

§  761.  All  responsible  for  results  of  design. — (1)  If  two  or 
more  persons  conspire  together  to  do  an  unlawful  act,  and  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  design  an  individual  is  killed,  or  death  ensue, 
it  is  murder  in  all  who  enter  into  or  take  part  in  the  execution  of 
the  design.  But  if  the  unlawful  act  be  a  trespass  only,  to  make 
all  guilty  of  murder  the  death  must  happen  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  design.  If  the  unlawful  act  be  a  felony,  or  be  more  than  a 
mere  trespass,  it  will  be  murder  in  all,  although  death  happens 
collaterally  or  beside  the  original  design.5 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  and 
other  persons  acting  with  him,  entered  into  a  conspiracy  to  kill 
the  deceased,  W,  and  that  in  pursuance  of  such  formed  design 
the  defendant,  and  others  acting  wUh  him,  did,  at  or  about  the 
time  and  at  the  place  alleged  in  the  indictment,  shoot  and  kill 
the  said  W,  you  will  find  the  defendant  guilty  of  murder  in  the 
first  degree.6 

§  762.  Conspiracy  to  commit  robbery. — If  you  should  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  there  was  a  conspiracy  to  commit  rob- 

v.   Arnold,   46  Mich.   268,   9   N.   W.  be  shown  not  only  to  the  satisfac- 

406;    Dayton    v.    Monroe,    47    Mich,  tion  of  the  jury,  but  also  beyond  a 

193,  10  N.  W.  196;   Spies  v.  P.  122  reasonable   doubt.) 

111.  1,  12  N.  E.  868,  17  N.  E.  898.  *  Miller  v.  P.  39  111.  464. 

s  Musser   v.    S.    157    Ind.    442,    61  $  S.  v.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa,  484. 

N.  E.  1.  (The  common  design  men-  G  Hardin   v.    S.    4   Tex.    App.    365. 
tioned    in    this    instruction    should 


789  PRINCIPAL  AND  ACCESSORY,  DECLARATIONS,  AIDING.         §    765 

bery,  and  that  the  same  was  undertaken,  and  that  B  was  killed, 
yet  if  you  have  a  reason-able  doubt  whether  such  general  purpose 
was  contemplated  and  assented  to  by  the  defendant,  or  whether 
it  was  done,  if  at  all,  by  his  knowledge,  and  in  furtherance  of  a 
common  design  to  commit  said  offense ;  or  if  you  have  a  reason- 
able doubt  of  the  defendant's  identity  as  one  of  the  persons  en- 
gaged in  said  robbery,  if  any  was  committed,  or  if  you  have  a 
reasonable  doubt  of  the.  presence  of  the  defendant  at  the  time 
and  place  of  the  robbery,  if  any  was  committed — in  either  event 
you  should  find  him  not  guilty.7 

§763.  Declarations  of  one  evidence  against  all. — Where  two 
or  more  persons  conspire  to  do,  and  are  associated  for  the  pur- 
pose of  doing,  an  unlawful  act,  the  act  or  declaration  of  one  of 
such  persons  while  engaged  in  and  in  the  pursuance  of  the  com- 
mon object,  is  the  act  and  declaration  of  all,  for  which  all  are 
liable,  as  each  person  so  associated  is  deemed  or  presumed  to 
have  assented  to,  or  commanded,  what  was  done  by  any  other  of 
the  conspirators  in  furtherance  of  the  common  object.8 

§  764.    Principal   and   accessory,    distinction   abrogated. — (1) 

The  distinction  between  an  accessory  before  the  fact  and  the  prin- 
cipal, and  between  principals  in  the  first  and  second  degree  in 
cases  of  felony,  is  abrogated;  and  all  persons  concerned  in  the 
commission  of  a  felony,  whether  they  directly  commit  the  act 
constituting  the  offense  or  aid  and  abet  in  its  commission,  though 
not  present,  must  be  prosecuted,  tried  and  punished  as  principals, 
and  no  other  facts  need  be  alleged  or  proved  under  an  informa- 
tion against  such  accessory  than  are  required  under  an  informa- 
tion against  the  principal.9 

(2)  An  accessory  to  the  commission  of  a  felony  may  be  pros- 
ecuted, tried  and  punished,  though  the  principal  may  be  neither 
prosecuted  nor  tried.10 

§  765.  Aiding  and  abetting. — (1)  All  persons  who  are  guilty 
of  acting  together  in  the  commission  of  an  offense  are  principals. 

7  Nite  v.  S.  41  Tex.  Cr.  App.  340,  9  S.  v.  De  Wolfe  (Mont),  77 

54  S.  W.  767.  Pac.  1087. 

s  S.  v.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa,  486;  Har-  10  S.  v.  De  Wolfe  (Mont.),  77 
din  v.  S.  4  Tex.  App.  365.  Pae.  1087,  Ulmer  v.  S.  14  Ind.  52; 

Ind.  Acts,  1889,  p.  260. 


§    765  CONSPIRACY.  790 

When  an  offense  is  actually  committed  by  one  or  more  persons, 
but  others  are  present,  and,  knowing  the  unlawful  intent,  aid  by 
acts,  or  encourage  by  words  or  gestures,  those  actually  engaged 
in  the  commission  of  the  unlawful  act,  such  persons  so  aiding  or 
encouraging  are  principal  offenders,  and  may  be  prosecuted  and 
convicted  as  such.11 

(2)  All  persons  concerned  in  the  unlawful  assembly  are  equally 
guilty  of  the  subsequent  acts  done  by  any  of  them  in  furtherance 
of  the  common  objects  of  the  assembly;  and  all  joining  them  after 
the  original  meeting,  and  who  were  present  at  any  subsequent  act, 
and  were  either  active  in  doing,  countenancing,  or  supporting, 
or  ready,  if  necessary,  to  support  or  aid  in  the  doing  of  the  unlaw- 
ful act,  thereby  became  parties  to  the  alleged  riot,  and  are  equal- 
ly guilty  of  all  subsequent  acts  in  the  commission  of  the  offense.12 

(3)  The  bare  presence  of  the  defendant  at  the  time  of  the  tak- 
ing of  the  property  in  question,  if  he  was  present,  would  not  justify 
his  conviction,  unless  the  evidence  shows  that  he  did  some  act 
aiding,  abetting,  assisting,  or  encouraging  the  person  who  actually 
did  steal  the  property.13 

11  Pierce  v.  S.  17  Tex.  App.  239.  is  Jackson  v.  S.  20  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

12  u.  S.  v.  Fenwick,  4  Crunch  (U.      192. 
S.)  6SO. 


CHAPTER  LV. 

ASSAULTS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

766.  Simple  assault  defined.  770.    Consent  to  sexual  intercourse. 

•767.  Assault  with    deadly   weapon.  771.     Consent  a  question  of  fact. 

768.  Assault  with  intent  to  kill.  772.    Assault  to  rob. 

769.  Assault  to  commit  rape. 

§  766.  Simple  assault  defined. — (1)  An  assault  is  an  unlawful 
attempt,  coupled  with  a  present  ability,  to  commit  a  violent  in- 
jury on  the  person  of  another.1 

(2)  By  the  expression,  "coupled  with  the  ability  to  commit  a 
battery,"  is  meant  that  the  person  making  the  assault  must  at 
that  time  be  in  such  position,  and  within  such  distance  of  the 
person  assaulted,  as  to  enable  him  to  commit  a  battery  on  such 
person  by  the  means  used.2 

(3)  The  use  of  any  unlawful  violence  upon  the  person  of  an- 
other, with  intent  to  injure  him,  whatever  be  the  means  or  de- 
gree of  violence  used,  is  an  assault  and  battery.     Any  attempt 
to  commit  a  battery,  or  any  threatening  gesture,  showing  in  it- 
self, or  by  words  accompanying  it,  an  immediate  intention  coup- 
led with  the  present  ability  to  commit  a  battery,  is  an  assault.3 

§  767.  Assault  with  a  deadly  weapon. — (1)  An  assault  and 
battery  becomes  aggravated  when  a  serious  bodily  injury  is  in- 
flicted upon  the  person  assaulted,  or  when  committed  with  a  dead- 

i  May  v.  P.  8  Colo.  226,  6  Pac.  816;          2  Perrin  v.  S.   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  78 
McCully   v.   S.   62   Ind.   433;    Kurd's      S.  W.  932. 
111.  Stat  §  20,  chap.  38.  3  Perrin  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  78 

S.  W.  932. 
791 


§    768  ASSAULT    WITH    INTENT.  792 

ly  weapon.  A  deadly  weapon  is  one  which,  from  the  manner  used, 
is  calculated  or  likely  to  produce  death  or  serious  bodily  injury.4 
(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  and  the 
prosecuting  witness,  B,  got  into  a  fight,  and  that  the  defendant 
cut  the  witness  without  intent  to  do  so,  then  you  will  find  the 
defendant  not  guilty.5 

§  768.  Assault  with  intent  to  kill.— (1)  If  the  defendant  fired 
into  the  crowd  in  question,  of  which  A,  the  prosecuting  witness, 
was  one,  with  the  deliberate  intention,  either  formed  at  the  time  or 
previously,  of  killing  or  murdering  some  one  of  the  crowd,  and 
that  A  received  a  portion  of  the  shot  and  contents  of  the  gun 
and  was  wounded  thereby,  it  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  assault 
and  battery  with  the  intent  charged.  And  if  the  case  is  other- 
wise made  out  it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  find  the  defend- 
ant guilty  as  charged  in  the  indictment.6 

(2)  If  you  should  find  from  the  evidence  that  had  death  result- 
ed from  the  assault,  the  killing  would  have  been  manslaughter 
only,  then  you  should  find  the  defendant  guilty  of  assault  and  bat- 
tery only,  and  not  guilty  of  assault  with  intent  to  kill.  But  if  you 
should  find  that  such'  killing,  had  death  resulted,  would  have  been 
murder  in  the  first  degree,  or  murder  in  the  second  degree,  then 
you  should  find  the  defendant  guilty  as  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment.7 

§  769.  Assault  to  commit  rape. — (1)  If  the  state  has  satisfied 
you  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  either  had  sex- 
ual intercourse  with  the  prosecuting  witness,  or  that  he  laid  his 
hands  upon  her  with  the  intent  and  purpose  of  having  sexual  in- 
tercourse with  her,  and  that  she  was  under  fourteen  years  of  age, 
then  the  state  made  out  a  case.8 

(2)  If  you  are  satisfied  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  defendant  took  hold  of  the  prosecutrix,  it  is  for 
you  to  say  whether  or  not,  under  all  the  circumstances,  the  in- 
tention to  have  intercourse  with  the  girl  was  then  in  his  mind, 
'and  it  was  with  that  purpose  that  he  laid  his  hands  on  her.9 

4  Perrin  v.  S.  (Tex.  Or.  App.) ,  78  «  Hanes  v.  S.  155  Ind.  120,  57  N. 

S.  W.  932.  B.  704. 

s  Ter.  v.  Baca  (N.  Mex.)  71  Pac.  a  Hanes  v.  S.  155  Ind.  112,  57  N. 

460.  E.  704.     Held  not  objectionable  as 

e  Walker  v.  S.  8  Ind.  292,  authorizing  the  jury  to  infer  par- 

?  S.  v.  Stout,  49  Ohio  St.  281,  30  ticular  intent. 
N.  E.  437. 


793  ASSAULTS.  §  772 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant, 
Hadley,  had  intercourse  with  Alma  Grugin  in  the  year  1896,  and 
that  she  was  then  unmarried,  of  previously  chaste  character,  and 
under  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  then  said  Hadley  is  guilty  of 
felony,  and  this  is  true,  even  though  you  may  further  find  that 
she  consented  to  such  intercourse.10 

§  770.  Consent  to  sexual  intercourse. — On  the  question 
of  consent  the  court  instructs  you  that  consent  induced  by  fear 
of  personal  violence  is  no  consent,  and  though  a  man  lay  no  hands 
on  a  woman,  yet  if,  by  physical  force,  he  so  overpowers  her  mind 
that  she  does  not  resist,  he  is  guilty  of  rape  by  having  the  unlaw- 
ful intercourse  in  such  manner.11 

§  771.  Consent  a  question  of  fact. — If  you  find  from  the  evi- 
dence in  this  case  that  an  act  of  sexual  intercourse  did  take  place 
between  the  defendant  and  the  prosecuting  witness,  as  charged  in 
the  indictment,  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  prosecuting 
witness  voluntarily  consented  to  such  act  is  a  question  of  fact  for 
you  to  determine  from  all  the  evidence  in  the  case.12 

§  772.  Assault  to  rob.— (1)  If  you  find  that  the  defendant  had 
not  used  such  force  and  violence  as  makes  him  guilty  of  assault 
with  intent  to  rob,  he  may  be  found  guilty  of  assault  and  battery.13 

(2)  Violence,  in  order  to  constitute  an  assault  with  intent  to 
rob,  must  not  be  subsequent  to  the  attempt  to  take  the  property 
in  question.14 

Robbery  is  the  felonious  and  violent  taking  of  money,  goods, 
or  other  valuable  things  from  the  person  of  another,  by  force 
or  intimidation.18 

(3)  Kobbery  is  the   felonious   and   violent   taking   of  money, 
goods,  or  other  valuable  thing  from  the  person  of  another  by  force 
or  intimidation.  Every  person  guilty  of  robbery  shall  be  impris- 
oned in  the  penitentiary  not  less  than  one  nor  more  than  fourteen 
years;  or,  if  he  is  armed  with  a  dangerous  weapon,  with  intent, 

10  S.  v.  Grugin  (Mo.),  42  L.  R.  A.          is  Hanson  v.  S.  43  Ohio  St.  378,  1 
774,  781.  N.  E.   136. 

11  Felton    v.    S.    139    Ind.    540,    49          i*  Hanson  v.  S.  43  Ohio  St.  378. 
N.  E.   228.  is  Fitzgerald    v.    S.    20    Tex.    Cr. 

12  Anderson  v.   S.  104  Ind.  470,  4  App.  294,  296. 
N.  E.  63,  5  N.  E.  711.     See  Hawkins 

v.  S.  136  Ind.  634,  36  N.  E.  419. 


§    772  ASSAULT    TO    BOB.  794: 

if  resisted,  to  kill  or  maim  such  person,  or  being  so  armed,  he 
wounds  or  strikes  him,  or  if  he  has  any  confederate  present  so 
armed,  to  aid  or  abet  him,  he  may  be  imprisoned  for  any  term 
of  years  or  for  life.16 

(4)  The  fact  that  the  defendant  took  the  property  in  question 
from  the  person,  and  that  it  was  afterwards  found  in  his  posses- 
sion, is  not  sufficient  to  convict  him  of  robbery.  You  must  further 
find  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  de- 
fendant took  it  from  the  person  mentioned  by  force,  and  in  spite 
of  his  resistance,  with  the  intent  to  rob  or  steal,  and  unless  you  do 
so  find  you  must  find  the  defendant  not  guilty.17 

is  Needham     v.     P.     98     111.     279          IT  Stevens   v.   S.   19  Neb.   650,   28 
(proper   as   defined   by  the  statute      N.  W.  304. 
of  Illinois). 


CHAPTER  LVI. 


HOMICIDE,   MURDER   AND    MANSLAUGHTER. 


Sec.  Sec. 

773.  Definition       and       illustrative      784. 

cases. 

774.  Murder  in  first  degree — Illus-      785. 

tratione. 

775.  Murder  in  the  second  degree.      786. 

776.  Malice   defined— Essential   ele-      787. 

ment  788. 

777.  Intent  presumed   from   means     789. 

used.  790. 

778.  Intent  in  administering  drug. 

779.  Drunkenness    reducing     grade      791. 

of    crime. 

780.  Time    of    deliberation,    length     792. 

immaterial. 

781.  Motive  proper,  but  not  indis-      793. 

pensable. 

782.  Killing  being  proved  presumed      794. 

murder. 

783.  Doubt  as  to  degree  of  homi- 

cide. 


Killing  while  lying  in  wait, 
murder. 

Killing  by  one  of  several 
burglars. 

Killing  person  not  intended. 

Officer  killing  while  arresting. 

Killing  officer  while  arresting. 

Arresting  without  a  warrant. 

Degree  of  proof  to  warrant 
conviction. 

Wound  neglected  causing 
blood  poisoning. 

Mere  presence  of  accused  is 
not  aiding. 

Inquest  proceedings  not  evi- 
dence. 

Manslaughter  defined  and  il- 
lustrations. 


§  773.  Definition  and  illustrative  case. — (1)  Murder  is  the  un- 
lawful killing  of  a  human  being  in  the  peace  of  the  people,  with 
malice  aforethought,  either  express  or  implied  by  law.1 

(2)  Murder  in  the  first  degree  is  the  killing  of  a  human  being, 
willfully,   deliberately,   premeditatedly,   and   with  malice   afore- 
thought.2 

(3)  Murder  in  the  second  degree  has  all  the  elements  of  mur- 
der in  the  first  degree  except  that  of  deliberation.3 

(4)  If  a  man  happen  to  kill  another  in  the  execution  of  a  ma- 


1  Jackson   v.   P.   18   111.   270. 

2  S.    v.   May,   172   Mo.   630,   72   S. 
W.   918. 


3  S.   v.   May,   172   Mo.    630,   72   S. 
W.  918. 


795 


§    773  MURDER    AND    MANSLAUGHTER.  796 

licious  and  deliberate  purpose  to  do  him  a  personal  hurt  by  wound- 
ing or  beating  him,  or  in  the  wilful  commission  of  any  unlawful 
act  which  necessarily  tends  to  raise  tumults  and  quarrels,  and 
consequently  cannot  but  be  attended  with  the  danger  of  personal 
hurt  to  some  one  or  other — as  by  committing  a  riot — shall  be  ad- 
judged guilty  of  murder.4 

(5)  You  are  further  instructed  that  if  you  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence in  this  case,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  defendant, 
with  malice  aforethought,  either  expressed  or  implied,  inflicted 
upon  the  deceased  the  mortal  wounds  in  manner  and  form  as 
charged  in  the  indictment,  not  in  self-defense,  as  the  same  is  de- 
nned in  these  instructions,  and  not  upon  a  sudden  heat  of  pas- 
sion caused  by  a  provocation  apparently  sufficient  to  make  the 
passion    irresistible,    and   that    the    said   H     did    thereafter   die 
from  said  mortal  wound     or  wounds  in   manner  and   form  as 
charged  in  the  indictment,  then  the  jury  should  find  the  defend- 
ant guilty  of  murder.5 

(6)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case,  beyond 
all  reasonable  doubt,  that  Belle  Bowlby  received,  on  the  nineteenth 
day  of  February,  1895,  the  injuries  by  the  means  and  in  the  man- 
ner set  forth  in  the  first,  second  or  third  counts  of  the  indictment 
herein,  and  further  believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  all  reason- 
able doubt,  that  said  injuries  were  inflicted  upon  the  person  of 
said  Belle  Bowlby  by  the  defendant,  Albert  Wallace,  as  charged  in 
the  indictment,  or  in  some  of  said  counts  thereof,  and  further  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence,  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  that  the 
death  of  said  Belle  Bowlby  was  occasioned  by  reason  of  said  in- 
juries at  the  time  and  in  the  manner  charged  in  said  indictment, 
or  in  some  of  said  counts  thereof,  then  in  that  state  of  the  proof 
the  law  would  pronounce  it  murder.6 

(7)  If  you  are  satisfied  from  the  evidence  in  this  case,  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt,  that  the  poison  charged  was  administered  by 
the  defendant,  as  charged  in  the  indictment,  for  the  purpose  of 
killing  and  murdering  his  wife,  and  that  death  ensued  as  alleged 

*  P.  v.   Abbott,  116  Mich.  263,  74  383;  Panton  v.  P.  114  111.  505,  2  N. 

N.    W.    529,    citing   1    Hawk.    P.    C.  E.    411;    Lyon    v.    P.    170    111.    527, 

(Curw.  ed.),  §  10,  p.  86.  48  N.  E.  964.;   Crowell  v.  P.  190  111. 

••*  Carle   v.    P.    200   111.    494,   66   N.  508,   GO  N.   E.   872. 

E.    32.     Held    distinguishable   from  6  Wallace  v.  P.   159  111.   446,   451, 

Steiner  v.  P.  187  111.  244,  58  N.  E.  42  N.  E.  771. 


797  DEGREES   OF    MURDER.  §    775 

in  the  indictment  in  consequence  thereof,  this  will  be  sufficient 
to  warrant  you  in  convicting  the  defendant.7 

§  774.  Murder  in  first  degree — Illustrations. — (1)  If  you  shall 
find  and  believe  from  the  evidence  that  at  the  county  of  Jackson, 
in  the  state  of  Missouri,  at  any  time  prior  to  the  thirty-first  day  of 
May,  1883,  the  day  on  which  the  indictment  in  this  case  was  filed, 
the  defendant,  V,  in  the  manner  and  by  the  means  specified  in  the 
indictment  willfully,  with  deliberation,  premeditation,  and  malice 
aforethought,  assaulted  and  wounded  the  deceased,  A,  and  that 
within  one  year  and  a  day  thereafter,  and  before  the  filing  of  the 
indictment,  the  said  A,  at  the  county  and  state  aforesaid,  died 
from  the  effects  of  the  wound  so  inflicted  upon  him  by  the  de- 
fendant, the  verdict  should  be  that  the  defendant  is  guilty  of 
murder  in  the  first  degree.8 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  defendant,  A,  in  H  county,  Missouri,  on  or  about 
the  sixteenth  day  of  December,  1899,  with  a  certain  pistol  will- 
fully, deliberately,  premeditately,  and  of  his  malice  aforethought, 
shot  and  killed  Henry  Hughes,  then  the  jury  will  find  the  defend- 
ant guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree,  and  will  -so  state  in  your 
verdict.9  - 

§  775.  Murder  in  the  second  degree. — (1)  If  you  shall  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  shot  and  killed  M  while  he, 
the  defendant,  was  in  a  violent  passion,  suddenly  aroused  by  op- 
probrious epithets  or  abusive  words  spoken  by  M  to  the  defend- 
ant, then  such  shooting  and  killing  was  not  done  with  deliberation, 
and  was  not  murder  in  the  first  degree.  On  the  other  hand,  al- 
though the  defendant  shot  and  killed  M  while  the  defendant  was 
in  a  violent  passion  suddenly  aroused  by  opprobrious  epithets  or 
abusive  words  spoken  to  him  by  M,  yet  if  such  shooting  and  kill- 
ing was  done  willfully,  premeditatedly,  and  of  his  malice  afore- 
thought, as  heretofore  explained,  then  the  defendant  is  guilty  of 
murder  in  the  second  degree.10 

(2)  If  you  shall  believe  from  the  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable 

7  Dyer  v.  S.  74  Ind.  595.  S.    W.    899.       Full    charge   set   out 

s  S.   v.   Vansant,   80  Mo.   67.     See  and   held   not   error. 
Koerner  v.  S.  98  Ind.  8.  10  S.  v.  Gee,  85  Mo.  649. 

»  S.   v.   Ashcraft,   170  Mo.   409,   70 


§    776  MURDER    AND    MANSLAUGHTER.  798 

doubt,  that  the  defendant,  at  the  time  and  place  mentioned  in 
the  indictment,  with  a  pistol  willfully,  premeditatedly,  and  of 
his  malice  aforethought,  but  without  deliberation,  shot  and  killed 
M.,  you  will  find  him  guilty  of  murder  in  the  second  degree,  and 
assess  his  punishment  in  the  penitentiary  for  a  term  not  less  than 
ten  years.11 

§  776.    Malice  defined — Essential  element. — (1)  Malice  is  the 
dictate  of  a  wicked,  depraved  and  malignant  heart.12 

(2)  By  malice  is  meant  not  only  anger,  hate,  and  revenge,  but 
any  other  unlawful  and  unjustifiable  motive.13 

(3)  Malice  includes  not  only  anger,  hatred,  and  revenge,  but 
every  other  unlawful  and  unjustifiable  motive.  Malice  is  not  con- 
fined to  ill  will  towards  an  individual,  but  is  intended  to  denote 
an  action  flowing  from  any  wicked  and  corrupt  motive — an  act 
done  with  a  wicked  mind — where  the  fact  has  been  attended 
with  such  circumstances  as  evince  plain  indications  of  a  heart 
regardless  of  social  duty  and  fatally  bent  on  mischief;  hence 
malice    is    implied    from   any    deliberate    or    cruel    act    against 
another,  however  sudden,  which  shows  an  abandoned  and  malig- 
nant heart.14 

(4)  Premeditated  malice  is  where  the  intention  to  unlawfully 
take  life  is  deliberately  formed  in  the  mind,  and  that  determina- 
tion meditated  upon  before  the  fatal  stroke  is  given.  There  need  be 
no  appreciable  space  of  time  between  the  formation  of  the  inten- 
tion to  kill  and  the  killing.    They  may  be  as  instantaneous  as  suc- 
cessive thoughts.     It  is  only  necessary  that  the  act  of  killing  be 
preceded  by  a  concurrence  of  will,  deliberation  and  premeditation 
on  the  part  of  the  slayer.15 

(5)  Malice,  in  law,  and  as  used  in  the  statute  defining  murder, 
has  a  technical  meaning,  including  not  only  anger,  hatred  and  re- 

11  S.  v.  Gee,  85  Mo.  648.  «  Jackson  v.  P.   18  111.  269;   Mc- 

12  S.   v.   Conley,   130   N.   Car.   683,  Coy  v.  P.  175  111.  224,  229,  51  N.  E. 
41   S.  E.   534.     (The  full  charge  of  777;    S.  v.  May,  172  Mo.  630,  72  S. 
the  court  is  set  out  in  this  case  pre-  W.  918.    Held  that  the  words  every 
senting  every  phase  of  murder  In  other    unlawful     and     unjustifiable 
the    first   and    second    degrees   and  motive  do  not  broaden  the  instruc- 
manslaughter  and  self-defense,  fol-  tion     to     include     every     motive, 
lowing   the   settled   precedents.)  whether    growing   out    of   the   evi- 

is  S.  v.  Hunter,  118  Iowa,  686,  92  dence  in   the   case   or  not. 

N.    W.    872;    Com.    v.    Webster,    5  is  Bims  v.   S.  66  Ind.  433;    Koer- 

Cush.     (Mass.)     304,    52    Am.    Dec.  ner  v.  S.  98  Ind.  8. 
711.    See  S.  v.  Gee,  85  Mo.  649. 


799  INTENT,    WHEN    PRESUMED.  §    777 

venge,  but  every  other  unlawful  and  unjustifiable  motive.  It  is 
not  confined  to  ill  will  towards  one  or  more  individual  persons, 
but  is  used  and  intended  to  denote  an  action  growing  from  any 
wicked  and  corrupt  motive — a  thing  done  with  bad  or  malicious 
intent — where  the  fact  has  been  attended  by  such  circumstances 
as  carry  in  them  the  plain  indication  of  a  heart  regardless  of  so- 
cial duty  and  fatally  bent  on  mischief;  and  therefore  malice  is 
implied  from  any  deliberate  and  cruel  act  against  another,  how- 
ever sudden.16 

§  777.  Intent  presumed  from  means  used. — (1)  Every  man  is 
presumed  to  intend  the  natural  and  probable  consequences  of 
an  act  which  he  intentionally  performs;  and  if  you  find  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendants  perpetrated  an  assault  and  bat- 
tery upon  B,  and  did  throw  him,  the  said  B,  from  a  rapidly 
moving  railroad  train  in  such  a  manner  that  it  was  reasonably 
calculated  to  destroy  his  life,  then  you  are  at  liberty  to  infer  that 
the  defendants  intended  to  kill  him,  the  said  B,  from  such  facts.17 

(2)  In  a  case  of  homicide,  the  law  presumes  malice  from  the  use 
of  a  deadly  weapon,  and  casts  on  the  defendant  the  onus  of  re- 
pelling the  presumption  of    malice  unless    the  evidence  which 
proves  the  killing  shows  also  that  it  was  perpetrated  without 
malice ;  and  whenever  malice  is  shown,  and  is  unrebutted  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  killing  or  by  the  evidence,  there  can  be  no 
conviction  for  any  degree  of  homicide  less  than  murder.18 

(3)  In  a  case  of  homicide  the  law  presumes  malice  from  the  use 
of  a  deadly  weapon,  and  casts  on  the  defendant  the  onus  of  repel- 
ling the  presumption,  unless  the  evidence  which  proves  the  killing 
shows  also  that  it  was  perpetrated  without  malice ;  and  whenever 
malice  is  shown,  and  is  unrebutted  by  the  circumstances  of  the 
killing,  or  by  other  facts  in  evidence,  there  can  be  no  conviction 
for  any  less  degree  of  homicide  than  murder.19 

(4)  The  law  presumes  that  every  sane  person  contemplates  the 
natural  and  ordinary  consequences  of  his  own  voluntary  acts, 
until  the  contrary  appears,  and  when  a  man  is  found  to  have 
killed  another  by  acts,  the  natural  and  ordinary  consequences  of 

IB  Harris   v.    S.    155   Ind.    271,    58  is  Sherrill  v.  S.  (Ala.),  35  So.  131. 

N.  E.   75.  is  Jenkins  v.  S.  82  Ala.  27,  2  So. 

IT  Anderson  v.  S.  147  Ind.  451,  46  150. 
N.  E.  901. 


§    777  MURDER    AND    MANSLAUGHTER.  800 

which  would  be  death,  if  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  homi- 
cide do  not  of  themselves,  or  the  evidence  otherwise,  show  that  it 
was  not  done  purposely,  or  create  a  reasonable  doubt  thereof,  it 
is  to  be  presumed  that  the  death  of  the  deceased  was  designed  by 
the  slayer.20 

(5)  Every  person  is  presumed  to  intend  what  his  acts  indi- 
cate his  intention  to  have  been,  and  if  the  defendant  fired  a 
loaded  pistol  at  the  deceased,  and  killed  him,  the  law  presumes 
that  he  intended  to  kill  the  deceased,  and  unless' the  defendant 
can  show  that  his  intention  was  other  than  his  act  indicated  the 
law  will  not  hold  him  guiltless.21 

(6)  If  an  act  be  perpetrated  with  a  deadly  weapon,  and  so 
used  as  to  be  likely  to  produce  death,  the  purpose  or  intent 
to  kill  may  be  inferred  from  such  act.22 

(7)  If  a  deadly  weapon  is  used,  the  law  infers  an  intent  to 
kill  or  to  do  grievious  bodily  harm;  and  if  the  circumstances 
do  not  show  excuse,  justification,  or  immediate  provocation,  the 
presumption  of  malice  is  conclusively  drawn.     A  deadly  weapon 
is  not  one  from  which  a  blow  could  ordinarily  produce  death, 
but  one  from  which,  as  it  was  used  in  the  particular  case,  death 
would  probably  result.23 

(8)  The  instrument  or  means  used  by  which  a  homicide  is  com- 
mitted are  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  judging  the  intent  of 
the  party  offending.    If  the  instrument  be  one  not  likely  to  pro- 
duce death  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  death  was  designed,  un- 
less from  the  manner  in  which  it  was  used  such  intention  evi- 
dently appears.24 

(9)  Where  a  homicide  is  prepetrated  by  an  intentional  use 
of   a   deadly   weapon,   in   such   a   manner   as   is   likely   to,   and 
actually   does,   produce   death,    the    law   presumes   such    killing 
was  committed  purposely  and  maliciously,  unless  it  was  done  in 
self-defense,  or  in  a  sudden  heat  caused  by  such  provocation  as 
by  law  reduces  the  killing  to  the  grade  of  manslaughter.25 

20  S.  v.   Achey,   64  Ind.   59.  22  Deilks  v.  S.  141  Ind.  26,  40  N. 

21  P.   v.   Langton,   67   Cal.   427,   7  E.  120;  S.  v.  Zeibart,  40  Iowa,  173. 
Pac.   843,   Am.    Cr.   R.   439.     If  the         23  Jenkins  v.  S.  82  Ala.  27,  2  So. 
evidence  of  either   side   shows   the  150. 

intention     of     the     defendant    was         24  Perrin   v.    S.    (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 

other    than    his    act    indicated,    he      78   S.   W.    932. 

should  be   held   guiltless.     The   de-         25  McDermott   v.    S.    89    Ind.    193. 

fendant  should  not  be  required  to 

show  his  innocence. 


801  DRUNKENNESS,    SPECIFIC    INTENT.  §    779 

§  778.  Intent  in  administering  drug.— If  you  find  from  the 
evidence  that  the  defendant  administered  to  S  I  cantharides,  for 
the  purpose  of  exciting  her  sexual  passions,  and  thereby,  and  by 
means  thereof,  enabling  him  more  easily  to  have  sexual  inter- 
course with  her,  the  said  S  I,  and  death  resulted  from  such  ad- 
ministration by  the  defendant,  without  any  intention  or  purpose 
to  kill  the  said  S  I,  then  under  that  state  of  facts  you  cannot 
convict  the  defendant  of  murder.26 

§  779.  Drunkenness,  reducing  grade  of  crime. — (1)  While  vol- 
untary intoxication  is  no  excuse  or  palliation  for  the  commission  of 
a  crime,  yet  if,  upon  the  whole  evidence  in  this  case,  you  shall 
have  a  reasonable  doubt  whether,  at  the  time  of  the  killing — if 
you  shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  accused  did  kill  the  de- 
ceased— he  had  sufficient  mental  capacity  to  deliberately  think 
upon  and  rationally  determine  so  to  kill  the  deceased,  then  you 
cannot  find  him  guilty  of  murder  of  the  first  degree,  although 
such  inability  was  the  result  of  intoxication.27 

(2)  It  is  a  general  principle  of  law  that  intoxication  is  no  ex- 
cuse for  crime,  but  this  principle  has  this  important  qualification, 
as  far  as  it  relates  to  murder  in  the  first  degree :    A  particular  or 
specific  intent  is  absolutely  essential  in  the  commission  of  this 
crime,  and  if  the  mind  of  the  person  doing  the  killing  is  unable, 
because  of  intoxication  at  the  time  of  the  killing,  to  form  this 
particular  or  specific  intent,  there  can  be  no  murder  in  the  first 
degree  unless  the  person  doing  the  killing  became  voluntarily  in- 
toxicated for  the  purpose  of  killing  while  intoxicated.28 

(3)  While  drunkenness  is  no  excuse  for  the  commission  of  a 
criminal  offense,  unless  occasioned  by  the  fraud  or  contrivance  of 
another  for  the  purpose  of  causing  the  perpetration  of  an  offense, 
yet  if  the  drunkenness  of  the  defendant  be  a  fact  appearing  in  the 
evidence  it  is  to  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  connection  with  all 

26  Bachtelheimer  v.  S.  54  Ind.  134.  posely  and  with  premeditated  mal- 

It  was  pointed  out  in  this  case  that  ice"    administering   poison,    which 

to  constitute  murder  in  either  the  is  also  murder  by  the  Indiana  law, 

first  or  second  degree  it  is  essen-  under  another  section  of  the  stat- 

tial  that  the  killing  be  "purposely  ute. 

and    maliciously"    done.      But    this  27  Aszman  v.   S.   123  Ind.   351,  24 

case  is  not  believed  to  be  good  law,  N.  E.  123. 

since    such    an    act    would    clearly  as  Cook  v.  S.  (Fla.),  35  S.  669. 
amount  to  causing  death  by  "pur- 


§    780  MURDER    AND    MANSLAUGHTER.  80£ 

the  other  facts  proven,  in  determining  the  degree  of  guilt,  if  the 
defendant  is  guilty.  The  fact  that  the  defendant  was  drunk,  if 
proven,  does  not  render  his  act  any  the  less  crimnial,  and  in  this 
sense  drunkenness  is  not  available  as  an  excuse,  but,  upon  the 
question  whether  the  act  was  deliberate  or  premeditated  it  is 
proper  to  be  considered,  but  only  for  this  purpose.  It  neither  ex- 
cuses the  offense  nor  avoids  the  punishment  which  the  law  pre- 
scribes when  the  character  of  the  offense  is  ascertained.29 

§  780.  Time  of  deliberation,  length  immaterial. — (1)  If  you 
believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the 
defendant,  in  C  county,  this  state,  before  the  finding  of  the  indict- 
ment in  this  case,  purposely  killed  W,  after  reflection,  with  a 
wickedness  or  depravity  of  heart  towards  the  deceased,  and  the 
killing  was  determined  on  beforehand — even  a  moment  before  the 
fatal  shooting  was  done — then  the  defendant  is  guilty  of  murder 
in  the  first  degree.30 

(2)  It  is  not  essential  that  the  willful  intent,  premeditation 
and  deliberation  shall  exist  in  the  mind  of  the  slayer  for  any 
considerable  length  of  time  before  the  actual  perpetration  of 
the  crime.  It  is  sufficient  if  there  was  a  fixed  design  or  deter- 
mination to  maliciously  kill,  distinctly  formed  in  the  mind  of 
such  slayer  at  any  time  before  the  fatal  injury  inflicted.  And 
in  this  case,  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt,  that  the  defendant  assaulted  and  shot  the  de- 
ceased at  the  time  and  place  and  in  the  manner  charged  in  the  in- 
dictment, and  that  either  at  some  time  before,  or  in  the  moment 
or  instant  of  "time  immediately  before  the  fatal  shot  was  fired,  the 
defendant  had  framed  in  his  mind  a  willful,  deliberate  and  pre- 
meditated design  or  purpose  of  his  malice  aforethought  to  take 
the  life  of  the  deceased,  and  that  the  said  fatal  shot  was  fired  by 
the  defendant  in  furtherance  of  that  design  or  purpose,  without 
any  justifiable  cause  or  lawful  excuse  therefor,  then  it  may  be 
said  that  the  defendant  acted  with  deliberation  and  premedita- 
tion, and  you  should  find  him  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree. 
But  if  you  fail  to  find  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  said  fatal  act  of  the  defendant  was  accompanied 
with  some  degree  of  deliberation  and  premeditation,  or  that  it 

29  May  v.  P.  8  Colo.  220,  6  Pac.  so  Stevens  v.  S.  (Ala.),  35  So.  124 
816.  See  Booher  v.  S.  156  Ind.  435. 


803  MOTIVE,    MURDER    PRESUMED.  §    782 

was  the  result  of  a  fixed  determination  on  the  part  of  the  defend- 
ant to  kill  the  deceased,  you  must  then  acquit  the  defendant  of 
the  crime  of  murder  in  the  first  degree.31 

§  781.  Motive,  proper  but  not  indispensable. — (1)  Proof  of  mo- 
tive to  commit  crime  is  not  indispensable  nor  essential  to  convic- 
tion. While  a  motive  may  be  shown  as  a  circumstance  to  aid  in 
fixing  the  crime  on  the  defendant,  yet  the  state  is  not  required  to 
prove  a  motive  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  in  order  to  convict, 
and  the  jury  would  be  justified  in  inferring  a  motive  from  the 
commission  of  the  crime  itself,  if  the  commission  of  the  crime  by 
the  defendant  is  proved  beyond  every  reasonable  doubt,  as  re- 
quired by  law,  and  you  find  that  the  defendant,  at  the  time  of 
the  commission  of  said  act  was  sane,  and  there  were  no  extenuat- 
ing circumstances.32 

(2)  If  the  evidence  fails  to  show  any  motive  on  the  part  of  the 
accused  to  commit  the  crime  charged,  this  is  a  circumstance  in 
favor  of  his  innocence  which  the  jury  ought  to  consider,  together 
with  all  the  other  facts  and  circumstances,  in  making  up  their 
verdict.33 

(3)  The  absence  of  all  evidence  of  an  inducing  cause  or  mo- 
tive to  commit  the  crime,  when  the  fact  is  in  reasonable  doubt  as 
to  who  committed  it,  affords  a  strong  presumption  of  innocence.3* 

§  782.  The  killing  being  proved,  presumed  murder. — (1)  The 
killing  being  proved  to  have  been  done  by  the  defendant,  the  bur- 
den of  proving  circumstances  of  mitigation  that  justify  or  excuse 
the  homicide  shall  devolve  on  the  accused,  unless  by  proof  on  the 
part  of  the  prosecution  it  is  sufficiently  manifest  that  the  offense 
committed  only  amounted  to  manslaughter,  or  that  the  accused 
was  justified  or  excused  in  committing  the  homicide.35 

(2)  If  the  killing  of  the  person  mentioned  in  the  indictment 
has  been  satisfactorily  shown  by  the  evidence,  beyond  all  rea- 
sonable doubt,  to  have  been  the  act  of  the  defendant,  then  the 
law  presumes  it  to  have  been  murder,  provided  the  jury  further 

si  S.  v.  McPherson,  114  Iowa,  492,  34  Vaughan  v.  Com.  85  Va.  672,  8 

87  N.  W.  422.  S.  E.   584. 

32  Wheeler  v.   S.  158  Ind.  700,  63  ss  Allen  v.  S.  70  Ark.  337,  68  S.  W. 
N.    E.    975.     Insanity   was   the   de-  28.      (Held   not   assuming  that   the 
fense  in  this   case.  defendant  did  the  killing.) 

33  Clough  v.  S.   7  Neb.  344. 


§    783  MURDER    AND    MANSLAUGHTER.  804 

believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  no 
circumstances  existed  excusing  or  justifying  the  act,  or  mitigat- 
ing it  so  as  to  make  it  manslaughter.36 

(3)  The  law  presumes  a  sober  man  intends  to  do  what  he 
actually  does,  but  the  law  does  not  presume  a  killing  was  done 
with  premeditated  design.  This,  like  every  other  element  of 
murder  in  the  first  degree,  is  to  be  inferred  by  the  jury  from  the 
facts  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.37 

§783.  Doubt  as  to  degree  of  homicide. — (1)  If  the  jury  have  a 
reasonable  doubt  growing  out  of  the  evidence  as  to  whether  the 
killing  was  done  deliberately,  or  as  to  whether  it  was  done  pre- 
meditatedly,  then  they  cannot  find  the  defendant  guilty  of  murder 
in  the  first  degree ;  and  if  they  have  a  reasonable  doubt  growing 
out  of  the  evidence  as  to  whether  the  killing  was  done  out  of  mal- 
ice, they  cannot  find  the  defendant  guilty  of  murder  in  either  de- 
gree, but  only  of  manslaughter,  if  guilty  at  all ;  and  if,  after  con- 
sidering all  the  evidence,  the  jury  have  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to 
the  defendant's  guilt  of  manslaughter,  arising  out  of  any  part  of 
the  evidence,  then  they  should  find  the  defendant  not  guilty.38 

(2)  If  the  jury  have  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  whether  the  killing 
was  done  deliberately,  or  as  to  whether  it  was  done  premedita- 
tively,  then  they  cannot  find  the  defendant  guilty  of  murder  in 
the  first  degree ;  and  if  they  have  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  whether 
the  killing  was  done  in  malice,  then  they  cannot  find  the  defend- 
ant guilty  of  murder  in  either  degree,  but  only  of  manslaughter 
at  most ;  and  if,  after  considering  all  the  evidence,  the  jury  have 
a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  defendant's  guilt  of  manslaughter, 
arising  out  of  all  the  evidence,  then  they  should  find  him  not 
guilty  of  any  offense.39 

§  784.  Killing  while  lying  in  wait  murder. — Although  the 
jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  deceased  and 
Tennie  Hicks  were  criminally  intimate,  this  would  not  in  law 
justify  or  excuse  the  defendant  in  lying  in  wait  to  shoot  and  kill 

ae  Upstone  v.  P.  109  111.  175.  Held  ss  Hunt  v.   S.   135   Ala.   1,   33   So. 

not  ignoring  the  defense  of  insan-  329;   Compton  v.  S.  110  Ala.  24,  20 

ity.    Jackson  v.  P.  18  111.  270.    See  So.   119:    Stoneking  v.   S.   118   Ala. 

Dorsey  v.   S.  110  Ga.   331,   35  S.   E.  70,   24    So.    47. 

651.  39  Adams    v.    S.    133    Ala.    166,    31 

ST  Cook  v.  S.  (Fla.),  35  So.  669.  So.   852. 


805  BURGLAR KILLING  OFFICER.  §    787 

the  deceased,  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  he  did  so  lie  in 
wait.  So,  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant followed  the  deceased,  and  shot  him  from  ambush,  feloniously, 
premeditated,  and  with  his  malice  aforethought,  as  the  terms  are 
in  these  instructions  denned,  then  the  criminal  relation  between 
the  deceased  and  the  said  Tennie  Hicks,  if  it  did  exist,  and  if  it 
were  known  to  the  defendant,  does  not  reduce  the  killing  below 
murder  in  the  second  degree,  and  affords  no  justification  or  miti- 
gation for  the  shooting  if  done  under  such  circumstances.41 

§  785.  Killing  by  one  of  several  burglars. — If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  homicide  charged  in  the  indictment 
was  committed  by  one  of  several  burglars  while  engaged  in  se- 
creting or  disposing  of  property  which  said  burglars  had  pre- 
viously stolen,  and  that  the  killing  was  done  to  prevent  the  dis- 
covery and  seizure  of  said  property  by  the  person  killed,  then,  un- 
less the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  all  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  defendant  was  present  at  the  homicide,  or  suffi- 
ciently near  to  render  aid  and  assistance  to  the  perpetrator,  and 
actually  did  aid,  abet,  or  encourage  the  person  who  committed 
the  homicide,  or  unless  the  jury  shall  find  that  the  defendant,  be- 
fore the  homicide,  counseled  or  advised  the  persons  in  charge  of 
the  said  goods  to  oppose  and  resist  whosoever  should  attempt  to 
seize  said  goods,  or  interrupt  them  in  secreting  them  or  disposing 
of  said  goods,  and  that  the  killing  of  the  deceased  occurred  in  the 
course  of  such  resistance  as  the  defendant  had  so  counseled  and 
advised,  then  they  ought  to  acquit  the  defendant.42 

§  786.  Killing  person  not  intended. — It  is  not  necessary  that, 
when  a  purpose  to  take  life  is  formed,  the  particular  party  who  is 
killed  shall  be  present  to  the  mind  of  the  party  accused.  It  is 
sufficient  if  the  purpose  was  formed  to  kill  any  one  coming  along 
who  presented  the  opportunity  and  inducements  to  the  crime.43 

§  787.  Officer  killing  while  arresting.  — If  the  defendant  was  a 
policeman  of  the  town,  as  he  insists  he  was,  the  law  clothed  him 
with  the  same  authority  to  make  arrests  within  the  town  as  is 
vested  in  the  sheriff,  and  if  he  could  have  kept  Brooks  in  custody. 

«  S.  v.  Hicks  (Mo.),  77  S.  W.  541.          43  g.  v.  Dickson,   6  Kas.  213. 
42  Lamb  v.  P.  96  111.  73,  81. 


§    788  MURDER    AND    MANSLAUGHTER.  806 

and  prevented  the  deceased  from  rescuing  him  without  striking, 
it  was  his  duty  to  have  done  so.  Were  there  bystanders?  If  so, 
he' had  authority  to  call  them  to  his  aid,  and  if  by  doing  so  he 
could  have  avoided  striking  the  deceased,  he  should  have  done  so, 
and,  if  he  failed  to  do  so,  he  was  not  justified  in  striking  the  de- 
ceased, and  it  will  be  your  duty  to  return  a  verdict  of  guilty ;  but 
if  the  situation  was  such  that  he  could  not  reasonably  and  con- 
veniently procure  assistance,  then  he  had  a  right  to  use  such  force 
as  was  necessary  under  the  circumstances  to  secure  Brooks,  and 
if,  in  the  due  exercise  of  that  right,  he  struck  the  deceased,  he  was 
justified.44 

§788.  Killing  officer  while  arresting. — Constables  are  peace 
officers,  and  it  is  their  right  and  duty  to  arrest  with  or  without  a 
warrant  any  person  who  has  committed  any  criminal  offense  in 
their  presence,  or  who  is  at  the  time  engaged  in  or  about  to  com- 
mit any  breach  of  the  peace ;  and  they  have  the  right,  in  making 
such  arrest,  to  use  such  force  as  is  necessary  therefor,  and  sum- 
mon to  their  aid  a  posse  sufficient  to  accomplish  such  arrest.  A 
breach  of  the  peace  is  a  public  offense,  and  it  may  be  committed 
by  any  loud  or  boisterous  words  calculated  to  disturb  the  good 
order  of  the  persons  there  assembled,  or  by  the  drawing  or  bran- 
dishing of  deadly  weapons,  accompanied  by  threats  to  attack  or 
kill  another  then  and  there  present.45 

§  789.  Arresting  without  a  warrant,  justifiable. — If  the  per- 
son arrested  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  act  of  committing  such 
offense  at  the  time  of  the  arrest,  and  the  officer  making  the  ar- 
rest has  information  or  knowledge  which  induces  him  to  reason* 
ably  believe,  and  at  the  time  of  the  arrest  he  does  believe,  that 
such  offense  is  being  committed,  and  the  arrest  is  made  for  that 
reason,  it  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  arrest  without  a  warrant.46 

§  790.  Degree  of  proof  to  warrant  conviction. — To  warrant  a 
conviction  the  state  is  required  to  prove,  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  defendant  feloniously  killed  the  deceased  at  the 

44  S.    v.    Bland,    97    N.    Car.    441,      homicide  in  killing  an  officer  while 
2  S.  E.  460.  attempting  to   make  an   arrest  for 

45  Fleetwood    v.    Com.    80    Ky.    1.      a  breach  of  the  peace.) 

(See  this  case  for  a  series  of  in-  *c  Ballard  v.  S.  43  Ohio  St.  340, 
structions  relating  to  the  law  of  1  N.  E.  76. 


807  WOUND   NEGLECTED MERE   PRESENCE.  §    792 

time  and  place  and  in  the  manner  and  form  as  alleged  in  the  in- 
dictment. It  is  not  sufficient  to  envelope  the  death  of  the  de- 
ceased in  mystery,  rendering  it  incapable  of  explanation,  without 
inferring  the  guilt  of  the  defendant.  To  warrant  a  conviction  the 
state  is  required  to  explain  all  mystery  sufficiently  to  remove  all 
reasonable  doubt  and  establish  facts  that  are  susceptible  of  ex- 
planation upon  no  reasonable  hypothesis  consistent  with  the  de- 
fendant's innocence,  and  that  point  to  his  guilt  beyond  any  other 
reasonable  solution  and  beyond  all  reasonable  'doubt.47 

§  791.  Wound  neglected,  causing  blood  poisoning. — If  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the 
defendant  cut  the  deceased  in  the  arm  with  a  knife  or  other  in- 
strument capable  of  inflicting  a  similar  wound,  as  charged  in  the 
indictment,  it  is  no  excuse  to  say  that  the  deceased  would  not 
have  died  if  he  had  taken  proper  care  of  himself,  or  that  neglect, 
or  the  want  of  proper  applications  to  the  wound  had  brought  on 
blood-poisoning,  and  of  that  he  died,  provided  you  believe  from 
the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  wound  was  the 
primary  or  principal  cause  of  his  death.48 

§  792.  Mere  presence  of  accused  is  not  aiding. — (1)  In  the  ab- 
sence of  a  conspiracy,  one  who  is  present  when  a  homicide  is  com- 
mitted by  another  upon  a  sudden  quarrel,  or  in  the  heat  of  pas- 
sion, is  not  guilty  of  aiding  and  abetting  the  homicide,  although 
he  may  have  become  involved  in  an.  independent  fight  with 
others  of  the  party  of  the  deceased,  unless  he  does  some  overt  act 
with  a  view  to  produce  that  result,  or  purposely  incites  or  en- 
courages the  principal  to  do  the  act;  and  so  in  this  case,  if  you 
find  the  defendant  on  trial,  although  present  at  the  time  of  the 
shooting,  knew  nothing  of  his  son  H  having  a  revolver  or  in- 
tending to  shoot,  and  took  no  part  in  the  killing,  and  did  no  overt 
act  to  produce  that  result,  then  he  is  in  no  way  responsible,  and 
must  be  acquitted,  unless  you  find  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt,  the  shot  was  fired  by  H  in  pursuance  of  a  con- 
spiracy previously  formed  by  them.49 

(2)  The  mere  presence  of  the  defendant  at  the  time  and  during 

47  Hinshaw  v.  S.  147  Ind.  386,  47          49  Woolweaver  v.   S.   50  Ohio  St. 

N.  E.   157.  287,  34  N.  B.  352.     See  Worden  v. 

*8  Duncan  v.  P.  134  111.  119,  24  N.  S.  24  Ohio  St.  143. 
E.   765. 


§    793  MURDER    AND    MANSLAUGHTER.  808 

the  act  of  killing  would  not  of  itself  be  sufficient  to  constitute  him 
an  aider  and  abetter  in  the  commission  of  the  act  charged ;  but  it 
is  not  essential,  in  order  to  constitute  him  such  aider  and  abetter. 
that  he  should  himself  have  fired  the  fatal  shot.  It  is  sufficient 
if,  at  the  time  of  the  killing,  he  was  present,  consenting  to  and 
encouraging  the  act,  and  ready,  if  need  be,  to  give  assistance  to 
the  one  who  did  the  killing.50 

(3)  It  is  not  sufficient  to  establish  the  guilt  of  the  defendant  of 
aiding  and  abetting  H  in  the  commission  of  the  homicide  charged 
in  the  indictment  that  he  was  present  on  the  scene  with  the  others 
where  the  alleged  killing  was  done,  for  he  may  have  been  present 
not  knowing  that  any  crime  was  about  to  be  committed;  and  if 
he  was  not  there  in  furtherance  of  an  understanding  or  common 
purpose  to  commit  some  unlawful  act,  and  was  in  company  with 
H  without  knowledge  that  H  or  any  of  his  co-defendants  con- 
templated the  commission  of  an  offense,  he  is  not  responsible  for 
the  acts  of  H  or  his  co-defendants,  if  he,  the  defendant,  did  not 
actually  participate  in  the  commission  of  the  crime  charged.51 

(4)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  H  named  as  principal  in 
the  indictment,  took  the  life  of  the  deceased,  but  did  it  in  a  sudden 
quarrel  or  in  the  heat  of  passion,  his  offense  would  be  man- 
slaughter ;  and  if  you  further  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  de- 
fendant did  no  overt  act,  and  took  no  part  in  the  killing,  but  was 
merely  present  when  the  quarrel  arose  or  fight  began,  you  cannot 
in  such  case  find  him  guilty  as  an  aider  and  abetter  of  the 
said  H.52 

§  793.  Inquest  proceedings  not  evidence. — The  court  further 
instructs  you  that  what  any  witness  or  witnesses  may  have  testi- 
fied to  before  the  grand  jury,  or  at  the  coroner's  inquest,  is  no 
evidence  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant.53 

§  794.  Manslaughter  defined,  and  illustrative  cases. — (1)  Man- 
slaughter is  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human  being  without  mal- 
ice, expressed  or  implied,  either  voluntarily,  upon  a  sudden  heat 

BO  Kelly  v.  S.  (Fla.)  33  So.  235.  ™  Rjtter   v.    P.    130   111.    255,    260, 

^  Goins    v.    S.    46    Ohio    St.    467,      22   N.  E.   605;    Purdy  v.  P.   140   111. 

21  N.  E.  476.  46,  52,  29  N.  E.  700. 

52  Goins  v.  S.  46  Ohio  St.  471,  21 

N.   E.    476. 


809  MANSLAUGHTER    DEFINED.  §    794 

or  involuntarily,  but  in  the  commission  of  some  unlawful  act. 
And  if  you  find  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
that  the  defendant  did  the  killing  unlawfully  and  voluntarily,  but 
in  a  sudden  heat  or  transport  of  passion,  or  involuntarily,  in  the 
commission  of  an  unlawful  act,  and  without  malice,  express  or 
implied,  then  the  offense  would  be  manslaughter,  and  you  should 
so  find  him  guilty.54 

(2)  In  general,  where  an  involuntary  killing  happens  in  conse- 
quence of  an  unlawful  act,  it  will  be  either  murder  or  man- 
slaughter, according  to  the  nature  of  the  act  which  occasions  it. 
If  it  be  in  the  prosecution  of  a  felonious  intent,  or  in  consequence 
of  an  act  naturally  tending  to  bloodshed,  it  will  be  murder.    But, 
if  no  more  is  intended  than  a  mere  civil  trespass,  it  will  be  man- 
slaughter.55 

(3)  If  you  are  convinced  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  by  the 
evidence  that  the  defendant  unlawfully  committed  an  assault  and 
battery  upon  the  person  of  C  on  the  sixteenth  day  of  August, 
1884,  without  any  intention  or  purpose  to  kill  him,  the  said  C, 
but  thereby  inflicted  a  wound  upon  his  person  by  reason  of  which 
fhe  said  C  died  on  the  twenty-fourth  of  August,  1884,  then  the 
defendant  is  guilty  of  involuntary  manslaughter.     Assault  and 
battery,  as  used  in  this  instruction,  means  any  unlawful  touch- 
ing, striking,  biting,  beating,  or  wounding  of  another  in  a  rude, 
insolent  and  angry  manner.66 

5*  Powers  v.  S.  87  Ind.  154.  se  s.   v.   Johnson,   102   Ind.   247,  1 

55  s.  v.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa,  495.  N.  E.   377. 


CHAPTER  LVII. 

HOMICIDE— SELF-DEFENSE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

795.  Justifiable  homicide  defined —      801.    Mere  previous  threats. 

Illustrations.  802.     Danger  need  not  be  real. 

796.  Cases  illustrating  self-defense.      803.    Reasonable    doubt    of    appre- 

797.  Defendant  at  fault  in  provok-  hension. 

ing  difficulty.  804.  Resisting    attack     of     several 

798.  Declining  further  struggle.  persons. 

799.  Bare  fear  no  justification.  805.  Resisting  unlawful   arrest. 

800.  Mere  belief  of  danger  no  de-  806.  Accidental   killing  no  offense. 

fense.  807.     Character  of   deceased   proper 

matter. 

§  795.  Justifiable  homicide  defined — Illustrations. — (1)  Justifi- 
able homicide  is  the  killing  of  a  human  being  in  necessary  self-de- 
fense, or  in  the  defense  of  habitation,  person  or  property,  against 
one  who  manifestly  intends  or  endeavors  by  violence  or  sur- 
prise to  commit  a  known  felony.  A  bare  fear  of  the  offense 
to  prevent  which  the  homicide  is  alleged  to  have  been  com- 
mitted shall  not  be  sufficient  to  justify  the  killing.  It  must  ap- 
pear that  the  circumstances  were  sufficient  to  excite  the  fears 
of  a  reasonable  person,  and  that  the  party  killing  really  acted 
under  their  influence,  and  not  in  a  spirit  of  revenge.1 

(2)  A  person  may  repel  force  by  force  in  defense  of  his  person, 
habitation  or  property  against  one  who  manifestly  intends  or 
endeavors  by  violence  or  surprise  to  commit  a  known  felony 

i  Blair  v.  S.  69  Ark.  E.58,  64  S.  "W.      was  raised  but  not  decided  by  the 
948.      The   objection    that    this    in-      court, 
struction  sets  up   an   ideal   person 

810 


SELF-DEFENSE    DEFINED.  §    79 G 

on  either ;  and  if  a  conflict  ensue  in  such  case,  and  life  is  taken, 
the  killing  is  justifiable.  It  must  be  proved  that  the  assault 
was  eminently  perilous,  and  unless  there  is  a  plain  manifesta- 
tion of  a  felonious  intent,  no  assault  will  justify  the  killing  of 
the  assailant.  A  person  is  not  compelled  to  flee  from  his  ad- 
versary who  assails  him  with  a  'deadly  weapon ;  but  before  he 
can  justify  the  homicide,  the  assault  must  be  so  fierce  as  not 
to  allow  the  person  assailed  to  yield  without  manifest  danger 
to  his  life  or  of  receiving  enormous  bodily  injury.  In  such 
case,  if  there  be  no  other  way  of  saving  his  own  life,  or  of 
preventing  enormous  bodily  injury,  he  may,  in  self-defense,  kill 
his  assailant.2 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that,  just'prior  to  his 
death,  the  deceased  attempted,  in  a  violent  manner,  to  enter 
the  dwelling  of  the  defendant  for  the  purpose  of  assaulting  or 
offering  personal  violence  to  the  defendant,  being  in  said  dwell- 
ing or  any  other  person  dwelling  or  being  therein,  and  that 
the  defendant,  in  reasonably  resisting  such  attempt  of  the  de- 
ceased, unintentionally  and  without  malice  killed  the  deceased, 
then  the  killing  was  justifiable  or  excusable,  and  the  jury  ought 
to  acquit  the  defendant.  The  jury,  in  considering  whether  the 
killing  was  in  defense  of  habitation,  should  consider  the 
circumstances  attending  the  killing  and  the  conduct  of  the  par- 
ties at  the  time,  and  immediately  previous  thereto,  and  the 
means  and  force  used  as  bearing  upon  the  question  of  whether 
the  killing  was  in  defense  of  habitation.3 

§  796.  Cases  illustrating  self-defense.— (1)  If  the  defendant 
went  to  the  house  of  L  for  the  purpose  of  ministering  to  his  wants 
as  an  invalid,  and  having  no  ill  will  or  quarrel  with  B,  and 
said  B  requested  the  defendant  to  go  out  of  the  house  with 
him,  and  they  went  out  together  at  B's  request,  and  when 
outside,  B.  threatened  to  assault  and  beat  the  defendant,  and 
without  cause  did  assault  and  strike  the  defendant  violently 
and  in  anger,  and  if  the  defendant  at  the  time  believed  and 
had  reason  to  believe  that  said  B  was  about  to  and  would 
do  him  great  bodily  harm,  then  the  defendant  had  a  right  to 

2  S.    v.    Kennedy,    20    Iowa,    571.         s  Greschia  v.  P.  53  111.  299. 


§    797  SELF-DEFENSE.  812 

defend  himself  with  his  pocket  knife  if  necessary ;  and  if  in 
the  reasonable  defense  of  his  own  person  the  defendant  in- 
flicted wounds  upon  the  said  B,  of  which  he  died,  then  the 
defendant  is  not  guilty,  and  he  should  be  acquitted  upon  the 
ground  of  self-defense.4 

(2)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant, 
Reins,   in  defense   of  himself,   inflicted  upon  the   deceased  thb 
wounds  or  stabs  which   caused  his   death,   while  the   deceased 
was   manifestly   intending   and   endeavoring  in   a   violent   man- 
ner to  enter  the  habitation  of  the  witness,  Mrs.  Poley,  for  the 
purpose  of  assaulting  or  offering  personal  violence  to  the  de- 
fendant,  Reins,   being  therein,   the   killing  was  justifiable,   and 
the  jury  must  acquit  the  defendant.5 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  deceased  first 
assaulted  the   defendant  without   any  reasonable   or  justifiable 
cause,  and  that  at  the  door  of  Mrs.  Foley's  shanty  the  defendant 
tried  and  endeavored,  in  good  faith,  to  escape  from  the  deceased 
and  prevent  his  entry  therein  and  did  not  seek  to  renew  the 
fight,  and  that  the  defendant  was  in  fear  of  his  life,  or  of  great 
bodily  harm  from  the  deceased,  and  that  from  all  the  surround- 
ing circumstances  he  had  reasonable  grounds  for  such  fears,  they 
should  acquit  the  defendant.0 

(4)  If  the  jury  believe  that  G  and  the  deceased,  acting  in  con- 
cert  and   with   the    intention   of   inflicting    great   bodily    harm 
upon  the  defendant,  attacked  him  with  clubs,  then  the  defend- 
ant had  the  right  to  resist  such  attack  with  a  weapon  of  like 
character,  and  if,  in  the  necessary  defense  of  his  own  person 
and  without  using  any  more  force  or  a  more  dangerous  weapon 
than  the  one  used  against  him,  if  any,  he  inflicted  a  blow  which 
he  had  reason  to  believe,  and  in  good  faith  did  believe,  was 
necessary  for  his  own  protection,  but  which,  unintentionally  upon 
his  part,  produced  the  death  of  his  assailant,  such  act  would 
not  be  criminal,  and  the  jury  should  acquit  the  defendant.7 

§  797.     Defendant  at  fault  in  provoking  difficulty.— (1)  The  de- 
fendant cannot  avail  himself  of  the  doctrine  of  necessary  self- 

*  Fields  v.  S.  134  Ind.  55,  32  N.  5  Reins  v.  P.  30  111.  256,  262. 
E.  780.  See  Trogdon  v.  S.  133  Ind.  o  Reins  v.  P.  30  111.  257,  263 
7,  3?.  N.  E.  725.  ?  3.  v.  Burke,  30  Iowa,  333. 


813  DEFENDANT    PROVOKING    DIFFICULTY.  §    797 

defense,  if  the  necessity  of  that  defense  was  brought  on  by 
himself,  or  provoked  by  his  own  deliberate  and  lawless  acts, 
or  by  beginning  the  fight  with  the  deceased  for  the  purpose 
of  taking  his  life  or  committing  a  bodily  harm  upon  him  in 
which  he  killed  the  deceased  by  the  use  of  a  deadly  weapon, 
unless  the  defendant  had  really,  and  in  good  faith,  endeav- 
ored to  decline  any  further  struggle  before  the  shot  was  fired.8 

(2)  If  you  shall  believe  and  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  de- 
fendant sought,  brought  on  or  voluntarily  entered  into  a  diffi- 
culty with  the  deceased  for  the  purpose  of  wreaking  vengeance 
upon  him,  or  if  you  shall  find  and  believe  that  he  wounded 
the  deceased  at  a  time  when  he  had,  because  of  the  acts  of 
the  deceased,  no  reasonable  apprehension  of  immediate  and  im- 
pending injury  to  himself,  and  did  so  from  a  spirit  of  retalia- 
tion  and   revenge   for  the   purpose    of   punishing  the    deceased 
for  past  injuries  done  him,  the  defendant,  then  the  defendant 
cannot  avail  himself  of  the  law  of  self-defense,  and  you  should 
not  acquit  him  on  that  ground — no  matter  how  great  the  dan- 
ger or  imminent  the  peril  to  which  the   defendant  may  have 
believed  himself  to  have  been  exposed  during  such  difficulty.9 

(3)  The  law  of  self-defense  does  not  imply  the  right  to  attack. 
If  you   believe   from   the    evidence   that   the   defendant    armed 
himself  with  a  deadly  weapon,  and  sought  the  deceased  with 
the  felonious  intent  of  killing  him,  and  sought  or  brought  on, 
or  voluntarily  entered  into  a  difficulty  with  the  deceased  with 
the   felonious   intention   to    kill   him,   then   the   defendant   can- 
not invoke  the   law   of  self-defense,   no   matter   how   imminent 
the  peril  in  which  he  found  himself  placed.10 

(4)  The  right  of  self-defense  is  allowed  to  the  citizen  as  a  shield, 
and  not  as  a  sword,  and  in  the  exercise  of  this  right  a  person 
must  act  honestly  and  in  good  faith.     A  person  when  assaulted 
may  exercise  a  reasonable  degree  of  force  to  repel  an  attack,  but 
must  not  provoke  an  attack  in  order  that  he  may  have  an  ap- 
parent excuse  for  killing  his  adversary.11 

s  Belt  v.  P.  97  111.  461,  473.    H§ld  103.    v.    Hicks    (Mo.),    77    S.    W. 

not  assuming  facts  and  not  objec-  540. 

tionable    in    not    referring    to    the  n  Harmon   v.    S.   158   Ind.   43,   62 

evidence.  N.  E.  630. 

a  S.  v.  Vansant,  80  Mo.  69. 


§    798  SELF-DEFENSE.  814 

§798.  Declining  further  struggle.— (1)  Before  the  defendant 
can  avail  himself  of  the  right  of  self-defense  it  must  appear  that 
at  the  time  of  the  killing  the  danger  was  so  urgent  and  pressing 
that,  in  order  to  save  his  own  life,  or  to  prevent  his  receiving 
great  bodily  harm,  the  killing  of  the  deceased  was  absolutely 
necessary,  or  apparently  necessary;  and  it  must  also  appear 
that  the  deceased  was  the  first  assailant,  or  that  the  defend- 
ant had  in  good  faith  endeavored  to.  decline  any  further  strug- 
gle before  the  mortal  shot  was  fired.12 

(2)  Before  the  defendant  can  claim  that  he  was  acting  in  self- 
defense  it  must  appear  that  he  really,  and  in  good  faith,  endeav- 
ored to  decline  any  further  struggle  before  the  homicide  was  com- 
mitted. And  in  this  case,  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
defendant  was  engaged  in  mortal  combat  with  D,  the  deceased,  and 
that  the  defendant  did  not  really  and  in  good  faith  endeavor  to 
decline  any  further  struggle  before  the  homicide  was  commit- 
ted, if  one  was  committed,  then  and  in  such  case  the  defendant 
cannot  avail  himself  of  the  plea  of  self-defense.13 

§  799.  Bare  fear  no  justification. — The  bare  fear  that  a  man 
intends  to  commit  murder  or  other  atrocious  felony,  however 
well  grounded,  unaccompanied  by  any  overt  act  indicative  of 
any  such  intention,  will  not  warrant  killing  the  person  by  way 
of  prevention.  There  must  be  some  overt  act  indicative  of  im- 
minent danger  at  the  time,  but  the  jury  will  judge  whether 
the  conduct  and  acts  of  the  deceased,  B,  at  the  time  of  the 
shooting  were  of  such  a  character  as  to  create  in  the  mind 
of  the  accused  a  reasonable  fear  that  the  deceased  intended 
to  commit  murder  or  other  felony,  or  to  do  the  accused  great 
bodily  harm.  Apprehension  of  danger,  to  justify  a  homicide, 
ought  not  to  be  based  on  surmises  alone,  but  there  ought  to 
be  coupled  therewith  some  act  or  demonstration  on  the  part 
of  the  person  from  whom  danger  is  or  was  apprehended,  evinc- 
ing an  immediate  intention  to  carry  into  execution  his  threats 
or  designs;  and  the  jury  are  to  judge  of  the  reasonable  grounds 
for  such  apprehension  on  the  part  -of  the  accused  from  all  the 

'    12  Henry    v.    P.    198    111.    162,    65         is  P.    v.    Robertson,    67    Cal.    649, 
N.  E.  120.  8  Pac.   600. 


815  FEAR,    BELIEF,    THREATS.  §    801 

facts  and  circumstances  as  they  existed  at  the  time  of  the  kill- 
ing.14 

§  800.  Mere  belief  of  danger  no  defense. — It  is  not  enough 
that  the  party  killing  another  believe  himself  in  danger  from 
the  person  killed,  unless  the  facts  were  such  that  the  jury, 
in  the  light  of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  known  to  the 
slayer,  or  believed  by  him  to  be  true,  can  say  he  had  reason- 
able ground  for  such  belief.15 

§  801.  Mere  previous  threats. — Previous  threats  or  acts  of 
hostility  of  the  deceased  towards  the  defendant,  however  vio- 
lent they  may  have  been,  were  not  of  themselves  sufficient  to 
justify  the  defendant  in  seeking  and  slaying  the  deceased.  To 
excuse  him  or  justify  him,  he  must  have  acted  under  an  honest 
belief  that  it  was  necessary  at  the  time  to  take  the  life  of  the 
deceased  in  order  to  save  his  own,  and  it  must  appear  that 
there  was  reasonable  cause  to  excite  this  apprehension  on  his 
part;  so  that  if  you  find  that  the  deceased  at  the  time  he  was 
killed  did  nothing  to  excite  in  the  mind  of  the  defendant  the 
fear  that  the  deceased  was  about  to  execute  his  threats,  then 
the  threats  and  bad  character  of  the  deceased,  whatever  you 
may  find  them  to  have  been,  are  unavailing,  and  should  not 
be  considered  by  you.  But  if  the  evidence  leaves  you  in  doubt 
as  to  what  the  acts  of  the  deceased  were  at  the  time,  or  im- 
mediately after  the  killing,  you  may  consider  the  threats  and 
character  of  the  deceased,  in  connection  with  all  the  other  evi- 
dence, in  determining  who  was  probably  the  aggressor.  The 
jury  are  instructed  that  mere  threats  made  by  the  deceased 
before  or  at  the  time  of  the  killing,  unaccompanied  at  the  time 
of  the  killing  with  any  attempt  to  carry  them  into  execution, 
are  not  sufficient  to  justify  the  killing  or  to  reduce  it  to  a  lower 
degree  of  homicide  than  murder;  and  if  you  find  that  the  de- 
fendant shot  and  killed  the  deceased  because  of  such  threats, 
and  because  the  defendant  thought  such  threats  would  justify 
him  in  killing  the  deceased,  and  that  when  he  shot  and  killed 
him  he  was  in  no  fear  of  imminent  danger,  he  is  guilty  of 

"  s.  v.  Cain,  20  W.  Va.  710.  ™  Todd    v.    S.     (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 

44  S.  W.  1096. 


§    802  SELF-DEFENSE.  816 

murder.  And  if  the  killing  was  the  result  of  a  deliberate  pur- 
pose fixed  in  his  mind  to  kill,  it  was  murder  in  the  first  de- 
gree.10 

§802.  Danger  need  not  be  real,  appearance  sufficient. — (1)  It 
is  not  always  that  the  danger  should  be  real  in  order  that  a  per- 
son may  justify  on  the  ground  of  self-defense,  but  if  the  de- 
fendant, acting  as  a  reasonable  man,  had  reason  to  believe,  and 
did  believe,  that  his  life  was  in  danger,  or  that  he  was  in  dan- 
ger of  receiving  great  bodily  harm  at  the  hands  of  the  de- 
ceased, and,  acting  upon  such  belief,  took  the  life  of  the  de- 
ceased, such  act  would  be  justifiable,  although  it  might  after- 
wards appear  that  there  was  in  fact  no  real  danger.17 

(2)  The  important  questions  for  the  jury  to  determine  are :  first, 
was  the  defendant,  at  the  time  he  fired  the  fatal  shot,  in  present 
danger  of  death  or  serious  bodily  harm,   or  were  the  circum- 
stances such  as  to  afford  him  reasonable  grounds  for  believing 
himself  to  be  in  such  danger?     second,  was  'the  shooting  done 
in  good  faith  to  protect  himself  from  such  danger  or  threat- 
ened danger?     If  both  of  these  questions  can  be  answered  in 
the  affirmative  the  shooting  would  be  justifiable.     The  defend- 
ant,  under  the   law,   would   have   the   right   to   defend  himself 
from  the  appearances  of  danger  the  same  and  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  he  would  were  the  danger  real.     That  the  danger  ap- 
peared real  to  the  defendant  is  all  the  law  requires    to  justify 
him  in  acting;  and  in  passing  upon  the  question  as  to  the  de- 
fendant's right  to   act,   the  matter  must  be  viewed  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  defendant.18 

(3)  The  law  is,  that  if  a  person  is  assaulted  in  such  a  way  as 
to  produce  in  the  mind  of  a  reasonable  person  a  belief  that  he 
is  in  actual  danger  of  losing  his  life,  or  of  suffering  great  bodily 
harm,  he  will  be  justified   in  defending  himself,   although  the 
danger  be  not  real,  but  only  apparent.     Such  a  person  will  not 
be  held  responsible   criminally  if  he  acts  in  self-defense   from 
real  and  honest  convictions  as  to  the  character  of  the  danger, 
induced  by  reasonable  evidence,  although  he  may  be  mistaken 
as  to  the  extent  of  the  actual  danger.19 

i«  Mize  v.   S.   36  AFK.  662.  "Francis  v.   S.    (Tex.   Cr.   App.), 

IT  S.  v.  Miller  (Ore.),  77  Pac.  660.      70  S.  W.  75. 

i»  Crews  v.  P.  120  111.  317,  11  N. 
E.    404. 


817  APPEARANCE    OF    DANGER.  §    802 

(4)  The  law  is,  if  a  person  is  assaulted  in  such  a  way  as  to  pro- 
duce in  the  mind  of  a  reasonable  person  a  belief,  and  if  he  does 
honestly  believe,  that  he  is  in  actual  danger  of  losing  his  life  or  of 
suffering  great  bodily  harm,  he  will  be  justified  in  defending  him- 
self, although  the  danger  be  not  real,  but  only  apparent.  Such  a 
person  will  not  he  held  responsible  criminally  if  lie  acts  in  self-de- 
fense, from  real  and  honest  convictions,  as  to  the  character  of  the 
danger,  induced  by  reasonable  evidence,  although  he  may  have 
been  mistaken  as  to  the  extent  of  the  actual  danger.20 
.  (5)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  de- 
fendants, or  either  of  them,  was  assaulted  by  the  deceased  in 
such  a  way  as  to  induce  in  such  defendant  a  reasonable  and 
well-founded  belief  that  he  was  actually  in  danger  of  losing 
his  life  or  of  suffering  great  bodily  harm,  then  he  was  justified 
in  defending  himself,  whether  the  danger  was  real  or  only  ap- 
parent. Actual  or  positive  danger  is  not  indispensable  to  justify 
self-defense.  The  law  considers  that  men,  when  threatened  with 
danger,  are  obliged  to  judge  from  appearances,  and  determine 
therefrom  as  to  the  actual  state  of  things  surrounding  them; 
and  in  such  case,  if  persons  act  from  honest  convictions,  in- 
duced by  reasonable  evidence,  they  will  not  be  held  responsi- 
ble criminally  for  a  mistake  as  to  the  extent  of  the  actual  dan- 
ger.21 

(6)  One  who  is  without  fault  and  in  a  place  where  he  has  a 
right  to  be  and    is  then  unlawfully    assaulted,  he    may,  with- 
out retreating,  repel  force  with  force,  and  may  go  even  to  the 
extent  of  taking  the  life  of  his  assailant,  if  in  repelling  him 
he  uses  no  more  force  than  is  reasonably  necessary  in  his  own 
self-defense.22 

(7)  If  a  person  assaulted,  being  himself  without  fault,  reason- 
ably apprehends   death   or  great   bodily  harm,  unless  he   kills 
his  assailant,  the  killing  is  excusable;  and  if  you  believe  that 
the  defendant  was  assaulted  by  the  deceased  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  cause  him  to  believe,  and  he  did  believe,  that  he  was  in 

20  McDonnall    v.    P.    168  111.    93,      N.    E.    745.      See    Fields    v.    S.    134 
48  N.  E.  86.  Ind.   55,   32   N.   E.   780;    Trogdon  v. 

21  McDonnall    v.    P.    168  111.    93.       S.   133   Ind.   7,   32   N.   E.   725;    S.  v. 
48   N.   E.   86.  Kennedy,  20   Iowa,  571. 

22  page    v.    S.    141    Ind.  237,    40 


§    803  SELF-DEFENSE.  818 

imminent  clanger  of  losing  his  life  or  suffering  great  bodily  harm 
at  the  hands  of  the  deceased  unless  he  kills  him,  and  while  so  be- 
lieving he  killed  the  deceased,  he  is  entitled  to  an  acquittal.23 

(8)  The  necessity  which  in  law  permits  the  taking  of  life  in 
self-defense  may  be  either  apparent  or  real.    It  is  real  when  there 
is  actual  danger  to  life  or  of  great  bodily  harm;  it  is  apparent 
when  the  circumstances,  at  the  time  of  the  taking  of  life,  in- 
dicate to  a  reasonable  mind  the  presence  of  actual  danger  to 
life  or  great  bodily  harm,  though  in  fact  there  is  no  danger.2* 

(9)  Every  person  has  the  right  to  defend  himself  against  at- 
tacks, or  threatened  attacks,  of  such  a  character  as  would  endan- 
ger his  life  or  limb,  or  do  him  serious  bodily  harm  or  injury, 
even  to  the  taking  of  the  life  of  the  assailant;  and  where  a 
person  apprehends  that  another  is  about  to  do  him  great  bodily 
harm,  and  has  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  the  danger  to 
be   imminent,  he  may  safely   act  upon  such  apprehension   and 
even  kill  the  assailant,  if  that  be  necessary  to  avoid  the  appre- 
hended danger.25 

(10)  In  order  to  justify  homicide  on  the  ground  of  self-defense, 
or  defense  of  another,  it  is  not  essential  that  there  should  be 
any    actual    or    real    danger    to    the    life    or    person    of    the 
party  killing  or  to  the  life  or  person  of  the  party  for  whose 
protection  the  homicide  is  committed,   if  there   be   an   appear- 
ance  of  danger,   caused  by  the   acts  or   demonstrations   of  the 
person   killed,   or  by  words   coupled   with  the   acts   or   demon- 
strations  of  such  person ;   and   if  such   acts   or   demonstrations 
or  such  words,   coupled   with   acts   or   demonstrations,   produce 
in  the  mind  of  the  person  slaying  a  reasonable  expectation  or 
fear  of  death  or  some  serious  bodily  injury  to  himself  or  to  the 
person   in  whose   behalf  he   interferes,   the   person   killing   will 
be   justified   if  he   in   good   faith   acts   on   such   appearance   of 
danger   and   under   such   reasonable   expectation   or   fear,    even 
though    it   subsequently   appear   that   there   was   in    reality   no 
danger.26 

§803.    Reasonable    doubt    of    defendant's    apprehension. — If 

'23  Deilks    v.    S.    141    Ind.    25;    40         25  Marts    v.    S.    20    Ohio   St.    162. 
N.  E.  120.  26  Kemp  v.   S.   13  Tex.   565. 

24  Marts   v.    S.    20    Ohio    St.    162. 


819  RESISTING    ATTACK — UNLAWFUL    AR3EST.  §    805 

the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case  that  there  is  a* 
reasonable  doubt  as  to  whether  the  prisoner  at  the  time  of 
the  shooting  was  under  reasonable  apprehension  that  the  pros- 
ecuting witness  intended  to  inflict  upon  him  great  bodily  harm, 
and  that  he  fired  the  shots  in  self-defense,  then  the  jury  must 
acquit.27 

§  804.  Resisting  attack  of  several  persons. — (1)  If  the  defend- 
ant and  his  co-defendants  were  in  the  exercise  of  their  lawful 
rights  in  passing  along  the  streets  at  the  time  of  the  conflict  in 
which  H  was  killed,  and  neither  of  the  accused  parties  began  the 
affray  or  attack,  then  the  defendant  and  those  accused  with 
him  had  the  right  to  repel  the  assault  with  such  force  as  was 
necessary  to  do  so,  and  had  the  right  to  defend  themselves 
from  danger  to  life  or  great  bodily  harm;  and'  if  they  were 
suddenly  assailed  or  surrounded  by  superior  numbers  of  per- 
sons armed  with  weapons  dangerous  to  life  or  calculated  to 
do  great  bodily  harm,  the  defendants  had  a  right  to  stand  on 
their  defense,  to  repel  force  by  force,  even  to  the  taking  of 
life,  if  they  believed,  and  had  reasonable  grounds  to  believe, 
that  it  was  necessary  to  do  so  to  prevent  either  death  or  great 
bodily  harm  to  themselves,  and  if  necessary,  they  may  use  such 
weapons  as  will  accomplish  the  purpose.28 

(2)  If  the  only  purpose  made  known  to  the  defendant  prior  to 
the  killing  of  H,  and  the  only  one  contemplated  or  entered  upon 
by  him  was  the  defense  of  himself  and  companions  from  an  attack 
by  a  number  of  men  superior  in  numbers  and  strength  which  had 
been  threatened,  and  neither  the  defendant  nor  his  companions 
were  to  be  the  aggressors,  or  attack  the  opposing  parties,  then 
such  common  purpose  of  defense  merely  was  not  unlawful  or 
criminal.29 

§  805.  Resisting  unlawful  arrest. — If  an  officer  or  other  per- 
son who  attempts  to  prevent  another  from  committing  a  felony, 
uses  more  force  than  is  reasonably  necessary,  he  becomes  a  wrong- 
doer, and  the  person  sought  to  be  prevented  may  resist  such 
excess  of  force  by  force,  even  to  the  killing  of  the  wrong-doer, 

2T  Lawler  v.  P.  74  111.  230.  29  Goins  v.  S.  46  Ohio  St.  468,  21 

2s  Goins  v.  S.  46  Ohio  St.  469,  21      N.  E.  476. 
N.  E.  476. 


§    806  SELF-DEFENSE.  820 

if  necessary,  to  preserve  his  own  life  from  such  excessive  use 
of  force,  to  save  himself  from  great  bodily  harm.30 

§806.  Accidental  killing  no  offense. — If  you  find  from  the 
evidence  that  the  deceased  and  defendant  were  riding  the  same 
horse  along  the  road  mentioned,  the  defendant  having  a  pistol 
in  his  hand,  and  that  the  deceased  seized  hold  of  the  pistol 
in  the  hand  of  the  defendant  and  attempted  to  take  the  pistol 
from  the  defendant  by  force,  and  in  the  scuffle  which  ensued 
the  pistol  was  accidentally  discharged  and  produced  the  death 
of  the  deceased  by  accident,  and  without  the  fault  or  culpable 
negligence  of  the  defendant,  and  without  the  defendant  com- 
mencing or  bringing  on  the  difficulty  with  the  deceased,  you 
will  find  the  defendant  not  guilty.31 

§  807.  Character  of  deceased  proper  matter. — The  character 
of  the  deceased  is  a  proper  matter  for  your  consideration,  and 
you  should  give  it  such  weight  as  you  deem  proper,  under  the 
evidence,  in  determining  whether  or  not  he,  by  his  acts  at  the 
time  of  the  wounding,  gave  the  defendant  reasonable  cause  to, 
apprehend  such  danger  as  to  justify  his  acts  of  wounding  on 
the  ground  of  self-defense,  according  to  the  law  upon  that  sub- 
ject as  stated  in  these  instructions.  The  mere  fact,  however, 
that  the  deceased  was  a  man  of  bad  character,  if  you  believe 
from  the  evidence  he  was  of  such  character,  will  not  justify 
the  taking  of  his  life.32 

so  Bossit  v.   S.   53   Ind.   417.     See  also  Potter  v.  S.  162  Ind.  213,  70  N. 

also  Plummer  v.  S.  135  Ind.  308,  34  E.   129. 

N.  E.  568.  32  S.  v.  Vansant,  80  Mo.  70. 

si  S.  v.  Wisdom,  84  Mo.  190.    See 


CHAPTER  LVIIL 

BURGLARY  AND  LARCENY. 

Sec.  Sec. 

808.  Breaking  defined.  814.  Definition    and    essential    ele- 

809.  Intent,  how  shown.  ments. 

810.  Burglary  and  larceny  at  same  815.  Intent    an    essential   element. 

time.  816.    Possession    of    stolen  proper- 

811.  Aiding    and    abetting,    acting,  ty,  evidence. 

together.  817.    Property  found  and  appropri- 

812.  Possession   of   property   taken  ated. 

by   burglary.  818.    Taking  under  claim  of  right. 

813.  Submitting  facts  to  the  jury.      819.    Prosecution  confined  to  prop- 

erty alleged. 

Burglary. 

§  808.  Breaking  defined. — (1)  The  opening  of  a  closed  door 
with  the  intent  expressed  in  the  statute,  as  by  lifting  a  latch,  turn- 
ing a  key  in  a  lock,  pushing  open  a  closed  door,  or  by  pushing 
open  a  window,  or  in  any  other  way  using  any  force  to  enter, 
is  sufficient  to  constitute  a  breaking,  and  it  is  not  necessary 
to  show  in  evidence  that  any  lock  or  other  fastening  was  broken 
by  violence.1 

(2)  The  breaking  of  the  window  by  pulling  off  the  plank  and 
undoing  the  fastening  is  a  forcible  bursting  and  breaking  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute.2 

(3)  If  you  are  satisfied  from  the  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  as  to  all  the  other  elements  necessary  to  constitute  a  bur- 
glary, except  a  breaking,  and  find  that  the  transom  was  closed 

i  S.   v.   Reed,   20   Iowa,   421.     See         2  s.   v.   Butterfield,   75   Mo.   301. 
S.    v.    O'Brien,   81   Iowa,    95,   46   N. 
W.   861. 

821 


§    809  BURGLARY    AND    LARCENY.  .       822 

on  the  night  in  question,  though  not  fastened,  and  that  the  de- 
fendant used  sufficient  force  to  push  it  from  its  place,  so  that  it 
would  swing  open,  that  would  be  a  sufficient  breaking  in  law, 
and,  under  the  circumstances,  if  you  are  satisfied  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt,  your  verdict  should  be  guilty.3 

§  809.  Intent,  how  shown. — (1)  If  you  find  that  in  the  night 
time  the  defendant  broke  and  entered  the  dwelling  house  de- 
scribed in  the  indictment,  this  fact  would  be  strong  presump- 
tive evidence  that  the  defendant  did  such  breaking  and  made 
such  entry  with  the  intent  to  commit  a  public  offense.  But 
such  presumption  may  be  overcome  by  evidence.4 

(2)  The  intent  with  which  an  act  is  committed  being  but  a  men- 
tal state  of  the  accused,  direct  proof  of  it  is  not  required.  Nor  in- 
deed can  it  ordinarily  be  so  shown ;  but  it  is  generally  established 
by  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  attending  the  doing  of  the 
act  complained  of  as  disclosed  by  the  evidence;  and  in  this  case 
the  intent  with  which  the  defendant  entered  the  dwelling  house 
of  G,  if  he  did  enter  it,  must  be  determined  by  you  from  all 
the  evidence  in  the  case.5 

§  810.  Burglary  and  larceny  at  same  time,  verdict. — (1)  While 
the  offense  of  burglary  and  larceny  are  charged  in  the  same 
counts  of  the  information,  yet  they  are  each  separate  and  dis- 
tinct offenses,  asnd  the  jury  are  at  liberty  to  acquit  as  to  one 
and  find  the  defendants  guilty  of  the  other,  or  find  the  de- 
fendants guilty  of  both,  or  acquit  of  both  offenses,  as  they  may 
believe  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence;  but  to 
find  the  defendants  guilty  of  either  offense  they  must  so  find  from 
all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt.  And  in  this  connection  the  court  further  instructs  you 
that  you  may  find  either  one  of  the  defendants  guilty  and  acquit 
the  other  of  either  or  both  offenses,  as  you  may  believe  the 
evidence  warrants.6 

(2)  If  the  jury  find  the  defendants  guilty  of  burglary,  and  if 
the  jury  further  believe  that  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  said 

s  Timmons  v.  S.  34  Ohio  St.  426.  also   Bloch   v.    S.    161    Ind.    276    68 

*  S.   v.   Fox,   80   Iowa,   312,   45   N.  N.  E.  287. 

W.  874.  f,  s.   v.   Peebles    (Mo.),   77   S.   W. 

s  S.  v.  Maxwell  42  Iowa,  210.  See  520. 


823  AIDING,    ASSISTING POSSESSION    OF   PROPERTY.  §    812 

burglary  the  defendant  did  take,  steal  and  carry  away  from 
the  premises  aforesaid  any  flour  owned  by  Hall,  you  should 
find  the  defendants  guilty  of  larceny,  and  fix  their  punishment 
at  imprisonment  in  the  penitentiary  for  a  term  not  less  than 
two  years  nor  more  than  five  years  in  addition  to  the  punish- 
ment assessed  for  the  burglary.7 

§811.  Aiding  and  abetting,  acting  together. — Where  two  or 
more  defendants  are  charged  jointly  with  the  commission  of 
a  crime,  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  be  shown  that  both  of  the 
defendants,  or  either  one  of  them,  when  tried  alone,  actually 
broke  and  entered  the  building  or  took  the  property.  It  is 
sufficient  if  it  be  shown  that  the  joint  defendants  were  acting 
together  for  that  purpose,  and  if  either  one  of  them,  while 
so  acting  together  for  that  purpose,  actually  broke  and  en- 
tered the  building  with  the  intention  of  stealing  therein,  then 
all  of  the  said  defendants  would  be  guilty  of  the  crime,  and 
either  one  of  them  may  be  prosecuted  alone  therefor.8 

§  812.  Possession  of  property  taken  by  burglary. — (1)  To  jus- 
tify a  conviction  of  burglary  in  this  case  there  must  be  other 
evidence  than  the  mere  unexplained  possession  of  property  re- 
cently stolen  by  burglary.  Evidence  that  the  defendant  was  in 
and  about  the  .store  in  question  on  the  evening  preceding  the 
burglary  thereof,  is  not  sufficient  to  justify  a  conviction,  even 
when  considered  with  the  unexplained  possession  of  goods  re- 
cently obtained  from  the  store  by  burglary.9 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  before  you  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  that  the  property  introduced  in  evidence  or  some 
portion  thereof  was  stolen  from  the  dwelling  house  in  question 
by  breaking  and  entering  the  same  in  the  night  time,  with  the 
intent  to  steal  said  property,  and  if  you  further  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  recently  thereafter  the  property  thus  stolen, 
if  any,  was  found  in  the  possession  of  the  defendant,  then  in 
such  case  you  would  be  warranted  in  concluding  that  he,  the 
defendant,  stole  the  property  thus  found  in  his  possession,  if 
any,  by  breaking  and  entering  the  said  dwelling-house  in  the 
night  time  with  intent  to  steal  the  same,  unless  the  facts  and 

7  S.  v.  Peebles  (Mo.),  77  S.  W.  »  S  v.  Tilton,  63  Iowa,  117.  See 
520.  Potterfield  v.  Com.  91  Va.  801,  805, 

s  S.  v.   Tucker,  36  Or.  291,   51  L..       22  S.  E.  352. 
R.    A.    246,    252. 
N.   W.   290. 


§    813  BURGLARY    AND    LARCENY.  824 

circumstances  shown  by  the  evidence  raise  in  your  minds  a  rea'- 
sonable  doubt  as  to  whether  he  did  come  honestly  into  posses- 
sion of  the  same.  But  if  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evi- 
dence do  not  raise  such  reasonable  doubt,  then  you  would  not 
be  warranted  in  drawing  such  conclusion  from  such  possession 
alone,  even  if  established  by  the  evidence.10 

§813.  Submitting  facts  to  the  jury. — (1)  If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendants  on  or  about  the  twenty- 
eighth  day  of  March,  1881,  at  the  county  of  Saline,  broke  and  en- 
tered the  dwelling  house  of  W  by  forcibly  breaking  and  bursting 
the  window,  in  which  there  was  at  the  time  a  human  being,  with 
the  intent  of  stealing  and  carrying  away  any  goods,  wares, 
merchandise  or  other  property  then  being  in  said  dwelling  house, 
then  they  will  find  the  defendants  guilty  of  burglary  in  the 
first  degree  and  assess  their  punishment  at  imprisonment  in  the 
state  penitentiary  for  a  term  of  years  not  less  than  ten.13 

(2)  If  in  this  case  the  jury  are  satisfied  from  the  evidence  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  committed  the  bur- 
glary as  charged,  still  if  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  did  steal  the  goods  de- 
scribed in  the  information,  then  the  jury  may  find  the  defend 
ant  guilty  of  larceny.14 

Larceny. 

§  814.  Definition  and  essential  elements. — Larceny  is  the  fe- 
lonious, stealing,  taking,  carrying,  riding  or  driving  away  of 
the  personal  property  of  another.15 

If  the  defendant  had  actually  taken  the  money  into  his  hands 
and  lifted  it  from  the  place  where  the  owner  had  put  it  so  as 
to  entirely  remove  it  from  the  place  where  it  was  put,  with  the 
intention  of  stealing  it,  he  would  be  guilty  of  larceny,'  though  he 
may  have  dropped  it  into  the  place  it  was  laying,  upon  being 
discovered,  and  had  not  taken  it  out  of  the  money  drawer.16 

10  S.  v.  Frahm,  73  Iowa,  355;    S.  W.    590.     Held   not  assuming   bur- 

v.  Rivers,  68  Iowa,  616;  S.  v.  Yohe,  glary  was  committed. 
87  Iowa.  35.  "  Bennett    v.    S.    70    Ark.    43,    66 

is  S.    v.    Butterfield,    75    Mo.    301  S.  W.  199;   Hughes'  Cr.  Law,  §  375, 

(held     proper     under     the     statute  citing-   4  Bl.   Com.   229;    2  East  P. 

of  Missouri).  C.  553';   1  Hale  P.  C.  503,   Johnson 

i*  Ferguson    v.    S.    (Neb.),    77    N.  v.  P.  113  111.  99. 

10  Eckels  v.  S.  20  Ohio  St.  515. 


825  LARCENY    DEFINED,    INTENT    ESSENTIAL.  §    815 

§815.  Intent  an  essential  element. — (1)  The  mere  unlawful 
taking  and  carrying  away  of  the  personal  property  of  another  is 
not  larceny.  The  taking  of  the  property  alleged  to  have  been 
stolen  must  have  been  accompanied  with  a  felonious  intent  to 
steal  the  same,  and  such  intent  must  have  existed  at  the  time 
of  the  taking  of  the  property.17 

-  (2)  Not  every  unlawful  taking  and  carrying  away  of  the  per- 
sonal property  of  another  will  amount  to  larceny;  the  felonious 
intention  to  steal  the  property  must  accompany  the  act  of  the 
original  taking.18 

(3)  Although  you  may  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant may  have  taken  the  horse  in  question,  you  cannot  find  him 
guilty  unless  you  further  find  from  the  evidence  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt  that  the  taking  was  with  the  felonious  intent  to  steal, 
and  that  the  horse  was  then  the  property  of  S.19 

(4)  Before  you  can  find  the  defendant  guilty,  you  must  believe 
from  the  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  at  some  time 
within  three  years  from  the  finding  of  the  indictment  in  the  case, 
he,  the  defendant,  took  possession  of  said  horse  with  the  intent 
to  steal,  take  or  carry  it  away,  and  that  said  horse  was  then  the 
property  of  S.20 

(5)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  horse  in  ques- 
tion was  running  at  large  and  regarded  as  an  estray  in  the  neigh- 
borhood, and  they  further  find  from  the  evidence  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt  that  the  defendant  took  possession  of  said  horse,  or  ex- 
ercised such  ownership  over  him  as  owners  of  live  stock  usually 
exercise  over  the  same,  with  intent  to  steal  said  horse,  they  wili 
find  the  defendant  guilty.21 

§  816.    Possession  of  stolen  property  evidence  of  guilt. — (1) 

The  court  instructs  the  jury  that  the  possession  of  stolen  property 
soon  after  the  commission  of  the  theft  is  prima  facie  evidence  that 
the  person  in  whose  possession  it  is  found  is  guilty  of  the  wrong- 

"  Williams     v.     S.    44    Ala.    396;  S.  v.  Woodruff,  47  Kas.  151,  27  Pac. 

Fulton  v.  S.  13  Ark.  168;   Keely  v.  842. 

S.    14    Ind.    36;    Smith    v.    Schultz         i»  Bennett   v.    S.    70    Ark.    43.    6(5 

1  Scam.   (111.)  490.  S.   W.   199. 

is  Hughes'    Or.    L.    §    380,   citing:          20  Bennett   v.    S.    70    Ark.    43,    66 

S.    v.    Wood,    46    Iowa,    116;    P.    v.  S.  W.   199. 

Moore,  37  Hun  (N.  Y.),  84;  Weaver          21  Bennett   v.    S.    70    Ark.    43,    66 

v.  S.  77  Ala.  26;  Levy  v.  S.  79  Ala.  S.  W.  199.     See  Starch  v.  S.  63  Ind. 

259;  S.  v.  Cummings,  33  Conn.  260;  283. 


§    816  BURGLARY    AND    LARCENY.  826 

ful  taking,  and  is  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction,  unless  the 
other  evidence  in  the  case  or  the  surrounding  circumstances  are 
such  as  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  of  such  guilt.-2 

(2)  If  the  evidence  in  this  case  shows  that  the  property  de- 
scribed in  the  indictment  was  feloniously  stolen,  taken  and  carried 
away  on  -  — ,  and  if  it  further  shows  that  on  the  next  day  it  was 
found  in  the  possession  of  the  defendant,  and  that  he  claimed  it  to 
be  his  own  and  sold  it  or  a  part  of  it ;  and  if  the  evidence  shows 
that  the  defendant  has  failed  to  honestly  account  for  his  possession 
of  the  same,  such  failure  is  a  circumstance  tending  to  establish 
his  guilt,  and  from  which  you  may  find  him  guilty  if  the  allega 
tions  of  the  indictment  have  been  proven  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt.23 

(3)  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  property  men- 
tioned in  the  information,  or  any  part  thereof,  was  feloniously 
taken  from  the  person  of  the  prosecuting  witness,   Carter,   as 
described  in  the  information,  and  received  into  the  possession 
of  the  defendant  shortly  after  being  so  feloniousy  taken,   the 
failure,  if  failure  there  be,  of  the  defendant  to  account  for  such 
possession,  or  to  show  that  such  possession  was  honestly  obtained, 
ife  a  circumstance  tending  to  show  his  guilt,  and  the  accused  is 
bound  to  explain  the  possession  in  order  to  remove  the  effect  of 
the  possession  as  a  circumstance  to  be  considered  in  connection 
with  other  suspicious  facts,  if  the  evidence  discloses  any  such.24 

(4)  The  exclusive  possession  of  property  recently  stolen  un- 
accompanied by  a  reasonable  account  of  how  the  possession  was 
acquired  creates  a  presumption  that  the  person  found  in  pos- 
session of  the  same  is  the  thief.25 

(5)  The  defendant  is  not  required  to  satisfactorily  explain  his 
possession  of  recently  stolen  property.     If  after  considering  all 

22  Smith  v.  P.  103  111.  82,  85.  (This  W.  727;  P.  v.  Chadwick,  7  Utan,  134, 

instruction    dotes    not    assume    the  25  Pac.  737;   Harper  v.  S.   71  Miss, 

existence  of  any  fact);    Keating  v.  202,  13  So.  882;   Galloway  v.  S.   Ill 

P.  160  111.  483,  43  N.  E.  724;  Gunther  Ga.    832,   36   S.   B.    63. 

v.    P.   139   111.    526,   28   N.    E.   1101;  23  Jones   v.   S.   53   Ind.    237.     See 

Gablick  v.   P.   40  Mich.   292,  3   Am.  Campbell  v.  S.  150  Ind.  75,  49  N.  E. 

Cr.  R.  244;    S.  v.   Kelley,  57  Iowa,  905. 

644,    11    N.    W.    635;    S.   v.   Brady  24  P.   v.   Wilson,   135  Cal.   331,   67 

(Iowa),  97  N.  W.  64;   Brooks  v.  S.  Pac.  322. 

96   Ga.   353,   23   S.   E.   413.   Contra:  25  Potterfield  v.  Com.  91  Va.  801, 

White  v.  S.  21  Tex.  App.  339,  17  S.  805,  22  S.  E.  352. 


827        POSSESSION  OF  PROPERTY — PROPERTY  FOUND.      §  817 

the  evidence  introduced  by  him  in  connection  with  all  the  other 
evidence  in  the  case,  there  appears  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his 
guilt  as  charged  in  the  indictment,  then  he  should  be  acquitted.26 

§817.  Property  found  and  appropriated  by  defendant. — (1) 
If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  found  the 
trunk  in  the  road,  you  are  bound  to  find  him  not  guilty,  although 
you  may  believe  that  he  afterwards  broke  it  open  and  disposed  of 
its  contents  to  his  own  use.-7 

(2)  If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  said  goods  had  been  lost 
and  were  found  by  the  defendant ;  that  at  the  time  he  found  the 
same  he  did  not  know  who  owned  them ;  that  there  were  no  marks 
upon  or  about  the  goods  showing  to  whom  they  belonged  so  that 
the  defendant  could  identify  the  owner  at  once,  even  though  he 
could  afterwards  have  discovered  the  owner  by  honest  diligence, 
then  you  must  acquit  the  defendant.28 

(3)  Though  the  money  was  actually  lost  and  the  defendant 
found  it  and  at  the  time  of  finding  supposed  it  to  be  lost,  and  ap- 
propriated it  with  intent  to  take  entire  dominion  over  it,  yet 
really  believing  that  the  owner  could  not  be  found,  that  was 
not   larceny   and   in   such   case   he    cannot   be   convicted.      The 
intent  to   steal  must  have  existed  at  the  time  of  the  taking. 
It  is  not  enough  that  he  had  the  general  means  of  discovering 
the  owner  by  honest  diligence.     He  was  not  bound  to  inquire 
on  the  streets  or  at  the  printing  offices  for  the  owner,  though 
if,    at    the    time    of    the    taking,    he    knew    he    had  reasonable 
means  of  ascertaining  that  fact,  that  might  be  taken  as  show- 
ing  a   belief   that   the    owner   of   the   money   could   be   found. 
In  order    to    convict    it    must    be    shown    that    the    taking    of 
the  money  was   with  felonious  intent,   that   is,   with  intent  to 
steal  under  the  definition  given ;  and  it  is  not  sufficient  that  after 
finding  the  money  it  was  converted  to  his  own  use  with  felonious 
intent.     The  intent  must  have  existed  at  the  time  of  the  finding.29 

§  818.    Taking  property  under  claim  of  right. — If,  from  the 

2«  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §     '3,  citing:  31   Neb.   460,   48   N.   W.   148;    Heed 

Hoge  v.  P.  117  111.  44,  6  N.  E.  796;  v.  S.  25  Wis.  421;  S.  v.  Merrick,  19 

S.  v.  Kirkpatrick,  72  Iowa,  500,  34  Me.  398. 

N.  W    301,  7  Am.  Cr.  R.  334;  Smith  27  Lane  v.  P.*  10  111.  307. 

v.  S.  58  Ind.  340,  2  Am..  Cr.  R.  375;  28  s.  v.  Dean,  49  Iowa,  74;  Bailey 

Van  Straaten  v.  P.  26  Colo.  184,  56  v.   S.    52    Ind.   466. 

Pac.  905;  S.  v.  Miller,  107  Iowa,  -'»  Brooks  v.  S.  35  Ohio  St.  48. 
656,  78  N.  W.  679;  Grentzinger  v.  S. 


§    818  BURGLARY    AND    LARCENY.  828 

evidence,  you  find  that  the  defendant  had  any  fair  color  or 
right  to  take  the  cattle  alleged  to  have  been  taken  by  him  at 
the  time  they  were  so  taken  by  him,  and  you  find  that  he  took 
the  same  under  that  claim  of  right,  or  if  you  find  that  he  be- 
lieved they  were  his  cattle,  or  he  had  a  right  to  take  them,  or 
if  you  have  a  reasonable  doubt  that  he  so  believed,  then  you  will 
acquit.30 

§  819.  Prosecution  confined  to  property  alleged. — If  you  find 
from  the  evidence  that  any  of  the  hogs  alleged  to  have  been  stolen 
do  not  answer  the  description  given  in  the  information,  then,  and 
in  that  case,  if  you  find  the  defendant  guilty,  you  will  ascertain 
from  the  evidence  the  value  of  the  hogs  only  that  do  answer  the 
description  in  the  information  in  fixing  the  degree  of  the  crime.31 

so  Reese  v.  S.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  si  s.  v.  Montgomery  (S.  Dak.), 
68  S.  W.  283.  97  N.  W.  717. 


CHAPTER  LIX. 

EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    FALSE    PRETENSE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

820.  Embezzlement      defined— Ele-      827.    President  borrowing  from  his 

ments.  bank — Evidence. 

821.  Agent   collecting   on    oommis-      828.    Condition    of    bank,    value   of 

sion.  assets,    liabilities. 

822.  Attorney  receiving  and  appro-      829.     Failure  of  bank  as  prima  fa- 

priating.  cie  evidence. 

823.  Debtor  and  creditor,  their  re-      830.    Definition  and  elements. 

lation.  831.    Offense    committed     by     acts, 

824.  Intent    an    essential    element.  symbols,    words. 

825.  Intent,    knowledge    of    bank's      832.    Defrauding      tax      collector- 

condition.  Essential  elements. 

826     Bank    receiving    deposits    by 
officers  or  others. 

Embezzlement. 

§  820.  Embezzlement  defined — Elements. — (1)  Embezzlement  is 
the  fraudulent  appropriation  or  conversion  to  one's  own  use  of 
the  personal  property  of  another  delivered  to  him  as  agent,  ser- 
vant, employe',  bailee,  trustee,  or  in  some  other  fiduciary  capacity, 
with  the  intent  to  cheat  and  defraud  the  owner.1 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  received 
from  C  the  organ  in  question,  under  an  agreement  that  he  should 
act  as  the  agent  of  the  said  C  in  the  sale  of  said  organ,  and  that 
the  defendant  should  sell  the  said  organ  and  pay  over  and  deliver 
to  the  said  C  a  certain  sum  of  money  or  notes  which  the  defend- 
ant should  secure  from  the  sale  of  said  organ,  and  you  further 
believe  that  the  defendant  sold  said  organ  as  his  own  property, 
and  not  as  the  agent  for  said  C,  and  that  at  the  time  of  said  sale 
the  defendant  had  the  fraudulent  intent  to  appropriate  the-pro- 

i  Hughes  Cr.  L.  §  492;   Underbill   Cr.  Ev.  §  282. 

829 


§    821  EMBEZZLEMENT  AND  FALSE  PRETENSE.  830 

ceeds  of  said  sale  to  his  own  use,  and  that  in  pursuance  of  said 
intent  the  defendant  afterwards  appropriated  the  proceeds  of 
said  sale  to  his  own  use  and  benefit  without  the  consent  of  said 
C,  the  defendant  would,  under  such  circumstances,  be  guilty  of 
embezzling  said  organ. - 

§  821.  Agent  collecting  on  commission. — If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  at  the  time  of  the  alleged 
embezzlement,  was  a  collector  for  the  company  in  question,  with 
the  right  to  retain  her  commissions,  that  is,  that  she  was  not 
required  to  pay  to  the  company  the  gross  sum  or  sums  of  money 
collected  by  her,  but  might  first  deduct  her  commissions  and  then 
pay  over  the  balance  or  net  amount  to  the  company,  she  was  not 
such  an  agent  as  is  contemplated  in  the  statute  defining  embezzle- 
ment, and  the  verdict  should  be  not  guilty.3 

§  822.  Attorney  receiving  and  appropriating  money. — Where 
an  attorney  receives  money  by  collecting  it  from  a  client,  he  can- 
not be  held  for  embezzlement  or  convicted  thereof,  unless  a 
demand  has  first  been  made  upon  him  for  the  money  by  the  person 
authorized  to  receive  it.  But  where  money  or  drafts  or  certifi- 
cates of  deposit  are  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  attorney  or  agent 
to  be  by  him  forwarded  or  paid  to  another  person,  and  he  receives 
the  drafts,  money  or  certificates  for  such  purpose,  and  unlawfully 
and  fraudulently  secretes,  appropriates,  purloins  and  converts 
the  same  to  his  own  use,  then,  in  that  case,  he  would  be  guilty  of. 
embezzlement  whether  any  demand  was  made  or  not.4 

§  823.  Debtor  and  creditor,  their  relation. — The  facts  that  the 
relation  of  debtor  and  creditor  exists  between  a  principal  and 
his  agent,  and  that  on  balancing  the  account  the  agent  would  be 
found  indebted  to  his  principal,  are  not  alone  sufficient  to  sustain 
a  verdict  finding  the  agent  guilty  of  embezzlement  or  converting 
to  his  own  use  the  property  of  his  principal.5 

§  824.    Intent  an  essential  element. — (1)  In  embezzlement  an 

2  Epperson  v.  S.  22  Tex.  App.  the  statute  of  Indiana  on  embezzle- 

697,  3  S.  W.  789.  ment,  one  where  demand  is  essen- 

s  McElroy  v.  P.  202  111.  477,  66  tial  to  be  made  and  the  other  where 

N.  E.  1058.  it  is  not  essential. 

*  Dean  v.  S.  147  Ind.  221,  46  N.  55.  v.  Culver  (Neb.),  97  N.  W. 

E.  528.  There  are  two  sections  of  1017. 


831          INTENT,  KNOWLEDGE,  BANK  RECEIVING  DEPOSITS.       §  826 

intent  to  feloniously  appropriate  the  property  at  the  time  of  the 
appropriation  is  essential ;  and  if  the  appropriation  is  made  upon 
the  belief,  honestly  entertained  by  the  accused  that  he  has  lawful 
title  or  right  to  appropriate  it,  the  act  is  not  criminal.6 

(2)  An  essential  element  in  the  crime  charged  in  this  case  is  a 
felonious  intent,  and  before  you  can  convict  the  defendant  you 
must  find  from  the  evidence  that  he  intended  to  convert  to  his 
own  use  the  money  of  the  prosecuting  witness,  and  to  cheat, 
wrong  and  defraud  him.7 

(3)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  before  you  that  it  was  the 
intention  of  the  defendant  to  act  in  good  faith  towards  C,  as  his 
agent  for  the  sale  of  the  organ  in  question  and  carry  out  his 
alleged  agreement,  and  that  he,  after  the  sale  of  the  organ,  con- 
ceived for  the  first  time  the  intention  to  appropriate  the  proceeds 
of  the  sale  to  his  own  use  or  benefit,  he  would  not  be  guilty  of 
embezzling  the  said  organ.8 

§  825.  Intent,  knowledge  of  bank's  condition. — It  is  no  offense 
for  an  officer  of  a  bank  to  assent  to  the  receipt  of  a  deposit  by 
such  bank  when  the  same  is  in  failing  circumstances,  if  at 
the  time  of  receiving  such  deposit,  the  officer  did  not  at  the  time 
know  it  was  in  failing  circumstances,  but  in  taking  into  con- 
sideration the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  bank  in  question 
was  in  failing  circumstances  on  the  tenth  day  of  July,  1893,  and 
as  to  whether  or  not  the  defendant  had  knowledge  on  that  day 
of  its  condition,  you  may  consider  all  the  facts  and  circumstances 
in  evidence  before  you.9 

§  826.  Bank  receiving  deposits  by  officer  or  others. — (1)  If  you 
shall  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  at  the  county 
of  Jackson,  in  this  state,  at  any  time  within  three  years  next 
before  the  thirtieth  day  of  -  — ,  was  the  president  of  the  bank 
mentioned,  and  that  said  bank  was  then  and  there  a  corporation 
and  doing  business  as  a  banking  institution  in  said  county  and 
state,  and  did  then  and  there  unlawfully  and  feloniously  assent 
to  the  taking  and  receiving  on  deposit  in  said  banking  institu- , 

e  Beaty  v.  S.  82  Ind.  232.  s  Epperson    v.    S.    22    Tex.    App. 

T  S.   v.   Eastman,   60  Kas.   557,   57      697,  3  S.  W.  789. 

Pac.  109.  »  S.    v.    Darrah,    152    Mo.    529,    54 

S.    W.    226. 


§    827  EMBEZZLEMENT  AND  FALSE   PRETENSE.  832 

tion  the  money  of  the  witness,  V,  to  the  amount  of  three  hundred 
dollars  or  more,  and  that  said  banking  institution  was  then  and 
there  in  failing  circumstances,  and  that  the  defendant  was  then 
and  there  the  president  of  said  banking  institution  doing  business 
as  such,  and  that  the  defendant  had  knowledge  at  the  time  when 
such  deposit  was  received  that  said  banking  institution  was  in 
failing  circumstances,  you  will  find  the  defendant  guilty  and  fix 
his  punishment  at  imprisonment  in  the  penitentiary  for  any  time 
not  less  than  two  years  and  not  more  than  five  years.10 

(2)  If  the  jury  shall  believe  from  the  evidence  that  on  the  —  day 
of  -  — ,  the  witness,  V,  deposited  in  the  bank  in  question,  a  bank- 
ing institution  doing  business  in  this  state,  at  the  county  of  Jack- 
son, the  sum  of  three  hundred  dollars  or  any  part  thereof  to  the 
value  of  thirty  dollars  or  more  lawful  money  of  the  United  States, 
of  the  money  and  property  of  the  witness,  V,  and  shall  further 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  said  deposit  was  not  taken  and 
received  by  the  defendant  himself,  but  was  taken  and  received  by 
some  other  person,  but  that  such  person  was  then  and  there  in 
the  employ  of  the  said  bank  and  acting  under  the  direction  and 
control  of  the  defendant  in  said  employment,  and  that  such  other 
person  had  general  power  and  authority  from  the  defendant  to 
receive  deposits  of  money  into  said  bank,  and  that  said  bank  was 
then  and  there  in  failing  circumstances,  and  the  defendant  had 
knowledge  that  said  bank  was  then  and  there  in  failing  circum- 
stances, they  will  find  the  defendant  guilty  as  charged.11 

§  827.    President  borrowing  from  his  bank — Evidence. — It  is 

not  of  itself  a  crime  for  the  president  of  a  bank  to  borrow  money 
from  the  bank  of  which  he  is  president,  and  you  may  consider  the 
fact  that  the  defendant  borrowed  money  from  the  bank  in  ques- 
tion, if  you  find  he  was  president  of  the  same  and  did  borrow 
money  from  it,  in  determining  the  condition  of  the  bank  on 
the  tenth  day  of  July,  1893,  and  for  no  other  purpose.12 

§  828.    Condition  of  bank,  value  of  assets,  liabilities. — (1)  A 

banking  institution  is  in  failing  circumstances  when  it  is  unable 

10  S.   v.   Darrah,   152   Mo.   527,   54         12  S.   v.   Darrah,   152   Mo.   529,   54 
S.  W.  226.  S.  W.  226. 

11  S.    v.    Darrah,    152    Mo.    527,    54 
S.  W.  2?6. 


833  BANK    OFFICIALS    APPROPRIATING.  §    828 

to  meet  the  demands  of  its  depositors  in  the  usual  and  ordinary 
course  of  business,  and  this  is  true  even  though  you  shall  believe 
that  there  was  at  the  time  a  stringency  in  the  money  market.13 

(2)  In  determining  the  condition  of  the  said  bank  on  the  tenth 
day  of  July,  1893,  you  should  consider  the  reasonable  market  value 
of  the  assets  of  the  bank  on  hand  as  compared  to  its  liabilities  on 
that  day;  all  consideration  of  the  condition  of  the  bank  is  con- 
fined to  the  tenth  day  of  July,  1893,  but  you  may  consider  any 
evidence  that  may  be  before  you  showing  its  condition  immedi- 
ately before  that  day,  if  there  is  any  such,  to  aid  you  in  determin- 
ing its  condition  on  that  day.14 

(3)  In  determining  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  said  bank 
was  in  failing  circumstances  on  the  tenth  day  of  July,  1893,  you 
should  consider  the  liabilities  of  the  bank  and  the  reasonable 
market  value  of  the  assets  of  the  bank  on  that  day  regardless  of 
any  change,  if  any,  or  additional  security,  if  any,  which  may  have 
been  given  since  that  day.     If  you  shall  find  from  the  evidence 
that  any  part  of  the  assets  of  said  bank  have  been  proven  to 
have  a  market  value,  then  you  should  give  such  assets  such  intrin- 
sic value  as  may  have  been  shown  by  the  evidence  in  the  case, 
and  if  there  be  any  of  said  assets,  to  wit,  stocks,  bonds  or  negoti- 
able paper,  that  have  not  in  your  opinion,  from  the  evidence, 
been  shown  to  have  a  market  value  nor  an  intrinsic  value,  then 
such  assets  are  presumed  to  be  worth  their  face  value.     This  will 
have  no  application  to  such  assets  as  may  have  been  shown  by 
the  evidence  to  have  no  value  at  all,  provided  there  is  such 
evidence  as  to  any  of  the  assets  of  said  bank.15 

(4)  In  considering  the  condition  of  the  bank  on  the  tenth  day  of 
July,  1893,  you  will  not  take  into  account  the  three  hundred 
thousand  dollars  of  capital  stock  as  a  liability.16 

(5)  The  court  instructs  you  that  in  determining  the  value  of 
any  of  the  assets  of  the  said  bank  on  the  tenth  day  of  July,  1893, 
as  shown  on  this  trial,  the  testimony  of  expert  witnesses,  who 

13  S.  v.  Darrah,  152  Mo.  528,  54  «  S.  v.  Darrah,  152  Mo.  531,  54 
S.  W.  226.  S.  W.  226. 

1+  S.  v.  Darrah  152  Mo.  528,  54  i«  S.  v.  Darrah,  152  Mo.  528,  54 
S.  W.  226.  S.  W.  226. 


§    829  EMBEZZLEMENT  AND  FALSE  PRETENSE.  834 

have  testified  before  you,  if  deemed  by  you  unreasonable,  may  be 
disregarded.17 

§  829.  Failure  of  bank  as  prima  facie  evidence. — Although  by 
the  statute  the  failure  of  the  bank  in  question  is  made  prima 
facie  evidence  of  the  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  defendant 
that  the  same  was  in  failing  circumstances  on  the  tenth  day  of 
July,  1893,  yet  the  burden  of  proving  the  state's  case  is  not  really 
changed.  The  law  enables  the  state  to  make  a  prima  facie  case 
by  proof  of  the  assenting  to  the  creation  of  said  indebtedness 
and  the  reception  of  the  money  into  the  bank,  but  the  defendant 
can  show  the  condition  of  the  bank  and  the  circumstances  at- 
tending the  failure  and  any  facts  tending  to  exonerate  him  from 
criminal  liability;  and  then,  on  the  whole  case,  the  burden  still 
rests  on  the  state  to  establish  defendant's  guilt  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt.  The  presumption  of  innocence  with  which  defend- 
ant is  clothed  never,  shifts,  but  rests  with  him  throughout  the 
case,  notwithstanding  a  prima  facie  case  may  have  been  made 
out  by  the  state.18 

False  Pretense. 

§  830.  Definition  and  elements.— (1)  A  false  pretense  has  been 
denned  to  be  such  a  fraudulent  representation  of  a  fact,  past  or 
existing,  by  a  person  who  knows  it  to  be  untrue  as  is  adapted  to 
induce  the  person  to  whom  it  is  made  to  part  with  something  of 
value.19 

(2)  To  make  out  a  complete  case  of  false  pretense,  the  fol- 
lowing essential  facts  must  be  established  by  the  evidence  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt:  first,  the  intent  to  defraud  some  par- 
ticular person  or  people  generally;  second,  an  actual  fraud  com- 
mitted; third,  the  false  pretense;  and  fourth,  that  the  fraud  re- 
sulted from  the  employment  of  the  false  pretense.20 

§  831.  Offense  committed  by  acts,  symbols,  words. — A  false 
pretense  may  consist  of  any  act,  word,  symbol,  or  token  calculated' 
to  deceive  another,  and  knowingly  and  designedly  employed  by 
any  person  with  intent  to  defraud  another  of  money  or  other 
personal  property.  And  if  you  shall  be  satisfied  from  the  evi- 

"  S.    v.    Darrah,   152   Mo.   532,   54  i»  S.  v.  Lynn   (Del.),  51  Atl.  882; 

S.   W.  226.  Jackson    v.    P.    126    111.    139,    18    N. 

is  S.  v.  Darrah,  152  Mo.  522,  533,  E.  286;  Hughes  Or.  Law,  §  579. 

54  S.  W.  226.  20  Hughes  Cr.   Law,   §   579. 


835       FALSE  PRETENSE  BY  ACTS — DEFRAUDING  TAXES.     §  832 

dence  that  the  defendant  made  such  false  pretense  as  charged 
in  the  •  indictment,  with  the  intent  to  cheat  and  defraud  as  de- 
nned in  these  instructions,  then  you  should  ascertain  whether 
the  defendant  did  by  such  false  pretense  actually  obtain  the 
money  of  K,  the  receiver  of  taxes  and  treasurer  aforesaid.21 

§  832.  Defrauding  tax  collector — Essential  elements. — In  order 
to  convict  under  the  indictment,  the  state  must  prove  to  your 
satisfaction  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt:  first,  that  the  defendant 
knowingly  made  a  false  pretense  as  charged  in  the  indictment ; 
second,  that  he  made  such  false  pretense  with  the  intent  to  cheat 
and  defraud  R,  the  receiver  of  taxes  and  county  treasurer: 
third,  that  by  such  false  pretense  he  actually  did  cheat  and  de- 
fraud the  said  R,  the  receiver  of  taxes  and  county  treasurer, 
and  did  obtain  from  him  thereby,  in  coin  or  paper  money,  or 
both,  lawful  money,  then  the  property  of  said  R,  receiver  of 
taxes  and  county  treasurer  aforesaid.22 

21  S.  v.  Lynn   (Del.),  51  Atl.   883.         22  s.  v.  Lynn   (Del.),  51  All.  882. 


CHAPTER  LX. 


OTHER  SPECIFIC  OFFENSES. 


Sec. 

833. 
834. 


ADULTERY. 

acts 


Occasional 

course. 
Common  law  marriage. 

BASTARDY. 


of      inter- 


835. 
836..  Public  rumor  is  not  evidence. 


Facts    to    be    determined    by 
jury. 


CRUELTY    TO    ANIMALS. 

837.  Killing     stock     to     preserve 

crops. 

838.  Intentionally   overdriving 

horse. 

DISORDERLY    HOUSE. 

839.  What     constitutes     disorderly 

house. 


840.  Forgery  defined. 

841.  Alteration    of    instrument    is 

forgery. 

842.  Aiding  and   abetting  another. 

843.  Uttering  or  publishing  forged 

document. 

844.  .Intent  to  defraud  essential. 

845.  Forging  a  deed — Venue. 


Sec. 


846. 
847. 
848. 
849. 


850. 

851. 

852. 
853. 
854. 

855. 
856. 
857. 


858. 


GAMING. 

Gaming  defined. 
Betting  on  game  of  cards. 
Betting  on  game  of  billiards. 
Doing  forbidden  act  in  public 
place. 

CRIMINAL    LIBEL. 

Motives    prompting   communi- 
cation. 


PERJURY. 

Evidence  of  one  witness  not 
sufficient. 

PUBLIC    NUISANCE. 

Offensive  smells  from  slaugh- 
terhouse. 

Nuisance  must  affect  whole 
community. 

Mill-dam  and  pond  producing 
offense. 

Pond  producing  malaria. 

Offense  caused  by  other  means. 

Caused  by  others,  not  the  de- 
fendant. 

HIGHWAY   VIOLATIONS. 

Public  roads — How  establish- 
ed. 


836 


837  WHAT    CONSTITUTES    ADULTERY BASTARDY.  §    835 

859.  Vacatingf  public    road — How.  SUNDAY  VIOLATIONS. 

860.  Malicious        destruction        cxf 

bridge.  861.    Operating  machinery  on  Sun- 

day. 

Adultery. 

§  833.  Occasional  acts  of  intercouse  not  adultery. — If  the  jury 
shall  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendants  were  not  living 
together  in  a  state  of  open  and  notorious  adultery,  but  were  sim- 
ply, at  the  time  charged  in  the  information,  stopping  together  in 
the  same  room  occasionally,  and  were  only  guilty  of  occasional 
acts  of  illicit  intercourse,  then  the  jury  should  find  the  defendants 
not  guilty.1 

§834.  Common  law  marriage,  what  constitutes. — A  simple 
agreement  between  one  man  and  one  woman,  who  may  lawfully 
contract  that  they  will  take  each  other  as  husband  and  wife 
thenceforth,  and  that  they  will  sustain  this  relation  thenceforth 
so  long  as  they  both  shall  live,  with  the  mutual  understanding 
that  neither  one  nor  both  can  rescind  the  contract  or  destroy  the 
relation  followed  by  cohabitation;  when  they  do  this  they  are 
married.  And  in  such  case  their  marriage  is  just  as  valid  as 
though  a  chime  of  bells  had  played  a  wedding  march  and  a  half 
dozen  bishops  and  clergymen  assisted  at  the  celebration  before  a 
thousand  people.2 

Bastardy. 

§  835.  Facts  to  be  determined  by  the  jury. — You  have  heard  the 
statements  of  the  relatrix  and  the  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
the  defendant  had  opportunities  for  intercourse  with  her;  and 
you  have  also  heard  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  tending  to  show 
that  persons  other  than  the  defendant  had  intercourse  with  her 
about  the  time  the  child  was  begotten;  you  may  consider  these 
circumstances  in  determining  whether  the  defendant  is  the  father 
of  the  child.3 

i  S.  v.  Crowner,  56  Mo.  149.   Rape  2  S.   v.  Miller,  12  Ohio  C.  C.   66; 

and    robbery — For   instructions   on  Teter  v.  Teter,  101  Ind.  129. 

these  offenses  see  "Assault,"  Chap-  3  Mobley   v.    S.    83    Ind.   94. 
ter  LV. 


§    83G  OTHER    SPECIFIC    OFFENSES.  838 

§  836.  Public  rumor  is  not  evidence. — In  determining  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  defendant  is  the  father  of  the  child  in  ques- 
tion, you  should  not  regard  or  consider  what  public  rumor 
was  before  the  time  of  the  begetting  of  the  child  concerning  the 
intimacy  of  the  defendant  or  other  person  with  the  relatrix,  but 
should  look  soley  to  the  evidence,  and  be  governed  by  it  as  to  the 
fact  of  the  begetting  of  the  child.4 


Cruelty  to  Animals, 

§837.  Killing  stock  to  preserve  crops. — If  you  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant  killed  one  or  more  of  the  hogs 
of  R.  by  shooting  them,  and  did  not  cruelly  beat,  abuse,  torture, 
or  purposely  injure  the  hogs,  but  killed  them  in  the  manner  above 
stated,  then  you  should  find  for  the  defendant,  if  you  should  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  killed  them  in  order  to 
save  his  crop.5 

§  838.  Intentionally  overdriving  horse. — The  commonwealth 
must  prove  that  the  defendant  overdrove  the  horse  knowingly, 
and  intentionally ;  that  the  defendant,  like  all  other  men,  was  pre- 
sumed to  know  what  he  did,  and  to  intend  the  natural  and  neces- 
sary results  of  his  acts ;  that  if,  in  the  proper  exercise  of  his  own 
judgment,  he  thought  he  was  not  overdriving  the  horse,  he  must 
be  acquitted:  and  that  upon  these  instructions  the  jury  might 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  a  question  of  fact  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  result  of  the.  testimony  introduced  by  the  common- 
wealth and  by  the  defense.0 


Disorderly  House. 

§839.  What  constitutes  disorderly  house. — If  you  find  from 
the  evidence  that  the  defendant  kept  a  bar-room  and  dance  hall, 
with  music,  for  the  purpose  and  with  the  intent  of  bringing  to- 

4  Saint  v.  S.  68  Ind.  129.  «  Com.    v.    Wood,   111    Mass.    409. 

s  Stephens   v.    S.    65    Miss.    330,    3 
So.  458;  Hunt  v.  S.  3  Ind.  App.  383. 


839  DISORDERLY  HOUSE,  FORGERY  DEFINED.  §    843 

gether  and  entertaining  prostitutes  and  men  desirous  of  their 
company,  and  that  such  persons  habitually  assembled  there  to 
drink  and  dance  together,  then  you  may  find  said  establishment 
a  disorderly  house,  within  the  meaning  of  the  law,  even,  though 
you  may  also  believe  that  the  house  was  quietly  kept,  and  no 
conspicuous  improprieties  were  permitted  inside.  The  jury  being 
the  judges  of  the  law  as  well  as  facts,  this  charge  is  to  be  under- 
stood as  advisory  only  of  what  the  law  is.7 


Forgery. 

§  840.  Forgery  defined. — Forgery  is  the  fraudulent  makng  or 
alteration  of  a  writing  to  the  prejudice  of  another's  rights,  with 
intent  to  cheat  and  defraud.8 

§  841.  Alteration  of  instrument  is  forgery. — Any  material  al- 
teration, in  part,  of  a  genuine  instrument,  whereby  a  new  opera- 
tion is  given  it  to  the  prejudice  of  the  rights  of  another,  is  a 
forgery  of  the  whole  instrument,  if  done  with  intent  to  defraud.9 

§  842.  Aiding  and  abetting  another. — It  is  not  necessary,  in 
order  to  sustain  a  conviction,  to  show  that  the  defendant  actually 
participated  in  making,  uttering,  or  passing  the  instrument  al- 
leged to  have  been  forged.  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  be- 
fore you,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  he  aided,  abetted  or  as- 
sisted in  such  forgery,  with  intent  to  cheat  and  defraud,  you 
should  find  the  defendant  guilty.10 

§  843.  Uttering  or  publishing  forged  document. — You  are  in- 
structed that  whoever  shall,  with  intent  to  injure  and  defraud 
any  one,  knowingly  utters  or  publishes  as  true  and  genuine  any 

T  Beard  v.  S.  71  Md.  275,  17  Atl.  Brown,    70    Vt.    521,    41    Atl.    1025; 

1044.  P.   v.    Underbill,   26   N.   Y.    S.    1030, 

s  Hughes    Cr.    Law,    §§    896,    897,  75  Hun,  329,  142  N.  Y.  38,  36  N.  E. 

citing:   4  Blackstone  Comm.  247;  U.  1049;    Com.    v.    Hyde,    94    Ky.    517, 

S.  v.  Long,  30  Fed.  678;   S.  v.  Flye,  15  Ky.  L.  R.  264    23  S.  W.  195,  and 

26  Me.  312;   3  Greenleaf  Ev.   (Redf.  other  cases. 

ed.),    §    103;    S.   v.   Rose.   70  Minn.  10  Hughes  Cr.  Law,  §  904,  citing: 

403,    73    N.    W.    177;    Underbill    Cr.  Anson    v.    P.    148    111.    502,    35    N. 

Ev.  §  419.  E.  145;  3  Greenleaf  Ev.  (Redf.  Ed.), 

s  Hughes  Cr.  Law,   §   897,  citing:  104. 
S.    v.    Wood,    20    Iowa,    541;    S.    v. 
Kattlenrann,   35   Mo.   105;    Owen  v. 


§    844  OTHER   SPECIFIC    OFFENSES.  840 

false  or  forged  check,  is  guilty  of  a  crime,  and  shall  be  punished 
as  prescribed  by  law.11 

§  844.  Intent  to  defraud  essential. — If  you  shall  find  from  the 
evidenc'e  in  the  case,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  defend- 
ant did  knowingly  utter  and  publish  the  check  set  forth  in  the 
indictment  as  true  and  genuine,  still,  before  you  can  convict  him, 
you  must  further  find  that  he  did  so  utter  and  publish  it  with  the 
intent  to  injure  and  defraud  another.  And  in  this  respect  you 
may  consider  whether  he  had  an  intent  to  injure  or  defraud  either 
the  person  to  whom  he  gave  the  check  or  W.  And  if  you  shall 
find  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  he  ut- 
tered and  passed  the  check  upon  J,  with  intent  to  deceive  him, 
and  did  obtain  money  on  it,  and  that  J,  relying  upon  the  check, 
presented  it  to  the  bank  for  payment,  then  you  may  infer  from 
that  act  an  intention  to  injure  the  said  J  or  W ;  and  if  you  shall 
find  from  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
that  the  check  was  so  uttered  with  the  intent  to  obtain  money 
upon,  you  should  find  that  he  did  utter  and  publish  the  said  check 
with  an  intent  to  injure  or  defraud.12 

§  845.  Forging1  a  deed — Venue.— If  you  find,  and  believe  from 
the  evidence,  that  the  deed  read  in  evidence  and  described  in  the 
information,  or  any  part  thereof  (not  including  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  same),  was  falsely  made,  and  forged  with  intent  to 
cheat  and  defraud  as  defined  in  other  instructions,  and  that  the 
defendant  had  possession  of  the  same  in  S  county,  Missouri, 
and  that  he  made  claim  to  the  land  therein  described,  or  any  part 
thereof,  by  virtue  of  and  under  said  deed,  then  these  facts  con- 
stitute evidence  that  he  committed  the  forgery  of  the  same,  or 
caused  the  same  to  be  forged,  and  that  he  committed  said  forgery 
in  S  county  and  state  of  Missouri;  and  unless  he  explains  or 
accounts  for  his  possession  thereof  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
his  innocence,  then  these  facts  are  sufficient  to  warrant  the  jury 
in  finding  him  guilty  of  forgery  as  charged  in  the  information.13 

"  Stockslager  v.  U.  S.  116  Fed.  W.  841.  (The  facts  recited  in  the 

(C.  C.),  599.  instruction  standing  unexplained 

12  Stockslager  v.  U.  S.  116  Fed.  raise  the  presumption  that  the  de- 

(C.  .C.),  599.  fendant  forged  the  deed  or  caused 

is  S.    v.    Payscher    (Mo.),    77    S.  it  to  be  forged  in  S  county.) 


841  GAMING    DEFINED CRIMINAL    LIBEL.  •  §    850 

Gaming. 

§  846.  Gaming  defined. — Gaming  is  an  unlawful  agreement  be- 
tween two  or  more  persons  to  risk  money  or  other  property  on  a 
contest  or  chance  of  any  kind  where  one  will  be  gainer  and  the 
other  loser.14 

§  847.  Betting  on  game  of  cards. — If  you  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence in  this  case,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  defendant 
played  at  a  game  of  cards  with  other  persons,  for  money,  in  man- 
ner and  form  as  charged  in  the  indictment,  at  or  about  the  time 
and  place  therein  stated,  under  an  agreement  or  understanding 
that  the  winner  of  the  game  should  take  the  money  put  up  or 
staked  by  each  of  them  on  said  game,  then  you  should  find  the 
defendant  guilty.15 

§  848.  Betting  on  game  of  billiards. — The  playing  of  billiards, 
pool,  or  other  games  played  upon  a  billiard  table,  when  there  is 
a  wager  of  the  money-rent  of  the  table  between  the  parties  play- 
ing, or  when  the  parties  play  such  game  for  a  wager  of  chips, 
checks,  or  other  things  of  value,  in  either  case  the  playing  of  such 
game  for  such  wager  is  gambling  within  the  meaning  of  the  law.18 

§  849.  Doing  forbidden  act  in  a  public  place. — A  shop  or  other 
building  is  the  private  property  of  its  owner  unless  he,  of  his  own 
volition,  so  uses  it  as  to  give  the  public  a  right  to  enter  it  at  will ; 
and  every  one  owning  such  building  may,  by  himself  or  agent,  in- 
vite any  number  of  his  neighbors  into  his  house  or  shop,  and  such 
persons  may  assemble  there  pursuant  to  such  invitation,  and  such 
assembling  would  not  make  the  place  a  public  place  in  the  legal 
sense  of  that  term.17 

Criminal  Libel. 

§  850.  Motives  prompting  communication. — The  burden  is  on 
the  state  to  show  affirmatively  that  the  communication  was  made 
with  malice ;  that  is  to  say,  not  from  a  sense  of  duty,  but  from  a 

i*  Hughes    Cr.   Law,   §   2193,   cit-  ie  Hamilton  v.  S.  75  Ind.  593. 

ing:       Eubanks     v.     S.     3     Heisk.  IT  Lorimer  v.  S.     76  Ind.  497:   S. 

(Tenn.),   488;    Portis  v.   S.    27   Ark.  v.  Tincher,  21  Ind.  App.  142,  51  N. 

360.  E.  943. 

is  Hughes'    Cr.    Law,    §    2193. 


§    851  OTHER   SPECIFIC    OFFENSES.  842 

dishonest  motive.  If  the  defendant  honestly  believed  it  to  be  his 
duty  to  make  the  communication,  and  did  so  under  a  sense  of 
duty  only,  he  is  not  guilty.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  his  motives 
were  not  good,  if  the  communication  was  not  made  for  a  justi- 
fiable end,  but  from  malice,  to  gratify  a  feeling  of  revenge  for 
supposed  injury,  then  he  is  not  justified,  and  he  should  be  found 
guilty.18 

Perjury. 

§  851.  Evidence  of  one  witness  not  sufficient. — The  evidence  of 
one  witness  as  to  the  falsity  of  the  evidence  upon  which  perjury 
is  assigned  is  not  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction.  If  there  is 
but  one  witness  testifying  directly  to  the  falsity  of  the  evidence 
of  one  charged  with  perjury,  there  must  be  evidence  of  circum- 
stances corroborating  such  falsifying  testimony.  There  is  no  rule 
by  which  the  exact  weight  of  the  corroborating  circumstances 
requisite  to  warrant  a  conviction  can  be  determined ;  and  the  jury 
must  determine  whether  such  corroborating  circumstances  are 
sufficient  to  justify  a  verdict  of  guilty.  It  is  frequently  stated 
that  such  corroborating  circumstances  must  be  equivalent  to  the 
positive  or  direct  testimony  of  a  witness.  But  sueh  is  not  the 
rule  of  law.19 

Public  Nuisance. 

§  852.  Offensive  smells  from  slaughter  house. — If  the  defend- 
ant maintained  a  slaughter  house,  as  charged  in  the  affidavit  and 
information,  and  allowed  and  permitted  offal  of  cattle  and  other 
animals  slaughtered  there,  if  any,  to  there  accumulate  as  alleged 
in  the  information,  and  noisome  and  offensive  smells  were  then 
and  there  emitted  therefrom,  which  blended  with  noisome  smells 
emanating  from  another  slaughter  house  and  a  deposit  of  filth  in 
the  vicinity  of  said  slaughter  house,  if  any,  and  rendered  the  air 
impure  or  unhealthful,  to  the  injury  of  persons  named  in  the  in- 
formation, as  therein  alleged,  the  defendants  would  be  liable,  and 
the  fact  that  such  other  slaughter  house  and  deposit  of  filth  ex- 

1$  Haase   v.    S.   24  Vroom    (N.   J.         «  Galloway  v    S.  29  Ind.  442. 
L.)   40,  20  Atl.   751. 


843  WHAT  CONSTITUTES  NUISANCE.  §    855 

isted  and  exhaled  such  noisome  smells,  if  such  is  the  fact,  would 
not  justify  or  excuse  the  wrongful  act  of  the  defendants,  if  prov- 
able.20 

§  853.  Nuisance  must  affect  whole  community. — To  make  the 
defendant's  mill-dam  and  pond  a  public  nuisance  and  the  de- 
fendants indictable  for  maintaining  the  same,  it  must  inju- 
riously affect  the  public ;  that  is,  must  affect  the  whole  community. 
The  fact  that  it  injuriously  affects  individuals  or  families  in  a 
community  is  not  sufficient  to  make  the  defendants  guilty.  They 
should  be  acquitted  unless  the  jury  are  satisfied  the  whole  com- 
munity is  so  injuriously  affected — not  every  family  or  person  in 
the  community,  but  the  community  generally.21 

§  854.    Mill-dam   and   pond   producing   offense. — If   the   dam 

either  directly  causes  or  increases  the  inundation  of  the  sand, 
mud  and  stagnant  water  which  produces  the  malaria,  or  the  water 
would,  if  unobstructed,  carry  off  the  sand,  and  the  dam  so  ob- 
structs as  to  prevent  it  doing  so,  the  defendants  would  be  guilty. 
The  law  will  not  undertake  to  apportion  the  liability  for  a  public 
wrong.  The  question  for  the  jury  to  decide,  applying  the  prin- 
ciples of  law,  is,  does  the  dam  and  pond  produce  the  nuisance? 
If  so,  the  defendants  are  guilty,  otherwise  they  should  be  ac- 
quitted.22 

§  855.  Pond  producing  malaria,  odors. — The  erection  of  the 
dam  is  not  in  itself  wrongful,  nor  is  the  mill-pond  in  itself  a  nui- 
sance ;  if,  however,  by  reason  of  natural  causes,  such  as  decaying 
vegetation  which  has  grown  or  been  brought  into  the  pond  by 
the  stream  or  its  natural  tributaries,  or  changes  in  the  topography 
of  the  land  adjacent  to  the  creek  from  the  operation  of  natural 
laws,  the  pond  produces,  or  contributes  to  the  production  of 
malaria  or  noxious,  unhealthy  odors,  to  that  extent  which  injures 
the  health  or  comfort  of  the  community  in  general,  it  would 
thereby  become  a  nuisance,  and  the  defendants  indictable  for 
maintaining  it.23 

20  Dennis  v.   S.   91  Ind.   292.  is    indictable.     Paragon   Paper   Co. 

21  S.  v.  Holman,  104  N.  Car.  864,      v.  S.  19  Ind.  App.  328. 

10    S.    E.    758.     Under   the   statutes         22  s.  v.  Holmani,  104  N.  Car.  866. 

of  Indiana  a  public  nuisance  erected  10  S.  E.  758. 

or  maintained  "to  the  injury  of  any          ™  S.  v.  Holman,  104  N.  Car.  866, 

part  of  the  citizens  of  this  state"  10  S.  E.  758. 


§    856  OTHER   SPECIFIC    OFFENSES.  844 

The  defendants  are  liable  only  for  such  results  as  flow  directly, 
naturally  and  proximately  from  the  pond  and  dam.  Therefore,  if 
you  find  that  the  pond  and  dam  are  the  cause  of  the  nuisance, 
you  should  convict  the  defendants;  but  if  other  causes  or  agen- 
cies, to  which  the  defendants  have  not  contributed,  and  which  did 
not  arise  from  their  agency,  so  affected  the  pond  and  dam  as  to 
produce  the  cause  of  the  sickness,  then  such  sickness  would  be 
attributed  by  law  to  such  agencies,  and  not  to  the  pond  or  dam, 
and  you  should  acquit  the  defendants.24 

§  856.  Offense  caused  by  other  means. — If  the  evidence  should 
satisfy  the  jury  that  the  whole  community  had  been  injuriously 
affected,  yet  defendants  would  not  be  guilty  unless  it  was  further 
found  from  the  evidence  that  such  injury  was  produced,  directly 
and  proximately,  by  defendants'  dam  and  pond,  and  by  no  other 
cause.25 

§  857.  Nuisance  caused  by  others,  not  defendant. — If  other 
persons,  not  under  the  control  of  the  defendants,  plow  or  bring 
into  the  pond  or  the  lands  adjacent  thereto,  substances  which 
decay  and  produce  malaria ;  or  if  such  persons  cut  ditches  into  the 
stream  above  the  pond,  thereby  bringing  sand  and  mud  into  the 
creek;  or  if,  having  cut  such  ditches,  failed  to  keep  them  open, 
permitting  them  to  become  choked  and  filled  up,  thereby  causing 
malaria,  such  result  would  be  attributed  to  such  persons  and 
agencies  and  not  to  the  pond,  and  defendants  should  be  ac- 
quitted.26 

Highway  Violations. 

§  858.  Public  road — How  established,  user,  dedication. — (1)  A 
public  road  may  be  properly  established  by  user,  and  if  the  county 
attempted  to  establish  the  roacl  in  question,  and  the  proceedings 
were  void,  yet  if  the  said  road,  or  the  part  thereof  upon  which 
the  bridge  was  located,  was  used  as  a  public  road,  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  defendant,  for  the  term  of  ten  years  just  prior 

2*  S.  v.  Holman,  104  N.  Car,  865,  26  s.  v.  Hclman,  104  N.  Car.  865, 
10  S.  E.  758.  10  S.  E.  758. 

.25  s.  v.  Holman,  104  N.  Car.  865, 
10  S.  E.  758.  But  see  Dennis  v.  S. 
91  Ind.  291,  note  20,  this  chapter. 


845  OBSTRUCTING   PUBLIC    ROADS.  §    860 

to  the  alleged  destruction  of  said  bridge,  then  the  said  road  was 
properly  established.27 

(2)  You  are  instructed  that  there  can  be  no  valid  dedication  to 
the  public  of  such  right  of  way  as  is  claimed  unless  it  is  proved 
that  the  owner  of  the  land  intended  a  dedication  of  such  way  to 
the  public.28 

(3)  The  plaintiff  is  not  bound  to  rely  upon  the  record  alone  for 
the  road,  but  may  rely  on  any  facts  that  may  constitute  a  road, 
and  the  road  may  exist  part  by  record  and  part  by  dedication; 
and  if  Biggs,  while  he  was  the  owner  of'  the  land  through  which 
the  road  runs  at  the  point  of  alleged  obstruction,  dedicated  a  por- 
tion of  the  road  in  question  in  exchange  for  a  portion  of  the 
laid-out  road,  of  any  way  laid  out,  then  the  portion  so  dedicated 
will  be  a  valid  road.29 

§  859.  Vacating  public  road — How.^-The  county  commission- 
ers had  no  authority  to  vacate  the  road  in  question  unless  there 
was  first  filed  in  the  proper  office  the  petition  required  by  law, 
properly  published  or  posted,  and  any  order  they  might  make 
without  first  filing  the  petition  and  the  publication  or  posting 
of  the  required  notice  would  not  vacate  said  road.30 

§  860.  Malicious  destruction  of  bridge  on  highway. — (1)  Before 
you  can  convict  you  must  be  satisfied  from  the  evidence  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt  of  the  truth  of  the  following  propositions :  first, 
that  the  bridge  in  question  was  a  public  bridge ;  second,  that  the 
road  upon  which  it  was  placed  was  a  public  road  at  the  time  of 
the  alleged  destruction ;  third,  that  the  said  road  was  properly  es- 
tablished by  the  proper  legal  authorities,  or  was  a  public  road  by 
user,  and  was  such  public  road  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  destruc- 
tion; fourth,  that  the  defendant  willfully  and  unlawfully  and 
maliciously  did  cut  and  destroy  the  said  bridge  with  intent  to  in- 
jure the  same.31 

(2)  If  the  portion  of  the  road  upon  which  the  said  bridge  alleged 
to  have  been  destroyed  was  placed  had  not  been  totally  aban- 
doned as  a  road  for  a  period  of  five  years  next  prior  to  the  de- 
struction charged  against  the  defendant,  then  you  may  find  that 

27  O'Dea  v.  S.  16  Neb.  243,  20  N.         so  O'Dea  v.  S.  16  Neb.  243,  20  N. 
W.   299.     See,  Wragg  v.  Penn.  Tn.      W.  299. 

94  111.  24;   Daniels  v.  P.  21  111.  438,         si  O'Dea  v.  S.  16  Neb.  242,  20  N. 
several  instructions  held  proper.  W.  299. 

28  Ross  v.   Thompson.  78  Ind.  97. 

29  Town   of  Havana  v.   Biggs,   58 
111.  485. 


§    861  OTHEK    SPECIFIC    OFFENSES.  846 

said  part  of  the  road  was  a  public  road,  provided  you  further  find 
that  the  said  road  was  in  the  original  instance  properly  estab- 
lished, or  has  been  in  public  use  for  a  period  of  ten  years  next 
prior  to  the  alleged  destruction  of  said  bridge.32 

(3)  If  you  shall  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
portion  of  the  road  on  which  the  bridge  was  placed  had  been 
totally  abandoned  as  a  public  road  for  a  period  of  five  years  next 
prior  to  the  establishing  and  placing  thereon  the  bridge  in  ques- 
tion, then  it  ceased  to  be  a  public  road  and  no  conviction  can  be 
had.33 

(4)  You  may,  in  endeavoring  to  learn  whether  or  not  the  de- 
fendant knew  the  bridge  was  a  public  one  and  located  upon  a 
properly  established  public  road,  consider  that  the  defendant  re- 
ceived damages  from  the  county  of  W  for  the  land  taken  to  con- 
stitute the  part  of  the  road  upon  which  the  bridge  was  located.34 


Sunday  Violations. 

§  861.  Operating  machinery  on  Sunday.—' '  The  court  instructs 
the  jury  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  state  in  this  case  to 
establish  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  the  fact  that  the  defendant 
pumped  or  operated  certain  oil  well  or  wells  in  K,  county  on  a 
Sabbath-day  within  one  year  prior  to  the  finding  of  this  indict- 
ment ;  and  further,  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  state  to 
prove  that  such  pumping  or  operating  was  not  a  work  of  necessity 
or  charity."35 

32  O'Dea  v.  S.  16  Neb.  242,  20  N.  34  Q'Dea  v.  S.  16  Neb.  243,  20  N. 
W.  299.  W.  299. 

as  O'Dea  v.  S.  16  Neb.  242,  20  N.  ss  s.  v.  McBee,  52  W.  Va.  260,  43 
W.  299.  S.  E.  121. 


CHAPTER  LXI. 

MISCELLANEOUS  INSTRUCTIONS. 
Sec.  Sec. 

CONTRACTS.  FENCES. 

862.  Extending  time  of  payment—      869-    Notice    of    fence    viewers    to 

Evidence.  parties  interested. 

GUARDIAN. 
CONVERTING  PROPERTY. 

870.    Estimating     value     of     guar- 

863.  Damages  for   property  appro-  dian's  services. 

priated. 

HANDWRITING,   PROVING. 

CORPORATIONS.  871.    Knowledge    from    seeing    per- 

son write. 

864.  Proving  existence  of  corpora-      §72.     Comparison  of  signatures  im- 

tion  by  user.  proper. 

CUSTOMS.  HOMESTEAD. 

873.     Abandonment  of  homestead. 

865.  Customs   and    rules   of   board 

°      ra  e'  SEDUCTION. 


874.  Exemplary    damages    proper. 

875.  Damages     for     alienation     of 

on 

strength  of  his  own  title. 


EJECTMENT. 

O  I'O.         JL 

T,,   .  wife's  affections. 

866.     Plaintiff     must     recover      on 


EVIDENCE. 


SELLING    LIQUORS. 

876.    Residence   district — What    is. 


867.  Copy,  instead  of  original,  used  TRESPASS. 

as  evidence. 

877.  Damages  for  trespass. 

ESTOPPEL.  VERDICT. 

868.  Disclaiming  interest  in  prop-      878.  Separate  verdict  where  several 

erty.  defendants. 

847 


§    862  MISCELLANEOUS  INSTRUCTIONS.  848 

Contracts. 

§  862.  Extending  time  of  payment — Evidence. — The  payment 
of  interest  in  advance  is  not  of  itself  conclusive  evidence  of  a 
contract  to  extend  the  time  of  payment  for  the  term  for  which 
interest  may  have  been  thus  paid,  but  it  is  a  strong  circumstance 
to  be  looked  to  by  the  jury  in  determining  the  existence  of  the 
contract  claimed.1 

Converting  property. 

§  863.  Damages  for  property  appropriated. — The  measure  of 
damages  is  the  value  of  the  logs  at  the  time  they  were  converted 
to  the  defendant's  use,  without  any  deduction  for  labor  rendered 
or  bestowed  upon  them  by  the  wrongdoer.2 

Corporations. 

§  864.    Proving  existence  of  corporation  by  user. — It  is  not 

necessary  for  the  state  to  prove  the  articles  of  association  or 
charter  of  the  railway  company;  it  is  sufficient  to  prove  by 
reputation  that  there  was  at  the  time  when  the  crime  is  alleged 
to  have  been  committed  a  corporation  known  by  that  name, 
operating  such  road,  and  carrying  goods,  stock  and  passengers 
for  hire  in  its  cars  running  along  or  upon  said  company's  road. 
A  de  facto  existence  of  the  corporation  is  only  necessary  to  be 
shown.3 

Customs. 

§  865.  Customs  and  rules  of  board  of  trade. — If  the  jury  be- 
lieve from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  went  upon  the  board 
of  trade  and  made  contracts  and  traded  with  the  members,  he 
is  bound  by  the  rules,  regulations  and  customs  of  said  board  the 
same  as  if  he  had  been  a  member  thereof,  and  in  that  case  will 
not  be  permitted  to  plead  his  ignorance  of  said  rules,  regula- 
tions and  customs  as  a  reason  for  not  being  bound  by  them.4 

i  Gard   v.   Neff,   39   Ohio  St.    607.          s  Burke  v.  S.  34  Ohio  St.  79. 
•2  Everson  v.  Seller,  105  Ind.  270,         *  Chicago,  P.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Tilton, 
4  N.  E.  854.  87   111.   553. 


849  EJECTMENT,    EVIDENCE.  §    867 

Ejectment. 

§  866.    Plaintiff  must  recover  on  strength  of  his  own  title. — (1) 

In  an  action  of  ejectment  the  general  rule  is  that  the  plaintiff  must 
recover  upon  the  strength  of  his  own  title  and  not  upon  the 
weakness  of  the  defendant's  title,  for  the  reason  that  the  defend- 
ant is  not  required  to  give  up  possession  until  the  true  owner 
demands  it,  and  the  right  to  show  in  defense  a  subsisting  out- 
standing title  rests  upon  the  same  principle.  So  if  the  title  of 
the  plaintiff,  D,  to  the  three  thousand  acres  of  land  claimed  by 
him,  became  forfeited  to  the  state  for  any  five  consecutive  years 
before  bringing  this  suit,  for  the  non-payment  of  taxes  thereon, 
or  for  the  failure  of  the  said  D,  or  any  one  under  whom  he  claims 
to  have  said  lands  entered  on  the  land  books  of  any  county  in 
which  part  thereof  is  situated  where  they  are  located  for  the 
purpose  of  taxation,  then  the  said  plaintiff  cannot  recover  in 
this  action,  and  the  jury  must  find  for  the  defendant.5 

(2)  Although  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
land  in  controversy  is  covered  by  the  deeds  under  which  the 
plaintiff  claims,  yet  if  they  further  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  the  defendants  and  those  under  whom  they  claim  have  been 
in  the  honest,  peaceable,  continuous  and  adverse  possession 
of  said  land,  paying  taxes  on  the  same,  under  color  of  title,  for 
fifteen  years  prior  to  the  institution  of  this  suit,  they  must  find 
for  the  defendants.6 

Evidence. 

§867.  Copy  instead  of  original  used  as  evidence. — Counsel 
for  the  plaintiff  have  agreed  that  the  accounts  offered  in  evidence 
by  the  defendant  and  taken  from  his  books,  shall  have  the 
same  effect  as  though  the  books  themselves  had  been  duly  proved 
and  produced  in  court;  but  unless  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  the  books  from  which  said  accounts  were  taken 
were  books  of  original  entry,  then  the  same  are  not  evidence  in 
favor  of  the  defendant  on  this  trial.7 

3  Davis  v.  Living,  50  W.  Va.  432,  T  Shrewsbury  v.  Tufts.  41  W.  Va. 
40  S.  B.  365.  217,  23  S.  E.  692. 

«  Rensens  v.  Lawson,  91  Va.  230, 
21  S.  E.  347. 


§    868  MISCELLANEOUS  INSTRUCTIONS.  850 

Estoppel. 

.  §868.  Disclaiming  interest  in  property. — (1)  Where  one  person 
by  his  acts  or  declarations  made  deliberately  and  with  knowl- 
edge induces  another  to  believe  certain  facts  to  exist,  and  such 
other  person  rightfully  acts  on  the  belief  so  induced  and  is 
misled  thereby,  the  former  is  estopped  to  afterwards  set  up  a 
claim  based  upon  facts  inconsistent  with  the  facts  so  relied  upon, 
to  the  injury  of  the  person  so  misled.  This  definition  embraces 
all  the  essential  elements  of  an  estoppel.  It  will  be  your  duty 
to  examine  the  evidence  and  ascertain  whether  all  these  elements 
are  proved  in  this  case.9 

(2)  If  before  P  had  obtained  his  deed  from  G  and  B  for  the 
land  in   contest,   and  before  paying  for  the  same,   he  went  to 
R   and  asked  him  if  he  had  any  claim  on  such  land,  and  he  told 
him  he  did  not  claim  any  land  on  the  south  side  of  S,  and  he 
was  induced  to  take  the  deed  and  pay  for  said  land  by  reason 
of  said  statement  by  R,  then  R  is  barred  from  now  setting  up 
claim  to  said  land  against  P's  vendee,  the  plaintiff.10 

(3)  To  constitute  an  equitable   estoppel   of  the   rights  of  the 
plaintiffs  in  this  action  it  must  be  shown  that  the  plaintiffs  were 
apprised  of  each  sale  to  innocent  vendees,  before  it  was  made, 
so  that  they  might  have  had  an  opportunity  to  inform  the  pur- 
chaser of  their  interest  in  the  property  sold.11 


Fences. 

§  869.  Notice  of  fence  viewers  to  parties  interested. — (1)  It  was 

not  necessary  that  the  notice  of  the  fence  viewers  to  plaintiff 
and  defendant,  of  the  time  they  would  examine  the  fence,  should 
have  been  given  for  any  definite  time  or  number  of  days  before 
such  examination.  The  law  required  due  notice  to  be  given. 
By  the  term  due*  notice,  is  meant  reasonable  notice;  and  the 
notice  to  the  defendant  was  due  and  reasonable,  if  after  the 

9  Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Platt    47         10  Ratcliff      v.      Bellfonte      Iron 
Ohio  St.  382,  25  N.  B.  1028.  Works   Co.    87   Ky.   564. 

11  Cox  v.   Matthews,   17   Ind.   367. 


851  HAND-WRITING,    PROOF    OF — FENCES.  §    871 

notice  was  given  he  had  a  reasonable  time  to  go  from  the  place 
where  it  was  served  and  be  at  the  examination  of  the  fence  at 
the  time  specified  in  the  notice.12 

(2)  It  was  not  necessary  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  that 
the  certificate  of  the  fence  viewers,  of  the  value  of  the  fence,  or  a 
copy  thereof,  should  have  been  served  upon  the  defendant,  or 
presented  to  him  before,  or  at  the  time  of,  demand  of  the  sum 
certified.13 

Guardian. 

§870.  Estimating  value  of  guardian's  services. — (1)  In  deter- 
mining the  amount  you  will  allow  Gr  for  his  services  as  guardian, 
in  the  event  you  find  for  the  plaintiff,  you  should  take  into 
consideration  the  amount  of  interest  he  has  charged  himself 
with,  the  rate  of  interest  he  could  reasonably  have  loaned  said 
funds  at  from  time  to  time,  and  his  allowance  for  services  by  the 
court  up  to  the  time  of  his  death.  A  guardian  who  loans  the 
funds  of  his  ward  and  collects  but  a  small  rate  of  interest 
thereon,  ought  not  to  have  for  his  services  as  much  compensa- 
tion as  one  who  loans  and  collects  for  his  ward  a  good  rate  of 
interest.14 

Handwriting,  Proving. 

§  871.  Knowledge  from  seeing  person  write. — (1)  Although  a 
witness  may  testify  that  he  has  seen  the  defendant  write,  yet 
this  is  not  proof  of  the  execution  of  the  instrument  of  writing 
purporting  to  have  been  executed  by  the  defendant,  unless  the 
witness  is  able  to  distinguish  the  signature  to  the  instrument  as 
that  of  the  defendant,  according  to  the  belief  of  the  witness 
founded  on  his  previous  knowledge  of  the  hand-writing  of  the 
defendant.15 

§  872.  Comparison  of  signatures  improper. — (1)  The  proof  of 
the  signature  of  the  defendant  to  the  note  in  question  cannot  be 
made  by  comparison  with  other  signatures,  but  the  burden  of 

12  Tnbbs  v.  Ogden,  46  Iowa,  137.          «  Richards  v.  S.  55  Ind.  383. 

13  Tubbs  v.  Ogden,  46  Iowa,  137.         ™  Putnam  v.  Wadley,  40  111.  346. 


§    872  MISCELLANEOUS  INSTRUCTIONS.  852 

proof  of  his  hand-writing  must  be  made  by  witnesses  who  have 
seen  the  defendant  write  and  are  familiar  with  his  signature, 
or  who  have  seen  letters  or  other  documents  which  the  defend- 
ant had,  in  the  course  of  his  business,  recognized  or  admitted  to 
be  his  own  hand-writing.16 


Homestead. 

§873.  Abandonment  of  homestead. — (1)  If  you  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  abondoned  his  wife  and  left  her  to 
shift  for  herself,  and  that  he  failed  to  support  his  wife,  and  that 
he  voluntariy  and  without  cause  left  the  premises  used  and 
occupied  as  a  homestead,  and  that  he  absented  himself  from 
said  house  and  continued  said  abandonment  up  to  the  death  of 
his  said  wife,  then,  and  in  that  event,  you  will  find  your  verdict  in 
favor  of  the  defendant.17 

(2)  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  defendant  had  aban- 
doned the  lot  in  controversy  for  home  use  and  appropriated  it 
for  other  than  home  purposes,  then  you  will  find  for  the  plain- 
tiff, unless  you  believe  that  at  the  time  of  the  levy  the  defendant 
had  reappropriated  said  lot  for  homestead  purposes  and  was 
using  and  occupying  the  same  with  the  intention  of  permanently 
using  and  occupying  the  same  as  a  home,  then,  in  that  event, 
you  will  find  for  defendant.  If  you  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  defendant  had  abandoned  the  lot  in  controversy  for  the 
purpose  of  a  home,  and  that  at  the  time  of  the  levy  he  was  using 
and  occupying  it  as  a  sham  and  pretext  to  shield  it,  from  his 
creditors,  then  you  will  find  for  the  plaintiff.18 


Seduction. 

§  874.  Exemplary  damages  proper. — If  the  jury  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  and  if  they 
further  believe  that  the  plaintiff  put  his  business  into  the  hands 

i«  Putnam  v.  Wadley,  40  111.  346.         "  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  Kenne- 
i?  Hector   v.    Knox,   63    Tex.    615.      dy,  75  Tex.  214,  13  S.  W.  28. 


853  SEDUCTION SELLING   LIQUORS.  §    876 

of  the  defendant  when  he  went  to  California  in  the  year  1862,  and 
that  the  defendant  took  advantage  of  his  situation-  for  the  pur- 
pose of  gaining  access  to  and  seducing  the  wife  of  the  plaintiff; 
and  if  the  jury  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant did,  under  these  circumstances,  commit  adultery  with  the 
wife  of  the  plaintiff,  they  have  a  right  to  give  exemplary  damages 
to  the  plaintiff  not  exceeding  the  amount  claimed  in  the  plain- 
tiff's declaration.19 

§  875.  Damages  for  alienation  of  wife's  affections. — If  you  find 
for  the  plaintiff,  then,  in  determining  the  question  of  damages, 
you  may  consider  what  injury,  if  any,  the  plaintiff  has  sustained 
to  his  domestic  peace  and  happiness  and  alienation  of  the  affec- 
tions and  the  society  of  his  wife,  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  such  alienation  has  been  proved  and  wrong  inflicted  upon  the 
plaintiff's  honor.20 

Setting  Liquors. 

§  876.  Residence  district — What  is. — (1)  If  a  certain  part  of 
the  city,  large  or  small,  is  principally  and  chiefly  used  for  resi- 
dence purposes,  families  residing  and  having  their  homes  there- 
in, such  part  of  the  city  would  not  become  a  business  portion 
of  the  city  merely  because  a  grocery  or  other  business  was 
there  carried  on  therein.  The  decided  preponderance  of  resi- 
dences and  families  residing  therein  determines  the  character 
of  such  portion  of  such  city.21 

.(2)  A  family  residing  in  a  dwelling  house  as  a  family  residence 
may  furnish  board  and  lodging  to  boarders  who  may  occupy  with 
the  family  a  part  of  such  residence,  and  such  use  of  a  dwelling 
house  will  not  change  its  character  from  a  residence  to  a  busi- 
ness house.22 

Trespass. 

§  877.  Damages  for  trespass. — If  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  that  the  defendant  is  guilty  of  the  trespasses,  or  either 

19  Yundt  v.  Hartrunft,  41  111.  16.  22  Shea   v.    City   of   Muncie,    148 

20  Ferguson  v.   Smethers,   70  Ind.  Ind.    35,    46    N.    B.    138    (ordinance 
521.  forbidding  sale  of  intoxicating  liq- 

21  Shea    v.    City    of    Muncie,    148  uors  in  residence  district,  construed 
Ind.  .34,  46  N.  E.  138.  by  the  court  in  this  case). 


§    877  MISCELLANEOUS  INSTRUCTIONS.  854 

of  them,  as  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  declaration,  then  the  jury 
will  find  for.  the  plaintiff  and  assess  her  damages  at  such  sum 
as  is  shown  by  the  evidence,  not  exceeding  five  thousand  dol- 
ars.23 

Verdict. 

§  878.  Separate  verdict  where  several  defendants. — Although 
the  defendants  are  jointly  informed  against  and  tried,  yet  as 
to  each  you  should  make  a  separate  finding,  and  if  you  should 
find  both  or  either  of  them  guilty,  you  should  state  in  your  ver- 
dict the  finding  and  punishment  of  each  separately.24 

23  Miller  v.  Balthasser,  78  111.  302.  24  s.  v.  Peebles  (Mo.),  77  S.  W. 
302.  520. 


INDEX. 


(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365—878  Forms.) 

A 
ABANDONED, 

counts  of  declaration  abandoned,  100. 
issues   abandoned,    100. 

ABANDONMENT, 

abandoning  homestead,  873. 
burden  of  proof,  land,    (4)    660. 
claim   to  land  abandoned,    (3)    660. 
insured  property,  forms,  428. 
what  is,   what  not,  land,    (4)    660. 

ABBREVIATIONS, 

determining  meaning  of,  160. 
in  writings,  meaning,   160. 

ABSENCE, 

evidence  wanting,  conspiracy,  82. 

motive  wanting,  killing,  264. 

no  street  lights,    (3)    591. 

of  request  for  instructions,  75,  220,  274,  284,  303. 

of  counsel,  35. 

defendant,  36. 
on  circumstantial  evidence,   303. 

ABSENT  WITNESS;  200. 

See  WITNESSES. 
statement   of,   instruction   n.   23,   211. 

ABSTRACT  INSTRUCTIONS, 

may  be   refused   though   correct,   48. 
misleading,  when,  48. 
too  general,  special  required.  26a. 
used   to   illustrate   rules,   48. 

ABSTRACT  PROPOSITIONS,  48. 

ACCEPTANCE, 

a  question  of  fact,   (3)    407. 

ACCESS, 

access  to  premises  impaired,    (4)    684. 

ACCESSORY.  See  AIDING,  ABETTING;  PRINCIPAL  AND  ACCESSORY. 

accomplice  an  accessory,  287. 
after  the  fact,  293. 

855 


856  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

ACCESSORY— Continued. 
before  the  fact,  293. 
definition,   statutory,   293. 
evidence  showing,  293. 
in  assault  to  kill,  293. 
is  principal,  764. 
mere  presence  not  aiding,  767. 
forms,  765,  792. 
trial  of  accessory,   764. 

ACCIDENT, 

accidental   killing,   **06. 

shooting,   defense,   261. 
collision   with   hand   car,   648. 
defense  to  murder,  261. 
forms  of  instructions,  killing,  806. 

railroads,  648,  806. 
from  natural  cause,  581. 

trolley  wire,   (4)   547. 
injury  from,    (5)    (6)    545. 

no  liability,  581. 

railroads,  648. 

neither  party  negligent,  648. 
no  liability  for  accident,  598,  614. 
passenger  assisting  carrier,  560. 

falling  from  platform,  569. 
resulting  in  injury,  545. 

ACCOMPLICE,  See  AIDING,  ABETTING. 

an  accessory,  287. 
assuming,  proper  when,  291. 

testimony  true,  291. 
as    a    witness,    287,    376. 
caution   against,   288,    (5)     (6)    376. 
corroborating  another  accomplice,  289. 
corroboration  of,  289. 

required,    (3)    (4)   376. 
credibility  of,  288. 

for  jury,    (5)    376. 
defective  instructions,  289. 
defined,  287,  290. 
evidence  conclusive.  291. 
if  there  is  evidence  of,  290. 
if  no  evidence  of  accomplice,  290. 
in  incest,  woman  consenting,  290. 
in  larceny,  290. 
instructing  that   witness   is,   291. 

without  request,  290. 
instruction  assuming,  291. 

discretionary,  288. 

improper,  when,  288,  290,  291. 

proper  caution,  288. 
is  witness  accomplice,  290. 
on  material  matters,  290. 
participant  in  crime,  287. 
proving  corpus  delicti,  n.  18,  289. 

degree  of  crime,  n.  6,   288. 
receiver  of  stolen  goods,  290. 
refusal  if  no  request,  292. 
refusing  instructions  on,  289. 


INDEX.  857 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

ACCOMPLICE— Continued. 

statutory  definition  of,  290. 

requirements,  289. 
swearing  falsely,  288. 
testimony,  error  when,  288. 
uncorroborated,    288,    289,    376. 
weighing  testimony,  of  288. 
what  is,  287,  290. 
wife  of  accomplice,  n.  9,  288. 

ACCOUNT, 

proving  and   disproving,   126. 

ACCRETIONS, 

land  along  rivers,  668. 

meaning  of,  668. 

owner  of  accretions,  668. 

ACCUSED, 

See  DEFENDANT. 

ACQUIT, 

direction,   argumentative,   68. 
essential  fact  wanting,  312. 
in  circumstantial  evidence,  312. 
material   fact   unproved,   312. 
used  for  "convict,"  78. 

ACQUITTAL, 

instruction    directing,    n.    108,    150. 

ACT, 

circumstances  of  committing,   279. 
clearly    negligence,    183. 
committed  voluntarily,  279. 

with  deadly  weapon,  279. 
probable   consequence   of,   279,    777. 

ACTION 

barred  by  limitation.   126. 
based  on  gambling  contract,    128. 
evidence  tending  to  prove,   130. 
for  assault  and  battery,    176. 
material  facts  of,  proof,  199. 

ACTUAL  POSSESSION, 

question  of  law,  163. ' 

ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS, 

See  FURTHER  INSTRUCTIONS. 
presenting  after  general  charge,  14. 

ADMISSIONS, 

See  CONFESSIONS,  318-737. 

acting  upon  with  caution,  738. 
competent,  when,  318. 
in  civil  cases,  n.  36,  321. 


858  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

ADMISSIONS— Continued. 

instruction  on,  improper,  319. 
made  by  deceased,  739. 
proving  case,  no  error,  243. 
subjeect    to    imperfection,    738. 

ADULTERY, 

common  law  marriage,   834. 
evidence  after  filing  complaint,  108. 

not  within  statute  of  limitation,   108. 
instruction  on  limitation,   108. 
living  together  openly,   833. 
occasional  acts,  no  offense,  833. 
refusal  on  limitation,  error,   108. 
seducing  another's  wife,   874. 

ADVERSE, 

claiming  land  by  possession,   (3)   658. 
possession  of  land,  656. 

ADVICE, 

counsel  advising,  malicious  prosecution,  506. 

AFFECTIONS, 

alienating  affections,  875. 

AFFIDAVIT, 

in   attachment,   n.   31,   53. 

AFFIRMATIVE, 

evidence,  hearing  bell,  204. 
negative  evidence,  204,  205. 
on  which  party,  163. 

AFFIRMATIVE   CHARGE, 
directing  verdict,  120. 

AFFIRMATIVE  EVIDENCE,  204,  205. 

AFFIRMATIVE  ISSUES, 

burden  of  proof  on,  6. 

AGE, 

affecting  credibility,  (9)   365. 
care  of  child,  negligence,  600. 
difference  of,  in  defense,   118. 
element  of  damages,  649. 

death,    (7)    650,    (2)    652. 
female  in  rape,  82. 
immature   judgment.   619. 
in  determining  negligence,  619 
negligence  of  boy,  639. 
of  witness,  consideration,  215. 

AGENCY. 

applied  to  partners,  459. 
company's    teller    acting,    390. 
lorms,  388. 
in  acts  of  negligence,  392. 


INDEX.  859 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,   §§    365—878  Forms.) 

AGENCY— Continued. 

in  borrowing  money,    ( 1 )    389. 

in  partnership,  form,    (3)    393. 

in  renting  house,  391. 

in  selling  land,  form,    (2)    388,  394. 

machine,  394. 
in  signing  note,    (3)    388. 
in  soliciting  subscriptions,    (4,    393. 
partners  act  for  each  other,  459. 

AGENT, 

acting  for  principal,  388,  390. 
appropriating    proceeds,   embezzlement,    820. 
borrowing  for  employer,  389. 

for  principal  "(3)     (4)    389. 
collecting  on  commission,  embezzlement,  821. 
embezzling  property,  82u. 
exceeding  authority,  form,  393. 
executing  notes,  form,    (3)    388. 
fraudulent   representations  by,    (2)    388. 
instruction  on,  misleading,  65. 
of  banking  company,  436. 
power  of,  misleading,  65. 
principal  adopting  act  of,  389. 
scope  of  authority,    (3)    388,    (4)    389. 
signing  contracts,  388. 
waiving  principal's  rights,  176. 

AGGRESSOR, 

facts  in  determining,  801. 

AIDING,  ABETTING,  765.  See  ACCESSORY. 

acting  together.   811. 
aiding  in  burglary,  811. 
by  woras  or  gestures,   765. 
forms  of  instructions,  765. 
in  forgery,  842. 
in  murder,   785. 
instructions  on,  293. 

for  defendant.  785. 
mere  presence,  forms,  792. 

is  not,    (3)    765,  792. 
not  being  present,  326. 
overt  act  necessary,   792. 

ALABAMA, 

directing  verdict,  when,  n.   15,   123. 

ALIBI,  See  DEFENSE.  , 

as  a  defense,  322,  743. 
attempt  to  prove.  328. 
burden  of  proof.  743. 

on  defendant,  322,  324,    (3)    743. 
casting   suspicion   upon,   325. 
caution  as  to  alibi,  745. 
comparative  weight,  328. 
considered  with  other  evidence,  743. 
degree  of  proof  of,  323. 


860  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

ALIBI — Continued. 

easily  fabricated,  328. 
entitled  to  instruction,  326. 
evidence   supporting,   326. 
failing  to  prove,  328. 
forms  of  instructions,  743. 
high  degree  of  proof,  745. 
instructions  discrediting,  325. 
improper,  323,  328. 
proper,   324,   327. 
no  evidence  of,  326. 
open  to  abuse,  328. 
preponderance  of  evidence,  324. 
presence   of  defendant,   322. 

raising   reasonable   doubt,   322,   323,   326,   743,   744. 
reasonable  doubt  on,   322. 
request  for  instruction,  326. 
scan    with    caution,    327. 
subjected  to  scrutiny,  325. 

ALIENATION, 

alienating  wife's  affections,  875. 

ALLEGATIONS, 

stating   allegations,    194. 

ALTERATION, 

alteration  in  forgery,  841. 

ALTERING, 

written  contract,  altering,  471. 

AMENDMENTS, 

amending  instructions,  40. 
amending  pleadings,   127. 

ANIMALS, 

attack  by  dog,  479. 
cruelty  to  animals,  837. 
dangerous    animals    at    large.    678. 
destroying   crops,    676. 
injuring  person,  478. 
killing  another,  liability,  512. 
to  preserve  crops,  837. 
overdriving   horse,   838. 
shipping   cattle,    hogs,    589. 
trespassing  on  premises,  512. 

ANSWERS, 

to  be  conclusive  of  rights,  231. 
to  interrogatories,  231. 

APPEAL, 


all  instructions  in  record.  359. 
exceptions  on  appeal,  347. 

taken   after,  352. 
in  absence  of  evidence,  361. 

legal   questions  not  reeviewable,  when,  n.  87,  360. 
objections,  how  considered.  10. 
oral  instructions  on,  n.  70,  358. 


INDEX.  861 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

APPEAL — Continued. 

party  held  to  position  taken  in  trial  court,  363. 

review  without  evidence,   361. 

reviewing  error  on:  346. 

rulings  reviewable  on,   149. 

what  record  must  show,   10. 

without  preserving  evidence,  362. 

APPEARANCES,  See  SELF-DEFENSE. 

appearances  in  self-defense,  256,  802. 
instruction   ignoring,   256. 
reasonable   doubt,    803. 
refusing   on.   error   when,   256. 

APPLIANCES, 

assuming  machinery  safe,  622. 

safe,  forms,  623. 
servant  presuming  safe,  622. 

APPROACHING, 

approaching    railroad    crossing,    184. 

ARBITRATION, 

award   void,   when,   432. 
form  of  instructions,  432. 
settling  disputes  by,  432. 

ARGUMENT, 

commenting  on  argument,  n.  201,  117a. 

ARGUMENTATIVE, 

containing  reasons  for  conclusion,  66,   67. 

if  relevant,   error  harmless,   67. 

illustrations  of,  68. 

instructions  misleading,  confusing,  66. 

lengthy  recital  of  facts,  66. 

long  and  verbose,  66. 

material  error,  when.  67. 

not   necessarily  error,   67. 

on  false  swearing,  66. 

reciting   facts   of   one   side,   66. 

relating  to  expert  witness,  66. 

stating  reasons  for  conclusion,  66,  67. 

two   conclusions,   suggesting,   68. 

verdict,  relating  to,  66. 

whereabouts  of  defendant,  68. 

ARGUMENTS  OF  COUNSEL, 

instructions  relating  to,  49. 

ARKANSAS, 

instructions,  civil  cases,  3. 

ARRANGEMENT  OF  WORDS,  77. 

ARREST, 

caused  maliciously,    (4)    504. 
officer  acting  unlawfully.  805. 
resisting  unlawful  arrest,  262,  805. 


862  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365—878  Forms.J 

ARREST— Cow  tinned. 

unlawful  arrest,  forms,  805. 

forms,   503,   505. 
without  authority,  killing,  262. 
without  warrant,  503. 

proper,  503,  789. 

ASSAULT, 

aggravated,  definition,  284. 
by  several,  defense,  804. 
deadly  weapon  used,  279,  767. 
exemplary   damages,   477. 
failure  to  instruct,  268. 
forms  of  instructions,   766. 
ignoring  defense  to,  118. 
included  in  felonious  assault,  267. 

in  rape,  274. 
instructions  not  assuming,   194. 

on  accessory,   293. 
intending  to  kill,  forms,  768. 
intent  to  commit  rape,   178,  477,  769. 
•no  evidence  of  assault,  268. 
refusing  instructions,   error,   267. 
simple  assault  defined,  766. 
to   commit   robbery,    772. 
with   deadly   weapon,  279,  767. 
with  intent,  and  bodily  injury,  98. 

to  kill,  88,  268,  277,  768. 

to  murder,   277. 

ASSAULT  AND  BATTERY, 

assessing    damages    for,    59. 
damages,  how  determined,   59. 
defined,  794. 
included  in  graver  offense,  267. 

in   robbery,   772. 
instruction  as  to  injury,   176. 
whether  shaming  as  to  injury,    176. 

ASSAULTING, 

in  self-defense,  474. 
not  in  self-defense,  475. 

ASSESSMENT, 

listing  land  for,  690. 

ASSETS. 

market   value,   embezzlement,    828. 
value  of,   bank   embezzlement,   828. 

ASSIGNMENT, 

fraudulent,   when,   524. 
void   for  fraud,   524. 

ASSIGNMENT  OF  ERRORS, 
in   court  of   review,   346. 
on  instructions  in  group,  353. 
right  not  waived,  355. 
unavailing,   when,    353,   359. 


INDEX.  863 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms'.) 

ASSUMING, 

assuming  facts,  illustrations,   193. 

without  evidence,   192,   197. 

no  evidence,   192. 

trespass  committed,  193. 

truth  of  testimony,  accomplice,  291. 

when  evidence  contrary,  192. 
controverted  facts,  error,  195. 
damages  assumed,    193. 
defendant  in  wrong,  259. 

made  false  statements,   193. 
evidence   of  theft,   error,    193. 
facts   in   dispute,   improper,    192. 

properly  assumed,   when,   196. 
harmless  when  defect  cured,   72. 
in  criminal  cases,  198. 
not   assuming,    illustrations,    194. 
not  error  when,   n.   33,   197. 
on  common  knowledge,  n.  33,  197. 
on  disputed  fact,  195. 
on   value   of   stock   killed,   error,    196. 
permanent   injury,   195. 
risks   of   employment,   617. 
shooting  took  place,  proper,   188. 
stating  allegation,  not  assuming,  194. 
suspicious   circumstances,    193. 
there  is  evidence  when  none,   192. 
when  both  sides  admit,   197. 
when  evidence  all  on  one  side,  196. 

close,   195. 

when  facts  admitted,    197. 
witness  accomplice,  290. 

ASSUMING  FACTS,  242,   192. 
ATTACHMENT, 

affidavit  in  attachment,  n.  31,  53. 

directing  vrdict  in,  127. 

ATTESTING, 

requirements  in  attesting  wills,  693. 

ATTORNEY, 

See  COUNSEL. 

cannot  recover,  when,  431. 
embezzlement   by   attorney,   822. 
value  of  services  of,  430. 

B 

BAGGAGE, 

degree  of  care,  carrier,  585. 
forms  rf  instructions,   585. 
limiting  liability  for,  586. 

forms,    586. 
lost  by  carrier,  585. 

by  railroad    584. 
ordinary  care,  when,  581. 
theft  of,   liability,   585. 
value  of,  assessing,  585. 


864  INDEX. 

{References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365—878  Forms.) 

BAILMENT,  See  KOBSE. 

abuse  of  hired  horse,    (5)    433. 
forms    of    instructions,    433. 
hiring  horse,  433. 
hotel   losing  property,   435. 
injury  to  property,    (2)    433. 
liability   for   conversion,    ( 1 )    433. 
money   intrusted,   liability,  434. 
violating  contract  of,  433. 

BANK, 

assets    and    liabilities,    embezzlement,    828. 
expert  testimony,  embezzlement,  828. 
failure  prima  facia  evidence,  829. 
holding  one  out  as  agent,  436. 
in   failing  circumstances,   when,   825,   828. 
knowledge  of  bank's  condition,  825. 
officers  appropriating  deposits,  825. 
officer  embezzling  funds,  240. 
president  borrowing  from,  827. 

receiving  deposits  unlawfully,    (2)    826. 
value  of  assets,  embezzlement,  828. 

BANKER, 

embezzling   deposits,    825. 

receiving  deposits  by  agents,    (2)    826. 

BANKING, 

attempting  to  defraud,  437. 
forms  of  instructions,  436. 
teller's  certification  of  check,  436. 

BASED  ON  EVIDENCE,  94,  98. 

on  evidence  rather  than  pleadings,  95. 

BASED  ON  PLEADINGS,  97. 

BASTARDY, 

forms  of  instructions,  835. 
jury  determine  facts,  835. 

BELIEF, 

mere  belief,  no  defense,  800. 
unsupported   by  evidence,   256. 
well  grounded  in  self-defense,  256. 

BELIEVING  WITNESS,  221. 

See  WITNESSES. 

BELL. 

failure  to  ring  at  crossings,  641. 

forms,  184,  641. 

frightening  traveler's  team,    (8)    641. 
ordinance  requiring,  644. 
ringing  at  crossings,  641. 

at  private  crossings,    (9)    641. 

BENEFITS. 

common  to  community,  687. 
deducting  benefits,  damages,  687. 


INDEX.  865 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

BETTING, 

on  game  of  cards,  847. 

BICYCLE, 

care  in  riding,  245. 

crossing   railway   track,   636,   641. 

injury  to  rider,  482. 

on    road,    480. 
while   riding.   245. 
negligence  of   rider,    (3)    482. 
rights  of  rider,    (2)    482. 
using  on  highway,  480. 

BILL  OF  EXCEPTIONS,  See  RECORD. 

preserving  all   evidence,   361. 

all  instructions,  358,  359,  361. 
court's  rulings,  149. 
instructions,  part  of  record,  357. 
oral   instructions,   n.   70,    358. 
relating  to  instructions,  jury  waived,  47. 

BILL  OF  LADING, 

in  shipment  of  goods,  587. 
prima  facie  evidence,  587. 

BILLIARDS, 

betting  on  game,  848. 

BLACKSTONE, 

on  summing  up  evidence,  119. 

BOARD  OF  TRADE, 

customs  and  rules,  865. 

BOAT, 

insurance  on,  forms,  428,  429. 

BOILER, 

explosion  of,  539. 

injury  from  explosion,   580,    (5)    619,    (2)    621,  623. 

BOND, 

inducing  sureties  to  sign,  521. 

BOOK  ACCOUNTS, 

copies  as  evidence,  867. 

BOTH  PARTIES, 

admitting  facts,  instruction  when,   197. 
facts  admitted  by,  197. 
guilty  of  negligence,    (3)    (6)    544. 
requesting  peremptory  instruction,  145. 
verdict,  effect,  146. 

BOUNDARY,  See  MEANDER. 

by  high-water  mark,  667. 
line  agreed  upon,  664. 
locating  dividing  line,  665. 
meander  line  boundary..  666. 
proof  of  agreement,  664. 

BRAKEMAN,  See  RAILROADS. 

assuming  risks,   (5)   617. 
carelessly  uncoupling  cars,    (3)   264. 
continuing  with  knowledge  of  danger,  619. 


866  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1— 3C4   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

BRAKEMAN — Continued. 

fellow  servant  of  engineer,  614. 

forms  of   instructions,   624. 

injured   coupling   cars,    (8)    610,    624. 

knowing  danger,  killed,   (4)   619. 

ladders  for,  on  cars,  639. 

not    careful,    coupling    cars,    624. 

presumed   competent,    (5)    617. 

railroad  carelessly  injuring,  624. 

BRANDING, 

evidence  of  larceny,    118. 

BREACH, 

of  contract,  296. 

of  marriage  contract,  455. 

of  warranty,  408. 

BREACH  OF  PEACE, 

what  constitutes,  788. 

BREAKING, 

breaking  defined,  burglary,   808. 
lifting  a   latch,   808. 
opening  window  or  door,   808. 
removing  transom,  808. 
turning  a  key,   808. 

BRIDGE 

construction  of,    (4)   545. 
dangerous  condition,    (4)    545. 
falling  causing  injury,  601. 
in  city,  repairing,  601. 
in    highway,   falling,    601. 
indictment   for   destroying,   860. 
insecurely  erected,  damages,  675. 
keeping  in  repair,  482,  601. 
malicious  destruction  of.  860. 
private  persons  controlling,  601. 
riding  bicycle   on,   482. 
washing  out,  injuring  dam,  675. 

BROKER, 

burden  of  proof,  442. 
buying  wheat,  form,  440. 
cannot .  recover,  when,  440. 
commission   earned,   when,  438. 
complying  with   contract,    (5)     (6)    438. 
entitled  to  commission,  when,  438,  439. 
facts  essential  to  commission,    (4)    439. 
failing   to    comply    with    contract,    440. 
interest  on   balances,   443. 
notice,  element  of  contract,  441. 
securing  purchaser,  439. 
.selling   land,   438,    (2)    439. 

BUILDING, 

contractor   entitled   to   recover,   444. 
contracts   for,   444. 
dangerous  roof,    (9-16)    544. 
original   contract  abandoned,   445. 
wilfully   abandoning   contract,    445. 


INDEX.  867 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

BUILDING  CONTRACT, 

erroneous  instruction  cured,  239. 
forms  of  instructions  on,  444,  445. 

BURDEN, 

all  averments,   form,    (3)     (4)     (5)    383. 
burden  on  plaintiff,  616. 

by  preponderance,    (1)    (4)    382,    (2)    383.  531. 
contributory  negligence,  633. 
disproving  ordinary  care,    (2)    631. 
does  not  shift,  n.  2,  199. 
forms  of  instruction  on,  531. 
from  either  side,   (3)   583. 
in  proving  warranty,  408. 
in  will  contest,  696. 
insanity,   criminal,   201. 
instructions  properly  refused,   191. 
negligence,   633. 
of  proof,  form,   382,   384. 
'    on  defendant,  form,    (2)    (4)    (6)   384. 

note,    (5)   415. 

when,   199,  202,    (2)    410.    (17)    415,  531,  548. 
on  free  from  fault,  258. 
on  mitigating  circumstances,  782. 
on  party  affirming,   199. 
on  payment,  form,    (6)   384. 
on  plaintiff,  brokerage,  442. 

negligence,   383,   385,  633,  616. 

when.   383,  410,   531. 
on  wrong  party,   error,   199. 

harmless,   199. 
proving  warranty,    (1)    410. 
refusal  of  instructions,  error,  199. 
requests  on,  essential,   199. 
slight   preponderance   sufficient,    (5)    382. 
when  facts  conclusively  shown,  199. 

BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   199. 

defective  instruction,  harmless,  when,  72. 
failure  to  instruct  on.   6. 
further  instructions  on,  6. 
instructions  on,  6. 

not   requested,   6. 
on  affirmative  issues,  6. 
preponderance   of   evidence,  n.   32,   200. 
request  for  instruction,  6. 

BURGLARY,  See  LARCENY 

aiding,   acting  together,   811. 
breaking   defined,    808. 
burglars   killing,    785. 
burglary  and  larceny,  810. 
evidence  of,  812. 
forms  of  instructions,   808,  810. 

submitting   facts.    813. 
intent,  how  shown,   809. 
joined   with   larceny,   810. 


868  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

BURGLARY— Con  tinned. 

night  time,  failure  to  define,  75. 
possession,  a  circumstance,  2G6. 

of  goods,  proof,  265a. 

of  stolen  property,  812. 

BURNING, 

railroads   burning   property,    645. 

BUSINESS, 

See  OCCUPATION. 
element  of  damages,    (3)    652. 
injured  by  nuisance,  679. 

BY-LAWS, 

construction  of,  155. 
legality  of  law,  163. 


CALIFORNIA, 

instructions  in  criminal  case,    165. 

CAR,  See  TRAIN. 

brakeman  coupling,  injured,  624. 
gripman  must  stop,  644. 
look  and  listen,   (3)   634. 
overcrowded,    care   when,    184. 

CARDS, 

betting  on   game,   847. 

CARE,  See  CARRIERS,  ORDINARY  CARE,  RAILROADS. 

age  of  plaintiff  considered,  600. 
an  issue,  instructions  ignoring,  92. 
approaching   railroad   crossing.    627. 
circumstances  in  determining,  608. 
defective  instruction  on,  cured.   72. 
degree  of  care  required,  532. 

master  for  servant,  610. 

disproving   ordinary   care,   burden,    (2)    631. 
due  care  required,  594. 
extraordinary   care   required,    532. 

not    required,     (4)     610. 
great  care  running  trains,   630,   631. 
high  degree,  carriers,  549,  563. 

required,  549,  563. 

highest   degree   required,    (2)    549,    581. 
in   conducting   a   race,   532. 
in  driving  vehicle,  533. 
in   furnishing   gas,   532. 
in  observing  danger,  618. 
in   operating   machinery,   534. 

trains,  648. 

in  personal  injury,  instructions,  92. 
in    preventing   damage,     (4)    676. 
in   traveling  streets,   600. 
in   using   electricity,    546. 
master    for    servant,    610. 
may  be  inferred,  535. 


INDEX.  869 

(References   are    to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.} 

CARE — Continued. 

of  defendant,  degree,  532. 
of  injured  party,  535. 
of  passenger,  degree,   184. 
omitting,  "due  care,"  error,   245. 
on    riding   wheel,    245. 
ordinary   care,   529,   534. 

defined,    530,    558,    599. 

exercising,   184. 

required,    532,    551,    610,    627. 
passenger's   care,    184,    551. 
passing  over   sidewalk.    592. 
question  of  fact,    (3)    594. 
reasonable    care    defined,    629. 
required  in  riding,  600. 

of  infant,  536. 

of  passenger,   184,  551. 
road   commissioners,   601. 
toward    children,    537. 
toward  a  trespasser, 
trains   in   city,    (3)    630. 
traveling  streets,   circumstances,   608. 
when  car  overcrowded,   184. 

CARELESSLY, 

definition  unnecessary,  75. 

CARELESSNESS, 
defined,  529. 

CARRIERS, 

See  RAILROADS. 

accidental,  injury  to  passenger,  581. 
approaches   to   station,   567. 
boiler   explosion   injuring  passenger,   580. 
burden  of  proof,  583. 

on    defendant,   when.    548. 
care   in   operating  cars,    ( 12 )    549. 

of   passenger,   184,   551. 
carrying  live  stock,  589. 

sick   person,   552. 
children  trespassing,  559. 
delay  in  delivering  good,  587. 
directions  to  passengers,   577. 
drunkenness,  forms,   55. 
duty   to   passenger,   584. 

to  stop,   564. 

toward    children.    559. 
ejecting   trespasser,    557,    558. 
failing  to  light   station.    (2)    563. 

to  stop  train,  561,  564. 
freight   rate   under   statute,   590. 
getting   off   moving   train.    561. 
high   degree   of   care,    549. 
highest   degree   care,    (6)    549. 
injury   to   passenger.    563. 

to   postal    clerk,   554. 

trespasser,    558. 


870  INPEX. 

(References   are    to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364    Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

CARRIERS— Continued. 

instructions,  on  liability  for  baggage,   586. 
letting  passenger  off,    (7)    551,  565. 
liability   for  baggage,   586. 

to   passenger,    (1)    549. 
liable  for  servant's  acts,    (8)    549. 
limiting  liability  for  baggage,   586. 
losing  baggage,   liability,   585. 

goods,  liability,  585,  587. 

forms,  587. 

misusing   child    trespasser,    559. 
negligence    of    carrier,    548. 

of  passenger,   562,   582. 
not    insurer    of    passenger,    549,    584. 
not  liable,  when,   588. 
obstructions   on   platform,   563. 
passenger    assisting,    560. 

following  directions,  567. 

injury  to,  548. 

negligent,   568. 

on  freight  car,  555. 

on   wrong   train,    576. 
platform   unsafe,   563,   566. 
putting  disorderly  passenger  off,  575. 

passenger  off,   556,  574. 
receiving  passengers,    (14)    549. 

where,    (15)    549. 
riding  on  car  platform,   570. 
right  of  way,   (6)   551. 
rotten  ties,    (16)    549. 
servant   injuring   passenger,    (8)    549. 
several  carriers,  liability,  585. 
slight  negligence,   liable,   549,   550. 
stages,   coaches,   550. 

starting  cars  suddenly,   548,  562,   563,  565,  567. 
stopping   at   station,    563. 
taking  on  passengers,    (14)    549. 
time    to   get    off,    565. 
trainmen   assisting   passenger,   571. 
trains  of  different  roads,  579. 
trespasser  on  train,    (5)    549. 

or  passenger,  558. 
using  horse  cars,    ( 13 )    549 
what  plaintiff  must  prove,  583. 
CATTLE, 

See  Cows,   ANIMALS. 
breaking  fences,   678. 
damages   for   failure   to   deliver,   400. 

for  killing,  646. 

from  disease,  513. 

in  shipping,    193. 
destroying  corn,  liability,  676. 
grass  damaged  by,  677. 
guards  at  crossings,   646. 
killed  by  railroad.  646. 
larceny  of.  branding.  118. 
shipping,   589. 


INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

CAUSE, 

remanded,  364. 

CAUTION, 

against  convicting  innocent  person,  32. 

in  grave  criminal  cases,  707. 

in  weighing  testimony,   207,  288. 

CAUTIONARY   INSTRUCTIONS,  49,   379. 
against   accomplice   witnesses,   288. 
against   convicting   innocent,    52. 

on  slight  evidence,  52. 
against  court's  opinions,  51. 
caution   as   to  excluded  evidence,   84. 
discretionary   with   court,   4!?. 
"great  caution,"  denning,  288. 
in  criminal  cases,  52,  707. 
on   confessions,    319. 
on  examining  evidence,  49. 
on    feigning    insanity,    333. 
on  matters  not  raised,  50. 
on  relatives  as  witnesses,  225. 
on   self-defense,   52. 
on  wife  as  witness,  225. 
on   witness'   credibility,   50. 
properly  refused,  when,  50. 
propriety  in  giving,  49. 
purpose   of  giving,   49. 
qualifying  other  instructions,  51. 
refusing   when   no   evidence,   50. 
relating  to  evidence,  49. 
restricting  jury   to   evidence,  51. 
when   several   defendants,   52. 

CERTIFICATE, 

fence  viewer's  certificate,    (2)    869. 
void,  on  sale  "f  land  for  taxes,  689. 

CHARACTER, 

See  GOOD   CHARACTER,   340. 

a  circumstance,  756. 
consider  when  impeached,  221. 
creating   reasonable   doubt,   757. 
deceased's  character,  807. 
defendant's  good   character,   340. 
for  honesty,  integrity,  756. 
forms   for   prosecution,   756. 
good  character,  756. 

unavailing,    756. 
instructions  for  defense,  757. 

for    prosecution,    756. 

on,  221. 

limiting  effect  of  evidence,  n.   27.   345. 
presumed  good,  758. 
witness'  character,  208,  220. 
impeached,    221. 


872  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

CHARGING  JURY, 

See  INSTRUCTIONS,  REQUESTS. 

court's  manner,  tone  of  voice,  46. 

in    abstract    propositions,    48. 

in  writing  and  orally,  11. 

oral   summary  of  evidence,    11. 

reading  statutes,   11. 

time  of  presenting  request,   14. 

waiving  time  of,   12. 

CHATTEL  MORTGAGE,  461.      See  MORTGAGE. 
rights  under,  461. 

CHECK. 

uttering   forged   check,   843,   844. 

CHILD, 

See  CHILDREN,  INFANT. 

care  of,  age  considered,  606,  619. 

CHILDREN,  See  INFANT,  MINOR. 

as  witnesses,  225. 
competency  as  witnesses,   225. 
credibility  as  witnesses,  225. 
getting  on  cars,  559. 
gripman   must  watch,   644. 
intelligence,   as   witnesses,    225. 
parents  liable  for  support,  448. 
railroad  killing  parent,    (2)    649. 
trespassers,  559. 
wife   supporting,   448. 

CIRCUMSTANCES, 

See  ESSENTIAL   FACTS,   FACTS. 

chain  of  facts,  proof,  312. 

consistent  with  guilt,  310. 

defendant  failing  to  testify,  229. 

drawing  inferences  from,  308. 

excluding  rational  conclusion,  310. 

immaterial   facts,   311. 

inconsistent   with   each   other,    310. 

indispensable  facts,  311. 

inferring  fact  from,  308,  309. 

possession   stolen   property,   266. 

weight  determined  by  jury,    182  • 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE,  729. 

absolute    certainty,    improper,    315. 
accounting   for   facts.    309. 

"all    is   circumstantial,"   improper,   n.    17,    305. 
applies  in  civil  cases,  n.   1,  303. 

circumstances    incompatible   with    innocence,    (5)    730. 
must  be  conclusive,   731. 
must  be   consistent.   731. 
comment   on   weight,    305. 
comparative  weight,  instructions,  305. 


INDEX.  873 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE— Continued. 
competency  of,   729. 
complete  charge  on,  n.  61,  313. 
conclusiveness   of,    (4)    729. 
consistent  with   guilt,   731. 
conviction    based    upon,    734. 
degree  of  proof,  734. 
direct   and   circumstantial,   304. 
drawing  inferences,  308. 
duty   of   court  without   request,   303. 
each  fact,  degree  of  proof,  734. 
"each   link"   in   chain,   733. 
entirely  circumstantial,   303. 
enumerating  facts,  effect,   309. 

excluding  reasonable  hypothesis,  303,  307,  313,  729,  730. 
facts   consistent,    310. 
forms  of  instructions,  729. 
illustrations,  erroneous,   306,  315. 
illustrations,   proper,    307. 
inconsistent  with   rational   theory,   732. 
in   determining   negligence,    639. 
inferences  from  circumstances,    (4)    729. 
inferring   main   fact,   309. 
in  larceny  case,   304. 
in  proving  conspiracy,   760. 
instructions   discretionary,    when,   304. 

excluding  other  persons,  314. 

explaining   proper,   305. 

improper,    315. 

may   be   refused,   when,   304. 

on,   improper,    306,    309. 

proper,   303,   312,   314. 

properly   modified,   n.    68,    315. 

properly    refused,    304. 

on    weight    improper,    305. 

when  eyewitnesses,  304. 
insufficiency   of   facts,   309. 
legal   and   competent,   303. 
"links  in  chain"  condemned,  n.   52,   312. 
main   fact,  proof  of.   312. 
material  facts,  consistency,  311. 
must  exclude  reasonable  theory  of  innocence,   730. 
of   included   offenses,   270. 
omission    of   "reasonable."    313. 
opposing  conclusions,  315. 
possession  of  fruits  of  robbery.   729. 
prejudice  against,  303. 
refusal   on,   error  when,   303,   304. 
request   on   unnecessary,    303. 
restricting  to  material   facts,   311. 
special  instruction  on,  26. 
strength  of,  improper,   306. 
subsidiary   facts   not   within   rule,   735. 
sufficiency  of,  303. 
suspicions   not   evidence.    736. 
two  opposing  conclusions,   315. 
will    support   instructions,   87. 


874  INDEX 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

CITY, 

absence  of  lights,    (3)    591. 
allowing   claims   against,   609. 
care  as  to  crossings,   597. 

of  plaintiff,  594. 

chargeable  with  knowledge,  597. 
controlling  bridge,  601. 
forms   of    instructions,    negligence,    591. 
grade  of  streets  improper,  602. 
ice  on  sidewalks,  603. 
issuing  building  permits,  605. 
keeping  lights  at   night,   591. 

sidewalks  in  repair,   (6)    (7)    (10)   591. 
maintaining   drains,    600. 
must  take  notice,  when,  597. 
negligence  of,  streets,  606. 
notice  of  danger,  595. 
not  liable,  bridge,  601. 

when,  593,    (3)    595. 
plaintiff  knowing  danger,  593,  594. 

negligence,  594. 

recovery  against,  when,    (5)    (6)    (10)    591. 
repair  of  sidewalks,  591. 

CLAIM, 

abandonment  of,  land,    (3)    660. 
barred  by  statute,  465. 
based  on  void  patent,    ( 1 )    405. 
claims  against  city,  609. 
disputed  claims,  404,  405. 
defense  against,   118. 

to   part  of,    118. 
mode  of  allowing,  609. 
payment  on  account,  467. 
promise   reviving   claim,   466. 
reviving  when  barred,  465. 
stating  admitted,  when  denied,   195. 
without  consideration,  405. 

CLAUSES, 

See  WORDS,  28. 

COERCING, 

compelling  jury  to  agree,  188. 

COLLECTOR. 

defrauding  tax  cpllector,   832. 

COLLISION, 

care  to  avoid,  648. 

COLOR, 

of  title  to  land,   663. 
question  of  law,  163. 

COMBAT, 

See  MUTUAL  COMBAT. 


INDEX,.  875 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

COMMENT, 

relating  to  fraud,  improper,   177. 
stating  act  is  negligence,   proper,    190. 

COMMENT  ON, 

alibi,   improper,  328. 
argument  improper,   n.   201,    117a. 
circumstantial  evidence,   305. 
evidence,  held  not,   173. 
commenting   on   confession,    217. 

on   evidence,    189. 
failure  to  produce  evidence,  222. 
when  witnesses  contradict,  212. 

interested,  209. 

COMMERCE  COMMISSION, 
tariff  rates  of,  590. 

COMMISSION, 

agent  collecting  on,  embezzlement.  821. 

selling  on,  394. 

broker  entitled  to,  when,  438. 
entitled  to,   when,  form,  439. 
facts  essential  to  entitle,    (4)   439 
for   selling   land,   438. 
rate  in  determining,  438. 

COMMISSIONERS, 

road   commissioners,    601. 
vacated  by, 

COMMON  KNOWLEDGE, 

instructions  on  discretionary,    107. 

COMMON   LABORER, 

definition   of,   unnecessary,   76. 

COMMON  LAW, 

court  expressing  opinion  on  evidence,    171. 
instruction  referring  to,  n.  2,  284. 

COMMON    SENSE, 

instructing  on  improper,    154. 

COMPENSATION, 

for  killing  kindred,    (4)    649. 
measured  by  risks  assumed,  617. 

COMPETENCY, 

competency  of  dying  declarations,   180. 
confession,    court   decides,    318. 
evidence,  court  decides,   174. 
witness,  court  determines,  n.  4,  206. 

COMPLAINT, 

See  DECLARATION. 

COMPROMISE, 

procuring  by  fraud,   524. 


876  I^DEX. 

(References   are    to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — S78  Forms.) 

CONCEALING, 

failure   to  produce  evidence,  222. 

CONCLUSIONS, 

facts  for  jury,   181. 
opposing  conclusions,  315. 

CONDEMNATION,  683. 

benefits    deducted,    687. 
fair  cash  value,  686. 
forms    of   instructions,    683. 
highest   and    best   use,   683. 
market   value,    (4)    683. 
measure  of  damages,   683,   685. 
railroad  taking  land,  685. 
witnesses   magnifying   value,   688. 

CONDUCT, 

witness'   conduct,    206. 

CONDUCTOR, 

at  fault  running  train,  617. 
mistake  taking  ticket,  573. 
running  train  rapidly,  617. 

CONFESSIONS, 

admitted  with   caution,   738. 
alone  insufficient,  320. 
believing    or    disbelieving,    316. 
by   slightest   menace   or   threat,   318. 
caution   against,  proper,   319. 
cautionary  instructions  on,   319. 
circumstances    of    making,    316. 
competency,   if  voluntary,   318. 

for   jury,   when,    318. 

of  generally,    112. 
considerations  in  weighing,  316. 
considered  same  as  other  evidence,   737. 
corpus  delicti,  proof,  320. 
corroboration,  320. 
credibility  for  jury,  319. 
evidence   conflicting,   318. 

wanting,  321. 

forms  of  instructions,  737. 
freely  and  voluntarily  made,  319. 
if  not  improbable,  738. 
induced   by   threat   or   promise,   318. 
instruction   on,   proper,    112. 

improper,  when,  317,  318,  321. 
intimating   opinion   on,   317. 
jury   believing  or  rejecting,  737. 

part,  737. 

misunderstanding  of,  317. 
no  evidence  of  confession,   321. 
not  disputed  or  challenged,  318. 
of  one  of  several  defendants.   112. 
refusing  instructions,  error,  318. 
regarding  or  disregarding,  318. 


INDEX.  877 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

CONFESSIONS— Continued. 
through  fear,  318. 
voluntarily  made,  weight,  317. 
whether  voluntary,  318. 
whole  of  the  confession,  ( 2 )  738. 
weight  of  for  jury,  316. 
withdrawing  evidence  of,  318. 

CONFLICT, 

abandoned,  259. 

CONFINING, 

confining  to  defense  alleged,  96. 
evidence,  105. 

CONFLICTING, 

evidence  conflicting,   instructions,   when,   6.2. 
reconciling  conflicting  testimony,  213,   365. 

CONJECTURE, 

caution  against,   (6)   379. 

CONNECTICUT, 

jury  judges  criminal  law,   167. 

CONSCIENTIOUS  BELIEF, 

belief  of  defendant's  guilt,  296. 

CONSENT, 

consent  to  sexual   intercourse,   770. 
question  of  fact,  rape,  771. 

CONSIDERATION. 

for   note,   form,    (10)    416. 
note  given  without,    (1)    405. 
insufficient,    (4)    404. 
sufficient,  when,  404. 

CONSIDERATIONS, 

in  assessing  damages,  condemnation,   (4)   685. 

determining  market  value,  685. 

mental  state,  701. 

negligence,  176,  639. 

validity  of  will.  703. 

estimating  damages,  81,  652. 
death,    (1)    (8)    649. 

guardian's  services,  870. 
in  mitigation  of  damages,  654. 
in  settling  disputed  claim,  404. 
in  weighing  testimony,  204.  215,  216,  227,    (2)    (5)    (6)    (8)    (9)    365, 

(6)    366. 
probability  or  improbability,   215. 

CONSISTENCY, 

instructions  proper,  314. 
of  circumstances,   310,   311. 

material  facts,  310,  311. 

CONSPIRACY, 

absence  of,  in  murder,  792. 
agreement  to  commit  murder.  761. 

to  commit  robbery,  762. 
all    responsible,    when,    761. 
declarations,  evidence  against  all,   763. 


878  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1  —  364   Principles,    §§    365  —  878  Forms.} 


—  Continued. 
defined,   759. 

evidence    circumstantial,    760. 
formal  agreement  unnecessary,  760. 
in  larceny  case,  88. 
instructions,  when  evidence  slight,  88. 
instructing  without  evidence,  82. 
pursuing  common  design.   760. 
slight  evidence   of  conspiracy,   88. 

CONSTABLES. 

arresting  without  a  warrant,  788. 

CONSTITUTION, 

legality  of,  law,  163. 

See  STATUTE. 

CONSTRUCTION, 

construed  as  a  whole,  70. 
cures  defects,  how,  71. 
instructions  as  a  whole,  238. 

considered  together,  72. 

of  both  parties,  71. 
wills  construed,   158. 
writings,    construction    of,    156. 
written  instruments  construed,  155. 

CONTESTANTS, 

must  prove  facts,  wills,    (5)    704. 

CONTRACT,  See  ORAL  CONTRACT. 

abandoned  before  completion,  399. 
agent   selling   machine,   395. 
altering  written  by  oral,  471. 
arbitration  of,   432. 
attorney's  services,  430. 
avoiding  for  duress,  527. 
bailment,   433. 

between  husband  and  wife,  523. 
breach  by  discharging  servant,   (2)   391,  397. 
breach  of,  recovery,    (2)    396. 
building  contracts,  444,  445. 
buying  through  broker,   440. 
by  compulsion,  526. 

correspondence,   156,  470. 

correspondence,  construction,  156. 

insane  person,  void,  403. 
completed  by  party,  396. 
damages  for  breach,  397,  398,  400. 
extending   time   of  payment,    862. 
failure  to  complete,  damages,    (3)    397,  399. 

to  perform,    (3)    397. 
for  making  road,    (2)    397. 
forms  of  instructions  on,   (  1  )   396. 
gambling   contracts,    528. 
instruction   on   breach,   form,   398. 
in  writing,  construction  of.   156. 
joint  or  several  liability,  401. 


INDEX.  879 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365—878  Forms.) 

CONTRACT— Continued. 

made  by  minor,  451. 
may  recover  on,  when,  396. 
meaning  of  contract,   156. 
not  signed,  binding,  472. 
on  constructing  road,  397. 
on  different  matters,  430. 
preventing  completion  of,  396. 
promissory  notes,   forms,   415. 
recovery  on,  form    396. 
relating  to  insurance,  420. 
rescinding  for  defects,  402,  413. 

instruction  on,  402. 
sale  by  sample,    ( 1 )   407. 

of  personal  property,  406. 
settling  disputed   claims,   404. 
signed  by  agent,  form,  388. 
subscription  contract,  462. 
terms  of,  for  court  to  determine,  156. 
time  of  performing,  n.   26,  405. 
to   build   railroad,    (1)    396. 

defeat   creditors,   void,   517. 

make  road     (2)   399. 
void  when,  517,  526. 

waiving  rights  in,    (5)    406,    (2)    413,  469. 
warranty  of,  broken.  239. 
what  constitutes,  for  court,   156. 
whether  entire,  for  court,   156. 
with  brokers,  438. 

CONTRACTOR, 

complying  with  contract,  444. 

CONTRADICTORY, 

contradictory  on  vital  point,  248. 
error  not  available,  248. 

immaterial,  when,  248. 

incurable,  247. 
instructions  contradictory,  when,  246. 

differing  widely,  248. 

on  intent,  279. 

self-contradictory,  249. 
jury  following  correct  instruction,  248. 
self-contradictory  instruction,  illustration,  249. 

CONTRIBUTED, 

definition  unnecessary,  75. 

CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE, 
a  defense,   118. 
both  parties  negligent,  636. 
burden  of  proof,  633. 

on  whom,    (3)   583. 

considerations    in    determining,     (3)    594,    639. 
deceased  guilty  of,  635. 
defense,  when,    (4)    582. 
defined,  632. 

eliminated  or  ignored,  245. 
facts  constituting,  635. 


880  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365—878  Forms.) 

CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE— Con  tinned. 
fact  for  jury,  639. 

forms  of  instructions,  543,   582,  632,  635. 
harmless  error,  instruction,   239. 
in  operating  machine,  619. 
instructions   for   defendant,   639. 

ignoring,  118. 

improper,    199. 
negligence  of  servant,  611. 
no  defense,  when,  581. 
not  in  issue,  94. 

parent  toward  child,    (5)    (6)     (7)    536. 
passenger  guilty  of,  582. 
plaintiff's   negligence,    543,    544,    594,    634. 
prevents   recovery,   635. 
what  constitutes,    (3)    543. 

is  not,    (2)     (4)    543. 

CONVERTING  PROPERTY,   863. 

CONVICT, 

See  ACQUIT,  78. 

CONVICTION, 

beyond  reasonable  doubt,  296. 

corroboration  required,  289. 

degree  of  proof  required,  313,  790. 

jurors'   convictions,   708. 

of  included  offense,  252. 

of   manslaughter,   effect,    100. 

on  accomplice  testimony,  288. 

on  circumstantial  evidence,  310.  734. 

on  confession  insufficient,  320. 

proof  of  essential  facts,  311. 

COOL,  SEDATE, 

definition  unnecessary,  75.    • 

COOLING  TIME,  254. 

question  law,  when,  254. 

COPYING, 

instructions  from  books,  286. 

CORPORATION, 

de  facto  existence,   864. 
increasing  stock  illegally,  463. 
proving  by  user,   864. 

CORPUS  DELICTI, 
proof  of,  320. 

by   accomplice,    n.    18,    289. 

CORRESPONDENCE, 

constituting  contract,   470. 
contracting  by  correspondence,   156. 
meaning  of  correspondence,  '  156. 


INDEX.  881 

(References  are   to  Sections,   §§    1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forma.) 

CORROBORATION, 

accomplice  corroborating  another,  289. 
affecting  credibility,    (9)    365. 
corroboration  of  witness,  209,  221,  365. 
of  female  in  rape,  82. 
required  by  statute,  289. 
should  be  defined,  289. 

COUNSEL,  See  ATTORNEY. 

absence  of  counsel,  35. 
instructing  in  absence  of,  35. 
stating  the  law,  form,  380. 

COUNTS,  See  DECLARATION. 

alleging  different  theories,  102. 
counts  abandoned,  100. 
disregarding  if  faulty,  n.  42,  54. 
evidence  supporting  count,   130. 
information  of  several  counts,  98. 
instructions  limited  to,  98. 
when  several  counts,  98. 
no  evidence  on  some  counts,  98. 
on  contract  and  tort,  98. 
several  sales  of  liquor,  98. 

COUNTY, 

liable  to  physician,  when,  464. 

COURT. 

belittling  the  law,   154. 
cannot  express  opinion,  119. 
coercing  jury  to  agree,   187. 
commenting  on  evidence,    119. 
construes    foreign   law,   when,    162. 

writings,  381. 
calling  witnesses,  n.  214. 

determines  law,  153,  380,  711. 

of  review,  346. 
criticising  the  law,   154. 
determines   competency  of  witness,  n.   4,  206. 

criminal   law,  when,    165,   711. 

facts,  when,  145  146. 

material   allegations.   53,    155. 

validity  of  laws,   161. 
directing  jurors  to  agree,   148. 
directs  verdicts,  when,   120. 
duty  to  instruct,  when,  118. 
expressing  opinion,  proper,  189. 
influencing   amount   damages,    185. 

jury.   185. 

instructing  on  its  motion,  3,   n.    14,  n.   54,    199,   234,   286. 
instructs  in  all   cases,   153. 
instructions  in  criminal  cases,  709,  710. 

without  request.  292. 
interprets  written  instruments,  156. 
intimating  inference,  improper,   181. 

opinion,  175. 

opinion  on  witness,  208. 


882  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

COURT — Continued, 

making  remarks,   154. 

misstating  evidencee,  correcting,  n.  11,  347. 

must   instruct   in   criminal   cases,    165. 

no  conscience  in  case,  improper,  185. 

plaintiff  made  better  case,   185. 

stating  what  witness  said,  n.  119,  191. 

suggesting  compromise  verdict,  186. 

trial  without  jury,  40. 

urging  jury  to  agree,  186. 

instructing  in  criminal  cases,   167,  168,  169. 

COWS, 

See  CATTLE,  646. 

injured  by  negligence,  646. 
railroad  killing,  (3)  646. 

CREDIBILITY, 

age  of  witness  affecting,    (9)   365. 

credibility  of  accomplice,  288. 

dying  declarations,    180. 

instruction  improper,  221. 

witness'  credibility,  206,  207,   208,   215,   216,   365. 

considerations  216. 

determining,   365. 
probability  of  story,    (3)   385. 
repeating  on   witness'   credibility,   24. 
swearing  falsely,  221. 

CREDITORS, 

fraud  in  settling  with,  524. 
hindering,  defeating,   517,   518. 
husband  and  wife  defeating,  523. 

CRIME,  See  CRIMINAL  OFFENSES. 

defendant  presumed   innocent,   714. 
elements  of,  proof,  296. 
maliciously  charged  with,  ( 1 )  507. 
no  motive  for  committing,  781. 
shown  without  motive,  781. 

CRIMINAL  INTENT.  279.  See  INTENT. 

instructions  on,  proper,  280. 

CRIMINAL  OFFENSE, 

definition  omitting  element,  276. 
departing  from  statutory  definition,  275. 
erroneous  definition  incurable,  276. 
instruction  stating  elements  of,  277. 
omission  in  defining,  276. 
omitting   intent   in   defining,    276. 
statutory  definition  of,  275. 

CRIMINAL  LAW,  251.  See  DEFENSES. 

accomplices  as  witnesses,  287. 
accomplice,  corroboration,  289. 
adultery,  what  is  not,  833. 


INDEX.  883 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1—364   Principles,    §§    365—878  Forms.) 

CRIMINAL  LAW— Continued. 

agreement  in  conspiracy,  760. 
aiding,   abetting,   in  burglary,   811. 
alibi,  defense,  322. 
appropriating  lost  goods,  817. 
arrest  unlawful,  262. 
assault  to  rape,   769. 

with  weapon,  767. 
attorney  appropriating  money,  822. 
bare  fear,  self-defense,  799. 
bastardy,  instructions  on,  835. 
belief  as  to  danger,  256. 
breaking  denned,  burglary,  808. 
burden  of  proof,  201. 
burglars    killing,    785. 
burglary  and  larceny,  265a. 

joined,  810. 

cautionary  instructions,  52,  707. 
caution  in  grave  cases,  707. 
character  of  defendant,  340. 
circumstances,  consistency  of,  310. 
circumstantial  evidence,  88,  303. 
claiming  right  in  property,  818. 
confessions,    admissions,    316. 
conspiracy  denned,  759. 
cooling  time,  homicide,  254. 
court  assuming  facts,   198. 

determines  law,   165. 

intimating  opinions,    178,   179. 
criminal    intent,    279. 
cruelty  to  animals,  837. 
danger  apparent,  self-defense,  802. 
deadly  weapon  denned,  278. 
deceased's  bad  character,  807. 
declarations,  evidence,  763. 
declining  further  struggle,  798. 
defendant  abandoning  conflict,  259. 

a  witness,  226,  227. 

failure  to  testify,  229. 

presumed  innocent,  713. 
defendant's  unsworn  statement,  228. 
defense  to  embezzlement,  824. 

to  larceny,  818. 
definitions  of  offenses,  275. 
degree  of  homicide,  251,  252,  253. 

of  murder  doubtful,  783. 

of   proof,   201. 
deliberation  in  murder,  780. 
detectives,  informers,  224. 
determined  by  court,  when,  711. 
different  offenses  joined,  810. 
directing  verdict,   150. 
disorderly  house  defined,  839. 
drunkenness  disproving  intent,  281. 

instructions,  779. 
duty  of  jury,  707. 
to  retreat,  murder,  260. 
dying  declarations,  180. 


884  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1—364    Principles,    §§    365—878  Forms.) 

CRIMINAL  LAW— Continued. 

embezzlement,  agent  appropriating,  821. 

denned,    820. 
errors  cured,  240. 
evidence  close,  conflicting,  250. 

in  larceny,  816. 

in  perjury,  851. 

supporting  instructions,  82. 
exceptions  to  instructions,  346. 
facts  in  burglary,  813. 
false  pretense  defined,  830. 
finding  lost  goods    (intent),  817. 
force  essential  in  robbery,  772. 
forms  of  instructions,  707. 
forgery  defined,  840. 
further  instructions  given,  36. 
gaming  defined,  846. 

grouping  instructions  into  one  series,  73. 
included  offenses,  267. 
in  Illinois,  709. 
in  Indiana,   710. 
in  Iowa,  712. 
in  Ohio,  711. 
insanity  defined,  329. 
instructions  as  to  highways,  858. 
for  murder,  773. 

on  burglary,  808. 

referring  to  indictment,  55. 
intent  in  burglary,  809. 

in  embezzlement,  824. 

in  larceny, -815. 

presumed,  when,  777. 
jurors  receive  law  from  court,  709. 
jury  determine  law,  when,   166. 

judges  of,  709,  710. 
justifiable  homicide  defined,  795. 
killing  in  self-defense,  805. 

officer  while  arresting,  788. 

trespasser,  263. 
larceny  defined,   814. 
lying  in  wait,  784. 
malice   aforethought,   282. 
malice  defined,  776. 
manslaughter  defined,   794. 
mere  belief  of  danger,  800. 

threats  no  defense,  801. 
motive  for  crime.  264,  781. 

in  libel,  850. 
murder  defined,   773. 

presumed,  when,  782. 
mutual   combat,   265. 
officer  wrongfully  killing,  787. 

peremptory  for  defendant,   151.  , 

peremptory  instructions,   150. 
possession,  evidence  of  guilt,  816. 

of  stolen  goods,  811,  812. 
presumption  of  innocence,  336. 


INDEX.  885 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms J 

CRIMINAL  LAW— Continued. 

prima   facie   evidence,    816. 
principal  and  accessory,  293. 
provoking  difficulty,  258. 
public  nuisances,   852. 
reasonable  doubt,  294. 
forms,   716. 

relatives  as  witnesses,  225. 
repeating  instructions,  20. 
request  for  instructions,  9. 
robbery  defined,  772. 
self-defense,  homicide,  255. 

unavailing,  when,  797. 

to  murder,  798. 

selling   intoxicating   liquors,    876. 
simple  assault  defined,   766. 
singling  out  facts,   115. 

witnesses,  223. 
slight  evidence,  88,  89. 
statute  of  limitation,  108. 
statutory  inst-%uctions.  284. 
Sunday  violations,  861. 
threats  of  deceased,  257. 
value  in  larceny,  819. 
variance,  261. 

verdict  when  several  defendants,  878. 
voluntary  confessions,  319. 
with  intent  to  kill,  768. 
wound  neglected,  791. 

CROPS, 

damage  by  hogs,  (4)  (5)  646. 
damaged,  owner  negligent,  676. 
destruction  by  animals,  646,  676. 

water,  674. 
injury  to,  damages,   677. 

instructions,  678. 

CROSSING, 

See  RAILROADS. 

bicyclist  crossing  track,  641. 

care   on   approaching,   627. 

careless  in  approaching,  627.    (2)    629. 

crossing    railroad,    forms.    627. 

embankment  Obstructing  view,  628. 

extra  dangerous,  care,    (4)    631. 

flagman  at  crossing,  643. 

gong  at  crossing,    (8)    629. 

look  and  listen,  627,   (6)   629,   (5)   633,   (4)   636,   (9)  639. 

presuming  traveler  cautious,   (5)    (6)   640. 

private  crossings,   (9)   641. 

railroad  at  fault,  641. 

violating  ordinance.   644. 
safety  required  at,   (6)   630. 
sounding  whistle,  bell,  641. 
unsafe  condition  of.  597,.  (6)    630. 
view  obstructed,  628. 
warning  at  crossings,    (5)    641. 


886  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

CULVERTS, 

construction  of  culverts,  674. 

CURING  ERROR,  See  ERROR,  HARMLESS  ERROR. 

by  opponents  instructions,  239. 
by  other  instructions,  242. 
by  withdrawing  evidence,  84. 

construing  instructions  together,  64,  84,  235,  236,  237,  238. 
correct  curing  erroneous,  246. 
damages,  instruction  on,  239. 
defective  definition  incurable,  276. 
how  oy  other  instructions,  246. 
in  circumstantial  evidence,  310,  313. 
in  criminal  cases,  240. 
incurable  if  contradictory,  247. 

when,  118,  247,  360. 
in  embezzlement,   240. 
instructions  as  whole,  239. 

on  damages,  241. 
not  cured,  when,  118,  177,  208. 
on  burden  of  proof,  239. 
on   reasonable  doubt,   312. 
presumed  cured,  when,  360. 
reading  instructions  together,  239. 
remittitur  failing  to  cure,  n.  62,  246. 
warranty  broken,  value,  239. 
when    not    cured,    60. 

CUSTOM, 

general  custom,  meaning,  655. 
in  using  pathway,   (2)   655. 
relating  to  railroads,  655. 
rules  of  board  of  trade,  865. 

D 
DAM, 

injury  to,  675. 

DAMAGES. 

age  and  element,  649. 

age  considered,  injury,  653. 

allowing  greater  than  claimed,   106. 

more  than  proven,  106. 

remote  damages,  57. 
amount,  estimating,  fc 

forms,  607. 

arising  from  plaintiff's   fault,   58. 
assessed  by  jury,  145. 

for  assault,  improper,  193. 

for  breach  of  warranty,    (4)    411. 

in  trespass,  59. 
assuming  damages,  193. 
based  on  market  value,  684. 
breach  of  marriage  contract,  457. 
bodily  pain  an  element,  652. 
by  animals,  676. 
by  changing  water,  flow.  647. 
by  excavations,  670. 


INDEX.  887 

(References   are    to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

DAMAGES— Continued. 
by  nuisance,  679. 
by  obstructing  water,  602. 
by  tenant,  453. 
care  in  preventing,  676. 
caused  by  accident,    (5)    474. 

change  of  grade  causing,   671.  , 

confined  to  evidence  rather  than  pleadings,  95. 

to  issues,  97. 

to  negligence  alleged,  94. 

jury  to  evidence,  106. 
considerations  in  assessing,  106,  476. 
in  assessing,  city,  607. 
considerations  in  estimating,  58,    (2)    (8)    649,  652,  653. 

in  estimating,  assault  193. 

in  estimating  death,   (9)    (10)    (11)   650. 

in  mitigation,  654. 
damages  to  premises,  (2)  685. 
distress  of  mind,  652. 
earnings  during  life,   81. 
estimating  on  breach  of  contract,  398,  400. 

on  property,  511. 
excluding  improper  damages,  58. 
exemplary  for  seduction,  874. 

damages,  673. 

for  assault,  477. 

instructions  on,  59. 
expenses  incurred,    (13)    652. 
failing  to  ask  instructions  on,  57. 
failure  to  fence  tracks,  646. 
fire  from  engine,  645. 
for  alienation  of  affections,  875. 
for  assault  and  battery,  59. 
for  breach  of  contract,  (5)  397,  398. 

of  warranty,   (3)    (4)   408,   (2)   411. 
for  converting  property,  863. 
for  death,  forms,  650. 

of  wife,   (14)   650. 

for  failure  to  deliver  property,  sold,  400. 
for  injury  to  person,    (3)    653. 
for  killing   anotheer,    (12)    649. 

person,  649,   (7)  *650. 

restricted,  650. 

for  mental  suffering,  476,  607. 
for  permanent  injury,  647,  652,  607. 
for  personal  injury,  58,  476. 

assessing,  n.  65,  58. 

considerations,  81. 
for  seducing  wife,  874. 
for  trespass,  877. 
for  unlawful  seizure,  509. 
forms  on  amount,  607. 
framing  instructions  on,  56.  57. 
from  bridge  washing  out,  675. 
from  change  of  grade,  671.  . 

from  diseased  cattle,  513. 
from  flood,   (2)   545. 


INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.} 

DAMAGE  S— Co  ntinued. 

from  fraudulent  representations,  515,  516. 

from  negligence,  evidence,  93. 

from  piling  filth,  dirt,  672. 

from  sale  of  liquors,  487,  488,  489. 

from  surface  water,  674. 

from  violating  statute.  81. 

improper  elements.  106. 

estimated,  81. 

imperfect   instruction    cured,    239. 
in   admitting  incompetent  evidence,  84. 
in  condemnation  proceedings,  683. 
in  destroying  fences,  673. 
in  factory  locality,  681. 
inferred  by  jury,    (10)    653. 
influencing  jury  on,  185. 
injury  to  land,  672. 

to  person,  476. 

in  malicious  prosecution,  508. 
in  sale  of  land,  522. 
in  shipping  goods,  587,  588. 

liability,    587. 
instructions  erroneous,  when,  57,  106. 

for  defendant,   651. 

generally,   106. 

on  breach  of  contract,  399. 

on  measure  of,  56. 

on  measure  of,   120. 

not  faulty,   106. 
in  trespass,  improper,  81. 
jury  not   confined   to  evidence,    106. 

restricted  to  reasonable,  57. 
land  damaged,  669. 
limiting  to  complaint,   241. 
loss  of  time,  injury,  95,  607. 
malpractice  by  physician,  484. 
measure  of,  considerations,    ( 1 )    499. 

crops,   677. 

death,    (4)    650. 

from  fire,  645. 

generally,  57. 

land,  671. 

in  slander,  498. 
medical  treatment,   (3)  652. 
mental  anguish  considered,    (3)    652,  653. 
plaintiff's  theory  for  damages,  58. 
nervous  shock  considered,   (4)    653. 
nominal  damages,   (3)  654. 
opinion  as  to  amount,   (10)   653. 
on  issue  not  alleged,  97. 
on  motion  for  peremptory,  145. 
pain  considered,  653. 
pecuniary  loss,    (6)    652. 

only  for  death.    (13)    650. 
personal  property  damaged,  509,  511. 
physical    condition.     (3)    653. 
physician's  bills,   (13)   652. 


INDEX.  889 

(References   are   to   Sections,    §§    1 — 364   Principles,    §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

DAMAGES— Continued. 

premises  as  pest-house,  681. 
procrustean  rule  in  estimating,    (2)    653. 
proper  limit  in  assessing,  106. 
prospective  suffering,   (6)    (7)   653. 
railroad  in  front  of  premises,  685. 

injuring  property,  684. 
remote,    speculative,    (3)    541.    (6)    685. 
restricted  to  pecuniary  loss,   650. 

to  pecuniary    (death),    (3)    650. 
signs  overnanging  walks,   604. 
speculative   not   allowed,    ( 12 )    652. 

remote,    (3)    541,    (6)    685. 
sufficiency  of  instruction,  57. 
tables  of  mortality,  death,  651. 
tenant  not  liable  for,    (3)    453. 
vindictive,  for  assault,  194. 
when  cannot  recover  land,   669. 
when  no  evidence  as  to  amount,  106. 
wife  not  considered  in  estimating,    (9)   652. 

DANCE  HALLS, 

disorderly  house,  839. 

DANGER, 

appearance   of,   self-defense,   256. 

self-defense,  285. 
city's  notice  of,  595. 
continuing  with  knowledge  of,  619. 
evidence  of,  self-defense,   802. 
greater  precautions,  when,  630. 
master  concealing  from  servant,  612. 

ignorance  of,  612. 

must  advise  servant,  612. 
means  of  knowing,   618. 
need  not  be  real.  256. 
open,  not  concealed,    (12)    639. 
person  knowing,  care,  594. 
plaintiff  knowing,    (12)   544,  593. 

forms,    (9)     (10)     (11)    544. 

not  heeding,  543,    (9)    (10)     (11)    544. 
reasonable  doubt  on,  803. 
seen  by   plaintiff,  594. 
servant  continuing  with  knowledge,  619. 

knowing,   618. 
tunnel  dangerous,  619. 
warranting  self-defense,  798. 

DARK, 

traveling  street  when,  608. 

DAY  OF  WEEK, 

instruction,   163. 

"DEADLY  VIOLENCE," 

used  for  "great  violence,"  75. 

DEADLY  WEAPON,  278.  See  WEAPON. 

defined,  278. 

forms  of  instructions,  767,  777. 
manner  of  using  weapon,   178. 


890  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

DEATH,  See  DECEASED. 

by  accident,  fall,  n.  58,  261. 

railroads,   (3)    (4)   648. 
by  murder  or  suicide,  261. 
caused  by  negligence,  649,  650. 
damage  for  death,  pecuniary,    ( 13 )    650. 
estimating  damages  for,    (3)    650. 
from   accident,    806. 

or  murder,  261. 
from  blood  poisoning,   791. 
from  blow  or  poison,  261. 
from  disease  or  wound,  261. 
from  electricity,   (3)    546. 
from  neglected  wound,  791. 

DEBTS, 

fraud  in  reference  to,  525. 

DECEASED,  See  DEATH. 

ability  to  earn,   (2)   652. 

damages,    ( 7 )    650. 
admissions   of   deceased,    739. 
age,  element  of  damages,    (8)    650,    (2)    652. 
bad  character  of,  807. 
character  of  deceased,   807. 
contributory   negligence  of,   635. 
drawing  weapon,   257. 
habits  and  industry,    (7)    (8)   650. 
killing  husband,  damages,  649. 
making  threats,  257. 
officer  killing  wrongfully,  787. 
thrown  from  engine,  650. 
value   to   kin,   damages,    (7)    650. 

of  services,  650. 

DECLARATION,  See  COUNTS. 

competency  on  intent,   111. 
evidence   of,   limited   when,    112. 
containing  defective  counts,  54. 
counts  abandoned,  100. 

abandoned,  dismissed,  54. 
in  conspiracy,   763. 
instruction  on  one  count,  54. 

referring  to,  53. 
limited  to  good  counts,  54. 
maker  of  will,  701. 
material  allegations  of,  what,    155. 
of  one  of  several  defendants,  112. 
several  counts,  instructions  when,  53,   54. 

DECLARATIONS,  See  CONFESSIONS,  ADMISSIONS. 

dying  statements,  180. 
evidence  in  conspiracy,  763. 

DEDICATION, 

highway  established  by,  858. 

DEEDS, 

construction  of,   156. 
conveying  real  estate,  473. 
description  of  property  in,  163. 
execution  and  delivery,  473. 


INDEX.  891 

(References   are   to -Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms .) 

DEEDS — Continued. 

forged  deed,  845. 

manner  of  signing,  473. 

placed  in  escrow,  468. 

takes  effect  from  delivery,  473. 

DEFECTIVE, 

correct  instruction  curing,  246. 

court  correcting,  27. 

how  cured  by  construction,  70. 

harmless   if  harmonious,   72. 

if  defective  in  any  particular,  27. 

if  element  omitted,  27. 

in  defining  negligence,  6. 

in  ignoring  facts,  harmless,   71. 

in  omitting  "if  you  believe  from  evidence,"   105. 

"reasonable,"  313. 
instruction  cured,  damages,  241. 
modifying  if  imperfect,  27. 
not  ground  for  error,  6. 
on  burden  of  proof,  harmless,   72. ' 
on  degree  of  care,  harmless,  72. 
refusing  after  promising,  27. 

entire  charge,  28. 
refusing,  when,  27. 

DEFENDANT, 

abandons  conflict,   self-defense,  259. 
admitting  plaintiff's  case,  243. 
affirming  facts,   burden,    199. 
believing  his  testimony,  227.     • 
burden  on  defendant,  when,   199. 
casting  suspicion  upon  him,  227. 
character   of   defendant,    756,    757,   758. 
conduct   during   trial,   215. 
competent  witness,   criminal,   226. 
competent  witness,    (7)    372,    (2)    373. 
considerations  in  weighing  testimony,  227. 
contradicted,  criminal,  372. 
corroborated,   criminal,   372,    (1)    373. 
credibility  as  witness,  226. 
declaring   further   struggle,    259,    797. 
defendant  a  witness,  instructions,  227. 
testimony,  n.   139.   227. 

sufficient,  88. 

doubt  on  his  testimony,  n.  139,  227. 
failing  to  testify,   civil.   222. 
failure  to  testify,  criminal,  222,  229,  374. 

"free  from   fault."   258.  ( 

guilt  presumed,  when  265a,   266. 
having  knowledge,  civil,  222. 
having    stolen    property,    criminal,    265a,    266. 
instructing  in  absence  of,  36. 
instructions,   when  witness,   214,   229. 

interested  witness,  criminal,  214,  226,  227,    (3)     (5)    (7)    372. 
introducing  false  testimony,   178. 
lying  in  wait,  240,  78.4. 


892  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

DEFENDANT— Continued. 

making  confession,  737. 

making  contradictory   statements,  227. 

making    false    statements,    227. 

must  retreat,  when,  260. 

not  calling  witness,  221. 

originally  in  wrong,  259. 

parents,   witnesses   for,   225. 

presumed  innocent,  336,  713. 

probability  of  guilt,   727. 

provoking   quarrel,   self-defense,   2581. 

rejecting  his  testimony,  227. 

same  as  other  witness,  227,   (7)   372. 

several  tried  jointly,   112. 

showing  mitigation,  782. 

singling  out  defendant,  226. 

statement  of  defendant,  64. 

surrendering  himself,  742. 

taking  flight,  740. 

testifying  falsely,   criminal,   372. 

testimony  of,  when  corroborated,  227. 

unsworn   statement,   criminal,  228. 

verdict,  when  several,  878. 

weighing  his  testimony,  criminal,  226,  227,  372. 

wife,  witness  for,  225. 

witness,  225. 

criminal,  226,  227. 

convicted  of  felony,  227. 

corroborated,  227. 

for  himself,  criminal,  215,    (4)    372. 

instruction  improper,  227. 

DEFENSE, 

accidental   killing,   806. 
advice  of  counsel,  506. 
against  branding  cattle,  118. 
against  unlawful  arrest,  805. 
age,  an  element,   118. 
alibi,  a  defense,  322,  743. 

strong  proof   required,   745. 
bare  fear  no  defense,  799. 
belief  as  to  owner,  larceny,   103. 
breach  of  marriage  contract,  456. 
claim  barred  by  limitation,  118. 
confined  to  that  alleged,  96. 
contributory  negligence,   118,    (4)    to    (9)    582. 
declining  further  struggle,  798. 
defense  to  some  counts,  118. 
degree  of  proof  of.  201. 
evidence  of,  embezzlement,   103. 
female  consenting,  rape,  103. 
fraud  as  defense,  form,    (4)    384. 
fraudulent  representation,  96. 
fully  and  clearly  stated,  23. 
ignoring,   118. 

assault,   118. 

by  instruction,  116. 


INDEX.  893 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

DEFENSE— Continued. 

ignoring  facts  of,  71. 

if  not  alleged,  96. 

proper,  when,  83. 
injury  wholly  accidental,  581. 
insanity  a  defense,  329,  746. 

evidence  wanting,  83. 

examine  with  care,  754. 
in  slander,  500,  501,  502. 
instructions  negativing   unnecessary,    104. 

repeating,   23. 

supporting,  criminal,  103. 

when  several  defenses,   102. 

intent  wanting,  embezzlement,   824. 
killing  bad  man,  807. 

instruction,  n.  24,  255. 
malicious  prosecution,   (7)   504. 
mere  belief  of  danger,   800. 

no  offense.  792. 

mere  presence  no  offense,   (3)   765. 
mere  threats  no  defense,  801. 
negativing  matters  of,  56. 
no  evidence  of  defense,  83. 
other   means   causing   nuisance,    856. 
preponderance  required,    ( 1 )    396. 
probable  cause,    (5)    504. 
raising   reasonable  doubt,   201. 
receiving  stolen  property,   103. 
reiterating  unnecessary,  23. 
repelling  force  by  force,   804. 
resisting  assault  by  several,   804. 
satisfactory  proof  of  defense,  201. 
self-defense,  appearances,  802. 

to  murder,  795. 
set-off   abandoned,    100. 
slight  evidence  in  support  of,   88. 
statute  of  limitations,   118. 
strength  an  element,   118. 

supported  by  testimony  of  defendant  alone,   88. 
taking  property  under  claim,   818. 
theory  of  defense,  refusing  on,   101. 
to   embezzlement,   belief,    103. 
to  larceny,  818. 

of  cattle,  118. 

to  malicious  prosecution,  506. 
to  murder,  accident,  261. 

accidental  shooting,   261. 

suicide,  261. 

ignoring,   261. 
to  note,   notice,    (5)    415. 
to  part  of  claim,   118. 
to  promissory  note,    (17)    415. 
to   receiving  stolen  property,   103. 
two  theories   inconsistent.   102. 
unnecessary  to  exclude.   104. 
variance  a   defense,   criminal,  261. 
violent  attack.   118. 
want   of   consideration,    ( 1 )    306. 


894  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.} 

DEFENSE— Continued. 

when  properly  withdrawn,  83. 
wound  neglected,  no  defense,  791. 

DEFINITIONS  OF  OFFENSES,  275. 
accessory  defined,  293. 
accomplice  defined,  287. 
assault  and  battery  defined,   794. 
breaking   defined,   burglary,   808. 
conspiracy   defined,    759. 
criminal   offense,  275. 
deadly  weapon  defined,  278,  767. 
defective  as  to  negligence,   6. 
definition    containing   matters   not   involved,   275. 
defining  "evidentiary  facts,"  6. 

terms,  6. 

disorderly  house   defined,   839. 
embezzlement    defined,    820. 
false  pretense  defined,  830. 
fellow-servant,  should  define,  76. 
forgery  defined,  840. 

defectively  defined,  276. 
gaming  defined,   846. 
insanity  defined,   329. 
in   statutory   words,   275. 
justifiable   homicide   defined,   795. 
larceny   defined,   814. 
malice    defined,    776. 
manslaughter  defined,  794. 
murder  defined,  773.    ' 
murder  defectively   defined,   276. 
negligence  defined,  6,  529. 

unnecessary  to  define,  75. 
not  in  words  of  statute,  275. 
not  statutory,  error  when,  275. 
of  receiving  stolen  property,   276. 
of  serious  bodily  injury,  284. 
of   statutory  words,    284. 

unnecessary,  284. 

of  words  phases,  unnecessary,  when,   75. 
omitting  element,   276. 
ordinary  care,  530. 
perjury  erroneous  defined,  276. 
reasonable  doubt  defined,   294,  295. 
repeating,  on  negligence,  2" 

of  definition  unnecessary  284. 
simple    assault,    766. 
sound  mind  and  memory,  695. 

DEFRAUDING. 

defrauding   tax    collector,    832. 

DEGREE, 

degree  in  homicide,  251,  11.  10,  252,  269,  270,  271. 
degree  of  murder  doubtful,  253,   783. 
included   offenses,   267. 
manslaughter,    degrees,   evidence,   271. 
murder,   degrees,   773. 


INDEX.  895 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

DEGREE — Continued. 

murder  first  or  second  degree,  273. 

proof,  circumstantial  evidence,  734. 

proof,  instructions,   315. 

proof  on  "each  link,"  312. 

proof   warranting   conviction,    790. 

restricting  to  first  degree,  n.  2,   251. 

DEGREE  OF  CRIME, 

proof  by  accomplice,  n.  6,  288. 

DEGREE  OF  PROOF,  200. 

beyond   reasonable   doubt,    201. 
for  misdemeanor,  n.   24,  296. 
too  high,   when,   200. 
in   criminal   case,   201. 
conscientious  belief,  criminal,  296. 
full  satisfaction  of  guilt,  296. 

DELIBERATE, 

definition  unnecessary,  75. 

DELIBERATION, 

definition  necessary,   75. 
forms  of  instructions,   780. 
may  be  instantaneous,    (4)    776. 
time   of   immaterial,   780. 
in  murder,    (4)    776. 

DELIRIUM, 

in  reference  making  will,    (2)    697. 

DELIVERY, 

carrier  delaying,   587. 
completes   sale,    (2)    406. 
on  conditions,    (3)   406. 
instruction  on,  form,    (2)   406. 

DELUSIONS, 

insane  delusions,  wills,  697. 

DEMAND, 

in  embezzlement,  822. 

DEPOSITIONS, 

comparing  weight  with  oral,  209. 

DEPOSITS, 

banker   appropriating,   825. 

DESCRIPTION, 

referring  to  indictment  for,  55. 

DETECTIVES, 

as  witnesses,  224. 
caution  against,    ( 1 )    378. 
credibility   of.   224. 
instructions   on.   224. 
weighing  testimony  of,  224. 


896  INDEX. 

(References  are   to  Sections,   §§    1—364   Principles,   §§    365—878  Forms.) 

DIFFICULTY, 

expressive  of  group  of  ideas,  74. 
meaning  and   application  of,    74. 

DIRECTING  VERDICT, 

See  NON-SUIT,  PEREMPTORY  INSTRUCTIONS,  VERDICT. 
action  of  trial  court  reviewable,    149. 
court    exercises   discretion,    when,    131. 
court   finding   facts,    145. 
discretionary,    Rhode   Island,   n.    57,    131. 
evidence    insufficient    for    defendant,    139. 
for  defendant  because  of  variance,    127. 
evidence    deficient,    126. 
improper,  when,  126,  129,  133,  134,  141. 

criminal,    151. 
proper,  when,    126,    127. 

criminal,   150. 

for  either  party,  when,   126. 
form  of  instruction  on,  n.  4,   120. 
for  plaintiff,  improper,  when,   134,   140,   142,    143. 

proper,  when,   135,   136,   137,   138,   139. 
for  prosecution,  proper,  when,  criminal,   152. 
if  certain  facts  proven,   309. 
if  evidence  deficient  on  one  element,   126. 
illustrations   of   principles,    134. 
improper,  when,   131,  145. 

two  theories,   132. 
in  ejectment  suit,   136. 
in  homicide  case,  251. 
instead  of  non-suit,  statute,   125. 
jurors  must  agree,   148. 
jury  determine  facts,   131. 
motion  excluding  evidence,  n.   14,   123. 

for,   by   both   parties,    145. 
no   motion   for,   effect,   n.    19,    124. 
of   acquittal    proper,   n.    108,    150. 
of  murder  or   acquittal,   271. 

or  no  offense.  269. 
of   offense,   proper,   when,   277. 
on  former  acquittal,  152.  . 

on   gambling   contract,    128. 
on  once  in  jeopardy,   152. 
on  title  to  land,   136. 
part  of  plaintiff's  claim  contested,   142. 
plaintiff's   evidence    insufficient,    126. 
prima    facie    case    undisputed,    136. 
reasons  for,   unnecessary,    120. 
recalling  jury  for.   124. 
request  of  both  denied,  effect,   147. 
ruling  on  motion  for  reviewable,   149. 
statutory  regulation,    125. 
time  of  requesting  instruction,   124. 
to  find  murder,  when,  251. 
validity  of  note   involved,    134. 
waiving  error  when  two  defendants.  144. 
right    to,    144. 
to  claim  error,   144. 


INDEX.  897 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

DIRECTING   VERDICT— Continued. 

when  burden  on  defendant,   135. 

when   controling  facts   admitted,    126. 

when  claim  is  barred,   126. 

when  defendant  admits  allegations,   137. 

when   evidence   conflicting,    141. 

when  facts  doubtful,   131. 

when   negligence    in   issue,    134. 

when  neither  entitled,  131. 

when   new   matter   set   up,    130. 

when  no  defense  made  out,   135. 

when    pleadings    insufficient,    138. 

when  several  defendants,  n.  27,  126,   142. 

when  two  defendants,   144. 

when   two  theories   shown,    132. 

where  amount  of  claim  disputed,   143. 

in  criminal  case,   150. 

error  to  refuse,  when,  criminal,  150. 

DISBELIEVING  WITNESS, 

See  WITNESSES. 

DISCHARGE, 

discharging  employee   wrongfully,   397. 
master  discharging  servant,   626. 

DISCLAIMING, 

estoppel  by  disclaiming,  868. 

DISCRETIONARY, 

instruction  when  discretionary,  49,  288. 

DISEASE, 

affecting  the  mind,  698,   699. 
injury  from,   (7)   545. 

DISMISSAL. 

on  opening  statement,  n.   40,    126. 

DISORDERLY   HOUSE, 

drinking  and  dancing,  839. 
forms  of  instructions,  839. 
what  constitutes,  839. 

DISREGARDING, 

accomplice  testimony,  288. 
confession,   when,   318. 
corroborated  witness,   217. 
credible   witness,   testimony,  217. 
entire  testimony,  219,    (8)    368. 
error   on   damages,   241. 
husband   as   witness,    370. 
impeached  witness,    (1)    367. 
instructions  improper.   219. 
irreconcilable  testimony,  217. 
testimony  in  part,  217. 
uncorroborated  witness,  217. 
unimpeached  witness,  207,    (8)    367. 


898  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

DISREGARDING— Continued. 

unless   corroborated,    (8)    368. 

when  witnesses  contradict  each  other,  212. 

whole  testimony,  when,   217. 

witness  of  bad  reputation,  221. 

testifying  falsely,    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   368. 

testimony   arbitrarily,    217. 

unles  corroborated,  219. 

DIRECTING  NONSUIT, 

improper,  when,  130. 

proper,  when,   126. 

variance   as  ground,    127. 

when   no   opposing  evidence,   126. 

DISPUTED  CLAIMS,  404,  405. 

DISSEISIN, 

what  constitutes,    (7)    657,    (1)    658. 

DOCUMENT, 

book  account  evidence,  867. 
collateral  evidence  merely,  159. 
construction  of,   156,  381. 
copies  as  evidence,  867. 
explaining  by  oral  evidence,    160. 
ignoring  when  in  evidence,   117. 
in   evidence  as   fact,    159. 
meaning  of,  156. 
parol  evidence  to  explain,   164. 
purpose  of,  a  fact,  when,   164. 
uttering  forged  document,  843. 

DOG,  See  ANIMALS. 

attack  by,  479. 
determining  ownership  of,  479. 

harboring  on  premises,  479. 

restraining,  controlling,    (2)   479. 

DOUBLE  MEANING, 

See  Two  MEANINGS,  61. 

DOUBT, 

See  REASONABLE  DOUBT,  294. 

DRAIN, 

causing  person's  injury,  600. 

falling  into,  600. 

in   dangerous   condition,    600. 

DRUG, 

given  to  excite  passions.  778. 
intent  in  administering,  778. 

DRUNKENNESS, 

affecting  intent,   instruction,  n.   6,   281. 
competent  to  show,  when,  779. 
disproving  deliberation.  779. 

specific   intent.   281. 
evidence  of  proper,  281. 
forms  of  instructions,  779. 


INDEX.  899 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365—878  Forms.) 

DRUNKENNESS—  Continued. 

instruction  erroneous,  281. 

proper,  n.    16,   281. 
is  not  insanity,  755. 
no  excuse  for  crime,  281,  755. 
not  negligence,  553. 
passenger  intoxicated,  553. 
reducing  grade  of  crime,   779. 
refusing  on,   error,   281. 
specific  intent,  disproving,  779. 
voluntary  drunkenness,   (1)    (2)    755. 

no  excuse,  779. 

"DUE  CARE," 

means,  "ordinary  care,"  "reasonable  care,"  74. 

DURESS, 

avoids   contract,  when,  527. 
by  threats,  526,  527. 
procuring  contract  by,  526. 

DWELLING, 

breaking  and  entering,  813. 

DYING  DECLARATIONS, 

cautioning  against,   180. 

comment  on  weight,  180. 

competency  of,  for  court,  180.  N 

credibility  of,  for  jury,   180. 

discrediting,   when.    180. 

instructions  on,   180. 

weighed   by  jury,    180. 

DYNAMITE, 

carelessness  in  using,   (4)   622.  . 

thawing  frozen  dynamite,   (4)   622. 


E. 


"EACH  LINK," 

circumstantial  evidence,  733. 

degree  of  proof.  312. 

doubt  as  to.  721. 

forms  of  instructions,  733. 

instruction  improper.  299,  312. 

proper,   299,  312. 
reasonable  doubt  on,  299. 

on  whole  evidence.  733. 
refusal  on,  error,  312. 

EJECTING, 

disorderly  passenger,  557.  575. 
pasenger  from   train,   557. 
directing  verdict  in,   136. 
instructions  on,  866. 

EJECTMENT, 

recovery  on  one's  title,  866. 


900  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    3G5 — 878  Forms.) 

ELECTRICITY, 

care  in  using,  546. 
dangerous  agency,  546. 
forms  of   instructions,   546. 
high  degree  of  care,  546. 
injury  from,   (2)   546. 
negligence  in  using,  546. 
railroad  using  wires,    (2)    546. 
trolley   wire,   injury,    (4)    547. 

ELECTRIC  WIRES, 

facilities  for  repairing,   (2)    547. 

injury  from,   547. 

injury  to  passenger,    (4)    547. 

out  of  repair,   547. 

time  to  repair,  547. 

ELEMENTS, 

definition  not  involved,  275. 

each   essential   element   of   crime,    735. 

in  definition,  omitting,  276. 

instructions  enumerating  elements  of  offense,  277. 

necessary  to  recovery,  599. 

no  evidence  sustaining,   126. 

proof  of  each  element  of  offense,  296. 

refusing  or  omitting,  245. 

ELEVATOR, 

care  in  operating,  534. 
carelessly  operated,    (4)    542. 
faulty  construction  of,    (4)    542. 
opening  unguarded,  618. 
plaintiff  knowing  danger,  618. 

ELIMINATING, 

material  element,  245. 

EMBANKMENTS, 

changing  water  flow,  674. 

obstructing  view  at  crossing,    (4)    630,    (5)    641. 
water  flow,  602. 

EMBEZZLEMENT, 

agent  collecting  on  commission,  821. 

deducting  commissions,   821. 
appropriating  honestly,   824. 
attorney  appropriating  money,  822. 
balance  on  account,  823.   • 
banker  appropriating  deposits.  825. 
belief  of  right  to  appropriate,  103. 
debtor  and  creditor,  823. 
defined.  820. 
defense  on  intent.   824. 
demand  essential,  when.  822. 
erroneous  instruction  cured,  240. 
facts  constituting,   820. 

not  sufficient.  823. 
forms  of  instructions,  820. 


INDEX.  901 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

EMBEZZLEMENT—  Continued. 
fraudulent  intent,  820. 
growing  out  of  agency,   820. 
honestly  appropriating,  103. 
intent  essential,  824.  , 

maliciously  charged  with,   ( 1 )   507. 
prima  facie  evidence,  829. 
principal  and  agent,  823. 
settlement  for  shortage,   (1(5)  415. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN,  683.       See   CONDEMNATION. 

EMPLOYE, 

remaining  idle  after  discharge,  397. 
wrongfully  discharging,  liability,    (4)    397. 

ENGINE, 

dangerous  condition,  620. 
fire  escaping  from,  645. 
master's  promise  to  repair,   620. 
spark   arresters   on,   645. 

ENGINEER, 

fellow-servant  of  brakeman,  614. 
not  fellow-servant,  613. 
ringing  bell,    (8)    641. 

ERROR,  See   CURING    ERROR,    HARMLESS    ERROR. 

abstract  instructions,  misleading,  48. 
acquit  used  for  convict,  is,  78. 
as  to  argumentative  requests,  67. 
as  to  peremptory,  how  waived,   144. 
as  to  time  of  instructing,   14. 

of  presenting  requests,   14. 
assigning  separately,  356. 

of  in  group,  353. 

assignment  of   unavailing,   353,   359. 
assuming  controverted  facts,    192,   195. 

disputed  facts,   192. 
at  one's  own  request,  363. 
by  incompetent  evidence,  84. 
by  special  instruction,  238. 
cannot  assign,  when,  7,  8. 
cannot  urge,  when,  9,   12,   13. 
considered  without  exception,   352. 
contradictory  instructions,  246. 
court  calling  on  jury,  39. 
curing  by  other  instructions,  71. 

withdrawing  incompetent,  84. 

error,  how,   60,   71,  72,  84.  238,  239,  240. 

when  not,  60,  208,   218,   238,  242,  245,  276. 
damages,  allowing  too  much,  106. 
defendant  absent,  instructing  when,  36. 
definition  omitting  element,  276. 
disregarded  by  verdict,  236. 
disregarding  defense,   118. 
witness,  217. 


902  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1—364   Principles,   §§    365—878  Forms.) 

ERROR— Continued. 

due  care  and  caution,  245. 
erronecn  s  standing  alone,  70. 
exception  to  instructions  essential,  13. 

pointing  out,  348. 
failing  to  confine  within  statute  of  limitations,  108. 

to  sign,  immaterial,  43. 
favorable  to  party,  244. 
further  instructions  entirely  new,  37. 

to  correct,  35,  38. 
general  and  special  charges,  238. 
giving  manslaughter  instructions,  252. 
harmless,  as  to  further  instructions,  35. 

when,  35,  236,  242,  243. 

in  assuming,  242. 

in  murder,  252.  253. 

unless  prejudicial,  243. 

when  verdict  right,  243. 
harmonizing  instructions,  235. 
if  instructions  contradictory,  247. 
if  whole  charge  be  abstract,  48. 
if  you  believe  defendant,    177. 
immaterial  generally,   72,  235. 

if   cured,   72. 

in  assuming  trespass,  193. 
in  coercing  jury  to  agree,    187. 
in   condemning   law,    154. 
in   conspiracy,   82. 
in  murder,  degrees,  252,  253,  263. 
in  larceny,  103,  265a. 
in  rape,  103. 
incurable  by   other   instructions,   246. 

when,   246,  247,  248,   360. 
in   directing  verdict,   waiving,    144. 
in  giving  specific  instructions,  60. 

too  many  instructions,   19. 
in   ignoring   facts,    116. 

issues,  92. 

theory,   101,   102,   104. 
in  influencing  jury,    185. 
in  not  restricting  to  counts,  98. 
in  omitting  facts  in  summary  instruction,   119. 

words,   79. 

in  presenting  issues,  243. 
in  referring  to  pleadings,  53. 
in  refusing,  on  theory,   104. 
to  limit  evidence,    110. 
in  repeating  instructions,  25. 
in  re-reading  instructions,  37. 
in  stating  disputed   fact  is   conceded,    177. 
instructing  on   issues   without   evidence,   93. 

doubtful    in    application,    48. 

evidence   close,  250. 

expressing  opinion,  175. 

not  required,  6. 

on  damages,  57. 

on   witnesses,   207,   208. 

self-contradictory,  249. 
interrogative  instruction,  69. 


INDEX.  903 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

ERROR— Con  tinned. 

in  withdrawing  facts,   117. 

theory,  101. 

irrespective  of  evidence,  243. 
judge  in  jury-room,  39. 
jury  determining  law,   155. 

disregarding  error,  241. 
killing  trespasser,  263. 
malicious  prosecution,  81. 
marking  instructions,   harmless,  44,  45. 
misleading  abstract  requests,  48. 
modifying  instructions,  30,  31. 

correct  instruction,  31. 
motive  refusing,  264. 
ground  for  error,  31. 
not  cured,  60,   118,  208,  238,  245,  276. 

by  general  charge,  60. 

denning  offense,   276. 
omitting  material  element,  245. 
on  circumstantial  evidence,  303. 
on  law,  when  trial  by  court,  47. 
on  presumption  of  innocence,  336. 
possession  stolen  goods,  265a. 
presenting  on  motion  for  new  trial,  356. 
presumed  cured  when,   360. 

prejudicial   when,   243. 
reciting  facts  not  in  evidence  80. 
refusal  on  burden,   199. 

to  limit  evidence,   109. 
refusing  all   requests,   26b. 

further  instructions,  38. 

impeaching  instruction,  220. 

instructions,  16,  103,  104. 
refusing   instructions    in    larceny,    88,    103,    118. 

on  accomplice,  288,  289. 

on  alibi,  326. 

on   motive,   264. 

on   self-defense,   255. 

on   swearing  falsely,  218. 

special   charge,   26. 

special  request,  26. 
relating  to  fellow-servant,  76. 
to  further  instructions,   36. 
same  error  by  both,  363. 
singling  out  facts,   113. 

issues,  92. 

specifically  pointing  out,   351. 
stating   certain   facts   constitute   murder,   251. 
submitting    facts    hypothetically,    when,    172. 

issues  not  alleged,  94. 
unavailing,  when,  6,  274. 
urging,  though  instructions  not  requested,  6. 

when   charge  incomplete,   7. 
vital  point  omitted,  245. 
waiving  error,  6. 
when  defendant  is  witness,  229. 
when  instructions  repugnant,  246. 
when   issues   abandoned,    100. 
without  motion  for  new  trial,  356. 


904  INDEX. 

(References   are   to   Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,   §§    365 — 878  Forms.) 

ESCAPE, 

attempt  to  escape,  741. 

ESCROW, 

deed  so  placed,  468. 

ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS, 

degree  of  proof.,  criminal,  201. 

ESSENTIAL   FACTS, 

degree  of  proof  on,  312. 
in  circumstantial  evidence,  311,  312. 
instructions   on   degree  of   proof,   312. 
must  be  consistent,  311. 
reasonable   doubt  on,   311. 
restricting  instructions  to,  311. 

ESTATE, 

conveying  by  will,  692. 

unnatural   dispositioh   by   will,    (2)    692. 

ESTOPPEL, 

barred  from  claiming   (2)    868. 
disclaiming  interest  in  property,  868. 
equitable  estoppel,  what  is,  868. 
forms  of  instructions,  868. 
what  constitutes,  868. 

ESTRAY, 

stealing  an  estray  horse,    (5)    815. 

EVIDENCE, 

admitting  facts  on  motion   for  peremptory,   124. 

age  of  female,  rape,  82. 

all  on  one  side,  instruction,   196. 

as  basis  for  damages,  106. 

of  instruction,  80,  220. 
changing  instruction  to  confine   to,   32. 
circumstantial,  303. 
close  on   vital   point,   250. 
comparing  direct  and  circumstantial,  305. 
competent  for  one  purpose,  110. 

of  evidence,   174. 

conflicting,    instruction   when,    178. 
copy  instead  of  original,  867. 
corroborating  witness,  221. 

in  rape  case,  82. 
court's  comment  on,  proper,   189. 

does  not  weigh,  121. 

expressing  opinion  on,  171. 

misstating,   correcting,   n.'  11,   347. 
declarations  in  conspiracy,  763. 

of  previous  acts.   111. 
defendant's  statement  as,  64. 

statements,  criminal,  228. 
deficient  on  one  element.  126. 
details   in   reviewing,    191. 


INDEX.  905 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms J 

EVIDENCE— Continued. 

different  conclusions  drawn  from,   131. 

constructions   of,    102. 
direct  and  circumstantial,  304. 

not  essential,    (1)    379. 
disproving  branding  cattle,  118. 
criminal  intent,  210. 
"undue  influence,"    (8)    704. 
doubtful  whether  grand  or  .petit  larceny,  89. 
dying  declarations,  evidence,   180. 
entirely  circumstantial,   303. 
equally  balanced,  instruction,  202. 

form,  202,    (1)    (5)    383,    (1)    384,  386. 
error  irrespective  of  evidence,  243. 
excluding,  by  instruction,  84. 

incompetent,  84. 

possibility  of  innocence,  222. 
failure  to  produce  evidence,  222. 
how  determine  preponderance,  203. 
impeaching  witness,  220. 

prosecutrix  in  rape,  82. 
incompetent,  adultery,   108. 

evidence,  608. 

instructions,  when,  84. 
when,  n.  21,  84. 
in  conspiracy,  slight,  88. 
in  control  of  party,  222. 
in  larceny  slight,  defense,  88. 
in  malicious  mischief,  82. 

instructing  there  is  none,  when  there  is,   174. 
instructions   based   on   evidence,    80,    95. 

reviewing  evidence,   191. 

when  close,  26a. 

insufficient   to '  sustain   verdict,    126. 
is  there  any  evidence?   174. 
jury  confined  to  evidence,  105. 

determine  weight,   182,  183. 

may  disregard,  182. 
limitLig  to  certain  defendants,   112. 

to  impeaching  witness,  110. 

to  malice,  intent,  111. 

to    specific   purpose,    109. 
mistakes  in  reviewing,   191. 
modifying  to  cover    33 
negligence  of  railroad,  540. 
no  evidence  of  fact,  220. 
not  in  record,  presumption,  362. 
obscure   instructions   when   evidence  conflicting,   62. 
of  branding  cattle,  118. 
of  defense  wanting,  83. 
of  earnings  wanting,  81. 
of  expenses  wanting,  81. 
of  extension  on  contract,  862. 
of  flight,   740,   741. 
of  former  conviction,  110. 
of  good  character,  340. 
of  malicious  prosecution,  81. 


906  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

EVIDENCE— Continued. 

of  motive  not  essential,  264. 

of  negligence  wanting,  93. 

of  opponent  admitted,  when,  121. 

of  plaintiff  alone,   86. 

of  several  defenses,  102. 

of  voluntary  manslaughter,  272. 

omission  to  produce  evidence,  222. 

on  alibi,  322. 

one  kind  better  than  other,   177. 

on  motion  for  peremptory,  121,  124,  126,  133,   134. 

opinion  on  weight  of,  170,   171,   175. 

party  having  exclusive  control,  222. 

surrender,  742. 

peremptory,  when  conflicting,   141. 
portions  made  prominent,   113. 
possible  inferences,  85. 
possession  of  stolen  property,  816. 
preponderance    of,    verdict,    133. 
presumption  of  innocence,  338. 
prima  facie  evidence,   136,    174,    165a,   829. 

undisputed,    verdict,    136. 
proof  by  preponderance,   199. 
proving  guilty  knowledge,    (4)    860. 

included  offense.  270. 
record  containing  all  evidence,  361. 
refusing   instruction,   error,   202. 
relative  weight,  instructions,  204. 
repeating  instructions,  when,  26a. 
restricting  jury  to  evidence,  6,   105. 
rumor  not  evidence,  836. 
scope    in    reviewing,    191. 
several  fires,  by  same  engine,  645. 
several  sales  of  liquor.  98. 
showing  gambling   contract,   128. 

manslaughter,   272. 

prima  facie  case.   126. 

verdict  right,  243. 
singling  out  decisive  portions,  114. 
slight  evidence  sufficient,  86. 

in  criminal  case,  86,  88. 

peremptory  improper,   129. 
speculative  insufficient,  85. 

on   negligence,   directing   verdict,    134. 
striking  out  evidence,  241. 
sufficient  though  slight,  86,  87. 

though    slight,    for    peremptory,    140. 
summing  up  evidence,  119,  170. 

forbidden,  when,  119,  170. 
supporting    defense    of    limitation,    118. 

facts,  117. 

only  manslaughter,  273. 

self-defense,  255. 

several  theories,  101,  102. 

theory,   101. 
tending  to  prove  any  count,  130. 

every  element,   130. 

two  theories,  132. 


INDEX.  907 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

EVIDENCE — Continued. 

"tends  to  show"  proper,  173. 
undisputed  showing  guilt,  243. 
"undue  influence,"  will  contest,  81. 

wills,  81,  704. 

unreasonable  or  inconsistent,   86. 
unsworn  statement,  227,  228. 
wanting,  80,  81,   82,  93,  93a,  98,   102,   126. 

form,  717. 

in  conspiracy,  82. 

in  larceny,  82. 

in  replevin,  83. 

in  will  contest,  81. 

on  any  fact,  80. 

on   bad   faith,    81. 

on  counts,  98. 

on  issues,   illustrations,   93a. 

on    mental    capacity,    93a. 

on  negligence,   126. 

on  opponent's  theory,  102. 

on  wilful  conduct,  81. 
weight  of,   for  jury,   170.   184. 

directing  verdict,   122. 

on  insanity,  751,  752. 
when  prima   facie   proof,    181. 
when  several  issues,  93. 
writing  as  a  fact,    159. 

EVIDENCE  BALANCED, 

instruction  improper,  when,  202. 
verdict,    when,    202. 

EVIDENCE  CLOSE, 

accuracy  on  instructions,  250. 

when,  n.  77,  250. 
assuming   facts,   when,    195. 
commenting  on  witnesses,  when,  208. 
error  in  instructions,  when.  250. 
instructions,  when,  26a,  202,  250. 
on  vital  point,  195. 

EVIDENCE  CONFLICTING, 

assuming  facts,   when,    195. 
credibility  of  witnesses,  when,  206. 
instructions,   when,   250. 
on  personal   injury,   195. 
on  vital  point,   195. 

EVIDENCE  LIMITED, 

to  one  or  more  of  several  defendants,  112. 

EVIDENCE  WANTING, 

See  EVIDENCE. 
on  confession,  321. 
on  included  offense,  268,  269,  273. 
on  involuntary  manslaughter,  273. 
on  insanity,  n.  30,  335. 
on  larceny,  268. 


908  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

EVIDENCE    WANTING— Continued. 
on   manslaughter,   260,   271. 
reasonable  doubt  from,  299. 
"want  of  evidence,"  omitting,  n.  2,  294. 

EXCAVATION, 

causing  injury  to  person,  599. 
damages  by,  recoverable,  670. 

caused  by,  670. 
measure  of  damages,    (5)    670. 
no  liability  for,  when,  670. 
on  adjacent  premises,  670. 

EXCEPTIONS,  346.  See  OBJECTIONS. 

absence  of  exceptions,  effect,  13. 
after   jury   retire,   347. 
before  jury  retire,  347. 
bill  of  exceptions,  47. 
by  number  of  instruction,  n.  32,  350. 
by   which   party   made,   357. 
court   misstating  evidence,   n.    11,   347. 
essential   to   save   error,    13. 
excepting   to    several    instructions,    353. 

to  oral   charge,   13. 
failure  to  accept,   352. 

form  of,   sufficiency,   346,   349,   350,   351,   357. 
general   or    specific,   349. 

to  entire  charge,  351. 
"given  and  excepted  to,"  346,  357. 
if  entire   charge   erroneous,    351. 
if  none  taken,  effect,  352. 
in  bill  of  exceptions,   357. 
in  criminal  cases,  352. 
instruction   on   character,   348. 

too  general,  351. 
in  trial  court,  352. 
limited  to  grounds  stated,  354. 
manner  of  taking,  346. 
matter  covered  by  other  exception,  349. 
must  be  taken,   346. 

one  exception  to  several  instructions,  349. 
on  motion  for  new  trial,  347. 
pointing  out  errors,  348. 
presumed  properly  taken,  347. 
"refused   and  excepted   to,"   346. 
relating   to   damages,    348. 
request  for  specific  instructions,  351. 
should  be  specific,  348. 
signing  under  statute,  346. 
statutory  requirements,   346. 
sufficiency   of   exceptions,   350. 
taking   before   verdict, 

from  "one  to  nine,"  350. 

jointly,    351. 

to   all   instructions,   346. 

to  entire   charge,    351. 

to  giving  or  refusing,  346. 


INDEX.  909 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§  365—878  Forms.) 

EXCEPTIONS — Continued. 

taking   to   charge,    "as    given,"    351. 

"to  each   and  every  one,"   348,   351. 

to   series   of   instructions,   353. 
though   instructions   not   requested,    355. 
time  of  taking,   347,  349. 
to  instructions  as  entirety,  351. 

"one,  two,  three,"  350. 
to  modifying  instruction,  n.  14,  347. 
to  rulings  on  instructions,  47. 
too  general,  348,  351. 
too  indefinite,  vague,  348. 
too  late,   347. 
unavailing,  346,  347,  351. 

excepting   to   part,    346. 
unnecessary,   when,   349,  352. 
waiving,  355. 

when  instructions  numbered,  350. 
when  to  be  taken,  347. 

EXCLUDING, 

damages  by  instruction,  58. 
opposing  theory,   58,   104. 
punitive  damages, 
theory  of  innocence,   730. 

of  opponent,   58,    104. 

EXCLUSIVE, 

possession  of  land,  656,    (5)    656.    (2)    659. 

EXEMPLARY  DAMAGES,        See  PUNITIVE  DAMAGED,  VINDICTIVE  DAMAGES. 
for    assault    and    battery,    59. 
for  seduction,  874. 
instructions  improper,   59. 
in  trespass,  59. 
means  punitive  damages,  74. 
omitting  facts  on,  59. 

EXEMPTION, 

from   execution,   452. 

EXPENSES, 

element  of  damages,    (3)    652. 

for  medical  treatment,   evidence  wanting,   81. 

in  estimating  damages,    (7)    652. 

no  evidence  of  expenses,  81. 

EXPERTS,  See  EXPERT  WITNESSES. 

comments  on,  improper.  211. 
"entitled  to  great  weight,"  n.  Ill,  223. 
hypothetical  questions  to,   (4)   377. 
medical  experts,  wills,  702. 
testimony,  if  unreasonable,    (5)    828. 
testimony  of  experts,  377. 
weight  of  opinion,  wills.   702. 
weighing  testimony  of,  377. 


910  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

EXPERT  WITNESSES, 

See    WITNESSES,  EXPERTS. 
argumentative   request,   66. 
basis  for  opinion,   211. 
cautioning   against,    211. 
commenting  on  testimony,  211. 
hypothetical  state  of  facts,  211. 
instruction  on,  improper,  211. 

proper,   223. 

suggesting  fact,  211. 
"little  value,"  "great  value,"  211. 
opinions  of  expert,  211. 

valueless,    when,    211. 
questions  hypothetical,  211. 
singling  out,  improper,  211,  223. 
weighing  testimony  of  expert,  211,  223. 

EXPLOSION, 

boiler  exploding,  servant  injured,    (5)    619,    (2)   621,  623. 
injury  from,  to  servant,  580,  623. 
through  negligence,  580. 

EXTRADITION, 

court  passing  upon,   163. 

F. 
FACTORY, 

fertilizer  factory,  681. 

FACTS. 

admitted  by  both  sides,  196,  197. 
as  basis   for   presumption,    181. 
assuming,  criminal   case,   198. 
disputed  facts,  192. 

harmless,   when,   72,   242. 

improper,  when,   192. 

in  will  contest,  193. 

killing,  homicide_.   198. 

proper,   when,   196. 

when   disputed,    195. 

when  evidence  close,   195. 

without  evidence,  192. 
circumstantial  evidence.  309. 
close  on  vital  point,  309,  250. 
closely  contested,  250,  309. 
conclusively  shown,  instruction,  196. 

though  disputed,    196. 
consistency  on  essential  facts,  311. 

with  guilt,   310. 
court  expressing  opinion,   170. 
determined  by  court,  when,  145,  146,  182. 
by  jury,  86,  'l70,  175,  379. 

by  special  findings,  231. 
entitled  to  "great  weight,"  182. 

to  "little  weight,"   182. 
essential  to  cause,  119,  199. 

to  recovery,  railroads,  647. 
evidence   slight, '  in    support   of,   87. 


INDEX.  911 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

FACTS — Continued. 

favorable  not   referred  to,    113. 

finding  of,  by  special  verdict,   160. 

for  defense  omitted,   115. 

for  prosecution  made  prominent,   115. 

giving  prominence  to,   113,   116. 

ignored  by  instruction,  65,   116. 

immaterial  circumstances,  311. 

inconsistent  with  other  conclusion,  310. 

indispensable  circumstances,  311. 

informing  main  fact,  309. 

instructions  assuming,   illustrations,   193. 

enumerating    facts,    647. 

omitting,  72. 

singling  out,  65. 

when  no  evidence,  174. 
jury  determine  facts,  86,   145,   146,   170,   175,  182,  379. 

sole  judges  of,    (6)    379. 
may   be   inferred,   308. 
necessary   to   recovery,   647. 
not  assumed,  illustrations,   194. 
no  evidence  supporting,  80. 
not  in  issue,  94. 
not  in  pleadings,  99. 
of  one  side  made  prominent,  113. 
omitting  in  examination,  222. 

in  summing  up,    119. 
oral  contract,  a  fact,  157. 
prejudicial  facts,  reciting,  80. 

no  evidence,  80,  82. 
prima  facie  evidence  of,    174. 
proof  of,  misleading,  65. 
shown    by    circumstances,    27. 

inference,   87,   290. 
singling  out  facts,  113. 

flight,    115. 

threats,    115. 

unobjectionable,   114. 
submitting  conjunctively,   199. 

improper,   when,    172. 

hypothetically,   172. 

to  jury,   147. 

burglary,    813. 
when  no  evidence,  81. 

when  undisputed,   172. 
summarizing  on  ont,  side.  1 16. 
summing  up  forbidden,   170. 
in   detail.    119. 
supported   by    evidence,    117. 
ultimate  fact  for  jury,  181. 
when  need  not  be  pleaded,  93. 
when  no  evidence  of,  174. 
withdrawing,   117. 

proper,  when,   117. 

FACTS  CLOSE, 

singling  out,  when  close,  113. 


912  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

FAILURE, 

to  call   witness,  222. 

to  instruct  on  presumption  of  innocence,   9. 

to  produce,  222. 

evidence,  instruction  improper,  222. 
to  request  instructions,  220. 

"FALSELY," 

definition  unnecessary,  75. 

FALSE   PRETENSE, 

committed  by  acts,  symbol,  831. 
definition  and  elements,  830. 
defrauding  tax  collector,  832. 
essential  elements,   (2)    830,  832. 
forms  of  instructions,  830. 
fraudulent  intent  essential,   832. 

i 

FARM, 

damaged  by  railroad,  685. 

FARMER, 

property  burned  by   railroad,  645. 

FATHER,  See  MINOR,  MOTHER. 

entitled  to  child's  earnings,  449. 
head  of  family,  when,  452. 

FEAR, 

bare  fear  no  defense,  799. 

FEDERAL  COURTS, 

commenting  on  evidence,  189. 
exceptions  to  instructions,  348. 
illustrations,  commenting  on  evidence,   190. 
opinion  on  evidence,  proper,  189. 

FEDERAL  STATUTE, 

carrier  violating,   590. 

FEIGNING   INSANITY, 

instructions  on,  proper,  333. 

"FELLOW  SERVANT," 

a  question  of  fact,  76. 

causing  injury,  614. 

engineer  and  brakeman,   614. 

form  of  instructions,  613,  614. 

liability,  when  not,  613. 

section  master  and  hands  under  him,  613. 

should  be  defined,  76. 

watchman  and  engineer,  not,  613. 

"FELONIOUS," 

definition  necessary,  when.   75. 

unnecessary,  75. 
omission  of,  immaterial,  240. 
surplusage,  when,  75. 

FELONIOUS   ASSAULT, 

simple  assault  included,  267. 

FELONY, 

definition  necessary,  when,  75. 


INDEX.  913 

(References  are  to  Sections,   §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

FELONY — Continued. 

instructing  without  request,  3. 

on,  Texas,  3. 
witness  convicted  of,  227. 

FEMALE, 

carnal  knowledge  of,  225. 

witness  in  sexual  intercourse,  225. 

FENCES, 

cattle  breaking  through,  678. 
damages  in  destroying,  673. 
expense  for  rebuilding,  673. 
failure  to  fence  tracks,  646. 
forms  of  instructions,  673. 
gaps  not  repaired,  676. 
lawful  fence,  678. 
malicious  destruction,  673. 
negligence  in  repairing,  676. 
not  required,  where,    (6)   646. 
notice  of  fence  viewers,  869. 
partition  fence,  676. 

evidence,  82. 

preventing  stock  entering,  676. 
railroads  fencing  tracks,  646. 
viewers  examining,  869. 

FEW,  See  Too  MANY. 

instructions  for  state,  n.  80,   19. 

FILTH, 

damaging  land  by,  672. 

FIRE, 

appliances  to  prevent,  645. 
buildings   with   openings,   645. 
caused  by  train,  631. 
damages   from,  railroads,   645. 
engine  out  of  repair,  645. 
escaping  from  engine,  645. 
precautions    to    prevent,    631. 
property  burned,  forms, 
railroad  not  liable,  when,  645. 
safe-guards   against,   railroads,   645. 

FIRE  INSURANCE,  See  INSURANCE. 

FIREMAN, 

ringing  bell,    (8)    641. 

FIXTURES, 

whether  machinery  is,  195. 

FLAGMAN, 

at  railroad  crossing,  643. 
not  required,  when,  643. 
train  without  flagman,  635. 

FLIGHT, 

a  circumstance  of   guilt,   179. 

only,    115,    179,   741. 
evidence   of   guilt,    115. 
forms  of  instructions.   740. 


914  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

FLIGHT — Continued. 

from  fear  of  pursuers,   740. 
instruction  on,  improper,  179. 

proper,    178. 
singling  out,   115. 
tends  to  prove  guilt,  740. 

FLOOD, 

damage  from,    (2)    545. 

FLORIDA, 

homicide    statutory    definition,    284. 

FORCE, 

essential  to  robbery,  772. 

FOREIGN  LAWS, 

construction  of,   162. 
fact  to  be  proved,   162. 
proof  of,  a  fact,  161. 

FORFEITURES, 

are  odious,  taxes.  691. 

must  be  strictly  proved,  691. 

rights  to  land,  691. 

FORGERY, 

aiding  and  abetting,  842. 
alteration  of  instrument,  841. 
charged  in  making  will,  706. 
defined,   840. 
definition  defective,  276. 

omitting   "intent   to   defraud/'    276. 
forms   of  instructions,   842. 
intent   to   defraud,    841,   843,   844. 

FORMER  ACQUITTAL, 

directing  verdict  on,  152. 

FORMER  CONVICTION, 

evidence  of,  to  impeach,  110. 


FORMS, 


IS, 

accident,   injury   from.   648. 
accidental  injury,   545. 
to  person,  581. 


FORM, 

accomplice  witness,  376. 
act  of  teller,  390. 

agency,  388,   (2)   393. 
actual   possession   of   land,   657. 
adultery,  833. 

agent  borrowing   for   principal,    (3)    389. 
borrowing  money,  389. 

exceeding  authority,   391,    (1)    393. 

selling  books,   393. 

selling   machine,    395. 
alibi,  743. 

all  material  averments,    (3)    (4)    (5)    383. 
arrest  without  cause,  504. 

without  warrant,  503. 
assaults,  766. 
assault  to  ravish,   477. 


INDEX.  915 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms J 

FORM— Continued. 

assisting  passenger  on  train,  571. 
blowing  whistle  at  crossings,   641,  642. 
both  parties  negligent,  636. 
building  contracts,  444,  445. 
burden  as  to  negligence,  531. 

of  proof,  382,  384. 

carriers,   583. 

on  defendant,   (2)    384. 

on  plaintiff,  383,  385. 
burglary  and  larceny,  808. 
care  defined,  529. 

in  driving  vehicle,  533. 

in  running  trains,  630. 

carelessness  on  leaving  train,    (5)    (6)     (7)    561. 
carrier   carrying   sick   person,   552. 

lighting  platform,   566. 

losing   baggage,    585. 
goods,  587. 

not  insurer.,   584. 

stopping  train,  564. 

taking  ticket,   573. 
circumstantial  evidence,   729. 
caution   against,   conjecture,    (6)    379. 
character  of  accused,  756. 
cautionary   instructions,   civil  or  criminal,   379. 

in  criminal  cases.  707 
children  trespassing,   559. 
company's  teller  acting,  390. 
conditions  of  sale  complied  with,  412. 
conduct  and  demeanor,   375. 
confessions,   admissions,    737. 
considerations  on  preponderance,    (3)     (7)    385. 
conspiracy,   759. 
construction   of   writings,    381. 
contracts  generally,  396,  430. 
contributory   negligence,    543,    582. 
court  determines  law,   380. 

construes  writings,   381. 
credibility  of  witnesses..  365. 
damages   for   death,   650. 
damages  generally,  474. 

for  slander,  498,   499. 

measure  of,   652. 

on  sale  of  cattle.  400. 

to  personal  property,  509. 
dangerous    platform,    carriers,    566. 
defeating  creditors,   517,  519. 
defective  scaffold,  negligence,   387. 
defendant   witness,   criminal,   372. 

form,  373. 
defense,  accident..   581. 

in  slander.  500. 
destroying  fences,   673. 
detectives  as  witnesses,  378. 
directions   to  passengers,    577. 
disorderly  house.    839. 
disregarding   entire   testimony,   368. 

false  testimony.  368. 

impeached   witness,    (7)    367. 

unimpeached  witness,    (8)    367. 


916  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

FORM— Continued. 

domestic  relations,   446. 

duress  by  threats,  527. 

ejecting  disorderly  passenger,  557,  575. 

passenger,    557.    574. 
embezzlement,  820. 

evidence  equally  balanced,    (1)    (5)    383,  386. 
failing   to   stop   train,   561. 
falling  off  platform,   569. 
false  pretense,   820. 
father  and  minor  children,  449. 
forgery,  840. 

for  railroad  defendant,  269. 
fraud  as  defense,  (5)   384. 

in  selling  land,    (2)    388. 
fraudulent  assignment,  524. 

representations,  515,  522. 

transactions,    514. 

gaining,  846. 

gambling  transactions,   528. 
grades  in  streets,  602. 
high  degree  care,  549. 
husband  and  wife,  523. 

for   wife,    370. 
ice  on  sidewalks,  603. 
impeachment  by  contradictions,    (6)    367. 
implied  warranty,  409. 
inferring  facts,   379. 
injury  from  natural  cause,  545. 

on  leaving  train,  563. 

proximate  cause.  541. 

to  person,  652,  653. 

to  postal    clerk,    554. 
innocent  purchaser.   518. 
insanity,  criminal,  746. 

relating  to  wills,  679. 
instructions  for  murder.  773. 

on  attorney's  services,    (8)    404. 

on  breach  of  contract,  397,   398. 

on  breach  of  warranty,  411. 
on  burglary,  808. 

contract,  397,    (1)    396.  407. 

disputed  claims,  404. 

patent  claim,  405. 

presence,   792. 

wills,  692. 

relating  to  land  656. 

sale  by  sample,    (1)    (2)   407. 

on  warranty,    (1)   408. 
insurance,  420. 

insurance,  proof  of  death,  423. 
interrogative  in  form,  69. 
joint   or  several   liability,   401. 
jury  determine  facts,  379. 

viewing  premises,    (3)    379. 

weigh  testimony,  366. 
killing  next  of  kin,   649. 

stock,  damages.  512. 
knowledge  of  fraud,  519. 


917 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

FORM — Continued. 

landlord  and  tenant,  453. 

law   determined   by   court,    380. 

libel   and   slander,   491. 

defined,   491. 

limiting   liability,   carrier,   586. 
loss  in  shipment,  587. 
malice  in  slander,  492. 
malicious   prosecution,   503,   504,   505,  506. 

defense,   506. 
malpractice,  484. 
master  and  servant,   110. 
medical  experts,  377. 
^minor's  contracts,  451. 

earning  wages.  449. 
money   intrusted,   bailment,   434. 
murder,   773. 

negligence,  defendant  liable,  542. 
negligence,  generally,  529. 

defined,   529. 

inferred,  538. 

not  inferred,  539. 

of  both,  544. 

of  carriers,  548. 

of  city,  591. 

of  defendant,  544. 

of  master  and  servant,  610. 

of  passenger,  582. 

of  railroads,  392,  627. 

presumed,  548. 

what  is  not,  539,  540. 
not  bound  to  believe  witness,  368. 
number  of  witnesses,    (2)   385. 
obstructions  in  highway,  480,  858. 
on  accommodation  note,'  (1)    416. 
on   agency,   388. 

on   applying  instructions,    (5)    379. 
on  attorney's  services^  431. 
on  contract  of  insane  person,  403. 

waiving  rights,    (5)    406. 
on   good   character.   756,   757. 
on  impeachment  of  witness,  367. 
on  negligence.   542. 
on  reasonable  doubt.  716. 

on   reconciling  testimony,    (2)     (3)     (4)     (8)    365. 
on   rescinding   contract,   402. 
on  sale  of  property,    (7)   413. 
on  truth  and  veracity,    (11)    367. 
on   unimpeached   witness,    (8)    367. 
on  witness  contradictions,    (13)   367. 
opinions  of  experts,  377. 

on  value.  520. 

ordinary  care  defined,  529,  530. 
partnership  contracts,   459. 
party,  witness  for  himself,  369. 
passenger  entering  train,  567. 

injured,  563. 

leaving  moving  train,  561. 

on  wrong  train,  576. 

care.  551. 

without  ticket,  574. 
physician's  practice,  484,  485,  486. 


918  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

FORM— Continued. 

plaintiff  assuming  risk,    (12)     (13)    544. 

as  witness,  369. 

knowing  danger,   (9)    (10)    (11)   544. 
policeman,    (2)    378. 
positive  and  negative  testimony,  371. 
preparing  streets  for  travel..   606. 
preponderance,    (5)    385. 

of  evidence,    (4)    385. 
presumption  of  innocence,  713. 

how  determined,  (1)  385. 
preventing  completion  of  contract,  397. 
principal  bound  by  agent's  act,  388. 
promissory  notes  involved,  415. 
proximate  cause  of  injury,  541. 
public  nuisance,  852. 

purchasing  with  intent  to  defraud,  414. 
putting  passenger  off  train,  556. 
reasonable  doubt,   716. 
railroads  burning  property,  645. 

not  insurer,  584. 
relating  to  assignment  of  policy,  424. 

banking,  436,  437. 

bicycles,    (2)    480,  482. 

brokers,   438. 

carriers,  548. 

children,  559. 

contracts,  430. 

electricity,  546. 

insurance,  420. 

real  estate, 

wills, 

riding  on  car  platform,  570. 
ringing  bell  at  crossings,  641. 
sale  induced  by  fraud,  414. 
sale  of  personal   property, 
self-defense,  instructions  on,  474,  475,  795. 
selling   intoxicating  liquors,   487. 

land  on  commission,  394. 
settlement  by  arbitration,  432. 
several   owners,   injury,   579. 
sidewalk  cases,  591. 
slander  defined,    (2)    491. 
slight  negligence,  carriers,  550. 

preponderance,   (5)   382. 
starting  car  suddenly,  562. 

train  too  soon,  565. 
statute  of  limitation,  465. 
Sunday  violations, 

tenant  guilty  of  negligence,    (8)    544. 
trolley-car  wires,  547. 
unlawful  arrest,  505. 
usury  on  note,  419. 
value  of  attorney's  services.  430. 
verdict  in  criminal   case.  42. 

in  writing.  42. 

waiving  right  to  rescind,  413. 
which  company  liable  for.  579. 
witnesses,  civil  or  criminal.  365. 

criminal  only.  372. 
witness  testifying  falsely,  368 

defendant  a  witness,  criminal.  372,  373. 


INDEX.  919 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

FORMULA, 

"if  you  believe  from  evidence,"  105. 

"if  the  evidence  shows," 

of  instruction,  105. 

need  not  repeat  formula,   105. 

not  essential,   when,    105. 

"under   the   evidence,"    105. 

FOUND, 

finding  and  appropriating,   817. 

FRAMING  INSTRUCTION, 
in  what  manner,  1. 

FRAUD, 

as  defense,  burden,    (4)    384. 
attempt    to    defraud    bank,    437. 
badges  of  fraud,   523. 
burden  of  proof  on,  514. 
committed  by  agent,  388. 
definition  unnecessary,   75. 
degree  of  proof  on,   200. 
fair  dealing  presumed,  514. 
fraudulent  assignment,  524. 
husband  and  wife.  200. 
influencing    jury    en    damages,    185. 
innocent   purchaser,   518. 
in  procuring  insurance,  427. 
'   in   reference   to   indebtedness,   525. 
in  sale  of  stocks,  516. 
in   selling   land,    (2)    388,    522. 

form,    (2)    388. 

in  settling  with   creditors,  524. 
instructions   improper,   insurance,    177. 

proper,  176. 

knowledge  of  fraud,    (3)    517. 
men   presumed  honest,   514. 
misleading  instruction   on,   65. 
must  be  proved,  form,   (5)    384. 
never  presumed.    177,    (5)    384,    (3)    514. 
"never  presumed,"  improper,  177,   (5)    384. 
not   in   issue,   96. 
not  question   of   law,   n.   70,    183. 
opinions  on  value,  520. 
presumptive  proot  of,    (4)    517. 
proof  by  "clear  preponderance,"  200. 
purchaser  in  good   faith.    (3)    517. 
purchasing  to  defraud,  form,  414. 
question  of  fact,    (4)    517." 
relief  from,  when,  515. 
rescinding  contract  for,    (1)   413. 
.sale  based  on  fraud.    (4)    517. 
settlement  procured  by  fraud,  404. 
shown  by  circumstances,  176. 
stating  facts  constituting,  n.  70,  183. 
sureties   signing  bond,   521. 

FRAUDULENT  ASSIGNMENT. 

forms  of  instructions  on,  524. 


920  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

FRAUDULENT   CONVEYANCE 

instruction  not  intimating  opinion,   176. 
no  evidence   sustaining    127. 
shown  by  circumstances,   176. 

FRAUDULENT   INTENT, 

known  to   purchaser,   519. 

FRAUDULENT    REPRESENTATIONS,    515. 
damages  resulting  from,  516. 
forms  of  instructions,  516. 
in  sale  of  stock,  516. 

"FRAUDULENTLY," 

definition   unnecessary,   75. 

FREIGHT  CAR, 

carrying  passengers,  555. 

FRENZY, 

is  not  insanity,    (5)    755. 

FURTHER    INSTRUCTIONS,    7. 
after   jury   retire,   34. 
correctness   of,    37. 

counsel  present  without  objecting  to,  35. 
discretionary  with  court,  38. 
duty  to  further  instruct,   34. 
eliminating  objectionable   features   in  charge,  7. 
further  with  jury  request,  38. 
giving  entirely   new  charge,   37. 

not  error,  when,  35. 

without    request,    38. 
in  absence  of  counsel,  35,  36. 

of  defendant,   36. 
in   presence  of  defendant,  36. 
in  writing,   when,  34. 
on   court's   motion,   38. 
on  points  not  requested,  37. 
remarks  of  court  on  giving,   38. 
re-reading   original    charge,    37. 
right  to  have,  34. 
statutory  prohibition,  Texas,  37. 
when  and  when  not  error,   3  P. 

G. 

GAMBLING. 

in  grain,  528. 
on   markets,   528. 

GAMBLING   CONTRACTS.    528. 
evidence  showing,   128. 
liability  on,  528. 

GAMING, 

defined,  846. 

betting  on  billiards,  848. 

betting  on  horse  race,  n.  33,  528\. 

chips  or  checks  used,  848. 


INDEX.  921 

(References  are  to  Sections,   §§    1 — 3G4  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

GAS, 

escaping  through  negligence,    (8)    544. 

GATES, 

at  crossings,  necessity,  643. 

GENERAL  AFFIRMATIVE  CHARGE,  120,  129. 

GENERAL  CHARGE, 

covering  all  principles,  26. 
embracing  principles  of  special,  26. 
specific  charge   with,   60. 
sufficiency  of,  without  special,  26. 

GEORGIA, 

jury   judges  of  criminal  law,    168. 

GIVING, 

abstract    instructions,    harmless    when,    48. 

after  modifying  request,  30. 

by  marking  "given,"  44. 

discretionary,  when,  206. 

full   charge   on   court's   motion,   26b. 

giving  or   refusing  as   requested,   31. 

giving,   though   not   requested   in   time,    17. 

giving  when  no  evidence,   81,   82. 

in  language  of  request.   32. 

instruction  employing  no  evidence,   192. 

marked  "refused,"  44. 

when  evidence  incompetent,  84. 

when  no  evidence,  80,  81,  82. 

without  marking,  44. 
instruction  without  marking,  44. 
on   court's   motion.   3,   26b,   346. 
on   impeachment   of  witness,   220. 
on  issues  when  no  evidence,  93. 
too  many  instructions,   19. 
when  evidence  speculative,  85. 
without  signing  instructions,  43. 

GIVING    PROMINENCE, 

prominence   to  facts,    113,   223. 
prominence  to  testimony,  113,  223. 

GOOD  CHARACTER. 

character  evidence,  340,  341. 
considered  with  other  evidence,  241. 
creating   reasonable    doubt,    341,    343. 
defendant's  character,  340. 
in  doubtful   case,   340. 
instruction  disregarding.   340. 
improper,    340.    345. 
proper.  343,  344. 
limiting  effect  of,  n.  27.  345. 
misleading  instruction.   345. 
no  evidence  of   character,   342. 
refusing  on,  proper  when.  342. 
repeating  instruction  on,  342. 
unavailing,   when,   344. 


922  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forma.} 

GOODS, 

See  PROPERTY. 

carrier  not  liable,  when,   588. 
.  damage,   carrier   not   liable,   588. 
delay  in  shipment,   588. 
lost   by   carrier,   587. 
shipment  of,  damage  to,  588. 
liability,   588. 

GONG, 

sounding  at  crossings,    (5)    641. 

GRADES, 

in  streets,   forms,   602. 
obstructing   water   flow,   602. 

GRAIN, 

sale  of,  in  storage,  n.  34,  414. 

GRASS, 

damaged  by  cattle,  677. 

"GREAT   BODILY   HARM,"   201. 

GRIEF, 

in  assessing  damages,  651.         ' 
not  element  of  damages,  650. 

GRIPMAN, 

keeping  lookout,    (3)   644. 

GROUNDS, 

stating  reasons  for  exception,  354. 

GROUPING, 

grouping  instructions,  73. 

into  one  series,  73. 

on  each  subject,  73. 

order  of  arrangement  discretionary,  73. 

GUARDIAN, 

failing  to  loan  funds,  870. 
value  of  services,  870. 

GUARDS, 

not  in  repair,  railroads,  646. 
preventing  cattle  crossing,  646. 

GUILT, 

beyond  reasonable  doubt,  296. 
conclusively  shown,   243. 
degree  of  proof  required,  313. 

criminal,  201. 
drunkenness  affecting,  779. 
excluding  other  hypothesis,  except,  310. 
facts  consistent  with.  310. 
presumed  when,  larceny,  265a. 

GUILTY, 

uncertain  who  is,  728. 

GUILTY  PERSON, 

caution  against  acquitting,  32. 


INDEX.  923 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§  365 — 878  Forms.) 

H. 
HABITATION, 

killing  in  defending  habitation,  795. 

HANDWRITING, 

comparing  signatures  improper,  872. 
instructions  on  proof,  870. 
proven  how,  871. 
seeing  person  write,  871. 

HARMLESS  ERROR,  S66  CURING  ERROR,  ERROR. 

admissions  proving  case,  243. 
assuming  facts,  242. 
cured  by  other  instructions,  64. 
defective   instruction    cured,    72,    105. 
disputed  facts,  assuming,  242. 
error  cured,  criminal,  240. 
erroneous    instructions  -  favorable,    244. 
failure  to  limit  evidence,  n.  157,  109. 
favorable  to  party,  244. 
if  verdict   is   right,   243. 
illogical  arrangement,  73. 
illustrations    of    principles,    237. 
imperfect  instruction  cured  by  others,  70. 
improper   remark,   n.    18,   238. 
in  arranging  instructions,  73. 
in  assessing  damages,  241. 
in  giving  instructions,  235. 
in  jury  determining  law,  when,   155. 
in  personal   injury,   241. 
in   refusing  instruction,   85. 
instructing  on  immaterial  issues,  91. 
instructions  construed  together,  238. 

corrected,   238. 

omitting  facts,  stated  in  others,  71. 

on    freight   rates,   n.    13,    238. 

on   machinery.   239. 

on  murder,  252,  n.  59,  274. 
manslaughter    instructions,    252. 
negligence,   instructions   on,   236,   239. 
omitting  "if  you  believe   from  evidence,"  cured,   105. 

reasonable  doubt,  313. 
on  argumentative  requests,  67. 
on  burden,   199. 

on  circumstantial  evidence,  310. 
on  contributory  negligence,  239. 
on  negligence,  236,  239. 
on  presumption  of  innocence  337. 
on  reasonable  doubt,  n.  19,  296. 
relating  to  damages,  237. 
safety  of  machinery  239. 
slight  inaccuracies,  n.  39,  243. 
submitting   immaterial   matters,   243. 
though  refused  instruction  proper,  236. 
using  "intentionally"   for  knowingly   and  wilfully,  219. 
verdict,    showing   error   disregarded,   236. 
when  error  cured,  238. 
when  evidence  undisputed,  243. 


924  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

HAY, 

catching    fire,    railroads,    645. 
destruction  by  animals,  676. 

HEALTH, 

affected   by   nuisance,    855. 
damages  for  injury  to,    (6)    653. 
drains  in  city  necessary,  600. 
element  of  damages,  death,    (7)    650. 
injured  by  nuisance,  679. 

"HEAT  OF  PASSION," 

definition  necessary,   75. 

HIGHWAY, 

established  by   record,    (3)    858. 
established   by   user,    dedication,    858. 
forms  of  instructions,  606. 
injury  to  traveler,  483. 
keeping  in  repair,  480. 
liability   if  dangerous,   606. 
maliciously  destroying  bridge,   860. 
notice  of  danger   in,   480. 
obstructions   causing   injury,   480. 
owner  giving  land  for,    (2)    858. 
preparing  for  travel,   606. 
riding  bicycle  on,  480. 
safe  for  travel,  forms,  606. 
turnpike   unsafe,   481. 

HOGS,  See  ANIMALS. 

at    large    unlawfully,    646. 
damaging  crops,   646. 

liability,    (4)    646. 
killing,    owner    negligent,    646. 

trespassing  hogs,  837. 
shipping,   589. 

HOME, 

See  HABITATION. 

HOMESTEAD, 

abandonment  of,  873. 
instructions   on,    873. 

HOMICIDE, 

See  MURDER,  MANSLAUGHTER. 
bare  fear  no  defense,  795. 
court  cannot  determine  degree,  251. 
defendant   must    retreat,    260. 
degree  of,  jury  determine,  251. 

Utah,  270. 

"entirely   free   from    fault,"   n.   40,   258. 
evidence  circumstantial,  instructions  wyhen,  273. 
"free  from  fault"  n.   44,   258. 
instructing  murder  or  nothing,  269. 

on  degrees,   270. 

when  evidence  wholly  circumstantial,  270. 


INDEX.  925 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

HOMICIDE— Continued. 

instruction   erroneous,   251. 

denning  degrees,  252. 

on  all  degrees,  proper,  when,  273. 

self-contradictory,  249. 
in  unlawful  arrest  262. 
justifiable  homicide  defined,  795. 
killing  trespasser,  263. 
murder    or    no    offense.    252. 
no  evidence  of   included   offense,   269. 
retreat   not   required,   260. 
self-defense,   belief,   appearance,   256. 

instructions,  255. 
threats  by  deceased,  257. 

HORSE  See  BAILMENT. 

injured  by   railroad,   646. 
killing   another,   512. 
over-driving,    cruelty,    838. 

HORSE-CARS, 

carrier  using,    ( 13 )   549. 

HOTEL, 

liable  for  loss,  when,  435. 
losing    guest's    property,    435. 

HOUSEHOLDER, 

what  constitutes,   form,  452. 

HUSBAND, 

ability  to  earn,  death,   (10)   649. 

age,   health,   length   of   life,    (13)    650. 

believing  or  disbelieving,  370. 

damages  for  killing,    (8)    649.  . 

duty  to  wife,    (2)    488. 

gift  to  wife,  446,    (3)   447. 

head  of   family,   exemption,  452. 

killed  by  railroad,  649. 

rights  to  wife's  estate,  446. 

value  of  services  to  family,    (13)    650. 

widow    and    children,    649. 

wife  killed,   damages,    (7)    650. 

witness  for  wife,  form.   370. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  446,  447,  523. 
contracts  between,   523. 
debtor  and   creditor  between,   200. 
forms  of  instructions,  446,  447. 
injuring  creditors,   523. 

HYPOTHESIS. 

See   REASONABLE  HYPOTHESIS. 

circumstantial  evidence  excluding.  730. 

HYPOTHETICAL, 

submitting  facts  hypothetically,    172. 


926  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

I. 

ICE, 

on  navigable  streams,  owner,  686. 
on  sidewalks,   forms,   603. 
liability,  603. 

IGNORING, 

defense,  ignored,   118. 

in  criminal  case,  118. 

of    limitation,    118. 

proper,   when,    83. 
facts  harmless,   71. 
immaterial  issues,  proper.  91. 
included  offense  ignored,  267. 
in  summary  instructions,  119. 
issue  of  care  of  plaintiff,  92. 
material   issues,   92. 
self-defense  in  instructions,   255. 
submitting   undisputed   facts,    116. 
summarizing   one   side,    116. 
theory  of  party,   error,   101. 

ILLINOIS, 

directing  verdict,  practice,   123. 
exceptions  to   instructions,   356. 
faulty  counts,  instruction,  n.  42,  54. 
judges  of  criminal   law,   153,   166,   709. 
peremptory  instructions  in   writing,   123. 
retreat  in  murder,  n.   51,  260. 

ILLUSTRATIONS, 

argumentative  instructions,  68. 

assuming    facts,    193. 

circumstantial  evidence,  306,  307,  314,  315. 

coercing  jury,  188. 

commenting  on  weight  of  evidence,   190. 

court   urging   jury   to   agree,    186. 

directing   verdict,    134. 

insanity,    instructions   proper,    334. 

instructions  based  on  pleadings,  97. 

improper,    184.  315. 

issues    unsupported    by   evidence,    81,    93a. 
legal   questions,    163. 
misleading  instructions,   65. 
no  evidence   supporting  instructions,   81. 
not  assuming  facts,    194. 
omission  of  words,  harmless,  314. 
on  good  character,   345. 
on    reasonable   doubt.    294. 
on  special  findings,  233. 
opinion    intimated,    177. 

not    intimated,    176. 
criminal,    178. 

personal  injury,  improper,   97. 
presumption    of   innocence,    339. 
questions  of  fact,  164. 


INDEX.  92?' 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

ILLUSTRATIONS— Continued. 

referring  to  pleadings,  proper  when,  155. 
self-contradictory  instruction,   249. 
withdrawing  negligence,    117a. 
witness'  credibility,  improper,  207. 

IMPEACHMENT, 

by  bad  reputation,    (13)    3G7. 

by   showing   contradictions,    (6)     (9)     (11)     (13)    367. 

former   conviction,    110. 
"evident  tending  to"  impeach,  220. 
form   of   instruction,    367. 
impeaching    witness,    220,    221,    367. 
instruction  misleading,  221. 

improper,  221. 
not  legal  question,  220. 
of  one's  own  witness,  222. 
on  moral  character,    (10)   367. 
question  for  jury,  220. 

INCEST, 

corroboration  required,  290. 
woman,  accomplice,  29,0. 

INCLUDED  CRIMINAL  OFFENSES.  267. 
evidence  supporting,  267,  270,  272. 

wanting  on,  268,  273. 

wholly  circumstantial,  270. 
form  of  verdict,  requesting,  42. 
if  no  evidence  of.  268. 
ignoring  in  instructions,  267. 
instructions,   55,  267. 

erroneous,  when,  267. 

improper,  when.  267,  269. 

improperly    withdrawing,   267. 
murder  or  no  offense,  269. 
must  request  instructions  on,  274. 
no  evidence  of,  269,  271. 
presumption  of  innocence  on,  n.  9,  337. 
refusing   instructions,   error  when,  29,   267,   268,   270,   272. 
slight  evidence  of,  267. 

INCLUDING, 

opposing  theory,  including,  32. 

INCOMPLETE    CHARGE, 

instructions   applicable  though   incomplete,   7. 
not  error  though  incomplete,  7. 

INCOMPLETE  INSTRUCTION, 
in  criminal   case,   29. 
opposing  party  requesting  modification  of,  27.  29. 

INDIANA, 

decisions   of   supreme   court,   criminal.    166. 
disregarding   instructions,   criminal,    166. 


928  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

INDIANA— Continued. 

exceptions,   how   taken,   357. 

instructions  merely  advisory,   169. 

judges  of  criminal  law,  710. 

jury  judges  criminal  law,   166,   169. 

legal    propositions,    preserving    when    jury    waived.    47. 

making    instructions    part   of    record,    357. 

preserving  instructions   in  record,  criminal,  n.  68,   357,  358. 

record  embodying  instructions,  357. 

must  show  written  requests,   10. 
signing   instructions.,    357. 

statute  on  preserving  instructions,  n.  68,  357. 
trial   without  jury,  47. 

INDICTMENT,  See  INFORMATION. 

containing  distinct  counts,  98. 

several    counts,   defense   to   part,    118. 
for  selling  liquor,  counts,  98. 
framing  instruction  for  one  count,  55. 
instructions  based  on  evidence  rather  than  indictment,  95. 

enumerating  facts,  55. 
limited  to  some  count,  55. 
no  evidence  on  counts,  98. 
proof  of  each  material  element,  735. 
referring  to.   for  description,   55. 
several    offenses,   instructions,   29. 

INFANT,  See  CHILDREN,  MINOR. 

care  and  prudence  of,   (5)   536. 
cautioning  against  danger,    (5)    536. 
degree  of  care  required,  536. 
exposed  to  danger,   ( 1 )   536. 
forms  of  instructions,  536,  537. 
injured  on  premises,  537. 
negligence  of  infant,  536. 
parents'  care  of  infant,    (6)    (7)    536. 
playing  on  premises,  537. 

INFERENCE, 

drawing  from  document.  159. 

from   evidence,  290,   84,    (1)     (6)    379. 

from    writing   collaterally,    164. 
for  jury  to  draw,   181,  308. 
from  circumstances  proved,  308,    (4)    729. 
from    circumstantial    evidence,    308,    729. 
from  facts  shown,  454. 
incorrect,  suggested  by  instruction,  60. 
inferring  main  fact,  309. 

material   fact,   279. 
intent  inferred,   279. 
instruction   intimating,   proper,    181. 
on  motion   for  nonsuit.    121. 

for  peremptory.   121,   129. 

for   verdict.    126. 
supporting  facts  in  issue,  117. 
unwarranted  from  evidence,  85. 
will    support    instructions,    87. 


INDEX.  929 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

INFORMATION,  See  INDICTMENT. 

of  distinct  counts,  98. 

INFORMERS, 

as   witnesses,   224. 

INGRESS, 

preventing  ingress,   679. 

INJURY, 

See  INJURY  TO  PERSON. 

by  fellow  servant,  614. 
negligence  in  treating,  654. 

INJURY  TO  PERSON, 

age  considered,  653. 
aggravated   by   negligence,    (2)    654. 
alleged  in  general  terms,  95. 
assault  to  ravish,  477. 

seif-defense,  474. 
assessing  damages  for,  476. 

city,  607. 

mortality  tables,   n.   65,   58. 
assuming  disputed  fact    195. 

pe  manent  injury,   195. 
at  railroad  crossings,  641,  642. 
bodily  pain   considered,   58. 
by   common  carrier,   550. 
by  his  own  fault,    (1)    539. 
by  obstructions  in  road.  480. 
by  railroad  company,   117a. 

instruction  improper,  184. 

stating   allegations,    194. 
caused  by  animal,  478. 
child  injured,  care,  600. 
compensation  for  injury,  58. 
considerations,   estimating   damages,.  476,    (3)    652. 

in  assessing  damages  476. 
damages   confined   to  issues,   97. 
for  humiliation,  476. 
for  pain,    (4)    653. 

improper,  when,   106. 

tables  of  mortality,  n.  65,  58. 
evidence    conflicting,   instructions,    195. 

of  permanent  injury,  86. 

of  wilfulncss  wanting.  81. 
exposing  one's  self,    (2)    654. 
facts  entitling  recovery,   647. 
falling  into  ditch   194. 
forms  on  damages,  652.  653. 
framing   instruction    for    injury,    58. 
from  accident,    (5)   474.  581,  598. 
from  disease,    (7)    545. 
from  natural  cause,   (7)   545. 
from  negligence,  instruction,  65. 
from  plaintiff's  carelessness,  600. 


930  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

INJURY  TO  PERSON— Continued. 
injury  to  postal  clerk,  554. 

undisputed,    196. 
instructions  for  damages,  58. 
liability  for  injury,  579. 
medical  treatment,  damages,    (3)    652. 

neglected,  654. 
mental   anguish  considered,  58. 

suffering  not  in   issue,   97. 
minor  working  for  another,  449. 
negligence,  proximate  cause,  541. 
no  evidence  of  earnings,  81. 
on  entering  car    184. 
on  highway,  forms,  483. 
'  pain,    suffering    considered,    58,    653. 
passenger  leaving  train,  563. 

on  freight  car,   555. 

standing  on  platform,  580. 

permanent  injury,  damages,  607,    (3)    (4)    (5)    (10)    652. 
proximate  cause  of  injury,  541. 
riding  bicycle  on  bridge,  482. 
several  railroads  involved,  579. 
slight  evidence   of   injury,   86. 
speculative   damages   improper,    ( 12 )    652. 
traveler  on  highway,  483. 
traveling  on  turnpike,  481. 
whether  shamming  injury,  176. 
while  changing  cars,  578. 
while  riding  wheel,  245. 
while  violating  company's  rules,  611. 

INJURY  TO  PROPERTY, 

accident  or  natural  cause,   545. 

INNOCENCE, 

argumentative  as  to.  68. 
defendant  presumed -innocent.  336,  713. 
presumed  throughout  trial,   336. 
presumption  favors  innocence  715. 

error,   when,    337. 

forms,  713. 

protection,   714. 
possibility  of,  improper.  297. 
reasonable  theory  of,  723. 

INNOCENT  PERSON, 

caution  against  convicting,  32,  52. 

INQUEST, 

proceedings  not  evidence,  793. 

INSANITY, 

ability  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong,  748. 
burden  by  preponderance,  331. 

on  defendant,  when,  201,  331. 

wills,   696. 

clear  proof  of,  when,  752. 
defense   to   murder,   instructions,   271. 


INDEX.  931 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.} 

INSANITY— Continued. 
defined,  wills,   698. 
definition,  329. 
degree  of  proof,  201,  751. 

rendering    irresponsible,    329. 
drunkenness  is  not,  755. 
evidence  of,  slight,  88. 

wanting,  83. 

examine  defense  with  care,  754. 
feigning  insanity,  caution  on,  333. 
forms  of  instructions,  criminal,  746. 

relating  to  wills,  697,  698. 
frenzy  is  not,    (5)    755. 
from    violent   temper,    (2)    747. 
higher  degree  of  proof,  752. 
ingenuous    counterfeit,    333. 
insane  at  intervals,  747. 

delusions,  wills,  697. 
instruction    cautioning    on,    333. 

may  define,   332. 

on  degree,  332. 

proper,  improper,  334,  335. 
intermittent  type,    330. 
in  will  contest,  696. 
irresistible  impulse,  750. 
lucid  intervals,  747. 

mentally  capable  of  choosing,    (5)    748. 
mind  permanently  unsound,   700. 
non-expert,   witness   on,   223. 
not  presumed  to  continue,    (2)    747. 
of   defendant's   relatives,    335. 
of  permanent  type,   330. 
overriding  reason,  329,  748. 
permanent  or  chronic,    (2)    747. 
presumed  to  continue,  when,  330,  747. 
proof  of,  wills,  696. 
raising  reasonable  doubt,   331. 
reason  dethroned,  750. 
reasonable  doubt  of  sanity,  331,  751. 
refusing,  error  when,  330. 

when   no  evidence   of.   n.   30,   335. 
renders  contract  void,  403. 
"right   and   wrong,"   test,    329,    748. 
sanity    presumed,    330,    (4)    751. 
temporary,  causes,    (2)    747. 
testator  making  will,  692. 
unable  to  refrain  from  act,    (4)    748,  749. 
uncontrollable  impulse,    (4)    748. 
weak  mind  no  defense,  753. 
wicked   passions,   not,    (5)    755. 
will  overcome  by  impulse,  749,  750. 

power  impaired,  749. 

to  resist  act,  747. 

INSOLVENCY, 

instructions  on  insolvency,  177. 


932  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

INSOLVENT, 

purchasing  goods,  when,  177. 

INSTRUCTING  JURY,  3. 

See  CHARGING  JURY. 
accuracy  required,   when,   n.   77,   250. 
certain  facts  constitute  negligence,  183. 

do  not  prove  guilty,  179. 
debt  is  admitted,  when  denied,   195. 
duty  without  request,  when  3. 
evidence  admits  of  one  conclusion,   181. 

prima  facie,  181. 

tends  to  prove,   181. 

tends  to  show,  173. 
"if  you  believe  derendant's  evidence,"  177. 

evidence  for  state,  178. 

testimony  of  defendant,  178. 
in  civil  cases,   3. 
in  felony  case,  Texas,  3. 
"must  give  weight,"  improper,  182. 
on   abandoned  issues,   error,   100. 
on  court's  motion,  n.  14,   199,  n.  54,  274. 
on  court's  own  motion.,  3. 
on  defective  bridge,  improper,   177. 
on  "free  from  fault,"  258. 
on  manner  of  reaching  verdict,  n.   19,  50. 
one  kind  of  evidence  better  than  other,   177. 

INSTRUCTIONS,  See  INSTRUCTING,  CHARGING  JURY. 

abstract  instructions, 
additional  after  general  charge,   14. 

after  jury  retire,  35. 

discretionary,   38. 

waived,   12. 

affirmative  and  negative  testimony,   204,   205. 
after  jury  retire,  34,  35. 
after  remanding  cause,  364. 
alibi  as  defense,  322,  743. 
all  preserved  in  record,  359. 
anticipating  opposing  theory,   104. 
applicable  as  far  as  they  go,  7. 

to  evidence,   1. 

arbitrarily  limiting  number,   19. 
argumentative,   illustrations,   66,  68. 
assuming  facts,   192.   193. 

permanent  injury,  195. 
as  to  each  juror,  301. 
as  to  punishment,   274. 
at  request  of  jury.  34. 
based  on  circumstantial  evidence,  87. 
.  on  evidence,  80. 

rather  than  pleadings,  95. 

on  inferences,  87. 

on  pleadings,  94. 

bill  of  exceptions,  preserving.  358. 
burden  of  proof.   199.   382. 
burglary  and  larceny,  265a.  810. 
cautionary,  criminal,  49,  52,  379,   707. 
circumstantial  evidence.   87.   303.   304,   729. 
clause  or  paragraph,  defective,  28. 


INDEX.  933 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

INSTRUCTIONS— Continued. 

coercing  jury  to  agree,    187. 
common  knowledge,   107. 
comparative  weight  of  evidence,    177. 
confessions,   admissions,   316,   787. 
confined  to  defense  alleged,   96. 

to  disputed  issues,  93. 
confining  to  evidence,   105. 

to  evidence,  criminal,  98. 

to  issues  in  pleadings,  94. 
conflicting   evidence,    105. 
considered  together,  238. 
conspiracy,  evidence  wanting,  82. 
construed  as  a  whole,  70,  380. 

both  parties  together,  71. 

together,   form.   70,    (4)    380. 
containing  objectionable- features,  7. 
copying  pleadings,   improper,  90. 
court  correcting,  if  faulty,  27. 
covering  several  counts,  29. 
criminal  intent,  279,  280. 
damages,  error  cured,  241. 

for  death,  650,  651. 
defective  in  any  particular,   27. 

cured,  72. 

standing  alone,  72. 
defining  offenses,  275,  276. 

reasonable  doubt,  294,   295. 
degree  of  homicide,  251. 
degree   of   proof,   criminal,   296. 
directing  verdict,   120,   126. 

for  defendant,   120,   126. 

for  plaintiff,   135   to   139. 
discretionary  as  to  arrangement,  73. 
doubtful   in   application,  48. 
drawing  inferences,   308. 
duty  to  instruct,  when,   3. 
each  link,   312. 
elements  of  request,  33. 
embezzlement,  820. 
enumerating  elements  of  crime,  277. 
error  held  cured,  64. 

in  malicious  prosecution,  81. 

instructions,  criminal,   169. 

in  will  contest,   81. 
evidence  slight   on   insanity,   88. 

if  no  evidence.    174. 

wanting,   criminal,    82. 
exceptions  to  instructions,   13,  346. 

to  oral  charge,  13. 
excluding  incompetent   evidence,   84. 

punitive  damages.  58. 
exemplary  damages,  59. 
explaining  contentions,  90. 
extracts  from  books,  286. 
facts  not  alleged,  99. 
failure  to  ask,  criminal,  9. 

to  instruct,  8. 

in  writing.  4. 
no  request,  8. 
false  pretense,  830. 


934  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

INSTRUCTIONS— Continued. 
form  of  verdict,  42. 
fraudulent  transactions,  514. 
full   charge  on  court's  motion,  26b. 
further,  entire  new  .charge..  37. 

in  absence  of  counsel,  35. 

must  be  requested,  7. 

on  court's  motion,  38. 

on  other  points,  37. 
giving   abstract   propositions,   48. 

as  requested,  32. 

facts  prominence,   113. 

on  court's  motion,  3,  n.   14,   199,  n.  54,  234,  286. 

or   refusing,  as   requested   31. 

out  of  statute  of  limitation.   108. 

prominence  to  facts,   113. 

too  many,  effect,   19. 

without  request,   3. 
good  character,  forms,   756. 
grouping  into  one  series,  73. 
harmonizing  by  modifying,   30. 
how  construed,  70. 
how  drawn,   1. 
hypothetical  in  form,   172. 
if  contradictory,  246. 
if  too  general,  7. 
ignoring  facts,   116. 

defense,   118. 

harmless,   when^   71. 

issues,   33. 

illustrative  of  rules,  48. 
impeaching  witness,  220. 
imperfect,  but  harmless,  238. 
in  absence  of  defendant,  criminal,  36. 

of  statute,  4. 

in  action  of  trespass,  59. 
in  bill  of  exceptions,  357. 
included  offenses,  55.  267. 
incomplete,  criminal,  169. 

charge,    7. 

instructions,   29. 

when,  several    counts,    29. 

when  several  offenses,  29. 
inconsistent  theories,   102. 
in  criminal  cases,  3,  29,  251,  707. 
in  display  type,  45. 
injury  to  person,  474. 
insanity  as  defense,  746. 
interrogative  form,  69. 
intimating  inference,   181. 

opinion,   175. 
in  words  of  statute,  284. 
in   writing,   4. 
issues   and   contentions,   90. 

immaterial,  91. 

abandoned,  100. 

issues  outside  of  pleadings,  99. 
jury  determining  law,   153,   155. 

facts,  170. 

disregarding  instructions,  153. 

requesting  instructions,   34. 


INDEX.  935 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

INSTRUCTIONS— Continued. 

larceny,  evidence  slight,  88. 

on  legal  possession,   163. 
limited  to  one  count,  54,  98. 

to  counts,  criminal,  98. 
limiting  confession.   112. 

evidence.    109. 

to  some  counts,  54. 

to  specific   purpose,    109,    110,    111. 
malicious    prosecution,    81. 
manslaughter,  proper,  272. 
marking  "for  plaintiff,"  "for  defendant,"  45. 

by  noting  authorities,  45. 

by  underscoring,  45. 

"given,"   "refused,"   44. 

reasons  for  refusing,  n.  197,  44. 
may  be  modified,  32. 
measure  of  damages,  56,  57,  120. 
misleading   instructions,    60,   63,    64,    65. 

if  of  two  meanings,  61. 

though  correct,  60. 
misconduct  in  argument,   14. 
modifying   correct   requests,    31. 

defective,  30. 

in   criminal   case,   32. 

to  cover  all   elements,   33. 

evidence,    33. 

negligence,  stating  facts,   183. 
neither  party  requesting,  8. 
not  bound  to  give,  when,  220. 
not  exnlaining  each  other,  246. 
not  referring  to  evidence,   105. 
object  of  instructions..   1. 
omitting  facts,  cured  how,  72. 

"reasonable  doubt,"  240. 
on  aiding,  abetting,  765. 
on  alibi,  322,  743. 
on  building  contract,  239,  444. 
on  contracts,   396,   430. 
on  court's  motion,  marking,  3,  19,  38,  44. 
on  malice,   intent,   279,   776,   777. 
on  marriage  contract.  455. 
on  murder,   773. 
on   negligence,   improper,    117a. 
on  permanent  injury,  241. 
on  personal  knowledge,  107. 

special  findings,  230. 

reasonable  doubt,  294. 
on  vital  points,  243. 
one  of  series.  246. 
one  qualifying  another,  70. 
one  stating  all  issues,   56. 
oral  or  written,  4. 

discretionary,  4. 
order  of  arrangement,   73. 
outside  of  issues,  improper,  94. 
party    must    request,    criminal,    9. 
petit    larceny,    proper,    89. 
plaintiff's  negligence, 
pointing  out  one  circumstance,   116. 
prejudicial  in  larceny,  82. 


936  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

INSTRUCTIONS— Continued. 

preparing  and  presenting,  17. 
presenting  before  general  charge,   14. 

to  court,  8. 

under  rule,  14. 
preserving  in  record.  357. 
presumed  in  writing,  when,   10. 

properly  given,  when,  360. 
presumption  of   innocence,   336,   713. 
properly   refused,   when,   94. 
propriety  of  giving,  2. 
reasonable  doubt,  716,  728. 
referring  to  by  number,  n.  32,  350. 

to  declaration,  53,   155. 

to  each  other,  246. 

to  issues,  90. 

to  pleadings,  53. 

to  time  of  offense,  n.  47,  56. 
refusing  all   instructions,   26b. 

further   requests,   38. 

repetitions,  20  to  27. 
relating  to  master  and  servant,  76. 

to  damages,  59,  474. 

to  master  and  servant, 

to  railroads, 

to  witnesses,  206,  365. 
relative  weight  of  evidence,  204. 
remote  damages,  57. 
repeating  as  to  defense,  23. 

in  detail,  22. 

on  preponderance,  21. 

on   reasonable  doubt,   21. 

unnecessary,  20. 
requesting  before  general  charge,  16: 

in  aggregate,  28. 

required  without   request,   when,   3. 
requiring  explanation,  61. 
reviewing  evidence,   191. 
rule  as  to  damages,  57. 
rulings,  remarks,  not  instructions,  41. 
same  error  by  both,  363. 
self-contradictory,   error,   249. 
self-defense,  criminal.  256. 

•  unlawful  arrest..   262. 
sending  after  jury  retire,  35. 
setting  out  pleadings,  53. 
several  sales  of  liquor,  98. 
should  be  simple.  1. 
signing  and  numbering,  43. 
singling  out  facts.  65,  113,  114,  115. 

witness,  223. 
slight  evidence.  86. 
specific  exceptions  to,  348. 
specific  instructions.  7. 
stating  allegations,  proper,   194. 

cause  of  action,  56. 

complete  case.  246. 

contentions,  53,  90,   173. 

claim  of  party,  173. 

whole  law,  56. 


INDEX.  937 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

INSTRUCTIONS— Continued. 

submitting  facts  hypothetically,  160,  172. 

issues  not  alleged,   94. 

negligence,  638. 

undisputed  facts,   172. 
suggesting  theory,  improper,   102. 
summing  up  evidence,   119. 
supported  by   slight  evidence,   86. 
"testimony  is  mostly  positive,"   176. 
theory  of  party,   101. 
time  of  giving,  14. 

of   presenting,    14. 
using  "acquit"  for  convict,  78. 
voluntary  confession,  317. 
waiving  instructions,  12. 

time  of  giving,   12. 
weight  of  evidence,  182. 
what  are  not,  41. 
when  case  admitted,  243. 
when  contract  is  illegal,   128. 
when   different  grounds   of   action,   56. 
when  degree  doubtful,  253. 
when  evidence  balanced,   202. 

close,   26a,   250. 

conflicting,   178,   191. 

incompetent,  84. 
when  jury  waived,  47. 
when  issues  abandoned,   100. 
when  no  evidence,  80,  93. 
when  several  offenses  joined,  98. 
when  several  issues,   93. 
when  some  issues   admitted,  93. 
when   witnesses  contradict  each  other,  212. 
withdrawing  facts,    117. 

instructions,   8,   40. 

prejudicial  evidence,   84. 

time  of,  40. 
whole  law  in  one,  56. 
written  and  oral,   11. 

required,  4. 

INSTRUMENT, 

collateral  evidence  merely,   159. 

INSURANCE, 

abandonment  of  property,  428. 

of  insured  boat,  428. 
agent   knowing     ickness,    176. 

wrongful  acts,  426. 
application  for  policy,  420. 
boat  insured,   428. 

not    seaworthy,    429. 
building   falling,   form,   425. 
contracts  relating  to,  420. 
false  statement  avoids  policy,  420. 

in   application,   420. 

forms,    420. 
forms  of  instructions,  420. 

on  waiving  rights,  421. 
fraud   in  proving  loss,   427. 


938  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

INSURANCE— Continued. 

instruction   on   fraud,,  improper,    170. 

proper,    176. 
no  recovery,  when,  425. 
not  responsible  for  agent's  acts,  426. 
notice  of  death..  422. 
opinion  not  intimated.  176. 
proof  of  death  unnecessary.  423. 
property  not  destroyed  by  fire,  <L25. 
receipt  of  premiums.  421. 
recovery,  what  defeats,  429. 
right   to   abandon   property,    (4)     (5)    428. 
statement   as   to   health,    (4)     (5)    420. 
sound   health,   meaning,    (5)    420. 
voidable  when,  instruction,  33. 
waiving   instruction   on,   33. 

notice  of  death,    (4)    422. 

rights,    176. 

to  avoid,  421. 

INTELLIGENCE, 

witness'   intelligence,    (5)     (7)    365,    (3)    366. 

INTENT,  See  MALICE. 

consequences  of  acts,  777. 
disproving  specific  intent,   779. 
doubt  as  to  sobriety,  281. 
drunkenness  disproving,  281. 
essential  in  embezzlement,  824. 

in   forgery,    844. 

in  larceny,   815. 
evidence   disproving,  280. 

of  similar  acts,    111. 
finding  lost  goods,   817. 
forms  of  instructions,  777. 
in  false  pretense,  832. 
inferred  from  acts,  279. 

from  weapon  used,   279. 
in  purchase  of  goods,   177. 
instruction  erroneous,   279. 

proper,  279. 
intent  in  burglary,  809. 

inferred  from  act,  809. 

sexual   intercourse.,   778. 
knowledge  of  bank's  condition,  826. 
limiting  evidence  to,   111. 
omitting  in  defining  offense,  276. 
presumed   from   means   used,   777 

from  act,   179. 
proof  of  intent,  65,  111. 
refusing  instructions  on,  280. 
shown  by  circumstances,  809. 
weapon  used  indicating,  279. 

INTENTION, 

accompanying   possession,   land,    660. 
in  claiming  land,    (1)   660. 
wanting  in  claiming  land,  660. 

INTEREST, 

defendant,  interested  witness,   227. 


INDEX.  939 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§  365—878  Forms. ) 

INTEREST— Continued. 

in  result  of  suit,  366. 

on  claim  for  damages,  671. 

on  monthly  balances,  443. 

on  note,  usurious,  418. 

payment,  evidence  of,  862. 

witness'   interest   considered,   214. 

INTERESTED  WITNESS, 

See  WITNESSES. 

INTERPRETATION, 

of  oral  contract,   157. 

INTERROGATIVE, 

intimating  opinion,  69. 
interrogative   instructions,   69. 

INTERROGATORIES, 
answers  to,  231. 

inconsistent,  233. 
effect  of  answers  to,  232. 
on   special    findings,    proper,   230. 
submitting    for    finding,    230. 

largely  discretionary,  230. 
ultimate  facts,  231. 

INTIMATING  OPINION, 

by  interrogative  request,  69. 

INTOXICATING  LIQUORS, 

death  from  sale  of,    (2)    487. 

evidence,    competency    of,    490. 

forms   of  instructions,   487,  488,  489,  490- 

injury  from   sale   of,   487. 

instructions   restricted,   98. 

to  wife  from  sales,  488. 
liability   in   selling,   487. 
selling  in  residence  district,  876. 

since   suit  instituted,  490. 

to  person  in  habit,  487. 

unlawfully,  876. 
several   distinct   sales,   98. 
transfer  of  license,  489. 
vindictive  Damages,  when,  488. 
wife  suing  for  damage,  490. 

INTOXICATION, 

See  DRUNKENNESS. 

INVADING, 

in  circumstantial  evidence,  309. 
in  homicide   case,   251. 
instruction  held  not,    176. 
on  alibi  defense,  328. 
on  confessions,  317,  319. 
on  good  character,  340. 

province  of  jury,   174,   175,   177,   181,   184,   185,  204,  211,  223. 
singling  out,  223. 

INVOLUNTARY  MANSLAUGHTER,         See  MANSLAUGHTER. 
instructions   on  properly  refused,   when,   273. 
no  evidence  of,  273. 


940  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364   Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

IN  WRITING, 

written  instructions  required,  when,  4,  34. 

IOWA, 

court,  judge  of  criminal  law,  712. 
exceptions   after   verdict,   349. 

to    instructions,    349. 
time  of  taking  exceptions,  347. 

ISSUES, 

abandoned,    instructions,    90. 

admitted,   instructions,   93. 

as  originally   presented  by   pleadings,  90. 

breach  of  warrant  alleged,  96. 

care  in  personal  injury,  92. 

changes  in  issues,  90. 

confined  to  those  remaining,   100. 

controlling,  instructions  on,  243. 

disposed    of    issues,    100. 

error  in  presenting,  243. 

further  instructions  on,   37. 

gross  neglect  not  involved,  97. 

immaterial,   instruction   on.   91. 

improperly   submitted,    100. 

in   different  counts,   33. 

instructions,    confine!    to,    94,    100. 

material  and  immaterial,  91. 

question  of  law,   155. 
mental  capacity,  no  evidence.  93a. 

suffering  not  involved,  97. 
misstatement  of  issues,  90. 
modifying  requests  to  cover,  33. 
no  evidence  on  issues,  80,  93,  93a. 
not  covered  by  general  charge,  26. 
not    in    pleadings,    94,    99. 
outside  of  pleadings,  94,  99. 
properly  withdrawn,   when,   117. 
proof  of  all   issues,  93. 
proving  facts  without  pleading  them,  93. 
purpose   of   stating  issues,   90. 
raised  by  defendant,  burden,   202. 

new  issues,  99. 

without  objection,  99. 
requiring  special  findings,  230. 

singling  out  as  controling,  92.  . 

stating  in  instructions,  53,  90. 

in  one  instruction,  56. 
submitting   issue  not  alleged,   96. 

without  evidence,   82. 
unsupported   by  evidence,   81. 

by  evidence,   117. 

ISSUES  ABANDONED.  90,   100. 

issues  disposed  of,  criminal,   100. 
withdrawing  the  same,  100. 


J. 


JEOPARDY, 

directing  verdict  on,   152. 


INDEX.  941 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

JOINT  EXCEPTIONS, 

taken  by  two,  351. 

JUDGE, 

See   COUBT. 

calling  on  jury,  39. 

manner  of   instructing,   voice,  46.  • 

signing  instructions,  346. 

JUDGMENT, 

error   will   not  reverse,   243. 

JUDICIAL  NOTICE, 

natural    laws   noticed,    163. 

JURORS, 

See  JURY. 

believe  as  men,   302,   718,  722. 
convinced    as    men,    302. 
instructions  on  proper,  301    302. 

JURY, 

See  JURORS. 

apply  their  knowledge,  182. 

attention   to  particular  facts,   114,    115. 

believe   as    men,    (4)    366. 

from  evidence,   105,   107. 

from   instructions,   error,    107. 
believing   or    disbelieving,    365,    (1)     (9)    366. 
bound  by  instructions,   153,  711,  712. 

law  given  by  court,  criminal,    165. 
cautioning    as    to    arguments,    49. 

duty,   49. 

in   criminal   cases,   52,   707. 

in  estimating  damages,  50. 

on  witness'  credibility,  50. 
coercing  into  agreement,  illustrations,   188. 
common  observation  of    ( 1 )     ( 8 )    36o. 
competency    of   confession,    318. 
confined  to  evidence  alone,  105,  107. 
conscientious  convictions,   708. 
consider  witness'  interest,  214. 
considering  personal  knowledge,   107. 
construe   instructions,   how,   70. 
court   coercing,    187. 

gives  law,  criminal,  711. 

improperly  influencing,   185. 

recalling  to  further  instruct,  38. 

urging  agreement  of,   186. 
deliberations   in   reaching   verdict,    708. 
determine   contributorv  negligence.   639. 

facts,  86,   170,   172,   175,  365,    (3)    379. 

foreign  laws.    162. 

law.  improper,   155. 

negligence.    117a.   625,   638. 

preponderance,   203. 


942  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

JURY— Continued. 

directing  several  retirements  of,  188. 

to   agree,    148. 

to  reason  together,   188. 

to  retire  again,  188. 

to  try  again,   187. 

dismissed  by  agreement,   effect,   145. 
disregarding  credible  witness,  217. 

entire  testimony,  218,    (8)    368. 

error,    241. 

instructions,  criminal,   153,   165,   166,   167,   168. 

testimony  in  part,  217. 

whole  testimony,  217. 
draws  inferences,   Ib4,   181,  308. 
duty  in  grave  criminal  cases,  707. 

to  agree,  if  possible,  708. 
each  juror,  301. 

acts  for  himself,  301,  708. 

to  be  satisfied,   301. 
error  to  call  on,  31. 
experience  of,  among  men,    (8)    365. 
following   correct   instructions,    248. 
governed   by   instructions,  n.   13,   49. 

the  law,    ( 1 )    365. 

heeding   instructions,    criminal,    169. 
if  believe  certain  facts,  309. 

defendant,   improper,   223. 
instructing  on  damages,   57. 
instruction    influencing,    185. 
instructions,  when,  40. 
interpret  writings,  when,   159. 
invading  province  of  jury,  207. 
judge  calling  on  while  deliberating,  39. 
judges   of   credibility,   365. 

of  criminal  law,   165,  709. 

of  law  and  fact,    166. 

of  law  by  statute,   criminal,    166,    167. 

of  law,  when,   153. 

juror's  knowledge  of  men.  n.  55,  215. 
jurors  reason  together,   708. 

should  agree  if  possible,  708. 
lack  of  unanimity,  301. 
may   disregard   testimony,   78. 
must   consider  witness'   interest,   216. 
not  bound  to  believe,  207,    (12)    367,    (1)    368. 

by  instructions,  criminal,   166,  168. 

to  believe  witness,  217. 

to  reject  testimony,  218. 
not  judges  of  criminal  law,  165. 
power  of,  in  disregarding  law,   165. 
recalling  for  further  instructions.  34. 
reconciling  testimony.  213,   (2)   365. 
referring  them  to  petition  or  declaration,  53. 
requesting  further  instruction,  34,  37. 
restricting  to  evidence,   51. 
restricted  to  issues,   90. 
should  follow  instructions,   153.  • 


INDEX.  943 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

JURY — Continued. 

special  findings  by,  231. 

submitting  legal  questions  to,  163. 

trial  without,  waiving,  47. 

urging  agreement  to  save  expense,  186,  187,   188. 

violating  oaths,   153. 

waiving  right  to  submit  facts  to,   146. 

weigh    testimony,     182,     183,    366. 

withdrawing  facts  from,  117. 

K. 

KENTUCKY, 

exceptions  to  instructions,  349. 
instructions  on  murder,  270. 
stating  issues,  90. 

KILL, 

assault  with  intent,  768. 

KILLING, 

accidental    killing,    806. 

absolutely  necessary,   error,   285. 

bad  man,  n.  24,  255. 

by  burglars,   785. 

damage  for  live  stock,  512. 

excuse  in  justification,  782. 

in  mutual  combat,  265. 

murder  or  self-defense,   273. 

officer  making  arrest,  262. 

one  not   intended,   786. 

resisting  illegal  arrest,  272. 

resulting  from  contentions,  263. 

trespasser,  instructions,  263. 

trespassing  animals,  837. 

while  robbing,  762. 

without   justification,    damages,     (12)    649. 

KIN, 

assessing  damages  for  death,   ( 10 )   650. 

damages  for  killing,    (9)    649. 

elements  of  damages  for  death,    (10)    (11)    650. 

killing  next  of  kin,  649. 

pecuniary  loss  for  death,  650. 

KNOWLEDGE, 

See   INTENT. 

jury  exercise  knowledge,  182. 

L. 

LADDERS, 

defects  in.    (11)    639. 

for  use  of  brakemen,    (11)    639. 

on  freight  cars,   639. 


944  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

LAND, 

See    REAL   ESTATE. 

abandonment  of  claim  to,    (3)    660. 
accretions  along  rivers,  668. 
acts   of   ownership,    (6)     (7)    656,    (2)    658. 
actual   possession  essential,   657. 
adjoining   stream,   boundary,   666. 

tracts,   boundary,  664. 
adverse  possession  of,   656. 
boundary   line,   664. 
ceasing   to   cultivate,    (4)    660. 
certificate  of  sale,  void,  689. 
claiming  by  color  of  title,   662. 
by   occupancy,   656. 
improvements  only,  660. 
title  to,  forms,    (6)    656. 
color  of  title  to,  662. 
cultivating,   improving,  663. 
damaged  by  excavations,  670. 

by  railroad,    (4)    685. 
damages  from  change  of  grade,   671. 
from  piling  filth,   672. 
measure  of,   671. 
to    land,    669. 

defeating   legal   title   to,   656. 
disseisin  of  owner,    (7)    657,    (1)    658. 
defeating  owner's  right,  662. 
division  line,  by  agreement,  664. 
exclusive  possession  of,  656,   659. 
fence   nearly   on   line,   661. 
fencing  under  claim,    (2)    657. 
forms  as  to  possession,   657. 
high-water    mark,    boundary,    667. 
increased   by   accretions,    668. 
intention  of  claiming,  660. 
listing  for  assessment,  690. 
locating  boundary  line,  665. 
market  value,    ( 5 )    685. 
meander  line  boundary.   666. 
measure  of  damages,   672. 
notice  to   owner   on   claiming,   661. 
occasional  acts  not  possession,    ( 1 )    659. 

use,  not  possession,    (3)    659. 
occupied    by   tenant,    (9)    656. 
twenty   years,   657,   663. 
occupying  and  cultivating.    (6)    (7)   656. 

without  color  of  title,  663. 
owner  dedicating  for  road,    (2)    858. 

permitting  damage.  669. 
paying   taxes    on,     (3)    658. 
permanent  injury  to,  672. 
retaking  possession,    (3)    661. 
selling  for  taxes,  689. 
taken   by   railroad,   683. 
taxes  on  land,  689. 
time  of  occupancy,  656. 


INDEX.  945 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.} 

LAND — Continued. 

title    by   possession,    forms,    656. 

to,  by  occupancy,  656. 
twenty  years'  occupancy,    (1)    657,  663. 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT,  510.  See  TENANT. 

seizing  tenant's  property,  510. 
evicting  tenant,  n.  57,  454. 
forms   of   instructions,   453. 
new  leasing  discharges  guaranty,  454. 

LARCENY,  See  BUKGLAEY. 

accomplice  a  witness,  290. 
assuming  evidence   of,    193. 
belief    as    to    ownership,    103. 
burglary  and  larceny,  810. 
claiming  to  be  owner,   818. 
confined   to   property   alleged,    819. 
definition  and  elements,  814. 

defective,   276. 

omitting  stealing,  276. 
omitting  value,   276. 
description  of  property,  95. 
doubtful   whether  grand  or  petit,   89. 
evidence    entirely    circumstantial,    304. 

not  circumstantial,  304. 

of   defense,    slight,    88. 
forms  of  instructions,   814. 
evidence  of  petit  larceny,  89. 
honestly    disposing    of    property,    103. 
included  in  robbery,  267. 
instructions  on  petit,   89. 
intent,   essential,    815. 
joined  with  burglary,   810. 
no  evidence  of,   268. 
petit  or  grand,  evidence,  89. 
possession   of  goods,  evidence,   82,   118. 

of  goods,  explanation,  82. 

of  stolen  property,  179,  201,  265a,  816. 
proof  of,  by  preponderance,  240. 

of  ownership,  error,  240. 
property    found    and    appropriated,    817. 
reasonable  doubt  omitted,   240. 
refusing,   instructions,  evidence  slight,   88. 
stealing  cattle,  branding,  118. 
several   offenses  joined,  29. 
submitting  with  burglary,  813. 
taking  an  estray  animal,  815. 

coupled  with  intent,  815. 
theory  of  defense,  103. 
time   material   to   defense,    118. 
value    of   goods   alleged,    89,    819. 

LAW, 

See  LEGAL  QUESTIONS,  163. 

affirmative  of  issue,    163. 
applicability  of  instruction,   163. 


946  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

LAW — Con  t  inued. 

clauses  of  instrument,   repugnancy,   163. 
color  of  title,  law,   163. 
common  sense  as  law,  154. 
constitution  and  by-laws,  163. 
construction  of  documents,   157. 

of   wills,    158. 

counsel   stating,   form,   380. 
court  determines,    163,    (4)    380. 
denounced  by  court,   154. 

description    of    property    in    mortgage,     163. 
determined   by   court,   163,    165,   380. 

by  jury,   criminal,    168. 
enumerating  certain   facts,   309. 
execution  of  writ,  whether  legal,   163. 
hiring  team,   ownership,    163. 
how  to  be  stated,    172. 
illustrations,  legal  questions,   163. 
instruction,    improper,    163. 

merely  advisory,   168. 

on  actual  possession,   improper,   163. 

on  title  to  land,    163. 
jury  judges  by  statute,   166. 
,    of  criminal,   168,   169. 
lawful  act,  law,    163. 
laws  of  other  states,  construction,   162. 

proof  of,   162. 
legal   possession,   law,    163. 
material  allegations  of  pleadings,   155. 
mortgage,  acknowledge  of,   163. 
natural  laws,  judicial  notice,  163. 
negligence,  legal  question,  when,   183. 
not  reviewable,  when,  n.  87,  360. 
organization    for    lawful    purpose,    163. 

of  association,   163. 
ownership  and  possession,   163. 
rairoad,  fencing  track,  163. 
reasonable  doubt  not  applicable,  n.  4,  294. 
reasonableness   of   rules,    163. 
statement  of.  on  supposed  state  of  facts,   172. 
statutory    provisions,    judges,    166,    167. 
submitting  question  of,  to  jury,   155. 
two  different  writings,   163. 

documents   construed   together,    163. 
whole  law,  56,  70,  246. 

LAWFUL  ACT, 

a  question  of  law,  163. 

LEASE, 

leasing  farm,  form,   (1)   384. 

LEGAL  POSSESSION, 

question  of  law,   163. 


INDEX.  947 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

LEGAL  PROPOSITIONS, 

presenting  to  court,  47. 

to  court,  Indiana,  47. 

to  court,  preserving  in  record,  47. 
preserving  in  record,  Indiana,  47. 

rulings   on,   47. 

LEGAL   QUESTIONS, 

See    LAW. 

improperly  submitted,  n.  48,   163. 

LETTERS, 

See  CORRESPONDENCE. 

LIABILITIES. 

bank's  liabilities,  assets,   (3)   828. 

carrier  not  liable,  581. 

for  personal   injury,  579. 

in  shipment  of  stock,  589. 

limiting  by  contract,  586. 

when  several   carriers  involved,  585. 

LIBEL, 

See  SLANDER. 
defined,  form..  491. 
instructions  on,  850. 
motives  of  revenge,  850. 

prompting  communication,  850. 

LICENSE, 

partnership,  transferring,  489. 
to  sell  liquors.  489. 

LIFE    INSURANCE, 

See   INSURANCE. 

LIGHTS, 

cities  without,   (3)    591. 

in  cities  all  night,   (3)   591. 

LIMITATION, 

payments    on    account,    467. 
statute  of  limitation,  465. 

LIMITING. 

failure  to   limit  evidence,   n.    157,    109. 
in   charging  jury,   54. 
limited   to   counts,  when,   54,   98. 
request   to   limit,   necessary,   n.    162,    111. 
when  defective  counts,  54. 

LIMITING  EVIDENCE..   109,    110. 

to  impeachment  of  witness,   110. 

LINE. 

center  of  stream,  666. 
considerations   in  locating,   665. 
fixing  by  agreement,  664. 
locating  boundary  line.   665. 
meander    line    defined,    666. 


948  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1— 304  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

"LINKS  IN  CHAIN," 

circumstantial    evidence,    n.    52,    312. 

LIQUORS, 

selling  in  residence  district,  876. 
unlawfully,  876. 

LIVE   STOCK, 

shipment  of,  589. 

LOSS. 

pecuniary  loss  only  allowed,  650. 

LOST, 

goods   lost,   owner  unknown,   817. 

LOTS, 

fronting  on  streams,   686. 
increase    by    filling    in,    686. 
retaining  wall,   671. 

LOUISIANA, 

jury  disregarding  instructions,  169. 

LUMBER, 

piling  in  street,  595. 

LYING  IN  WAIT, 

killing  from  ambush,   784. 
provocation  for  killing,  784. 

M. 

MACHINERY, 

assuming  machinery  safe,  622. 
best  appliances,    (4)   610. 
care  and  safety  of,  534. 
hidden  defects  of,  610. 
injury  from,   610. 
master's   promise   to   repair,   620. 
reasonably   safe,    (3)    534. 
servant  presuming  safe,  622. 

knowing  danger,  610. 
shall  be  safe,    (6)    610. 
suitable  and  safe,   610. 
whether  real  estate,    195. 

MALICE, 

See  INTENT. 
a   fact,   282. 

competency   of  evidence   on,    111. 
defined,  murder,  776. 
essential  in  slander,  492. 
forms    of    instructions,    776. 
implied  from  unlawful  act,  282. 

in  slander,  492. 

when,    (3)   492,    (5)    776. 
includes  anger,  hatred,  etc.,    (3)    (5)    776. 


INDEX.  949 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

MALICE— Continued. 

instruction  may  define,  282. 

erroneous,  283. 

inferring,  283. 

intoxication  affecting,  instruction,  n.    16,  281. 
limiting  evidence  to.  111. 
may  be  implied,  282. 
"with  premeditated  malice,"    240. 

"MALICE  AFORETHOUGHT," 

definition   unnecessary,   when,   75. 
essential   in  number,   282. 

MALICIOUS  ASSAULT,  268. 

MALICIOUS  MISCHIEF, 

evidence    wanting,    instructions,    82. 
fence,  destroying,  evidence,  82. 

MALICIOUS   PROSECUTION, 

arrest  without  warrant,  503. 
burden  of  proof,    (6)    504. 
cause  for  prosecution,  504. 
charging  with  embezzlement,    ( 1 )    507. 
defense,   advice  of  counsel,   506. 
essential  elements,  507. 
estimating  damages   for,   508. 
forms   of  instructions,   503. 

damages,   508. 

instructions   for   defense,   506. 
probable  cause,  instruction,  81,   164. 

no  evidence,  81. 

MALPRACTICE. 

by  physician,  484. 

MANSLAUGHTER, 

act  is  murder,  when,  794. 
defined,   794. 

evidence  supporting,  272. 
forms   of   instructions,    794. 
included    in    murder,    251. 
instruction   explaining,   252. 

harmless.  252. 

proper.    272. 

properly  refused,  269. 
involuntary,  when.   794. 
murder   or   self-defense,    271. 
no   evidence   of  manslaughter,    178,   269,  271. 
refusing,  error  when,   272. 

proper,   when,   271. 
requesting  instructions  on,  274. 

specific  instructions,  274. 
resisting  illegal   arrest,  272. 

restricting  to,   by   instruction,   proper,   when,   273. 
verdict  for,  when.  783. 
voluntary,  "272,   273. 
what   constitutes,    (4)    792. 


950  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms. ) 

MARKING, 

by  noting  authorities"  on  requests,  45. 
instructions  "given,"  refused,  44. 
in   display   type,   45. 
showing  book  for,  law  supporting,  45. 
reasons   for   refusing,   n.    197,   44. 
statute  on,   directory   only,   44. 

MARRIAGE, 

common  law,  what  constitutes,  834. 

MARRIAGE   CONTRACTS, 
action  for  breach,  455. 
damage   for   breach,  457. 

considerations    in    assessing,    457. 
defense  for  breach,  456. 
forms    of    instructions,    455. 
unchastity  of  woman,  456. 

MARYLAND, 

exceptions  to  instructions,   349. 
jury,   judge   of   criminal   law,    168. 

MASSACHUSETTS, 

instruction  suggesting  inference,   proper,    181. 
jury   judges   of   law,   criminal,    166,    167.  • 

MASTER,  See  SERVANT. 

advising  servant  of  danger,  612. 
concealing  danger,  612. 
discharging    servant,    626. 
liable  to  servant,  when,    (7)    610. 
not  liable,  when,  615. 
promise  to  repair,  forms,  620. 
safe  appliances  for  servant,  622. 
safety  of  servants,    (2)    622. 
servant,   knowing  danger,  619. 
wilful  act,  615. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT,  610. 

forms   of   instructions,    610. 

MATERIAL  ALLEGATIONS, 
question  of  law,  53,  155. 

MATERIAL  ELEMENT, 

omitted,  cured  how,  240. 

MATERIAL  FACTS, 

consistency  of  facts,   310,  311. 

facts  of  case,  199. 

restricting  instructions  to,  311. 

MATERIAL  ISSUES, 

should  be  stated,  91. 

MATERIAL  MATTERS, 

swearing  falsely  on,  218,  219,  221. 

"MAY," 

instead  of  should,  216. 


INDEX.  951 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

MEANING, 

See    CONSTRUCTION. 

"fellow  servant,"  essential,   70. 
instructions,  how  determined,  70. 

MEANDER,  See  BOUNDARY. 

meander  line   defined,   666. 

MEMORANDUM, 

purpose  of,  a  fact,  wh'en,  164. 

MERCHANT, 

injury  to  business,   679. 

MILL-DAM, 

creating  nuisance,  854. 

MIND,  See  WrtLS. 

affected  by  insanity,  698. 
capable  of  reasoning,   wills,    (2)    695. 
capacity  to  recollect,    (5)    695. 
determining  condition,   702. 

state  of,   701. 
faculties  of,  wills,  695. 
feeble    in    mind,    wills,     (5)     694. 
impairing    mental    faculties,    699. 
presumed   sound,   wills,   696. 
sound  mind,  wills,  692. 
"sound  mind  and  memory,"  defined,  695. 
transacting   ordinary   business,    (5)     (6)    694. 
unsoundness  not  presumed,  692. 

permanent,  700. 
vigor  and  power  of,  695. 

MINER, 

killed  carelessly,  649. 

MINES, 

appliances  for  safety,    (6)   649. 
careless  operation  of,  649. 
fencing  shafts,    (5)    649. 
miner  killed  carelessly,   (5)   649. 

MINOR,  See  CHILDREN,  FATHER,  MOTHER,  INFANT. 

employment  of,  449. 
injury  to  person  of,  449. 
liable  on  his  contracts,  when,  451. 
mother  must  support,  448. 
occupying  minor's   land,    (3)    657. 
railroad  killing  parent,   (2)   649. 
recovering  from  parent,  450. 
remaining  with  parents  after  age,  450. 
rights  against  parent,  450. 
wages  of,  449. 

MISDEMEANOR, 

convicting  of,  on  light  evidence,  n.  24,  296. 


952  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

MISLEADING   INSTRUCTIONS,    1,   65. 
abstract    instructions,    48. 
attention   directed   to   immaterial   facts,  65. 
blending   distinct   proposition,    65. 
'confusing  instructions,  erroneous,  63. 
cured  by  others,  64,  240. 
curing  error,  how,  64,  240. 
error  cured,  criminal,  240. 
fraud  not  presumed,  65. 
fraudulent  or   honest  transaction,   65. 
held  misleading,  62,  65,  n.  88. 
if  argumentative,   66. 
illustrations  of,   65. 
in  singling  out  facts,  65,  113. 

witness,  65. 
instructions  held  not  misleading,  65,  n.  88. 

mental   condition,   63. 

singling  out  facts,  65,   113. 

two  meanings,  61. 
intent  "strictly  proved,"  65. 
obscure  instruction,   62. 
on  criminal  intent,  65. 
on  determining  facts,  65. 
on   honesty   and   fair  dealing,   65. 
on  "probability  of  innocence,"  n.  25,  297. 
on   proof   of   facts,   65. 
on  reasonable  doubt,  n.  32,  297. 
on  "reasonable  time."  65. 
relating  to  honest  dealing,  65. 
repairing  of  sidewalk,  65. 
tendency  to  mislead  not  error,  60. 
though  correct,  60. 
when  evidence   incompetent,   84. 

MISSISSIPPI, 

murder,  statutory  definition,  284. 

MISSOURI. 

elements  stated,  murder,  277. 
instructions  in  civil  case,  3. 

in  homicide.  252. 
jury,  judge  of  criminal  law,  153. 

MISTAKES, 

how  corrected.   119. 

in  summing  up  evidence,  119. 

MITIGATION, 

in  assessing  damages,  654. 

MODIFYING  INSTRUCTIONS,  4, 

after  promising  to  give,  as  requested,  27. 

by    adding   words.    30. 

by   stating   converse   of   proposition,   32,   33. 

by  striking  out  words,   30. 

cautionary    instruction,   criminal.    32. 

conforming  requests   to  issues,   33. 

correct   instructions,   31. 


INDEX.  953 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

MODIFYING    INSTRUCTIONS—  Continued. 
defective  instructions,  30. 
exception  to  modification,  n.   14,  347. 
immaterial    modification,   harmless   error,    31. 
incomplete  instruction,  29. 
in  criminal  cases,  32. 
in  what  manner,  30. 
may  be   harmless,   31. 
no  ground  for  error,  when,  31. 
not  allowed,  when,   31. 
on   circumstantial  evidence,   n.   68,   315. 
on   reasonable   doubt,   300. 
special  request,  Texas,  31. 
to  confine  to  evidence,  32. 
to  cover  allegations  of  counts,  33. 
to  include   different  elements,   33. 

omitted   facts,    33. 

opposing  theory,  criminal,  32. 
when  defective,  27. 

MOON, 

instruction  on  rising  of,  163. 

MORAL  CHARACTER, 

See    CHARACTEB. 

MORTGAGE,  See  CHATTEL  MORTGAGE. 

acknowledgment  of,   163. 
construction  of,  156. 
description   of   property   in,    163. 
instruction  on  acknowledgment  of,  163. 
on  chattels,  461. 

MOTHER. 

must  support  children,  448. 

MOTION, 

at  close  of  all  evidence,   124. 

of  plaintiff  evidence,   124. 
by  both  parties,  peremptory,   145. 
defendant   moving  for  verdict,   proper  when.    126. 
denial  of,  error  cured,  n.  40,  126. 
disposing  of.  for  peremptory,  121,  122,  145. 
evidence  taken  as  true,  121,  126. 
for  non-suit,  disposing  of,   121. 

stating  grounds.   123. 

time  of  presenting,   124. 
for  new  trial,   instructions,   356. 
for  peremptory  for  variance,  n.  44,    127. 

evidence.    122. 

instruction,   121. 

weighing  evidence,    122. 

when,   124. 

grounds   for,   stating,    123. 
nature  of  demurrer  to  evidence.   121. 
properly   denied,   when,    peremptory,    134. 
renewing  motion  for  verdict,  n.  86,   144. 
stating  reasons  for  peremptory,  123. 


954  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

MOTION— Continued. 

time  of  presenting  peremptory,   124. 
to  exclude  evidence,  n.  14,   123. 
weighing  evidence  on,   122. 

MOTIVE, 

absence  of  motive,  264,  781. 
error   in   refusing,   when,   264. 
for  criminal  act,  781. 
for  killing,  264. 
instructions   on,   264. 
improper,   264. 
not  indispensable,   264,   781. 
of  witness,    (6)    (10)    366. 
refusing  instructions  on,  264. 

MOTORMAN, 

acting  willfully,   liability,   615. 

may  presume  persons  cautious,    (7)    640. 

MURDER,  See  SELF-DEFENSE. 

accident,   defense  to,   261. 
admissions  of  deceased,   739. 
agreement  to  fight,  265. 
aiding,    abetting,    assisting,    785. 
bare   fear   no   defense,    795,   799. 
burglars  killing,   785. 
by   administering  drug,   277. 
by  drug,  778. 
by  one  of  several,  792. 
by  poison,    (7)    773. 
by    snooting,    instruction,    277. 
circumstances   tending  to   prove,    (5)     (6)    729. 
committing  by   poison,   272. 
consequences    of    act,    presumed,    179. 
conspiracy  to  commit,   761. 
conviction  of  manslaughter,  252. 

effect,    100. 
"cooling   time,"   254. 
danger  apparent,  self-defense,   802. 
death  by  other  means,  261. 
defendant   abandoning   conflict,   259. 

provoking  difficulty,   797. 

seeking  difficulty,  797. 
defense  against  several,  804. 
defined,  Illinois,  773. 

Michigan,   773. 

Missouri,   773. 
definition   defective,   276. 

omitting    "with    malice    aforethought,"    276. 
degree  in   doubt,  253,   783. 

of  proof  required,  790. 
directing  to  find,  when,  251. 
disposed  of,  100.  , 

drunkenness    reducing    crime,    779. 
enumerating  elements   of,   277. 
facts  constituting,  Illinois,    (5)    (6)   773. 


INDEX.  955 

(References  are   to  Sections,  §§   1 — 304  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

MURDER—  Continued. 

"feloniously"  omitted,  immaterial,  240. 
first  degree,   774. 

defined,  773. 

or   nothing,    252,   269. 
first  or  second  degree,   273. 
from  mutual  combat,  265. 
forms   of   instructions,    773. 
giving  murder  instructions  only,  252. 
if  all  elements  proven,   251. 
includes  manslaughter,   251. 
insanity   defense,   instruction,   271. 
in  second  degree,  269,  277. 
instructing    on    all    degrees,    270. 

assuming  Killing,   198. 

erroneous,  282. 

for  second  degree,  270. 

harmless   error,    n.    59,    274. 
when,   252. 

improperly  restricting,  270. 

malice   aforethought,  282. 

manslaughter,    252. 

not  cured,  282. 

omitting  element,  282. 

on  degrees,  n.   10,  252. 

harmless,  n.  59,   274. 

on   "fear,"   257. 

on  "free  from  fault,"  n.  44,  258. 

proper,  277. 

intent   presumed,   when,    777. 
killing,   "absolutely   necessary,"  error,   256,   285. 

bad  man  807. 

being   proved,    782. 

in   passion,   775. 

in   self-defense,  795. 

instruction,  n.  24,  255. 

officer,    in   self-defense,    805. 

trespasser,   263. 

wrong    person,    786. 
malice   aforethought,    774. 

an  element,   776. 

essential,   282. 
mere  belief  of  danger,  800. 
mere   presence,    not    aiding,    792. 
mere    threats,    no    defense,    801. 
mitigating  circumstances,  782. 
motive  for  killing,   264. 
no   conspiracy,   792. 
no  evidence  of  manslaughter,   178,  252. 
or   no  offense,    269. 
presumed    from    killing,    782. 
proof  and  allegations  vary,  261. 
reasonable   doubt  of,   783. 

restricting  to   first   degree,   n.   2,   251,   269,   270. 
retreat  not  required,   Illinois,  n.   51,   260. 


956  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

MURDER— Continued. 

second  degree,   775. 

elements,   773. 

evidence,   270. 

forms,  775. 
self-defense,    798. 

shooting  admitted,   instruction,    198. 
slayer  lying  in  wait,  784. 
sound  mind  not  defined,  6. 
stating   facts   constituting,   251. 
statutory   definition,   proper,    277. 
suicide,   defense,   261. 
third   person   guilty,   216. 
throwing  from  train,   777. 
time  of  deliberation,  780. 
verdict  should  be,    (3)    777. 
while   committing   robbery,   269,   271. 
wound  neglected,  791. 

MUST, 

implies  duty,  216. 
instead  of  may,  216. 
misuse  of,  for  may,  78. 

MUST  REQUEST, 

See   REQUEST,   INSTRUCTIONS. 

failure   to   request   instructions,   n.   9,   48. 

MUTUAL  COMBAT, 

mutual    comTbat   or   self-defense,   265. 
improper,   instructions   on,   265. 
instructions  on,  265. 

proper,   when,    265. 

N. 

NAMES, 

misuse  of,  78. 

plaintiff,  instead  of  defendant,  78. 

prisoner  for  defendant  immaterial,  78. 

NAVIGATION, 

public  rights  of,  686. 

NEBRASKA, 

exception  to  each  instruction,  353. 

NEGATIVE, 

not  hearing  bell,  204. 
testimony,  204. 

NEGLIGENCE, 

accidental  injury,  545. 
act  clearly  negligence,  183. 
age  of  plaintiff  considered,  600. 
agent  negligent,  principal  liable,  392. 
an  issue,  instruction,  93. 


INDEX.  •  957 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.} 

NEGLIGENCE— Continued. 

both  parties  guilty  of,  544,  636. 

bridge  unsafe,  (4)  545. 

burden  of  proving,  531,  (1)   (2)  539. 

on  defendant,  531. 

on  plaintiff,   form,   387,  481,   531,  616,  633. 
by  committing  act,  183. 
by  omitting  act,  183. 
by  violating  ordinance,  644. 
care  inferred,  when,  535. 
cause  of  injury,  541. 
city  not  negligent,  595. 
common  carriers,  548. 
comparative  negligence,  591. 

obsolete,  236. 

considerations  in  determining,  176,  594. 
damages  by  one's  own,  58. 
defective  definition,  6. 

scaffold,  form,  387. 
defendant  liable  for,  638. 

liable,  when,  544. 
denned,  529,  (2)  632. 

carriers,  (3)  549. 
definition  of  unnecessary,  75. 
degree  of  care,  532. 
directing  verdict  on,  134. 
drunkenness  is  not,  553. 
evidence  of  negligence,  540. 

speculative  on,  directing  verdict,  134. 
fact  for  jury,   117a,   164,   183,    (6)    542,  625. 
facts  constituting,  (2)  639. 
failure  to  ring  bell,  641. 
fire  caused  by,  railroads,  645. 
forms  of  instructions,  542. 

for  defendant,  639. 

for  defendant,  railroads,  629. 

of  instructions,  railroads,  638. 
framing  instruction  on,  56. 
gates  at  crossings,  643. 
generally,  529. 
getting  off  moving  train,  561. 

on  moving  car,  183. 
gross  and  slight,  591. 

negligence,  529,  558,  (3)  635. 
harmless  error  on,  237,  239. 
if  only  slight,  recovery,  606. 
in  approaching  railroad  crossing,  184. 
in  backing  train,  improper,  .184. 
in  blowing  whistle,  642. 
in  constructing  bridge,    675. 
in  crossing  railroad,  117a. 
in  driving  vehicle,  533. 
infant's  negligence,  536. 
inferring  from  facts,  539. 
injuring  passenger  on  platform,  567. 

trespasser,  558. 


958  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

NEGLIGENCE— Continued. 
in  losing  goods,  134. 
in  operating  elevator,  (4)  542. 
in  shipping  live  stock,  (2)   589. 
in  speed  of  cars,  (4)  044. 
instructing  act  is,  proper  when,  183. 
instruction  enumerating  facts,  117a. 

not  invading,  176. 

proper,  164,  176. 

stating  law,  56. 

submitting,  638. 

withdrawing,  117a. 
in  treating  injury,  654. 
in  using  electricity,  546. 
may  define,  183. 
negligence  of  railroads,  627. 
neither  party  negligent,  648. 
no  evidence  of  negligence,  93. 

proving,  126. 

not  assumed,  illustration,  194. 
,    not  negligence,  when,  643. 
not  presumed,  when,  539. 
of  carrier  presumed,  548. 
•  of  cities  and  towns,  591. 
of  common  carrier,  550. 
of  fellow  servant,  614. 
of  highway  commissioners,  480,  482. 
of  passenger,  551,  568. 
of  physician,  liability,  484. 
of  plaintiff,  (7)    (8)    (9)    (10)  543,  (9)  544. 

and  defendant,  544. 
of  railroad,  instruction  improper,  184. 
of  road  supervisors,  601. 
party  assuming  risk,  25. 
passenger  guilty  of,  582. 

negligent,  562. 
plaintiff  assuming  risk,  (12)   544. 

at  fault,  (4)  544. 

guilty  of,  (8)  544,  594. 

knowing  danger,   (13)   544. 

may  recover,  when,  544. 

negligent,  when,  (8)  544,  594. 
plaintiff's  slight  negligence,  591. 
presumed,  when,  26,  538,  548. 
prima  facie  case  of,  554. 
proximate  cause  of  injury,  184. 
question  of  fact,  117a,  164,  (6)  542,  625. 

of  law,  when,  183. 
railroads  in  city,  (2)    (3)  631. 

killing  person,  649. 
referring  to  declaration  for,  53. 
relating  to  children,  (6)    (7)  536. 
removing  brake-staffs,  616. 
repairing  fence,  (3)  676. 
repeating  definition,  25. 
resulting  in  death,  649,  650. 


INDEX.  959 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

NEGLIGENCE— Continued. 

ringing  bell  at  crossings,  (6)  641. 

scintilla  of  evidence,  540. 

servant  does  not  assume  negligence  of  employer,  (2)  622. 

negligent,  618. 
several  acts  of,  65. 
slight  negligence,  liable,  550. 
starting  train  too  soon,  565. 
stating  fact  is  negligence,  improper,  184. 
submitting  to  jury,  forms,  625,  638. 
tenant  guilty  of,  (8)   544. 
train  running  too  fast,  640. 
trespasser  may  recover,  559. 

negligent,  559. 
what  is  not,  (3)    (5)    (6)  539,  540. 

illustration,   183. 

improper,    183. 

NEGRO, 

as  witness,  instruction,  176. 

NEW  JERSEY, 

exceptions  to  instructions,  349. 

NEW  YORK, 

directing  verdict,  133. 

statutory  definition  of  murder,  277. 

NIGHT, 

dark  night,  negligence,  594. 
traveling  when  dark,  care,  608. 

NOMINAL, 

damages  nominal,  (3)  654. 

NON-EXPERT, 

on  insanity,  weighing,  223. 

NONSUIT, 

See  DIRECTING  VERDICT. 

changing  order  for,  124. 
directing,  improper  when,  130. 

when,    126. 

failure  to  prove  one  element,  126. 
improper  though  evidence  conflicting,  141. 
motion  for,  121. 

on  contributory  negligence,  properly  denied,  134. 
on  plaintiff's  testimony,  126. 
waiving  right  to  claim  error,  144. 
when  action  barred,  128. 
when  negligence  involved,  134. 
when  transaction  illegal,  128. 

NORTH  CAROLINA, 

charging  jury,  manner  of,  311. 


960  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365— 878  Forms.) 

NOTE, 

accommodation  note,  (4)    (8)  416. 

only,   (3)   415,   (9)   416. 
alteration  relieves  liability,  (2)  416. 
collateral  security,   (14)   415. 
consideration  worthless,   (11)   416. 
contracts  on  notes,  415. 
dead  person,  (5)  416. 
defense  against,  burden,   (17)   415. 
doubtful  consideration,  (10)   416. 
endorsement  without  recourse,   (2)   417. 
executed  by  several,  (11)  415. 
forgery  of  name,  (11)  415. 
form  of  instructions  on,  415. 
holder  cannot  recover,  416. 

may  recover  on,  when,  415. 

presumed  owner,  (1)  415. 
indorsement  in  blank,    (3)    417. 
indorser  only,  (6)  416. 
interest  on,  usury,  418. 
lost  by  carelessness,  419. 
never  delivered,  (5)  416. 
notice  of  defenses  to,  (4)  415. 
purchase  before  due,  (2)    (3)  415. 

with  notice,  (3)  415. 

without  notice,  (2)   415. 
recovery  on  proper,  form,  (5)  415. 
reviving  liability  on,  (6)   (7)  415. 
suit  on  lost  note,  419. 
suit  on  several  counts,    (19)    415. 
transferring  by  endorsement,  (1)  417. 
without  consideration,  (7)   (10)   (12)  416. 

NOTICE, 

actual  not  unnecessary,  (3)    (4)  596. 
condition  of  sidewalk,  592. 
defective  sidewalk,  notice,  (3)  595. 
element  of  contract,  441. 
essential  on  claiming  land,  661. 
fence  viewers,  notice,  869. 
inferred  when,  city,  596. 
lumber  in  street,  595. 
of  condition  of  sidewalk,  65. 
of  danger  in  highway,  480. 
of  death  in  insurance,  422. 
of  defense  to  note,  (5)  415. 
reasonable  time,  misleading,  65. 
sufficiency  of,  brokers,   (2)    441. 
to  city  of  danger,  595. 
what  is  sufficient,  city,  597. 

NUISANCE, 

affecting  only  family,  853. 
burden  in  proving,  180. 
business  injured  by,  679. 
by  noise,  smoke,  dirt,  horses,  679. 


INDEX.  961 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   305—878  Forms. j 

NUISANCE— Continued. 
causing  injury,  (579. 
created  by  others,  857. 
decaying  vegetation,  855. 
defense,  other  means  causing,  856. 

others  causing,  857. 
facts  constituting,  680. 
forms  of  instructions,  852. 

civil,  679. 

gases  and  emanations,  681. 
health  injured  by,  679. 
in  factory  locality,  681. 
injuring  health,  680. 
injury  to  business,  679. 
mill-dam  and  pond,  854. 
must  affect  public,  853. 
obstructing  highway,  679. 
offensive  smells,  852. 
other  means  causing,  856. 
plaintiff  proving,  680. 
pond  producing  malaria,  855. 
public  nuisance,  852. 
slaughter  houses  causing,  852. 

NUMBER, 

number  of  witnesses,  (5)  365. 

NUMBERING, 

numbering  instructions,  43. 

See  SIGNING. 

NUMEROUS  INSTRUCTIONS,  See  Too  MANY. 

confusing,  misleading,  19. 
prosecution  should  ask  few,  19. 
refusing  when  too  many,  19. 

O. 

OBJECTIONS,  346.  See  EXCEPTIONS. 

raising  objections  on  review,  347. 
time  of  making,  347. 
too  late,  when,  347. 
waiving,  355. 

OBSCURE, 

instructions  held  obscure,  62. 
on  burden  of  proof,  72. 
on  reasonable  time,  65. 
on  repairing  sidewalk,  65. 

OBSCURE  INSTRUCTIONS,  60. 

See  MISLEADING,  60 

generally  erroneous,  63. 
misleading  if  obscure,  62. 
when  evidence  conflicting,  62. 


962  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§  365 — 878  Forms.) 

OBSTRUCTING, 

flow  of  water,  602. 
obstructing  highway,  679. 
railway  tracks,  (5)  634. 
while  building,  streets,  605. 

OCCUPATION, 

See  BUSINESS. 

consider  in  damages,  607. 
element  of  damages,  (7)  652. 

OFFENSE, 

See  CRIMINAL  OFFENSES. 

committed,  on  or  about,  n.  47,  56. 
different  offenses  joined,  98. 
instruction,  when  no  offense,  103. 
statutory  definition  proper,  275. 

OFFICE, 

office  of  instructions,  1. 

OFFICERS, 

arresting  without  warrant,  788. 
killing  in  self-defense,  805. 

officer,  788. 

while  arresting,  787. 
making  unlawful  arrest,  262,  272,  805. 
offense  in  officer's  presence,  789. 
wrongfully  killing  person,  787. 

OHIO, 

court  judge  of  criminal  law,  711. 

OMISSION, 

criminal  intent  omitted,  error,  276. 
definition  omitted,  harmless  when,  284. 
due  care  and  caution  omitted,  245. 
element  omitted,  error,  245. 
error  cured,  criminal,  240. 
failing  to  call  witness,  222. 

to  produce  evidence,  222. 
feloniously  omitted,  immaterial,  240. 
in  circumstantial  evidence,  313. 
in  defining  crime,  error  not  cured,  276. 

larceny,  276. 

offense,  276. 

perjury,  276. 

in  stating  case,  n.  60,  247. 
on  vital  point,  error,  245. 
premeditated  malice  omitted,  240. 
reasonable  doubt  omitted,  313. 
want  of  evidence,  harmless,  n.  2,  294. 
words  omitted,  harmless,  314. 

OMITTING, 

if  you  believe  from  evidence,  105. 


INDEX.  963 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

OPENING, 

saloon  on  Sunday,  194. 

OPENING  STATEMENT, 

dismissal  of  case  on,  n.  40,  126. 

OPINION, 

as  to  amount  of  damages,  (10)  653. 
court  intimating,  (6)  379. 

may  express,  when,  189. 
court's  opinion  on  weight  of  evidence,  170,  171. 

prohibited,  119. 
error  in  intimating,  203. 
expert's  opinion,  comment  on,  211. 

valueless,  when,  211. 

weight,  211. 

expert  witness'  opinion,  211. 
expressing  in  comparing  evidence,  177. 
"if  you  believe  defendant,"  error,  177. 
instructing  contract  is  conceded,  177. 
intimated,  illustrations,  177. 

instruction,    175. 

on  witnesses,   208. 

opinion,   criminal,   178,    179. 
non-expert  on   insanity,   223. 
not  basis  of  fraud,  520. 
not  intimated,  illustrations,  176. 

insurance,    176. 

on  fraud,   176. 

on  negligence,   176. 

on  positive  testimony,    176. 
on  combination  of  facts,  175. 
on  confession,  317. 
on  evidence,  in  federal  courts,  189. 
on  value,  520. 
on  weight  of  evidence,  not,  173. 

proper,  191. 

on  witness'  credibility,  208. 
opinion  of  medical  expert,  (1)   377. 
submitting  facts  without  expressing,  172. 
though  correct,  improper,  175. 
when  evidence  conflicting,  191. 

opinion   intimated,    179. 

not   intimated,    178. 

OPPOSING  THEORY, 

See  THEORY. 

instructions  excluding,  104. 

not  to  anticipate,  104. 
separate  instructions  for,  104. 

ORAL  CHARGE, 

given  without  exception,  13. 
stenographer  taking  down,  12. 


964  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 3U4  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

ORAL  CONTRACT,  See  CONTRACT. 

determined  by  jury,  157. 
evidence  of  contract,  157. 
interpreted  by  jury,  157. 
legal  effect,  for  court,  157. 
terms  of,  for  jury,  157. 

ORAL  DIRECTIONS, 

not  instructions,  41. 
on  form  of  verdict,  42. 

ORAL  INSTRUCTIONS, 

oral  or  written  charge,  4. 
preserving  by  bill  of  exceptions,  n.  70,  358. 
proper,  when,  4. 
taken  and  written  up,  5. 
by  stenographer,  5. 
written  instructions  not  requested,  4. 

ORDINANCES, 

construction  of  ordinances,  156. 
forms  for  violating,  644. 
governing  street  cars,  (3)  644. 
proof  of,  how  made,  161. 
railroads  violating,  644. 
regulating  speed,  trains,  644. 
requiring  bell,  railroads,  644. 
validity  of,  for  court,  161. 
violation  of,  instruction,  155. 

ORDINARY  CARE,  See  CARE. 

definition  of,  74. 
failure  to  exercise,  529,  530. 

OTHER  HYPOTHESIS, 

See  HYPOTHESIS. 
in  circumstantial  evidence,  310. 

OTHER  INSTRUCTIONS, 
cure  error,  how,  246. 

curing  errors,  235.  236,  237,  238,  239,  240,  242. 
errors  not  cured  by  when,  246. 

OUGHT, 

means  in  duty  bound,  78. 

OWNER, 

cars  causing  injury,  579. 
entitled  to  notice,  land,  661. 
permitting  damage  to  land,  669. 

OWNERSHIP, 

accretions  along  rivers,  668. 

acts  of  ownership,   (2)   658. 

by  occupying  land,  656. 

in  larceny  case,  240. 

lots  on  navigable  streams,  686. 

owner  of  vicious  dog,  479. 


INDEX.  965 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms. ) 

P. 

PARENT, 

negligence  of  parent,  (6)    (7)  536. 

PARTNERSHIP, 

•  each  partner  acts  for  all,  459. 
forms  of  instructions,  458. 
not  general  partners,  460. 
partners  agents,  form,  (3)  393. 
binding  each  other,  459. 
what  constitutes,  458. 

PARTY, 

completing  contract,  recovery,  396. 
witness  for  himself,  369. 

PARTY  MUST  REQUEST. 

definition  of  essential  elements,  36. 

of  terms,  6. 

explanation  of  subsidiary  facts,  6. 
full  instructions,  7. 
in  criminal  cases,  9. 
on  matters  omitted,  7. 
specific  instructions,  7. 

PASSENGERS,  See  CARRIERS,  RAILROADS. 

accommodation  of,  ( 14)   549. 
approaching  train,  567. 
assisting  on  car,  571. 
assisting  carrier  in  accident,  560. 
at  fault,  (3)  547. 

boarding  cars  away  from  station,  (15)   549. 
careless  on  leaving  train,  (5)   (6)   (7)  561. 
carrier's  duty  to,  584. 
carrying  by  stage,  550. 
disorderly,  575. 

drunkenness  of  passenger,  553. 
ejecting  from  train,  557. 

maliciously,  81. 

entering  cars,  where,  (15)   549. 
exercising  care,  551. 

in  getting  off,  (3)  565. 

ordinary  care,  (2)   548. 
expelling  from  train,  81. 
falling  off  platform,  569. 

no  liability,  (1)    (2)   569. 
following  trainmen's  directions,  567. 
forcible  ejection  of,  575. 
forms,  on  care  of,  551. 
getting  off  moving  train,  561. 

on  train,  (5)   567. 

guilty  of  negligence,  (7)  551,  568,  582. 
having  no  ticket,  574. 
injury  to,  549. 

accidentally,  581. 

by  carrier,  548,  550. 


966  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

PASSENGERS— Continued. 

injury  by  which  road,  579. 

from  boiler  explosion,  580. 

negligence,  538.  . 

on  leaving  train,  556,  (3)  563,  (4)  564. 

on  platform,  566,  ( 10)  567. 

while  changing  cars,  578. 
instructing  to  get  on,  567. 
jumping  from  car,  582. 
negligent  in  getting  off  train,  562. 
on  car,  care  and  caution,  184. 
on  freight  car,  555. 
on  wrong  train,  576. 
position  on  car,  (13)  567. 
putting  off  moving  train,  556. 

train,  574. 

reasonable  time  to  get  off,  562. 
receiving  not  at  station,  567. 
refusing  to  pay  fare,  574. 
relying  on  directions,  577. 
requested  to  assist  in  accident,  560. 
riding  on  car  platform,  570. 
rights  as  to  ticket,  573. 
rightfully  put  off,  574. 
should  follow  directions,  577. 
sick  person  as,  552. 
ticket  not  essential,  572. 
time  for  leaving  train,  565. 
waiting  for  train,  injured,  184. 
when  one  is  passenger,  572. 
wrongfully  ejecting,  557. 

PATENT, 

claim  based  on,  405. 

letters  patent  void,  when,  405. 

PATH, 

on  railway  premises,  637. 

PAYMENTS, 

application  of  an  account,  467. 

PEACE, 

breach  of  peace  denned,  788. 

PECUNIARY, 

damages  restricted,  death,  650. 

PEREMPTORY  INSTRUCTION, 

See   DIRECTING    VERDICT,  NONSUIT. 

both  parties  request,  145. 

defendant's  motion  for,  124. 

defined,  120. 

for  defendant,  improper,  when,  129,  141. 

proper,   when,    126. 

properly  refused,  134. 


INDEX.  967 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

PEREMPTORY  INSTRUCTIONS— Continued. 
for  plaintiff,  improper,  when,  140. 

proper,  when,  135. 
form  of  instruction,  120. 
how  waived,  144. 
illustrations,  134. 
in  criminal  case,  151. 

for  defendant  proper,  150. 
for  prosecution  proper,  when,  152. 
instead  of  nonsuit,  125. 
in  writing,  123. 

measure  of  damages,  instruction,  120. 
motion  for  by  defendant,  123. 

nature,  121. 

"no  evidence,"  meaning  of,  126. 
other  instructions  with,  120. 
presenting  with  motion,  123. 
properly  refused,  when,  133. 
requesting  on  motion,  123. 
submitting  with  others,  123. 
time  of  requesting,  124. 
waiving  right  to,  144. 
when  claim  is  barred,  126. 
when  evidence  strong  against  plaintiff,  133. 

warrants,  196. 

when  no  opposing  evidence,  126. 
waiving,  123. 

PERJURY, 

amount  of  evidence  on,  851. 
corroborating  evidence,  851. 
definition  erroneous,  276. 
one  witness  not  sufficient,  851. 

PERMITS, 

building  permits,  605. 
forms  of  instructions,  605. 

PEST-HOUSE, 

damages  from,  682. 

PERSONAL  INJURY, 

See  INJURY  TO  PERSON. 

PERSONAL  KNOWLEDGE, 

instruction  on  improper,  107. 
jury  cannot  consider,  107. 

PETITION,  53. 

See   PLEADING,   DECLARATION. 

PHYSICIAN, 

county  liable  for  services,  464. 
damages  for  malpractice,  484. 
liable  for  negligence,  484. 
patient  observing  directions,  486. 
negligence,  486. 


068  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   305 — 878  Forms.} 

PH  YSICIAN— Continued. 

services  to  public,  464. 
skill  of,  ordinary,  484. 
treatment  by  him,  485. 

PIANO, 

monthly  payments  for,  509. 

PLAINTIFF, 

all  material  facts,  burden,  199. 

assuming  risks,  (4)   617. 

as  witness,  369. 

at  fault,  negligence,  (7)   (9)  544. 

burden  on  plaintiff,  199,  616. 

cannot  recover,  when,  632. 

city,  593. 
care  approaching  railroad,  627. 

not  extraordinary,   594. 

of  plaintiff,  618. 

required  of  him,  594. 

when  knowing  danger,  594. 
careless,  when,  railroad,  639. 
contributory  negligence,  (5)  591,  594,  632,  634. 
essential  elements  of  case,  599. 
exposing  himself  to  danger,  (3)  593. 
guilty  of  negligence,  (8)  to  (13)  544. 
his  testimony  alone,  86. 
interested  witness,  369. 
knowing  danger,  (12)  544,  593. 

walk,  (3)  593. 
negligence  of,  543. 

carriers,  562. 

not  at  fault,  negligence,  550. 
not  negligent,  recovery,  644. 
observing  danger,  (5)  618. 
only  witness  on  value,  196. 
ordinary  care  by,  610. 
singling  out  plaintiff,  223. 
taking  risk,  city,  593. 
using  plaintiff  for  defendant,  78. 
what  he  must  prove,  carrier,  583. 
witness  for  himself,  369. 

PLATFORM,  See  CARRIERS. 

dangerous  to  passengers,  566. 
lights  on  necessary.  (2)   (4)  566. 
of  carrier  unsafe,  566. 
of  railroad,  obstructions  on,  563. 
passenger  falling  off,  569. 

injured  on,  (10)   567. 
riding  on  car  platform,  570. 

PLEADINGS, 

admitting  facts  in,  197. 
copying  in  instructions,  90. 
framing  instruction  referring  to,  53. 


INDEX.  969 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§  365—878  Forma.} 

PLEADINGS— Continued. 

instructions  based  on,  94. 
referring  to,  53. 

criminal,  55. 
error,  when,  53. 
issues  in  general  terms,  95. 
not  in  pleadings,  99. 
material  allegations  for  court,  155. 
referring  to  for  description,  53. 
refusal  to  amend,  127. 
showing  verdict  right,  243. 
stating  different  theories,  102. 
substance  sufficient,  90. 

POISON, 

murder  by,  form,  (7)  773. 

POLICEMAN, 

killing  while  arresting,  787. 

POLICE  OFFICERS, 

instruction  on,  form,  378. 

POLICY, 

application  for  insurance,  420 

assignment  of,  424. 

void,  when,  420. 

waiving  right  to  avoid,  421. 

POND, 

causing  nuisance,  854. 
producing  malaria,  odors,  855. 

POSITIVE  AND  NEGATIVE, 
testimony,  form,  371. 

POSSE, 

assisting  officer,  787,  788. 

POSSESSION, 

accompanied  by  intention,  land,  060. 
acts  of  ownership,  (2)  658. 

showing,  663. 

adverse  possession  of  land,  (4)  659,  663. 
continuous,  and  unequivocal,  (1)   659. 

twenty  years,  (3)   657. 
evidence  of  guilt,   criminal,   812. 
explaining,   instruction   improper,  n.   77,   266. 
explanation  of  sufficient,  criminal,  265a. 
fencing  land  unnecessary,    (2)    658. 
having  stolen  goods,  812. 

property,   816. 

honestly  obtaining  possession,  criminal,  816. 
must   be   actual,   title,    657. 
not  adverse  possession,  forms,  659. 
occasional  acts  of  ownership,    ( 1 )    659. 
obtaining  honestly,  criminal.  812. 


970  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§  365—878  Forms.) 

POSSESSION— Continued. 

of  goods  unexplained,  265a. 

of  land  by  tenant,  (9)  656. 

of  real  estate,  656. 

of  stolen  property,  265a. 

open  and  notorious,  656. 

prima  facie  evidence,  816. 

refusing  instruction,  error,  265a. 

retaking  land,  (3)  661. 

securing  title  by,  (5)  656. 

shown  by  acts  of  ownership,  (4)   658. 

shown  by  inclosing  land,   (5)   658. 

uninterrupted  and  notorious,  656. 

POSSESSION  OF  GOODS,  See  POSSESSION. 

evidence  of  theft,  118. 
instruction  on  explanation,  82. 

proper,  265a. 
time  when  found  in  possession  of,  material,  118. 

POSSESSION  OF  PROPERTY,       See   POSSESSION. 
explanation  of  possession,  201. 
instruction  on,  improper,  179. 

POSSIBILITY, 

of  innocence,  297. 

POSTAL  CLERK, 

forms  of  instructions,  carriers,  554. 
on  mail  car,  554. 

PRACTICE, 

on  peremptory  and  nonsuit,  125. 

PREMEDITATED  MALICE, 

omitted  in  instruction,  240. 

PREMEDITATION, 

See   DELIBEBATION. 

definition  essential,  75. 

PREMISES, 

access  to  impaired,  (4)  684. 

annual  value  depreciated,  (2)   685. 

considerations,  estimating  damages,  684. 

damaged  by  railroad,  684. 

lumber  yard,  safety,  537. 

rental  value  impaired,  (3)  685. 

safety  of,  537. 

using  as  a  pest-house,  682. 

PREPONDERANCE, 

considerations  in  determining,  203,  (3)   (7)   (8)  385. 
defined,  form,  (8)   385. 
definition  of,  improper,  199. 

unnecessary,  when,  75. 
degree  greater  than,  improper,  200. 


INDEX.  971 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§  365—878  Forms.) 

PREPONDERANCE— Continued. 
determined,  how,  203. 

form,  (1)   385. 
error  cured,  240. 

erroneous  instruction  on,  harmless,  244. 
from  opponent's  evidence,  199. 
from  whole  evidence,  199. 
instruction  proper,  203. 
means  greater  weight,  200,  203. 
number  of  witnesses,  203,  (1)   (5)  385. 
of  evidence  denned,  (1)  385. 

on  affirmant,  199. 

required,  531. 
on  alibi,  when,  324. 
on  negligence,  form,  387. 
on  party  affirming,  199. 
quality  of  testimony,  203. 
relating  to  definition  of,  199. 
repeating  instructions,  21,  23. 

PRESENCE, 

aiding  without  being  present,  326. 
at  place  of  crime,  322,  323. 
forms  of  instructions,  792. 
mere  presence,  not  aiding,  765. 
where  office  occurs,  792. 

PRESENTING  INSTRUCTIONS, 

after  arguments  have  commenced,  15. 

at  conclusion  of  evidence,  14. 

before  general  charge,  14. 

before  jury  retire,  14. 

court  may  give  time,  17. 

court's  power  to  make,  18. 

giving  time  to  prepare,  17. 

in  absence  of  rule,  14. 

in  North  Dakota,  14. 

too  late,  when,  15. 

under  rule  of  court,  14. 

PRESUMPTION, 

character  presumed  good,  758. 
defendant  not  testifying,  229. 

presumed  innocent,  713. 
definition  unnecessary,  75. 
exceptions  on  review,  347. 
failing  to  call  witness,  222. 
from  certain  facts;  181. 
from  possession  stolen  goods,  265a. 
in  absence  of  evidence,  302. 

of  instructions,   360. 
in  burglary  and  larceny,  265a,  266. 
in  construing  instructions,  70. 
in  court  of  review,  360. 
insanity  presumed,  when,  700. 
intent  inferred,  burglary,  809 

in  murder,  777. 


972  INDEX. 

(References  are   to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364   Principles,  §§   305 — 878  Forms.} 

PRESUMPTION— Con  tinned. 

jury  construe  instructions  as  a  whole,  70. 

murder  presumed,  when,  777,  782. 

negligence  not  presumed,  26. 

of  ownership,  (1)  415. 

of  theft  from  possession,  266. 

on  insanity,  330. 

presumption  of  innocence,  336,  829. 

protection,  714. 

continues,  336,  715. 
relating  to  witnesses,  214. 
sanity  presumed,   (4)   751. 
sidewalk  presumed  safe,  592. 
sound  mind  presumed,  696. 
will  presumed  genuine,  706. 

PRESUMPTION  OF  INNOCENCE,  336. 
erroneous  instructions,  337. 
illustrations,  instructions  proper,  339. 
instruction  applies  to  included  offenses,  n.  9,  337. 

proper,  338. 
is  evidence,  338. 

misleading  instruction,  n.  11,  337. 
refusing  instructions  on,  337. 

"PRETENDED," 

referring  to  will,  74. 

PR  IMA  FACIE, 

evidence  showing  prima  facie  case,  126. 
in  embezzlement,  evidence,  829. 
need  not  be  defined,  75. 
possession  of  stolen  property,  816. 

PRINCIPAL, 

acts  of  paying  teller,  390. 

adopting  agent's  acts,  388,    (2)    389,  391. 

borrowing  by  agent,  389. 

bound  by  agent's  acts,  388,  390,  391. 

canvassing  agent  of,  (4)  393. 

liable  for  agent's  act,  388. 

not  liable,  when,  (1)  393. 

principal  and  agent,  embezzlement,  823. 

PRINCIPAL  AND  ACCESSORY,       See  ACCESSORY,  AIDING..  ABETTING. 
distinction  abrogated,  764. 
if  evidence  shows,  293. 
if  no  evidence  showing,  293. 
instruction  proper,  when,  293. 

PRISONER, 

using  prisoner  for  defendant,  78. 

PROBABLE  CAUSE, 
defined,  (5)   504. 
for  prosecution,  504. 
in  malicious  prosecution,  81,   164. 
instruction  on,  164. 
proper,  164. 


INDEX.  973 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms. ) 

PROBABILITY, 

of  defendant's  guilt,  727. 
of  innocence,  criminal,  297. 

PROMISE, 

master's  promise  to  repair,  620. 
procuring  confession  by,  318. 

PROMISSORY  NOTES, 

See    NOTES. 

PROOF, 

all  facts,  unnecessary  to  prove,  199. 
all  material  fact,  199. 
burden  of,  199,  (2)  383. 

carriers,  583. 

criminal  cases,  201. 

either  side,  583. 

form,  382,  383. 

on  affirmant,  199. 

will  contest,  200. 
by  clear  preponderance,  200. 
circumstantial  evidence,  degree,  312. 
"conclusive,"  improper,  200. 
degree  greater  than  preponderance,  200. 

in  criminal  cases,  296. 

on  each  link,  312. 

of  proof,  312. 

necessary,  criminal,  790. 

too  high,  200. 

criminal,  201. 
each  essential  fact,  312. 
fair  preponderance,  200. 
fraud,  degree  of  proof,  200. 
in  circumstantial  evidence,  315. 
jury  must  be  sure,  200. 
"more  and  better  evidence,"  200. 
preponderance  of,  form,  (1)   384,  (5)  385. 
prima  facie,  larceny,  265a. 
proving  all  facts,  199. 

insanity,  751,  752. 
"satisfactory  proof,"  200. 
varying  from  allegations,  261. 
with  "clearness  and  certainty,"  200. 

PROPERTY, 

See  GOODS. 

in  factory  locality,  681. 
purchasing  with  knowledge,  681. 
taking  by  burglary,  812. 

PROPRIETY, 

propriety  of  giving  instructions,  2. 

PROSTITUTES, 

in  disorderly  house,  839. 


974 


INDEX. 


(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

PROVINCE  OF  JURY,  See  JUBY. 

in  circumstantial  evidence,  309. 
instruction  invading,  207. 

invading,  railroad,  177. 
invading,  as  to  witness,  215. 

by  assuming  facts,  192. 

by  instruction,  185. 

illustration,  184. 

on  confessions,  319. 

province  of,  175. 

when,  174,  181,  204. 
jury  determines  facts,  175. 

PROVOKING  DIFFICULTY, 

"entirely"  free  from  fault,  n.  40,  258. 

PROXIMATE, 

cause  of  injury,  541. 

negligence,  instruction  improper,  184. 

PUBLICATION, 

libelous  per  se,  (3)    (4)   495. 
what  constitutes,  497. 

PUBLIC  PLACE, 

what  is  not,  849. 

PUNISHMENT, 

for  each  grade,  instruction,  n.  59,  274. 
instruction  on,  proper,  n.  59,  274. 
no  instruction  on  requested,  274. 

PUNITIVE  DAMAGES,      See  EXEMPLARY  DAMAGES,  VINDICTIVE  DAMAGES. 

excluding  punitive  damages,  58. 

instructions  on,  59. 

means  "exemplary  damages,"  74. 

PURCHASE, 

induced  by  false  statements,  516. 

PURCHASER,  See  FRAUD. 

innocent  of  fraud,  518. 
knowing  fraudulent  intent,  519. 

"PURPORTED," 

referring  to  will,  74. 

Q. 

QUESTIONS, 

for   special   findings,   230. 

on    evidentiary    facts,    231. 

single   and   direct,   for  finding,   231. 


INDEX.  975 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

R. 

RAILROADS, 

See  CARRIERS,  CROSSINGS. 

accident  and  negligence,    (3)    545. 

from  natural   cause,   581. 

injury   from,   648. 
appliances   presumed   safe,    622. 
approaches  to  station,  dangerous,    (4)    567. 
approaching  crossing,  care,  627. 
assisting   passenger   on,   571. 
benefits  offsetting  damages,  687. 
blowing  whistle,   forms,   642. 

wrongfully,   642. 

boiler   explosion,   carelessness,   580. 
brakeman    injured,    liability,    610,    624. 
burning  property,  631,  645. 

not   liable,    645. 
car    owned    by    another,    579. 
care   in   coupling  cars,    (12)    549. 

running   trains,    forms,   630. 
carelessly  injuring  brakeman,  624. 
carriers  of  passengers,  548,   549. 
carrying  live   stock,   589. 
children   trespassing,   559. 
competent  employe's,  essential,   581. 
contract  to  build,   396. 
contributory  negligence,  633,   634. 

forms,  632. 

crossing  land,  damages,    (4)    685. 
customs,  usages,   rules,  655. 
cutting  up  farm,  685. 
damages   by   fire   escaping,    645. 

in  shipping  goods,  588. 
damaging    farm,    685. 

property,  684. 

deceased's   contributory  negligence,   635. 
different  companies  operating,  579. 
diverting  water  course    674. 
duty  in   crossing  sreets,   630. 

to  passenger,  584. 
ejecting  passenger,   574. 
electric  cars,   using,  3,   634. 
employe"   at   fault,    619. 

knowing  danger,   618. 
employe's    keeping   lookout,    630. 
failing   to   deliver   goods,    587. 
fence  not  required,  when,    (6)    646. 
fencing  tracks,  646. 

tracks   at   stations,    (7)    646. 
flagman   at  crossing,   643. 
forms    for    defendant,    629. 

of  instructions.  627. 
frightening   team,    liability,    (8)     641,     (3)     (4)     642. 

team,  wrongfully,   642. 
gates  at  crossing,  necessity,   643. 
getting  off  moving  train,  561. 


976  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

RAILROADS— Continued. 

great  care  required,  631. 
greater   care,   when,    630,    (2)    631. 
greatest  care  required,    ( 1 )    550. 
gripman's  duty,  644. 
high   degree  of  care,  -549. 
highest  care  required,   (3)  545. 
impairing  access   to   premises,    (4)    684. 
injury   to   passenger,   550. 

to    person,    579. 
instruction   enumerating   facts,    647. 

enumerating   issues,   629. 
killing  hogs,  no  liability,  646. 

persons,  damages,  649. 

stock,  liability,  646. 
ladders  on  cars,    (11)    639. 
liable  for  injury,  550. 

negligence,   638. 
slight   negligence,   550. 
losing  baggage,  forms,  585. 
moterman's    willful    act,    615. 
negligence,  causing  injury,  610. 

in  city,    (2)    (3)    631. 

not  presumed,   533. 

of   agents,   392. 

of  both,    (3)    (6)    544. 

of  passenger,  582. 

of  railroad,   539,  627. 

presumed,   538. 
negligent,  when,    (3)    630. 
not  at  fault,    (5)    648. 
not   insurer   ot   passenger,   584. 
not  liable,  injury  to  brakeman,    (4)   624. 
obstructing  tracks,  634. 
ordinance  requiring  bell,  644. 
ordinary   care  required,   630. 
owner  of  cars  causing  injury,   579. 
passenger  jumping  from   car,  582. 

obeying  directions,   567,   577. 

on   freight  car,  555. 
pathway   across   track,    (2)    655. 
plaintiff  cannot   recover,  when,    (4)    634. 

can  recover,  when,  630. 

careless,  629. 

contributory  negligence,  630,    (6)    634. 

may   recover,  when,   630. 

negligent,  fire,   645. 
platform   unsafe,   556. 
presume    travelers    careful.     (5)     640. 
recovery  against,  when,  647. 
right  of  way,   damages,    (5)    685. 
rules  for  conduct  of  servants,  611. 

violated,    655. 

safe  cars  and  couplings,  610. 
safe  guards  against  fire,  645. 
safety  for  servants,  (8)  610. 
section  master  and  hands,  613. 


INDEX.  977 

(References  are  to  Sections,   §§    1 — 364   Principles,  §§   305 — 878  Forms.) 

RAILROADS— Continued. 

servant's  negligence,    (4)    543. 

side-tracks,   fencing,    (6)    046. 

slight  negligence,    ( 1 )   549. 

sounding  whistle,  ring  bell,  641. 

spark  arresters,  045. 

speed  of  trains,  regulating,   (9)   641. 

starting  train  suddenly,   (3)   548,   (8)    (9)   567. 

stopping  at  station,  564. 

switchman  assuming  risk,  617. 

ties  out  of  repair,    ( 16 )    549. 

train  running  too  fast,  640. 

traveling  on  premises  of,  637. 

trespasser,   riding  on,    (5)    549. 

trespassing   on   premises,   637. 

using  electric   wires,    (2)    546. 

trolly  wires,    (2)    548. 
view  in   approaching,  obstructed,   628. 
violating  ordinances,  644. 
water,   removal  of,   649. 
what  company  owns   road,  579. 

is  not  negligence,  540. 

RAILROAD  COMPANY,  See  CROSSING. 

burning   property,   instruction,    177. 
engine   emitting   sparks,    177. 
fencing  track,  legal  question,  163. 

RAILROAD   CROSSING, 

approaching   without    stopping,    184. 

RAPE. 

age  of  female,  evidence,  82. 
assault  with  intent,   178,  268,  769. 
child    witness..    225. 

instruction,  225. 
consent,  question  of  fact,  771. 

through  fear,  770. 
evidence  of  consent,  103. 
instructions   on    assault,    274. 
intercourse  by  consent,   103. 
requesting  instructions  on  assault,  274. 
testimony  of  child,   225. 
theory    of    defense,    female    consenting,    103. 
woman  overpowered,  770. 

REAL  ESTATE, 

See   LANIX 
real  estate,  656. 
adverse   possession.   656. 
forms   of   instructions,   056. 

REASON, 

for   doubt,    717. 

REASONABLE  CARE, 

See  CARE,  ORDINARY  CARE,  74. 


978  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§  365 — 878  Forms.} 

REASONABLE    DOUBT,    294. 

abiding  conviction,   718,   719. 
absolute  certainty,  297. 

not   required,   720. 
a  doubt,  or  all  doubt,  300. 
affecting  reasonable  man,   719. 
alibi   creating  doubt,   744. 
arising  irom  evidence,   295. 
as  to  each  link,   721. 
as  to  sanity,   751. 
as  to  subsidiary  facts,   735. 
as  to  the  whole  evidence,  733. 
based  on  common  sense,  296. 

reason,  294. 

captious  artificial  doubt,  720. 
causing  hesitation,    (4)    716,  719. 
confined  to  essential  facts,  311,  725. 
conjectural,   instructions,   298. 
conscientiously  believe,   error,   296. 
convincing  evidence  required,   720. 
creating  sources  of  doubt,  718. 
definitions  of,   294,   295. 

unimportant,   n.    4,    294. 
degree  of  murder,   783. 
desire  for  more  evidence,  n.  32,  297. 
doubt  removed,   when,    (5)    716. 

though  probably  guilty,  724. 
each   juror,   301. 
each  link  in  chain,  299. 
entirely  satisfied,  error,   295. 
evidence  conclusive,  error  harmless,  n.   19,  296. 
excluding   theory,    723,    727. 
fears  from  appearances,  803. 
forms  of  instructions,  716. 
from   evidence,   719. 
from  part  of  evidence,   299,   726. 
from   undue   sensibility,   718. 
from  want  of  evidence,   717. 
from   whole    evidence^    299. 
full  satisfaction  of  guilt,  296. 
generating  doubt,  299. 
good   character,  creating,   343,  757. 
greater  weight  of  evidence,    (2)    727. 
hesitate  and  pause,   294. 
hunting  up  doubts,  298,   (2)   716,  719. 
illustrations    on    doubt,    295. 
in    circumstantial    evidence,    312. 
ingenuity  of  counsel,  299. 

in    graver    transactions.    295,    (1)     (4)     716,    719. 
instruction  erroneous,  295. 

for  defense,  723. 

for  prosecution,   716. 

improper,   297. 

proper,   294,    295,   297. 

properly    modified,    300. 

whole  evidence,  299. 


INDEX.  979 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.}' 

REASONABLE  DOUBT— Continued. 
jurors  believe  as  men,    (2)    718. 
mathematical  certainty,  297. 
mere   probability   of   guilty,    727. 
merely  conjectural,  298. 
misleading  on  doubt,  n.  32,  297. 
modifying  instructions  on,  300. 
must   arise   from   evidence,    (2)    716. 
imust  be   removed,   716,   790. 
not  applicable  to  law,  n.  4,  294. 
not   idle   conjecture,   294. 
not   mere   whim,   294. 
omitting   in   circumstantial   evidence^   313. 

in  larceny  instruction,  240. 
on  alibi,   323. 

on  defendant's  testimony,  n.   139,  227. 
on   degree   of   homicide,   253. 
one  essential  fact  doubtful,  734. 
on   insanity,   331. 
on  one   fact  in   chain,   312. 
on  subsidiary  facts,  725. 
possibility  of  aoubt,    (2)    716. 
probability  of  guilt  only,  724. 

of  innocence,  n.  25,  297,  723. 

possibility,   297. 
proof  beyond  doubt.  201. 
reason  for  doubt,  717'. 
reasonable    certainty    required,     720. 
repeating  instructions   on,   21. 
refusing  usual  instruction,  296. 
satisfy   conscience,   297. 

judgment,   297. 

several   instructions   defining,   294. 
substantial  doubt,  295. 
to  moral  certainty,  295. 
trivial,    fanciful    doubts,    718. 
uncertain,   which  guilty,   728. 
very  reasonable  doubt,  295. 
want  of  evidence,  299. 

omitting,  n.  2,  294. 
well  founded  doubt,  716. 
what  is  doubt,  716. 

REASONABLE  HYPOTHESIS, 

evidence   excluding,    303,    307. 

excluding  in  circumstantial  evidence,  310. 

of  innocence,   723. 

omission  of  reasonable,  error,  313. 

REASONABLE  TIME. 

meaning  of,  carriers,  565. 
to  get  off  train,   565. 

RECALLING  JURY, 

See  FURTHER  INSTRUCTIONS. 
for  further  instructions,  38. 


980  INDEX. 

'(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

RECEIVING, 

accomplice  in  receiving,  290. 

RECEIVING  STOLEN  PROPERTY, 
defense  to  charge   of,    103. 
definition    defective,    omitting    intent,    276. 

RECONCILING, 

conflicting  testimony,    (8)    213,    (2)    (3)    (4)    (8)    365. 

contradictory  testimony,   223. 

illustrations,  improper,  213. 

instructions    on    reconciling    testimony,    223. 

RECORD,  See  BILL  OF  EXCEPTIONS. 

all  evidence  in,  necessary,  when,  361. 
all  instructions  in  record,  359,  360. 
embodying  instructions  in,  359. 
error,  though  all  instructions  not  in,  360. 
evidence  and  instructions  in,  361. 
instructions   not  in,   presumption,   360. 
making  instructions  part,  357. 
must   contain    all    evidence,    361. 
of   extradition   proceedings,    163. 
oral   instructions,   preserving,   n.   70,   358. 
presumed   correct,   360. 

presumption    in    absence    of    instructions,    360. 
recitals   as   to   instructions,    359. 
showing  instructions  filed,   357. 
silent    as    to    all    instructions,    359. 

construction   of   records,    156. 

instruction  as  to,  proper,   163. 
sufficiency  of,  as   evidence,    163. 

RECOVERY, 

facts  necessary  to  recover,  647. 

REFERRING    TO    PLEADINGS, 

illustration,  instruction  proper,   155. 

REFUSAL, 

See  REFUSING. 

on  burden,  error,  when,   199. 

on  each  link,   312. 

on   impeachment  of   witness,   220. 

REFUSING, 

all   requests,   26b. 

by   marking,   refused.   44. 

caution  against  accomplice,  288. 

cautionary    instructions,    50. 

correct  instructions,   if  misleading,   60. 

defective   requests,   27,   28. 

discretionary,  when,  206. 

error,  when,  118. 

further   instruction,  38. 

harmless   to   refuse,   when,   243. 

if  argumentative.   66.   68. 

if  requiring  explanation,  61. 


INDEX.  981 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§    1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms J 

REFUSING— Continued. 

in  absence  of  evidence,   83. 

incomplete    instruction,   29. 

in   homicide,   proper,   when,   269. 

in  petit  larceny,   89. 

in   personal   injury,   97. 

instructions  properly  refused,  97. 

.misleading  instruction,  60. 

on   intent,   65. 

on   fraud,   65. 
obscure  instruction,  62. 
on   alibi,   error,  when,   326. 
on  burden  of  proof,   199. 
on   circumstantial  evidence,  303,   304,  311. 
on   corroboration,   error,   289. 
on  defendant  as  witness,  229. 
on  good  character,   342. 
on    immaterial   issues,    91. 
on  involuntary  manslaughter,  273. 
on  presumption  of  innocence,  336. 
on  receiving  stolen  property,    103. 
on  self-defense,  error,  when,  255. 

proper,  when,   255. 
repeating    unnecessary,    25. 
special  covered  by  general,  26. 

requests,  26a. 
when   evidence    close,    26a,   250. 

inconsistent,   84,   86. 

slight,  85. 

criminal,  88. 

when  justice  is  done,  243. 
when   no  evidence,   80. 
when  substance  is  given,  25. 
when   too  many,    19. 

REFUSING  REQUESTS,  27b. 

See    REFUSAL. 

RELATIVES, 

as  witnesses,   225. 
believing    or    disbelieving,    225. 
caution  in  weighing  testimony  of,  225. 
disinheriting  by  will,   692. 
instruction   improper,   225. 

proper,  225. 
weighing  testimony  of,  225. 

REMANDED, 

for  new  trial,   364.' 

instructions  after  remanding,  364. 

REMARK, 

by    court:    no   conscience    in    case.    185. 
caution  against,    (5)    379,    (6)    379. 
equivalent   to   peremptory,    n.    4.    120. 
harmless,  if  retracted,  n.   18,   238. 
influencing   jury,    improperly,    185. 


982  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

REMARK— Continued. 

instructions  on,  361. 
is  directing  verdict,  n.  4,   120. 
plaintiff   has   made   better   case,    185. 
preserving  by  bill  of  exceptions,  361. 

REMITTITUR, 

failing  to  cure  error,  n.  62,  246. 

REPAIR, 

keeping  sidewalks  in,  591. 
keeping  streets  in,   (8)  591. 

REPAIRING, 

electric  wires,  547. 

REPEATING, 

defense  once  stated,  23. 

explanations  of  words,  22. 

formula,  if  you  believe  from  evidence,  105. 

in  special   charge,  error,   25. 

may  cause  error,  25. 

on   assuming   risk   of   danger,   25. 

on  interest  of  witness,   24. 

on   preponderance,   21,   23. 

on   reasonable  doubt,   21.  . 

on  witness'  credibility,  24. 

principles  need  not  be   repeated,   20. 

of  general  charge,  26. 

in  detail,  22. 

refusal   not   ground   for  error,    22. 
refusing  when  given  in  others,  25. 
rule  once  stated,  sufficient,  21. 
special   charge   repeating,   general,  26. 
substance  given  in  others,  25. 
when   charge   is   general,   22. 
when  evidence  is  close,  26a. 

REPEATING   INSTRUCTIONS, 

See   REPEATING. 

REPLEVIN, 

action  on  bond,  evidence,  83. 
evidence  wanting,  on  plea,  83. 
writ  of,  legality  of,  law,  163. 

REPUTATION, 

See   CHARACTER,   756. 

believing   or    disbelieving    witness,    271. 
for  peace  and  quiet,    (2)    756. 
witness'  bad  reputation,  221. 

REQUESTS, 

See  INSTRUCTIONS,  REQUESTING  INSTRUCTIONS. 

absence  of  requests,  6,  7,  8,  9,  274,  284. 
for  definition  of  "night  time,"  75. 


INDEX.  983 

{References  are  to.  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

REQUESTS — Continued. 

for  instruction,  absence  of,  199. 
on  impeachment,   220. 
unnecessary,  292. 
for  specific  instructions,  9. 
on  abstract  instruction,  n.  9,  48. 
on  alibi,  necessary,  326. 
on    circumstantial    evidence,    303. 
on  reasonable  doubt,  9,   294. 
unnecessary,  when,  303. 

REQUESTING    INSTRUCTIONS, 
failure  to  request,   6. 
giving  without  request,  292. 
in   criminal   cases,   6. 
neither   party   asking,   8. 
on   included   offense,   274. 
party  must  request,  6. 
written  requests,  6. 

RESIDENCE, 

business  house  or  residence,    (2)   876. 
injured  by  nuisance,   679. 

RESIDENCE   DISTRICT, 

what   constitutes,   876. 

RESTRICTING   JURY, 

jury  restricted  to  evidence,  6. 

RETREAT, 

See  HOMICIDE,  SELF-DEFENSE. 

officer   need   not  retreat,   260. 
not  required, '  when,  n.  51,  260. 
required  in  self-defense,  260. 
unnecessary,  when,   (6)   802. 

REVIEW, 

court  reviewing  errors,  349. 
.in  absence  of  evidence,   361. 

legal   questions   not   reviewable,   when,   n.   87,    360. 
on  appeal  or  error,  346. 
same    error    by    both,    363. 

REVIEWING, 

evidence  in  detail,   191. 

on  important  matters,  191 
mistakes  in  reviewing  evidence,   191. 
scope  in  reviewing  evidence,  191.     . 

REWARD, 

offering   for    detection,    224. 
instruction,  when   reward  offered,   224. 

RHODE  ISLAND, 

directing  verdict,  not  reviewable,  n.  57,   131. 

RIGHT  OF  WAY, 

to  carriers,    (6)    551. 


984  INDEX. 

(References  are  to.  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §8   365—878  Forms.) 

RIGHTS   PREJUDICED, 

in   admitting  incompetent  evidence,   84. 

RISKS, 

not    assumed,    when,    621. 

servant  assuming,  t>17. 
RIVER,  See  STREAM. 

ROAD, 

abandoned,    (3)    860. 
establishing  public  road,   858. 
vacating  road,  how,  859. 
width  of  railroad,    164. 

ROBBERY, 

armed   with   weapon,    (3)    772. 

conspiracy  to  commit,  762. 

denned,    (3)    772. 

definition   unnecessary,  when,   269. 

force   essential,   772. 

instructions   on    larceny,    268,   274. 

larceny   included,   267,   274. 

requesting  instructions,  necessary,274. 

resulting  in  killing,   762. 

RULES, 

for  conduct  of  servants,  611. 
habitually   violated,   655. 
of   railroad   company,   570. 
reasonableness    of,    law,    163. 
relating  to  passengers,    (4)    570. 
to  railroads,   655. 

RULE   OF    COURT, 

for  noting  authorities  on  requests,  n.  207,  45. 

how    made    valid.    18. 

must  be  reasonable  and  lawful,   18. 

on  presenting  requests,  18. 

power  to  make  rule,  18. 

presenting    instructions    under,    14. 

RULINGS, 

preserving  for  review,   149. 

RUMOR, 

rumor  is  not  evidence,   836. 


SALE, 

complete,  when,  (1)   (4)  406. 
conditions  complied  with,  412. 
delivery  completes,  form,  (2)  406. 
fraudulent  sale,  (3)  517. 
full,  fair  consideration,  518. 
grain,  sale  of,  n.  34,  414. 
husband  to  wife,  523. 
induced  by  fraud,  414. 


INDEX.  985 

(References  are  to  Sections,   §§    1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms. ) 

SALE — Con  tinned. 

instructions  on,  form,  406. 
made  by  sample,  (1)    (3)  407. 
made  when  in  debt,  (4)  517. 
not  void,  when,  518. 
of  personal  property,  (1)  406. 
on  warranty,  409. 

breach,  408. 

purchaser  knowing  fraud,  519. 
rescinding  for  defects,  413. 

of  sale,  406. 
selling  for  taxes,  689. 
to  defeat  creditors,  (2)    (3)  517. 
to  wife  in  good  faith,  (4)  517. 

SALOON, 

opening  on  Sunday,  194. 

SANITY,  See  INSANITY. 

overcoming  presumption  of,  331. 
presumed,  330,  331,  696,  700. 

SCAFFOLDING, 

assuming  to  be  safe,  (3)  622. 

"SEDATE," 

SEE  COOL. 

SEDUCTION, 

seducing  another's  wife,  874. 

SEIZURE, 

personal  property,  damages,  511. 
unlawful  seizure  of  pioperty,  509. 

SELF-DEFENSE,  795.  See  MURDEB. 

abusive  language  only,  (4)  475. 
acting  upon  appearances,  (2)   474,  802. 
actual  danger  unnecessary,  285. 
appearances,  acting  on,  285. 
appearance  of  danger,  256. 

forms,   802. 

bare  fear  no  defense,  795,  799. 
belief  from  appearance,  256. 

of  danger  well  founded,  474. 
burden  on  defendant,  201. 
can  not  claim,  when,  258. 
cases  illustrating,  796. 
cautionary  instruction  on,  52. 
character  of  deceased,  807. 
danger  need  not  be  real.  802. 

urgent   and   pressing,    798. 
declining  further  struggle,  798. 
defendant  abandoning  conflict,  259. 

at  fault,  258. 

must  retreat,  260. 


986  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

SELF-DEFENSE— Continued. 

defendant  originally   in  wrong,   259. 

provoking  difficulty,  258,  797. 

threatened,  257. 
defending  another,    (12)    649. 
degree  of  proof,  201. 
evidence  supporting,  88,  255. 

slight,  sufficient,  88. 

tending  to  prove,  102. 
excessive  force  in  defense,  475. 
fear  from  words,  threats,  257. 

with  overt  act,  799. 
fleeing  from  adversary,  795. 
forms  for  defense,  795,  796,   802. 
grounds  for  belief,  800. 
ignoring  when  evidence  of,  102. 
improperly  refusing  on,  259. 
instruction  defective,  56. 

for  defense,  796. 

ignoring,  255,  259. 

improper,  when,  255. 

omitting  elements  of,  56. 

proper,  255. 

properly  refused,  258. 

requiring  actual  danger,  256. 
killing  not  "absolutely  necessary,"  256. 
law  correctly  stated,  256. 
mere  belief  of  danger,  800. 
mere  threats  unavailing,  801. 
murder  or  self-defense  only,  271. 
no  evidence  of  self-defense,  255. 
not  well  founded,  475. 
reasonable  doubt  on,  803. 
refusing  on,  error,  when,  255. 

proper,  when,  255. 
resisting  attack  of  several,  804. 

unlawful  arrest,  262,  805. 
retreat,  essential,  260. 
"satisfactory  proof,"  too  high,  201. 
slight  evidence  supporting,  255. 
statute  defining,  error,  285. 
statutory  language  improper,  284. 
testimony  of  defendant  alone  supporting,  88. 
unavailing,  when,  797. 
using  excessive  force  in,  (5)   475. 
what  constitutes,  474. 
when  lying  in  wait,  240. 

SERIES, 

arranging  into  one,  73. 
both  sides  into  one,  73. 
considered  as  a  whole,  70. 
instruction  of  both  into,  73. 

not  one   of,   246. 
position  of  instruction  in,  70. 


INDEX.  987 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  forms .) 

SERVANT,  See  MASTEB. 

assuming  appliances  safe,  622. 

risks,  617,  621. 
at  fault,  injury,  623. 

no  recovery,  619. 

running  train,   617. 
away  from  place  of  duty,  623. 
care  in  observing  danger,  618. 
continuing  after  knowing  danger,  (5)  618. 

master's  promise  to  repair,  620. 

with  knowledge  of  danger,  619. 
contributing  to  injury,  611. 
discharging  for  cause,  626. 

forms,  626. 

does  not  assume  risks,  when,  621. 
employer's  negligence,  621. 
employment  hazardous,  611. 
form  of  instructions,  620. 
ignorant  of  danger,  (2)  622. 
injured,  when  at  fault,  forms,  000. 

while  violating  rules,  611. 
injury  to  servant   660. 
knowing  danger,  618,  (4)  618. 

defective  boiler,  619. 

defects   in   machinery,   610. 
master  advising  of  danger,  612. 

concealing   danger,    612. 
not  assuming  risks,  forms,  621. 
observing  companv's  rules,  611. 
of  railroad,  (8)    (9)  549. 
out  of  his  place,  injured,  623. 
relying  on  master's  promise,  620. 
safety  of,  by  master,  610. 
injuring  passenger,  (8)    (9)   549. 
using  scaffolding,  (3)   622. 
willful  act  of,  615. 

SERVICES, 

considerations  in  estimating,  guardian,  870. 
value  of  deceased's  services,  (4)   650. 

SET-OFF, 

burden  on  defendant,  (2)  384. 
instructions  on  claim  of,  104. 
issue  of,  abandoned,  100. 

SETTLEMENT, 

accepting  less  than  due,  404. 
binding,  when,  404,  (5)  404. 
claim  of  not  denied,  100. 
compromising  disputed  claims,  404. 
consideration  for  settlement,  404. 
form  of  instruction  on,  404. 
of  disputed  claims,  404. 
particular  formality  unnecessary,  404. 
procured  by  fraud,  (7)  404. 
without  consideration,  404. 


988  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.; 

SEVERAL  COUNTS,  See  COUNTS. 

instructions  covering,  29. 

SHIPMENT, 

damage,  delay  in,  587,  588. 
of  live  stock,  589. 

SHOOTING, 

not  justifiable,  damages,  649. 

"SHOULD," 

instead  of  "may,"  216. 

SICK, 

carrying  sick  person,  552. 

SIDE-TRACKS, 

need  not  be  fenced,  646. 

SIDEWALKS, 

care  in  maintaining,  65. 

in  passing  over,  592. 

in  traveling,  608. 
city  not  insurer  of,  (9)    (10)  591. 
constructed  properly,  596. 
defective  for  years,  (2)  591. 
defects  long  standing,  (3)   (4)  595,  596,  597. 
elements  necessary  to  recovery,  599. 
excavation  in  causing  injury,  599. 
forms  of  instructions,  591. 
ice,  snow,  sleet  on,  603. 
in  dangerous  condition,  591. 
keeping  in  repair,  (6)   (7)  591. 
knowing  unsafe  condition,  593. 
misleading  instruction,  65. 
notice  of  condition  inferred,  (1)  596,  (4)  596. 

of  defects,   595,   597. 
opening  or  cellar  in  walk,  593. 
plaintiff  knowing  condition,  forms,  593. 
presumed  safe,  forms,  592. 
reasonably  safe,    (9)     (10)    591. 
repairing,  65. 
signs  overhanging,  604. 
slippery  from  ice,  603. 
traveling  on  when  bad,  (2)  591. 
unsafe  condition,  forms,  593,  596.  , 

SIGNATURES, 

proof  of  writing,  871. 
testator  signing  will,  693. 

SIGNING  AND  NUMBERING, 

failure  to  number  requests,  43. 

to  sign  requests,  43. 
statutory  requirement,  4.3 

SIGNING  INSTRUCTIONS, 

by  court  and  counsel,  43. 


INDEX.  989 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms. ) 

SIGNS, 

city  liable  for  injury,  004. 
shall  regulate,  604. 
overhanging  sidewalks,  dangerous,  604. 

SINGLING  OUT  FACTS,  113. 

by  summary  instruction,  115. 
evidence  decisive  of  cause,  114. 
excluding  facts,  114,  115. 
facts  of  one  side  ignored,  113. 

proper,  when,   114. 

unobjectionable,   when,    114. 
favorable  facts,  116. 
in  criminal  case,  115. 
in  homicide  case,  115. 
instruction  condemned,  115. 

unobjectionable,  114. 
misleading,  when,  113. 
one  of  several  issues,  92. 
omitting  defendant's  side,  115. 
plaintiff  improper,  223. 
singling  out  threats,   115. 
singling  out  witness,  223. 
strongest  facts,    113. 
strong  points  for  prosecution,  115. 
subordinate  issue  improper,  92. 
unimportant  facts,  113. 
when  evidence  slight  or  contradictory,  113\ 

SLANDER,  See  LIBEL. 

actual  damages  unnecessary,  (1)  498. 
charging  one  with  larceny,  (2)  496. 

with  murder.  496. 

with  fornication,  494. 
damages  not  pecuniary  only,  (2)  499. 
defined,  form,  (2)  491. 
forms,  on  damages  for,  498,  499. 
good  faith,  defense,  501. 
"he  stole  my  hogs,"  (2)  494. 
jury  judges,  (3)  493. 
justification,  degree  of  proof,  502. 
malice  implied,  when,  492. 

is  essential,  492. 

presumed,  when,  492. 
matters  in  mitigation,  500. 

measure  of  damages,  considerations,  498,  (1)  499. 
part  of  words  sufficient,  494,  (2)  495. 
probable  cause,  defense,  501. 
proving  slanderous  words,  493. 
publication  in  good  faith,  501. 

libelous,    (3)     (4)    495. 

what  constitutes,  497. 
punitive  damages,  proper,  499,  (3)   499. 
specific  damages  unnecessary,  (3)  495. 
woman  is  whore,  (2)  495. 
words  essential  to  action,  494. 

libelous  per  se,  495. 


990  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§  365 — 878  Forms. J 

SLAYER, 

lying  in  wait,  784. 

SLIGHT  EVIDENCE,  See  EVIDENCE. 

in  criminal  case,  88. 
on  insanity,  88. 
will  support  instructions,  86. 

SMELLS,. 

causing  nuisance,  679. 

SMOKE, 

causing  nuisance,  679. 

SNOW, 

on  sidewalks,  liability,  603. 

SORROW, 

in  assessing  damages,  651. 
not  element  of  damages,  650. 

SOUND  MIND, 

SEE  MIND. 
failure  to  define,  6. 

SPECIAL  FINDINGS,  230. 

answers  inconsistent,  234. 
general  instructions  improper,  232. 
jury  find  facts,  232. 
proper,  when,  230. 
questions  and  answers,  233. 
questions  illustrating  practice,  233. 
statutory  regulation,  231. 
submitting  interrogatories,  230. 

SPECIAL  INSTRUCTION, 

error  in  not  cured,  238. 

not  cured,  60. 

exceptions  should  be  taken,  348. 
failing  to  request,  9. 
failure  to  give,  7. 
no  ground  for  error,  when,  7. 
on  matters  omitted,  7. 
party  must  request,  7. 
refusal  of  error,  when,  26. 

in  criminal  case,  26. 

when  evidence  close,   250. 

when  repetition,  26. 

repeating  matters  in  general  charge,  25. 
specific  and  general,  60. 
when  charge  incomplete,   60. 
when  charge  too  general,  7. 

SPECIFIC  INTENT,  2BO.  See  INTENT. 

drunkenness  disproving,  281. 
instructions  on,  proper,  280. 
refusing  instructions  on,  281. 


INDEX.  991 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

SPEED, 

regulating  by  ordinance,  644.    . 

speed  of  train,  640. 

train's  speed  at  crossings,  (5)  640. 

STAGE, 

as  carrier,  (4)  550. 

STATE, 

on  exception,  354. 

STATEMENT, 

See  UNSWORN  STATEMENT. 

defendant's  statement,  criminal,  64. 
as  evidence,  60. 

STATION, 

approaches  to,  (12)  567. 

dangerous,    (4)    567. 
dark  at  station,  563. 
lighted  and  safe,  564. 
need  not  fence,  (546. 
receiving  passengers  away  from,  567. 
station  not  lighted,  563. 

STATUTE, 

carrier  violating,  590. 
construction  of  statute,  156. 
defendant  as  witness,  226. 
denning  accessory,  291. 

crimes,   275. 

offenses,  284. 

self-defense,   285. 
definitions  in  words  of,  275. 
instructions  in  words  of,  284. 
in  words  of,  improper,  when,  285. 
making  jury  judges  of  law,  166,  167,  169,  169. 
on  corroboration,  289. 
on  exceptions,  346,  347,  352. 
on  peremptory  and  nonsuit,  125. 
on  preserving  instructions,  Indiana,  n.  68,  357. 
on  ringing  bell,  (7)  641. 
on  signing  exceptions,  346. 
prohibiting  court  from  expressing  opinion,  170. 
provisions  not  relevant,  284. 
reading  to  jury,  n.  8,  284. 
referring  to  by  name,  n.  2,  284. 
relating  to  wills,  693. 
stating  substance  of,  284. 
validity  of  for  court,  161. 
violating  provisions  of,  81. 

STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS, 

referring  to  by  name,  n.  2,  284. 


992  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

STATUTE  OF  LIMITATION,  465. 
barring  claim,  126. 

suit,  128. 

confining  within,  criminal,  108. 
evidence  confined  within,  108. 
in  criminal  cases,  108. 
instruction  confining  within,  108. 

on  plea  of,  n.  82,  96. 

proper,  criminal,  108. 
refusal,  error,  criminal,  108. 
reviving  barred  claim,  466. 

STATUTORY  DEFINITIONS,  275. 

STATUTORY  INSTRUCTIONS,  284. 

reading  statutes  to  jury,  n.  8,  284. 

STATUTORY  OFFENSES,  275. 

STEALING, 

essential  in  larceny,  276. 

STENOGRAPHER, 

taking  oral  charge,  5. 

STOCK, 

killing  at  side-track,  646. 

live  stock,  837. 
railroads  killing,  646. 

STOCKS, 

fraud  in  sale  of,  516. 
illegally  increasing,  463. 

STOLEN  GOODS,  See   POSSESSION. 

explaining  possession,  82,  816. 
instruction  improper,  266. 

on   possession,   265a,    812. 
possession  a  circumstance,  (2)   (3)  8J6. 

evidence,  266,  816. 

prima  facie  proof,  265a. 
receiver  of,  accomplice,  290. 
refusing  instruction  on,  265a. 
unexplained  possession,  812. 

STREAM, 

center  of  stream,  line,  660. 
docks  and  wharves  on,  (2)  686. 
lots  fronting  on,  value,  686. 
owner  to  middle,  686. 
public  navigating,  686. 

STREETS, 

are  for  public,  (5)  631. 
care  in  passing  over,  592. 
channels  for  water,  602. 
city  must  notice  condition,  597. 
shall  keep  safe,  606. 


INDEX.  993 

(References  are  to  Sections,   §§    1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

STREETS— Continued. 

defects  in,  notice  of,  596. 
electric  cars  running,  (3)  634. 
grade  obstructing  water,  602. 
gutters  insufficient  for  waterflow,  602. 
keeping  in  repair,  (8)  591. 
obstructing  in  building,  605. 
piling  lumber  in,  595. 
reasonably  safe  condition,  (9)  591. 
safe  to  travel  on,  forms,  606. 
unsafe  condition,  notice  of,  596. 
unskillfully  constructed,  602. 

STREET  CARS, 

right  of  way,  551. 

STRENGTH, 

element  of  defense,  118. 

SUBSCRIPTION, 

altering  contract,  462. 

alteration  of  release's  subscriber,  462. 

SUICIDE, 

defense  to  murder,  261. 

evidence  supporting,  261.  •* 

SUMMARY  INSTRUCTIONS,  119. 
civil  and  criminal  cases,  119. 
nature  and  qualities  of,  119. 
noticing  antagonistic  theory,  119. 
omitting  facts,  objectionable,  119. 
oral  summary  cf  evidence,  311. 
reco'gnized.  but  condemned,  119. 
without  expressing  opinion,  119. 

SUMMING  UP, 

material  facts,  119. 

mistakes  in,  correction  of,  119. 

unimportant  facts  immaterial,  119. 

SUNDAY, 

operating  machinery  on,  861. 
opening  saloon  on,  194. 
Sunday  violations,  861. 
work  of  necessity  on,  861. 

SUPERVISORS, 

keeping  roads  repaired,   (2)   601. 

SURETIES, 

signing  bond,  521. 

SURPLUSAGE, 

explanation  of,  unnecessary,  75. 

SURRENDER, 

defendant  surrendering,  742. 


994  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   305 — 878  Forms.) 

SUSPICION, 

not  evidence,  290. 
suspicion  not  evidence,  735. 

SUSTAINING, 

"evidence  tending  to  sustain,"  220. 
witness,  if  evidence,  220. 

SWEARING  FALSELY,  See  WITNESSES. 

accomplice  a  witness,  288. 
circumstance,  221. 
disregarding  witness,  218,  219. 
unless  corroborated,  219. 
instruction  improper,  219. 
on  material  matters,  218. 


SWITCHMAN, 

assuming  risks,  617. 

SYMBOLS, 

false  pretense  committed  by,  831. 

T. 

TABLES  OF  MORTALITY. 

in  assessing  damages,  n.  65,  58. 

TAXES, 

certificate  of  sale,  void,  689. 
listing   land    for,    690. 
on  realty,  689. 
public  sale  for,  689. 
selling  land  for,  689. 
tax  title,   691. 

TEAM, 

frightening  at  crossings,   641,  642. 

TELLER. 

acting   within   authority,    (2)    393. 
without  authority,    (2)    393. 
agent  of  bank,  436. 

TENANT.  See  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

carelessly   igniting  gas,    (8)    544. 
damaging  premises,  liable,  543. 
guilty  of  negligence,    (8)    544. 
land  occupied  by,    (9)    656,    (3)    658. 
landlord  seizing  property  of,  510. 
not  liable,   when,    (3)    453. 
possession,  land  by,    (2)    662. 

TENNESSEE, 

assessing  damages  for  personal  injury,  n.  64,  58. 

TESTATOR,  See  WILLS. 

competent,    though    feeble,    694.    69o. 
declarations  as  to  property,  602. 

of  testator,  701,    (5)    (8)    704. 


INDEX.  995 

(References  are   to  Sections,  §§    1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

TESTATOR— Continued. 

disinheriting  relatives,  692. 
disqualification   of,   697. 
eccentric,    peculiar,    699. 
family  and   connections,   701. 
feeble  in  mind,    (4)    695. 
free  agency  of,    (5)     (6)    704. 
incompetent    to    comprehend,    697. 
induced  to  make  will,    (3)    704. 
ill  will  toward  relatives,  703. 
knowing  what  he   is   doing,   694. 
mental    weakness   only,   699. 
partially   insane,   692. 
persuading  to  make  will,   705. 
physically  weak,    (5)    695. 
possessing  eccentricities,  699. 
presumed  of  sound  mind,  696. 
radical   or  extreme,   699. 
reasoning  faculties,   694. 
requesting  witnesses,  693. 
signature  to  will,   693. 
signing  in  presence  of,   (3)    (4)  693. 
sound  mind  and  memory,  694. 
understanding  business,   (5)    (6)   694. 

business,    698. 
weakness  of  intellect,  697. 

TESTATRIX, 

sexual  relation  with  devisee,    (2)    705. 

TESTIMONY, 

abandoned  woman,   207. 
accomplice    uncorroborated,    288. 
affirmative  or  negative,    (3)     (8)    366. 
considerations  in  weighing,    (2)    365. 
expert  witness,   211,   377. 
impeaching,  effect,   221. 

not  excluding,  221. 
instructions   on   affirmative,   204. 

on  negative,   204. 
jury  not  bound  to  reject,  218. 
oral  and  depositions,  209. 
positive  and  negative,  form,  371. 
sustaining  by  rebuttal,  221. 
using  testimony  for  evidence,   78. 
weighed   by  jury,   206,   366. 
weighing,   considerations,    (3)    215,   366. 

TEXAS, 

considerations,  weighing  testimony,  215. 
instructing   as  requested,   32. 
instructions  in  felony  cases,  3. 
reconciling  conflicting  testimony,   213. 
special  instructions.  32. 
weighing  witness'  testimony,   215. 
cattle,  513. 


990  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

TEXT  BOOKS, 

copying   instructions   from,   286. 

THEORY, 

antagonistic   theory,    119. 

argumentative  instruction,  68. 

belief,   on   ownership,   larceny,    103. 

circumstantial  evidence  excluding,   732. 

comparing    theories,    criminal,    102. 

confine  to  theory  alleged,  96. 

contributory   negligence,   defense,    118. 

defendant's   theory   ignored,   71. 

different    theories,    instruction,    when,     102. 

directing  verdict,  when  two,   132. 

each  presenting  his  own,   104. 

error  in   ignoring,   when,    101. 

evidence    on    two,    132. 

female  consenting,  rape,   103. 

guilt  or  innocence,  criminal,   68,    102. 

ignoring  defendant's   theory,   criminal,    101. 

defense,  error,   255. 

in   all   instructions,    104. 

on  any  element,    101. 

one  of  several,   102. 

when  evidence  supports,    101. 
illustrations   of   rule.    103. 
inconsistent   theories,    criminal,    102. 
instruction  for  plaintiff,   proper,   104. 

on,  improper,  102. 

when  several,   102. 
in   one   instruction   unnecessary,    101. 
modifying  to  include  opposing  theory.  32. 
opponent's    theory,    instructions.     102.     104. 
outside   of   pleading,   99. 
presenting  prosecution  only,  255. 
refusing   instructions   on,    101. 
relating  to  damages,  58. 
right   to   instructions,   criminal,    101.    103. 
several  theories,   criminal,   102. 
suggested  by  instruction,  improper,   102. 
suggesting  theory,   criminal,    102. 
summary  instructions.   119. 
two   opposing   theories,    101. 
unsupported  by  evidence,   82,   101. 
withdrawing,   error,    101. 

THREATS.  See  DEFENSE,  SELF-DEFENSE. 

by  deceased,  material,  257. 
evidence,  proving  threats,  257. 
instructions  ignoring  threat.  257. 
improper,   257. 
instructing  proper.   257. 
made  to  compel  contract,  526.  527. 
mere  threats,  no  defense,  801. 
procuring  confession  by.   318. 
singling   out   threats.    115. 


INDEX.  997 

(References  are  to  Sections,   §§    1 — 364  Principles,  §§   3U5 — 878  Forms.) 

TICKET, 

conductor,  taking  up,  573. 
form  of  instruction  on,  573. 
passenger   without   ticket,   572,   574. 

TIMBER, 

supply  at  coal  mines,    (6)    649. 

TIME, 

damages  for  loss  of,    (5)   653. 
element  in  larceny,    118. 

of  damage,    (3)    652. 
for  deliberation  in  murder,  780. 
loss  of  time,  damages,    (7)     (8)    652. 
take  exceptions,  when,  347. 

TIME  OF  INSTRUCTING, 

after  arguments,  Missouri,    14. 

at  conclusion  of  evidence,  Missouri,   14. 

before  closing  argument,   14. 

before  or  after  arguments,   14. 

in  absence  of  rule,   14. 

refusal,  error  when,   14. 

TIME   OF  PRESENTING, 

at  close  of  evidence,    15. 

giving  instructions  though  presented  too  late,   17. 

TIME   OF   REQUESTING, 

before    charge    was    given,    16. 
rule    regulating,    14. 
too   late,    15. 

TIPPLING  HOUSE, 

instruction    on    opening,    proper,    194. 
opening  on   Sunday.    194. 

TITLE. 

abandonment  of  land,    (3)     (4)    660. 
acquired  by  occupancy  only,  663. 
acquiring  without   color,   663. 
adverse  possession,  by  color  of,  662. 
by  adverse  possession,    (2)    661. 
claim,    without   color   of,    663. 
claiming  by   possession,   657. 
land  by  color  of,  662. 
defective,    (2)    689. 
established  by  admission,    (3)    662. 
forms    of    instructions,    land,    656. 
how   obtained   to   land,   656. 
inclosing   land,    (5)    659. 
in   ejectment,    867. 
instructions  on  title,    163. 
legal  title,  how  defeated,  656. 
loss  of  deed,   affecting,    (2)    689. 
no  writing,  showing,    (5)    659. 
passes,  when,    (3)    406. 
securing  by  possession,  land,  656,  657. 


998  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

TOO  MANY,  See  FEW,  NUMEROUS  INSTRUCTIONS. 

arbitrarily   limiting   number,    19. 
error  in  giving.,   19. 

few  instructions  for  prosecution,  n.  80,   19. 
too   many,    instruction,    19. 

TOWN, 

liable,    dangerous    highway,    606. 

TRACKS, 

fenced  in,  646. 

TRAIN. 

See  CAR,  CARRIERS,  RAILROADS. 

approaching   private   crossings,    (9)    641. 
care  in  entering,    (6)    (7)    567. 

in  running,  630. 
danger  signals   required,   644. 
extra  trains  running,    (10)    630. 
getting  on  carelessly,  568. 
great  care,  running,  630,  631. 
in  frequented  localities,    (3)    631. 
negligence    in    city,    (2)     (3)    631. 
ordinance   requirements,   644. 
passenger   getting  on,   567. 
regulating  speed,    (9)    641. 
rules    governing    servants    operating,    611. 
running  dry  season,  fire,  631. 

in  city,  care,  631. 

on   time,     (9)    630. 

too  fast,  617,    (3)    630. 
special   precautions,  when,   631. 
speed,  dangerous,  617,  630. 

high  rate,    (3)    639,  640. 

violating  ordinance,    (4)    644. 
starting  car  suddenly.    (3)     (4)    565,    (9)    567. 
stopping  reasonable  time,  565. 

sufficient  time,  565. 
without   flagman,    635. 

TRANSFER, 

See  SALE. 

TRAVELER, 

approaching  railroad  crossing,   5,   633. 
care  at  crossings,    (4)    631. 
injury    at    crossing,    liability,    642. 

by  railroad,  644. 
injured  on  highway,  483. 
on  public  streets,   injury,  606. 
presumed    careful    at    crossing,    (5)    640. 
team  frightened   at  crossing,    (8)    641. 

TREATMENT, 

expenses  for.  damages.  607. 
for  injury  damages,   607. 


INDEX.  yy 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 304  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

TRESPASS, 

action  for  assault,  102. 

assuming  trespass  committed,   193. 

by  expelling  passenger,  81. 

damages,   considerations   in   assessing,   59. 

for,   59,    877. 

estimating  damages   in,   81. 
execution   of    replevin    writ,    163. 
for  assault  and  battery,  59. 
self-defense  to  assault,    102. 
wilful    conduct,   evidence   wanting,   81. 

TRESPASSER, 

care  toward  trespasser,    (5)   549,  558. 
carrier  injuring,  558. 
children,  getting  on  cars,  559. 

trespassing,  559. 
ejecting  from  train,   558. 
facts  showing  not,  637. 
forms  of   instructions,   559. 

when  not,   637. 
killing,   unjustifiable,   263. 
may   recover,   when,  559. 
on  train,  558. 

plaintiff,    not    trespasser,    637. 
removing  from  premises,  263. 

TRESPASSING, 

animals  trespassing,   512. 

TRIAL   WITHOUT  JURY,  47. 

TROLLEY-WIRE, 

See  ELECTRIC  WIRE. 

TRUTHFULNESS, 

vouching   for   witness,    222. 

TURNPIKE, 

keeping  in  repair,  481. 
used    as   highway,    481,   483. 

TWO  MEANINGS, 

.instructions  of,  61. 

\ 

U. 

UNCERTAIN, 

which  of  two  guilty,  728. 

UNDERSCORING, 

See  "MARKING,"   "INSTRUCTIONS,"   345. 

UNDUE  INFLUENCE,  See  WILLS. 

evidence  disproving,  wills,  (8)  704. 

wills,  704. 

in  procuring  will,  704. 
what  constitutes,  wills,  (6)  704. 


1000  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 3(54  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

UNGRAMMATICAL  WORDS,  77. 

UNSWORN  STATEMENT, 

caution  against  believing,  228. 
defendant's  mere  statement,  criminal,  228. 
failure  to  instruct  on,  228. 
given  as  evidence,  criminal,  228. 
instruction  on,  228. 

when,   n.    105,    140. 
no  instruction  on,  228. 
"not  binding,"  improper,  227. 
statute  on,  instruction,  228. 

USAGES, 

relating  to  railroads,  655. 

USER. 

evidence  of  corporation,  8G4. 
highway  established  by,  858. 

USURY, 

interest  is  principal,  when,  (2)  418. 

on  note,  418. 
penalty  for  charging,  (2)  418. 

UTAH, 

degrees  of  homicide,  270. 

UTTERING, 

publishing  forged  instruments,  843. 

V. 

VALIDITY, 

ordinance,  law,  validity,  161. 
warrant,  validity  of,  163. 

VALUE, 

attorney's  services,  forms,  430. 
bank  assets  in  embezzlement,  828. 
confined  to  property  alleged,  819. 
considerations  in  determining,  511. 
damaged  property,  672. 
essential  defining  larceny,  276. 
estimating  guardian's  services,  870. 

market  value,  511. 
in  defining  larceny,  276. 
lots  fronting  on  streams,  686. 
market  value,  645. 

condemnation,  (4)   683. 

damages,  685. 

land,  677. 

new  or  second  hand  goods,  (2)  511. 
of  stock  killed,  196. 
of  stolen  property  doubtful,  89.  819. 
one  witness  on,  instruction,  196. 
opinions  as  to,  520. 


INDEX.  1001 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§    1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms. ) 

VALUE— Con  tinned. 

property  damaged  by  fire.  645. 

taken  by  condemnation,  G83. 
railroad  damaging  farm,  085. 
rental  value  impaired,  (3)  685. 
witnesses  exaggerating,  688. 

VARIANCE, 

cause  for  nonsuit,  127. 

death  by  blow,  or  poison,  261. 

from  disease  or  wound,  261. 
error  cured,  n.  5B,  261. 
evidence  showing  variance,  261. 
ground  for  directing  verdict,  127. 
in  homicide  case,  261. 
instructions,  when,  criminal,  261. 
peremptory,  when,  n.  44,  127. 
whether  death  was  accident,  n.  58,  261. 

VEHICLE, 

care  in  driving,  533. 

VENUE, 

forgery  committed,  when,  845. 

VERDICT, 

See  DIRECTING  VERDICT. 

both  parties  negligent,  636. 

coercing  jury  into  verdict,  187. 

correct,  though  instructions  contradictory,  248. 

could  not  be  different,  243. 

court  urging  compromise,  186. 

covers  whole  issue,  234. 

both  parties  requesting,  145. 

burglary  and  larceny  joined,  810. 

by  special  findings,  232. 

directed  by  court,  when,  120. 

because  of  variance,  127. 

for  defendant,  126. 

for  either  party,  126. 

for  plaintiff,  135. 

improper,  when,  130. 

in  ejectment,  136. 

jurors  to  agree,  148. 

murder  or  acquittal,  269. 

on  former  acquittal,  152. 

on    once    in    jeopardy,    152. 

verdict  generally,  124. 

when  claim  admitted,  137. 

when  evidence  conflicting,  141. 
doubtful,   131. 

when  neither  entitled,  131. 

when    part    of    claim    contested.    142. 

when  pleadings  insufficient,  138. 

when  several  defendants,  142. 
each  juror  acts  for  himself,  708. 


1002  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

VERDICT— Continued. 

evidence  conclusive  against,  126. 
exceptions  before  verdict,  347. 

taken  after,  349. 
excluding  proper,  when,    126. 
failure  to  request,  form  of,  42. 
for  damages,  amount,  106. 
for  included  offense,  252. 
form  of,  for  included  offense,  42. 

in  writing,  42. 

not  requested,  42. 
for  plaintiff  improper,  when,  126. 
general  and  special,  232,  234. 
manner  of  reaching,  n.  19,  50. 
murder,  first  degree,  774. 
not  guilty,  when,  783. 
on  gambling  contract,  128. 
party  requesting,  form  of,  42. 

peremptory  instruction  when  negligence  involved,  134. 
right,  though  instructions  wrong,  85. 
should  be  murder,  when,  (3)   777. 
showing  error  disregarded,  236,  237,  243. 
unsupported  by  evidence,  139. 

setting  aside,   126. 
warranted  by  evidence,  n.  39,  243. 
what  it  does  not  mean,  66. 
when  degree  doubtful,  253. 

homicide,   783. 
when  different  counts,  810. 
when  evidence  balanced,  202. 

equally  balanced,  (5)  383. 

strong  against  plaintiff,  133. 
when  prima  facie  proof,  136. 
when  several  counts,  civil,  (19)  415. 

defendants,  878. 

VIEWERS, 

giving  due  notice,  fences,  869. 
fence  viewers  notice,  869. 

VIEWING  PREMISES, 

evidence,  when,    (3)    379. 

to  understand  evidence,  (3)   379. 

VINDICTIVE  DAMAGES        See  EXEMPLARY  DAMAGES,  PUNITIVE  DAMAGE. 
for  assault,  when,  194. 

VIOLATION, 

in  public  place,  849. 
Sunday  violations,  861. 

VITAL  POINT, 

contradictory  instructions  on,  248. 
evidence  close  on,  250. 
facts  closely  contested  on,  309. 
instructions  on,  error  presumed,  243. 
omitting  instructions  on,  245. 


INDEX.  1003 

(References  are  to  factions,  §§    1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms. ) 

VOID, 

assignment  void,  when,  526. 
certificate  of  tax  sale,  689. 
contract  void,  when,  526. 

VOID  INSTRUMENT, 

court  determines,  163. 

VOLUNTARY  MANSLAUGHTER,       See  MANSLAUGHTER. 
evidence  supporting,  272. 
no  evidence  of,  273. 

VOUCHING, 

for  witness'  truthfulness,  222. 

W. 

WAIVING, 

jury  trial,  47. 

waived  on  motion  for  verdict,  146. 
notice  of  death,  insurance,  (4)  422. 
rights  in  contract,  406,  469. 

in  insurance,  421. 

on  sale  of  goods,  (3)  407. 

to  claim  error,  peremptory,  144. 

to  nonsuit,  144. 

to  peremptory,  144. 

to  rescind  contract,  (2)  413. 

to   submit    facts   to  jury,    145,    146. 
trial  by  jury,  47. 

waiving  rights,  how  determined,  (5)  406. 
written  instructions,  12. 

WAIVING  INSTRUCTIONS,  12. 
by  agreement,    12. 
by  failing  to  ask,  12. 
by  not  objecting  to  oral,  12. 

WAIVING  RIGHTS, 

See  WAIVING. 
instruction  on  waiving,  33. 

WALL, 

retaining  wall,  land,  671. 

WANTONNESS, 

unsupported  by  evidence,  81. 

WAREHOUSE  RECEIPTS,  n.  343  414. 

WARRANT, 

arrest  without.  503. 

when,  789. 
valid  or  void,  law,  163. 

WARRANTY, 

breach  of  warranty,  408. 
burden  of  proving,   (1)   408,  410. 
damages  for  breach  of,    (4)    408,  411. 


1004  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 304  Principles,  §§   305 — 878  Forms.} 

WARRANTY— Continued. 
implied,  when,  409. 
liability  for  breach,  (3)  408. 
on  sale  of  machine,  23!). 

of  property,  (1)  408. 

WATCHMAN, 

injured  not  at  his  place,  623. 

not  fellow  servant  of  engineer,  613. 

WATER, 

changing  flow,  railroads,  647. 
channels  to  carry  off,  602. 
damage  by,  forms,  674. 

from,   674. 

diverting  from  natural  course,  074. 
natural  channel,  647. 

How  of,  602. 
obstructing  flow  of,  602. 

WAY, 

for  railroad,  width,  164. 

WEAPON, 

See  DEADLY  WEAPON,  278. 

assault  with  deadly  weapon,  767. 

deadly  weapon  defined,  767. 

intent  inferred  from,  (2)   (6)   (7)   (8)    (9)  777. 

likely  to  produce  death,  (8)   777. 

manner  of  using,  (7)    (8)   (9)   777. 

WEIGHING, 

plaintiff's  testimony,  weighing,  369. 

WEIGHT, 

absent  witness'  testimony,  weight,  n.  23,  211. 
affirmative  and  negative  testimony,  204,  205. 
circumstantial  evidence,  305. 
confession,  improper  comment,  317. 

weight  of,  316,  317.- 

consider  witness'  opportunity  of  knowing,  (2)   365. 
"evenly  balanced,"  (5)  365. 
expert  testimony,  weight,  211. 
form  on  weight  of  testimony,  366. 
jury    determine    weight,    86. 

determine,  experts,  211. 
weighing  conflicting  testimony,  209. 

of  testimony,  366. 

"WHILE," 

relates  to  entire  transaction,  74. 
use  and  scope  of,  74. 

WHISTLE, 

failure  to  sound,  641. 
blowing  wrongfully,  642. 


INDEX.  1005 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

WHOLE  LAW, 

in  one  instruction,  246. 
in  series  of  instructions,  56. 
in  several  instructions,  70. 
stating  in  one  instruction,  56. 

WHORE, 

charging  woman  with  being,  (2)  495. 

WIDOW, 

damages  for  killing  husband,   (11)   649. 
mine  operator  killing  husband,  (5)   649. 
pecuniary  damages  only,  (5)   650. 
railroad  killing  husband,  649. 

WIFE, 

abandonment  of,  homestead,  873. 
affections  alienated,  875. 
compelling  to  sign  deed,  527. 
cannot  recover,  448. 
damages  for  death,   (13)   650. 

for  injury,  (9)  652. 

for   killing   husband,    (2)    650. 
discrediting  improperly,  225. 
injured  by  sale  of  liquor,  488. 

to  support  of,  488. 
instruction  improper,  225. 
interested  witness,  225. 
liability  for  husband's  debts,  447. 
must  support  children,  448. 
of  accomplice,  instruction,  n.  9,  288. 
separate  estate  of,  446. 
witness  for  defendant,  225. 

suspicion,  225. 

WiLFULNESS, 

no  evidence  of,  81. 

WILL,  bee  TESTATOR,  UNDUE  INFLUENCE. 

age  in  making,  692. 
assuming  insanity  without  evidence,  193. 

presence   of   witnesses.    193. 
advice  in  making,  forms,  705. 
advising  person  to  make,  705. 
burden  on  contestants,  200. 
capacity  to  make,  692,  (5)   694. 

to  recollect,  (5)  695. 
competency  to  make,  692. 
considerations  in  determining  validity,  703. 
construction,  operation,  effect,  158. 
contestant  must  prove,  (5)   704. 
determining  mental  state,  701. 

forms,  701. 
devising  to  charity,  692. 


100G  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.) 

W I LL — Con  tinned. 

disinheriting  children,  (2)   692. 

relatives,  692. 

evidence  of  undue  influence  wanting,  81. 
forms,  as  to  presumption,  696. 

on  insanity,  697,  698. 

on  mentaf  state,  694. 

on  "undue  influence,"  704. 

relating  to  forgery,  706. 

sound  mind,  o»J5. 
free  will  in  making,  094. 
incapable  of  making,  (2)  695,  (2)  697. 
insane  delusions,  697. 
insanity  defined,  698. 
invalid,  when,  697. 
legal  right  to  make,  (5)  694. 
lucid  intervals,  697. 
legatees  and  devisees,  701. 
made  in  extremis,  (4)  695. 
maker  presumed  sound,  696. 
medical  experts  on  mental  state,  702. 
mental  capacity  to  make,  694. 

faculties  feeble,  (4)  695. 

weakness  only,  699. 
mind  presumed  sound,  696. 
must  be  in  writing,  693. 
presumed  properly  attested,  693. 
procured  by  "undue  influence,"  704. 
properly  attested,  693. 
provisions  of  consistent,  696. 
"purported"  will,  74. 
requirement  in  attesting,  693. 
signed  by  testator,  693. 
sound  mind  and  memory,  692,  694. 

defined,  695. 

submitting  "undue  influence,"  81. 
testator  physically  weak,  (5)  695. 

with  eccentricities,  692. 
two  witnesses  required,  693. 
"undue  influence,"  a  fact,  n.  70,  183. 

evidence,  200. 

used,  704. 
validity,  considerations  in  testing,  (2)  692. 

of  will,  703. 

what  essential,  (5)   694. 

when,  696. 

what  constitutes  undue  influence,  (6)   704. 
whether  contain  special  trust,  158. 
Avill  alleged  to  be  forgery,  706. 

presumed    genuine,    706. 
witnesses  signing  in  presence,  693. 

to  will,  693. 
words  referring  to,  74. 


INDEX.  1007 

(References  are   to  Sections,   §§    1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  forms.) 

WITHDRAWING, 

abandoned  issues,  100. 

defense  of  insanity,  83. 

erroneous  instructions,  40. 

evidence  of  confession,  318. 

manner  of  withdrawing  instructions,  40. 

when  instructions  withdrawn,  40. 

WITHDRAWING  FACTS,  117. 

WITNESSES,  See  CREDIBILITY. 

abandoned  women,  as  .witness,  207. 
accomplice,  287,  376. 

inducements,  288. 

affirmative  or  negative,  (3)   '8)  366. 
age  of  witness,  225. 
apparent  candor  of,  216. 

appearance  and  conduct,  215,  216,  (5)   (7)   (8)   (9)  365,  (4)  366,  (7*)   385. 
arbitrarily  disbelieving  witness,   ( 10 )    366. 
.     argumentative  as  to  expert,  66, 
attesting  will,  (2)   693. 

witness  defined,  (2)   (3)  693. 
becoming  hysterical,  206. 
believing  or  disbelieving,  221,  (4)    (9)   366. 

though  impeached,  220,  (4)    (5)   367. 
bias  or  prejudice.  (6)  209,  (6)    (7)    (9)  365,  (3)  366. 

temper,  feeling,   (7)   215,  365. 
both  failing  to  call,  222. 

candor,  or  want  of,  (4)    (6)    (7)   (9)   365,  366. 
character  of  his  testimony,  (8)   366. 
child  as  witness,  225. 
competency,  for  court,  n.  4.  206. 

conduct  or  demeanor,  206.  (7)   (8)   (9)  365,  375,  (3)  385. 
considerations  on  credibility,  208,  365,  (3)   385. 
contradicting  each  other,  212. 

himself,  223. 

control  of  both  parties,  222. 
corroborated  or  uncorroborated,  209,  221,  365. 

or  contradicted,  (8)   (9)  365. 
court  calling  witness,  n.  55,  215. 
convicted  of  felony,  226. 
creating  scene,  206. 
credibility  affected,  206,  207,  208,  215,  216,  224,  365. 

of 'witness,  206,  227. 
defendant's  competency,  criminal,  226. 

corroborated.  227. 

failing  to  testify,  229. 

same  as  other,  227. 

demeanor  on  stand,    (7)    206,    (7)    (8)    (9)    365.  375,    (3)    385. 
detectives,  informers,  224. 

determining  preponderance  by,  203,   (4)    (2)   385. 
disbelieving  if  impeached,  221,  (9)   367. 
discrediting  entirely,  221. 
disinterested,  credible,  form,  (4)    (8)  385. 
disregarding  if  impeached,  (10)   366,  (1)    (2)    (7)   367. 

testimony.  (5)  217,  3G6. 


1008  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

WITNESSES— Continued. 

equally  truthful,  fair,  209,  366. 
evidence  impeaching,  110. 
examine  testimony  cautiously,  209. 
expert,  instruction  proper,  223. 

opinions  of,  211. 
failure  to  produce,  222. 
fairness  of,  (3)   366. 
feeling,  partiality,  bias,  215. 
form  for  experts,  377. 

on  credibility,  365. 

on  impeachment,  (13)   367. 
greater  number  of,  (1)  385. 
"has  told  truth,"  221. 
having  knowledge  failing  to  testify,  222. 
hired  for  state,  224. 
.  his  appearance,  conduct,  manner,  215,  216,  (5)   (7)   (8)    (9)  365,  (4)   366, 

(7)   385. 

his  intelligence,  considered,  216. 
husband,  for  wife,  370. 
if  his  testimony  is  true,  179,  212. 
"if  you  believe  witness,"  179,  212. 
ignoring  testimony  of,  65. 
illustrations  on  credibility,  improper,  207. 
ill  will,  instruction,  209. 
immature  child  as,  225. 
impeached,  how,  220,  (1)  367. 
impeachment  of  witness,  220,  367. 
instruction  on  believing,  221. 

on  credibility,  170,  206. 

on  disbelieving,  221. 

on  "greater  credit,"  209. 

to  give  same  weight,  207. 

when  wilfully  false,  218. 

intelligence  of  witness,  215,  (5)    (9)   365,  (3)  366. 
interest  in  case,  223,  (2)    (6)    (7)    (8)    (9)365.   (2)    (4)366,  372,   (3)385. 

considered,  209,  214. 

or  disinterested,  209,  214. 
intimating  disbelief  of,  210. 

opinion  on,  208. 

invading  province  of  jury  as  to,  215. 
is  he  accomplice,   290. 
jury  believing  or  disbelieving,  (1)    (2)   (3)   365,366. 

disregarding,  error,  207. 

judges  of  credibility,  206. 

"must"  consider  interest,  216. 

reconciling  testimony  of,  213. 
knowledge,  experience,  (9)   365,  366. 
liars  and  truthful,  208. 
magnifying  value,  condemnation,  688. 
manner  of  testifying,  (5)    (6)    (7)  365,  (2)    (4)   366. 

on  stand,  366,  (4)  372. 
means  of  information,  (7)  365. 

of  knowing,  (7)  209,  216,  (1)   (6)   (7)  366. 
medical  expert,  forms,  377. 

wills,  702. 


INDEX.  1009 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.) 

WITNESSES— Continued. 

mistaken  or  false,  223. 

motives,  purposes  of,  (6)    (10)   366. 

not  bound  to  believe,  207,  217. 

number  testifying,  form,  (5)  365,  (6)    (7)    (8)   385. 

objects,  purposes,  (7)   366. 

of  tender  age,  225. 

omitting  facts,  examining,  222. 

on  motion  for  peremptory,  122. 

opinion  not  intimated  on,  176. 

opportunity  of  knowing,  (2)   (9)  209,  216,  (2)   (9)  365. 

"perjured  himself,"  221. 

praising,  denouncing,  210. 

presumed  truthful,  214. 

prejudiced,  feelings,  (7)   3G6. 

probability  of  testimony,  215,  (2)   (8)  366,  (4)  372. 

reasonableness  of  testimony,  (7)   (9)  365,  (3)  366. 

reconciling  testimony  of,   (4)   365. 

related  to  defendant,  criminal,  226. 

to  parties,  (7)    (8)    (9)   365. 
relatives  as  witnesses,  225. 
repeating  on  credibility,  24. 
reputation  bad,  221. 
scan  testimony  with  caution,  207. 
singling  out  experts,  223. 

improper,  219,  223. 

witness,  65,  115. 
stating  what  he  said,  210. 
supported  or  contradicted,  (4)   220,  366. 
sustaining,  no  evidence,  220,  366. 
swearing  falsely,  66,  217,  218,  221. 
tending  to  sustain,  220. 
testifying  wilfully,  falsely,  209,  368. 
testimony  of,  conflicting,  178. 

when  absent,  209. 
truth  and  veracity,   (4)    (11)   367. 
\vncontradicted,  instruction,  when,  196,  366. 
unimpeached...  196,  (5)  366. 
unworthy  of  belief,  209. 
vouching  for  truthfulness,  222. 
witness  called  by  court,  n.  215. 

WOMAN, 

abandoned  women,  207. 

testimony   of,    207. 

WORDS,  PHRASES, 

"acquiescence,"  need  not  explain,  75. 
"acquit"  used  for  "convict,"  78. 
"at  the  time,"  scope  of,  74. 
awkward  arrangement  immaterial.  77. 
"carelessly,"  definition  unnecessary,  75. 
''common  laborer,"  definition  unnecessary,  76. 
"contributed,"  definition  unnecessary,  75. 
"cool,"  "sedate,"  definition  unnecessary,  75. 
"deadly  violence,"  instead  of  "great  violence,"  75. 
definition  not  required,  when,  284. 

of  words,  6. 

"deliberation,"  definition  necessary,  75. 
"difficulty ,"  meaning  of,  74. 


1010  INDEX. 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1 — 364  Principles,  §§   365 — 878  Forms.} 

WORD  PHRASES— Continued. 

"due  care,"  "ordinary  care,"  reasonable  care,  convertible,  74. 

error  to  use  "acquit"  for  "convict,"  78. 

"evidentiary  facts,"  explaining,  6. 

"exemplary  damages,"  meaning,  74. 

"falsely,"  explanation  unnecessary,  75. 

"fellow  servant,"  definition  essential,  76. 

"felonious,"  definition  necessary,  when,  75. 

"felonious,"  "feloniously,"  definition  unnecessary,  75. 

"felony,"  definition  necessary,  when,  75. 

"fraud","  definition  unnecessary,  75. 

"fraudulently"  need  not  be  explained,  75. 

"great  bodily  harm,"  75. 

"heat  of  passion,"  definition  necessary,  75. 

instructions  defining,  6. 

repeating,  explanation,  22. 

"intentionally"  for  "knowingly  and  wilfully,"  219. 
"malice  aforethought,"  75. 
"must"   for   "may,"   78,   216. 
need  explanation,  284. 
"night  time,"  not  defined,  75. 
"not"  omitted,  error,  n.  153,  79. 
of  written  instruments,  160. 
omission  of  immaterial,  when,  314. 

of  "reasonable,"  313. 
omitting  words,  79. 
"ordinary  care"  defined,  74. 
"ought,"  meaning  of,  78. 
"premeditation,"  definition  essential,  75. 
"preponderance,"  definition  unnecessary,  75. 
"presumption,"  definition  unnecessary,  75. 
"pretended"  will,  74. 
"prima  facie,"  unnecessary  to  define,  75. 
"punitive  damages,"  meaning,  74. 
"purported,"  referring  to  will,  74. 
"ratification,"  unnecessary  to  define,  75. 
"repudiation,"  need  not  explain,  75. 
"serious  bodily  injury,"  definition,  284. 
"should"  for  "may,"  216. 
statutory  words  ambiguous,  284. 
"subsidiary  facts,"  explaining,  6. 
technical  terms  should  be  explained,  75. 
"testimony,"  used  for  "evidence,"  78. 
used  in  instructions,  74. 
using  "acquit"  for  "convict,"  78. 

"plaintiff"  for  "defendant,"  78. 

"prisoner"  for  "defendant,"  78. 
underscoring  in  instructions.  45. 
ungrammatical  and  awkwardly  arranged,  77. 
"while,"  scope  of,  74. 
"will"  used  for  "may,"  78. 
words  which  are  surplusage,  75. 

WOUND, 


JNU, 

causing  blood  poisoning,  791. 
neglected,  causing  death,  791. 
primary  cause  of  death,  791. 


INDEX.  1011 

(References  are  to  Sections,  §§   1—364  Principles,  §§   365—878  Forms.} 

WRITINGS, 

See  WRITTEN  INSTRUMENT. 

as  collateral  fact,  164. 

construed  by  court,  form,  156,  381. 

by  oral  evidence,  160. 
proof  of  handwriting,  871. 
when  a  fact  in  evidence,  159. 

WRIT  OF  ERROR, 

See  APPEAL. 

WRITTEN  CONTRACTS, 

meaning  of  terms,  157. 
varying  by  parol  evidence,  471. 

WRITTEN  INSTRUCTIONS,         See  INSTRUCTIONS. 
failing  to  ask,  waived,  12. 

to  give,  effect,  4. 

to  request,  6. 

to  request,  waives,   12. 
form  of  verdict  included,  42. 
handing  to  jury  without  reading,  13. 
how  modified,  4. 
instructing  orally,  effect,  4. 
modification  of,  4. 
must  be  requested,  4. 
neither  party  asking,  4. 
oral  directions  as  to  verdict,  41. 

request,  disregarding,  4. 

summary  of  evidence,  11. 
party  must  request,  6. 
peremptory  in  writing,  123. 
presenting  after  commencing  oral  charge,  15. 
presumed  in  writing,  when,  10. 

in  writing,  when  not,  10. 
reading  statutes,  11. 
required  by  statute,  4. 
rulings,  remarks  are  not,  41. 
statute  is  mandatory,  4. 
stenographer  taking  oral  charge,  5. 
waiving  by  agreement,  12. 

how,  12. 

opponent's,  12. 

WRITTEN  INSTRUMENT, 

construction,  when  a  fact,  159. 
court  determines  effect,  156. 
explaining  by  oral  evidence,  160. 
interpretation  of,  156,  159. 

by  jury,  when,  156,  159. 
legal  effect  of  instrument,  156. 
oral  evidence  to  interpret,  160. 
two  in  evidence,  effect,  156. 
whether  clauses  of,  are  repugnant,  163. 


Whole  number  of  pages,  1165. 


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